Mabanag vs Lopez Vito (G.R. NO.

L-1123)

FACTS: 3 senators and 8 representatives are the petitioner. The said senators were suspended by senate
due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower
House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps
were required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) – which is considered as an enrolled bill. At the same time, the votes were already entered
into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
“Official documents may be proved as follows: . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.

GONZALES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-28196 NOVEMBER 9, 1967

FACTS: The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the
Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. he second, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections. In addition, the third, proposing
that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval
by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the Congress cannot
simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional
convention.

ISSUE(S):
1. Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
2. WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?

HELD:
YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is
different from the law-making power of Congress. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental
Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution.
TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR. NO. L-34150 OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS: A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The main thrust of the petition
is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved
by the Convention have no force and effect as laws as far as they are in contravention to Section 1
Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE:
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.

HELD: NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts
and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the
resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention’s
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
condition in Section 1, Article The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is
precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and
aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in
the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions, which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any
idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.

Planas v. Commission of Elections

Facts : Charito Planas filed a petition to the Supreme Court in order to prohibit the implementation of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 73 scheduling a plebiscite to ratify or reject the proposed Constitutional
amendments submitted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, citing constitutional provisions. Other
identical actions were filed including a supplemental urgent motion for issuance of restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction from implementing PD No. 73 and any other similar proclamations related
to such. The Supreme Court justices decided on a vote of 6 to 3 to dismiss all petitions finding it
unnecessary to pass upon the question given the postponement of the said plebiscite to an indefinite
time in the future, until further notice. Facts:

Issues: MAJOR: 1. Is the issuance of PD No. 73 by the President valid given that such power is exclusive
of Congress? 2. Did the 1971 CC exceed their authority in approving the aforementioned sections in the
Proposed Consti? 3. Does Martial Law affect the validity of the “proper submission of the Proposed
Consti to the people for ratification” given that there is no freedom of speech, press and assembly? 4. Is
Proc No. 1102 valid and in conformity with the requirements for ratification stated in the 1935
Constitution? MINOR:

1. Does the 1971 CC have the authority to continue functioning despite Martial Law?

Held: MAJOR:

1. The issue has become moot and academic. Since the plebiscite in question has been postponed, the
court finds it unnecessary to pass upon the question of the validity of PD No. 73
Supreme Court: As regards to the authority of the President to issue PD No. 73, the court finds it
unnecessary to pass upon such question because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been
postponed.
JAvellana vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. L-36142

FACTS: On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political
question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the
said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It
is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled
applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the
qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places
COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," independently of the Executive.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution.

Sanidad vs COMELEC Case Digest

________________________________________
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
referendum-plebiscite; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree numbers 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the
COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite. Petitioners contend that
the President has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, a such, the referendum
has no legal basis.

Issues
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling
Yes.
In the transitory provision of the 1973 provisions, the National Assembly, although composed mainly by
legislators, amending the Constitution is not legislating.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapproved applies only to the ordinary case of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution.
The petitions are dismissed.
MITRA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,. G.R. No. 191938 : October 19, 2010

FACTS: To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in
election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's
action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a
situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated
from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our evaluation of the evidence
presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We
also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of
Governor of Palawan. On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan
residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In
fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence
failed to sufficiently controvert.Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra
remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.

ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented and
substituted its own factual findings over that of the public respondent.

HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral
arguments.With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC,
we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however,
that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely
raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications. Under these
terms, we cannot be any clearer. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY,
for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral arguments now before us.Let
entry of judgment be made in due course.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO G.R. NO. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal
because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
The Supreme Court further held that:

• The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;
• It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
• The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059, August 31 1987 - 153 SCRA 602

FACTS: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Memorandum issued by the OIC Governor designating the respondents to replace
the petitioners from their respective positions was valid.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held it was not valid. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February
2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now
be held to have acquired security of tenure especially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982
declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and
limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8,
Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS: In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits
of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s
initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the
term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI,
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said
Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total
number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for
its implementation.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as
UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so
dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely
wasted its time, energy, and resources.

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, et.al. G.R. No. 146710-15, 02 March 2001

Facts : After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph Estrada
issued a statement that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a peaceful transition
of power and start the healing of the nation warped by confusion due to his impeachment trial.
Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House stating that he is
temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of the President and let then Vice-President
Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the position of Acting President. Later, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the Petitioner. A special panel of prosecutors
were assigned to investigate the charges against the Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he cannot be criminally charged by the
Ombudsman on the ground of immunity from suit. He claimed that he is still the President of the
Philippines, and that Respondent is merely holding the position in an acting capacity. Further, he
claimed that he cannot be considered as to have resigned because he is prohibited by law from resigning
since he was under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.

Issue :
1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.
2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.
3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

RULLING :
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the resignation
is clear, the same act must be given legal effect. In the present case, it was established the Petitioner
resigned from his position as President of the Philippines. the issuance of a statement wherein the
Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. 2. NO. The
Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was temporarily
incapable of exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed solely to Congress, as
provided in the Constitution the Petitioner was not temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency
because he resigned as President, and Houses of Congress already recognized the legitimacy of the
Respondent.
3. NO. The Court held that presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President The
said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

Lambino v. COMELEC

Fact : Lambino Group, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under Sec 5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735. They alleged that their petition had the support
of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. COMELEC denied the petition.

Issue :
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

RULING:
NO. The framers intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready
and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal, before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them and that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”The essence of amendments “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. Two essential elements must be present: the people must author and sign the entire
proposal andit must be embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”
only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The
Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition, a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.