HUMAN DIGNITY – Art 26, CC (What are protected by Art 26?

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22. Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College, March 12, 2013
Facts: SSC is the owner of 4 parcels of land measuring, located in Marikina Heights. Located within the property are
SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some 30 years
ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ord. No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of
Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to SSC to demolish
and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru; to move it back about 6 meters to provide
parking space for vehicles to park.
SSC filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. They
contended that petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192, as such contravenes
Section 1, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution in demolishing their fence and constructing it 6 meters back would result in
the loss of at least 1,808.34 sqm, worth about P9,041,700, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02 sqm, worth roughly
P9,770,100, along East Drive. It would also result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric house,
storage house, comfort rooms, guards’ room, guards’ post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed
Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The
implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law. Moreover, petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their property through eminent domain. The goal
of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had
served as sufficient protection for many years.
Petitioners alleged that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could restrain
property rights for the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general
prosperity.
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the Ps from implementing the demolition of the fence at
SSC’s Marikina property. RTC Marikina ruled in favor of the SSC & SSA: issued a writ of prohibition commanding
petitioner to permanently desist from enforcing Ord. No. 192.
Issue: Whether the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power
Ruling: NO. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to
free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court―the rational relationship test
and the strict scrutiny test: We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of
less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as
it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.

What is the Writ of Habeas Data

Form of Instrusion
23. Sps Hing v Choachuy, Sr, June 26, 2013
Facts: Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s
constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the
application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidence for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two
video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the
fence.
The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. The RTC issued an order
granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video surveillance cameras
they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set
aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the Hing’s right to privacy
Ruling: YES. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy
against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states: Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying
into the privacy of another’s residence; x x x x This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.”
The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy. This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also
“similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society,
other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article
26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation
has been violated. “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-
case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.

24. Jose Angeles v Hon. Rafael Sison, February 16, 1982

Facts: Petitioner Jose Angeles, a professor of the Institute of Technology of the Far Easter University file an
administrative case against his two students: Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran before the office of Gilberto G.
Mercado – Dean of the Institute for allegedly assaulting him at the Oak Barrel Restaurant located outside the campus.
Dean Mercado, taking action on the complaint filed by Angeles, immediately created a committee headed by him
to investigate the complaint. The two respondents, Picar and Patawaran questioned the authority of Mercado and his
committee to conduct an investigation on the basis of jurisdiction since the incident happened outside the premises of the
university campus. The respondents filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint with petition for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from proceeding with the administrative investigation
for which the judge granted by issuing a decision perpetually enjoining the petitioners from further proceeding with the
administrative investigation.
Issue: Whether the Dean is authorized to investigate and discipline the students for their conduct outside of school hours
and not within the school premises which affects the good order and welfare of the school
Ruling: YES. A college or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students. One is to provide
opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy
citizens of the community. Discipline is one of the means to carry out the second responsibility. The respondent judge
correctly stated that the general rule is that the authority of the school is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction, or its
school grounds, so that any action taken for acts committed outside the school premises should, in general, be left to the
police authorities, the courts of justice, and the family concerned.
However, this rule is not rigid or one without exceptions. It is the better view that there are instances when the
school might be called upon to exercise its power over its student or students for acts committed outside the school and
beyond school hours in the following: a) In cases of violations of school policies or regulations occurring in connection
with a school sponsored activity off-campus; or b) In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his status as a
student or affects the good name or reputation of the school. There can be no doubt that the establishment of an
educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and
the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the
protection of the students, faculty, and property.
The true test of a school's right to investigate, or otherwise, suspend or expel a student for a misconduct
committed outside the school premises and beyond school hours is not the time or place of the offense, but its effect upon
the morale and efficiency of the school and whether it, in fact, is adverse to the school's good order welfare and the
advancement of its students. Likewise the power of the school over its students does not cease absolutely when they leave
the school premises, and that conduct outside of school hours may subject a student to school discipline if it directly
affects the good order and welfare of the school or has a direct and immediate effect on the discipline or general welfare
of the school. Therefore, as aptly stated by the petitioners to affirm the decision of the respondent Judge would give
nothing less than a license to students of a school, public or private, to assault and maul their teachers or professors
without fear of being subjected to discipline by the school as long as the assault takes place off-campus or beyond school
hours.