361-560 ART 3 (Collated)

Case No 361
ADIL
SECTION 2 When is a search a “search”?
Guazon v. De Villa – 181 SCRA 623
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives"
in Metro Manila. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights
abuses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive conducted by the police force violated the rights guaranteed
under Section 2.
RULING: No. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force
to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of
Rights.
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far outweighed by
the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police action.
Case No 362
ADIL
SECTION 2. No presumption of regularity in search cases
People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept 26, 2003
FACTS: Upon report that Tudtud, an alleged Marijuana seller, is about to engage in another transaction of
selling, a team of Davao police officers sought and cornered Tudtud and his company and asked if they
can see the contents of the box to which Tudtud said “it was alright”. When the bundles were unwrapped,
there contained marijuana leaves.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and arrest conducted by the police officers were valid and lawful.
RULING: No. There was no waiver of right on the part of the appellee. For a lawful waiver of right against
unreasonable searches and seizures to be effective the following requisites must be present: (1) It must
appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
Case No 363
ADIL
SECTION 2. No presumption of regularity in search cases
Sony Music v. Judge Espanol, GR 156804, March 14, 2005
FACTS: In a criminal complaint filed against private respondents for infringing on the petitioner Sony
Music Inc.’s copyright as testified by the agent who conducted the preliminary investigation. However, the
answers of the Agent, particularly those relating to how they knew that the compact discs they purchased
or received were illegal, unauthorized or infringing, were based on certifications and not personal
knowledge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity is availing in aid of the search process when an
officer undertakes to justify it.
RULING: NO. To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a
liberal construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual. Consistent with
this postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence probable cause, that should be known
by the one who wishes to obtain such warrant. The more decisive consideration determinative of
whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify the issuance of a search warrant is that they
had personal knowledge that the discs were actually infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies.
Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its issuance of the search warrant was without
probable cause and, therefore, invalid.
Case No 364
ADIL
SECTION 2. d. Instances of warrantless searches and seizures
People v. Sevilla, 229 SCRA 625
FACTS: Both Sevilla and Gaspar were arrested, and the bricks of dried marijuana leaves and
flowering tops confiscated without a warrant of arrest. The prosecution claims that it is incidental to the
lawful arrest of Sevilla who had been long wanted by the police authorities, and so, relying on the
presumption that the arresting officers performed their official duties regularly and rejecting
appellants defense of denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was valid.
RULING: No. The Court is of the irresistible conclusion that there was no probable cause for
conducting an extensive search in the house occupied by appellants. The law attaches to the
fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Of course, there are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the absence of a warrant,
to wit: 1. Search which is incidental to a lawful arrest (Rule 126, Section 12, Rules of Court); 2.
Seizure of evidence in plain view; 3. Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Case No 365
ADIL
SECTION 2. d. Instances of warrantless searches and seizures

People v. Sapla, GR No. 244045, June 16, 2020
FACTS: The accused-appellant was charged with violation of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 for possession of 4 bricks of marijuana leaves. The evidence for prosecution established that an
officer on duty received a phone call from a concerned citizen that a certain male individual would be
transporting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela Province. The joint operation was thereafter called and a
checkpoint was strategically placed to intercept the individual. Later, a jeep passed by the checkpoint and
was flagged to stop by the side of the road. The officers requested to open the blue sack in the jeep to
which they found the bricks of marijuana. Sapla was then arrested.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers.
RULING: No. In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) where
the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening
the car’s doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where
the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area. Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte
blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. The situation
presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle. It cannot be
seriously disputed that the target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by
accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the
person who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack. Therefore, the
search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.
Case No 366
ADIL
SECTION 2. i. Incidental to a lawful arrest
Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The
officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to
explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section
11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him.
The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search
warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
CASE NO. 367
ADIL
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
Padilla v. CA, GR 121917 March 12, 1997
FACTS: Robin Padilla was involved in a hot pursuit and a hit-and-run incident. When stopped and
apprehended, the police saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. The police insisted that the gun
be shown in the office if it was legal. A magazine clip of a rifle was also found in his possession which
made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms
were voluntarily surrendered by Robin. Now, Robin’s defense was that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule.
ISSUE: W/N the firearms and ammunitions seized from Robin Padilla without a search warrant is an
inadmissible evidence
RULING: NO. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest is recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence. But the tests for a valid warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest are: (1) the item to be searched was within the arrestee’s custody or area of
immediate control; (2) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of
the nature of the offense.
CASE NO. 368

ADIL
ESPANO VS COURT OF APPEALS
MAIN POINT: An exception rule of freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures provided in
Article III, Sec 2 of the Constitution is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In
the case at bar, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner’s house after his arrest
at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
FACTS: Police operatives went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug
pushing in the area. They saw petitioner Rodolfo Espano selling “something” to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The
search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he
replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When convicted, petitioner raised the inadmissibility of the seized
evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence seized by the policemen were admissible

RULING: YES – DURING ARREST. NO – SEARCH IN THE HOUSE. The articles seized from petitioner
DURING HIS ARREST were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. A
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust
operation, and the marijuana thereby seized after searching the latter are admissible in evidence, being
the fruits of the crime. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant at the time.
CASE NO. 369

ADIL
PEOPLE VS DE LARA
FACTS: Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation. During the investigation, he was forced to
sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and
Information Sheet which were all presented and admitted in evidence, in absence of his counsel. He
was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, appellant questions the
legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his house. Furthermore, he claims
that he was not assisted by counsel during his custodial interrogation.
ISSUE: W/N arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his house was legal
RULING: YES. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person; a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it xxx. In the case at bench, appellant was caught
red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the
aforementioned provision of law, appellant’s arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of
arrest.
A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the
result of appellantÊs arrest inside his house.
CASE NO. 370

ADIL
PEOPLE VS LEANGSIRI
FACTS: Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country heroin. In
his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people
(Amidu and 2 others) in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. In Las Palmas Hotel, the officers also went to the
room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing the
name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of Amidu were also confiscated.
ISSUE: W/N the piece of paper found in Amidu’s hotel room, with the name “SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI” written on it is admissible
RULING: NO. The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest outside the suspect’s person and the premises under his immediate control admits of an
exception. The exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as explained in People vs.
Musa, in this wise: “x x x Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.”. In the case
at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing
Leangsiri’s name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found
tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu’s telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless
search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does
not destroy the prosecution’s case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0371
People v. Cuenco – GR 128277, Nov. 16, 19982014
FACTS: Police officers hatched a plan that a buy-bust. The informant introduced PO1 Camantigue to
Cuenco. Camantigue relayed that he wanted to buy marijuana. Cuenco got the money, called his
common-law wife, Florida Fajardo, and instructed her to get marijuana. Fajardo went inside the house
and when she returned, she handed Camantigue the marijuana. The police officers arrested Cuenco and
proceeded with the search, in the course of which, SPO1 Sarmiento found a box which contained dried
flowering tops of marijuana. The trial court convicted both accused. Cuenco appealed questioning his
conviction because of the illegality of the search made in his house. Appellant insinuates a
frame-up.
ISSUE: W/N the search of the house consequent to a lawful arrest is valid
RULING & MP:. Yes. The search of the house is valid as the latter is still within the permissible area of
search. The arrest of appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante
delicto.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach,
i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him
with the means of committing violence or of escaping.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0372
People v. Che Chun Ting – 328 SCRA 592
FACTS: NARCOM deployed a team of agents for the entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting, with the
cooperation a suspected drug courier who was apprehended, and revealed the source of the drugs. Upon
entrapment, the NARCOM agents immediately arrested Che Chun Ting. A black bag with several plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance was seized. The accused and the evidence were brought to
Camp Crame. The contents of the bank were tested and found positive for shabu. The Defense denied
the allegation. It contended that Unit 122 is owned by Nimfa Ortiz and that Che Chun Ting lived at a
house located at Parañaque. Further, 2 NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched
the premises without search warrant.
ISSUE: W/N search of Unit 122 is within the purview of the warrantless search incidental to an arrest
RULING & MP:. NO. The search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of shabu were illegal for being
violative of one's basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and thus are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. A warrantless search should be limited
to the premises and surroundings that are under the immediate control of the accused. Unit 122 is not
even the house of the accused but that of his girlfriend. The inadmissibility of such however does not
totally exonerate the accused. His arrest was lawful and the seized bag of shabu was admissible in
evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0373
People v.Chi Chan, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015
FACTS: Two policemen, after receiving radio message from the Barangay Captain, headed towards
Ambil Island, Oriental Mindoro and noticed 1 fishing boat and 1 speed boat anchored side by side. They
noticed 1 person on the fishing boat and 2 on the other, who were transferring cargo from the former to
the latter. As they moved closer, the fishing boat sped away. The officers were only able to reach the
speed boat and found the respondents with transparent, plastic bags containing shabu. They didn’t know
how to speak English, the officers had to get an interpreter to tell them of their Miranda rights. The Trial
Court found the respondents guilty and the CA affirmed the said decision. Respondents’ contention: there
was a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrantless
arrest and the consequent search and seizure on their persons and possessions are unjustified, hence,
the confiscated bags of regulated drugs were inadmissible against them.
ISSUE: W/N not there was a violation of the respondents’ constitutional right on unreasonable search and
that the confiscated bags were inadmissible against them.
RULING & MP:. : NO. The Court did not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure
UNREASONABLE in view of the fact that the bags containing the drugs were in plain view of arresting
officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining a search warrant.
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

The objects falling in the plain view of the officer, who has the right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
Requisites:
a) The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion, or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area
b) The discovery of the evidence in the plain view is inadvertent, and
c) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0374
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413
FACTS: Peace officers heard burst of gunfire. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they
saw one Baraquiel Rosillo who was firing gun into the air. He ran to the nearby house of Evaristo. Rosillo
escaped thru the window. As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, they investigated in the house of
Evaristo where they were given permission to enter. They accidentally discovered the firearms in the
latter’s possession. Accused-appellant found guilty of illegal possession of firearms contended that the
seizure of the evidence is inadmissible because it was not authorized by a valid warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence obtained without warrant in an accidental discovery of the evidence is
admissible.
RULING & MP:. Yes. The firearms seized was valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An
offense was committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant. What constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches
and seizures. Yet, one of the exceptions is the plain view doctrine which provides that objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in that view, are subject to
seizure and may be introduced as evidence.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0375

People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993)
FACTS: Respondent-accused, Carmelina Tabar, was charged, together with her nephew, Rommel
Arriesgado, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. She placed the packs of marijuana sticks under the
rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the
arrest of Rommel. She was asked by the policement to spread it out, then the package containing the
packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed. The accused were then convicted of the offense charged
against them in the trial court. On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower court erred
in admitting the evidence against her when there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore, violating the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING & MP:. No. The accused, who voluntarily unrolled the pair of pants with the package containing
packs of marijuana sticks, thereby exposing the same to the plain view of the police officers, could
lawfully be arrested and searched without the corresponding arrest and search warrants. A crime was
thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Further, when one voluntarily submits to a search and
consent to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later voluntary surrender to the
search and seizure without warrant, deemed waiver of one’s constitutional right relative thereto.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0376

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on a specific date. The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver
and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated and were used as the bases of the charge against the
petitioner. Respondent Judge said that when a police officer personally filed his application for a search
warrant, he appeared before him in the company of his 2 witnesses.
ISSUE: W/N the search warrant and seizure of illegal articles were violative of constitutional guarantee.
RULING & MP:. Yes. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the revolver and the
bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were
taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the
petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0377

United Laboratories v. Isip – GR 163858 (June 28, 2005)
FACTS: UNILAB sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of
search warrant. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and distribution
of the said vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and
instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to
contain Inoflox and Disudrin. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to
suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the
boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine.
ISSUE: W/N seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were
valid under the plain view doctrine.
RULING & MP:. NO. It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view
doctrine. The petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some
other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. It
would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0378

People v. Doria – GR 125299, Jan. 22, 1999
FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of
selling prohibited drugs and during the operation, the police officers searched for the marked bills that
they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When
they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box. The box's flaps was open and inside the
box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun.". The police peeked inside the box and found that it contained
ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Both accused were convicted of the
crime charged.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility
of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid under the plain view doctrine.
RULING & MP:. No. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest. She was not committing any crime. The marijuana was not in plain
view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.
In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0379

Del Rosario v. People, GR 142295, May 31, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the decision of the RTC and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation illegal
possession of firearms. Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the
search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution and consequently, the evidence seized was
inadmissible. He also submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in
his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his daughter’s bedroom, were
either planted by the police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
ISSUE: W/N not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
RULING & MP:. Yes. The Supreme Court said that the search warrant was no authority for the police
officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the
warrant. In this case, the firearm was not found unintentionally and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not
mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. True that as an exception, the police
may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently
found in plain view.
ALMONTE
CASE NO. 0380
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Moving Vehicle

Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517 (1996)
FACTS: The PNP Maritime Group boarded and inspected a big fishing boat with the consent of the boat
captain. In the course of the inspection, the police discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and
assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. Some of the fishes were tested to
contain cyanide. The petitioners primarily question the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in
view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUE: W/N search of the fishing boat was lawful.
RULING & MP:. Yes. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It
is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. A fishing vessel found
to be violating fishery laws may be seized without a warrant on two grounds: firstly, because they are
usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuit, and secondly, because the
seizure would be an incident to a lawful arrest.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 381
ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

(lll. Moving Vehicle)
BAGALIHOG V. FERNANDEZ 198 SCRA 614
FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a motorcycle suspected to be the get-away vehicle of the assailant
of the late Rep. Moises Espinosa who was shot shortly after disembarking at the airport. Witnesses said
that one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. Petitioner’s house was searched with his consent but the
search proved fruitless by the members of the Philippine Constabulary. The motorcycle was seized two
days after the killing and impounded the same on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the
killers. There was no warrant for the seizure obtained by the respondent. When petitioner sought to
recover the vehicle, police claimed that it was needed for the prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure of the motorcycle was lawful.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the confiscation, without warrant, was unlawful. The
constitutional provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to
be guilty but are nevertheless presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The necessity for the
immediate seizure of the motorcycle had not been established; neither can the vehicle be detained
on the ground that it is a prohibited article.
ANOOS
CASE No. 382

Aniag, Jr v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424
FACTS: Pursuant to the COMELEC Gun Ban, petitioner (Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan)
instructed his driver to return the two firearms issued to him to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representative. The driver was apprehended by the PNP at a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex
after PNP searched the car and found two firearms in the trunk of the car. When prosecuted, petitioner
questioned the manner which PNP conducted the search. He contended, among others, that the firearms
were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of his driver but instead neatly packed in their
gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Hence, the search of his car that yielded the
evidence for the prosecution was violative of Section 2 Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the extensive search at a checkpoint was violative of the Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING: Yes. An extensive search without warrant could only be resulted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle
to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the
facts of the case. In the case at bar, records did not show that the manner by which the package was
bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms.
ANOOS
CASE No. 383

People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 402
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested by PC officers after disembarking from M/V Wilcon 9 at 8:30PM in Iloilo
City. The PC officers (had earlier received a tip from their informer) who were in fact waiting for him,
simply accosted him, inspected his bag, and finding what looked like marijuana leaves, took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspected articles were confiscated and taken to the
NBI laboratory for investigation. When prosecuted, he claimed that he was arrested and searched without
warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible as evidence against him
under the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest and search upon the person of the petitioner is legal.
RULING: No. The petitioner was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had
just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as PC officers received the
tip from their informant two days before the arrest within which they can persuade the judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest and search.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 384

People v. Malmstedt, G. R. No. 91107
FACTS: Due to persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs, checkpoints were set-up at Tublay Mountain Province. Furthermore, an
information was received by the Commanding Officer of Narcotics Command (NARCOM) that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The bus where respondent
Mikael Malmstedt (Swedish national) was riding was stopped for inspection. NARCOM officer noticed a
bulge on respondent’s waist. Suspecting it to be a gun, he was asked to present his passport and
identification papers but he failed to do so. He was then required to bring out whatever it was bulging on
his waist which turned out to be a pouch bag containing hashish (derivative of marijuana) wrapped in
brown packing tape. He was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted, he got two
travelling bags from the luggage carrier which upon inspection of the officer contained two teddy bears
stuffed with hashish. He was brought to the headquarters for further investigation. Seeking the reversal of
the trial court’s decision finding him guilty of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act, he argued that the search
of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and therefore, the
prohibited drugs discovered in his custody were inadmissible as evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search was legal.
RULING: Yes. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs hence, the search
made upon his personal effects falls under paragraph 1 of warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(i.e when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense). The information received by NARCOM plus respondent’s suspicious
failure to produce his passport led the officers to believe that he was hiding something illegal. There was
probable cause which justified the warrantless search made on the personal effects of the respondent.
Where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant.
ANOOS
CASE No. 385

People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017
FACTS: Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers about an organized group, of
which the respondent was a member, engaged in the importation of illegal drugs. Respondent, together
with the deep penetration agent hired by the operatives, arrived in Manila from China. They rode a taxicab
from the airport but were intercepted by the readily awaiting operative team. The taxi driver was asked to
open the back compartment of the vehicle and the operatives requested permission from the respondent
and his companion to search the luggage contained therein. Tin cans containing 56 teabags of
Metamphetamine (shabu) were found inside the luggage. On appeal after conviction, he contended that
the warrantless search and seizure made against him was illegal. That the anti-narcotics agents had both
time and opportunity to secure a search warrant given that they were informed of the date and time of his
arrival two days prior.
ISSUE: W/N the search and seizure made against the respondent is illegal.
RULING: No. The circumstances of the case showed that the search in question was made as regards as
moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on respondent and his
co-accused. Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities, the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that respondent would attempt to bring contraband and
transport it within the country.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 386

People v. Saycon – 236 SCRA 325
FACTS: NARCOM agents had conducted a test-buy which confirmed that Saycon was engaged in
transporting and selling of “shabu”. The police authorities did not arrest him on that occasion but his
identity as drug courier or distributor was established. A confidential information that he would probably
board MV Doña Virginia from Manila to Dumaguete City was received by the officers on the same
morning he arrived. Pursuant to this, a checkpoint was set at the Pier where Saycon was identified by
NARCOM police officer. He was invited to Coast Guard Headquarter where he was asked to open his bag
which was found to contain a Marlboro pack containing suspected “shabu”. He was then arrested without
warrant and brought to the NARCOM office, together with his bag and the suspected shabu which was
later brought to PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. In seeking reversal of the trial court’s conviction
of him, he argued that the search of his bag was illegal due to lack of warrant thus, the shabu discovered
in his possession was inadmissible as evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest and search upon the person of the respondent is illegal.
RULING: No. There was probable cause for the authorities to believe that Saycon would be carrying or
transporting prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City. Warrantless search and arrest would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe that the accused was violating some law. Probable cause in the case at bar consisted of two
parts, the test-buy conducted by police authorities and the confidential information received on the day of
his arrest. Also it was not possible for the NARCOM agents and the Coastguard Officers to obtain a
judicial search warrant or warrant of arrest given that it was only in the morning of his arrival that the
specific information confirming his arrival was received by authorities.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 387

People vs CFI, 101 SCRA 86
FACTS: A light blue Dodge car speed away after giving the toll receipt. The Regional Anti-Smuggling
Action Center (RASAC) gave a chase, overtook them and ordered them to stop but Sgt. Hope made a
U-turn and tried to escape. An inspection of the dodge car revealed boxes containing more or less 4,441
wrist watches and more or less 11,075 watch bracelets which were all untaxed. At the time Hope and
Medina were apprehended, the RASAC Agents were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.
ISSUE: W/N items seized in a moving vehicle without a warrant of seizure are admissible for evidence.
RULING: Yes, searches and seizures without warrant are valid if made upon probable cause. The
RASAC agents were vested with authority under the Tariff and Customs Code, they did not exceed such
authority. The Court also held that there were rare cases which can be exempted from the requirement of
a warrant, such as that of a moving vehicle as it is not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant
before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 388

People vs Barros G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994
FACTS: Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for possession of
four (4) kilos of marijuana while being a passenger to Baguio City. Petitioner now questions the judgment
for ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search.
ISSUE: W/N items seized in a moving vehicle without a warrant of seizure are admissible for evidence.
RULING: No, record failed to show probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box
allegedly owned by appellant Barros. When, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search is permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or
cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 389

Mustang Lumber vs CA G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied
with the required invoices and transport documents, the truck together with its cargo were impounded at
the DENR.
ISSUE: W/N the seizure was lawfully conducted.

RULING: Yes, the seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a
forest officer or employee. The search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Search of a moving vehicle is
one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence
of probable cause.
ANOOS
CASE NO. 390

People vs Lacerna G.R. No. 109250. September 5, 1997
FACTS: Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when a group of police signaled them to park on
the side of the road for inspection. The police officers went about searching the luggages and found
several blocks of marijiuana.
ISSUE: W/N the search seizure was lawfully conducted.
RULING: Yes, though probable cause is not evident, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly
searched. The police expressly sought appellants permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed
to have his person and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which
validated the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless
search
CASE 391
BENITEZ
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 CONSENT OR WAIVER
De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 PHIL 689
FACTS: Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained a search warrant to search the person,
house or store of the petitioner. They went to the office of the petitioner and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioner's bookkeeper and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined
at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. It was argued that the petitioner had waived her
constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid waiver.
RULING/MP: NO. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied.
No express waiver has been made in this case. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by
implication. To constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right exists;
secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
CASE 392
BENITEZ
ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

Caballes v. Court of Appeals, GR 136292, Jan 15, 2002
FACTS: Suspecting that the jeep driven by Caballes was loaded with smuggled goods, 2 police officers
flagged down the vehicle. They checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by NPC. Then, Caballes and the vehicle were brought to the Police Station and
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal Jail.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search without consent is valid.
Ruling/MP: NO. The evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the 2 police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. They were informing, nay, imposing
upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The “consent” given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
CASE 393
BENITEZ

People v. Agbot, 106 SCRA 325
FACTS: Antonio Agbot was charged and convicted of murder for the death of her sister Leona. The police
officers went to the scene of the crime, took the “paltik” gun with Antonio’s permission, and brought him to
the station. He admitted the crime and thus, he was convicted. He appealed his case asserting that
there was no search warrant when the gun was taken from the house and cannot be used as an evidence
against him.
ISSUE: Whether the seizure was valid.
RULING/MP: YES. The verity of his admission of guilt having been firmly established, the contention that
the confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal clearly becomes devoid of factual or legal basis. Further,
the taking of his gun from his house with his acquiescence and consent would not constitute a violation of
an his constitutional right against admissibility of illegally seized objects.
CASE 394
BENITEZ

Lopez, Velasco v. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
FACTS: M/V Jolo Lema (chartered by Velasco) was searched by the authorities and they discovered that
the vessel is carrying smuggled copra and coffee. Another task force headed to Velasco’s rented hotel
room (he was not there), raided the said room and seized documents. They were allowed entry inside the
room by Ibañez who appeared to be Velasco’s wife but turned out to be a manicurist.
ISSUE: Whether there was consent to allow the warrantless search and seizure.
RULING/MP: YES. Ibañez executed an affidavit as “Velasco’s wife.”

There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the same by an affidavit of one Corazon
Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife. The officers of the law could not be blamed if they would
act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their
request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why
she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent
sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant.
CASE 395
BENITEZ

People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457
FACTS: A group police entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was
absent. They requested the alleged helpers of Damaso in the house to allow them to look around. In
one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated. They likewise brought the
alleged helpers found in the house to the headquarters for investigation, and they revealed that Damaso
was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated.
ISSUE: Whether the search was valid.
RULING: NO. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, Damaso was not in his house at that time his
alleged helper allowed the authorities to enter it. No evidence that would establish the fact that the
persons were indeed the Damaso’s helper or that Damaso had given authority to open his house in his
absence.
CASE 396
BENITEZ

People v. Asis, Formento, GR 142531, October 15, 2002
FACTS: Asis and Formento were charged for the crime of Robbery with homicide of Yu Hing Guan. They
were found guilty and sentenced to death. Upon review by SC, they objected to the introduction of a
bloodstained shorts of the victim allegedly recovered from the bag of Formento arguing that the
search was illegally done. The prosecution contended that it was Formento’s wife who voluntarily
surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained shorts. Such act constituted a valid consent to the
search without a warrant.
ISSUE: Whether Formento has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained shorts.
RULING: NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is
expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained shorts was recovered, Formento, together with his wife
and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given
consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person. The
person who is the subject of the search must be the one who should give the consent to a search, not
anybody else present.
CASE NO. 397

BENITEZ
ART III SEC. 2 E. Warrantless Searches and Seizures; iv. Consent or waiver
Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632, June 18, 1992
FACTS: Capt. Obrero, based on an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding inside, raided and
entered the house of the Veroys, without warrant, after calling petitioner and acquiring permission to
search the house subject to the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must be there
during the search. A .45 caliber gun and other effects were confiscated, which were the basis of the
charge of illegal possession of firearms against them. The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the
evidence on the ground that that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was merely for
the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers.
ISSUE: WON the evidence were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
RULING: YES. The permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to room search inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional
rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them. The Court ruled that the case at bar does
not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless search. The qualified consent did not result to an effective and
valid waiver against unreasonable searches and seizures.
CASE NO. 398

BENITEZ
People v. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462
FACTS: Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged down a
cream-colored Ford Fiera driven by Omaweng. Former asked permission to inspect the vehicle including
a cream-colored bag and appellant acceded to the request. 41 plastic packets of different sizes containing
pulverized substance (illegal drugs) were found and confiscated. Omaweng contends the confiscated
items were inadmissible as evidence as they were acquired in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE: W/N Omaweng’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
RULING: NO. Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused
waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
CASE NO. 399
BENITEZ
People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679
FACTS: Accused appellants were caught in the possession of 8 bundles of dried flowering tops of
Marijuana wrapped in pieces of papers and plastic tapes when they were stopped in an avenue by police
operatives. Appellants assail the admission of the seized marijuana flowering tops as evidence against
them, arguing that the same was the fruit of an illegal search conducted without any search warrant.
ISSUE: WON the seized marijuana were fruits of an illegal search.
RULING: NO. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
First, they never protested when police officers opened the tin can loaded in the appellants vehicle and
found eight (8) bundles. Appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs
and their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution.
Second, appellants effectively waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure in question
by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment and by participating in the trial.
CASE NO. 400

BENITEZ
People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557
FACTS: Following a tip from an informer, police operatives patrolled Miranda Subdivision for a possible
engagement with the suspects of a series of armed robbery incidents. Accompanied by one of the victims,
the lawmen chanced upon petitioner Felimon Ramos who the victim identified as one of the armed men
he encountered during the robbery. When accosted and frisked by the lawmen, Ramos yielded in his
waistline a .38 caliber snub nosed “paltik” revolver loaded with two (2) live bullets. At the police
headquarters, Ramos admitted involvement in the robbery incidents.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: NO. The evidence for the prosecution clearly discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily allowed
himself to be frisked and that he gave the gun to the ones who arrested him. On cross-examination,
counsel for Ramos did not suggest or insinuate, even obliquely, that Ramos did not voluntarily allow
himself either to be frisked or dispossessed of the gun by the person who arrested him
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 401
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

CONSENT/WAIVER
People vs Tudtud
MAIN POINT
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains
why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in
the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
FACTS
Tudtud was reported to have been allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their
area. Police gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. A man who
identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a gun. Tudtud raised his arms and asked,
Sir, what is this about. The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was
carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of pants. On appeal, Tudtud
assigned, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were
seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The RTC justified the
warrantless search of appellant’s belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful
arrest.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure in the case at bar is constitutional as it is part
of one of the exceptions
RULING
No. Appellant’s implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellant’s lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 402

CONSENT/WAIVER
People vs Tabar
MAIN POINT
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
FACTS
Tabar was charged with the selling of marijuana sticks, cigarettes and drugs to people. The trial
court discredited the bare denials of Tabar and unfavorably considered against her an admission that she
had been arrested before by the CANU for possession of marijuana, was charged for the violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 and was convicted therein, but is now on probation. Tabar
challenged the decision of the trial court on grounds that evidence was seized from her without any
warrant.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the evidence
RULING
No. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana
sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left her shanty
after noticing the arrest of Rommel(accomplice). When she was asked to spread it out, which she
voluntary did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the
member of the team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 403

CONSENT/WAIVER
People vs Encinada
MAIN POINT
The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search.
FACTS
SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant that Encinada would be arriving in Surigao
bringing with him marijuana. Upon arrival, he was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the
passengers to disembark. Thereafter, all the baggage of the passengers and the driver were ordered to
stand in a line for which a body search was made individually. After the search was made, the accused
was singled out in the line and ordered to board the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the
PNP Police Station. Encinada was openly protesting to the action taken by the police authorities and
demanded from the apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest for the
search made and for his apprehension; In the police headquarters, the accused was made to undergo
custodial investigation for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject
marijuana leaves.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that search and the arrest of the accused without
a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as incident to a lawful arrest
RULING
No. In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City
policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful
arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. Bolonias’ receipt of
the intelligence information regarding the culprit’s identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
his exact whereabouts underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed or neglected
to do so. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 404

CONSENT/WAIVER
People vs Aruta
MAIN POINT
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government
FACTS
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged with violating Act No. 6425. Lt. Abello was tipped
off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, he formed a team that led to the search and seizure of
Aruta. Aruta claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater. In the
middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the
NARCOM Office. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or Objection to
Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were
allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s constitutional rights
RULING
Yes. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the
agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents
would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because,
as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 405

CUSTOMS SEARCH
Papa vs Mago
MAIN POINT
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search
warrant may readily be obtained. A search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
FACTS
Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the goods was
intercepted by the BOC who was acting under a tip, questioned the validity of the search conducted by
them since. He also questioned if the BOC had jurisdiction over the forfeited goods. The items were
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued and was said to be released the following day from the customs
zone of the port and loaded on two trucks, police officers intercepted and seized said trucks.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the search conducted by the BOC is valid
RULING
Yes. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 406
Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

Pacis vs. Pamaran
MAIN POINT: The collector of customs has the requisite authority to issue a warrant of seizure and
detention for an Automobile whose duties and taxes not been paid for. In exercising this authority, the
Collector has not violated the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizures and he may
not be prosecuted for criminal offense of usurpation of judicial function.
FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is an owner of a car which he bought from a tax-exempt individual.
He paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Pedro Pacis, the Acting Collector of Customs, received a
letter stating that Santos' car was a hot car. The amount collectible was P2,500.00, not just P311.00.
Based on such discrepancy, Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
detention. The car was taken by agents who were authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant.
Santos wrote to Pacis about the seizure. Santos also filed a case of usurpation of judicial authority of
against Pacis. Manuel Pamaran, an Assistant Fiscal, proceeded with the charge against Pacis.
ISSUE: May petitioner effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a component court?
RULING: YES.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to such search and
seizure. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 407

People vs. Gatward
FACTS: In 30 August 1994, U Aung Win, a Passenger of the Thai Airways which had just arrived from
Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage for examination to Customs Examiner Busran Tawano. When
opened, the bag revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its partitions.
Representative samples of the substance were examined by 2 chemists of the Crime Laboratory Service
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and concluded that the entire substance, with a total weight of
5,579.80 grams, is heroin. During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that U Aung Win had a contact in Bangkok
and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines. The members of the team were able to
establish the identity of other two persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing who were
scheduled to leave for Bangkok. While on board, Gatward was requested to disembark and was invited
by the police officers for investigation. Gatward’s luggage, with his consent, was subjected to x-ray
examination and there also found powdery substance which was concluded to be 5,237.70 grams of
heroin by the chemists.
ISSUE: Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s luggages may be searched without warrant.
RULING AND MAIN POINT: YES.

While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his
personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in
accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived
any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante
delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. The evidence thus presented convincingly
proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for
customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 408

People vs. Susan Canton
MAIN POINT: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if
any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
FACTS: February 12, 1998 at the NAIA, Canton was a departing passenger bound to go to Saigon,
Vietnam. She passed through a metal detector which emitted a beeping sound. Mylene Cabunoc, who
was a civilian employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the
frisker duty called Canton’s attention. They subsequently checked Canton. Cabunoc felt something
bulging in several parts of Canton. This was reported thereafter to her supervisor. Canton was requested
to go the comfort room for a physical examination wherein she was asked to take her clothes off. The
packages that she carried was examined and turned out to be 998.2809 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or SHABU, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license. She was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Article 3, Section 16 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Canton filed for Motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
ISSUES: Whether or not there was a valid search and arrest.
RULING: YES
The search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall
contain among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. which shall
constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. In this case, after the metal
detector alarmed, R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 409

People vs. Johnson
MAIN POINT: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
FACTS: Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her possession more
than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in the airport.
The security personnel felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that
she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her
supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent, packets of shabu were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In the present
appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her was not valid and that her constitutional
rights were infringed when such search was conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search and arrest was made.
RULING: YES.
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was validly arrested without warrant
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and…
DINALAGAN
CASE NO. 410

PEOPLE V. CFI
FACTS
The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705. They entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, then
illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and
without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, 60 logs of different species,
consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with total value of P50,205.52 including government charges.
The trial court dismissed the information.
ISSUE
whether the information charged an offense
RULING
1. Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal.
It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but
from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant’s deceased father, Macario
Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not
make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including
those produced in private woodlands.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient
that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 411
Stop and frisk situation
Malacat: “Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person with
whom he is dealing may be armed and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigation of this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other’s safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such person in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 412
Stop and frisk situation
Malacat (1997): Probable cause is not required. However, mere suspicion or a hunch is not
enough. Rather, a “genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.”
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 413
ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI. Stop and Frisk Situation
Terry vs. Ohio
FACTS: The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other
men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for
questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men
before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
ISSUE: WON a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search.
RULING/MP: No. it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited
search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical
beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the
officer suspects to be armed. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant,
even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed
and dangerous.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 414
Posadas vs. CA
FACTS: While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street,Davao
City, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to beacting suspiciously.They
approached the petitioner and identified themselves asmembers of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee
but his attempt to get away wasthwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.They then checked the
"buri" bag of the petitioner where they found unlicensed firearms.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest and search was valid
RULING/MP: Yes. The search in the case at bar is reasonable considering that it is effected on the basis
of a probable cause. When the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of
the police officers to inspect the same.The assailed search and seizure is justified as akin to a "stop
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 415
People vs. Solayao
FACTS: SPO3 Jose Nio in conducting an intelligence patrol proceeded to Barangay Onion to stop any
potential disturbance in the area where they met the group of Solayao who was then drunk and wearing a
camouflage uniform, suspicion arised. Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.
Confiscated from Solayao is a homemade firearm and was charged with illegal possession of firearm.-
Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to the court against the admissibility of the firearm as
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm
RULING/MP: No. Firearm is admissible as evidence. There are many instances where a search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is
stop-and-frisk in the case at bar. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant
when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion also
arouse when the group was spotted dressed in camouflage. An officer may perform a search for
weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes
that the person may be armed and dangerous.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 416
Malacat vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was searched by a
group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously with his eyes moving fast together with
other Muslim-looking men in a Plaza. When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered
in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a
search was made on his person. He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. He contended
that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade
from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
RULING/MP: No. There are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid. 1. There is
grave doubt that Malacat is a member of the group which attempted to bomb the plaza 2. There was
nothing in petitioner’s behaviour or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion
other than that his eyes were moving very fast and 3. There was at all no ground, probable or otherwise,
to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. When the policemen approached the accused
and his companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline. They
did not see any bulging object in his person. Mere suspicions are not sufficient to validate
warrantless arrest. While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 417
Manalili vs. CA
FACTS: Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted surveillance along Mabini Street after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area. The policemen chanced upon the
petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner. Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to
introduce themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Policeman Espiritu found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside his wallet. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and
took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
ISSUE: WON search and seizure conducted was valid
RULING: Yes. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. The police, from his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior of petitioner was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana
in petitioners possession and is an admissible evidence against him.A stop-and-frisk is defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s).
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 418
ART 3, SEC 2: Stop and frisk
People v Aruta
FACTS: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving
from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day they waited for
the bus, When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the
police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. Instead of
presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from theatre While
about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later
on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and Also, no search
warrant was presented during investigation
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search is in violation of Art 3 Sec 2
RULING/MP: Yes. There was no indicator that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents
as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. She was merely crossing the street when
apprehended. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no
probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. The seized marijuana was illegal and
inadmissible evidence The Stop and frisk rule, should not become unbridled licenses for law
enforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 419
People v Sy Chua
FACTS: The police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the
Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to
secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a stop-and-frisk.
ISSUE: WON the stop& frisk is a valid in the case at bar
RULING/MP: No. stop-and-frisk is a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. However,
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) The safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officerIn this case, accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so and there was no overtact that
called for his arrest. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension
BUKLASAN
CASE NO. 420

People v Victor Cogaed Y Romana
FACTS: Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would be transporting marijuana. The police
organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.” A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy
arrived at the checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatas indicating a
male passenger was carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatas approached the male passenger who was
identified as Victor who was carrying a blue bag. SPO1 Taracatas asked Victor about the contents of his
bag and he said he did not know since he was transporting the bag as a favor to his barrio mate named
Marvin. After this exchange, Victor opened the blue bag revealing three bricks of marijuana. SPO1
arrested Victor and was brought to the police station. The RTC and the CA found Victor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165 when Victor waived his right against warrantless searches
“without prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, he voluntarily opened his bag.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana
RULING/MP: No. “Stop and frisk” are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. Its object is
either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo temporarily while
the police officer to obtain more information. The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness".
Experienced police officers have the ability to discern whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner and the search is illegal because of the absence of the requisite of “suspiciousness.”
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 421
ART 3, SEC 2: Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

People v De Gracia
FACTS: Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup
d’état on against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were being bombarded. The search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office (and confiscated
6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.)
Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping
through the door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano, No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity
of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were closed.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search is valid.
RULING: Yes. The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Furthermore, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts. The trial judge himself manifested that when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. The
absence of a judicial warrant is valid by the exigencies of the situation that involves the survival
of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 422
ART 3, SEC 2: Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

Lacerna v DDB
FACTS: Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 imposes the requirement of mandatory, suspicionless and random drug
tests nationwide among all high school and college students, all public and private officers, workers and
employees, all local and national candidates for elective and appointive government positions, and all
respondents facing preliminary investigations of the criminal complaints filed against them with an
imposable penalty exceeding 6 years and 1 day.
ISSUE: WON the mandatory drug testing violates the right to privacy & the right against unreasonable
searches.
RULING: Yes. To impose mandatory drug testing is a blatant attempt to violate a person’s right to
privacy and forced to incriminate themselves. The constitutional validity of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random and suspicious drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement. However, there is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes punishable with at least 6 years and one day imprisonment as they are singled out and
impleaded against their will. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness” and “suspicionless.”
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 423
ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES;
DRUG, ALCOHOL AND BLOOD TESTS
Pimentel Jr. v. COMELEC
FACTS: In these consolidated petitions, (one of which is AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS) the constitutionality of Section 36(g) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on senatorial
candidates.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be declared unconstitutional insofar as it imposed
an additional qualification on senatorial candidates.
RULING: Yes. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirements not otherwise specified in the Constitution. It may
of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does
not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or
would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made
drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall
have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. The mandatory drug test requirements as a pre-condition for the validity of a certificate
of candidacy of electoral candidates not established under the Constitution, e.g. local government
positions, is valid.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 424
ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH

People v. O’Cochlain, GR No. 229071, 10 December 2018
FACTS: In the final security checkpoint inside the Laog City International Airport, the Security Screening
officer was instructed to conduct a pat down search on Eanna, who agreed. Eanna was frisked, while he
raised his hands by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders with palms open, two rolled sticks of
what appeared to be dried Marijuana leaves was seized from his possession. Eanna was charged with
illegal possession of Marijuana under Section 11, Article 11 of RA 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act of 2002.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of an illegal possession of drug during a routine airport inspection is
a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.
RULING: Yes, the search upon his person was not unreasonable but actually was an exception to the
prescription against warrantless search and seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or
right that was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations to maintain peace,
order and security at the airports. In fact, Eanna’s plane ticket carried a proviso allowing airport
authorities to check on his person and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of RA No. 6235
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 425 (Not a case, base on syllabus, just main point I guess..)
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
b. When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 426
ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
People v. Dela Cruz
FACTS: After receiving a confidential report from an informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by
the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team with P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat.
Deogracias Gorgonia to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer to buy
marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. After ascertaining
that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his
teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, and they converged at the place, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. Accused-appellants
were charged in the RTC with violations Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). From
this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban interposed
the instant appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Buy-Bust Operation being done to enforce Republic Act 6425 is
unconstitutional and any evidence acquired under such method should not be admissible in court.
RULING: No. There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence. While the Court is not unmindful of the fact
that the common modus operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers does not always commend
itself as the most reliable way to go after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the proliferation of drug
addiction and trafficking has already reached an alarming level and experience has proven entrapment to
be an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as exemplified by this case. The Solicitor General
explains that a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto which is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither
instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent
originated. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from
one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the
search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught
red-handed.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 427

People v. Doria
FACTS: Accused-appellants Doria and Gaddao were charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of
selling prohibited drugs and during the operation. The police officers searched for the marked bills that
they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When
they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box which contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao as well as the search of the latter’s
person and house was valid.
RULING: Yes as to warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria. Warrantless arrests are allowed in
three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is
apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
No as to the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without
a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant
Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court,
there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 428
Espiritu v. Lim
FACTS: 8 petitions have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein. Particularly in Espiritu v. Lim, Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media, was heard
urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike to force the government to give into their
demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention
of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further,
Espiritu, taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda likewise announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike. In their respective Returns, the respondents
uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they
have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. The
petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the persons detained have been illegally arrested or arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases warrant their release on
habeas corpus.
RULING: No. The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court. In Espiritu vs. Lim, the
release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an
Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted. The arrest of a person without a warrant of
arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest
may be effected without a warrant are clearly spelled out under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, when the person arrested is caught in flagrante
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 429
Umil v. Fidel Ramos
FACTS: Military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to
verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the 5 male "sparrows" who murdered 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols the day before at
about noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," 22 years old of Block 10, Lot 4,
South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man
was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Rolando Dural was lawfully arrested.

RULING: Yes. It clearly appears that Dural was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident; seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified,
however Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion, being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
GRAVADOR
CASE NO. 430
ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

People vs. Sucro
FACTS: Fulgencio was monitoring activities of appellant Sucro because of an information that Sucro was
selling marijuana. Sucro was seen to have talked and exchanged things three times. During the
transaction with the 3rd buyer, Macabante, police officers intercepted. Macabante saw the police and
threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro. The
police thereafter arrested Sucro without an arrest warrant. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana.
ISSUE: WON appellant’s arrest without warrant is lawful.
HELD: YES. A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
a. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
It would suffice if the overt acts were to be seen by a police officer, although from a distance.
Fulgencio, within a distance of 2 meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity, and the fact that
Macabante, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he
bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just committed an illegal act of
which the police officers had personal knowledge.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 431
Art III Sec. 2 Warrantless Arrest – In Flagrante Delicto

People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791
FACTS: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money
treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don.
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later
identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made
a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of
the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The
accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained
and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the arrest and seizure were illegally conducted.
RULING: Yes. The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a
person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also
violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the
circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search
is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 432

People v. Yap, 229 SCRA 787
FACTS: Accused-appellant Yap were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having sold
in Ozamiz City six sticks of marijuana for a consideration of 10php. 2 buy-bust operations were scheduled
to be conducted simultaneously inside the public market of Ozamiz City. Upon seeing appellant Yap,
poseur-buyer Raterta approached and offered to buy marijuana, whereupon six sticks thereof were
delivered to him after he handed the marked ten-peso bill to Yap. Immediately after the consummation of
said sale of the six sticks of marijuana, Sgt. Mugot, who was four to five meters away, saw appellant go
inside the public market. They did not immediately arrest the latter as they were still waiting for the result
of the other buy-bust operation conducted by another group in the same vicinity, and knowledge of their
presence might alarm other drug pushers who may be present therein. When the other group informed
Sgt. Mugot that their operation failed, he and his companions forthwith arrested both appellants and
brought them to their headquarters.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.

RULING: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may effect an arrest without a warrant when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it. Sgt. Mugot had personal knowledge of the commission of
the crime, having been present in the locus criminis and having actually witnessed the unlawful
transaction. The interval between the commission of the crime and the time of the arrests was only four to
five minutes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to apprehend a
malefactor in flagrante delicto, that is, to catch him red-handed while selling marijuana to a person acting
as a poseur-buyer.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 433

People v. Alolod, 266 SCRA 154
FACTS: Accused Alolod was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm. A
passenger jeepney driven by one Alberto Juan was cruising along Quirino Highway. On board were four
(4) passengers including accused Alolod. All of a sudden Alolod grabbed the plastic bag held by one of
the passengers. The latter resisted. Alolod then pulled out a gun and shot de Vera point-blank. As a
result, blood oozed from the body of de Vera. But, despite his wound, he insisted on wrestling with Alolod
for the possession of the bag until the latter fired a second shot. As they grappled they fell from the
jeepney. As Alolod and de Vera continued to struggle, SPOI Eduardo Liberato arrived but Alolod
succeeded in running away with the bag. Liberato pursued Alolod until he caught up with him. Accused
now comes on appeal contending that the trial court erred in appreciating evidence for the prosecution
that were manifestly "fruits of the poisonous tree."
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
RULING: Yes. The police officers, particularly SPOI Liberato, appropriately responded to the call of duty
by immediately chasing the suspected criminal. A peace officer may effect warrantless arrest when in
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense or, an offense has just in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. SPOI Liberato
arrived when accused Alolod and victim Romeo de Vera were still wrestling with each other. As the officer
approached them Alolod ran away so that Liberato had no recourse but pursue him until he was arrested.
That was a legitimate arrest without warrant. Alolod was actually committing a crime in the presence of
the police officer or at least had just committed it, and the police officer had personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that Alolod had committed the crime. In this case, the warrantless arrest being legal, any
evidence gathered as a result thereof cannot be considered "fruit of a poisonous tree;" consequently, it is
admissible.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 434

People v. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174
FACTS: The Western Police District received a call from an informer that there were 3 suspicious looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team was
forthwith dispatched. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it,
while his companion had a fan knife. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of
illegal possession of firearm arm. Accused claims that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his
arrest. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it
had been illegally seized.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
HELD: Yes. An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. An arrest without warrant is lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense
in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. These
requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was
being committed in their presence. Moreover, a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad
daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 435

People v. Elamparo – 329 SCRA
FACTS: Joel Elamparo has been convicted with Illegal Possession of Drugs and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. The case was raised for automatic review.
Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a report from an informant that "some people
are selling shabu and marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City." Thus, Baldonado
organized a buy-bust team and deployed at a known "market" for buyers of marijuana. Thereafter, a
runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The runner then left and returned with the
marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy bust team member then handed over the marked money
and arrested the runner who freed himself and ran.
The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with steel gate. Having
trapped the runner inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The
police officers likewise found Joel Elamparo repacking five bricks of "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper
on top of the round table inside the house. Elamparo was then arrested.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Elamparo valid?
RULING: Yes. The members of the buy bust team were justified in running after him and entering
the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside
the house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him.
They also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full
view on top of a table.
Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have been
judicially formulated: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in
plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 436

Rizaldy Sanchez Y Cajili v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014
MP: For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of RA 9165. Prosecution claims that arresting officers
allegedly caught him coming out of the house of certain Jacinta Mariano who is contended to be selling
prohibited drugs. The officers further claimed that they chased the tricycle and after catching up with it,
they requested Rizaldy to alight and noticed that he was holding a match box., SPO1 Amposta while
examining it found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance.
Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver.
The group brought the two to the police station. Defense on the other hand claimed that petitioner was on
his way home together with Darwin Reyes after transporting a passenger with his passenger jeep, when
they were apprehended by 4 armed men who claimed to be police claiming that he bought drugs from
Alapan.
RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto, In actual possession of
shabu. Sanchez appealed before the CA but the latter upheld RTC’s decision. MR of petitioner was
likewise denied. Hence the petition where Sanchez raised the issue
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the absence of probable cause
on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court?
RULLING: Yes. The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the
police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded
towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same
would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a lawful warrantless
arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 437
Art III Sec. 2 Warrantless Arrest – Hot Pursuit

Go v. CA – 206 SCRA 138
FACTS: Petitioner entered a one-way street and travelled in the “wrong” direction. When Magauan
(victim) and petitioner’s cars almost nearly bumped each other, petitioner alighted from his car, walked
over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard
at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting (plate number turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife
name). Eventually, the victim succumbed to his wounds. Six (6) days after the shooting incident, petitioner
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by
the police and has been positively identified by an eyewitness to the shooting. The police forthwith
detained him. Hence, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made by the police was lawful.
RULING/MAIN POINT:: No. Under the Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, a peace officer or
a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when the
shooting had in fact just been committed" could not be within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan. The information had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting and such does not constitute "personal knowledge." Thus, it must be the
arresting officer who shall have personal knowledge of the crime.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 438

People v. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701 (1994)
FACTS: Herein accused were convicted by the trial court of the crime of Murder. Alfaro, the victim, was
stabbed by Alfaro (accused) in the chest with a 6-inch double-bladed knife then Manlulu (accused)
followed suit and stabbed Alfaro in the abdomen several times with an ice pick. Moreover, Samson (using
the gun of Alfaro) also shot the victim in the neck. The incident happened during a drinking session and at
around one o'clock in the morning. Nonetheless, Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around
seven o'clock in the evening of the same day of the incident, he, together with some other officers,
arrested Manlulu (without warrant) on the information given by Manlapaz (witness).
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Manlulu, without warrant, was valid.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge,"
nor was the offense "in fact just been committed." The killing took place at one o'clock in the
morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening,
some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest.
Moreover, while Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which led to the arrest of
Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering
of information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest
immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 439

People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Rodrigueza was found guilty of a violation (possession and sale of marijuana
leaves) of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The issue stemmed when an informer told a Narcotics
Regional Unit of an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs involving herein accuse. After a buy-bust
operation conducted against accused, a team was ordered to arrest the accused even without warrant of
arrest when the latter was apprehended. However, the next day after the arrest, Rodrigueza was released
from detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made against Rodrigueza was valid.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto
requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or
any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure
adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the
prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran
immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This
act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly
contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a
buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been
subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 440

People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586
FACTS: Enrile was charged for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The issue stemmed when
Abugatal (Enrile’s co-accused but killed because of an attempted jail break), who was caught from a
buy-bust operation, together with the policemen, went to a house where Enrile was staying. Thereafter,
the former pointed he latter and accused him as the source of the marijuana confiscated from the
mentioned operation. This then caused the policemen to immediately arrest herein accused Enrile absent
any warrant of arrest. Hence, accused challenges the trial court’s decision for violation of the
Constitutional right against unlawful arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made against Enrile is valid.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. Abugatal’s accusation/confession against Enrile is in itself does not justify
Enrile's warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (a)
and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later
arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana. According
to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana
and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately
arrested him. What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the
information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search
was fruitful, arrest Enrile. Enrile was not caught in flagrante delicto.
FARGAS
Case No. 441
Hot Pursuit
People v. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166 (1997)
FACTS:
Patrolmen received a radio message that there was a shooting incident in Ihaw-Ihaw on Bonifacio
Street.
Because of this, they proceeded to the scene and saw the victim. Bystanders pointed to
accused-appellant as the
one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant. Hence, there was a warrantless arrest
conducted.
ISSUE:
W/N the warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court has held in analogous circumstances from several decided cases that a
warrantless arrest is valid when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it provided that the incident
only happened moments before the arrest and attendant by other related circumstances such as the
fleeing of accused or obvious manifestations of the crime connecting the accused to the incident. In the
case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact
accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was
then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the
victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.
Case No. 442

Hot Pursuit
People v. Del Rosario, GR 127755, April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Accused Rosario, a tricycle driver, was found guilty as co-principal for committing the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Bernas, a 66-yo businesswoman. Rosario
pleaded not guilty on the ground that he was unable to flee the scene of the crime or to assist the victim
because he was being threatened at gun point by Accused Santos that if he reports the incident to the
police, his family would be in danger. During the police raid a day after, Rosario was handcuffed by the
police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO. Respondent was arrested during the police raid at the place of accused Marquez, his arrest
was invalid because he wasn’t caught in the act or caught immediately after the consummation of the act.
Therefore, his arrest was outside the ambit of the exception on warrantless arrests because he was
arrested on the day after the commission of the offense. The appreciable lapse of time requires a
warrantless arrest, also the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the offense committed.
FARGAS
Case No. 443
Hot Pursuit
People v. Samus, GR 135957, April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Accused Samus, a farmer in the land in Laguna, was found guilty for the killing of Balisi, the 62-yo
neighbor of Samus’ father, and her 6-year old grandson by strangling and banging their heads to a
concrete which caused their death. Senior Inspector Garcia received an order to investigate the murder
then discovered that the elder Balisi’s earrings were missing. On September 10, the Criminal Investigation
Group (CIC) went to the Vallejo’s house where Samus was sighted and asked permission to enter, which
was granted. Samus was seen crawling on the roof then jumped from the roof. They ordered him to stop.
The CIG closed in on Samus, who admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo.
ISSUE:
RULING:
NO. The killing of the Balisis was not done in the presence of the arresting officers. In order for a
warrantless arrest to be valid, the peace officer or private individual must: 1.) when, in their presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense; 2.)
when an offense has just been committed, and they have probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it and 3.) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another, or from a penal establishment where he or she is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while the case is pending. None of these circumstances was present when the CIG arrested
Samus. He was not a prisoner.
FARGAS
Case No. 444
Hot Pursuit
People v. Cubcubin, GR 136267, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Cavite PNP station received a report that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard;
an alleged witness saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; the waitress at the Sting
Café said that the man who was last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and
was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; a tricycle driver told them that the physical
description given by the waitress fitted Cubcubin, and who said he knew where Cubcubin lived and
accompanied the police team to Cubcubin’s house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. found a bloodied white t-shirt upon
entering the house. When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it.
ISSUE:
W/N an arrest without personal knowledge that a criminal committed the act is valid.
RULING:
NO. 2 conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that “personal
knowledge of Facts’ in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion”.
FARGAS
Case No. 445
Hot Pursuit
People v. Gorente, 219 SCRA 756
FACTS:
Valenzuela Police Station patrolman Urrutia received a report from the Palo Police Detachment
about a mauling incident. The patrolman went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by that the victim died on arrival.Patrolman Urrutia with police team proceeded
to where the mauling incident took place and found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and
two roaches of marijuana. Witness informed them that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gerente as
one of the three men who killed Blace. The policemen proceeded to the house of the Gerente who was
then sleeping. Gerente was arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
W/N the policemen had personal knowledge of the facts rendering the warrantless arrest valid.
RULING:
YES. The arrest without warrant was lawful. The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense” ;(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
FARGAS
Case No. 446
Hot Pursuit
Padilla v. CA, GR 121917, March 12, 1997
FACTS:
Robin Padilla was involved in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992 as reported to the police. The
police stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response said report, he was later on apprehended
there. Upon arrest 4 high powered firearms and ammunitions were found in his possession. Padilla
claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of
Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers.
ISSUE:
W/N Padilla’s arrest was valid.
RULING:
YES. The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public
place and the
raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. Moreover,
when
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition. Petitioner’s
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
FARGAS
Case No. 447
Hot Pursuit
People v. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Burgos was charged with illegal possession of firearms and accused to be a member of the NPA.
This
allegation was made after the surrender of a former member of the NPA Masinlok. Mainsinlok claims that
Burgos
forced him to join the NPA and threaten to kill his family. Burgos was then arrested without a warrant. The
police
also searched his house without a search warrant however they found gun buried underneath the land
where the
house is located. Burgos denies the allegation charges against him he contend that it was Masinlok who
buried the
gun himself.
ISSUE:
W/N Burgos warrantless arrest justified.
RULING:
NO. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in
his presence or within his view. Personal knowledge required of an officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense
FARGAS
Case No. 448
Hot Pursuit
People v. Sucro – 195 SCRA 388
FACTS:
Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was under surveillance and saw the
accused Sucro
selling drugs in a chapel. Seeing the transaction made he radioed his commanding officer but was told to
continue
the surveillance. After two days the police apprehended Sucro and was charge in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs
Act. The Accused now contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under
Section 2,
Artilce III of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N there is a violation of the constitutional right.
RULING:
No. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. When a police officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant.
FARGAS
Case No. 449
Hot Pursuit
People v. Briones – 202 SCRA 708
FACTS:
Briones, Javier and Allied conspired and stole money from the Sps Gutirrez. During the
commission of the
robbery the accused-appellants hit the spouses with different objects that resulted to their death. The
following
morning the “eye witness” disclosed the information the police. The police formed teams and
apprehended the
culprits thereafter.
ISSUE:
W/N the accused- appellant were under an invalid since there was no warrant.
RULING:
Yes. It is unequivocally clear that no valid arrest was made on the accused-appellants, the arrest
having
been made without any warrant at all. Neither can the appellants’; arrest qualify as a lawful arrest without
a
warrant under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because the police officer who
effected the
arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed the
crime. It is eyewitness Francisco who had such personal knowledge, In like manner, We cannot accept
appellee’s
bare allegation that Briones was a fugitive from justice at the time of the latter’s arrest because it is not
supported
by the evidence on record. In sum, therefore, the warrantless arrest of the appellants is illegal. Mere
allegations and without the proper authorities witnessing the actual crime constitutes to illegal arrest.
FARGAS
Case No. 450
Hot Pursuit
People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79
FACTS:
A robbery had took place after some armed men tried to stop the delivery of wages to a hacienda
in Cebu.
After the robbery the police received a report and found the getaway motorcycle without the perpetrators
but they
found a paper which was a biodata containing the “Melvida, Nenito” and the entry for the father’s name
filled in
with “Elpidio Melvida”. Luna the policeman took Melvida to the police station instead kept him there the
whole
night and placed a bail only then he was allowed to leave. During the investigation Melvina was without a
counsel.
ISSUE:
W/N a valid warrantless arrest was effected.
RULING:
No. Luna’s basis for arresting Melvida was the bio-data sheet with Melvida’s name on it found at
the crime
scene. By no means can this indicate that Melvida committed the offense charged. It does not even
connote that
Melvida was at the crime scene for the biodata sheet could have been obtained by anyone and left at the
crime
scene long before or after the crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating
Melvida’s guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion. Melvida’s arrest was thus illegal. Where a
policeman had no personal knowledge of facts indicating a suspect’s guilt—at best, only an Unreasonable
suspicion—then the warrantless arrest effected was illegal
LAUGHTON
CASE 451
Hot pursuit
People v. Nazareno – 260 SCRA 256
FACTS: Bunye rode a tricycle and crossed the road then One of the men jumped out of a tricycle and
shot Bunye at the back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant fired another shot at
Bunye’s head. Then, the other man approached Bunye and shot him in the head. The tricycle drivers
executed sworn affidavits relating what they had witnessed. The two described the assailants and stated
that they could recognize the killers if they saw them again. Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando
Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were put in a police line-up. They were
identified and pointed to as the assailants. Accused-appellants claim that their arrests without warrant
were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N Accused-appellants claim that their arrests without warrant were illegal and justify the
nullification of the proceedings of the trial court tenable.
RULING/MP: NO. The contention is untenable. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Narciso
Nazareno was upheld by this Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It was alleged that Nazareno’s
arrest was illegal because it was made without warrant fourteen days after the killing of Romulo Bunye II.
This Court dismissed the petition. He filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court also denied on the
ground that the warrantless arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
LAUGHTON
CASE 452
Hot pursuit
People v. Mahusay – 282 SCRA 80
FACTS: On April 19, 1988, in Leyte, the house of the Bughao family was entered by men, herein
accused, and took items from their dwelling and raped one of the daughters, Marilou. Immediately the day
after the unfortunate event, the family went to Integrated National Police to report the case. Which
prompted the quick dispatch of officers and later, without any warrant, arrested the accused.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest is of hot pursuit where a warrant of arrest is not necessary.
RULING/MP: NO. Their contention is wrong that what transpired is of the nature of a hot pursuit, thus the
case does not warrant a warrantless arrest. Under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal
Procedure., two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the person to be arrested
must have just committed an offense, and second, the arresting peace officer or private person must have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. In the instant case, the second condition is not attendant.
LAUGHTON
CASE 453
Hot pursuit
People v. Alvario – 275 SCRA 529
FACTS: Esterlina, the offended party, looking for a job as a house helper. During the search, with the
assistance of a friend, found an opening in one of the residences in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati. The one
who hired her was herein accused. After days of being employed, Alvario routinely went inside the room
of Esterlina with a gun, and started raping her. After gaining courage, she called her sister who then
reported such a heinous act to the authorities. Alvario was then arrested at his residence without a
warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest without a warrant is justifiable in the case at bar.
RULING/MP: YES. The Court notes that during the trial, Alvario consistently protested his warrantless
arrest. Suffice it to say that his arrest falls within the purview of Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at bar was culled
from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the
time of his arrest. A warrantless arrest may be made by police officers based on their personal knowledge
culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to the suspect as the man who
raped her at the time of his arrest.
LAUGHTON
CASE 454
Hot pursuit
Larranaga v. CA – 287 SCRA 521
FACTS: Francisco Larranaga (aka Paco) was arrested without warrant by PNP CIG at Center for Culinary
Arts. The arrest was made in connection with the kidnapping and serious illegal detention of 2 women.
However, upon the assistance of Paco’s counsel, asked that they furnish a copy of the affidavits and be
given 20 days to file their defense, and that Paco should be subjected to a regular preliminary
investigation, not undergo an inquest investigation. However, this was denied by the City Prosecutor of
Cebu.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest is lawful.
RULING/MP: NO. The records do not show that the petitioner was “lawfully arrested.” For one, the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that
he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on
September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless
arrest of the petitioner. : Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
LAUGHTON
CASE 455
Hot pursuit
People v. Olivarez – GR 77865, Dec. 4, 1998
FACTS: A robbery with homicide was allegedly made by the accused in a house located in Tanada
Subdivision Venezuela, Metro Manila. During the investigation, Olivarez was pointed out. In pursuit of the
accused, the PNP went to its former employer where the workers stated that Olivarez has not been
reporting since the incident. Later on, upon receiving reliable information, the arresting officers went to the
address where they found the accused and without warrant or order, asked the latter to come with them to
the police precinct and conducted an investigation.
ISSUE: W/N not the invitation of the accused to the police precinct is a prohibition that is not wanting in a
warrantless arrest.
RULING/MP: YES. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made, the arresting officers testified
that appellants were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however, when construed in the
light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an
interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended
for no other reason than to conduct an investigation.
LAUGHTON
CASE 456
Hot pursuit
Cadua v. CA – 312 SCRA 703
FACTS: PO3 Joselito Burdeous and companions received a radio call, during their duty, that there was an
alleged holdup in the vicinity of Fairview, Quezon City. Upon arriving at the place, the police officers found
two (2) complainants and asked them to board their patrol car. Upon exchange of information, the
complainants were able to describe herein accused, Cadua. While patrolling with the complainants, they
were able to identify the accused and found that he was holding an unlicensed firearm in his possession,
which then proceeded his arrest without a warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless is valid.
RULING/MP: YES. The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court. Through police
dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a
robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was
directly implicated as a suspect. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
LAUGHTON
CASE 457
Hot pursuit
People v. Cubcubin – 360 SCRA
FACTS: The Cavite City Police Station has received a telephone call that a person had been shot. For
this reason, a police team responded to the call and found the victim slumped dead on his tricycle. A
tricycle driver then told a police officer that the accused-appellant and the victim were last seen together
coming out of a café located about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. A waitress at the
said café told the investigators that she had seen the accused arrive together with the victim but did not
know if they left together. She described the accused-appellant in which then another tricycle driver told
the investigators that he knows a person that fits the description given by the waitress and told them
where his house is. As the police went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao noticed a
“bloodied” shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two (2) spent .38 caliber shells fell. As they proceeded the
search, PO3 Estoy found on top of a plastic water container a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38
revolver and five live ammunition. The police station then took custody of Cubcubin and the evidence was
found. After an evaluation of the evidence, a formal criminal complaint was filed against the
accused-appellant.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was valid.
RULING/MP: NO. Two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has
just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that
“‘personal knowledge of facts’ in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The arresting officers did not have ‘personal
knowledge of the facts as their knowledge of the circumstance from which they allegedly inferred that the
accused was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others. They merely relied
on information given to them by others.
LAUGHTON
CASE 458
Hot pursuit
People v. Compacion – 361 SCRA 540
FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing
and cultivating marijuana plants, police officers of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a
surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain. During the said
surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to
be marijuana plants. A team was immediately formed. The team proceeded at the residence of accused
despite failure to obtain a search warrant. Police officers alleged that the accused-appellant opened the
gate and permitted them to come in. Compacion, however, contended that after he opened the gate, four
(4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the
house. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some went upstairs while the others went
around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid search in the backyard of the accused.
RULING/MP: NO. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every
right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently—the act of the accused in allowing the members of the police force to enter his
premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed
as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so
when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. An accused is not
presumed to have waived the unlawful search simply because he failed to object—a peaceful submission
to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law.
LAUGHTON
CASE 459
Hot pursuit
Posadas v. Ombudsman – 341 SCRA
FACTS: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a
rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity. Petitioner Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman
asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. With
that, respondent Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI and his men went to U.P. and,
on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses; they attempted to arrest
Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as
suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police
Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
ISSUE: W/N the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant.
RULING/MP: NO. The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two
students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two
alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. Where the
NBI agents only had the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, the same is
insufficient to justify an arrest without a warrant.
LAUGHTON
CASE 460
Hot pursuit
People v. Acol – 232 SCRA 406
FACTS: Percival Tan was driving his jeepney when two men boarded the vehicle, together with two other
companions, announced a hold-up. After the incident, Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort
Bonifacio to report the crime. A team was formed to track down the culprits. Tan saw four persons, one of
whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio; he told the police
authorities to waylay said persons. After the officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to
different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were
apprehended. Acol and Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with
bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Tan and the
passengers as the hold-uppers. Acol and Boses denied the charges alleging that they were arrested
without cause and were forced to admit ownership of guns which were shown to them.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid arrest on the basis of the circumstances.
RULING/MP: YES. This falls under the exception which states “when an offense has in fact been
committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.” The police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons
responsible for the crime on account of the information related by Tan that they had just been robbed. And
since the accused's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid.
Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the
robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.Warrantless arrest and seizure was
valid where it was done by a police team dispatched to look for persons responsible for the crime based
on information related by victims who have just been robbed.
LOTA
Case No. 461
ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: PROCEDURAL RULES
People v. Rabang
FACTS: After the happening of a stabbing incident which caused the death of one and the injury of the
witness, herein accused-appellant was held in custody by police officers upon the giving of testimony.
Upon the case reaching the Supreme Court, appellant assailed the legality of his arrest by the police
investigators allegedly for the reason that it “was based solely on the basis of the tip and say-so from a
telephone informant who refused to identify himself.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may assail the legality of his arrest during trial.
RULING: No. The Court considers that appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
An examination of the record reveals that this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant before
this Court. He had not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground.
Thus, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
MAIN POINT: Any irregularity attendant to an arrest is cured when the accused voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
LOTA
Case No. 462
Art III Sec 2. Procedural Rules
People v. Lopez
FACTS: Accused Lopez was charged with the murder of Jesus Reyes. On arraignment, he entered a
plea of not guilty and a trial ensued where the RTC later found him guilty of the said charge.
Appellant, in the instant petition, challenges the trial court’s decision because he insists that he is
innocent and raises the question of his arrest without a warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may still assail the illegality of his arrest.
RULING: NO. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. When accused-appellant was arrested
and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and
presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Besides,
this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information
before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was
cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not
guilty and by participating in the trial.
LOTA
Case No. 463
Velasco v. CA
FACTS: A warrant of arrest was issued against accused Larkins for violation of BP 22. Later, a certain
Desiree Alinea filed a complaint-affidavit before the NBI accusing Larkins of rape, pursuant to such,
Larkins was arrested and detained, but Judge Padolina later issued an order for his release. Special
Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused, as Larkins was still detained for another cause, which was
rape. Consequently, Alinea filed a complaint for rape with the RTC. Larkins filed a motion for its dismissal
based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, which was denied. Hence, his common-law wife
filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CA granted because the complaint presented to the NBI by
Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not
meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners insist that the
petition for habeas corpus could no longer be granted because Larkins had already been charged with
the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus should be granted in the case at bar, in view of the
accused’s illegal arrest and detention.
RULING: NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the filing of a complaint or information
for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is
already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available. It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, Criminal charges have been filed
against petitioner. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed. Larkins’ detention has become legal by virtue of the complaint
before the trial court.
LOTA
Case No. 464
People v. Buluran
FACTS: Appellants Buluran and Valenzuela were charged with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment,
they entered a plea of not guilty but were later convicted of the crime charged. Appellants now argue that
their warrantless arrest, lack of counsel during custodial investigation, and the lack of preliminary
investigation render the criminal proceedings against them illegal for violation of their constitutional rights.
ISSUES: (1) W/N appellants may still question the validity of their arrest; (2) W/N their constitutional rights
were violated during custodial investigation for lack of counsel; (3) W/N the lack of preliminary
investigation render the proceedings in the trial court invalid.
RULING:
(1) Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they
never raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
(2) There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation
since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or admission. Any allegation of
violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction.
(3) The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not render the
proceedings invalid. While the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive right,
nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Appellants only raised said issue during appeal.
Additional Readings:
As per syllabus:
Ø ARREST – RULE 113 of Rules of Criminal Procedure

Ø Section 2 of Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
Ø RA. 7438: AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a
language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained
does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect
known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and
void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers
and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or
priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall
be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any
national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of
by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President.
The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child,
brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or
ward.
LOTA
Case No. 465

Art III Section. Arrest
AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 496
FACTS: In a rape case, private complainant failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness
stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that the
complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.”
ISSUE: W/N Judge Carbonell was right in dismissing the case due to lack of probable cause.
RULING: No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court explained that
this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.
LOTA
Case No. 466
People v. Alunday, G.R. No. 181546, 3 September 2008, 564 SCRA 135
FACTS: The Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of the Mountain Province received a
report from a confidential informant that there was an existing marijuana plantation within the vicinity of
Mt. Churyon. After a series of validations, the existence of the subject plantation was finally confirmed.
The Police Director ordered a contingent of policemen to the subject plantation and upon arriving at the
area saw Ricardo Alunday cutting and gathering marijuana leaves. The police took Alunday to the hut
where they saw a woman, an M16 rifle and some dried marijuana leaves.
ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
RULING: Yes. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in
flagrante delicto. In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which
warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a
crime, or is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the arresting
officer.
LOTA
Case No. 467

Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit
People v. Joselito Del Rosario
Facts: Accused Rosario, a tricycle driver, was found guilty as co-principal for committing the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Bernas, a 66-yo businesswoman.
Witness Alonzo, also a tricycle driver testified that there were two men who alighted from the tricycle.
Who are, accused Visaya who snatched the victim’s purse, and accused Marquez who chased away the
man who was trying to assist the victim. Victim was shot on the head. Afterwards, they boarded the
tricycle. Alonzo reported the incident to the police. Rosario pleaded not guilty on the ground that he was
unable to flee the scene of the crime or to assist the victim because he was being threatened at gun point
by Accused Santos that if he reports the incident to the police, his family would be in danger. During the
police raid a day after, Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already
gathered enough evidence against him. Rosario alleged that his arrest was unlawful because there was
no warrant of arrest.
Issue: W/N an arrest a day after the commission of the crime without a warrant is a lawful warrantless
arrest.
Ruling: NO. Respondent was arrested during the police raid at the place of accused Marquez, his arrest
was invalid because he wasn’t caught in the act or caught immediately after the consummation of the act.
Therefore, his arrest was outside the ambit of the exception on warrantless arrests because he
was arrested on the day after the commission of the offense. The appreciable lapse of time
requires a warrantless arrest, also the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the offense
committed.
Main point in bold. Detailed version below.
2 stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the
time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
LOTA
CASE NO. 468

ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit
People v. Jayson
FACTS: Patrolmen received a radio message that there was a shooting incident in Ihaw-Ihaw on
Bonifacio Street. Because of this, they proceeded to the scene and saw the victim. Bystanders pointed to
accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant. Hence, there
was a warrantless arrest conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING/ MAIN POINT:: Yes. The Supreme Court has held in analogous circumstances from several
decided cases that a warrantless arrest is valid when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge (even if did not personally witnessed the crime) of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it provided that the incident only happened moments before the
arrest and attendant by other related circumstances such as the fleeing of accused or obvious
manifestations of the crime connecting the accused to the incident. In the case at bar there was a
shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. Accused-appellant was
pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not
gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was then fleeing. The arresting
officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.
LOTA
Case No. 469

ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Oliver Edano
FACTS: Oliver arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached Oliver and
talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was
approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. They chased the appellant;
PO3 Corbe was able to grab Oliver, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a
"knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun
tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police
brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
RULING: NO. In this case, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was
unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic
bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come
from an invalid search and seizure. Moreover, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
LOTA
Case No. 470
Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014, 739 SCRA 337
FACTS: The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless arrest took place. The RTC denied
the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.
Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter
called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with
augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation
and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest is valid.
RULING: YES. the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: when an offense has just been committed, and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it. the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than
one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso.
NICANOR
CASE 471
RULE 126 OF REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
SECTION 1. Search warrant defined.—A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.—An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the
judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. —A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. —The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
SEC. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. —If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search.—The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses.—No search
of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
SEC. 9. Time of making search.—The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless
the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
SEC. 10. Validity of search warrant.—A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its
date. Thereafter, it shall be void. (9a)
SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized.—The officer seizing property under the warrant must
give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in
the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. —(a)
The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall
ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the
judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court. (11a)
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
SEC. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.—A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted
upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been
instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in
another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.
NICANOR
CASE NO 472
“A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC (Rules on the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in the Execution of Warrants)
SECTION 3. Use of Body-Worn Cameras During Arrest. — At least one body-worn camera and one
alternative recording device, or such number as necessary to capture and record the relevant
incidents during execution of the warrant shall be worn by members of the team making the arrest
by virtue of a warrant. Should a body-worn camera be unavailable, at least two alternative
recording devices must be used. The officers having such cameras shall ensure that they are
worn in a conspicuous location and in a manner that maximizes thelr ability to capture a recording
of the arrest. Both video and audio recording functions of the cameras shall be activated as soon
as the officers arrive at the place of arrest. Unless provided in Rule 4, Section 10 of these Rules,
the cameras shall not be deactivated until the arrest has been fully concluded and the arresting
officers have delivered the person arrested to the nearest police station or jail pursuant to Rule
113, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Where a peace officer effectuates an arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and insofar as it is practicable, the arrest shall be recorded using body-wom
cameras or alternative recording devices in the same manner as an arrest made with a warrant.
Further, in cases of warrantless arrests effected under Section 21 of the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended, the media representative may be allowed to record the
operation, subject to the custody requirements under Rule 4, Sections 1, 2, and 3 of these Rules.
In case of malfunction, damage, or unavailability of body-wom cameras, resort to alternative
recording devices may be allowed. Reasons for resorting to such alternative devices shall be
explained in the affidavit to be submitted to the court under Section 4 of this Rule.
SECTION 4. Affldavit of Arrest and Submission of Recordings to Court.
— Upon filing of the report under Rule 113, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
all recordings from the body-wom cameras or alternative recording devices used during the
execution of the warrant shall be stored in an external media storage device and simultaneously
deposited in a sealed package with the issuing court, provided that the officer may, Resolution 13
A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC with leave of court, retain a back-up copy for justifiable reasons for a period
not exceeding 15 days. In case of redaction of personal identifiers in the recordings pursuant to
Rule 4, Section 4 of these Rules, both the unredacted and the redacted files shall be submitted to
the court. The report shall be accompanied by affidavits of the officers whose body-worn cameras
or alternative recording devices were used to capture the recordings, and the affidavits shall
state:
1. The date, time, and place of the recording;
2. The manner by which the recording was taken and stored, and when applicable, the fact of
unavailability of body-worn cameras and that a resort to alternative recording devices was
necessary, and the circumstances detailing the non-activation, interruption, or sudden termination
of the recording;
3. The fact that persons subject of the recording were notified of the use of body-wom cameras or
alternative recording devices;
4. The date, time, place, and other circumstances surrounding the first instance of retrieval or
download of the recordings from the cameras;
5. The names and positions of the persons who had possession of and access to the recordings,
including details of such access, from the time of their taking until their deposit with the court;
6. The fact of redaction of personal identifiers appearing in the recording whenever applicable, the
special circumstances justifying such redaction, and the details redacted, pursuant to Rule
4, Section 4 of these Rules;
7. Whenever applicable, a certification that both unredacted and redacted files containing the
recordings are submitted to the court;
8. The names and positions of the officers who will be delivering the recordings to the court;
9 Reasonable ground in case of noncompliance with any of the requirements on the use of
body-worn cameras or alternative recording devices, including all acts undertaken showing
genuine and sufficient efforts exerted to ensure compliance with these Rules.
In case of death, physical disability, resignation, or severance of ties with the agency of the
officers whose body-worn cameras or alternative recording devices were used in the execution of
the warrant, any member of the arresting team shall make the affidavit.
NICANOR
473
SEC 2: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014
FACTS: A search warrant was issued to search the premises of herein petitioner World Wide Web
Corporation as well as the premises of Planet Internet. The application for the search warrants alleged
that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations that amounted to theft and violation of P.D.
No. 401 to damage and prejudice the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
ISSUE: W/N the issuance is valid
RULING/MP: Yes. Probable cause is determined based on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the offender. In the case at bar, probable cause
existed which justified the issuance of the search warrants in question.
CASE 474
NICANOR
People vs Cogaed
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
FACTS: A police officer “received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer” that one Marvin
Buya would be transporting marijuana.” Thereafter, the police officers established a checkpoint. The
jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to the police officer indicating the two male passengers who
were carrying marijuana. The police officer asked passengers Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of
their bags. Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana.
RULING/MP: No. The search was made without a warrant and does not constitute a valid warrantless
search. The Constitution provides that every person has the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In this case, there was no valid search since there was no search warrant. Moreover, the search
made does not fall squarely to the exceptions or valid warrantless search.
CASE 475
NICANOR
PEOPLE vs. CALANTIAO
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
FACTS: EDWIN LOJERA approached PO1 NELSON MARIANO while on duty and asked for police
assistance regarding a shooting incident. When they reached the place and while approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away.
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued and recovered from the accused a
black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana.
ISSUE: W/N marijuana found in his possession is admissible as evidence against him
RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s
possession and within his immediate control. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also
in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control.
CASE 476
NICANOR
LUZ vs.PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
FACTS: SPO1 caught the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and while he was issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he told the accused to put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or meta. He asked the accused to open it and upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be two
(2) contained suspected shabu.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid search and seizure
RULING/MP: No. In the case at bar, there was no valid arrest hence, seizure is illegal. In addition, the
evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.Neither was there a consented warrantless search. The subject items seized during the illegal
arrest are inadmissible.
CASE 477
NICANOR
CONFUSED CITIZEN VS ARGUELLES
FACTS: After hearing the applicant and his witnesses, Judge Sabarre issued Search Warrant against
Espinosa, Sr and to be served at the Sub-Provincial Jail in Baybay, Leyte. November 5, 2016, the search
warrants were served. PCI Laraga reported that during the implementation of the search warrant against
Espinosa at Cell No. 1, "respondent fired upon the raiding team that resulted to a firefight causing his
untimely death. Items seized "during the conduct of the crime scene by the SOCO" include "one (1) unit
firearm chamber loaded) with six ( 6) live ammos and a transparent cellophane containing suspected
shabu, and other paraphernalia."
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of search warrants directed against persons already under the custody of a
government detention facility is proper
RULING/MP: NO. Judges Sabarre should have required the applicants to comply with OCA Circular
before issuing the subject search warrants implemented inside the Abuyog Pena Facility.
Paragraph 5, OCA Circular No. 40-2016, provides, among others, that the the heads of the National
Bureau of Investigation· (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Anti-Crirrie Task Force (ACTAF)
and the Philippine Drug 'Enforcement Agency (PDEA) shall personally endorse ( or authorize) all
applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of · firearms
and ammunitions as well as violation~ of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;
A perusal of the records shows that the applicant police officers failed to secure the endorsement of
any of the enumerated key officers of the PNP in any of the search warrants they secured from Judges
Sabarre and Cabalona.
CASE 478
NICANOR
ART III SEC 3: RIGHT TO PRIVACY
DISINI vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

FACTS:The Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 or known as theCybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 which seeks to protect individuals from crimes or unlawful acts that can be
committed through the internet.Petitioners in these consolidated cases, contended that this law violated
certain constitutional rights thus praying that it be declared void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: W/N provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violated freedom of expression and
privacy
RULING/MP: YES, the Supreme Court declared three (3) provisions void for being unconstitutional, to wit
Sections 4(c)(3), Section 12, and Section 19. The Court in Section 4(c)(3) placed great weight in the
protection of commercial speech, it is ruled that unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression. It ruled that there is no basis to the claim that the presence of unsolicited commercial
communications or spam tend to slow down the efficiency of computers, as well as its storage and is
considered as a nuisance to the users. Commercial speech is afforded protection in this case, further
stating that people have the right to read one’s email, and the denial of such constitutes violation of
freedom of expression. As to Section 12, the court found that it failed to provide safeguards to the right to
privacy of every individual, as it authority is given to law enforcement authorities to gather electronic traffic
data referred as the date, time, size, origin etc. of a certain communication. It is declared as
unconstitutional, as it must be specific and definite to ensure that the rights of every individual are
protected
CASE 479
NICANOR
ART III SEC 3: Scope: Tangible and Intangible Objects
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information
by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Evidence of petitioner's end of the
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to
the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, since there was
"no physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation in Fourth Amendment
RULING/MP: Yes.The US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal
telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy
right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
(I copied the ruling found in our syllabus)
CASE 480
NICANOR
Riley vs California
June 25, 2014
FACTS: The petitioner, Riley was stopped by the police for traffic violations. This led to a search of his
car. He was subsequently arrested for possessing firearms. His cell phone was seized in the process and
searched. On the basis of evidence discovered in the phone, he was charged with possession of firearms
and attempted murder. Riley moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the phone. He claimed that it
was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, since no warrant had been issued for the search of the
cell phone. This was rejected by the trial court, and this decision was affirmed by the California Court of
Appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search of the cell phone of an arrested person was a violation of the right to
be secure against unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
RULING/MP: YES. It held that a warrantless search of the cell phone of an arrested person was not
reasonable and thus violated the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches.
The Court held that the digital data stored on a cell phone could not itself be used as a weapon to harm
an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. As far as preservation of evidence was
concerned, the Court held that once a cell phone had been seized, there was no longer a risk that the
arrestee would delete incriminating data from the phone. Hence, the present case of warrantless search
was held to be violative of the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. Further, it was held that warrantless search of cell phones would violate “the
privacies of life” of individuals.
PIEDAD
Case No. 481

US v. Graham
FACTS: Defendant-Appellants Graham and Jordan were charged as co-conspirators in a string of
armed robberies. Police caught Graham during the last robbery and recognized certain similarities
with earlier ones. As a result, the government obtained a search warrant for Graham’s residence; the
search uncovered, among other things, two cell phones. Investigators then obtained two court orders
directed at Sprint/Nextel, the provider of the two cell phones, which commanded the company to
disclose cell site location information associated with the defendants' devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not government’s warrantless procurement of extended cell site location
information violated the appellants’ right to privacy.
RULING: YES. The Majority emphasized that there is a “recognized privacy interest in the
comprehensive accounts of one’s movements and location” and that the extended nature of
the cell site location information collection and inspection, which allowed the government to
account for the defendants’ movements was unreasonable.
PIEDAD
Case No. 482
ART III SEC 3: Factors to Determine Violation of the Right to Privacy

In the matter of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas of Camilo I. Sabio GR 174340,
FACTS: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced a resolution “directing an inquiry in aid of

legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporations and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation Holdings Corporation, due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this,
Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation and invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the government violate such reasonable expectation of privacy exhibited by
the PHILCOMSAT directors.
RULING: NO. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Obviously, the inquiry
focuses on petitioners’ acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the
said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where
the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which
the people have the right to information.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 483
ART III SEC 3: Factors to Determine Violation of the Right to Privacy
Briccio Pollo v. Chairperson Karina David
FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received a document from an anonymous

source, making her aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed
personnel and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein. Respondent
found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to administrative cases
and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. He asserted that the CSC conducted
a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was
anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials).
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to
privacy.
RULING: NO. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The SC found that he
had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not have a separate office
space, nor did he use a password for his computer. The CSC also implemented a policy that
its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 484
ART. III SEC 3: FACTORS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales
FACTS: Atty. Miguel Morales is a clerk of the Court in the MeTC of Manila charged in an anonymous
letter with misconduct for allegedly using working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using
office supplies, equipment and utilities. On a spot investigation conducted, evidences were
discovered on hi personal computer. The accused now contends that since the evidences were
acquired from his personal computer without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence
should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy. While the
investigating officer claims that it was obtained with the consent of the former.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the
present administrative case against him.
RULING: No. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under
Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution
also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The fact that the present case
is administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative.
The contention that it was obtained with consent is not sufficient to have it fall under a valid
warrantless search into the personal computer of Atty. Morales. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence with which burden of proving
lies with the State.
MP: Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. To constitute a valid
consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 485

Syhunliong v Rivera
FACTS: Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition.
The said accused with a text message saying that she had suffered a lot in collecting her last pay,
meant and intended to convey and to destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong.
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that her text message was not prompted by ill will or
spite but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests. RTC denied the said
motion and her MR. Upon appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed ruling that the matter
contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354 of the RPC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of the case
on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged communication.
RULING: No. The Court stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within
the purview of a qualified privileged communication. Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a
qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own
interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no
unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."
MP: The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any
subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is
privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 486

Ramirez v CA
FACTS: Petitioner filed a civil case against the private respondent Ester Garcia alleging that the
latter vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy evidenced by
a tape recording of the said confrontation. Respondent then filed a criminal case against the
petitioner for violation of RA 4200 or An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner contends that the
said law does not apply as the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. RTC ruled in favor of
herein petitioner but the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not “private communication” in RA 4200 also contemplates “private

conversation”.
RULING: Yes. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of
R.A. 4200.
MP: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 487

Navarro v CA
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the
decision of the trial court finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide based on a voice recording between the petitioner and the deceased inside the police
station the night the incident happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recording is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits
wiretapping.
RULING & MP: Yes. The RA 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private as it
was inside a police station, its tape recording is not prohibited.Nor is there any question that it was
duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 488
ART. III SEC 3: RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
NOT COVERED
Alejano v Cabuay
FACTS: This is a petition to review which seeks to nullify the decision rendered by the CA
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus filed by the counsels of detained officers who committed a
coup d’état on the 23rd of July 2003 renouncing their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Petitioners bewail the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing
the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel. Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read
the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy for the petitioner’s
complaint at bar.
(2) Whether or not opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainee is an infringement of
his right to privacy.
RULING & MP: (1) No. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate. Petitioners themselves admit that they do not question the legality of the
detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal
and military offenses. Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to
circumstances where there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. However, a mere
allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. (2) No. That a law is
required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that
is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. By
the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for
the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were
not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 889
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED

IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA
FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her
case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust
resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1stDivision, that it was railroaded with such
hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is
nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she
would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro
Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty.
Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en
banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was
not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not
aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap
eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa,
Herrera,Cruz), again with more threats to “exposethe kind of judicial performance readily constituting
travesty of justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen
Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute
Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the
press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that
the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now,
the SC is charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and
that they did not intend to dishonor the court.
ISSUE: WON privacy of communication was violated
RULING: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the
premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of
an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession.
PIEDAD
CASE NO. 490

PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA
Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio, a
forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing.
The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused
Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an
extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to
join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim,
Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.” Esma testified against
the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was
thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to
change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were
convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of
alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy.
RULING: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who
produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing
really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being
taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.
MAINPOINT: Albofera’s letter is not covered by the Sec 3, Art III provision as it was not the result of
an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s
privacy.z
CASE NO. 491

DR LEE VS P/SUPT ILAGAN
MP: As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
FACTS: Neri visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he
noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported
sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied
the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation
where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this,
Joy filed several cases against him,. The RTC found that her acts of reproducing the same and
showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him.
ISSUE: W/N the right to privacy of Neri was violated
RULING: NO. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a
privacy interest in the suppression of this video, he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
CASE NO. 492

GAMBOA VS P/SUPT CHAN
MP: It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.
FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance
operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP- Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the
right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty
or security.
RULING: NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
CASE NO. 493

GAANAN VS IAC
MP: Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension line is not punished
by Anti- Wiretapping Law.
FACTS: Laconico requested petitioner to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for complainant’s
settlement discussing terms of withdrawal of complaint. Complainant asked Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions, which the latter answered in affirmative. When he received the
money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant then charged
Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the telephone conversation without
complainants consent.
ISSUE: W/N extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such
that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line
RULING: NO. The phrase “device or arrangement” in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the
same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the
main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
CASE NO. 494

Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered
by private respondent were 3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. CA
denied the petition because tape recordings are not inadmissible per se.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in
evidence
RULING: NO. Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible in

evidence. RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
CASE NO. 495

Zulueta v. CA
MP: A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged.
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet therein and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought
the action for recovery of the documents and papers against Zulueta, with Manila RTC, which
ruled in favor of Martin, and ordered Zulueta to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable even
when aggrieved party is the spouse.
RULING: YES. The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
CASE NO. 496

Ople v. Torres
MP: The right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. It requires
that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
FACTS: A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos for the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that: it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, o it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy. Petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and heads of government
agencies, who were charged of the implementation of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.
RULING: YES. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional. The vagueness of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar,
the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services.
CASE NO. 497

Waterous Drug v.. NLRC
MP: The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refer to
the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion of the government.
FACTS: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. Yung
Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP, Inc.), a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, through
Catolic, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets. However, previous purchase orders issued to YSP showed
that the price was lower by Php 64.00 per unit than the original price. YSP Accounting Dept.
confirmed paying through check to Catolico. Catolico denied receiving the same. However, a
clerk of Waterous confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check payable to Catolico.
Waterous ordered the termination of Catolico. NLRC dismissed the petition. Evidence of the
respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
RULING: YES. The incident involving the opening of the envelope addressed to Catolico
does not warrant the application of constitutional provisions. There was no violation of
the right of privacy of communication in this case.
CASE NO. 498

People vs. Marti
MP: The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against act of private individuals, but it
is directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law.
FACTS: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in

Zurich. The proprietress asked if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before
delivering the packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the
proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the
standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents. He
brought the said sample to the NBI. The contents, after examination by forensic chemists, were
found to be marijuana flowering tops. The appellant contended that the marijuana leaves were
fruits of an illegal search and therefore under exclusionary rule of Sec. 3 (2) of Bill of Rights.
The appellant was invited by the agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty
of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s

constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked against the State. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals.
CASE NO. 499
ART III SEC 3: EXCLUSIONARY RULE
PEOPLE V. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626
MP: The Supreme Court declared that in a search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest, it is necessary for probable cause to be present, and probable cause must be
based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed.
FACTS: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling
Rose” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team.
The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio,
when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rose” was, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rose” about the contents of her
bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic
bag marked “cash katutak”. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to
evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the
accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie
“Balweg”. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder
bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the
old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.
RULING: NO. The Court invalidated the search and seizure made on a woman, “Aling Rose”,
who, upon alighting from a bus, was pointed out by the informant. In this case, the accused was
merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner which would engender a
reasonable ground to believe that she was committing or about to commit a crime.
CASE NO. 500

ART III SEC 4: FACIAL CHALLENGE CONCEPT
IMBONG V. OCHOA, GR 204819 April 08, 2014
MP: A facial challenge is an exception to the rule that only persons who are directly affected by
a statute have legal standing to assail the same. This is only applicable to statutes involving free
speech, impeached on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness. Here, the litigants are
permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but
because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged on its face as it is not a speech regulating
measure.
ISSUE: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy
regarding facial challenge.
RULING: YES. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
CASE NO. 500-B

ART III SEC 4: FACIAL CHALLENGE CONCEPT
Divinagracia v. CBS, Inc. GR 162272, April 2009
MP: A facial challenge is an exception to the rule that only persons who are directly
affected by a statute have legal standing to assail the same. This is only applicable to
statutes involving free speech, impeached on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness.
Here, the litigants are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of
free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the
statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.
FACTS: Following the enactment of these franchise laws, NTC issued Provisional Authorities
allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various
locations throughout the nation. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that he was a
stockholder of respondent companies, filed two complaints with the NTC alleging that despite
the provisions of the law mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of
Respondents, both entities had failed to make such offering. Petitioner prayed for the
cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of Respondents. The NTC dismissed both
complaints, positing that although it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional
Authority or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions, it refrained from
exercising the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of
entities which Congress has issued franchises to operate
RULING: NO. We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as established by E.O. No.
546. One can readily notice that even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs
to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or
otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and
CPCs from operating radio or television stations.
SAKIR
CASE 501
ART III SEC 4: STATE REGULATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MASS MEDIA

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP. V. DANS, JR.
137 SCRA 628, July 19, 1985
FACTS: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE
which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was
denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a
factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which
closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a
motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
expression.
RULING: Court did not rule on the matter because the case is already moot and academic since
the petitioner withdrew his petition. However, the Court issued these guidelines:
The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right, although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression
is the “clear and present danger” rule – that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent. The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a
simplistic and all-embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. It must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by
government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and
sophisticated handling.
SAKIR
CASE 502
ART III SEC 4: VALID PRIOR RESTRAINT; DANGER TO NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAVEZ V. GONZALES
GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Chavez seeks to annul void the proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents alleging that their acts are
violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped
conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of
such issuances, and orders by respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents are violative of the freedom of expression and of the
press.
RULING: Yes. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Generally, restraints on
freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests. One of those is
the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” In this case, the need to
prevent the violation of the law cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a
preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.
SAKIR
CASE 503
ART III SEC 4: SPEECH/EXPRESSION AND THE JUDICIARY

OCA Circular No. 173-2017, Proper Use of Social Media, 17 August 2017
MAIN POINT: While judges and court personnel are not prohibited from engaging in social media, they
are reminded that when they do, they do not thereby shed off their status as members of the Judiciary.
Using social networking sites is an exercise of freedom of expression; however, there are
restrictions upon a judge’s conduct inherent in the office. Photographs and commentaries, including
“liking” and “sharing” posts, that are otherwise acceptable for the general public may be considered
inappropriate for members of the Judiciary due to the higher standard of integrity, candor, and fairness
reposed on them. As visible personification of law and justice, judges and court employees have a higher
standard of conduct. The standard of conduct expected from members of the Judiciary is much higher
than an ordinary man.
SAKIR
CASE 504

LORENZANA V. AUSTRIA
AM No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Complainant against Judge Austria for, among others,
acts of impropriety and conduct unbecoming of a Judge when Respondent displayed her photographs in
a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge,
allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely
covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
Respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website “Friendster” could
hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an “off-shouldered” attire is an acceptable social
outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition
against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made.
ISSUE: Whether or not committed acts of impropriety and conduct unbecoming of a Judge and therefore
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING: Yes. The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an
account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right “includes the freedom
to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers.” Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent
judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the Code. However, the Code also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. This rule reflects the general principle of propriety
expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an
“off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
SAKIR
CASE 505

ESPEJON AND CABONITA V. JUDGE LORREDO
AM No. MTJ-22-007, March 9, 2022
FACTS: Complainants charged Judge Lorredo of bias and partiality alleging that the Respondent made
remarks showing his prejudgment of the case and obvious bias and partiality against them and their
sexual orientation. They also averred that the Respondent’s treatment and conduct was heavily
influenced by his religious beliefs and impressions about homosexuality which he irrelevantly tried to
relate to the case. The Respondent maintained that as a Christian, he merely tries his best to guide
lawyers and litigants who appear before his court to arrive at a settlement with the help of the Bible. He
claimed further that he had, so far, settled 101 cases using the Bible. He further added that he was only
warning complainants about God's punishment for those who violate His commandments.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lorredo should be held administratively liable.
RULING: Yes. The Court finds Judge Lorredo administratively liable for his improper remarks and
overbearing demeanor and unwarranted acts during the preliminary conference; and for allowing his
religious beliefs to impair his judicial functions. While judges are not completely stripped of their
freedom to express, exercise, or uphold their religious beliefs and convictions, it goes without
saying that in doing so, their foremost duty to obey the rule of law should not stand to suffer.
SAKIR
CASE 506

OCA V. JUDGE ATILLO
AM No. RTJ-21-018, September 20, 2021
FACTS: This administrative matter concerns the social media posts of Respondent Atillo, Jr. on his
Facebook account that may be considered inappropriate under the New Code of Judicial Conduct and a
violation of the OCA Circular on Proper Use of Social Media. The subject posts include pictures of
Respondent on his Facebook account showing him half-dressed and revealing tattoos on his upper
bodies that were used as “cover photos” and “profile pictures” in his profile page. Respondent averred
that his account was hacked and his privacy setting was switched from private to public. He asserted that
the pictures were exclusively meant for his own viewing pleasure and for his Facebook friends only.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent violated the Code and the OCA Circular.
RULING: Yes. The Court finds that Respondent had breached his duty to avoid impropriety, or even just
the appearance of impropriety, when he posted the subject pictures showing his half-dressed body and
tattooed torso on his Facebook account that eventually became readily accessible to the general public.
The Court clarifies that the impropriety in this case relates solely on Respondent’s act of posting the
subject pictures on social media, and it has absolutely nothing to do with his choice to have tattoos on his
body. Simply put, by posting the pictures on Facebook, Judge Atillo, Jr. placed himself in a situation
where he, and the status he holds as a sitting judge, became the object of the public's criticism and
ridicule. This is easily evinced by the very fact that an anonymous person saw fit to send the pictures to
the OCA for appropriate disciplinary action. The OCA Circular 173-2017 mandates all members of the
Judiciary who participate in social media to be cautious and circumspect in posting photographs,
lilting posts, and making comments in public on social networking sites like Facebook.
SAKIR
CASE 507
ART III SEC 4: PRIVATE AND GOV’T SPEECH (VALID PRIOR RESTRAINT)
NEAR V. MINNESOTA
238 SCRA 31
FACTS: In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford alleged
that the police chief, the mayor, a prosecutor, and grand jury members were neglecting their duties to
prosecute known criminal activity. The anti-Semitic newspaper suggested that these authority figures
were colluding with Jewish gangs. Despite two ensuing assassination attempts on Guilford, the
newspaper's disclosures resulted in the conviction of a local gangster.
The prosecutor, Floyd Olson, sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds
that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of “prior restraint” is absolute.
RULING: NO. The government does not have the right to prohibit negative speech about it if there
is some truth to it. There must be a case-specific analysis to determine whether the allegations have a
basis in truth, although war or other types of national emergency may reduce the protections of the press.
Although any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality, there are exceptions to the rule. "When a nation is at war, many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." On similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the
community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of
orderly government. The constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.” These limitations are not applicable
here.
SAKIR
CASE 508
ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH; Prior Restraint

Freedman v. Maryland
380 US 51
FACTS: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board censors before being exhibited. The
board can disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals or tended to incite crime.
There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged Maryland motion
picture censorship statute as unconstitutional due to the procedure to obtain approval which provided no
judicial participation for prompt judicial review. However, he did not suggest that prior approval itself was
unconstitutional. He exhibited the film “Revenge at Daybreak” at his Baltimore theatre without first
submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maryland law is a valid prior restraint.
RULING: No. The law provided the danger of unduly suppressing protected expression. The board was
allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the
procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect
against undue inhibition of protected expression: 1) place the burden of proving film is unprotected
expression on the censors; 2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination; and 3)
require prompt determination within a specified time period. Non-criminal process which requires prior
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate dangers of a censorship system.
SAKIR
CASE 509

New York Times Co. v. US
403 US 713
FACTS: US Government sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
the contents of a classified study entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy”.
The Government argued that despite the First Amendment’s command, the three branches of
government can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in
the name of national security, equity, and presidential power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the executive branch may restrain petitioner from publishing the classified
material.
RULING: No. The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Only when the Nation is at war can the
First Amendment’s ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden. Any system of prior restraint of
expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. Thus, Government
carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such restraint.
SAKIR
CASE 510

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
G. R. No. 115444
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 7716 (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law) contending
that by removing the exemption of the press from VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. It averred that even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the discriminatory treatment of the press is
highlighted by the fact that profit-oriented transactions continue to enjoy exemption under RA 7716.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law is a prior restraint to press freedom
RULING: No. Press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and what the constitutional
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the
press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content
of the publication and RA No. 7716 is none of these. VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed on the sale,
barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could
take back the privilege without offense to the Constitution.
Case No. 511

Salazar
Article III, Sec 4. People v Government Speech (Prior Restraint)

Alexander v. US – 113 S. Ct. 2766
125 L. Ed. 2d. 441, 1993
FACTS: The petition who was owner of stores and theatres dealing in sexually explicit materials,
was convicted of violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). The District Court ordered the forfeiture of such assets related to his
racketeering activity. Petitioner contended that this forfeiture, which effectively shut down his adult
entertainment business, constituted a prior restraint on speech and was overbroad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the forfeiture of petitioner’s assets constituted a prior restraint on speech
RULING/MP: No. The forfeiture in the case at bar is a permissible criminal punishment and not a
prior restraint on speech. The order imposed no legal impediment to petitioner’s ability to engage
in any expressive activity; it merely prevented him from financing those activities with assets derived
from his prior racketeering offenses. The assets in question were not forfeited because they were
obscene but because they were directly related to past racketeering violations. The RICO forfeiture
statute calls for the forfeiture of assets because of the financial role they play in the operation the
racketeering enterprise. Prior restraint refers to administrative and judicial orders forbidding
certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to
occur.
Case No. 512

Salazar
INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529
G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
FACTS: The Respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified and rated
the TV Program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend
and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. The program
propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices oftentimes in comparative studies
with other religions. Petitioner was then required to submit its VTR tapes for review of the Board.
Petitioner contended that the Board has no power to review its religious program.
ISSUE: Whether or not the censorship of petitioner’s TV Program is a prior restraint on religious
speech
RULING/MP: Yes. Respondent Board failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The
decision of the board which was affirmed by CA was bereft of finding of facts to justify the conclusion
that the subject program constitutes impermissible attacks against another religion. Prior restraint
on speech, including religious freedom, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on
ground. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video
tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion.
Case No. 513

Salazar

SWS v. COMELEC
GR 147571, May 5, 2001
FACTS: This is an action by SWS for prohibition to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 (Fair Election Act),* Petitioners intend to publish the result of the survey up to the last day of
election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not 5.4 R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression, and the press.
RULING: Yes, the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of
a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression
of freedom of expression.
* Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Case No. 514

Salazar

Chavez v. Gonzales
GR 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: In 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won in the presidential elections against her
nearest rival, Fernando Poe, Jr. The NTC, on one hand, issued a press release warning radio and
television stations that those who will air the Garci Tapes will face suspension or revocation of their
license. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as citizen, filed a petition to nullify the “acts, issuances, and
orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (DOJ Secretary) on the grounds that it violated the
freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
ISSUE: Whether the NTC warning constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression.
RULING/MP: Yes, it is clear that the challenged acts need to be subjected to the clear and present
danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The exceptions, when expression may be
subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression namely: a.
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
Case No. 515

Salazar
Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy
GR 170270 and 179411, April 2, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners applied for the renewal of mayor’s permit. They were required to submit papers
which were previously not required since property had always been classified as commercial.
They were subsequently denied zoning clearance, thus no mayor’s permit. RTC Denied their
application for mandamus but DAR granted the application in favor of petitioners. Respondent Meer,
Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, claimed that the DAR Order was spurious or void and that
there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the
issuance of the mayor’s permit. Respondents went to the property and closed the radio stations.
Petitioners sought COMELEC to enforce the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibited the closure of
radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period. The COMELEC issued an order
directing the parties to maintain the status and allowed the operation of the radio stations, and
petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following day.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an
act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
RULING/MP: Yes Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system of prior
restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on
speech are invalid. Governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of
justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior. At the same time,
jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under
well-defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as
more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the
regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to
speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Case No. 516
Salazar

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN
GR 155282, January 17, 2005
FACTS: Respondent aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of The Inside Story produced and hosted
by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable
them to pay for their tuition fees. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the
school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila
conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of The Inside Story caused
uproar in the PWU community. Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that
the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its
female students. Petitioner asserts that the program violated the PD No. 1986 and ordered that all
subsequent programs of the The Inside Story be submitted for approval.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of MTRCB is an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression.
RULING/MP: No, the court was not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the
program. Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit. Respondents were merely penalized for their
failure to submit to petitioner The Inside Story for its review and approval. There Supreme Court
need not resolve whether MRTCB Rules or other presidential decrees violated the Constitution.
Case No. 517

Salazar
Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Estrada Trial
AM No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001
FACTS: This is a request to the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order" to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history
ISSUE: WON live broadcast of court proceedings leads to a conflict between the right of the people
to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of
the accused to a fair trial;
RULING/MP: Petition Denied. Live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall
not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited
to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the
trial proper. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration
is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to
suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Case No. 518

Salazar

Soriano v. Laguardia, GR 164785, April 29, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, made obscene remarks against INC.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. MTRCB found Soriano liable for his
utterances and imposed on him a three-month suspension from his program.
ISSUE: W/N Soriano‘s statements during the televised ―Ang Dating Daan part of the religious
discourse and is exempted from governmental restraint
RULING/MP: NO. The SC ruled that Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.
The utterances are considered obscene given the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used. The suspension is
not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said
that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the
free speech clause.
Case No. 519

Salazar

The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, GR No. 205728, 747 SCRA 1, Jan 21, 2015
FACTS:: Petitioners posted a tarpaulin within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod which is in the front walls of the cathedral within public view. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”
with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the
RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it formed “Team Buhay.” Respondents conceded that
the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that
the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped
in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens
RULING/MP: NO. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Case No. 520

Salazar

GMA Network, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
FACTS: Petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to
elect during the forthcoming elections.
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’
television and radio guesting and appearances.
ISSUE: W/N Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits is a valid prior
government restraint and is constitutional
RULING/MP: NO. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. The contention of leveling the playing field
– does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of
a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible,
then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. While Comelec is
authorized by the Constitution to enforce election laws, it cannot exercise its power w/out limits or
reasonable basis. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and
rational basis for any changes in those rules.
TALAVER
Case No. 521
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Davao City Water District v Aranjuez
MAINT POINT: Those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of
limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just
by reason of their employment.
FACTS:
Private respondents Aranjuez et al., are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuno sa
Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several administrative cases
due to acts committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with
inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the designated places. The inscriptions and postings
bore employees’s grievances. The officers and members of the NAMADACWAD was found guilty as
charged with penalties ranging from suspension to dismissal from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not government employees’s constitutional right to freedom of speech may be
regulated?
RULING: YES. Although the Court finds no merit in ruling a suspension or dismissal to those who
violated the rules governing the posting of posters with grievances only within the designated places,
the court affirmed that they violated the said rule and must be reprimanded. It is correct to conclude
that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their
freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their
constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment.
Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom.
Case No. 528

PRIOR RESTRAINT
1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v COMELEC
MAINT POINT: The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free
expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
FACTS:
1-Utak assails COMELEC’s promulgated Resolution No. 9615 which provides that the violation of
items 5 and 6 under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise
and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an
election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006.
ISSUE: Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaints against the students?
RULING: NO. Said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint
on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the
prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation
of their franchise or permit to operate
Case No. 529

PRIOR RESTRAINT
Social Weather Stations v COMELEC
MAINT POINT: Sec 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
FACTS:
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act). Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of

freedom of speech, expression and the press?
RULING: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression,

speech and the press. It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
Case No. 530

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
People v Perez
MAINT POINT: Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they
became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez stating seditious statements. The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an
altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they
endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter
maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the
Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful
manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and
substituted by another.
ISSUE: Whether or not Subsequent punishment of expression can be invoked in the case at bar?
RULING: Yes. Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws.
.
Case No. 525
Espiritu v. General Lim, GR 85727, October 3, 1991
MAINT POINT: In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult
at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest
FACTS:
Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner
of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . .
hanggang sa magkagulona. and that the police authorities were present during the press conference
held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide
strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language
which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the arrest is valid?
RULING: Yes. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost
the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free
speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is
still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at
times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the
arrest.
Case No. 526

Dennis v. US – 341 US 494
MAINT POINT: Whether an attempt to overthrow the government poses a clear and present danger
to it should not be determined according to whether such an attempt will be likely to be successful.
Instead, the appropriate standard is whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
warrants a restriction on free speech that is needed to avoid the danger.
FACTS:
Petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party in this country, were indicted and convicted in a federal
district court under 3 of the Smith Act for willfully and knowingly conspiring.
ISSUE: Whether or not Subsequent punishment of expression can be invoked in the case at bar?
RULING: Yes. The government has a compelling interest in preventing its overthrow by force or
violence, so it is justified in placing some limits on speech to protect that interest, notwithstanding the
First Amendment.
Case No. 527

Gonzales v. COMELEC – 27 SCRA 835
MAINT POINT: In determining the validity of the law, free speech as a social value must be
weighed against the political process as a social value.
FACTS:
The Revised Election Code under RA 4880 was amended to include two new sections which
prohibits the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity. Petitioners alleges that RA 4880 is unconstitutional because its
enforcement would prejudice basic rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly
and the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention was valid?
RULING: No. The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that
is not too formidable in character. The right of association is affected. Political parties have
less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is
not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate
activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there an infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose.
Case No. 528

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. – 137 SCRA 628
MAINT POINT: Since broadcast radio and TV are the most convenient and popular means of
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
FACTS: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station
DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. Petitioner contended that it
was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used
to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted
to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech.
ISSUE: Whether or not the shutting down of the radio station was unconstitutional?
RULING: Yes. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media
by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. The closure of the
radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and without
hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process
was not observed.
Case No. 529

Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong – 160 SCRA 865
MAINT POINT: The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower

than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of
simple private citizenship. He continues to be a “public figure.”
FACTS:
The petitioner proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enactment of the events that made
possible the EDSA revolution. Petitioners claim that in producing and “The Four Day Revolution”
they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution.
Private respondent (Enrile), upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the
production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his
privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the described motion picture is unconstitutional as to private respondent’s
privacy?
RULING: No. Private respondent is a “public figure” precisely because of his participation as
a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986.
Because his participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be
grossly unhistorical.
Case No. 530

Kelley v. Johnson – 425 US 238
MAINT POINT: Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel
is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state
choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State’s police power.
FACTS:
An order had been put into effect requiring that male members of the police force abide by certain
hair-grooming standards. Police officers were forbidden from having beards or goatees, and the
length of hair and sideburns were likewise regulated. There was an exception for medical need. The
action was said to violate Johnson’s First Amendment right of free expression, as well as his
Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulated hairstyle of police personnel violated Johnson’s rights?
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the regulations were not so irrational as to be deemed “arbitrary,”
and therefore respondent had not been deprived of liberty. On the contrary, the Court determined
that similarity in appearance of police officers was desirable and served as a rational basis for the
regulations imposed by the police force.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 531
ART III, SEC 4: SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Brandenburg vs Ohio
FACTS: Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later
convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as
well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism."
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is unconstitutional as it violates freedom of speech
RULING:Yes. SC ruled that (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing
imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act
made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and
teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the
law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT:The Court held that hate speech is protected under the First Amendment as long as it does
not provoke violence.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 532
ART III, SEC 4: SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Miriam College Foundation vs CA
FACTS: Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all
moral values. This was how some members of the Miriam College community allegedly described the
contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam Colleges school paper and
magazine. Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee
reiterating his clients position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty.
Valmonte, the Committee was trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having written
articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists. Hence, he argued that what applies is
Republic Act No. 7079 [The Campus Journalism Act] and its implementing rules and regulations. He also
questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly had already articulated their
position against his clients.
ISSUE: W/ School can suspend or expel the students?

RULING: NO. Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should be read in a manner as not to infringe
upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not construe said
provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech.
MAIN POINT :Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel
a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially
disrupt classwork or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 533
ART III, SEC 4: SPEECH AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Sanidad vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529; GR 90878, January 29, 1990
FACTS: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of
the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said
Organic Act. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier”
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of
the said resolution, which provides “During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation violates petitioner’s freedom of expression.
RULING: YES .We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner’s freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason
was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement.
MAIN POINT: Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO.534
National Press Club (NPC) vs. COMELEC 207 SCRA 1
FACTS: It is principally argued that Section 11 (b) of RA No. 6646 invades and violates freedom of
expression. Said section provides that for “it is unlawful any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television
station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission on Elections as
provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.” Petitioners who were representatives of
mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out
for suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of candidates.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned section of RA 6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of
expression.
RULING: NO. The fundamental purpose of such “supervision or regulation” has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of “equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,” as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with “public
information campaigns and forums among candidates.
MAIN POINT: The Constitution has expressly authorized the Comelec to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information.
Davide, Jr. J., concurring: Freedom of speech and of the press or of expression which the Bill of Rights
guarantees is not an absolute right now settled.
Padilla, J., concurring: It is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the state
in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting: R.A. No. 6646 will certainly achieve one result—keep the voters ignorant
of who the candidates are and what they stand for.
Cruz, J., dissenting: The most important objection to Section 11 (b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on
the dissemination of ideas.
Paras., J., dissenting: The freedom to advertise one’s political candidacy in the various forms of media
is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression and of our right of access to information.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 535
Adiong vs. COMELEC 207 SCRA 712; GR 103956, March 31, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections, now assails
the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like
cars and other moving vehicles (Sec. 21, COMELEC Resolution No. 2347). The petitioner believes that
with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of
politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places except in
designated areas by the COMELEC is unconstitutional.
RULING: YES. The prohibition is null and void. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s
fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
MAIN POINT: Freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 536
Osmena vs. COMELEC 288 SCRA 447; GR 132231, March 31, 1998
FACTS: NPC v. COMELEC (Case No. 522) upheld the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims
that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. Petitioners are NOW seeking a reexamination of the
validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from
selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to
the Commission on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming elections.
Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmeña is candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P.
Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned section of RA 6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of
expression.
RULING: NO. The term political “ad ban,” when used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading,
for even as §11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it
mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media.
There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.
MAIN POINT: Here, there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of the
speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to
the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying
exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 537
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811; GR 133486, January 28, 2000
FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN
or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was
issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
has prepared a project to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with
the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). In other words, they allege that the exit survey/poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process. It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of Speech and
of the Press.
RULING: YES. Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of
a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as
possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled.
Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. Finally, not
at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate
and independent from the exit polls.
MAIN POINT: A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 538
SWS vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Section 1 of R.A. 9006, the Fair Election Act, says “Surveys affecting national candidates shall
not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
7 days before an election.” The provision as well as the implementing resolution of the COMELEC is
challenged as violative of freedom of expression. The COMELEC, however, justifies the rule as
necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous
survey just before election.
ISSUE: WON the Act violates the freedom of expression
RULING: Yes. The power of the COMELEC over media franchise is limited to ensuring “equal
opportunity, time, space and the right to reply” as well as to reasonable rates of charges for the use of
media facilities for “public information and forums among candidates.” Here the prohibition of speech is
direct, absolute and substantial. Nor does the rule pass the O’Brien test for content related regulation
because it supresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc. and the
restriction is greater than what uis needed to protect government interest because the interest can be
protected by narrower restriction such as subsequent punishment.
MAINPOINT: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press .
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 539
Penera vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period
and thereafter, had a motorcade convincing the residents to vote for her. Due to this, private respondent
filed a petition against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code
Section 80 which says “It shall be unlawful for any person, … to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during
the campaign period. She was found guilty of premature campaigning.
ISSUE: WON petitioner guilty of premature campaigning
RULING: No. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress
stated that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language
of the law need not be construed further. Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a
candidate for.
MAINPOINT: Prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy,
he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she
cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What
she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 540
ART III, SEC 4: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Rubin vs. Coors Brewing
FACTS: Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an
approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements
to prevent “strength wars” among brewers. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First
Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The district court upheld the ban of alcohol content in
advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.
ISSUE: Does the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s prohibition of displaying alcohol content on beer
labels violate the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech?
RULING: Yes. For the government to regulate commercial speech, the government must have a
substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest the government intended
to protect by banning the display of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the “strength wars” of
competing beer companies, which could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that
this interest was not substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic
content on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation was more extensive than
necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the First
Amendment. The regulation is unconstitutional because it did not increase consumer awareness, but
instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.
MAINPOINT: The regulation violated the First Amendment’s of protection of commercial speech, that it
should not be false or misleading.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 541
ART. III, SEC. 4: 4.Commercial Speech
Cincinnati vs. Discovery Network
FACTS: The case arose when the City of Cincinnati decided to revoke permits allowing the
Discovery Network to distribute advertisements from 38 news racks on city property because of an
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills on public property. Cincinnati
claimed that it served the significant public interests of safety and aesthetics. The far more
numerous (1500) newspaper racks were not affected. Discovery Networks challenged the legality
of the ordinance under the First Amendment.
ISSUE: WON the ordinances violated the free speech protection
RULING: Yes. The restrictions on the distribution of commercial flyers in news racks violated the
First Amendment. Despite the undisputed fact that flyers were commercial advertisements, the
Court refused to diminish their free speech protections. The removal of a small number of news
racks did little to advance the city’s interests in safety and aesthetics. In short, it was not a
reasonable fit.
MAINPOINT: Commercial speech remains a lower category of protected speech, but this decision
indicates that governments cannot ban or restrict it without a reasonable justification.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 542
ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech

Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission New York
FACTS: In 1973, when an oil embargo caused fuel shortages, the New York Public Service
Commission issued a regulation prohibiting electric companies from advertising to promote
electricity use. Central Hudson Gas & Electric, a public utility company, challenged the regulation,
arguing that its advertisements were commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. (Sec 4:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress or grievances)
ISSUE: WON the ban is in violation of Free Speech
RULING: yes. in central hudson, the u.s. supreme court ruled that the ban on advertisements for
electricity violated the first amendment. in doing so, the court established a four-part test,
balancing government and commercial-speech interests to determine when commercial- speech
regulations encroach on free-speech rights. if the commercial speech is truthful and relates to a
lawful activity, the regulation must directly advance a substantial government interest and not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. although energy conservation represented a
substantial government interest, the restriction was more extensive than necessary, as it banned
even advertisements for products and services that use energy efficiently. therefore the prohibition
encroached the right to free speech
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 543

Pharmaceutical v Sec. of Health
FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino, a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted
and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes.
ISSUE: WON the DOH violated the constitutional freedom on free trade for breastmilk substitutes
RULING: Yes. The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some
form of regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests. "free
enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." It must be clearly explained
and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result
in the restraint of trade. petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers’
participation would hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes and failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the RIRR is unreasomable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade
MP BOLD
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 544

City of Laduc v Gilleo
FACTS: A City of Ladue ordinance prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs to prevent
visual clutter, except for residence identification, for sale signs and signs warning of safety hazards.
Margaret Gilleo hammered a sign into her lawn in Ladue City which reads “Say No to War in the
Persian Gulf. Call Congress Now”. When Gilleo learned that the sign violated a city ordinance, she
approached the city council for an exemption and was denied. Gilleo then sued the city, claiming
that the ordinance violated her right of free speech. Later, she removed the sign and placed it on
window that read “For Peace in the Gulf.” The City expanded the resolution on the prohibition on
signs thus, the sign in the window also violated the city ordinance
ISSUE: WON the ban on signs in the City of Ladue is Unconstitutional
RULING: Yes. While signs pose distinctive problems and thus are subject to municipalities' police
powers, measures regulating them affect communication itself. Such a regulation may be challenged
on the ground that it restricts speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of signs'
messages, or on the ground that it prohibits too much protected speech. The ordinance forbade
most signs but allowed others, such as “For Sale” signs, the circuit court ruled the law is
unconstitutional because it failed to be content neutral; it favored commercial speech over
noncommercial speech.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 545

Disini v Sec. of Justice
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to declare several provisions of the RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012 as unconstitutional and void because it violated the freedom of speech. The cybercrime
law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace and because linking with the internet
opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or sneakily accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding
him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in
sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings.
ISSUE: WON the Cybercrime prevention act violated freedom of speech
RULING: Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic

communications, commonly known as spams, the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him.”. Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as
unconstitutional. It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by
prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial communications
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 546
ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Policarpio v. Manila Times
FACTS: Peitioner Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission. She had filed
charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission and caused the latter to
be separated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for
investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed complaints against Policarpio for alleged
malversation of public funds and for estafa through falsification of public documents. Policarpio
filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false
articles/news items in Saturday Mirror and in the Daily Mirror. The articles contain news on Reyes’
charges against Policarpio. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner had not
proven that respondent had acted maliciously in publishing the articles, although portions thereof
were inaccurate or false.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manila Times is guilty of having published libelous/defamatory
articles,
RULING: Yes. Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of discretion in determining the manner in
which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as
a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspapers may
publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such
proceedings. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be
not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or
remarks. Art. 354, RPC provides that “Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious
even if it be true, if no good intention & justifiable motive for making it is shown, except, “A fair and
true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks….” In the case at bar, aside from
containing information derogatory to the petitioner, the articles presented her in a worse
predicament than that in which she in fact was. Said articles were not a fair and true report of the
proceedings therein alluded to.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 547
Lopez v. CA
FACTS: On the front page of the Manila Chronicle, as well as on other daily newspapers, was a news
story of Fidel Cruz, a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands who gave a “hoax” report
informing authorities in Manila that the people in the Babuyan Islands were living in terror, due to a
series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955 when in truth, there were no killers and Fidel
Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle
devoted a pictorial article in its two issues regarding the incident. The magazine on both occasions
carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were
published on both occasions were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and
that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle in
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the format
was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. As soon, however, as the
inadvertent error was brought to the attention of petitioners, the following correction (i.e. the
correct photo) was immediately published along with an apology, stating that the mistake was made
die to the fact that they were rushing to meet the deadline of publication. Respondent Fidel G. Cruz
sued petitioners in the CFI of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character
of the publication of his picture.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of
Fidel G. Cruz.
RULING: Yes. An action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the photograph of Cruz
even though the publisher made a correction of their mistake immediately upon discovery thereof.
Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person,
is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are
imputed to such person. While a newspaper should not be held accountable for honest mistakes
owing to the pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet, and no occasion to act
with haste in a weekly magazine.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 548
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
FACTS: Sullivan was one of the 3 Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was
defamed in a full-page ad entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices” taken out in the New York Times. The
advertisement charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed against
those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not mention Sullivan by name, he claimed
that it referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. New York
Times Co. claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement because it did not have any
reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy.
Sullivan demanded that the corporation retract the advertisement. The jury found the ad libelous
per se and actionable without proof of malice and awarded damages to Sullivan. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed. New York Times Co. appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not New York Co. is liable for defamation for printing an advertisement which
criticized a public official’s official conduct.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution
delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. It
is not adequate evidence of malice that New York Co. failed to check the advertisements accuracy.
Also, the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting
the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made of and concerning Sullivan. The
State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public
official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual
malice"—that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was true or false. Factual error, content defamatory of official
reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements
unless "actual malice" is alleged and proved.
Additional Information:
● In US Laws, the First Amendment guarantees freedom concerning religion, expression,
assembly, and the right to petition.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 549
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.
FACTS: George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested
him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast,
run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or
“reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom
and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually,
Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges. Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel.
The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only
for rendering “knowingly and recklessly” false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was
not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where
Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded
Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive
damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and
recklessly false standard applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the knowingly and recklessly false standard for defamatory statements apply
to private individuals.
RULING: Yes. The US Supreme Court held in this case that the “knowingly and recklessly false”
standard applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that
Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not
support the damages award under the proper constitutional standard.
Additional Information:
● In libel cases in the US, the difference between defamation of a public figure versus
defamation of a private person is that a private person who claims defamation only needs to
prove that the defamer acted negligently, while a public figure who claims defamation has to
prove that the defamer acted intentionally or recklessly.
SOLIVEN
CASE NO. 550
Gertz v. Robert Wlech – 418 US 323
FACTS: Gertz was hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed said family's son. In a
magazine, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter"
because he chose to clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz lost the libel suit
because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan which necessitates proof of actual
malice may be applied in this case
RULING: No. The application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was
inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. First, the
recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even
for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard
of fault less than recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Because private individuals
characteristically have fewer effective opportunities for rebuttal than do public officials and public
figures, they are more vulnerable to injury from defamation. Because they have not voluntarily
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods, they are also more
deserving of recovery
TANGGING
CASE NO. 551
ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH

LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH)
Hustler Magazine vs. Falwell
FACTS: Jerry Falwell was a nationally known minister and active commentator on both political and
public issues. Hustler Magazine printed a parody article about Falwell inferring Falwell and his mother
were incestuous and immoral drunks. In response, Falwell sued Hustler Magazine claiming damages for
libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The federal district court found for
Falwell on the emotional distress claim, awarding him damages in the amount of $150,000. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment. Hustler appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N a public figure can recover damages for a claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress if the public figure does not show actual malice.
HELD: No. Public figures and officials must show actual malice in order to recover damages from
intentional infliction of emotional distress from a publication. Falwell is a public figure and cannot recover
damages absent a showing of the actual malice. Public figures must prove more than outrageous conduct
as citizens receive First Amendment protections related to speech. More than mere outrageous conduct
must be shown. The Court held that deciding otherwise would assign damage awards to political
cartoonists for caricatures that play up the negative features of their public figures. Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell established that Public Figures could not recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress absent a showing of actual malice. Actual malice requires that the statement was
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
TANGGING
CASE NO. 552

In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373
FACTS: Senator JPE et al. were charged by the State with Rebellion complexed with murder, in
contravention of the Hernandez doctrine which states that Rebellion absorbs murder. While the SC was
deliberating their decision, the Manila Standard published an article by Atty. Emil Jurado stating that
“Rebellion complex does not exist SC” and that “State back to square one in cases v. Enrile et al.” His
article claimed that the SC had reaffirmed the Hernandez doctrine by a 14- 1 vote according to “sources
in the SC”. He published another article that stated that the SC was expected to promulgate a decision
within the day or the next day. He divulged information, such as the revised vote of 14-0 and that the
decision would be penned by Assoc. Justice Narvasa. New articles showed that the SC was “still
deliberating” on the issue. On that same day, the SC issued a resolution branding as false the news
reports and claimed that no decision had been signed as of the date, and required Atty. Jurado to respond
within 5 days why he should not be dealt with administratively. Atty. Jurado claimed freedom of the press
and justified the article on the people’s right to know about decisions.
ISSUE: W/N the report and comments in question are protected by freedom of the press and right of the
people to know information on matters of a public concern.
RULING: No. Publication regarding judicial action in a pending case, which tends to impede, embarrass
or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice is not
protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable as contempt. Freedom of the press and
administration of justice are both equally sacred and neither should be violated by the other. In order to
dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality
of the verdicts, the court will not hesitate to exercise the power to punish for contempt. His article
published comments on a non-existent decision and obstructed the proper functioning of the SC. The
premature revelation placed the court in an unfavorable light as an inept and incompetent guardian of its
own confidential proceedings.
TANGGING
CASE NO. 553

In Re Jurado 243 SCRA 299
FACTS: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the “Manila Standard,”had
been writing about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months. The case
at bar is related to “controversial case” of “PLDT v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).” In that
decision, the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. “Philippine
Daily Inquirer” and other newspapers published a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles
Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. He examined and analyzed the decision of Justice Gutierrez in
relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay,
to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the
conclusion that the Gutierrez decision “looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT’s counsel.”
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order “Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports
of Corruption in the Judiciary,” to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary.
ISSUE: W/N Jurado’s allegations constitute criminal libel.
HELD: Yes. Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and
reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to
degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. The norm does
not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any
bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech,
it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a
like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
TANGGING
CASE NO. 554

Vasquez vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Vasquez and some 37 families from the Tondo Foreshore Area went to see then
National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After the meeting, petitioner and his companions
were interviewed by reporters of the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The article was published containing
such statements from the petitioner imputing that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was
able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in illegal activities such as
attempted murder, gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a complaint for libel.
ISSUE: W/N there is actual malice to warrant criminal liability for libel.
RULING: No. Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice —
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but
also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they
were false or not. If the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. In this case, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against
the barangay official. His allegation was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General Fernandez to
petitioners. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be
contrary to the RPC. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
TANGGING
CASE NO. 555

Borjal vs. CA
FACTS: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for
writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao,
attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning
resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however
was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court
ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not
sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published articles.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD: No. Malice is further defined as the presence of spite or ill will; when a person acts not out of
response to duty, but for some unjustifiable motives or bad intentions. Petitioner acted out of a sense of
civic duty and in the performance of his job as a newspaperman in exposing alleged anomalies in the
government. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows that
all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct as Executive Director of the First National
Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT). Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory
words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The burden of
proving actual malice then lies on private respondent Wenceslao.
Qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found
to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. Fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,
it is not necessarily actionable. It must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.
TANGGING
CASE NO. 556
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Libel(Unprotected Speech)

546 Vicario v. CA
Facts: Petitioner was charged with by MTC resp judge, as complaining witness. Allegedly the crime was
committed when Vicario circulated in the vicinity of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman
photocopies of page 7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which is about the filing
of OMB with the SB graft charges against the Resp judge who allegedly pocketed the P1,000.00 cash
bond posted by a respondent in one of several cases pending in his sala. Said article named the
respondent. Hence, a complaint was filed by resp against the petitioner alleging that the latter’s act
greatly prejudiced his reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner
Vicario on the other hand disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, and
raised that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal charge for graft and
corruption against respondent before the Omb and an admin complaint for dishonesty with SC, both due
to the latter's unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's cash bond of P1,000.00. Later RTC found
Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. On appeal CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari where petitioner raised the issue
Issue: W/N the news item in question is a privileged matter thus, not a libelous act.
Held: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish express malice on the part of petitioner by positive proof, its
cause perforce must fail.
The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation; Exemption is a qualifiedly
privileged communication. Art. 354. 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged communication, the character of which is a
matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the accused. Once it
is established that the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the
plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. When this is
accomplished the defense of privilege becomes unavailing. Since the prosecution failed to establish
express malice on the part of petitioner by positive proof, its cause perforce must fail.
TANGGING
CASE No. 557
Pader v. Pp
Facts: On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was conversing with his
political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate and
shouted “putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” The latter was dumb-founded and
embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the
elections of May 8, 1995. On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac,
Bataan a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
MTC after trial held that petitioner was guilty. On appeal, RTC affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court in toto. On appeal the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but with modification as to the penalty
imposed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation.
Held: No. Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual
backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The expression “putang ina mo” is a common
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. SC do
not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on
seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his
feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor,
occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
TANGGING
CASE No. 558
CASE NO. 548
Fermin v PP
.
Facts: Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid. The June
14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the
US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case herein the Philippines for she and
husband Eddie have more problems/cases to confront there. This was said to be due to their, especially
Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money, failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the
cookware they were selling and not being on good terms with the latter. Respondents filed libel
cases against petitioner and Tugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.
RTC held Fermin and Tugas guilty of libel. On appeal CA: acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation
but Fermin's conviction was affirmed. Fermin's MR was denied hence, the petition where she argues that
she had no knowledge and participation in the publication of the article, that the article is not libelous and
is covered by the freedom of the press.
Issue: W/N the article is not libelous and is covered by the freedom of the press.
Held: No. petitioner cannot take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the
performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false,
malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public
interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants
are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people,
including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled
license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments,
whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 559
Art III Sec. 4 Libel as Unproteccted Speech

Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107
FACTS: Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in five major daily newspapers. These
ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed
illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel.
ISSUE: WON there is an actual malice for the liability to arise
HELD: No. In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement
must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was
false or not. Here, petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of the private respondents. The
statements embodied in the advertisement are covered by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech. This carries the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official.
DELOS REYES
CASE NO. 560
Art III Sec. 4 Libel as Unproteccted Speech

Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc 426 SCRA 336
FACTS: Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged
a complaint against petitioner the NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction
with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter
and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the
headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following
the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages.
Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his
write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice
to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING: No. In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. Respondents could of course have been
more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item
give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by
Emelita.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in
the choice of words.

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Case No 361

SECTION 2. d. Instances of warrantless searches and seizures

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)

CASE NO. 368

ISSUE: W/N the evidence seized by the policemen were admissible

CASE NO. 369

CASE NO. 370

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Plain View

ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Moving Vehicle

ISSUE: W/N search of the fishing boat was lawful.

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search was legal.

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ISSUE: W/N the seizure was lawfully conducted.

ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ISSUE: W/N the search seizure was lawfully conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid waiver.

ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search without consent is valid.

ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

ISSUE: Whether the seizure was valid.

ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

RULING/MP: YES. Ibañez executed an affidavit as “Velasco’s wife.”

ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid.

ART. III, SEC. 2: Consent/Waiver

CASE NO. 397

CASE NO. 398

ISSUE: WON the seized marijuana were fruits of an illegal search.

CASE NO. 400

ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Searches

Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

RULING AND MAIN POINT: YES.

Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

ISSUES: Whether or not there was a valid search and arrest.

Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search and arrest was made.

Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Custom Search

whether the information charged an offense