I.

PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS – CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL PENAL

LAWS

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
On or about the 4th day of August 1908 in the City of Manila, Go Chico displayed
in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle
Rosario, a number of medallions in the form of a small button, where the
miniature faces of Emilioon Aguinaldo and the flag or banner or device used
during the later insurrection in the Philippine Islands were printed to designate
and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States.
That on the day previous from that above, Go Chico purchased the said medallion
at a public sale under the authority of the City of Manila’s Sheriff.
On August 4, Go Chico was arranging his stocks to be displayed to the public
and in doing so places in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the
medallions.
The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of
medallions in question and had no corrupt intention.

Issue:
Whether or not criminal intent is necessary for crimes punishable by Special
Penal Laws

Lower Court Ruling:

City of First Instance Manila – Guilty of Section 1 of Act. 1696 (An Act to prohibit
the display of flags, banners, emblems, or devices used in the Philippine Islands
for the purpose of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United
States and the display of Katipunan flags, banners, emblems, or devices, and for
other purposes) and sentenced him to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs of
the auction, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the
forma and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid.

CA Ruling:
N/A

SC Ruling:
No. It is not necessary that there is criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by
statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is
entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution.

The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the United States" mean
not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is
of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag.
That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that
type of flag.
 Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, vs. THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113,
respondent.

Facts:
The case is an administrative complaint filed by the then Commissioner of
Customs, Alexander Padilla against Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch
115, Pasay City for rendering an erroneous decision in view of gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law in Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P
(“People of the Philippines v. Lo Chi Fai”) where he acquitted the accused of the
offense charged against the same.

Lo Chi Fai was caught by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July
9, 1986 while on Flight PR 300 bound for Hongkong attempting to smuggle 380
pieces of foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments with a total of USD
355,349.57 in various currency denominations. This was in violation of Section 6
of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank. The penal sanction is provided by Section
1 of P.D. No. 1883.

The respondent judge in his decision acquitting the accused stated that the
factual issue the court to determine whether or not the accused willfully violated
Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The possession of the accused of foreign
currencies alone did not make him liable for Section 6. According to Judge Dizon,
“What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign
currencies out of the country was done the very intention. It is that which
qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to violate
and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is
shown by overt acts of a person.”

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question.

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the
law in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent
to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or
deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws,
which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his
gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of
his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the
amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central Bank as
required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two
foreign currency declarations in his possession. These were old declarations
made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
 G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division)

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA
7659.

He claimed that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional based on the following

grounds:
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions;
and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

He was charged with 8 cases filed with the Sandiganbayan including one of
plunder for allegedly having amassed Php 4.1 billion in ill-gotten wealth. He
moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080,
otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the
information charges more than one offense.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion.

Issue:
Whether or not Plunder as defined by RA 7080 is malum prohibitum

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:
Probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants
of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramon Tan or Mr. Uy and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.

SC Ruling:
No. Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because
the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in
a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that theamended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.”It
thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
 G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007

HENRY T. GO vs. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF

THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:
The Court rendered the Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), declaring as null and void the 1997 Concession
Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), and the
Supplemental Contracts entered into between the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.

On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and
taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into an
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA
IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law)
providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
that the latter defaults specifically Article IV, Section 4.04(c) in relation to Article I,
Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in
violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not a private individual may be charged with violation of Section 3 (g)
of Republic act No. 3019

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:
Overturned its initial resolution denying Motion to Quash upon reconsideration
on the premise that the ground relied upon was that the allegations do not
constitute a crime. It did, however, deny the Motion, ruling that the determination
of the existence of Probable Cause is the responsibility of the Prosecutor or the
Ombudsman, not the court, and that the other issues are defense issues that
must be proven or disproven during trial.

SC Ruling:
No.

Section 3(g) can only be violated by a public officer. Any private individual
accused to have conspired with a public officer in violating Section 3(g), must be
charged under the proper provision of the law. The acts for which private persons
can be charged together with the public officials are enumerated in the last
paragraph of Section 3 and Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of R.A. No. 3019. It is
reiterated that for the Information against Go to be sufficient in form and
substance, he should be charged with specificity for violation of Section 4(b) in
relation to Section 3(g).

Indeed, there is a need to ferret out and expel corrupt public officers and to
punish the private individuals who abet their illegal activities. However, the
remedy is not to indict and jail every person who happens to be a signatory in a
contract as in the instant case, which later on is proved to be manifestly
disadvantageous to the government
 G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative
district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007,
respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify2 petitioner on the
ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section
3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to
pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from
running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office

Issue:
Whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude

Lower Court Ruling:

COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which
was denied in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution for being moot, thus:

It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional
elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third
district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for
Reconsideration moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 28

May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar Y. Teves challenging the Resolution of this
Commission (First Division) promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for
having been rendered moot and academic.

CA Ruling:
Petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

SC Ruling:
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a
function of the government prosecutor, which in this case is the Ombudsman. As
a rule, courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in
determining probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons.29 Mindful of
this salutary rule, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless made its own determination on
the basis of the records that were before it. It concluded that there was sufficient
evidence in the records for the finding of the existence of probable cause against
petitioner Go.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power
must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.30 Clearly, in the light of the foregoing disquisition,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed on the Sandiganbayan when it held
that there exists probable cause against petitioner Go.
 G.R. No. 179090 June 5, 2009

LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, Appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
COURT OF APPEALS, Appellees.

Facts:
On August 29, 2001, Nilo Sanchez was charged with the crime of Other Acts of
Child Abuse.

On September 2, 2000, in Clarin, Bohol, the appellant physically abused a child

(VVV). A sixteen-year old minor by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs.

The appellant searched his rented fishpond for VVV's father. After hearing the
man was gone, he proceeded inside the home and used his sickle to break down
the walls, roofs, and windows. VVV was advised to see the barangay tanod, but
that didn't help.

The appellant left his store with a gallon of gas when she got home. She informed
her family appellant would burn the house. She protected her family with a piece
of wood from the back of their house. But, the appellant approached VVV’s
younger brother (BBB), got the wood, and began thrashing him. VVV approached
appellant and pushed him. Because of what she did, the appellant turned around
and hit her three times with the piece of wood, twice on her left thigh and once on
her right buttocks. So, the wood split. VVV hurled some shattered pieces at
appellant. VVV’s mother (MMM) restrained BBB. The appellant left with the gallon
of gas.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty in violation of Section 10(a) of RA
7610 notwithstanding that the act complained of is obviously covered
by the RPC as slight physical injury.

Lower Court Ruling:

Yes. Appellant admitted that he hit VVV, although unintentionally.

Evidence did not favor appellant because his demand for VVV’s father (FFF)'s
family to vacate the fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual
use of force, exceeded the limits allowed by law. Injuries sustained by VVV were
distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was
strong
CA Ruling:
Yes. Appellant’s defense was one of absolute denial.

The Information filed against appellant was not defective inasmuch as the
allegations therein were explicit. The prosecution had fully established the
elements of the offense charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No.
7610 and P.D. No. 603.

The RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because R.A. No. 7610
is a special law. Award of civil indemnity and damages is deleted for utter lack of
basis.

SC Ruling:
Yes. Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the
following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.

In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610.Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. — (a) Any person who shall
commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,
but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period.

In here, Appellant contends that after proof, the act should not be considered as
child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant forgets that during the incident,
VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as
mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes
physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not.
 G.R. No. 121179. July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a.

ANNIE B. SALEY, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
Foreign contract employees seeking employment abroad fall victim to illicit
recruiters who provide them with fake tourist visas. These would-be workers pay
astronomical "placement" fees, only to find that they can't go to the nation where
they're meant to be working, or if they can, they're quickly and humiliatingly sent
home. Saley is appealing her guilty verdicts on eleven counts of estafa and six
charges of unlawful recruiting, including one for massive illegal recruitment. All
of the cases were consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.

The defense argued that the appellant had done nothing wrong by helping the
complainants apply for jobs overseas through legitimate travel firms from whom
she had received a commission.

From 1983 to 1986, according to Saley, she worked as the Friendship Recruitment
Agency's contact officer. In that role, she would submit a "contract for
processing employment orders for candidates" to the POEA and help people out
right before they flew out.

After the licensing agency she had worked for folded in 1986, she moved to
Baguio and started a business buying and selling fresh produce and flowers. But,
she would still feel comfortable suggesting legitimate organizations that help
people find work abroad to job seekers. She mentioned Dynasty travel and Tours
and Mannings International as two such legitimate companies.

The trial court has handed down its judgement, finding the appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges for which he was tried. Appellant's
contention that she was just an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or
Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio might be disproved.

Issue:
Whether or not Saley may be convicted of both Estafa and Illegal Recruitment in
the various cases filed against her

Lower Court Ruling:

It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty
Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed
were true, said the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead,
that failure exposed her to the "adverse inference and legal presumption that
evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced." It also found "hard to
believe," the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly
containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by
the CIS and remained unaccounted for.

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
Yes.

The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did
represent herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract
workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and
receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be briefed by
appellant on the requirements for employment overseas.

The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for

illegal recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has involved
himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well
be justified.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the
punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum
offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while
estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. Under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly,
these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.
 G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA,

respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.

Facts:
Appellant caught during a buy bust operation on October 28, 1988 where he sold tea
bags of marijuana to a NARCOM poser-buyer. 4 tea bags were confiscated weighing a
total of 3.8 grams. 2 were sold and the other 2 were merely confiscated.

Appellant denied the facts stating that he was watching television with his family
members in their house when 3 persons arrived. The appellant got into their jeep
because they told him they just wanted to ask him about something at their detachment.
He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later saw that they were going
a different way. He was told that he was a pusher while he was in the jeep, so he tried
to get out but was handcuffed instead. When they finally got to the camp, he was told to
sign some papers. When he refused, he was punched eight or nine times in the
stomach. He was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the
documents presented to him.

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower
court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his
defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Simon was correct

Lower Court Ruling:

Trial Court convicted appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay
a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government

CA Ruling:
SC Ruling:
Yes, but with modification.

Since Republic Act No. 6425 was changed by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalties in
the Revised Penal Code have been adopted in their technical terms, with their technical
meanings and effects. In fact, the court used the changes to Section 20 of the same law
to come up with prision correccional as the maximum sentence and Article 64 of the
Code to come up with the same sentence for the medium period. Even though this kind
of crime is covered by a special law, it is now punished by the Revised Penal Code. To
figure out the minimum, the court used the first part of the same Section 1 which states,
““in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles
61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional
 G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

Facts:
Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became regular costumers of Alfredo Oculam’s
pawnshop in 1989. They borrowed P9,075.55 from him sometime in May 1990, secured
by UCPB through Check No. 284743 postdated to July 7, 1990. Between the last week
of April and the first week of May 1990, they borrowed P12,730.00 more from him,
secured by UCPB Check No. 284744 postdated to July 26, 1990. Between May and
June 1990, they obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB
Check No. 106136, postdated to July 22, 1990; the three checks bounced upon
presentment, it being a “CLOSED ACCOUNT”
The Ladongas claimed that the checks were only issued to guarantee the obligation and
that Alfredo Oculam should not encash the checks. 
Further, they claimed that the petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no
involvement in its issuance, despite the fact that they acknowledge that the checks
issued by Adronico bounced because there was insufficient credit or the account was
closed.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner could be held liable for violating BP 22 as conspirator

Lower Court Ruling:

Yes.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they
stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and
fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them,
and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year
and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them
and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount
of ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced;
but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.

CA Ruling:
Yes.
Provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the
decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, U.S. vs. Ponte, and U.S. vs. Bruhez.
It noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall
be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. Since B.P. Blg.
22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases
involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The fact that petitioner did not make and issue or
sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that
a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone
performed.
In conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.

SC Ruling:
No.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party
to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
 G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

Facts:
On December 25 – January 1997 in Quezon City, the accused was employed as a taxi
driver for Elias Cipriano, a taxi cab operator. That the accused has free access to the
taxi that he is driving and “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with
grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away” a Taxi with
Plate No. PWH-266 worth ₱303,000.00.
On December 26, Cipriano followed up on why the taxi was not yet returned. The taxi
was not at the accused house. Then, Cipriano reported the taxi missing.
Appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi because he was short of the
boundary fee. He said he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Accused claims that he left his license with Cipriano.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of Qualified Theft

Lower Court Ruling:

Yes.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
charged, and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the
preventive imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

CA Ruling:
Yes.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle
on January 5, 1997 to the garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00
in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten (10) days. He could not even be
certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-examination,
he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of
₱2,000.00 and it was his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-
examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his wife on that date for payment to
the taxicab owner

SC Ruling:
No.
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it
erred in the imposition of the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was
attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same cannot be appreciated as the
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of
said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by
express provision or by necessary implication.
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no
suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code or by
other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for
felonies under the Code.
 G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and
JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

Facts:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married on April 18, 1999. They had
two children. After barely 6 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and his parents.
She stated that Steven had conspired with his parents and caused her verbal,
psychological and economic abuses which are in violation of Sec. 5, of RA 9262 (Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004).

Issue:
Whether or not respondents may be issued a TPO, in accordance with RA 9262

Lower Court Ruling:

No.
To include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained
interpretation of the provisions of the law.

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
Yes.
The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be
remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not
of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature
Conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier
of facts. It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this
controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be
included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can
be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
II. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner, when he was around 14 was charged with rape on two separate cases for
allegedly raping a child 8 years of age.
The first and second time, he did so by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against
her will.
While the case was ongoing, RA 9344 was on the process of being amended raising the
criminal age from 9 to 15.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9344 should be applied in this case

Lower Court Ruling:

No.
Petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioner
as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and
credibility. It could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of
Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families.

CA Ruling:
No.
The respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it
is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates
rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.
Petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts.
SC Ruling:
Yes.
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times
over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most
particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim
that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of
their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or
below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs,
simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law.
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates
petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the
tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the
law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the
language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.
Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts,
and we have done so in this case.
 G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR,
respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner, then 11 yrs old, was playing with his best friend, Teodoro, and three other
children. They were target shooting bottle caps with an air rifle borrowed from a
neighbor.
During the game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which in result, he
died.
The fiscal exculpated the petitioner because of his age and because it situation
appeared to be an accident.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner should be charged with reckless imprudence

Lower Court Ruling:

No.
The facts charged do not constitute an offense.
CA Ruling:
SC Ruling:
No.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two
distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the
former refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance
that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another
but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to
the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue,
as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted
with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable
result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is
worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused.
 G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA,
defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Deceased Ragojos and one Rarang were playing volleyball in a province in
Pangasinan. The accused intervened and caught the ball and then tossed it to Ragajos,
and hit him on the stomach.
Because of this, Ragajos chased him around the yard and upon overtaking him,
slapped him on the nape. Accused turned against the deceased with a threatening
attitude which caused the deceased to strike him on the mouth with his fist.
Accused then got his cousin’s knife and confronted Ragojos where Ragojos did not
agree to a fight and continued playing. Accused then stabbed Ragojos which ultimately
caused his death.

Issue:
Whether or not accused acted with discernment

Lower Court Ruling:

Yes.
The accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99. He is to be sent to the Training School for
Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
CA Ruling:
SC Ruling:
Yes.
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law,
is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and
such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all
the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance,
the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs.
Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by
it is correct.
 G.R. No. 183563 December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HENRY ARPON y
JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
The accused is charged with the rape of AAA, who is a minor. The rape committed was
allegedly 8 times once in 1995 and 7 times in 1999.
AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rape because accused threatened that
he would kill her mother if she did. The accused is AAA’s uncle, being the brother of her
mother.
Accused claimed minority as his defense claiming that he was still 13 years old during
the first offence in 1995 and that he was not around in 1999. He stated that he did not
go to the house of AAA because he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents.

Issue:
Whether or not accused is entitled to claim minority as a defense

Lower Court Ruling:

No.
The findings of the medico-legal officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The
accused-appellant’s defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court,
declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time
of the day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City. The accused-
appellant was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and
she held no grudge against him. The penalty of death is imposed as it found that AAA
was less than 18 years old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the
accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree. Aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime is present.

CA Ruling:
No.
The relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations
and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate court, however, differed in
appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s
minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an
insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to
be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely sought by the
accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals
awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
SC Ruling:
Accused is exempted from criminal liability on the first count of rape.
For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
In Sierra v. People, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the
minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: "(1)
the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal
certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused;(2) the
presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the
accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the
prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or
his relatives ‘testimonies are untrue.“
In the case at bar, it was only the testimony of Arpon which showed that he was a minor
at the time the crime was committed. No other evidence was presented to prove his
claim. However, there was no objection from the prosecution and no contrary evidence
was presented. Although the acts were committed before the effectivity of RA9344, it is
still applicable to those children who have been convicted and serving sentences, and in
the case of Sarcia, it further stressed that with more reason that the act should be
applicable to cases which are still in review, as in this instant case.
Thus pursuant to RA 9344 Section 6 (1), the Court, thus, exempts Arpon from criminal
liability for the first count of rape but remains to be civilly liable thereof. For the second
and third counts of rape, the court held that Arpon was 17 years old and acted with
discernment because he threatened AAA that he will kill her mother.
 G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Facts:
An unknown informant told P/Supt Joseph Castro on November 14, 1995, that a major
drug trafficking organization from Greenhills would be delivering 100 grams of shabu in
Chowking. A report like that prompted SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra to play the role of a
poseur buyer. They strategically parked their vehicles to overlook the entrance and exit
of the building.
With Alvin Jose at the wheel, Sonny Zarraga's afternoon Toyota Corolla rolled up. The
informant came over to Sonny Zarraga and started talking to him. A call was then sent
to SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, who was informed that Sonny Zarraga was in possession
of 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra, SPO1, proposed to purchase the narcotics. SPO1
Bonifacio Guevarra was asked if he had the cash by Sonny Zarraga. That's the answer
that Guevarra gave. He produced the aforementioned wad of "money bills" as proof.
After that, Sonny Zarraga had Alvin Jose deliver the shabu to Guevarra. Now it was
SPO1 Guevarra's time to hand up the wad of cash.
Eventually, the other officers came up and introduced themselves as Narcom
Operatives. A couple of guys named Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose were taken into
custody.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be claim minority as a mitigating circumstance and be
exempt from criminal liability.

Lower Court Ruling:

Accused and Zarraga are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 6425.

CA Ruling:
Accused is still guilty but due to minority (him being only 13 yrs old), the penalty I
reduced.
He was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a reduction
of the penalty by two degrees

SC Ruling:
Yes.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and
under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies
even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal
law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be
exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age
is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime – the capacity to know what is wrong
as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in
the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong. However, such presumption is
rebuttable. For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that
he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt
acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of
the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his
disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
 G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006
NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
That, on or about the 24th day of September 2002, DEBBIELYN SANTOS, a
complainant, was a minor, seven (7) years old, and that NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor, twelve
(12) years old, acting with discernment, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of her at that time, against her will and consent.
Debbielyn stated in her deposition that she got home after 6:00 p.m. on September 24,
2002. She went to her mother's store after changing into new clothing. Marilou
requested that her daughter bring the jar containing the unsold quail eggs home.
Debbielyn followed instructions and left. She noticed the petitioner as she got closer to
the vacant house, and he abruptly dragged her behind a stack of hollow blocks that was
in front of the unoccupied house. The lamp post's small amount of light was present.
She resisted, but in vain. She was told to lie down on the cement by the petitioner. She
complied, terrified. She had her shorts and underwear taken off, then he did the same.
He piled up against her. She experienced the insertion of his penis into her vagina. He
kissed her. She cried out in pain. She was certain that at the time, there were onlookers
on the street close to the abandoned house.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner acted with discernment

Lower Court Ruling:

Petitioner acted with discernment.
The prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable
doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her
and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and consent who is
only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted with the
Death penalty.

CA Ruling:
Decision of lower court is affirmed with modification.
Sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the complaining witness the amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages and ₱20,000
by way of exemplary damages.

SC Ruling:
Yes.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows:
"the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under 15 years of age but over 9, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong" (People v.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age,
he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v.
Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
In the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as
his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the
prosecution’s witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away.
Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that
private complainant’s father was looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not
until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmother’s house that petitioner
came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of
going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity
of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed
innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would
have immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having
sexually abused their daughter.
 G.R. No. 198444 September 4, 2013
CITIBANK N.A. AND THE CITIGROUP PRIVATE BANK, Petitioners, vs. ESTER H.
TANCO-GABALDON, ARSENIO TANCO & THE HEIRS OF KU TIONG LAM,
Respondents.

Facts:
On September 21, 2007, the heirs of Ku Tiong Lam, Arsenio Tanco, and Ester H.
Tanco-Gabaldon filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission's
Enforcement and Prosecution Department (SEC-EPD) alleging that Citibank N.A.
(Citibank) and its officials, Citigroup Private Bank (Citi Gabaldon, Tanco, and Lam
violated the Securities Regulation Code (SRC) and the Revised Petitioner Lim
"persuaded" respondents to sign a subscription agreement for USD 2,000,000.00 worth
of Ceres II Finance Ltd. Income Notes in March 2000. They discussed a new
investment proposal with Lim again in September of that year. It purchased
USD500,000.00 of Senior Subordinated Income Notes from Aeries Finance II Ltd.
Citigroup informed respondents in January 2003 that their investments plummeted till
their account was empty. The SEC confirmed that the Ceres II Finance Ltd. Notes and
Aeries Finance II Ltd. Notes were not registered securities. Ceres II Finance Ltd., Aeries
Finance II Ltd., and the petitioners are not registered as securities issuers, brokers,
dealers, or agents.
Citibank and Citigroup, who submitted the petition, stated they weren't given a copy of
the complaint until October 26, 2007, when the Bangko Sentral ng Philippines sent them
a letter (BSP). They denied to the BSP that Citibank or its officers were involved in the
transactions or goods. Citibank and Citigroup sent their letter to the SEC-EPD and the
senders' lawyers.
The SEC-EPD on December 8, 2008 order concluded its inquiry because the
respondents' action had concluded. SEC-EPD, "A similar complaint was sent to the
DOJ in October 2005 and the SEC-EPD on September 21, 2007. The DOJ complaint
was submitted one month late, while the SEC action was filed seven years late." In
Baviera v. Prosecutor Paglinawan, the respondents filed a complaint with the
Mandaluyong City Prosecutor's Office on October 24, 2005, alleging RSA and SRC
violations.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal action for offenses punished under the SRC filed by the
respondents against the petitioners has already prescribed
Lower Court Ruling:
SEC en banc – Reinstated the complaint and ordered the immediate investigation of the
case.

CA Ruling:
It was the CA's view that since the SRC has no specific provision on prescription of
criminal offenses, the applicable law is Act No. 3326. Under the SRC, imprisonment of
more than 6 years is the imposable penalty for the offenses with which the petitioners
were charged, and applying Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period for the filing of an
action is 12 years, reckoned from the time of commission or discovery of the offense.
The respondents' filing of the complaint with the SEC, therefore, was within the
prescriptive period.

SC Ruling:
The CA did not commit any error when it ruled that "the phrase 'any liability' in
subsection 62.2 can only refer to other liabilities that are also civil in nature. The phrase
could not have suddenly intended to mean criminal liability for this would go beyond the
context of the other provisions among which it is found."
Given the absence of a prescriptive period for the enforcement of the criminal liability in
violations of the SRC, Act No. 3326 now comes into play. Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department
of Justice expressly ruled that Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive period.
 G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN,
Respondent.

Facts:
Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 with the Quezon City City Prosecutor on
September 16, 1997. Malolos stated that respondent provided private complainant nine
checks for a total of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-Two Pesos (9,658,592.00), but they were not paid.
Respondent sued private complainant in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela
City on December 5, 1997, for accounting, recovery of commercial papers, contract
enforceability and effectivity, and specific performance.
Five days later, the respondent filed a " Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground
of Prejudicial Question" with the Quezon City City Prosecutor. She added her ongoing
Valenzuela City RTC civil lawsuit as basis.
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor advised postponing the criminal case until
the RTC of Valenzuela City resolved on respondent's civil action. The Quezon City
Prosecutor agreed.
On January 5, 1999, the Secretary of Justice at the time, Serafin P. Cuevas, overturned
the decision of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the respondent to be
charged with violating BP Blg. 22 for writing City Trust Check No. 127219 for
4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 for 4,475,000.00, for a total of
8,604,000.00. The charges of theft and breaking BP Blg. 22 for the seven other checks
listed in the affidavit-complaint filed on September 16, 1997, were, however, thrown out.
So, on February 3, 2000, two counts of violating BP Blg. 22 were filed against
respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. Both counts were from November 18, 1999. On June
7, 2000, these cases were given to MeTC, Branch 31 by chance.
On June 17, 2000, the respondent filed a "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" with the MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.
She said that because of prescription, she was no longer guilty of a crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16
September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense

Lower Court Ruling:

Although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the
Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two counts
for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed
with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings
having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

CA Ruling:
The filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.

SC Ruling:
Yes.
Respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of
service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the
original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in
ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act
No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is
the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases.
 G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

Facts:
Appellant and Ben Genosa got married in Ormoc City, Philippines, on November 19,
1983.
Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight on November 15, 1995, after they received
their salary. The last time Arturo saw Ben alive was then. Arturo also noticed that the
Genosas' rented house seemed to be empty and was always locked since then.
On November 16, 1995, the appellant asked her close friend and neighbor Erlinda
Paderog, who lived about 50 meters from her house, to take care of her pig while she
went to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant also asked Erlinda to sell her
motorcycle to Ronnie Dayandayan who didn't have enough money to buy it.
That same day, around 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus to
Ormoc when he saw the appellant leaving their house with her two kids, each of whom
was carrying a bag. Joseph, the appellant, and her children all went to Ormoc on the
same bus. 
On November 18, 1995, Steban Matiga's neighbors told him that the house which Ben
and appellant were renting, smelled bad. Steban went into the smelly where he saw
Ben's dead body lying on its side on a bed with a blanket over it. He was only in his
underwear, and the back of his head was hurt. He left the house and told Ben's mother
about what had happened. 
In the morning of the same day, SPO3 Acodesin heard that the Genosas' rented house
smelled bad. SPO3 Acodesin went to the house with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and
Dr. Refelina Cerillo. They went into the bedroom, where they found Ben's body lying on
its side and wrapped in a bedsheet. Ben, who was only wearing his briefs, had blood on
his neck. SPO3 Acodesin found a metal pipe leaning against a wall in a corner of an
aparador. There wasn't a mess in the bedroom.
Dr. Cerillo came to the conclusion that Ben's death was caused by "cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital [bone]."
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She that when she got home from work on November
15, 1995, she was worried that her husband might have gone gambling because it was
payday. The appellant and her cousin Ecel Arao went to look for Ben at the market and
in taverns, but they didn't find him there. When they got back, Ben was drunk.
Ben is said to have bugged the appellant about following him and even asked her to
fight. She is said to have ignored him and helped their kids with their homework instead.
Ben turned off the light and used a chopping knife to cut the TV antenna or wire so she
couldn't watch TV. He did this because he was upset with how she responded. Ben was
going to attack appellant, so she ran to the bedroom, but he grabbed her hands and
spun her around. She fell off the bed and cried out for help. Ben left and he appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. When Ben got home and saw his
packed clothes, and got very angry. He dragged the appellant out of the bedroom and
held her by the neck as he dragged her towards a drawer and told her, "You might as
well be killed so no one will bother me." She "smashed" Ben's arm with a pipe and hit
him in the back of the head.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self-defense.

Lower Court Ruling:

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the
prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.

The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
No.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts
of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
 G.R. Nos. 136149-51 September 19, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL
alias "WARPAN," appellant.

Facts:
PO3 Allan Marcos Obut requested a search warrant against appellant, his wife, and
certain John Does. 
More than thirty policemen under Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad drove to
appellant and his wife's Rio Hondo home.  Three people seated at a nearby store
hurried toward appellant's residence shouting, "[P]olice, raid, raid” When the cops got
around ten meters from the house's main gate, the second story opened fire. Gunfire
also erupted behind the house.
Lacastesantos noticed an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on the sala sofa on the
second floor and other rifles.
Rivera, Dela Peña, Gregorio, and Obut entered appellant's house after Lacastesantos
and Mirasol. Obut showed the old women the search warrant after identifying
themselves as PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit members. Dela Peña and Rivera searched
appellant's ground-floor chamber with Punong Barangay Elhano present. A pencil case
with 50 folded aluminum foils containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) was
on a table. Coins of various denominations and one handmade were also uncovered.
Zamboanga Police Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit informant Rino Bartolome Locson. On
September 24, 1997, SPO2 Gaganting ordered him to buy "shabu" from appellant.
Three shabu decks came out his waist pack.
Police Diestro, found gunpowder nitrates in appellant's paraffin casts from both hands.
On September 26, 1997, gunpowder residue examinations revealed that the following
firearms "were fired": a.38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092,
another.38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number, a Cal. 7.62 mm M14
U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225, and an M79 rifle. They were sacked five days before
the exam.
Police Inspector Cayabyab found methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms
after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

Lower Court Ruling:

The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter
his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering
that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved
to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the
fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are
inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search
conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was
issued for more than one offense, and were not found in ‘plain view’ of the police
officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and
with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively
considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and
ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be
returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the
accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said
assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
NO.
The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of
two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a
weapon and (2) maintaining a drug den.
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of
the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should [the courts].

The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession
of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision
correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of
firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and
scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This
consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose
wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here
appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion
to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of
the legislature. [The Court’s] task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law
and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done so in this case.
 G.R. No. 131592-93           February 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO, accused-appellant

Facts:

Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City, was the location of the crime when it was still
under construction. On the morning of November 14, 1995, around 8 a.m., ROBERTO
LUSTICA, a construction worker, was standing on the third floor of the Gaisano building
when he witnessed his coworker, ROGELIO ABAWAG, being chased by the accused,
JULIAN CASTIILLO, a lead man on the same construction site. Accused pulled out a
revolver and shot Abawag while they were running from the police. At this point,
Abawag was kneeling next to a stack of hollow bricks, roughly half a meter away from
the accused.

The initial shot was heard by FRANKLIN ACASO, a mason on the third story of the
Gaisano building. He initially ignored it, supposing that the noise was being made by
one of their construction vehicles. There was another gunshot a few seconds later, and
someone said, "Ouch, that is enough!" When he turned to investigate the source of the
noise, he found the suspect standing about a meter in front of Abawag with a.38 caliber
handgun pointed at him. Abawag begged for his life while he leaned on a stack of
hollow blocks. Despite Abawag's pleading, the suspect fired a third time. Abawag was
left for dead as the accused ran away.

The shooting was reported by Gaisano management, and police officers arrived at the
restaurant quickly afterward. The victim's brother-in-law, JUN LIM, alias "Akoy," a
construction worker at the Gaisano, volunteered to go with the police and help them find
the perpetrator.

Issue:

Whether or not the charge of the trial court which is homicide and illegal possession of
firearm aggravated by homicide is correct

Lower Court Ruling:

The self-defense theory hoisted by the accused who testified solely for the defense was
not given credence by the trial court. Thus, he was convicted of Homicide, as the
prosecution failed to prove the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, and of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by
homicide.

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:

No.

Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the
existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside
his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the
Information lies with the prosecution
The first element — the existence of the firearm — was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice with
a .38 caliber revolver. Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the
security guards in the building after the shooting. The same gun was recovered from the
appellant and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof was adduced
by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant
was not licensed to possess the firearm. This negative fact constitutes an essential
element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a
license or permit should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a
licensee of the subject firearm or that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully
possessed only by certain military personnel. Indeed, if the means of proving a negative
fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party
averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an
unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the
prosecution who has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is a
constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative
allegation of non-existence.
 G.R. No. 187229 February 22, 2012
ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Arnel Sison was found guilty of the crimes of rape and violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294. A petition for
review was submitted in response to the decision that was made by the Court of
Appeals on March 17, 2009, which upheld the decision made by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, which found petitioner Arnel Sison guilty where the
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to both of the allegations against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC in sentencing the
appellant guilty of crimes of rape and violation of P.D. No. 1866
Lower Court Ruling:
CA Ruling:
SC Ruling:
One essential factor that the prosecution must prove in rape cases is the victim's lack of
consent to the sexual confab. [14] The primary offense of rape is engaging in sexual
contact with a woman without her consent while using force or intimidation. [15] The
degree of force used in rape varies depending on the age, strength, and size of the
partners. The victim's perspective and judgment at the time the act was committed must
also be considered when determining if intimidation occurred.

Arnel Sison y Escuadro was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the crime of qualified
rape in the Court of Appeals' decision dated March 17, 2009, and it is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ORDERED to pay AAA the reduced
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Additionally, the petitioner is ORDERED to pay P30,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
from the date that this judgment becomes final until all damages have been paid,
interest at a rate of 6% per year is imposed on all damages awarded.

By this action, the petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of a firearm is

QUALIFIED and REVERSED.
 G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALLEN UDTOJAN
MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
Via an informant, a buy-bust operation was carried out at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao
District, Butuan City, on October 1, 2003. Allen Mantalaba, a 17-year-old, was captured
selling "shabu" in front of barangay representatives by two poseur-buyer police officers.

The appellant was the subject of two information brought before the RTC of Butuan City
for alleged violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165. The RTC concluded that the
appellant had committed the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issue:
Whether or not Allen Mantalaba was wrongfully convicted of the offense accused by the
lower court despite the prosecution's inability to show his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Lower Court Ruling:

The RTC concluded that the appellant had committed the alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

CA Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
In a buy-bust operation, the presence of each of the following aspects of the offense
establishes whether or not there was a sale of dangerous drugs:
(1) The name of the seller, the item being purchased, and the amount being paid; and
(2) The delivery of the item being purchased and the payment
It was clear from the prosecution witness's testimony above that the requirements had
been completed in a satisfactory manner. Both the seller and the pretend-buyer were
recognized. Both the topic of harmful medications and the type of marked currency
utilized were satisfactorily presented. The testimony made it quite evident how the buy-
bust operation was carried out

G.R. No. 172019 February 12, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BOISAN CABUGATAN y
MACARAMBON, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
The appellant was found guilty of illegally selling and possessing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, more commonly referred to as "shabu," by the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City Branch 61, in Criminal Cases No. 20441-R and No. 20442-R. A petition for
review was submitted in relation to this decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave error in relying only on the prosecution's
testimony to condemn the accused-appellant of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II
of RA 9165.

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
All of the elements of the crime have been identified. The prosecution's witnesses
effectively established that the buy-bust operation took place, and the shabu, the
subject of the deal, was brought into the room and accurately identified in court.
Positively, the poseur-buyer (PO2 Del-ong) identified the appellant as the person who
gave him a packet of white crystals, substance 41, which was later determined to be
shabu by two chemical examinations.
The appellant was unable to substantiate his claim that he was an unlucky victim of an
alleged police plan. All signs led to him not knowing anyone on the buy-bust crew that
had apprehended him. As a result, there was no reason for them to set him up. In the
lack of proof of a reason to falsely accuse him of such a serious criminal, the
assumption of regularity in the fulfillment of official tasks and the trial court's conclusions
about the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the appellant's unambiguous
assertion that he was framed. In other words, the police officers' unequivocal and
convincing testimony, supported by physical evidence, surpasses the appellant's
unsupported accusation of ulterior motive.

G.R. No. 169042 October 5, 2011

ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON
MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M.
TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. GAYYA, Respondents.

Facts:
In a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before the Court, Erdito Quarto, who is
the petitioner, has appealed the resolutions of the Ombudsman from January 7, 2004,
and November 4, 2004, which granted Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A.
Gayya (collectively, respondents) immunity from prosecution. This resulted in the
respondents' exclusion from the criminal informations that were submitted to the
Sandigan In addition to forcing the Ombudsman to name the respondents as accused in
the informations for estafa through falsification of public documents and for violation of
Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the petitioner seeks to revoke the immunity
granted to the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not the immunity granted to Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A.
Gayya is valid.
Lower Court Ruling:
CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
The petition is dismissed for two reasons: first, the petitioner did not make use of the
remedies that were available to him before filing this present petition; and second, within
the context of the Court's policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of
his investigative and prosecutorial powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the
grant of immunity to the respondents was attended by a grave abuse of discretion. The
petition is dismissed because the petitioner did not make use of the remedies that were
available to him before filing this In consideration of the facts and the law, it has been
decided that the petitioner has completely failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman
severely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the respondents. This conclusion
was reached as a result of the circumstances described above. In spite of his allegation
that neither requirement (a) nor condition (d) of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court are met, we take note of his complete absence of argument on the "absolute
need" of the testimony of the respondents. In point of fact, the petitioner did not even
make an attempt to explain how he arrived at the conclusion that the "extreme need"
criteria does not exist based on the "evidence" presented by the Ombudsman.

G.R. Nos. 185729-32 June 26, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ANTONIO P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P.
ANDUTAN, JR., RAUL C. DE VERA, ROSANNA P. DIALA AND JOSEPH A.
CABOTAJE, RESPONDENTS

Facts:
Before the Sandiganbayan on May 21, 2004, the private respondent was accused with
breaching Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 14452. This charge was filed by
the government. At the arraignment, which took place on October 20, 2004, the private
respondent pled not guilty to the charges against him. Manolo Tulibao Villad, the State
Auditor for the Commission on Audit (COA), was the sole witness that the prosecution
called to the stand. After that, the prosecution presented its formal evidence offer and
then declared its case to be closed.
The motion for permission to make a demurrer to evidence was submitted by the private
respondent on April 20, 2006. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on June 16,
2006, granting the motion that had been submitted. The demurrer to evidence that was
submitted by the private respondent on June 30, 2006 can be seen here. The
Sandiganbayan upheld the plaintiff's right to demur to the evidence. The petitioner
argued in their petition for certiorari that the prosecution was able to prove each and
every element of the offense they were being charged with.
The private respondent argues that the award of a demurrer to evidence is the same as
an acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal because doing so would place
the accused in a position where they would be subject to double jeopardy. In addition, if
we assume that the Sandiganbayan made a mistake by incorrectly granting the
demurrer, then this would at most be considered an error in judgment and not an error
in jurisdiction. Hence, the petition for certiorari cannot be used to modify the
Sandiganbayan's decision to allow the demurrer to evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission of a demurrer to the evidence in this case amounted to
acquittal.

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:
SC Ruling:
Yes.
The decision to grant a demurrer in a criminal case is equivalent to an acquittal, and the
dismissal order cannot be challenged because doing so would subject the accused to a
second trial.
The dismissal order is still reviewable, even though it is not appealable, but only through
certiorari on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as when the prosecution was not given the chance to present its case
or when the trial was a sham, rendering the assailed judgment invalid.
The prosecution failed to show that the government incurred any harm as a result of the
private respondent's failure to pay back the subject cash advance, and the
Sandiganbayan upheld the demurrer in the matter at hand. An essential component of
the violation isn't that the non-liquidation of the cash advance caused actual harm to the
government.
The Sandiganbayan made decisions based on an incorrect reading of the law and its
implementing regulations; this was a mistake of judgment rather than jurisdiction. The
petitioner was unable to prove that the dismissal decision was contaminated by a
serious abuse of discretion, such as the denial of the prosecution's right to due process
or the holding of a phony trial. In conclusion, the Sandiganbayan's error is of such a
character that the prosecution can no longer correct it through an appeal because doing
so would subject the accused to double jeopardy. It was incorrect to throw out the
criminal case against the private respondents.
However, the Supreme Court decided that even though the judgment dismissing the
Information was based on an incorrect interpretation of the law, it was nonetheless a
judgment on the merits from which the prosecution had no right to appeal because
doing so would subject the accused to double jeopardy. Even though the respondent
Court's order was incorrect and caused a miscarriage of justice, this error cannot now
be corrected due to the timely plea of double jeopardy.
 G.R. No. 100295 April 26, 1994
PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., and J. LORENZO VERGARA, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Facts:
Mapa and Vergara, who are charged with Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, entered into
an agreement with PCGG to serve as key witnesses in order to ensure the conviction of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who are accused of
violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. Mapa and Vergara
were charged with Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. Vergara and Mapa were charged
with Anti-Graft and (RICO).

They were granted immunity from any potential criminal culpability emanating from
cases that PCGG had filed against them in the past or planned to file against them in
the future, on the condition that they would cooperate with the US prosecutors and
make themselves accessible as witnesses. The petitioners were successful in adhering
to their individual commitments. But, in the nick of time, the United States Prosecutors
chose not to summon either of them to testify in the trial.

The petitioners' defense in Criminal Case No. 11960, which is currently being heard by
the respondent court, became the focus of the ongoing legal battle. Petitioners
submitted a joint motion to dismiss the case on October 22, 1990, relying on the
immunity that was afforded to them in the proceeding.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan engaged in serious abuse of discretion when it rejected
the petitioner's request to have the case dismissed due to the PCGG's claim of
immunity under section 5 of E.O. 14 (as amended).

Lower Court Ruling:

CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
When the respondent court rejected the petitioner's application to dismiss the case
based on a claim of immunity that was granted by the PCGG in accordance with section
5 of E.O. 14, as modified, the court committed a serious breach of its discretion.

In spite of the judgement made by the court that was asked to react, the petitioner's
failure to testify in the RICO charges brought against the Marcoses in New York cannot
be used to strip them of their immunity from prosecution. They have accomplished the
requirements of the law as well as the implementing agreements between the parties.
They were required to provide information to the prosecution in accordance with Section
5 of E.O. No. 14, in its altered version, and they did so. They had committed, as part of
their Memorandum of Understanding, to make themselves accessible as witnesses in
the aforementioned RICO cases, and they fulfilled this obligation.
The petitioners were prepared to testify; however, the US prosecutors handling the
RICO cases did not bring any of them to the stand. Their inability to testify was not due
to anything they did on their own. The decision of the US prosecutors, who may have
believed that the evidence they possessed was sufficient to condemn the Marcoses,
was what ultimately led to this happening. Because the petitioner's failure to testify was
neither their choice nor the result of any action or inaction on their part, justice and
equity forbid that they be penalized by having their immunity revoked in order to punish
them for their silence.
 G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary
of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor,
National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. addressed a letter to Secretary Leila De Lima
and requested that Kenny Dalandag be included in the informations for murder since
the aforementioned individual had previously acknowledged his role in the commission
of the crime. His request was turned down by the Secretary, so the petitioner tried to
compel the respondents by filing a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
in Manila (RTC Manila).
The petition for mandamus was rejected by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on June
27, 2011. Thus, this appeal is being submitted in the form of a petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the public respondents may be compelled by Mandamus to investigate and
prosecute Kenny Dalandag as an accused in the informations for multiple murders in
the Maguindanao massacre cases in light of his admitted participation thereat in
affidavits and official records filed with the prosecutor and the QC RTC; and,
Whether the subsequent inclusion of Kenny Dalandag in the witness protection program
justifies exclusion as an accused and his non-indictment for his complicity in the
Maguindanao massacre, notwithstanding admissions made that he took part in its
planning and execution.

Lower Court Ruling:

The contested order rejecting the mandamus petition in Civil Case No. 10-124777 was
issued by the RTC of Manila on June 27, 2011.
CA Ruling:

SC Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
When it comes to using their right to prosecute, prosecutors have a great deal of leeway
to choose what and who to bring charges against. They are solely responsible for
locating sufficient evidence to establish probable cause in order to warrant the filing of
suitable criminal charges against the defendant who is the subject of the investigation. It
is not possible to apply the doctrine of mandamus to decide the general or specific
manner in which judgment and discretion will be exercised. As a result, a writ of
mandamus may be used to compel the Secretary of Justice to act on a letter request or
a motion to include a person in the information. However, a writ of mandamus may not
be used to compel the Secretary of Justice to act in a particular manner, such as to
grant or deny such a letter-request or motion.
Because his testimony was absolutely necessary to effectively prosecute criminal
charges, Dalandag has been protected as a state witness by the United States
government under its witness protection program since August 13, 2010. Its inclusion
was justified by the necessity of his testimony. Even though he admitted to playing a
role in the Maguindanao massacre's execution, he was nevertheless accepted into the
state's witness protection program as a state witness. Therefore, his confession, which
was included in the affidavit on the basis of which he was released for the current crime,
would be presumed innocent unless he later refused or failed to testify and thus had him
accused of participating in the Maguindanao Massacre. in this case, he could no longer
be prosecuted. can no longer be prosecuted.