Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh

Author(s): Vijay Sen Budhraj

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 482-495
Published by: University of California Press
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MOSCOW AND THE
BIRTHOF BANGLADESH
/ VijaySen Budhraj

whateverPekingand Islamabad may say,' it is wrongto assertthat

SovietRussia had a hand in thedismemberment of Pakistan.Indeed,the
weightof evidencesuggeststhatMoscowsoughtto preventthethirdIndia-
PakistanWar whichled to Pakistan'sbreakup.From the verystartthe
Sovietgovernment had triedto bringhometo themilitary junta in Islama-
bad theneedforseekinga politicalsolutionto thecomplicatedsituationin
East Pakistan,believingthatthiswas theonlywayto keepPakistanunited,
to maintainpeace and to checktheinterferenceof Pekingand Washington
in a regioncloseto theUSSR.
SOVIET REACTION TO THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR
lNo doubtthe situationwas complicated.The generalelection,held in
December1970, clearlyrevealedthe existenceof, to quote ZulfikarAli
Bhutto,"twomajorityparties"in Pakistan,one in the easternwingwhere
theAwamiLeague (AL) had secured167 of 169 East Pakistanseatsin the
313-member NationalAssemblyand the otherin WestPakistanwherethe
PakistanPeople'sParty(PPP) had secured88 of 144 WestPakistanseats.
When towardthe end of March 1971 the militaryjunta arrestedSheikh
MujiburRahman,outlawedtheAL, and launcheda militaryoperationin
East Pakistanto crushthemovement fordemocracyand autonomy, theAL
announcedtheestablishment of a sovereign,
independent RepublicofBang-
ladesh.
In responseto thissituation,
Sovietleaderscouldsay thattheyhad known
thatreligiousunitywouldultimately proveto be illusory,foreven in the
late 1940s SovietIndologistshad denouncedthe partitionplan. They had
arguedthatBritishimperialism provokedreligiousmassacresand usedthem
as an excusefordividingthecountryand thatthedivisionof India was no
solutionto thecommunal problem.In theearly1950s theydescribedPakis-
tan as an "artificial"state,a geographicalabsurditywithits two wings
'On December 10, 1971, PekingReviewargued that "with the backing of Soviet re-
the Indian reactionariesinvaded Pakistan . . . to impose
visionistsocial-imperialism,
the puppet regimeof the so-called 'Bangla Desh' so as to . . .annex East Pakistan."
(Vol. XIV, No. 50), p. 12. Z. A. Bhutto stated in the SecurityCouncil that Moscow
was a "party to Pakistan's dismemberment"and that India was "arrogant enough to
defy the will of the General Assembly" because it stood on "the shoulders of a big
power,"the USSR. S/PV. 1611,December12, 1971.

482

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 483

separatedby a thousandmilesof Indian territory. Stalindubbedthe very

conceptof Pakistan"primitive"and N. S. Khrushchev held thatWestern
imperialismhad made the"two HindustanStates"bitterenemies.During
his visitto India in 1955, the Sovietleader said in Srinagarthathe was
convincedthat"whenpassions... calmeddown,"thepeoplewouldregret
the "artificialdivisionof India." But in the 1960s,whenPekinghumbled
New Delhi in theHimalayas,the Sovietsbegan to improvetheirrelations
withPakistan.2Moreover,in 1971 theSovietshad to considerthestrategic
implications of civilwar "in the immediatevicinityof the USSR" against
thebackground oftheirdeepinvolvement in theregion,theSino-Sovietdis-
puteand rivalry, China'seffortsto promotesubversionin WestBengaland
Nagaland,and Washington's attempts to improveits relationswithPeking.
It is important to notethatsincethe1965 war betweenIndia and Pakistan,
theSovietshad been devisingmeansto bringthe"twoblood brothers"-on
thesubcontinent closertogetheras a meansof ensuringstability, peace and
security and reducingtheinfluence of outsidepowersin theregionin order
to safeguardMoscow'ssoutheastern flank.WhenthePakistanitroopswent
intoactionin East Pakistan,tensof thousandsof terrified East Pakistanis
pouredintoIndia. Since mostrefugeeswereHindus,it was fearedthatthe
subcontinent mightwitnesstherenewaloftheHindu-Muslim riotsof 1947,
whichcould have underminedIndia's stability,obstructedits rapid and
orderly progress,and destroyed all Soviethopesofinvolving bothIndia and
Pakistanin Moscow'ssecurityplans forthe region.
Thatwasnotall.Sinceall Sovietattempts to weanPakistanfromWashing-
tonand Pekinghad beenunsuccessful and since GeneralYahya Khan had
refusedin 1969 to accepttheSovietplan forregionaleconomiccooperation
betweenIndia,Pakistan,Iran andAfghanistan (althougha fewweeksearlier
he had committed himselfto supportit), theSovietleaderslookedforward
to theestablishment of a democratic government in Pakistan,believingthat
sucha government wouldpursuea different policy.Butthearmycrack-down
in East Pakistandashedall Soviethopesofan earlyreturnto civilianrulein
Pakistan.
Something had to be doneto restorenormalcyin East Pakistan.The peo-
pleofIndia,especiallyofpolitically sensitiveWestBengal,condemned army
atrocities in East Pakistanand demandedthattheirgovernment shoulddo
something to stopthereignof terror.Accordingly, on March31 theIndian
Parliamentcalled upon all countriesto persuadePakistanto stop"thesys-
tematicdecimationof peoplewhichamountsto genocide."Moreover,it as-
sured"the75 millionpeopleofEast Bengal... thewhole-hearted sympathy
andsupportofthepeopleof India."13

2For details, see this author's "The Evolution of Russia's Pakistan Policy," The
AustralianJournal of Politics and History,December 1971 (Vol. XVI, No. 3), pp.
343-360.
'For the resolution'sfull text,see Bangla Desh Documents (New Delhi, Ministryof
ExternalAffairs, 1971), p. 672.

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 484 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

The Sovietgovernment respondedto theIndian appeal immediately. On

behalfofthePresidiumoftheSupremeSovietoftheUSSR, PresidentPod-
gornywarnedPresidentYahya Khan on April2 that"continuation of re-
pressivemeasuresand bloodshedin East Pakistanwill,undoubtedly, only
makethesolutionof theproblemmoredifficult" and could"do greatharm
to thevitalinterestsof theentirepeople of Pakistan."He consideredit his
"duty"to appeal to the Presidentof Pakistan"to stopthe bloodshedand
repression" and to turn"to methodsof a peacefulsettlement"
in theinterest
of "preserving peace in the area." He showedhis sympathy for the AL
leaderswhenhe spokeofthemas having"receivedsuchconvincing support
fromtheoverwhelming majority."But lestthisfriendlyadvicebe regarded
as interferencein Pakistan'sinternalaffairs,
theSovietPresidentstated:

In appealingtoyouwe areguidedbythegenerally humani-

recognized
tarianprinciples intheUniversal
recorded ofHumanRights
Declaration
andbyconcern forthewelfare
ofthefriendly
peopleofPakistan.4

Threethingsshouldbe notedhere.The emphasison and concernfor"the

entirepeople of Pakistan" (mentionedtwice) in theSoviet messageindi-
catedthatMoscowwas on theside of thestatusquo-it did notwantPaki-
stan'sbreakup.Second,the reference to "peace in the area" revealedthat
Moscow thoughtthatpoliticalchaos and fighting withinPakistancould
overflow and escalateinto a war betweenIndia and Pakistan-a situation
Moscowwas determined to prevent.Third,theappeal reflected SovietRus-
sia's deepconcernfortheregion.
It appearsthatMoscowwas oftheviewthatthePakistanGovernment was
dividedon the "toughpolicy"issue. A Sovietwriterblamed"a groupof
armyhawks"fortheuse offorceandseemedtoimplythatwhenthe"hawks"
threatened "a coup if thegovernment compromised withthe easternprov-
ince," PresidentYahya Khan was led to crushthe popularmovement by
forceofarms.Commenting on somereportsin theWesternpresswhichpre-
dictedthebreakupofPakistan,theSovietspokesmanobservedthatthiswas
what"certainimperialistcircles"hoped and that"the imperialists would
notbe aversetotakingadvantageofthesituationin Pakistanto further their
selfish, aims."5Finally,he assertedthatwhileEast Pakistani
neo-colonialist
leadershad certaineconomicgrievances, oncethesewereredressedthetwo
wings,despitetheirculturaldifferences, could worktogetherforthe pros-
perityofthewholeofPakistan.
This approachservedMoscow'sinterests in severalways.First,any en-
couragement to thesecessionist
movement wouldhavejeopardizedMoscow's
'For full text of PresidentPodgorny'smessage, see "Message fromN. V. Podgorny
to the President of Pakistan," CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press (hereafterCDSP),
May 4, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 14), pp. 35-36 (fromPravda, April 4, 1971), "Soviet
Union & the Struggleof the Bangla Desh People," Soviet Review (supplement), Jan-
uary18, 72 (Vol. IX, No. 3), pp. 8-9.
'A. Ulansky,"The Eventsin Pakistan,"New Times,No. 15,April 1971,p. 9.

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 485

presencein Islamabad.Second,othergreatpowerswithinterests in there-

gion stoodsolidlybehindtheWestPakistanigeneralsin orderto counter-
balancewhattheybelievedto be Sovietinfluence in New Delhi. As a rela-
tivelysatisfiedpower,Moscowwas neitherpreparednor was in a position
to taketheriskofcreatinga newstate.Third,thebreakupofPakistancould
have thrownthe entiresubcontinent intochaos and spread the germsof
secessionto therestof Pakistanand possiblyto India. The Chinesewould
havebenefited themostfromsucha situation.
It is not impliedherethatMoscowwantedthe continuation of military
rulein Pakistan.It verymuchwishedthegeneralsto retirefrompolitics,to
transfer powerto therepresentatives ofthepeople.Its sympathy fortheAL
was understandable. Afterall thispartyhad won a majorityofseats in the
NationalAssembly, itssocioeconomicprogramwas in Moscow'seyes"pro-
gressive,"its leaderswere againstPakistan'smembership in SEATO and
CENTO and stoodforcloselinks,economicand cultural,withIndia. As the
Sovietscalculated,Pakistan-thewholeof it-ruled by theAL couldbetter
servetheirpolicyobjectivesin theregion.
To return to President
Podgorny's message,thoughPresident YahyaKhan
assuredMoscowthathe wouldstarttalks"withnationalrepresentative ele-
mentsin 'EastPakistanat theearliestopportunity,"" he had no intention of
openingnegotiations withtheAL leaders.As thebrutalityof thearmyin-
creased,manyintellectuals joined the ranks of secessionists.Disaffection
evenspreadtoBengalidiplomats inPakistanmissionsabroad.MostBengalis
wereconvincedthattheirsurvivaldependedon fullindependence. Many
tookto armsand organizedthemselves into the 'MuktiBahini (liberation
force)andseveralmillionfledacrosstheborderto India to escapethearmy
terror.
The influxofso manyrefugees intoIndia and thestoriesofgenocidethey
brought withthem,and theestablishment ofBangladeshdiplomatic missions
in Calcuttaand New Delhi in April1971 all worsenedtherelationsbetween
IndiaandPakistan.MoscowfearedthattheIndiraGandhigovernment would
notbe able to postponeforlongwhatthepeopledemanded:recognition of
Bangladeshand large-scalemilitaryassistanceto theMuktiBahini. It was
certainthatrecognition wouldlead to war betweenIndia and Pakistan.A
Sovietanalyst,therefore, cautionedthat

thecontinuingbloodshedin East Pakistanis doingseriousharmnot

onlytothevitalinterests
ofthePakistanipeople,butalsoto thecause
ofpeacein Asia andthroughouttheworld.7

6"PakistanIs Determined Not to AllowAnyCountry to Interfere

in Pakistan'sIn.
ternal
Affairs,"PekingReview,April16,1971(Vol.XIV,No. 16), pp.8-9.
.I. Ratnikov, "International
Notes: Crisisand Its Consequences,"CDSP, June1,
1971(Vol.XXIII,No.18), p. 28 (fromPravda,May1,1971).

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486 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

THE ATTITUDE OF PEKING AND WASHINGTON

The "hawks"in Pakistan,however,werenotin a mood to open negotia-

tionswiththe electedrepresentatives
of thepeople,regardedas "traitors"
and "inferior"Muslims.The standof Pekingand Washington on thecivil
warstrengthened thehandsofthosewhowereagainsta politicalsettlement.
In a messageto PresidentYahya Khan,PrimeMinisterChou En-laistated
thatwhatwas happeningin Pakistanwas "purelythe internalaffairof
Pakistan"and thatonly"a handfulof persons"wanted"to sabotagethe
unificationof Pakistan."He did notmiss theopportunityto denouncehis
rivalsin theregion,forhe allegedthatbothMoscowand Washington had
been"carryingout grossinterferencein theinternalaffairsof Pakistanby
exploitingtheinternal
problemsofyourcountry." Finally,he assuredIslama-
bad that
shouldtheIndianexpansionists... launchaggression againstPakistan,
theChineseGovernment ... will,as always,firmly
support thePakistan
Government and peoplein theirjust struggle to safeguardstatesov-
andnationalindependence.8
ereignty
Thoughthemilitaryjunta lost all moralauthority to rule East Pakistan
whenit failedto abide by the resultsof a freeelectionand launchedits
suppressioncampaignin the region,the Nixon administration refusedto
takea publicstandagainstthemassacreof civilianpopulationand did not
take the necessarystepsto effectively
halt all its arms sales to Pakistan.
Washington tohavewarnedIndia thatin case Pekinghelped
is also reported
Islamabadin a warwithIndia,NewDelhi shouldnotcounton U.S. support.
Moscow,on itspartand underthesecircumstances, did notwantwar at all.
Generalwarin thesubcontinent wouldhavebeendisastrousfromtheSoviet
pointofview.It wouldhaveweakenedbothIndia and Pakistan,prolonged
militaryrulein Pakistan,strengthenedtherightist forcesin India and fur-
therincreasedIslamabad'sdependenceon Pekingand Washington. What
was worse,Moscowcouldnotcounton Washington's supportto preventthe
involvement ofChinain a newIndia-Pakistan war.Thiswas a newsituation,
forin the1965 war theU.S. and USSR had warnedPekingnotto intervene
in theconflict.IzvestiacommentatorV. Vasin understandably advisedboth
India and Pakistanin identicaltermsto make efforts to preventa "further
aggravation ofthesituation"in theIndiansubcontinent.9
THE INDO-SOVIET SECURITY PACT

All thisemboldenedPakistanto threatenIndia withwar. Islamabadve-

hemently accused India of undermining
Pakistan'sintegritythroughsub-
8Radio Pakistan broadcast Prime MinisterChou En-lai's message on April 11, 1971.
The messagehas been printedin J. A. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh (New
Delhi, S. Chand,1972) as appendix5, pp. 133-34.
'"Russia Also Takes to Delhi-Pindi ParityFormula,"Sunday Standard (New Delhi),
July11,1971.

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 487

versionand supportingthe liberationstruggle.PresidentYahya Khan's

utterances grewincreasingly bellicose.He publiclystatedthatPakistanwas
verynearto warwithIndia and thatit wouldnotbe alone.As thesituation
worsened,thetwo sides alertedtheirfrontier forces.Therewas no doubt
thatIndia trainedand suppliedtheMuktiBahiniforceswitharmsand am-
munitionon thehopethattheywouldbe able to drivethePakistaniforces
out of East Pakistan.Moreover,in India it was beingarguedthatlooking
aftersevenmillionrefugees hampereddevelopment and was moreexpensive
thanwar,whichappearedto be the onlysolutionto settletheBangladesh
problemonceand forall. Finally,severalIndianpoliticalpartiesand many
Congressleadersdemandedtheimmediate recognitionofBangladesh.It was
evidentthatrecognition wouldgreatly increasetensionandcouldlead to war.
A way out appearedto be to makeit clearto 'Pakistanand its allies that,
if-attacked, India wouldnotbe aloneeither.The Soviets,therefore, hastened
to offerto India a treatydesignedto assureNew Delhi'ofSoviethelpin case
any countrythreatened its security.The 'SovietForeignMinisterarrived
in India on August8 and thenextdaythetwocountries puttheirsignatures
to a twenty-year treatywhosedetailshad apparently been workedoutmuch
earlier.ArticleIX of thetreatyservedas a warningto Pakistanthatif it
attackedIndia,Moscowshouldnotbe expectedto remainneutral.
To say thisis notto suggestthatas of August9 theKremlinabandoned
thepost-Tashkent policyof treatingIndia and Pakistanalike. The Soviets
had invitedIslamabadin 1969tojoin itscollectivesecurity arrangement and
the invitationhad not been withdrawn. Pakistancould still join. It was
reported thataboutthistime"a non-aggression pactbetweentheUSSR and
Pakistan"was "mootedin informed quartersin Islamabad,"10butprobably
thehawksin themilitary juntacould notbe won over.
Again,theSovietambassadorto Pakistancouldhavereferred to thejoint
statement issuedon theconclusionofthevisitoftheSovietForeignMinister
to India whereinit was emphasizedthatthetreatywas notdirectedagainst
anyone.Additionally, he couldhavepointedoutthatthejointstatement did
notreferto East Pakistanas East Bengal,thoughthisis whatIndia desired
and was thetermtheIndianParliamenthad used in itsresolution ofMarch
31.
Thoughthetreatyhelpedin defusingtheexplosivesituationforthetime
being,refugeescontinuedto pour into India. Moscowwas convincedthat
thesituationon bothsidesoftheIndia-Pakistanbordercouldbecomenormal
onlyiftherefugees returnedhomeand thattherefugeeswouldnotgo back
tillthegeneralstransferred
powerto thosein whomthepeopleof East Paki-
stanhad faith.The Sovietgovernment, therefore,
continuedto advisePresi-
dentYahya Khan to seeka politicalsolution."
--

'0Zubeida Mustafa,"USSR and Indian Actionin Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon,fourth

quarter1971 (Vol. XXIV, No. 4), p. 65.
"D. Volskyand A. Usvatov,"War on the Indian Subcontinent,"New Times, No. 50,
December1971,p. 8.

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488 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

Pakistancouldnotdisregardcompletely Sovietadvice; particularlysince

theWesternpowersalso had beenadvising-thoughnotas forcefully, open-
ly norclearly-Islamabadto respectthefundamental rightsof thepeopleof
East Pakistan.The Westernpress and politicalobserverswere generally
sympathetic towardthe people of East Pakistan,denouncedthe atrocities
committed by the Pakistanarmyand stronglyurgedIslamabad to create
conditionswhichwouldpermittherefugeesto return.
The resultwas that PresidentYahya Khan assuredthe community of
nationsand thepeople of Pakistanthathe was committed to establishing
democracy in hiscountry.In keepingwithhis pledgeto restorecivilianrule,
he announcedon August31 theappointment ofDr. A. M. Malikas governor
ofEast Pakistan.Dr. Malik appointedsomeEast Pakistanisas membersof
his cabinet.The Presidentalso proclaimeda generalamnesty,appealedto
therefugeesto returnhomeand announcedtheholdingof freshelections
(by-elections)in East Pakistanto fillthe 78 NationalAssemblyand 193
East PakistanAssemblyseatsmade vacantby thedisqualification of those
AL memberswho wereallegedto have "takenpartin the anti-national ac-
tivity."
It was commonknowledgethatthe Malik government could not inspire
confidence amongthepeople.The governor, thougha BengaliMuslim,was
considereda QuislingbymostEast Pakistanis.In fact,thenewgovernment
had thesupportof a smallminority of collaborators-Muslims of non-Ben-
gali originwho had settledin East Pakistansince 1947 and some Bengali
conservatives whohad beendiscredited in theDecember1970 election.The
refugees couldnottrustsuchpeopleand almostall ofthemrefusedto return
home.
EFFORTS TO 'PERSUADE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PRESSURE YAHYA

For India,thefinancialand socialburdenimposedbysucha largenumber

of refugeeswas unbearable.It wantedtheSovietsto use theirinfluence in
Islamabadfor-apoliticalsettlement. PrimeMinisterIndira Gandhiherself
visitedMoscowtowardtheend of September1971 to seek Soviethelp for
-thesolutionof therefugeeproblem.Thoughthe Indianpressclaimedthat
shewas successful"in bringing theSovietUniontoa positioncloserto India
on Bangladesh,"'12theKremlinstillmaintaineda neutralposture.One must
remember thatsinceMarch1971 India had beencallingEast Pakistan"East
Bengal."Butin thetextofthejointstatement issuedat theend oftheIndian
PrimeMinister'svisitto theUSSR, theterm"East Pakistan"was used,13
evidently in deference Whatwas moreimportant,
to Pakistan'ssensitivities.
'theSovietPrimeMinistertoldMrs.Gandhithattheconflict in East Pakistan
was "an internal problem-ofPakistan,"thatitwas forthepeopleofPakistan
""Major Shiftin Soviet Policy on Bangla Desh," Times of India, September30, 1971.
1""JointSoviet-IndianStatetment,"New Times,No. 41, October 1971, p. 7. Also see
"Joint Soviet-IndianStatement,"CDSP, October 26, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 39), pp.
10-11 (fromPravda, Izvestia,September30, 1971).

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 489

to decide "whatsortof politicalsecuritytheyshouldhave" and that"the

struggleof thepeoplehad to go on in Pakistanterritory."14
MoscowthuscautionedIndia againstseekinga militarysolutionof the
Bangladeshissue,and madeitclearthattheIndo-Soviet treatydid notmean
Sovietbackingof theliberationmovement. The Sovietsdid notwishto say
anythingwhichwas likelyto damage SovietrelationswithIslamabadbe-
yondrepair.This explainsthefactthat,unlikesomeoftheWesternpowers,
the Kremlindid not suspendeconomicaid to Pakistan.If therewas any
doubtonthispoint,itwas removedbytheSoviet-Algerian jointcommunique
of October8, 1971, whichproclaimedMoscow's"respectforthenational
unityand territorial integrityof bothIndia and Pakistan."'15 Moreover,a
Sovietcommentator called fora settlementbased bothon the"will and in-
terests"oftheEast Pakistanisand on "respectforPakistan'sterritorial in-
tegrity."'6 One otherreasonforthisSovietposturemaywellhavebeenthat
the Kremlinwas not preparedto displease its Arab friendswho backed
Islamabadand who were opposedto the dismemberment of Pakistan,the
largestMuslimstatein theworld.Incidentally, evenmostIndian Muslims
did notfavorthebreakupofPakistan.
Stillanotherfactorcouldbe thatthesituationin East Pakistanhad notyet
crystallized.The liberationforcescouldnotmatchtheresourcesofthePaki-
stangovernment andtheirhit-and-run tacticshad notdislodgedthePakistan
armyfromanystrategic position.The July-August gainsoftheMuktiBahini
seemedtohavebeenwipedoutbythemilitary operationsofthearmyfollow-
ing the rainyseason. The Bangladeshleadersin India and elsewherehad
stillto demonstrate theirstrength on thebattlefield
to warrantattentionfrom
theinternational community and to justifytheirdemandthattheybe con-
sideredthereal representatives of thepeopleof East Pakistan.
Mostimportantly, it was held in Moscowthatif WestPakistanagreedto
let East Pakistanhave substantialautonomy, Pakistancould stillremaina
singlepoliticalunit,and nothingwouldhave pleasedtheSovietsmorethan
a unitedPakistanwithSheikhMujiburRahmanas PrimeMinister.For the
Sheikhappearedto MoscowtheNehruof Pakistan-a votaryof non-align-
ment,secularism,socialismand democracy.It is apparentthatfor Soviet
militarystrategists, WestPakistanwas moreimportant thanEast Pakistan.
They could not ignorethe strategiclocationof WestPakistanwherethe
UnitedStateshad onceoperatedan intelligence base notfarfromtheUSSR,
and whichwas nowlinkedwithChinaby tworoads-the old Silk Routere-
openedin August1970 and theKarakoramHighwaycompletedin January
1971. Moscowvisualizeda definitedecreasein Chineseand Americanin-
fluence in PakistanwhenpowerpassedintothehandsoftheAL, themajority
partyofPakistan.It therefore reneweditsefforts to securethereleaseofthe
Sheikhand in thebeginningof Octobera largenumberof Sovietpublicor-
14"Major Shiftin Soviet Policy on Bangla Desh," Times of India, September30, 1971.
15"Soviet-Algerian Statement,"New Times,No. 42, October1971,p. 37.
16A.Ulansky,"The Tragedyof East Pakistan,"ibid.,pp. 13-15.

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490 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

ganizationsdemandedhis releaseand also thatof "'otherpopularleadersof

East Pakistan."The resolutionspassed by theseorganizations condemned
"theactsofterrorandviolence"and "thepersecution ofprogressivepolitical
leaders."'7
It is notwithoutsignificance thatthe Sovietleadersdiscussedthe situa-
tionon thesubcontinent whentheyvisitedCanada and France in October
1971.In hisspeechin Paris,Brezhnevurgedthenecessity offindinga politi-
cal solutionto theproblem.And in Ottawa,theSovietPrimeMinistertold
CanadianM.P.s and Senatorsthatduringhis visitto Iran theSovietPresi-
denthad demandedof PresidentYahya Khan (on October15) therestora-
tionof democracyin East Pakistan,thefreeingof theSheikhand arrange-
mentsforthereturnoftherefugeesfromIndia. Radio Pakistan,however,
claimedthatduringhis talkswithPresidentYahya Khan,theSovietPresi-
denthad "expressedthe SovietUnion'skeen interestin the unityand in-
tegrity ofPakistan."'8To be sure,theunityofPakistancouldbe maintained
ifthemilitary juntasteppedaside in favorof theelectedrepresentatives of
thepeople.TheKremlinevensentNikolaiFirybbin, a SovietDeputyForeign
Minister, to Delhireportedly topersuadetheAL leaders"to acceptautonomy
forBangladeshwithina singlePakistan."'19
At aboutthistime,on October24, PrimeMinisterIndira Gandhibegan
hertourof six Westerncapitalswhichpresumably had Moscow'sblessings.
Since 'theNixon administration appearedto be almostwhollyout of step
withtheAmericanpressand public opinionon thisissue,Moscowhoped
thatthe Indian PrimeMinisterwould succeedin persuadingthe United
Statesto prevailupon Pakistanto releasethe Sheikhand switchfromre-
pressionto negotiation and reconciliation.
Meanwhile,thesituationon theIndo-Pakistani borderhad again become
tense.The twosidesaccusedeach otherof borderviolations.A Sovietcom-
mentator remindedbothIndia and Pakistanof thetragicand harmfulcon-
sequencesof the1965 war.He arguedthatin Pakistanit had "led to infla-
tionand a rise in prices"whichaggravated"the people'sdiscontentwith
capitalistexploitation and feudaltyranny."Even thedemandforautonomy
in East Pakistanand thevictoryof theAL in theDecember1970 election
wereconsideredto be "a consequenceof" the 1965 war. 'He playeddown
PresidentYahya Khan's threatsof war and blamed"irresponsible and ad-
venturisticelements" in Pakistanforwhipping up warhysteria.Significantly,
he also statedthatin India "theleadersofreactionary andcommunalparties
and organizations" weretrying"to capitalizeon the developments in East
Pakistanand therefugeeproblems,"employed"ultra-patriotic slogans. ..
to fanreligiousstrife"and impart"a dangerousemotionalcharacterto the
"For full texts of "Statementsof Soviet Public Organisations,"see supplementto
Soviet Review,January18, 1972 (Vol. IX, No. 3), pp. 19-24.
18"Mr.KosyginWorriedby Pakistan," The Times (London), October 21, 1971 and
"Yahya Meets Podgorny,"The Statesman (New Delhi), October17, 1971.
""'KremlinEnvoy Meets Leaders of Bangla Desh," The Times (London), October
25, 1971.

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 491

tensionbetweenneighbouring countries."Both India and Pakistanwere,

therefore,advisedto "displayrestraint and statesmanship,and bridlethe
'hawks'and ithechauvinists.
This analysisstronglyindicatesthatMoscow was deeplycommitted to
preserving Pakistan'sunityand to treatingIndia and Pakistanalike. Ap-
parently,the Soviets still hoped that Washingtonwould cooperatewith
Moscow,as it did duringthe1965 war,in persuadingIslamabadto aban-
donthepolicyofconfrontation. Had thetwosuperpowersactedin concert,
Islamrabad mighthave been pressuredinto comingto termswiththe im-
prisonedleadersand Pakistanwouldhave thusremaineda singlepolitical
unit.
POLICY CHANGE IN MOSCOW
In the earlypart of November,two eventsconvincedMoscow thatthe
"hawks"had cometo controlthemilitaryjunta in Islamabad.First,after
movinghistroopsand armortowardforward positionin September-October
on thepretextof an exercise,PresidentYahya Khan despatchedthethree
chiefsofstafftoPekingonNovember5. The missionwas led byZ. A. Bhutto,
who,it maybe recalled,had denouncedtheTashkentagreement as a great
betrayal.Moreover,he was partyto PresidentYahya Khan's decisionto
crushthemovement forautonomy and restorationofcivilianrulein March.
Uponhisreturnfrom Peking,Z. A. BhuttoclaimedthatChinawouldsupport
Pakistanif an armedconflict occurred.PrimeMinisterKosyginconcluded
that"theforcesof an anti-popular militarydictatorship"had "joined ranks
withexternalaggressivecircleshostileto the peoples of Hindustan."21It
was heldin Moscowthat"therecouldbe no peace on thesubcontinent while
theIslamabadforceswererunningamuckin East Pakistanitowns."22
Second, Prime MinisterIndira Gandhi'svisit to the UnitedStatesre-
mained unproductive. Reportingon the Gandhi-Nixonmeeting,Pravda
quotedan Americancommentator tosay that"thetwoleadersfailedto agree
on measuresto mitigatethepresentdifficulties in theIndiansubcontinent."
It also statedthatthe"USA gave no indicationof itsreadinessto influence
GeneralYahya Khan in favorof a politicalsettlement" in East Pakistan.23
In otherwords accordingto the Soviets,theAmericanPresidentwas not
preparedto use his influenceand authority to securethereleaseof Sheikh
MujiburRahman.SincebothMoscowandNewDelhiconsideredtheSheikh's
releasethefirststeptowarda politicalsettlement and thereturnof therefu-
gees,theonlyoptionopen to themwas to wishtheliberationforcesearly
and speedysuccess.And by this timethe guerillaand liberationforces
20I.Borisov,
"DarkSkiesovertheIndianSubcontinent,"
New Times,No. 44,October
1971,pp. 10-12.
21"Pakistan's BhuttoAsks forUnderstanding,"
CDSP, April12, 1972 (Vol. XXIV,
No.11),p. 2 (fromPravda,March18,1972).
22D.Volsky,"NowThattheGunsAre Silent,"New Times,No. 52, December1971,
p.9.
28"U.S.Attitude
Unhelpful,
SaysPravda,"SundayStandard(NewDelhi), November
7,1971.

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492 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

had increasedtheirstrength to about 100,000 and the news agenciesre-

portedbitterfighting betweenthemand regularPakistaniarmyunitsin
differentpartsofEast Pakistan.The newsfromEast Pakistanwas verybad
forthemilitary junta.
Theremayhave beentwomorereasonsforthechangein Sovietpolicy.
First,as the Sovietssurveyedthe scene,theycalculatedthatthe Chinese,
eveniftheywished,could perhapsdo little'tosave East Pakistanfortheir
protegenowthatthemountain passesin theHimalayaswouldsoonbe closed
by snow.Second,the flowof Sovietarmsto India had continuedand the
top-ranking Sovietdiplomaticand militaryofficials, whovisitedNew Delhi
towardtheend of October,wereconvincedthatIndia was in a positionto
destroythewarmachineofthe"anti-popular in East
militarydictatorship"
PakistanwiththeKremlin'sdiplomaticsupport.
The shiftin Sovietpolicywas reflected in theSovietpresswhichbecame
overtlycriticalof 'Islamabad'spolicyin East Pakistanand expressiveand
demonstrative in its supportfortheliberationforces.It began to highlight
theactivitiesand gainsoftheMuktiBahiniknowingfullwellthatthelibera-
tionforceshad theirbases in and receivedweaponsfromIndia. In thesec-
ondweekofNovemberan articlein New TimesblamedIslamabadforten-
sion on thesubcontinent. The authoralso statedthatthe "Dacca Cabinet"
was composedchieflyofmembersoftheparties"whichsuffered a crushing
defeat"in the1970 electionand thatit enjoyed"neitherauthority nor sup-
portamongthepopulationof East Pakistan."He describedthestepstaken
bythemilitary juntato restorenormalcyin East Pakistanas "half-measures
or rathera smoke-screen for the authorities'unwillingness to workfor a
realpoliticalsettlement." (It is importantto notethattheIndianpresshad
madesomewhat similarobservations whenthesestepsweretakenin thebe-
ginningof September.)All thisled theSovietanalystto concludethatthe
refugeeproblemwas no longeran "internalaffair"of Pakistan.Moreover,
he approvingly quotedThe New YorkTimes (of October28) to assertthat
"the unprecedented flowof destituterefugees"constituted, "in effect,a
bloodlessaggressionagainstIndia."24
Whilepreviously theSovietobservers had beenplayingdownthescale of
disasterand invariablyquotedthe Indian or Westernpress while giving
figures,twoSovietanalystsobservedin Novemberthattheyhad seen with
theirowneyesthe"floodofhumanmiserythathas swepttenmillionpeople
overintoIndia." Moreimportantly, theyemphasizedthefactthattherewas
no truthin thePakistaniclaimthatall theconditionsforthereturniofthe
refugeeshad beenprovidedand thatthousandsweresafelyreturning home
everyday.25

24A. Ulanksy,"Indian Subcontinent:Roots of the Crisis," New Times, No. 46, No-
vember 1971, pp. 7-8. Also see "Hindustan Needs Peace," CDSP, December 14, 1971
(Vol. XXIII, No. 46), pp. 20-21 (fromIzvestia,November16, 1971).
25V. Simonov and A. Shalnev, "The Tragedy of the Refugees," New Times, No. 49,
December 1971,p. 11.

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 493

THE THIRD INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR

In theverynatureofthings,theWestPakistantroopscouldnotmaintain
theirauthority in a hostileenvironment forlong.TheycoulddestroyMukti
Bahinipocketsin big cities,notin villages,especiallyin thevillagesalong
the Indianborderas theguerrillaforcescould alwaysseek shelteracross
thefrontier in India. To destroyguerrillabases, Pakistanbegan shelling
Indianbordervillagesand towns.In retaliation, Indiantroopswereauthor-
ized on November21 to crossintoEast Pakistan.Two days laterPakistan
declareda nationalemergency and PresidentYahy.aKhan said thathe ex-
pectedto be "offon a war withinten days." Pravda strongly condemned
Pakistan'saggressiveposture,blamed"reactionary forces"in Pakistanand
abroad"foraggravating PakistaniiIndian relationsand forgivingthemthe
characterof an international conflict."X26
Significantly, it did not mention
growingIndian militarypressurealong the borderof East Pakistan; the
neutralposturehad evidently beenabandoned.
iOn'December 3 Pakistanlaunchedair and groundattacksall alongIndia's
Western borderandportrayed theconflictas a warbetweenMuslimPakistan
and Hindu India. Moscowdid not agreewiththisassessment. It held that
thepeopleofEast Pakistanhad risennotagainsttheirMuslimco-religionists
in WestPakistan,butagainstthemilitaryclique oppressingbothpartsof
Pakistan,against"theWestPakistanimilitaryoligarchy," and thatPakistan
was responsibleforescalatingtheconflict. Called uponto live up to provi-
sions of the Indo-Soviettreaty,the Kremlinmovedalong severallines. It
was of theviewthattheinterests ofthepeopleof East Pakistanand of the
stabilityof thearea wouldbe bestservedby an Indianvictoryin thewar.
ButIndiacouldrepelaggression intheWestandhelpMukti'Bahinito achieve
itsaim, providedWashingtonor Pekingor both and the SecurityCouncil
did not intervenein the conflict.Accordingly, Soviet diplomacywas di-
rectedtokeeptheconflict localized.On December5, 'a Tass statement warned
all powerstokeepoutoftheconflict. It observedthattheSovietUnionstood
for"thespeediestendingof thebloodshedand fora politicalsettlement in
East Pakistan."27 The Kremlinthuslinked'theending-ofthe war witha
politicalsettlement in East Pakistan.Second,the Sovietspresumablycal-
culatedthattheU.S. wouldnot intervene militarilyin theconflict'andthe
Soviet government was determinedto oppose Chinese intervention. The
Sovietambassadorin New Delhi,N. M. Pegov,is reportedto have assured
Indiathatincase ofa ChineseattackacrosstheHimalayas,theSovietUnion
wouldstartdiversionary actionin Sinkiang.28It was a riskyventure, but
Moscowcould notaffordto let downits ally in theregion.Dr. HenryKis-
26"Internationalising Issue: USSR Opposed," The Hindu (Madras), November29,
1971. Also see "Pravda CriticisesPak Repressionin East Bengal," The Hindu, Novem-
ber22, 1971.
27Forfulltextof the Tass statement,see Soviet Review,supplement,n. 17, pp. 12-13.
28VinodGupta, Anderson Papers: A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India (Delhi,
Indian School SupplyDepot, 1972), p. 126.

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494 MOSCOW AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

singer'svisitsto Pekingin Julyand Octoberand PresidentNixon'sproposed

visitto Pekingcreatedthefearof Sino-American collusionand made it all
themorenecessaryforMoscowto demonstrate to its non-Communist allies
thattheKremlinwouldnotallowitselftobe browbeaten byPekingor Wash-
ington.AnywaveringduringIndia's momentof peril mighthave caused
seriousdoubtsin Moscow'sothernon-Communist allies aboutthedependa-
bilityof Sovietsupportto them.
Third,in the SecurityCouncilMoscowlentunqualifiedsupportto the
liberationmovement and proposedthattherepresentatives-ofthismovement
be givena hearing.The Sovietdelegatepointedoutthatthedeterioration in
thesituationdid not occuronlyon 3 December,thattheSecurityCouncil
shouldnot close its eyes to whathad been takingplace in East Pakistan
since the beginning of 1971 or "to realityand . . . actual state of affairs."
He proposeda resolution whichsuggesteda politicalsettlementin East Paki-
stanand whichcalleduponPakistanto orderitstroopsin East Pakistan"to
cease all acts ofviolence."The resolutionshowedbothrealismand an un-
derstanding ofthebasic issuesinvolved,butas expectedwhentheresolution
was put to thevote (on December5) China votedagainst,theUSSR and
Poland in favorand therestabstained.
BetweenDecember4 and 21, whentheSecurityCouncildebatedthecon-
flict,theSovietstandremainedconsistent. Moscowcasta negativevotethree
timesto block "one-sided"U.S. or U.S.-sponsoredresolutionsand cham-
pionedtherightofself-determination ofthepeopleofEast Pakistan.Mean-
while,theIndiantroopswiththeactivesupport iofMuktiBahiniand thepeo-
ple reachedthe outskirts of Dacca. But the Soviet'delegationassuredthe
SecurityCouncilthatIndia wouldwithdrawits troopsfromEast Pakistan
if Pakistandid the same. He arguedthatin orderto achievean effective
politicalsettlement powermustbe transferred to thosewho"wona majority
at theDecember1970elections."Finally,he emphasizedthatonlytheelected
representatives of thepeople could "createconditionsforthe returnof all
EastPakistanrefugees fromIndia" andnotthePakistanmilitary authorities.
Evidently, MoscowwantedIndia to undertake in BangladeshwhatIslama-
bad shouldhave done: transfer of powerto theelectedrepresentatives of
thepeople.Moreover,it did notwantIndia to broadenor prolonghostilities
in theWestto teachPakistana lesson.Such a movewouldhave provoked
bothPekingand Washington-a situationtheKremlinwas determined to
prevent.The First Soviet DeputyForeignMinister,who arrivedin New
Delhi on December12, twicepostponedhis departureforMoscow,perhaps
in orderto impressuponIndia thedesirability ofkeepingtheconflict in the
West limited.He leftNew Delhi only afterthe Pakistaniarmyhad sur-
renderedin Dacca (on December16) and the day Pakistanagreedto a
cease-fire in theWestin responseto an Indianproposal.
To sum up, theoutcomeof theThird India-PakistanWar and thebirth

2S/PV. 1615,December
15,1971.

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VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ 495

of Bangladeshcould be describedas greatvictoriesfor Sovietdiplomacy.

The Kremlinreckonedthatthetimingof thewar was unfavorable to China
and thatPekingwouldnotintervene militarilyno matterhowvehemently its
representativesdenouncedIndia and Moscow'srole in theconflict.It also
calculatedthatPakistan's"blackdeeds"in theeasternwinghad beenso well
and widelypublicizedand condemned by theAmericanpress,leadingU.S.
Senators(SenatorEdwardKennedyand SenatorFrankChurchchargedthe
Pakistaniswithcommitting genocide),threeformerU.S. ambassadorsto
India, a largebody of intellectuals,academicians,religiousleaders,social
workers, Commonwealth parliamentarians and East Pakistanistudents,
dip-
lomatsand intellectuals abroadthattheNixon administration wouldnotbe
in a positionto lendanything morethanits diplomatic supportto Pakistan
at theUnitedNations,particularly sincethemajorNATO allies of theU.S.
had expressedtheirsympathies forthepeopleof East Pakistan.Finally,the
KremlinrealizedthatthepeopleofEast Pakistanwantedcompleteindepen.
denceand thatIndia was strongenoughto pushback Pakistanin theWest
and destroyIslamabad'swar machinein theEast.
These calculationsprovedto be correct.The Sovietgovernment was well
satisfiedwiththeoutcomeofthewar: themilitary regimein Islamabadwas
sweptout of power,foron December20 GeneralYahya Khan transferred
powerto theleaderofthemajoritypartyin whatwas leftof Pakistan,Zul.
fikarAli Bhutto;Pakistan'smilitarymachinehad been humbled,crippled
and demoralized;thelegallyelectedrepresentatives ofEast Pakistanmoved
theBangladeshgovernment to Dacca on December22; and Sovietprestige
in India and Bangladeshhad risenskyhigh.
Of course,Moscowhad to pay a priceforthesegains,forthetruncated
PakistanheldtheKremlinresponsible foritsdismemberment withtheresult
thatfollowingthewar Soviet-Pakistani relationsstoodat a low ebb. When
passionscalm downand Pakistanianalystsmake an objectivestudyof the
breakupoftheircountry, however, theymaynotblameMoscowas muchas
themilitarydictatorship for'thefatePakistanmetin December1971. Presi-
dentBhuttoadmittedthiswhenhe said on June27, 1972,thatthe"power-
drunk"military junta"plungedour peopleintothewar and involvedus in
an intolerablesurrender and lost us halfour country."Moreover,thefact
thatWestPakistan'spoliticalleadersand bureaucracy tacitlysupportedthe
reignofterrorintheeasternwinghad convincedthepeopleofEast Pakistan
thattheirhonorand survivaldemandedcompleteindependence. Had the
UnitedStatesj oinedhandswiththeSovietUnion,as itdidin 1965,inkeeping
PekingoutoftheIndia-.Pakistan conflictand had it cooperatedwithMoscow
duringtheearlystagesofthecivilwar in effectively persuadingtheYahya
regimeto step aside in favorof the legallyelectedrepresentatives of the
people,theThirdIndia-Pakistan Warmighthavebeenprevented andthetwo
wingsof Pakistancouldagain have a commongovernment.
VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ is Reader in Political Science, KurukshetraUniversity,
Kuruk-
shetra,Haryana,India.

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