DEFENSIBLE SPACES IN

ARCHITECTURE
“A PRAGMATIC APPROACH FOR REDUCING CRIME”

Report by:

Zoya Zahid Meraj (AR-18020)

Table of Contents
Chapter 01: Introduction
1.1. Introduction To The Topic .............................................................................................................
1.2. Background .........................................................................................................................................
1.3. Hypothesis............................................................................................................................................
1.4. Research Questions .........................................................................................................................
1.5. Rationale and Justification .............................................................................................................
1.6. Scope and Limitations .....................................................................................................................
1.7. Tentative Methodology ...................................................................................................................
1.8. Expected Outcomes .........................................................................................................................
1.9. Keywords .............................................................................................................................................
Chapter 02: Literature Review
2.1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................................
2.2. Crime ......................................................................................................................................................
2.2.1. Types of crime. ............................................................................................................................................
2.2.2. Elements of crime ......................................................................................................................................
2.2.3. Causes of crime ...........................................................................................................................................
2.2.4. Stages of committing a crime ................................................................................................................
2.3. Impact of crime on human behavior ..........................................................................................
2.3.1. Concept of fear ............................................................................................................................................
2.3.2. Relationship of fear with architecture ..............................................................................................
2.4. Role of architecture in mitigating crime ...................................................................................
2.4.1. Natural Surveillance .................................................................................................................................
2.4.2. Territoriality ................................................................................................................................................
2.4.3. Building community .................................................................................................................................
2.4.4. Strengthening targets ...............................................................................................................................
2.5. Defensible spaces in architecture ...............................................................................................
2.5.1. Origin ..............................................................................................................................................................
2.5.2. Concept of a defensible space ...............................................................................................................
2.5.3. Evolution of the concept .........................................................................................................................
2.5.4. Characteristics of a defensible space .................................................................................................

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 2.5.5. Physical mechanisms for achieving defensible space .................................................................
2.6. Theories and Counter Theories ...................................................................................................
2.6.1. Hetero architecture for Heteropolis by Charles Jencks..............................................................
2.6.2. Building Paranoia by Steven Flusty ....................................................................................................
2.6.3. Divided we Fall by Edward J Bakely and Mary Gail Snyder .....................................................
2.6.4. Defensible spaces by Oscar Newman ................................................................................................
2.6.5. Outcome .........................................................................................................................................................
2.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................

Chapter 03: Programme and Research Design

3.1. Introduction.........................................................................................................................................
3.2. Research Objectives..........................................................................................................................
3.3. Target Groups ....................................................................................................................................
3.3.1. Target Group for Research ..........................................................................................................
3.3.2. Target Group for Project ..............................................................................................................
3.3.3. Stakeholders .....................................................................................................................................
3.3.4. Specialists...........................................................................................................................................
3.4. Research Methodology ....................................................................................................................
3.5. Data Collection Methods and Process ......................................................................................

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CHAPTER 03: PROGRAMME AND RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. Introduction

This chapter includes the steps in which the research was conducted and the methods
adopted for data collection.

3.2. Research Objectives

The rising crime rate of the city has led to the securitization of the urban fabric that
resulted in the violation of the architectural aesthetics and ethics yet proving to be
ineffective as well.
Therefore, the research objectives are;
 To study the different types of crime committed and their demographics.
 To explore the relationship between the built environment and crime.
 To explore the role of architectural spaces and elements in order to cater to
crime.
 To provide an alternative approach in terms of architectural design to ensure
people with a safer community, and keep intact the ethics and aesthetics of
architecture.
 To design strategies for security that could be consulted as guidelines for
future planning.
 Evaluating the effectiveness of existing crime-resistant design measures.

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3.3. Target Groups
3.3.1. Target Group for Research
 General Citizens and users.
 The victims of crime.
 The witnesses of crime.
 Architects and Professionals.
 Security Experts.
 Criminals.
3.3.2. Target Group for Project
 General Citizens and users of the selected typology of building.
 The victims and witnesses of crime.
 Architects and Professionals (in the case of design strategies).
3.3.3. Stakeholders
Primary
 Citizens / daily users of the space.
 Architects/designers.
 Engineers.
 Security Experts / Police officers
 Security Guards
 Offender and Victims
 Residents of the area
Secondary
 Nearby residents.
 People earning livelihood/passersby
 Visitors of the space.
3.3.4. Specialists
Architects
 Dr. Noman Ahmed
 Arif Hasan

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 Security Experts / Analysts
 Ikram Seghal
 Mansoor Raza

3.4. Research Methodology

The research has been conducted in the following phases.

a) Impacts Of Current Trends Of Security On The Built Environment

In order to challenge or criticize the current security infrastructure, it is
necessary to first understand its impact on the built environment and to what
degree is it effective. This was done through documentation and surveys of
different typologies or places that are subjected to the security infrastructure.

b) Opinions Of Different Stakeholders Related To The Security

Infrastructure
Secondly, it is necessary to know the opinion of different stakeholders that
come in contact with this security infrastructure regularly. This might include
the general public, experts and security guards, etc. Questionnaires and
Interviews were conducted for this matter.

c) The Role of Architectural Spaces And Elements In Cases of Earlier

Criminal Attacks
In order to propose architectural design interventions for security it is
necessary to first understand the role of architecture in controlling crime. By
doing so, we might better know what architectural elements and strategies can
be helpful in creating architecture against crime. This was done by studying
multiple case studies. Their negative and positive aspects were also noted
down which made them either successful or a complete failure.

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 d) Architectural Spaces That Are Already Designed Keeping In Mind The
Parameters of Security
Case Studies were analyzed to understand how are spaces designed and
planned considering the factor of safety and to keep safe the aesthetics.

3.5. Data Collection Methods and Process

The following methods were pursued for the data collection.

1) Documentation and Surveys

To understand the impact of current trends of security on the built
environment, different types of places subjected to these measures were
visited and photographed, they are:

a) Residences
The residence is a space that is designed keeping in mind the comfort of
the resident the most. It is supposed to provide its user with the perception
of safety and security. However, on the contrary, people do want to get
their houses designed by an architect, but eventually, after its completion,
they line it up with barbed wires, cables, and higher boundary walls, which
conceals the façade and negates the aesthetics of the architecture.

Figure 01: The boundary wall of a house lined with barbed wires and cables.

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b) Educational Institutes
Educational Institutes are supposed to be a place of peace and their
architecture must add up in the training of the students. The students must
feel calm and secure when in school. On the contrary, the presence of
physical security measures such as barriers, bollards, concrete blocks, and
barbed wires along the entire boundary wall gives an impression of a
fortified enclave, and promotes feelings of insecurity and fear among the
students, alarming them of a constant threat, such feelings are against the
ethics of an educational institute.

Figure 02: The boundary wall of a school lined with barbed wires and a guard post.

Figure 03: The boundary wall of a school lined with barbed wires and a CCTV camera.
c) Public Spaces
Public spaces, as stated in the name are designed specially to attract the
public, taking care of their comfort and experience. Here, aesthetics matter
the most since it is the prime factor that catches the attention of the public.
This includes hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, parks, etc. which too now
a day are being subjected to physical security measures eventually leading

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 to a violation of architectural aesthetics and disrupting the user experience
and comfort.

Figure 04: High boundary wall with steel jalis covering the façade of a known hotel.

2) Interviews and Questionnaires

To get the opinions of the general citizens, professionals (architects), and
security experts on the increasing presence of the security infrastructure in
the urban fabric.
a) Interviews
Architects/Urban Planners
 Dr. Noman Ahmed
In order to provide security to the people through designing
neighborhoods, you must first understand why crime occurs in the very
first place. It occurs due to:
 Lack of social organization, social cohesion, and informal social
control.
 Lack of proprietary interests and territoriality among residents.
 Lack of supervision and organized activity for youth.
 Lack of employment opportunities for residents.
Talking about the security of a space there are several factors that have
to be considered while designing a space. The factors are:
 Identification of the user group living in the area.
 Identification of crime rate and the typology of crimes that exist
within the vicinity

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  Screening of the potential attackers and their methodology of
performing the crime.
After studying the above-mentioned factors you might plan your
strategies for designing a secured physical space. Some of the strategies
that have been proven to be fruitful in our context are mentioned as
follows:
 Promote community building through your design i.e. provide more
recreational areas for the residents to communicate.
 Promote diversity by including people of different castes and ethics
within the same area.
 Promote entrepreneurship in low-income areas so that they can
generate an economy. It might also bring an increase in street
activities promoting community engagements.
 The concept of 'Cul de sac' (i.e. no through road or no exit road)
works well if the community building is strong.
 Ar. Arif Hasan
In order to design a community space that is crime-free, you must first
focus on why crime is occurring in our residential areas. The reasons
are:
 Lack of surveillance.
 Lack of access control.
 Lack of clearly defined areas and physical facilities.
 Conflicting uses of public housing grounds.
 Lack of adequate circulation patterns and transportation services
and facilities.
Now in order to cater to the above-mentioned reasons for promoting
crime you may not want to go for just applying physical barriers like
bollards, sandbags, metal barriers, cameras, etc. In fact, you must start
resolving this issue by bringing major design changes in planning the
urban layout of the area. By saying so, I may suggest some strategies

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that should prove to be fruitful in reducing the impact of crime on our
society. The strategies are:
 Provision of lesser crossroads as possible for safety. By doing so we
might be able to control the access of the users to the area.
 Promote natural surveillance through your design. Look for the
concept provided by Jane Jacobs i.e. “Eyes on the Street.”
 An old but gold concept of 'Cul de sac'. It has proved to be very
fruitful in reducing crime.
 Provision of smaller grounds in different areas rather than one
whole barren land. By doing so you may also build a community and
help them engage with each other.
 One of the major issues in our residential areas is poor lighting
design. Design adequate lighting strategies in order to provide a
sense of security at night time.
 Landscape is not just for aesthetics, if designed smartly it can be
used as a safety barrier.
 Avoid fencing or creating boundary walls, as it does nothing but
provide an unaesthetic look to your building. Once the fencing is cut
the intruder can easily do his work.

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Security Expert
 Mr. Ikram Sehgal
In my vision security and safety of the users must be the very first
priority of the designers. In Pakistan, the crime rate is quite high due to
the inadequate security measures.
For example, why do you think bank robberies are so successful in
Pakistan?
They are possible because our banks just have one door from where
the robbers rush in having one person inside already. They should use
turnstiles that allow only one person at a time. The learning is that
create a delay for every person entering so that you are able to judge
the criminal way before he acts.
In the case of designing a secure space, you can look for the applications
of the following strategies:
 Design spaces in a way that brings a delay in the approach toward
the specified target, you may do it by providing a radial or a zig-zag
layout of landscape or roads. Such things might not provide a feeling
of terror to its users and also act as a medium of deterrence for the
criminal.
 Always remember that when you plan for security you plan in
compartments. If they penetrate the first component, how will they
enter the other, if they somehow enter the second compartment
how will they be delayed to get back to the first one?
 An attacker has advantages of time and choice of location. While
his greatest disadvantage is speed. If you can hold his speed you
can get him stuck.

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b) Questionnaire
 How does the rising crime rate of the city affect you on an individual level?

 On a scale of 10, how do you rate the crime rate of the city?

 Has crime somehow impacted the social lifestyle that you once carried?

 In your opinion, does your physical layout play a role in rising or

mitigating criminal activities?

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  Are you satisfied with the security infrastructure that has been
implemented in the city?

 In your opinion which typology needs to be secured more in terms of

security infrastructure?

3) The Role of Architectural Spaces And Elements In Cases of

Earlier Criminal Attacks
In order to develop a better understanding of how architecture and its spaces
become a reason for either promoting or mitigating crime, multiple buildings
were studied which have been under a criminal attack.
Pruitt-Igoe Housing Project, USA
A newly constructed 2,740-unit public
housing high-rise development, Pruitt-Igoe,
went to ruin due to the ever-increasing
criminal activities taking place within the
building. Although initially viewed as an
improvement over the tenement housing in
the slums, living conditions in Pruitt–Igoe
began to deteriorate soon after completion, Figure 05: Pruitt-Igoe in the
process of being torn down, at
and by the mid-1960s, it was plagued by poor aloss of $300 million.

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 maintenance, high crime, and low occupancy. Vandalism and juvenile delinquency
were endemic problems.

Figure 06: Exterior and Interior Views of Pruitt-Igoe

The visuals of the buildings depict the consequences faced by the people due to:

 Lack of surveillance.

 Lack of community building.

 Long non-catered corridors,

with no adequate lighting.

 The hidden and enclosed

staircase at the corner not
allowing any surveillance of
the corridor area.
Figure 07: Typical floor plan of Pruitt-Igoe showing the
placement of rooms and staircase

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Army Public School, Peshawar

Army Public School Peshawar is located on Mall Road Hassan Ghari which is the most
secured zone in the Peshawar Cantonment surrounded by important Military and
Government buildings. Established in 1992 this school runs under the management
of the Army Public Schools and Colleges System. The School was attacked on 16th
December 2014 from the rear end, it had a farm and a cemetery in the adjoining
Tehkal Village there.

Figure 08: Zoning details of the school along with intruder’s passageway

Despite being a highly guarded building, the intruders easily made their way within
the space and were able to cause several casualties. The space itself became a hurdle
in letting the people escape. The architecture of the school was poor and this disaster
took place due to the following issues:

 Lack of surveillance on the rear wall, knowing that there is a barren land there
where the attackers could stay, observe and attack.

 Improper placements of exits and entrances, they were direct with no delay or
deterrence.

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 The placement of larger blocks within close proximity, allowed the attackers to
take over the place easily.

 No hiding spaces or escape routes even in case of an emergency everyone had to

follow a single route which became quite hectic in this scenario causing delays for
the students to escape.

 Windows within the space were covered with steel bars which made it impossible
for the students to leave the classroom once the intruders came in and attacked
them.
 Despite of huge boundary walls and barbed wires, it proved to be a great example
of unsuccessful architectural space and security infrastructure.

Sandy Hook Elementary School

The Sandy Hook Elementary School
shooting, also called the Newtown shootings
of 2012, mass shooting in Newtown,
Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, that left
28 people dead and 2 injured. A single
person named Adam Lanza fatally shot 20
children and 6 adults at Sandy Hook
Elementary School before taking his own
Figure 09: Demolition in process of the school post
life. It was one of the deadliest school mass shooting.

shootings in U.S. history.

On analyzing the plan and zoning of the school, it was known that there were multiple
mistakes made while designing the layout of this school. It was not prepared to hold
against any such incident. The identified problems in its architecture are mentioned
below:

 The main entrance led directly to the classrooms (the most populated and
vulnerable) through a corridor without any hindrance, which resulted in more
causalities.

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 Figure 10: Zoning and Layout of the school.

 The open space (courtyard) was close at all four sides therefore, it did not help the
victims to run out. Those who went there were eventually trapped and killed.

4) Architectural Spaces That Are Already Designed Keeping in

Mind the Parameters of Security

Keeping in mind the tragedies happening all around the world the architects started
planning buildings including security infrastructure. Some of the examples are
described below:

Sandy Hook Elementary School

Following the mass shooting in 2012, the school was demolished and redesigned with
security infrastructure. The design for the New Sandy Hook School hides its security
features in plain sight (keeping safe its aesthetics) offering improved natural
surveillance and increase situational awareness through an extensive series of
Windows as well gradual, guarded approach from the main road it was based on 5
major security design strategies. They are:

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1) Deterrence
After entering the site several layers of guarded pathways which include
driveways, gardens, and parking (separate for visitor staff, and students) were
placed in order to show the great amount of effort that would be needed to reach
the main building which was set back.

Figure 11: Site plan showing the buffers between the building and entrance.

2) Detection
 Setting the building back from the entrance road on a contoured terrain allows
school staff to detect visitors from a distance and height.
 Segregating and directing traffic patterns so that visitors are clearly
distinguished from unwanted intruders.
 Keeping the form of the building a curvilinear concave on the vulnerable side for
maximum visibility.
 Placing large Windows for maximum natural surveillance.

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 Figure 12: Large windows for maximum natural surveillance.

3) Delay
 By grouping administrator and
office functions towards the front
of the building and classrooms
towards the back.
 All-access routes to the classroom
go through what is essentially a
screening layer.

Figure 12: Rectangles showing the classrooms

placed at the backside of the building.

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4) Deny
 In the event of unwanted intruder access to the rear portion of the building, it
can be denied by electronically closing doors which will lock in the event of a
security alert.
5) Open Space
 The new building has three courtyards. The old one was laid out in a looped
square, so classrooms wrapped around one inner courtyard. The new building
is shaped like an ‘E’ with four limbs: there is one central, slightly curved
structure with four hallways that branch off of it. Green courtyards and small
auditoriums occupy the gaps between each of those. This gives the school
more outdoor space eventually providing more evacuation roots in an
emergency.

Figure 13: Arrows showing the three courtyards.

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