8. LORENZANA VS. LELINA G.R. No.

187850, 17 August 2016;

 In 1975, Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married to Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino), executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel of land in favor of her son, the
respondent Rodolfo Lelina (Rodolfo).
 The Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS), however, specified only an area of 810 sq. m. as the one-
half (1 /2) of the property covered by the tax declaration (it should have been half of 16k sq.
m.). Nevertheless, the DAS contained the technical description of the land. Immediately after
the execution of the DAS, Rodolfo took possession of the property and the tenants would
continue delivering to him his share of the produce of the property.
 A complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of documents was filed by Rodolfo,
prompted by the turn of events, when, sometime in August 1996, he and his three tenants
were invited at the Municipal Agrarian Office [of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur] for a conference where
they were informed that the property is already owned by petitioner Anita Lorenzana by
virtue of a Deed of Final Conveyance and tax declaration, both under her name.
 Petitioner claimed that she acquired a land with an area of 16,047 sq. m. through a
foreclosure sale. She averred that she was the judgment creditor in a case for collection of
sum of money she filed against Aquilino, and when the decision in her favor became final, the
portion of the land covered by tax declarations under the name of Ambrosia was levied upon,
and by reason of the expiration of the period within which respondent could have legally
redeemed the same.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent upholding his ownership over the half of the levied
property. It ruled that the levied property is exclusively owned by Ambrosia (it was undisputed
that the property is found within the levied property; it was further shown that the Deed of
Final Conveyance expressly describes the levied property as registered and owned by
respondent) and could not be held to answer for the obligations of her husband in the
collection case. As a result, it declared the Deed of Final Conveyance dated October 9, 1978
(pertaining to that of petitioner), as well as the proceedings taken during the alleged auction
sale of levied property, invalid and without force and effect on Ambrosia's paraphernal
property.
 The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld respondent's ownership over the
property. It ruled that the power of the court in the execution of its judgment extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor; Ambrosia exclusively owned
the levied property, and petitioner cannot rely on the execution sale in proving that she has
better right over the property because such execution sale is void.
 Hence, this petition under Rule 45.
 Summary of petitioner’s arguments: o Respondent’s sole basis for his claim is the DAS, the
original of which was not presented in court. Since only a photocopy was presented, its
contents are inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule. Thus, his claim of ownership
should be denied. o Even if the DAS be considered as evidence, it only proves respondent’s
ownership over 810 sqm. The area of the lot awarded should be limited to what was prayed
for in the complaint. o The property is jointly owned by the spouses, and therefore, it may be
validly held answerable for the obligations incurred by Aquilino.

ISSUE: Whether the presentation of the photocopy of the DAS is admissible as evidence
RULING: YES. This proves that respondent is owners of half of the levied property. This Court
disagree with petitioner’s contention as regards the photocopy.

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the
instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. o
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered

 In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the
proper time, and the grounds specified. o Objection to evidence must be made at the time it
is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of
the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is
being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary
evidence may be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence
at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. o
This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been
rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Moreover, grounds for objection must
be specified in any case. Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be
considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even
on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those
that were raised at the proper time. In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale
was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Evidence on February 12,
2003 which included the DAS as Exhibit A. While petitioner filed a Comment and Objection on
February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed of Absolute Sale for being self-serving. In
the Order dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the DAS, rejecting the objection of
petitioner. Having failed to object on the ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence
rule, petitioner is now deemed to have waived her objection on this ground and cannot raise
it for the first time on appeal.
9. Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the two Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May
25, 2006 and September 13, 2006.

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted
a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the Sandiganbayan. “The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by [the
Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda Marcos[.]”

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business
interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic presented
thetestimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and
of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.

The Republic eventually manifested that it was “no longer presenting further evidence.”Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 “to file its formal offer of
evidence.”

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved “for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006,
within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence.” This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan
in a Resolution of the same date. On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or
until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was granted by
the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion for
extension was filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed
to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from
the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence. He argued that the Republic
showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. Fe Roa Gimenez filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she
joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.

On June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution]
and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of
documentary exhibits attached to the Motion: EXHIBITS A TO G (and series consist of the Income Tax
Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source,
Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net
Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period) among
others.

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.
According to the Sandiganbayan: While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and
that the higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical
grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court
allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases.

The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of
certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were
not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion
for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to
Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant
Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner’s evidence has no probative value
and granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to
evidence

HELD:

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b), and form part of the official records of the PCGG:
“Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and
compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets
and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of
various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several
transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as conduit in the
disbursement of government funds.“

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not “official
issuances of the Philippine government.”They are mostly notarized private documents. Petitioner’s
evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper. Respondent
Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s
documentary evidence has no probative value, considering that most of these documents are only
photocopies.
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as
either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Courtprovides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers,

whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it
has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official
with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by
law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in
court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition
or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or
the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is
material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
. . . .
“Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer” include those specified as public
documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation
or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized
documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date
of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on
October 12, 1992, the date stated thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the
different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly
performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn
to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths
is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to
the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn
to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized
documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution. (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation, this court discussed the difference between mere copies of
audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or
secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the
Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC.
Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow)
show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements
prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner)
are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule,
private documents. However, once financial statements are filed with a government office pursuant to
a provision of law, they become public documents.

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, this court held that mere collection of documents by the
PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not
make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public
and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of
the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the
purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could
testify as to their contents. To reiterate, “[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must
be proved by those witnesses.” Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal
knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how
she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to
the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses
his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. (Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off
the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the
second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by
petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial
evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies
of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption
that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public
officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s
salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.

The Sandiganbayan should have consideredAtienza v. Board of Medicine, et al. where this court held
that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright
reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In
case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on
demurrer to evidence.An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is
because while a demurrer “is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action,” it
specifically “pertains to the merits of the case.”

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence
essentially deprives one party of due process. PETITION GRANTED.
10.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CHUA MO, defendant-appellant.

Jos. N. Wolfson, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the illegal possession of opium, in violation of the provisions of the
Opium Law.

After hearing the evidence, the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge found the defendant guilty of the crime
charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P300 and the costs of the action, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

From that sentence the defendant appealed. The defendant alleged in his defense in this court that the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not have jurisdiction to try him; that the testimony
adduced during the trial of the cause fails to show where the offense was committed.

The complaint filed in the present cause alleges that "on or about the 19th of March, 1912, in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Chua Mo, voluntarily, illegally and criminally was the owner
and had in his possession and under his control" a certain quantity of opium.

The judge of the lower court, after hearing the evidence, made the following findings of facts:

From the evidence presented at the trial, I find that internal revenue agents went to the place
described as 717 Calle Sacristia in the city of Manila, and entering the premises there found the
defendant, etc.

It appears, therefore, that the complaint charges that the crime was committed in the city of Manila. The
judge who tried the cause found from the evidence presented that the crime was committed in the city
of Manila. An examination of the evidence adduced during the trial shows simply that the internal
revenue agents, on or about the 19th of March, 192, entered the residence at 717 Calle Sacristia, etc.,
etc. There is nothing in the record which shows where or in what political division of the Philippine
Islands the said residence at No. 717 Calle Sacristia is located. The judge of the lower court evidently
took judicial notice of the fact that Calle Sacristia was one of the public streets of the city of Manila.
We have then the question presented whether or not a trial judge can take judicial notice of the fact that
a certain public street is located in a certain city or political division of the Philippine Islands. Section
275 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (Act No. 190) provides:

Matters judicially recognized.—The existence and territorial extent of states, and of the several
islands forming the Philippine Archipelago, their forms of government, and symbols of
nationality, the laws of nations, the admirality and maritime and history of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands, the seals of the several departments of the Government of the
United States, and of the States of the Union, and of the Philippine Islands, public and private,
and officials acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and
of the Philippine Islands, the laws of nature, and the measure of time, the geographical
 divisions and of political history of the world, and all similar matters of public knowledge shall
be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof; but the court may
receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary
for its own information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence.

In the case of Marzon vs. Udtujan (20 Phil. rep., 232), this court held, under the provisions of section
275 above quoted, that the trial court had a right to take judicial notice of the fact that a certain
municipality or barrio was within its jurisdiction.

In the present case the question presented is whether or not the trial court had a right to take judicial
notice of the fact that certain house, upon a certain street, was within a city in its jurisdiction. Said
section 275 above quoted provides that trial courts may take judicial notice, among other things, of the
geographical division of the state. Cities and municipalities are created by public law. Their limits are
also prescribed by public law. The streets are laid out, surveyed and established by virtue of public
authority. In the present case the complaint alleged that the crime was committed in the city of Manila.
The court, in his findings of fact "from the evidence, found that the crime was committed in the city of
Manila." We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court was authorized, under provisions of
section 275, to take judicial notice of the fact that the house located at No. 717 Calle Sacristia, was
located within the city of Manila.

Mr. Justice Gray, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Jones vs. United States (137
U.S., 202) in discussing the right of the court to take judicial notice of territorial extent, said:

All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction exercised
by the government whose laws they administer . . . as appearing from the public acts of the legislature
and executive, although those acts are not formally put in evidence nor are in accord with the
pleadings." (U.S. vs. Reynes, 9 How., 127; Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 How., 38; Hoyt vs. Russell, 117
U. S., 401-404; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U.S., 1; State vs. Dunwell, 3 R. I., 127; State vs. Wagner, 61
Me., 178; Taylor vs. Barclay, 2 Sim., 213.)

So far as the facts of the political organization and operation of the State are determined by law, they
are judicially notices as a part of the law. The chief difficulty comes in distinguishing between what is
contained solely and abstractly in the law and what depends more or less on specific official acts done
under the law or upon the application of the terms of the law to concrete things. Courts should be
permitted to give a liberal interpretation to the law permitting them to take judicial notice of the facts
mentioned in such laws, especially when a technical interpretation would have the effect of defeating
the very purpose and object of the law. (Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2575.)

In the case of Master vs. Morse (18 Utah, 21) it was held that courts might take judicial notice that a
certain city had been surveyed into lots, blocks and streets and that judicial notice would be taken of
such divisions. 1awphil.net

In the case of "The Apollon" (9 Wheaton, 362-374) the Supreme Court of the United States held that
"public facts of geographical divisions might be taken judicial notice of."

In the case of Peyrox vs. Howard (7 Peters, 324-342), the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the court would take judicial notice of the fact that the port of New Orleans was within its jurisdiction,
as depending on the ebb and flow of the tide.

In the case of Board vs. State (147 Ind., 476) the supreme court of the State of Indiana held that trial
courts might take judicial notice of the area and boundary lines of a county.

The cases holding that courts may take judicial notice of the fact that certain towns are within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the courts are almost innumerable. (St. Louis I. M. and S. Ry. Co. vs. Magness, 68
Mo., 289; People vs. Etting, 99 Cal., 577; People vs. Faust, 113 Cal., 172; State vs. Powers, 25 Conn.,
48; Perry vs. State, 113 Ga., 936; Gilbert vs. National C. R. Co., 176 Ill., 288; Ham vs. Ham, 39 Me.
263; Commonwealth vs. Desmond, 103 Mass., 445; Baumann vs. Trust Co., 66 Minn., 227.)

In the case of Gardner vs. Eberhart (82 Ill., 316), the supreme court of Illinois held that the trial courts
had authority to take judicial notice of the subdivision of towns and city property into blocks, lots, etc.
(See also Sever vs. Lyons, 170 Ill., 395.)

We believe, considering the ample provisions of said section 275 and the jurisprudence already
established by reputable courts, that we have authority for holding that the lower court committed no
error in taking judicial notice of the fact that the place where the crime was committed was within its
jurisdiction. Therefore the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
11. Degayo vs. Magbuana-Dinglasan, et.al. G.R. No. 173148, April 6, 2015

Facts: Degayo and the tenants claims ownership on the belief that the area was an accretion
to Lot No. 861. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was
an abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the
erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River presently runs. Magbanua-
Dinglasan filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the tenants, with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 16047). Degayo sought to intervene in Civil
Case No. 16047 but her motion was denied. Notably, Degayo never bothered to question
the interlocutory order denying her motion for intervention by filing a petition for certiorari.
Instead, Degayo initiated the present suit against the respondents for declaration of
ownership with damages, also with the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No.
18328, involving the disputed parcel of land. On May 7, 1996, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27,
rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in favor of the respondents which became final
and executory. Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 18328, the court, a quo, found in favor of
Degayo and declared the property in question as an accretion to Lot No. 861. The CA
granted the respondents’ appeal and reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC Branch
22 in Civil Case No. 18328. The CA likewise noted that the previous RTC Branch decision in
Civil Case No. 16047 is conclusive to the title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment. Degayo sought for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this
petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case
No. 16047, which was not even presented during the hearing of the present case.

No. The CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 16047. The taking of judicial notice is a
matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is
intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not
authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when
said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge."
While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, this rule is not absolute.
There are exceptions to this rule. Like when there is a close connection with the matter in
the controversy and when determining whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration
12. Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino
Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted.
Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and
Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino
spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in
the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be
taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member
of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a
foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former.
According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad
and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it
is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming
arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce
proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not
follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative
intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the
Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle,
blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights
are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the
equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26
is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The
violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the
discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the
foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances
are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity
of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly
discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the
solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if
the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to
only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic
types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the
Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The
fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce
must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.
13. Expertravel and Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Korean Airlines
G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005

FACTS:

Korean Airlines (KAL), a foreign corporation filed a collection suit against Expertravel and Tours, Inc.
(ETI) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila through its appointed counsel, Atty. Mario
Aguinaldo. He signed and indicated in the attached verification and certification against forum shopping
that he was the resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and he caused the preparation of the complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to
execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The motion was opposed by KAL and
Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a resolution of the
KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting conducted through a special teleconference.
However, he failed to submit a copy of the said resolution.

ISSUE:

Evidence – Was it proper for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that in this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice
that business transactions may be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is
interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic
medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they
are separated by hundreds of miles. Teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of
directors of private corporations is commonly used in the Philippines to conduct business transactions
or corporate governance.

Judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As
the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. Teleconferencing is considered a matter of
common knowledge.
 14. Manzano vs Despabiladeras
FACTS:

Respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from petitioner Roger Manzano various construction
materials which she used in her construction project at the Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges
(CSPC).By petitioner’s claim, he delivered to respondent during above-said period a
totalofP307,140.50 worth of construction materials payable upon respondent’s initial collection from
CSPC, to bear 8% monthly interest until fully paid.1Respondent having paid the amount of
onlyP130,000.00 exclusive of interest, despite receipt of payments from CSPC, petitioner filed on
April 6, 1990 a complaint2against her for sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Iriga.In her Answer with Counterclaim,3respondent alleged that petitioner had substantially
altered the prices of the construction materials delivered to her; and that in addition to
theP130,000.00 she had paid petitioner, she had made additional payments to petitioner via two checks
(one in the amount ofP43,069.00 and the other in the amount ofP14,000.00).Petitioner filed his Reply
and Answer to Counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the two checks represented payment for past
obligations other than that subject of the case. At the pre-trial conference, there is no dispute that
the plaintiff delivered and defendant received certain construction materials but the defendant does
not agree on the cost claimed by the plaintiff. Wherefore, it is mutually agreed that the plaintiff shall
submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to
the defendant together with the cost claimed by the plaintiff within fifteen (15) days
furnishing copy thereof to the defendant who will state her objections if any, or comment therein
within the same period of time. Instead of submitting "an offer to stipulate," petitioner filed on October
24, 1990 a "Request for Admission" asking respondent to admit within 15 days from receipt the
following:1. That the plaintiff delivered to and defendant received the various items particularly
described in said annexes duly covered by the invoices respectively set forth therein;2.That of the total
amount ofP314,610.50 representing the value of the goods described in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2,
plaintiff has paid onlyP130,000.00.However, no response to the Request for Admission was proffered
by respondent until in the course of the trial of the case or on April 8, 1991.By Decision13of July 7,
1997, the trial court found for petitioner.

x x x Despite receipt of said request for admission, defendant did not answer the same, under
oath, consequently, defendant is deemed to have admitted that plaintiff delivered to her and she
received the goods delivered with the total value ofP314,610.50 and that of the said total
amount, she has paid onlyP130,000.00.There is no more need for the Court to examine and discuss the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff to prove the account of defendant because what has been
admitted need not be proved. On the other hand, the evidence submitted by defendant which are
intended to impress upon the Court that aside fromP130,000.00, she paid on September 20, 1989,
she made other payments, and that her total unpaid balance is not the amount being demanded by
plaintiff, have to be ignored by the court, without even ruling on their credibility, because of her
aforesaid admission that her total account isP314,610.50 and out of which, she has paid
onlyP130,000.00. However the Court of Appeals set aside that of the trial court and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint.

ISSUE: Whether a request for admission of material and relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not
answered under oath within the period stated in the Rules by a party litigant is deemed admitted as an
evidence?

RULING: Yes. Petitioner’s arguments are impressed with merit. At the commencement on April 6,
1990 of the action, the prevailing rule, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of
which were substantially reproduced in the present Rules,24provides:SECTION 1. Request for
admission. –At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant documents described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matters of fact set forth
in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have
already been furnished. SECTION 2. Implied Admission. –Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request,
which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the
court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters. Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter
requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution.
 15. YUJUICO VS URAMI

FACTS: Several stockholders of STRADEC, including petitioner, pledged a certain amount of their
stocks in favor of URAMI to secure the loan obligations of STRADEC to URAMI. STRADEC failed
to comply with its loan obligations. Respondent Nethercott, who claimed to be the attorney-in-fact of
URAMI, sent and signed a notice informing STRADEC and the stockholders that the pledged stocks
will be auctioned. Three days before the auction, petitioner filed a injunction complaint seeking to
enjoin it and claiming that the planned auction is void because Nethercott lacked authority who claimed
to be the attorney-in-fact of URAMI. The trial court did not issue a TRO and the auction pushed through
with URAMI as the winning bidder. Nonetheless, the trial court eventually issued a writ of preliminary
injunction which effectively prevented URAMI from appropriating the stocks it had purchased during
the auction sale. More than a year later, in 2006, URAMI filed a motion for leave to file an answer and
this was granted. URAMI claimed that Nethercott had no authority and it made the auction sale void.
However, in its amended answer without leave of court in February 2009, URAMI claimed that the
auction sale was valid. This was not admitted by the court due to the absence of a leave of court. In
September 2009, URAMI filed a leave of court to file an amended answer which was then admitted by
the court. This was sustained by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the order to allow respondent URAMI to file its
amended answer?

HELD: No. As long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with
intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended
pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion. Matters involving
the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule10 and not by
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rule of Court. Hence, allegations (andadmissions) in a pleading—even if
not shown to be made through "palpable mistake"—can still be corrected or amended provided that the
amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, even if we are to apply
Section 4 of Rule 129 to the present case, we still find the allowance of URAMI’s amended answer to
be in order. To our mind, a consideration of the evidence that URAMI plans to present during trial
indubitably reveals that the admissions made by URAMI under its original answer were a product of
clear and patent mistake. One of the key documents that URAMI plans to present during trial, which it
also attached in its amended answer as "Annex 8" thereof, is URAMI’s Board Resolution38 dated 21
June 2004 that evinces Atty.Nethercott’s authority to cause the foreclosure on the pledged stocks on
behalf of URAMI. With the existence of such board resolution, the statement in URAMI’s original
answer pertaining to the lack of authority of Atty.Nethercott to initiate the 23 June 2004 auction sale
thus appears mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we find it only right and fair, that
URAMI should be given a chance to file its amended answer in order to rectify such mistakes in its
original answer. The said grant is consistent with our time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal
treatment to amendments to pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial
16. PEOPLE VS QUITOLA
 17. PEOPLE VS LAZARTE

FACTS:
At around 11:45 o'clock P.M., on October 8, 1986, Lorenzo Lara was sleeping in his residence at
Zone 5 Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila.A knock at the door, awakened him. He stood up and
opened the door, but he saw nobody. Then, to his surprise, someone entered the house through the
window. It was Nonito Jambunganan, the owner of the house which Lara was occupying for free, as a
caretaker. Seeing Lara, Nonito embraced him. As Lara held Nonito, he felt blood in the latter's clothes
and sensed that he had wounds in his body. When he asked Nonito what happened, the latter replied,
"Tol, sinaksak ako sa labas. "Who stabbed you?" Lara asked. "Tony, Suay, Ric and Junior," he
answered. Nonito also "shouted" twice, "Help me!" Frantically, Lara called out to his neighbors for
help. Neighbors came running. When Nonito was about to be placed on board a jeep, he collapsed. He
was declared "DOA". dead on arrival, at the Nichols Airbase Hospital. Nonito sustained three stab
wounds at the back and died of hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the ding declaration of the victim

RULING:
From the records of the case, it is clear that the conviction of the appellant had been based largely on
the alleged dying declaration of the victim.It behooves us therefore to determine not only the
admissibility, but also appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration of the deceased Nonito
Jambunganan testified on by the principal witness for the prosecution, Lorenzo Lara.

As a rule a dying declaration is hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the mandate of the
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 30, which states: SEC. 30. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules. The above-quoted section of the Revised Rules of Court expresses the hearsay rule in evidence.
However, there are several exceptions to this rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one
being a dying declaration given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, likewise of Rule 130,
Revised Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 31.Dying declaration. - The declaration of a dying person, made
under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

Thus, in order that a dying declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must
1) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
2) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death;
3) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
4) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is a victim
 18. Mabunga vs People

On October 2, 1994, Employees of Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Villaruel, found that the
hasp of the door of BFP office was destroyed and the only typewriter there was missing. From the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, tricycle driver Bernardo, Diana, Villaruel, Sylvia, and SPO2
Madali, the facts are presented as follows:

On October 15, 1994, around 3pm, Diana was in front of her store in Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon,
waiting for a tricycle, saw accused, dealer of marble slabs, carrying a box that bore the marking HOPE
and tied with gray straws, board a pedicab driven by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband who
works at BFP that accused was prime suspect for robbery in BFP, she followed the accused. She noticed
the pedicab head for the pier and so she went to Villaruel’s place to inform him about it. Villaruel then
proceeded to the pier. By that time accused had reached the pier and unloaded the HOPE box. Diana
also contacted Police Major Madali at his house.

Not long, accused reboarded that same tricycle of Bernardo without the box and headed for his house
at Capaclan. Diana saw him board the tricycle on his way home. Villaruel confirmed that the box was
brought by accused. Major Madrona instructed SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero to watch the box of
HOPE brand cigarettes placed under the bench inside the PPA terminal and wait for someone to get it
and load it aboard vessel M/V Penafrancia.

Villaruel, entering the terminal, was told by Sylvia, cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that a man
identified as accused thru a photo shown to her, entrusted the box to her telling her it contained a
damaged electric fan. When the vessel left for Batangas at 8pm, with accused on board the same, PPA
officers an hour later arrived at the terminal. They turned over the box to the police. When it was opened,
it contained the stolen typewriter.

Appellant was charged with robbery in RTC Romblon, Romblon. He pleaded not guilty and interposed
an alibi. While he admitted bringing to the pier a box, he said that it bore a marking CHAMPION not
HOPE. He said he left Romblon on September 24, 1994, and arrived Manila. He then took the bus
bound for Sorsogon, stayed there overnight then proceeded to Northern Samar thru a jeep. He traveled
to several different places because of purchasing materials for the marbles. He returned to Cebu when
the project was done and the next day boarded the ferrt for Romblon and reached the same on October
9 1994. He presented bus tickets and purchase receipts to support his claim. He further claimed that he,
with his son, boarded the pedicab of Bernardo, carrying the box containing marble materials. At the
pier, he laid it down at the gate of PPA and stood beside it as he waited for the ship to dock; he placed
it at the back of his cot upon boarding.

CA, affirming RTC, found him quilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery. CA relied on Section 3 (j)
Rule 131 ROC (notes).

Issue

w/n appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery – no

ruling:
Petition is impressed with merit.

The presumption in Section 3 (j) Rule 131 ROC is misapplied [RELEVANT]

Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. Robbery was discovered when it was noticed that
the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing. On the sole basis of presumption under
Section 3 (j) Rule 131, CA wrongly affirmed the conviction.

A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found
or otherwise established in the action. 21 It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising
from its usual connection with another which is known. A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof
to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on
the presumed fact unless there is proof to the contrary.

In understanding the presumption in Section 3 (j) Rule 131, US v Catimbang is controlling:

If as a matter of probability and reasoning based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken in
connection with other evidence, it may fairly be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty of the theft.

The inference of guilt is one of fact and an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to rebut such
an inference and an accused person may therefore put witness on the stand to explain his possession, and any
reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty connection with the commission of the
crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt
RULING

WHEREFORE, the decision on review is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDEand appellant, Modesto Moody
Mabunga, is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of robbery.

NOTES

1) Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx

(j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him;
 19.

Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation v. Castro

G.R. No. 189061, August 6, 2014
Reyes, J.:

DOCTRINE:
Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the title
of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
FACTS:
The petitioner Midway Maritime Foundation is the lessee of two parcels of land. Its
president, Dr. Manglicmot is married to Adoracion, who is the registered owner of the
property. Inside said property stands a residential building owned by the respondents.
The respondents alleged that Manglicmot, who was the President of the petitioner
leased the building from the mother of the respondents. The respondents prayed that they
be declared as the owners of the residential building, and that the petitioner be ordered to
vacate the same and pay rent arrearages and damages.
Petitioner disputes and denies the ownership of the respondents. According to the
petitioner, it is Adoracion who actually owns the residential building having bought the same
from her father Tomas, who, in turn, bought it in an auction sale.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner lessee may deny the ownership of the respondents lessor

RULING:
No. It is settled that once a contact of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the
lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the
lessor has a valid title to or a better right of possession to the subject premises than the
lessee." Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from denying the title
of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
In this case, the petitioner’s basis for insisting on Adoracion’s ownership dates back to
the latter’s purchase of the two parcels of land from her father, Tomas. It was Tomas who
bought the property in an auction sale by Union Bank in 1993 and leased the same to the
petitioner in the same year. Note must be made that the petitioner’s president, Manglicmot,
is the husband of Adoracion and son-in-law of Tomas.
It is not improbable that at the time the petitioner leased the residential building from
the respondents’ mother in 1993, it was aware of the circumstances surrounding the sale of
the two parcels of land and the nature of the respondents’ claim over the residential house.
Yet, the petitioner still chose to lease the building. Consequently, the petitioner is now
estopped from denying the respondents’ title over the residential building.
20. People vs arposeple
 21. CELEDONIO VS PEOPLE

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Eduardo Celedonio. April 2007, in Navotas, , with intent to gain and by means of force upon
things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by destroying the backdoor of said
house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away things owned and belonging to
CARMENCITA amounting to 223,000. On the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Marquez
witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman while she was
away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house.
Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, identified
Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police
and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly having committed the crime,
based on the account of Marquez. A follow-up operation was conducted accompanied by
Marquez to survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect.
Marquez pointed that Celedonio was the man in the motorcycle. Police officer informed
Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just
bowed his head. Police officer asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then
alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where Police officer saw some of
the stolen items. Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. RTC
found him guilty of robbery with force upon things. The appeal in CA was also denied

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petitioner’s guilt could be proven by circumstantial evidence.
2. Whether or not the search conducted on the petitioner was illegal, rendering the articles
recovered inadmissible.

1. Yes. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when
taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that
Celedonio was the perpetrator. 2. No. There was no illegal search was made upon
Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen items were, they merely made a
general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not show
that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in Celedonio's
motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked
Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force or
intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio
himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the
items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it. The police officers, therefore, were left
without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance,
the police officers had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not
have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into
consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police had to immediately
act on it.
 22. TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

FACTS: Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias and Wilfredo N. Matias entered into a lawful
marriage on January 1, 1968. After the marriage, the couple put up their conjugal home in
San Miguel, Tarlac City. Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to
again serve the Philippine Constabulary. Wilfredo never came back from his tour of duty in
Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated with the
petitioner. According to the records of the National Police Commission, he was already
declared missing since 1979. Petitioner claimed that she constantly pestered the then
Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding Wilfredo, but the Philippine Constabulary
had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news of him going AWOL, all
they know was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army. After
more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it is
now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to
survive; thus she petitioned for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo to claim
the benefits arising from the death of the latter. On January 15, 2012, the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65 (RTC) granted the petition when it ruled as follows:
“WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS
absent or presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military officer. On appeal of the
Republic, the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled the decision of the RTC and set aside the
petition on the ground that the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on
the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code when the purpose of the petitioner was not to
remarry; the RTC should have invoked Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code applies in the instant case – the
declaration of presumptive death for purposes of claiming benefits?

RULING: No. Article 41 does not apply in the case at bar. The Court ruled that the
petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that
would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the Family Code which shows that
the presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus: “Art. 41. A marriage
contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.” Allan Rey N. Esmael Here,
petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of
presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any
other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a amended. Given
that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any
civil purpose. Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code,
and not on Article 41 of the Family Code.
 23. DIAZ SALGADO VS ALSON

G.R. No. 204494

July 27, 2016

FACTS:

Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses
Salgado) seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson. They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship.

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there
was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain
to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed
three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who
secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When Severina died Maria Luisa
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis
adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties.

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in
defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the
family code for lack of marriage license.

RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

ISSUE:

Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage
license?

HELD:

No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil
Code) being cited as the reason therefor.
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible.
Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage,
but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage contract are prima facie
proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of
ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage
already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious
practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of
marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony
must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the
ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to
each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of
marriage appearing on the records.

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony
between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite,
practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall
under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of
the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious
ceremony, were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage
is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina’s
marriage to be valid.
 24. DE JESUS VS ESTATE OF DIZON

FACTS:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having
been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the
decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter’s estate
under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01
March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of
the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus
to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate
children of deceased Dizon
COURT’S RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during
the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth
in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171 of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late
Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status
as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the
latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a
child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
 25. PP VS LIM

FACTS:

Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a

certain “Romy” has been engaged in the sale of prohibited
drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, CDO, IO1 Orellan and his
teammates were directed by the Regional Director to gather for
a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1
Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader, the
arresting officer, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.

When the team arrived in the target area at around 10:00 PM,
IO1 Carin and the C1 alighted from the vehicle near the house
of “Romy”, while IO1 Orellan and the other team members
positioned themselves in the area to observe. Upon reaching
the house, IO1 Carin and the C1 encountered Gorres who invited
them inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa watching TV. When the
C1 introduced IO1 Carin as a buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres
to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres handed a small medicine
box to Lim, who then took 1 sachet of shabu and gave it to IO1
Carin, who in turn paid him with the ₱500 buy-bust money.
After examining the sachet, IO1 Carin made a signal and the
team immediately rushed to Lim’s house. IO1 Orellan declared
that they were PDEA agent and informed Lim and Gorres of their
arrest for selling dangerous drug. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan
conducted a body search on both of them. The team brought Lim
and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in
possession of the seized items. Likewise, he made the
Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items, however, it was
not assigned by Lim and Gorres. There also no signature of an
elected public official and the representatives of the DOJ and
the media as witnesses.

The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession

and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient
evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Romy Lim’s conviction must be reversed.

HELD: Yes. Lim is acquitted.

It appears from the evidence that during the buy-bust operation,

the operatives failed to comply with the requirements of Section
21 of RA 9165. They did not secure the presence of the insulating
witnesses (no media representative and no elected official). The
operatives also completed the inventory of the evidence at their
office.

The Supreme Court emphasized the strict requirements of Section

21 or the chain of custody rule in drugs cases.

In the event that the operatives cannot comply with Section 21

due to valid excuses, the following must be observed:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing

officers must state their compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the

apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order
to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/
confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in

the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must
not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she
must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order
to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence,

the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a
commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case
outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 112, Rules of Court.