Two Kinds of Essence in Aristotle A Pale Man Is Not The Same As His Essence

Philosophical Review
Two Kinds of Essence in Aristotle: A Pale Man is Not the same as His Essence
Author(s): Norman O. Dahl
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 233-265
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The Philosophical Review, Vol. 106, No. 2 (April 1997)
Two Kinds of Essence in Aristotle: A Pale Man Is

Not the Same as His Essence
Norman 0. Dahl
Virtually everyone will agree that according to Aristotle, for a par-

ticular substance to be is at least for it to be a thing of a certain
kind. Every particular substance falls under a substance kind,
where the essence of that particular substance (what it is for that
particular substance to be) at least includes the essence of its sub-
stance kind (what it is for something to be a thing of that kind) -I
For example, for a particular man to be is at least for him to be
This paper develops one part of a paper originally presented to an NEH

Institute on Aristotle's metaphysics, biology, and ethics at the University of
New Hampshire in the summer of 1988. I am grateful to all those who
provided comments and suggestions on that paper on that occasion. A
somewhat distant ancestor of the present paper was presented at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota in 1993, and at a conference on Aristotle's metaphysics
at Notre Dame University in 1993, where Edward Halper served as com-
mentator. I thank Professor Halper and everyone else who responded to
that paper on those occasions. A more recent draft was presented to a sem-
inar on Aristotle's metaphysics at the University of Minnesota in the fall of
1995, and I am grateful for the reactions to it that I received there. Work
on the topic of this paper was supported during the summer of 1995 by a
University of Minnesota Graduate School Summer Fellowship and a Mc-
Knight Summer Fellowship, both of which I happily and gratefully acknowl-
edge. During the course of working on this paper I have benefited from the
comments of Elizabeth Belfiore, John Bruss, Kevin Falvey, Aryeh Kosman,
Einar Molvar, Del Reed, Paul Teng, and anonymous referees for the Philo-
sophical Review. There are also two people to whom I owe a special debt. The
first is my colleague Sandra Peterson, for her encouragement and comments
on earlier drafts of this paper. The second is Marc Cohen, for having been
such a patient and careful critic of a succession of drafts of this paper. His
response to them has been of immeasurable help.
I say "at least includes" to allow for the possibility that Aristotle takes
substances to have particular essences. However, if the essences of partic-
ular substances are universal, then the essence of a particular substance
will be the essence of its substance kind. For examples of those who take
Aristotle to endorse particular essences, see Frede and Patzig, Harter, Ir-
win, and Witt. For evidence that Aristotle takes particular substances to
have essences, see Metaphysics Z 4 1029bl3-16, where he says that being
musical is not your essence because you are not musical kath' hauto, and
Metaphysics Z 6 1032a8-10, where he says that one should be able to de-
termine from what has just been said whether Socrates is the same as his
essence.
233
NORMAN 0. DAHL
characterized by those predicates that make something a man.

More generally, if A is said of a particular A kath' hauto ("with
respect to itself' or essentially), then the essence of that particular
A (what it is for that particular A to be) will at least include the
essence of the kind A (what it is for something to be an A). Let
us call the first of these essences the essence of a particular A, and
the second the essence of the kind A. The question now is whether
Aristotle would maintain that the essence of a particular A includes
the essence of the kind A for every kind A. In particular, would he
maintain this when A is said of a particular subject kata sumbebewos
("with respect to an accident" or accidentally)? For example,
would he say that what it is for a particular pale man to be includes
what it is to fall under the kind pale man?2
At first sight, one might think he would not. If a pale man is a
man who happens to be pale, and if what it is for something to
fall under the kind pale man includes what it is to be pale, then it
looks as if the essence of the kind pale man will not be part of
what it is for a particular pale man to be. A man who happens to
be pale can exist without being pale. However, if what some recent
commentators have argued is correct, this would be a mistake. Ac-
cording to Frank Lewis and Gareth Matthews, when Aristotle talks
about a kata sumbebeios legomenon ("a thing said to be what it is with
respect to an accident") such as a pale man,3 he is not talking
about a man who happens to be pale. He is talking about an ac-
cidental comound (or a "kooky object") consisting of a particular
2To see that Aristotle does take the kind pale man to have an essence
in at least a derivative sense of 'having an essence', see Metaphysics Z 4
1029bl2-14.
3There are at least two ways of understanding the expression, 'kata sum-
bebekos legomenon'. One takes it to refer to something said (legomenon) with
respect to an accident (kata sumbebekos), and thus to something predicated
of a subject accidentally. The other takes it to refer to a subject said to be
what it is with respect to an accident. In a context like the present one
where what is being talked about are things such as a man who happens
to be pale, or an accidental compound consisting of a particular man and
his pallor, the second of these is clearly preferable. That is why I have
translated this expression that way here. It is less clear that this is the
appropriate translation when it comes to the arguments that will be the
main focus of this paper, Aristotle's arguments at the beginning of Meta-
physics Z 6 that kata sumbebikos legomena are not the same as their essences.
However, I shall argue below that these are arguments about particular
things said to be what they are with respect to an accident, so that this will
be an apt translation throughout this paper.
234
TWO KINDS OF ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE
man together with one of his accidents, pallor.4 So understood, a

pale man is not identical with a man who happens to be pale. A
man who happens to be pale can exist when he is no longer pale,
but the accidental compound of a man and his pallor can not. If
this is how one should understand a particular A when A is said of
its subject accidentally, then it looks as if the essence of a particular
A will always include the essence of the kind A. The accidental
compound of a man and his pallor can't exist without being char-
acterized by what it is to be a compound of that sort. Whether A
is said of its subject essentially or accidentally, the essence of a
particular A will always include the essence of its corresponding
kind.
The extent to which this doctrine of accidental compounds plays
a role in Aristotle's thought is of both historical and philosophical
interest. For example, according to Lewis, by the time of the Met-
aphysics Aristotle takes individual substances that involve matter and
form (for example, a man or a horse) to be a kind of accidental
compound. If Lewis is right about this, then one would expect this
to provide an important part of an explanation of why in the Met-
aphysics Aristotle would take substances to be forms of individual
substances rather than those individual substances themselves.5 On
the other hand, if this doctrine is not central to Aristotle's discus-
sion of substance in the Metaphysics, individual substances may turn
out to be stronger candidates for substance than one might first
think.
One reason this doctrine of accidental compounds is of philo-
sophical interest is that it provides an alternative to referential
opacity as a way of diagnosing the validity of certain inferences.
For example, if Socrates is a musical man and I know that Socrates
is in the market place, it does not follow that I know that a musical
man is in the market place. As we would be apt to put the point,
even if 'Socrates' and 'a musical man' refer to the same thing, this
inference fails because it results from substituting one co-referen-
tial term for another in a referentially opaque context. According
to Lewis's and Matthews's interpretation, however, Aristotle could
take 'I know that' to introduce a purely referential context and still
4See, for example, Lewis 1982 and 1991, and Matthews.

5For Lewis's way of filling out this explanation, see his 1991, part 4,
chaps. 10-11.
235
NORMAN 0. DAHL
explain what is wrong with this inference. Since a musical man is

an accidental compound consisting of a particular man and his
musicality, but Socrates is not, whatever is true of Socrates will not
necessarily be true of a musical man even if there is a sense in
which Socrates and a musical man are the same. (They are "acci-
dentally the same."6 Where today we might talk about one and the
same thing under two different descriptions, according to this in-
terpretation of him, Aristotle will talk about two different things.
(According to this interpretation, Aristotle requires more for iden-
tity than "accidental sameness." Two things are identical if and
only if they are the same in number and substance-that is, only
if they are "essentially the same"). As a result, Aristotle can account
for what is wrong with the above inference without having to ap-
peal to anything like referential opacity.7
In this paper I shall argue that even though there may be oc-
casions on which Aristotle takes such things as a musical man to
be accidental compounds,8 there are also occasions on which Ar-
istotle takes a particular A, where A is said of its subject accidentally,
to be a thing that happens to be an A, and thus to be something
whose essence does not include the essence of the kind A. In par-
ticular, I shall argue that this is how one should understand Aris-
totle at the beginning of chapter 6 of Metaphysics Z, where he ar-
gues that things said to be what they are with respect to an accident
are not the same as their essences. I shall argue that one can't fully
understand what is going on in this passage without taking Aristotle
to acknowledge that when A is said of its subject accidentally, the
essence of a particular A does not include the essence of the kind
A. It will follow from my argument that this passage provides
grounds for taking Aristotle to anticipate something like referential
opacity.
Aristotle's arguments at the beginning of Z 6 are also interesting
6They are accidentally the same in number. See, for example, Topics
103a30-31.
7See, for example, Lewis 1982, esp. 18-27; Lewis 1991, part 2, chaps. 3
and 5; and Matthews, esp. 230-35.
8For example, at Physics 190al8-21 Aristotle says,
One part survives, the other does not; what is not an opposite survives (for the
man survives), but non-musical or unmusical does not survive, nor does the
compound of the two, namely the unmusical man. (Revised Oxford transla-
tion)
236
in their own right. Indeed, it is solutions to the puzzles that sur-

round them that will provide the basis for the above conclusions.
1. Metaphysics Z 6, 1031a19-28
Metaphysics Z is meant to shed light on the nature of substance

(ousia). The primary aim of chapter 6 of Z is to argue that things
said to be what they are with respect to themselves (kath' hauta
legomena) and therefore substances, are the same as their essences.
Aristotle begins Z 6 by saying that it has been thought that each
thing is the same as its essence (1031a17-18). This turns out to be
a mistake, because things said to be what they are with respect to
an accident (kata sumbebeios legomena) are not the same as their
essences. The text of his arguments for this conclusion is given
below. (In order to facilitate references to different parts of it, I
divide it into four sections. I use '(a) pale man' to refer to Aris-
totle's example in the first section in order not to beg the question
of whether the argument offered here is about a particular pale
man and his essence or the universal pale man and its essence. I
provide two versions of the third section because of a question that
arises concerning the Greek text. The translation is my own.)
Speaking of things and their essences, Aristotle says,
(A) Now in the case of things said to be what they are with respect
to an accident it would seem that the two are different, e.g., (a) pale
man is different from the essence of (a) pale man. For if they were
the same, then the essence of (a) man and the essence of (a) pale
man would be the same; for (a) man and (a) pale man are the same,
as they say, so that the essence of (a) pale man and that of (a) man
would also be the same. (1031al9-24)
(B) Or is it not necessary that things that are accidentally the same
be the same? For the extremes do not become the same in the same
way. (1031a24-25)
(CI) But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extremes
that are accidents become the same (ta akra gignesthai tauta ta kata
sumbebikos), as in the case of the essence of pale and the essence of
musical. (1031a25-28)
(C2) But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extremes
become accidentally the same (ta akra gignesthai tauta kata sumbebeios)
as in the case of the essence of pale and the essence of musical.
(1031a25-28)9
9Some manuscripts contain 'ta' after 'tauta' at 1031a27; others omit it.
More recently, Jaeger (137) and Ross (7) take 1031a27 to contain 'ta';
237
NORMAN 0. DAHL
(D) But it seems not. (1031a28)
A number of questions arise concerning this passage. Is the ar-

gument in (A) about a particular pale man and his essence or the
universal pale man and its essence? What essence does Aristotle
have in mind when he talks about the essence of (a) pale man that
is its essence? And just what is the sameness relation that is involved
in his claim that things said to be what they are with respect to an
accident are not the same as their essences? The most pressing
prQblem, however, is the following. The argument offered in (A)
appears to be fallacious, something Aristotle seems to recognize in
(B). (C) appears to suggest an alternative argument that might be
valid, but (D) suggests that it too fails. Nevertheless, Aristotle ac-
cepts the conclusion of these two arguments and does so without
ever offering any additional support for it.10 How could he do this?
2. The Validity of Aristotle's Arguments
2.1 Aristotle's First Argument
To begin answering this question, let's start with the argument in

(A). It is a reductio argument, and it can initially be reconstructed
as follows.
Argument I
(1) (A) pale man is the same as its essence, the essence of (a)
pale man. [Supposition to be reduced to absurdity]
(2) (A) man is the same as (a) pale man. ["As they say"]
(3) Therefore, (a) man is the same as the essence of (a) pale
man. [From (1) and (2) ]
(4) (A) man is the same as its essence, the essence of (a) man.
Frede and Patzig (text and translation, 74) and Bostock (8) omit it. Al-
though it is possible to omit 'ta' and still understand 1031a25-28 in the
way it would be understood if the text contained 'ta' (see, for example,
Frede and Patzig, text and translation, 74, commentary, 90-91), there is a
way of translating these lines when 'ta' is omitted that makes a difference
to what Aristotle says. That is the way I have translated them.
'0See, for example, 1031b22-28, where Aristotle says that "the pale" (to
leukon), understood as a pale thing and not the quality pale, is not the
same as its essence, where in the meantime he has offered no new argu-
ment for this conclusion. (For support for this way of taking 1031b22-28,
see note 30 below.)
238
[Granted by anyone who thinks that each thing is the same

as its essence, and by anyone who would grant (1)]1I
(5) Therefore, the essence of (a) man is the same as the es-
sence of (a) pale man. [From (3) and (4)]
Since (5) appears to be false, we can reject what was assumed at

(1). (A) pale man, thus, is not the same as its essence."2
1In place of (4) one could substitute

(4*) If (a) man is the same as the essence of (a) pale man, then the
essence of (a) pale man is the essence of (a) man,
an instance of
(S) For any thing x with an essence, and for any essence E, if x stands
to E in the sameness relation that is Aristotle's main concern in Z
6, then E is the essence of x.
(S) can in turn be taken to be a conceptual truth, true in virtue of the

sameness relation that is Aristotle's main concern in Z 6. One reason for
replacing (4) with (4*) is that (4*) doesn't presuppose what Aristotle has
yet to argue for in Z 6, that things said to be what they are with respect to
themselves, and thus (a) man, are the same as their essences. However, if
the present argument is directed against someone who thinks that each
thing is the same as its essence, this isn't something Aristotle has to argue
for. His opponent would grant (4). As a result, I shall follow most com-
mentators and take the argument in (A) to rest on (4) rather than on
(4*).
12Halper would disagree with this reconstruction. He takes step
be true rather than false, taking the essence of a pale man to be the essence
of a man, and thus not to include the essence of pale. He doesn't take
Aristotle to have reached an absurdity until 1031a27-28 (in text (C)),
where he takes Aristotle to conclude from the essence of a musical man
and the essence of a pale man being the same that the essence of pale
and the essence of musical are the same (76-80). He thus takes texts (A)-
(D) to set out a single, valid reductio argument, rather than, as I have
suggested, two different arguments each of whose validity is open to ques-
tion.
However, if the essence of a pale man is the essence of a man and doesn't
include the essence of pale, then the essence of a musical man will also
be the same as the essence of a man and won't include the essence of
being musical. But then nothing will follow about the essence of pale and
the essence of musical from the essence of a musical man and the essence
of a pale man being the same. Maintaining the latter would simply amount
to maintaining that the essence of a man is the same as itself. Something
would follow if the essence of a musical man included the essence of mu-
sical and the essence of a pale man included the essence of pale. But then
one should understand the argument in (A) in the way I just set it out, a
way that leaves its validity open to question. What is said in (C), thus,
239
NORMAN 0. DAHL
There are three issues surrounding this argument that can be

settled at the outset. Having settled them will put us in a better
position to determine the argument's validity.
First, the essence that (1) assumes (a) pale man is the same as (the
essence of (a) pale man) includes the essence of pale and perhaps
the essence of a particular pale. If it didn't, then the essence of (a)
pale man and the essence of (a) man would be the same, and step
(5) would be true rather than false. This would rob the argument of
any chance of being a successful reductio argument.13
Second, this argument is about a (concrete) particular pale man
and his essence, not the universal pale man and its essence. In
order for Argument I to be sound, step (2) must be true. However,
it isn't true if it is about the universal pale man. Also, Aristotle says
that (a) man and (a) pale man are the same "as they say" (hols
phasin) (1031a22-23). What people would say is that a particular
man is the same as a particular pale man, not that the universal
man is the same as the universal pale man. But if step (2) is about
a particular pale man, then so is step (1). The inference from (1)
and (2) to (3) is valid only if (1) and (2) share a common term,
and that common term is (a) pale man. (1) must, then, assume
that a particular pale man is the same as his essence.
Furthermore, since Aristotle says in Z 4 that essence belongs pri-
marily to substance and derivatively to other things, if the universal
pale man has an essence, it has an essence derivatively, its essence
depending on both the essence of man and the essence of pale.'4
For example, if the essence of man were rational animal, and the
essence of (being) pale were having a surface of a certain sort, then
the essence of the universal pale man would be rational animal having
a surface of a certain sort. But then the universal pale man would be
should be taken to be part of a second argument alluded to as an attempt

to avoid the objection raised in (B) to the argument in (A).
13As I indicated in note 12, Halper (76-80) takes (5) to be true. How-
ever, for the reasons I gave in note 12, I don't think that this is correct.
'4See, for example, 1030b12-13, where Aristotle says that even (a) pale
man has a formula, although not in the way that pale or a substance have
a formula. Since in this context a formula is the formula of an essence,
Aristotle grants here that there is a sense in which the universal pale man
has an essence. It won't have it in the ways that man and pale have es-
sences. Man has an essence primarily, and pale has an essence secondarily
and thus derivatively. The universal pale man will have an essence even
more derivatively, depending on both the essences of man and of pale.
240
TWO KMiDS OF ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE
identical with, and hence the same as, its essence. An interpretation
of an argument designed to show that something is not the same as
its essence that leaves that thing the same as its essence hardly seems
an adequate interpretation.
Finally, if one takes Aristotle to countenance particular essences,
one should take this argument to be about a concrete particular man
and his particular essence, where his particular essence includes the
essence of pale and perhaps the essence of a particular pale. If this
argument were about a particular pale man understood as a partic-
ular essence and his essence, then again a pale man would turn out
to-'be identical with, and therefore the same as, its essence. Thus, if
one takes this argument to be about particular essences, one will have
to take it to be about a concrete particular pale man and his partic-
ular essence, where a concrete particular pale man will have matter
that his particular essence lacks. Argument I, therefore, is about a
(concrete) particular pale man and his essence.
The third issue surrounding this argument that can be settled is
the nature of the sameness relations in steps (1) and (2). As I
mentioned earlier, the main aim of Z 6 is to argue that substances
are the same as their essences. While there is more than one claim
that Aristotle can make when he says that a thing is the same
(tauto) as something,'5 it is fairly clear what claim he has in mind
when he argues in Z 6 that substances are the same as their es-
sences. Substances are the same in formula (logos) and substance
(ousia) as their essences.16 At 1031b32-1032al Aristotle says that
things that are one and the same as their essences have the same
formula (logos) as their essences, and at 1031al8 he says that the
essence of a thing is said to be its substance (ousia). If an essence
is also its own essence, then the things that Z 6 argues are the same
as their essences are things that are the same in formula and sub-
stance as their essences. Since the point of Argument I is to show
that things that are said to be what they are with respect to an
accident are not the same as their essences in the way in which
substances are later argued to be the same as their essences, step
(1) in Argument I assumes that a pale man is the same in formula
15For example, things can be the same in number, species, or genus

(Titics 103alO-14).
"For this way-of things being the same, see, Metaphysics 1018a5-1 1. (For
a corresponding way in which things can be one, see Physics 185b5-9 and
Metaphysics 1016b8-1 1.)
241
NORMAN 0. DAHL
and substance as his essence.'7 As there is some question as to

whether this relation should be taken to be identity or a weaker
relation, I shall express this by saying that a pale man is the same
in (number and) substance as his essence.'
It should also be clear what the nature of the sameness relation
is in step (2) of Argument I. If a man is a pale man, then this is
so because of one of his accidents. As a result, if a man and a pale
man are the same, they are accidentally the same.19 Thus, steps (1)
and (2) of Argument I involve different sameness relations.
Once all these points have been recognized, one is in a better
position to see why Argument I might be thought to be fallacious.
Indeed, reconstructed as follows, it is fallacious.
Argument IA
(1) A pale man is the same in (number and) substance as his

essence, the essence of a pale man. [Supposition]
(2) A man is accidentally the same as a pale man. [A more
precise formulation of what it is "they say"]
(3) Therefore, a man is the same in (number and) substance
as the essence of a pale man. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) A man is the same in (number and) substance as his es-
sence, the essence of a man. [Granted by anyone who
would grant (1)]
(5) Therefore, the essence of a man and the essence of a pale
17For someone else who takes this to be the sameness relation at issue
in Z 6, see Pelletier.
'8At least in principle, two things can be the same in formula and sub-
stance without being identical. A concrete particular substance and its es-
sence are not identical. But even if they have an essence in different senses
of 'having an essence', a concrete particular substance and its essence can
still have the same essence, and therefore be the same in formula and
substance. Things that are the same in formula and substance will be iden-
tical if they are also the same in number.
Most commentators have taken the sameness relation that is Aristotle's
concern in Z 6 to be identity (see, for example, Bostock, Code, Frede and
Patzig, Furth 1988, Halper, Irwin, Lewis 1991, Owen, Ross, and Woods).
For two notable exceptions see Cohen 1978, and Pelletier.
While I am inclined to think that this relation should not be taken to
be identity, I want to leave that question open here. As a result, I use 'is
the same in (number and) substance as' to refer to this relation.
'9They are accidentally the same in number. (See, for example, Topics
103a30-31).
242
man are the same in (number and) substance. [From (3)

and (4)]
The fallacy here occurs in the inference from (1) and (2) to (3).
It is the fallacy that Aristotle calls the fallacy of accident.
Aristotle introduces this fallacy at De Sophisticis Elenchis 166b29-30,
saying that it occurs when an attribute is claimed to belong in the
same way to a thing and its accident. He also recognizes instances of
this fallacy that involve accidental sameness. At De Sophisticis Elenchis
179bl-4 he considers an example in which a man wearing a mask is
approaching and the man happens to be Coriscus, whom one knows.
He says that it does not follow that one both knows and does not
know the man who is approaching, because Coriscus and the man
approaching are only accidentally the same.
More important, it is this latter objection that Aristotle raises to
the argument in (A) when he says in (B),
Or is it not necessary that things that are accidentally the same be

the same? For the extremes do not become the same in the same way.
(1031a24-25)
A number of considerations support this way of taking (B).

First, the reference to necessity at the beginning of (B) suggests
that an inference is being called into question.
Second, this inference is described as one that takes things that are
accidentally the same to be the same. This fits Argument IAs infer-
ence from (1) and (2) to (3). It takes a man to have the same attrib-
ute, being the same as the essence of a pale man, as does something
that is accidentally the same as it, a pale man. That is, it takes things
that are accidentally the same to be the same in the sense of having
the same attributes. This is also what happens in Aristotle's example
of the fallacy of accident of the man approaching.
That this is the objection Aristotle is raising to the argument in
(A) is confirmed by the explanation he offers in (B) for why the
inference in question fails. Its extreme terms are not the same as
their middle term in the same way. This fits the inference from (1)
and (2) to (3) in Argument IA. Its extreme terms are a man and
being the same as the essence of a pale man, and its middle term
is a pale man. (1) assumes that a pale man is the same in substance,
and thus essentially the same as the essence of a pale man, whereas
(2) says that a man is accidentally the same as a pale man. The
extreme terms in this inference, thus, are not the same as their
243
NORMAN 0. DAHL
middle term in the same way. They are not both accidentally the
same as their middle term. Moreover, this is the only inference in
Argument IA for which this is true.
(B), thus, says that the argument initially offered in (A) commits
the fallacy of accident. Since this is the fallacy committed by Argu-
ment IA, one has good reason to take it to be the argument Aristotle
offers in (A). It is also an argument that he recognizes is fallacious.20
2.2.-Aristotle 's Second Argument
Text (C) at 1031a25-28, however, suggests an alternative to this

argument. Perhaps it provides a valid argument for the conclusion
20The foregoing is essentially the way Ross (175-77) takes (B). Bostock,
however, understands (B) differently. He translates it as,
Or is there rno necessity that things that are coincidentally [the same] should
be the same? For it is not in this way [namely, coincidentally] that the extreme
terms become the same (8),
taking the extreme terms referred to here to be those in the inference to

(5) in Argument IA, not those in the inference from (1) and (2) to (3).
Rather than taking (B) to call attention to a fallacy in the argument in
(A), Bostock takes it to say that this argument is unsound because its step
(2) is false. (2) is false because the things it says are the same (a man and
a pale man) are not the same in the sense required for (5) to follow. In
order for (5) to follow, a man and a pale man would have to be the same
in the same way that the extremes in (5) are said to be the same. They
would have to be the same in number and substance (Bostock, 104-6).
Besides the considerations I have already offered, the following provide
additional reasons for not taking (B) in the way Bostock takes it.
First, there is a sense in which Aristotle does take things that are acci-
dentally the same to be the same. In this sense (2) is true. Understood in
this way, Argument IA is invalid rather than unsound, and the problem
lies with its inference from (1) and (2) to (3).
Second, if Aristotle had wanted to point out that a man and a pale man
are not the same in the way (5) takes the essence of a man and the essence
of a pale man to be the same, it is doubtful that he would do so by asking
whether it is necessary that a man and a pale man are the same in this
way. To ask this is to suggest that it is possible for a man and a pale man
to be the same in this way. But if a man and a pale man are accidentally
the same, then necessarily they are not the same in number and substance.
As a result, it seems preferable to take Aristotle's reference to necessity at
the beginning of (B) to call an inference into question.
Finally, if the first part of (B) calls an inference into question, it would
be more natural to take the last part of (B) to explain why this inference
is questionable, referring to its extreme terms rather than those in another
inference. But then the inference in question is the inference from (1)
and (2) to (3). It is the only inference in Argument IA whose extreme
terms are not the same as their middle term in the same way.
244
that things said to be what they are by accident are not the same
as their essences. I shall argue, however, that no matter which way
one takes these lines, they still don't provide Aristotle with an ar-
gument that he takes to be valid.
2.2.1 Version One
According to (Cl), 1031a25-28 says,
But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extremes that
are accidents become the same, as in the case of the essence of pale
and the essence of musical.
Suppose that this is the right way to take 1031a25-28. Aristotle

is then saying that an argument about the essence of pale and the
essence of musical might provide an argument that avoids the fal-
lacy in Argument IA, because of the way in which the accidents in
this new argument become the same. As the following reconstruc-
tion of it shows, the accidents in this new argument are a pale man
and a musical man; and they do become the same as their middle
term in the same way.21
Argument HA
(1) A pale man is the same in (number and) substance as his

essence, the essence of a pale man. [Assumption]
(2) A man is accidentally the same as a pale man. ["As they
say"]
(3) A man is accidentally the same as a musical man. ["As they
say"]
(4) Therefore, a pale man is accidentally the same as a musical
man. [From (2) and (3)]
(5) Therefore, a musical man is the same in (number and)
substance as the essence of a pale man. [From (1) and
(4)]
(6) A musical man is the same in (number and) substance as
21What follows is essentially the way Ross understands the argument

Aristotle alludes to in (C) (see Ross, 176-77). The main difference between
us is that where Ross talks about two ways in which things can be identical,
absolutely identical and identical per accident, I talk about two ways in which
things can be the same, the same in (number and) substance and acci-
dentally the same.
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NORMAN 0. DAHL
the essence of a musical man. [Granted by anyone who

would grant (1)]
(7) Therefore, the essence of a musical man is the same in
(number and) substance as the essence of a pale man.
[From (5) and (6)]
(8) Therefore, the essence of pale is the same in (number
and) substance as the essence of musical. [From (7)]22
Argument IA was fallacious because the inference from (1) and

(2) to (3) in it takes things that are accidentally the same to have
the same attributes. Because of this, the extreme terms in this in-
ference are not the same as their middle term in the same way.
Aristotle now says that Argument IIA might be thought to avoid
this objection, because in it the extreme terms in the inference
that takes its accidents to be the same-the inference from (2) and
(3) to (4)-are the same as their middle term in the same way. A
pale man and a musical man are both accidentally the same as a
man.
However, it doesn't take much thought to see that Argument IIA
is no improvement over Argument IA. Although Argument IIA's
inference from (2) and (3) to (4) may not commit the fallacy of
accident, the inference from (1) and (4) to (5) still does. Further-
more, its inference from (2) and (3) to (4) is still fallacious. It
relies on the transitivity of the accidental sameness relation, but
accidental sameness is not transitive.23 Aristotle seems to recognize
that this new argument is no improvement over the first argument
he offered, for after suggesting in (Cl) that this second argument
might be valid, he says in (D), "But it seems not (dokei de ou) ."24
22For one place where Aristotle recognizes the validity of this last infer-
ence, see Z 4 1029b21-22, where he says that if the essence of a pale surface
were the essence of a smooth surface, then the essence of pale and the
essence of smooth would be one and the same.
23As I understand accidental sameness, it is symmetric and irreflexive.
(If x is accidentally the same as y, then y is accidentally the same as x, but
no object is accidentally the same as itself.) However, if accidental sameness
were symmetric and transitive, it would not be irreflexive. (If x is acciden-
tally the same as y, then, given symmetry, y is accidentally the same as x.
But if accidental sameness were also transitive, then x would then be ac-
cidentally the same as x.) Since accidental sameness is symmetric, it is not
transitive.
24Although both Frede and Patzig and Furth understand 1031a25-28
along the lines of (Cl), they offer a slightly different reconstruction of the
argument alluded to in these lines from the one I have offered. However,
246
Thus, if (Cl) is the way to take 1031a25-28, the only arguments

Aristotle has considered in support of his conclusion that things
said to be what they are by accident are not the same as their
essences are arguments that he takes to be fallacious.
2.2.2 Version Two
Prospects may seem brighter if we take (C2) as the way to under-

stand 1031a25-28. However, here too I think we should take Aris-
totle to end up offering only an argument that he takes to be
fallacious.
According to (C2), 1031a25-28 says,
But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extremes become
accidentally the same, as in the case of the essence of pale and the
essence of musical.
This suggests a new version of the argument in (A) that might turn
out to be valid, one whose extreme terms become accidentally the
same in the way that the extreme terms in an argument involving
the essence of pale and the essence of musical become accidentally
the same. This latter argument is, I think, best understood as fol-
lows.
Argument IIB
(1) A pale thing is the same in (number and) substance as its

essence, the essence of a pale thing. [Supposition to be
reduced to absurdity]
(2) A pale thing is accidentally the same as a musical thing.
[As it happens]
(3) Therefore, a musical thing is accidentally the same as the
essence of a pale thing. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) A musical thing is the same in (number and) substance as
its essence, the essence of a musical thing. [Granted by
anyone who will grant (1)]
(5) Therefore, the essence of pale (what it is to be a pale
thing) is accidentally the same as the essence of musical
(what it is to be a musical thing). [From (3) and (4)]25
as they reconstruct it, this new argument still offers no improvement over
the argument offered in (A). It commits the fallacy of accident twice rather
than once. (See Frede and Patzig, commentary, 91, and Furth 1985, 112.)
25There is another way of reconstructing this argument.
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NORMAN 0. DAHL
While there are issues surrounding this argument that are worth
pursuing,26 what is important here is the version of the argument
Argument IIC
(1) A pale man is the same in (number and) substance as its essence,
the essence of a pale man. [Assumption]
(2) A pale man is accidentally the same as a musical man. [As it happens]
(3) Therefore, a musical man is accidentally the same as the essence of
a pale man. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) A musical man is the same in (number and) substance as its essence,
the essence of a musical man. [Granted by anyone who will grant (1)]
(5) Therefore, the essence of a pale man is accidentally the same as the
essence of a musical man. [From (3) and (4)]
(6) Therefore, the essence of pale is accidentally the same as the essence
of musical. [From (5) ]
(Compare, for example, Furth 1985, 112, and Frede and Patzig, commen-
tary, 91.)
There are two reasons I prefer Argument IIB to Argument HC as the argu-
ment about the essence of pale and the essence of musical alluded to in (C2).
First, the inference from (5) to (6) in Argument IIC is fallacious. As I
point out below, two essences E and E' can be taken to be accidentally the
same if it is an accident of an E that it is, or is an E, if and only if it is an
E', and it is an accident of an E' that it is, or is an E', if and only if it is
an E. Even if it happens that pale men can't be, or be pale men, without
also being musical men, and even if it also happens that musical men can't
be, or be musical, without being pale men, it still doesn't follow that there
can't be a pale thing that is, and is pale, without being musical. Some
things that can't be musical can still be pale. As a result, there can be a
pale thing that is, and is pale, without being musical. (It is true that at Z
4 1029a21-22 Aristotle seems to endorse an inference similar to that from
(5) to (6) (see note 22 above). But I think that the inference endorsed
there is best understood as one that takes the essences in question to be
at least the same in substance, and thus to be essentially the same.)
Second, it may be odd to call the essence of pale and the essence of
musical in (6) extremes, since the inference from (5) to (6) is not an
inference involving two extreme terms and a middle term.
Argument IIB, however, contains no inference comparable to the infer-
ence from (5) to (6) in Argument IIC, and the inference to step (5) in
Argument IIB does involve two extreme terms and a middle term.
Nevertheless, it won't make any difference to what I go on to say if one
accepts Argument IIC as the argument involving the essence of pale and
the essence of musical that is alluded to in (C2). What is important is what
follows about the validity of the version of the argument in (A) that is
suggested by what Aristotle says in (C2). Arguments IIB and IIC both sug-
gest the same version of that argument.
26One is its validity. That it is valid on one way of understanding it and
invalid on another should become clear from the discussion that follows
in this section. Another is why Aristotle would suddenly switch his examples
248
in (A) that it suggests. This is a version whose extreme terms are

accidentally the same. At first sight, it appears to be an argument
that Aristotle is committed to taking to be valid:
Argument IB
(1) A pale man is the same in number and substance as his

essence, the essence of a pale man. [Supposition to be
reduced to absurdity]
(2) A man is accidentally the same as a pale man. [As it hap-
pens]
(3) Therefore, a man is accidentally the same as the essence
of a pale man. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) A man is the same in number and substance as his es-
sence, the essence of a man. [Granted by anyone who
would grant (1)]
(5) Therefore, the essence of a pale man is accidentally the
same as the essence of a man. [From (3) and (4)]
After having pointed out that things that are accidentally the
same don't necessarily have the same attributes, Aristotle says at De
Sophisticis Elenchis 179a36-39 that two things would have the same
attributes if they were the same in number and substance. It is this
principle that licenses the two inferences in the above argument.
(For example, if a pale man is accidentally the same as a man, then
of essences from the essence of a pale man and the essence of a man to
the essence of pale and the essence of musical. (See, for example, Bostock,
106.) This latter question can, I think, be answered.
Aristotle switches examples in order to provide a clear case of essences
that, if they were the same, could only be accidentally the same. Someone
might think that the essence of a pale man and the essence of a man could
be the same in substance because they share what could be taken to be a
common genus, what it is to be a man. It is clear, however, that if the
essence of pale and the essence of musical were the same, they could only
be accidentally the same. These essences characterize different aspects of
sensible substances, and thus don't even share a common genus. Pale is
an attribute of the body of a sensible substance (an attribute of its surface),
whereas musical is an attribute of the soul of a sensible substance. Accord-
ing to (C2), Aristotle wants one to consider a version of the argument in
(A) that concludes that the essences in it are accidentally the same. He
accomplishes this by first calling attention to an argument in which the
essences that are concluded to be the same could only be accidentally the
same.
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NORMAN 0. DAHL
what is the same in number and substance as a pale man, the

essence of a pale man, will also be accidentally the same as a man.)
Aristotle, thus, is committed to taking this argument to be valid. It
also looks as if step (5) in this argument is false.
There are two ways in which a claim that two essences are acciden-
tally the same could be false. First, essences are either essentially the
same or they are not the same at all, so that such a claim is necessarily
false. Second, although essences can be accidentally the same, the
essences in question turn out not to be accidentally the same. In what
follows, it is this second possibility that I shall rely on.
Since an essence consists in a set of predicates that specifies what
it is for something to be, or to be a thing of a certain kind, the obvious
way for two essences to be accidentally the same is that they acciden-
tally indicate what it is for the same things to be, or to be things of
a certain kind. That is, two essences E and E' are accidentally the
same just in case for anything that is an E, it is an accident of it that
it is, or is an E, if and only if it is an E', and for anything that is an
E', it is an accident of it that it is, or is an E', if and only if it is an
E. For example, the essence of a pale man and the essence of a man
are accidentally the same just in case either it turns out that for any
man, it is an accident of his that he is if and only if he is a pale man,
and for any pale man, it is an accident of his that he is if and only
he is a man, or it turns out that for any man, it is an accident of his
that he is a man if and only if he is a pale man, and for any pale
man, it is an accident of his that he is a pale man if and only if he
is a man. Understanding step (5) in Argument in IB in this way is
enough to make it false. Since there are men who are not pale, there
are men for whom it is not an accident that they are men if and only
if they are pale men.
Argument IB, thus, looks as if it provides what Aristotle needs-
a valid reductio argument that shows that things said to be what
they are by accident are not the same as their essences. However,
there is a strong reason for not taking Argument IB to be the ar-
gument Aristotle has in mind if (C2) is the way to understand
1031a25-28. It is Aristotle's disclaimer in (D), "But it seems not."
According to (C2), Aristotle has just suggested that the argument
offered in (A) might be valid if the extreme terms in it were taken
to be accidentally the same. Given this, the most natural way to
take his then saying, "But it seems not," is that he is now saying
that in spite of what initially might seem to be the case, this alter-
250
native version of the argument in (A) seems not to be valid after

all.27 Furthermore, there is a formulation of this alternative argu-
ment that fits this way of taking (D).
Argument IC
(1) A pale man is the same in substance as his essence, the

essence of a pale man. [Supposition to be reduced to ab-
surdity]
(2) A man is accidentally the same as a pale man. [As it happens]
(3) Therefore, a man is accidentally the same as the essence of
a pale man. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) A man is the same in substance as his essence, the essence
of a man. [Granted by anyone who would grant (1)]
(5) Therefore, the essence of a pale man is accidentally the same
as the essence of a man. [From (3) and (4)]
As I indicated earlier, there is a question whether the sameness

relation between things and their essences that is Aristotle's main
concern in Z 6 is identity or a weaker sameness relation. Argument
IC relies on this being an open question. In contrast to Argument
IB, it does not take things that are the same in this way to be
identical. It only takes them to be the same in substance.
27There are two other ways of taking this disclaimer. One takes it to
refer to the extreme terms Aristotle has just been talking about-either
the extreme terms in the argument alluded to in (C2), the essence of pale
and the essence of musical, or the extreme terms in the argument origi-
nally offered in (A), the essence of a pale man and the essence of a man-
saying that it seems that these extreme terms are not accidentally the same
after all. (See, for example, Bostock, 106.) The other takes it to refer to
the argument alluded to in (C2), Argument IIB or Argument IIC, saying
that the conclusion in this argument doesn't follow after all.
However, "But it seems not" seems too tentative to make the rather
obvious point that the essence of pale and the essence of musical, or the
essence of a pale man and the essence of a man, are not accidentally the
same. Furthermore, at least as I have set it out, one has as much reason
for thinking that the argument alluded to in (C2) is valid as one has for
thinking that the alternative version of the argument in (A) suggested by
it is valid. If the argument alluded to in (C2) were fallacious, one would
expect the version of the argument in (A) suggested by it to be fallacious
as well.
(D), thus, is best thought of as saying that despite what might initially
seem to be the case, the version of the argument in (A) that (C2) suggests
turns out not to be valid after all.
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NORMAN 0. DAHL
What is more, Argument IC does not commit the fallacy of acci-

dent. Neither its inference from (1) and (2) to (3), nor its inference
from (3) and (4) to (5), takes things that are accidentally the same
to have the same attributes. In fact, Aristotle is committed to taking
its inference from (1) and (2) to (3) to be valid.28 This explains why
this argument can appear to be an improvement over the first version
of the argument offered in (A). Nevertheless, the argument is still
fallacious. Its inference from (3) and (4) to (5) is not valid.
What follows from (3) and (4) is that the essence of the man
who happens to be pale is accidentally the same as the essence of
a man. That is, it follows that it is an accident of this man that he
will be if and only if he is a pale man. The most that will follow
from this is its generalization-that for any man who happens to be
pale, it is an accident of his that he is, or is a man, if and only if
he is a pale man. However, (5) claims more than this. It maintains
that for any man, it is an accident of his that he is if and only if
he is a pale man. But then, even if it were true that for every man
who is a pale man, it is an accident of his that he will cease to be
the moment he ceases to be a pale man, the existence of men who
are not pale and thus men who do not cease to be when they are
not pale men will be enough to show that (3) and (4) could be
true and (5) false. The inference from (3) and (4) to (5), thus, is
not valid.
Although Argument IC may appear to be valid, it turns out not
to be valid after all. Since this is just what (D) seems to say about
the version of argument in (A) that (C2) suggests, it is Argument
IC that one should take Aristotle to be calling attention to if (C2)
is the right way to understand 1031a25-28. But then it again turns
281ts validity follows from a principle that Aristotle accepts in the Cate-
gories-that if a predicate is said of an individual that is present in a subject,
then that predicate is present in that subject. Take essential (kath' hauto)
predication to be the descendent of the said of relation, accidental (kata
sumbebikos) predication to be the descendent of the present in relation as
it holds between predicates and subjects, and take two individuals' being
accidentally the same to be the descendent of the present in relation as it
holds between individuals. Suppose also that if an individual is the same
in substance as an essence, then being the same as that essence is predi-
cated essentially of that individual. Then it follows from the above principle
in the Categories that if a pale man is the same in substance as the essence
of a pale man, and a man is accidentally the same as a pale man, then a
man will be accidentally the same as the essence of a pale man.
252
out that Aristotle has only considered arguments that he takes to

be fallacious as arguments in support of his conclusion.
3. The Main Problem Surrounding This Passage, and Its Solution
Thus, whether one takes (Cl) or (C2) as the way to understand

1031a25-28,29 the only arguments Aristotle considers in (A)-(D)
as arguments in support of his conclusion that things said to be
what they are with respect to an accident are not the same as their
essences are arguments that he takes to be fallacious. How could
he do this and still accept this conclusion? How could he do this
when he also doesn't go on to provide any additional support for
this conclusion?30
29While the considerations I shall go on to offer do not depend on it,

it seems to me that of these two ways of understanding 1031a25-28, (C2)
is preferable to (Cl). (CI) relies on the text at 1031a27 containing 'ta',
while (C2) relies on its omission. Since 'ta' repeats the last two letters of
the word that would precede it in the text, 'tauta', it is as likely that these
two letters were inadvertently added after 'tauta' to a manuscript that
didn't contain them as it is that they were omitted from a manuscript that
did contain them. As a result, the main basis for deciding which way to
take the Greek text would seem to be seeing which makes the best sense
of what Aristotle says in (A)-(D). This consideration, I think, favors (C2).
(CI) provides a rather indirect way of introducing a second argument
that so obviously commits the same fallacy as does Aristotle's first argument
that one wonders why anyone could have ever thought it would be an
improvement over that first argument. (C2), however, provides a more
direct way of introducing an argument, Argument IC, that, even though it
turns out not to be valid, could plausibly be taken to be an improvement
over Aristotle's original argument because it doesn't commit the fallacy
committed by the original argument. (C2), thus, does seem to make better
sense of what Aristotle is saying in (A)-(D).
30Again, see 1031b22-28, where Aristotle reaffirms that things said to
be what they are with respect to an accident are not the same as their
essences, without in the meantime having provided any additional support
for this conclusion.
Two objections might be raised for this way of understanding 1031b22-
28.
First, someone might point out that the arguments Aristotle offers im-
mediately prior to and after 1031b22-28 (his arguments at 1031a28-b14
and at 1031b28-1032a4) do provide support for what Aristotle says in
1031b22-28, and take this as grounds for saying that Aristotle did go on
to provide additional support for his claim that things said to be what they
are with respect to an accident are not the same as their essences. However,
what the arguments at 1031a28-b14 and 1031b28-1032b4 support is Aris-
totle's claim in 1031b22-28 that things said to be what they are with respect
to themselves are the same as their essences. Supporting this is not enough
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NORMAN 0. DAHL
The remainder of this paper will be concerned with providing

an answer to these questions. The answer runs roughly as follows.
One can understand how Aristotle could have offered only argu-
ments he points out are fallacious in support of his conclusion that
things said to be what they are with respect to an accident are not
the same as their essences, because the truth of this conclusion
follows from a diagnosis of the fallacies committed by these argu-
ments. Understanding what is wrong with them allows one to un-
to support the claim that things said to be what they are with respect to
an accident are not the same as their essences.
Second, someone who accepts the text and translation of 1031b22-28
adopted by Furth might think that in this passage Aristotle not only reaf-
firms his conclusion that things said to be what they are by accident are
not the same as their essences, but also endorses the argument in (A) for
this conclusion. If he endorses this argument, then it looks as if he doesn't
take it to be fallacious.
Furth translates 1031b22-28 as follows,
But what is said per accidens, like musical or pale, owing to its having a double
signification it is not true to say that it and the essence are the same; indeed,
both that on which pale supervenes [accidit] and the supervener [accident]
[are called pale], so that in one way it [pale] and the essence are the same
and in another not the same; for the essence of man and the essence of pale
men [sic] are not the same, but it [pale] is the same as the essence of the
affliction [pale]. (1985, 12-13)
Someone might take the reference to the essence of man and the essence
of pale man near the end of this passage to both refer to and endorse the
argument in (A).
However, not only would such a person be faced with the task of ex-
plaining what Aristotle says in (B), but, as Cohen points out (1988), in
every manuscript but one the text at 1031b27-28 reads 't6i men gar anthr6p6i
kai t6i leuk6i anthr6p6i ou tauto, t6i pathei de tauto'. One manuscript has 'to'
(nominative) in place of the second t6i (dative), and Alexander reads 'to'
for the first 'tWi'. Furth appears to follow Alexander, taking 'to anthrbp6i'
and 'to leuk6i anthr6p6i' to be short-hand versions of Aristotle's standard way
of referring to essences (for example, 'to anthrdp6i einai'). But as Cohen
says,
If we follow the manuscript tradition, we must take the implied subject to be

the to ti e-n einai of the previous clause and the dative to be governed by tauto;
the kai, I would suggest is epexegetic. The line then reads, "For it [sc. the
essence of pale] is not the same as the man, i.e., the pale man, but it is the
same as the attribute [pallor]." (1988, 313)
So understood, there is no reference to, and thus no endorsement of the

argument in (A).
Aristotle does go on to accept the conclusion of the arguments he con-
siders in (A)-(D), and he does so without going on to provide any addi-
tional support for it.
254
derstand why the conclusion of these arguments is true. Pointing

out that these arguments are invalid, thus, ends up serving the
same purpose that offering valid arguments in support of this con-
clusion would have.
3.1 The First Version of this Solution
Suppose that (Cl) is the right way to understand 1031a25-28.

Then the arguments that Aristotle offers in (A)-(D) and then
points out are fallacious are Arguments IA and IIA. Since both
commit the same fallacy, the fallacy of accident, it will be enough to
see why a diagnosis of this fallacy in one of them allows one to see
why its conclusion is true. It should then be clear that the same thing
can be said of the other argument. I shall focus on Argument IA.
In order to see why the truth of the conclusion of this argument
follows from a diagnosis of the fallacy committed by it, we need a
better understanding of this fallacy-the fallacy of accident. There
are at least two ways of diagnosing this fallacy in this kind of case.3'
(Here we return to a topic I mentioned at the beginning of this
paper.)
The first involves an anticipation of referential opacity.32 It is
clear that some instances of the fallacy of accident do involve re-
ferentially opaque contexts-for example, the argument at De So-
phisticis Elenchis 179bl-4, in which a man wearing a mask is ap-
proaching, the man happens to be Coriscus whom one knows, and
it is inferred that one both knows and does not know the man who
is approaching. As we would be apt to put the point, this fallacy
consists in substituting one co-referential term for another in a
referentially opaque context. No fallacy would be committed, how-
ever, if besides being co-referential, the terms in question were the
same in meaning or definition. As Aristotle puts the point, such
an inference would go through if the things in question were the
311 say 'in this kind of case', because it is doubtful that there is a sin
diagnosis that can be applied to every instance of the fallacy of accident.
(Compare the example of the man approaching noted above with the two
examples that Aristotle offers when he introduces the fallacy of accident
at De Sophisticis Elenchis 166b30-36. It is doubtful that one diagnosis will fit
all three cases.)
32For examples of those who accept this diagnosis for at least some
instances of the fallacy of accident, see Pelletier, Peterson 1969 and 1985,
and Spellman.
255
NORMAN 0. DAHL
same in number and substance (De Sophisticis Elenchis 179a37-39).

The claim that two things are the same in number and substance
can be taken to be the nonlinguistic counterpart of the claim that
two co-referential terms have the same meaning or definition.
This diagnosis can be applied to Argument IA because 'is the
same in (number and) substance' can be taken to introduce a
referentially opaque context. This is so because whether a thing is
the same in substance as its essence depends on the description
that is used to specify its essence. For example, a man who happens
to be pale could be the same in substance as his essence if his
essence were taken to be the essence of a man, but not if his es-
sence were taken to be the essence of a pale man, something that
includes the essence of pale. According to this first diagnosis, Ar-
gument IA is invalid because its inference from (1) and (2) to (3)
results from substituting one nonsynonymous co-referential term,
'a man', for another, 'a pale man', in the referentially opaque con-
text 'is the same in (number and) substance as its essence'. As
33The following may help one see why this is so.

According to this diagnosis, a pale man is a man who happens to be
pale. As has already been noted, the essence that (1) assumes a pale man
to be the same as (the essence that in this context counts as his essence)
includes what it is to be pale. Otherwise step (5) wouldn't be false. But
then the essence of a pale man that counts as his essence must be under-
stood in terms of what is said of him accidentally. That is,
(i) The essence of a pale man (a man who is accidentally a pale man)
that counts as his essence is the essence of a pale man,
where the italicized occurrences of 'a pale man' occur in referentially

opaque contexts because they occur in connection with the expressions
'accidentally' and 'is the essence of and because the same expression must
occur in connection with each of these two expressions.
Step (1) not only maintains what is said in (i), it also says that a pale
man is the same in (number and) substance as his essence. Thus, it inherits
the referentially opaque contexts of (i). This can be noted by rephrasing
it as
(1') It is as a pale man that a pale man is the same in (number and)
substance as his essence, the essence of a pale man,
where again italicized occurrences of 'a pale man' occur in referentially

opaque contexts.
The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) can then be rephrased as,
(2') A man is the same in number as a pale man, and is accidentally

the same in number as a pale man.
(3') Therefore, it is as a man that a man is the same in (number and)
substance as the essence of a pale man. [From (1') and (2')]
256
Aristotle would put the point, although a man and a pale man are
the same in number, they are only accidentally the same in num-
ber. They do not meet the further condition of being the same in
substance. I shall call this diagnosis of this kind of instance of the
fallacy of accident the semantic diagnosis.
The second way of diagnosing the fallacy of accident allows one
to treat contexts in which it occurs to be purely referential.34 Ac-
cording to it, when Aristotle talks about a man approaching, he is
talking about an entity distinct from the man who happens to be
approaching. It is a distinct entity because it is composed of the
man in question and one of his accidents, approaching. Such an
accidental compound will cease to be once the man in question
ceases to approach, but the man in question won't have ceased to
be when he ceases to approach. What goes wrong in the fallacy of
accident in the kind of instance with which we are concerned is
that two items that are accidentally the same in number are treated
as though they were identical. If one knows who Coriscus is, and
Coriscus is accidentally the same as the man who approaches, it
doesn't follow that one knows who the man approaches is, because
Coriscus and the man who approaches are not identical. The man
who approaches is an accidental compound, but Coriscus is not.
Such an inference would go through if Coriscus and the man who
approaches wereidentical. But according to this diagnosis, Aristotle
(3') is formulated as it is because, given (1') as a formulation of (1), (4)

must be formulated as
(4') It is as a man that a man is the same in (number and) substance

as the essence of a man.
It is only if (3) is formulated as (3') that there will be a chance that
(5') The essence of a man is the same in (number and) substance as

the essence of a pale man,
will follow from (3') and (4').

Whatever one says about this latter inference, if the first half of (2')
ensures that 'a man' and 'a pale man' are co-referential, it is clear that the
inference from (1') and (2') to (3') results from substituting one co-ref-
erential term for another in a referentially opaque context. (It results from
replacing an italicized occurrence of 'a pale man' with an italicized occur-
rence of 'a man'.)
34For advocates of this way of diagnosing the fallacy of accident in the

kind of case with which we are concerned, see Lewis 1982 and 1991, and
Matthews.
257
NORMAN 0. DAHL
requires more for identity than that two items be the same in num-
ber. They must also be the same in substance.35
One can apply this diagnosis to Argument IA if one takes the
pale man in it to be an accidental compound consisting of a par-
ticular man and his pallor. So understood, one can treat 'is the
same in (number and) substance as its essence' as purely refer-
ential and still maintain that if such an accidental compound were
the same in (number and) substance as the essence of a pale man,
it wouldn't follow that the man who underlies this compound
would be the same in (number and) substance as the essence of a
pale man. Such a conclusion would follow if the man and the pale
man were identical. But they are not. They are only accidentally
the same. I shall call this diagnosis of this kind of instance of the
fallacy of accident the ontological diagnosis.
We are now in a position to see why it follows from a diagnosis
of the fallacy in Argument IA that a pale man is not the same as
his essence. This follows from the semantic diagnosis of the fallacy
of accident. According to this diagnosis, a pale man is a man who
happens to be pale. As we have already seen, the essence of a pale
man that counts as his essence in this context includes what it is
to be pale. But then a pale man is not the same in substance as
his essence. As I pointed out earlier, a particular thing is the same
in substance as an essence just in case it and the essence in ques-
tion have the same essence-that is, if and only if the essence in
question specifies what it is for that particular thing to be. But if a
pale man is a man who happens to be pale, and if his essence
includes the essence of pale, then a pale man will not be the same
as his essence. Being pale will not be part of what it is for a man
who happens to be pale to be. Thus, it follows from the semantic
diagnosis of the fallacy in Argument IA that a pale man is not the
same as his essence.36 Note also that it follows that the essence of
35Again, see Matthews, 230-35, esp. 234-35.

36As Sandra Peterson pointed out to me, it might be thought that the
argument I have just given also commits the fallacy of accident, and thus
is unacceptable on its own grounds. In effect, the argument I just offered
points out that a man who happens to be pale is not the same as the
essence of a pale man, notes that a pale man is a man who happens to be
pale, and then concludes that a pale man is not the same as the essence
of a pale man. If 'is the same as its essence' introduces a referentially
opaque context, then why doesn't the inference in this argument result
from substituting one co-referential term for another in a referentially
opaque context?
258
a particular pale man does not include the essence of the kind
pale man. If a particular pale man is a man who happens to be a
pale man, then a particular pale man can exist without falling un-
der the kind pale man.
No such conclusions, however, follow from the ontological di-
agnosis of the fallacy in Argument IA. According to this diagnosis,
since a pale man is an accidental compound consisting of a man
and one of his accidents, what it is to be such a compound will
include the way in which such a compound is pale. As a result, one
can't argue that such a compound isn't the same in substance as
its essence because its essence doesn't include what it is to be pale.
The essence of such a compound does include what it is to be pale
in this way. Indeed, it looks as if such a compound is the same in
substance as its essence.
But why should one accept the semantic rather than the onto-
logical diagnosis of the fallacy of accident in Argument IA? There
are two main reasons for accepting it.
First, as we have just seen, only the semantic diagnosis allows one
to explain how Aristotle could have offered only arguments that
he takes to be fallacious in support of his conclusion that things
said to be what they are with respect to an accident are not the
same as their essences.37
That it doesn't can be seen from the following paraphrase of this argu-
ment, where again it is italicized expressions that occur in referentially
opaque contexts.
(1) A man is not the same in substance as the essence of a pale man.
(2) A man is the same in number as a pale man, and is accidentally the
same in number as a pale man.
(3) Therefore, a pale man is not the same in substance as the essence
of a pale man. [From (1) and (2)]
(4) Therefore, a pale man is not the same in (number and) substance
as his essence. [From (3) and (i) in note 33 above.]
Taking the first half of (2) to ensure that 'a man' and 'a pale man' are co-
referential, (3) results from substituting 'a pale man' for an unitalicized
occurrence of 'a man' in (1), and thus for an occurrence of 'a man' in a
referentially transparent, not a referentially opaque, context. Furthermore,
even though (4) can be taken to result in part from substituting 'his es-
sence' for 'the essence of a pale man' in a referentially opaque context,
this inference is valid because in this context these two expressions mean
the same thing.
37Strictly speaking, we have only seen this if (CI) is taken as the way t
understand 1031a25-28. However, as we will see below, it is also true if one
accepts (C2) as the way to understand these lines. Given (C2), Argument
259
NORMAN 0. DAHL
Second, Aristotle's reaffirmation at 1031b22-28 of the conclu-

sion of these arguments confirms this way of diagnosing the fallacy
in Argument IA. When Aristotle talks about things said to be what
they are by accident in 1031b22-28, he talks about things that hap-
pen to have an accident, not compounds of those things and their
accidents. Taking the quality pale as an example of an accident,
he says that 'pale' can refer either to a thing that happens to be
pale, or to the accident itself, the quality pale (kai gar hoi sumbebeke
leukon kai to sumbebekos) (1031b24-25). It is the first of these that
is a thing said to be what it is with respect to an accident, because
it is the first of these that Aristotle says is not the same as its es-
sence.
For it [the essence of pale] is not the same as the man, that is, the
pale man, but it is the same as the quality [pale] (t&i men gar anthrbp6i
kai toi leuk6i anthrbpoi ou tauto, t6i pathei de tauto) (1031b27-28, slight
variation of S. Marc Cohen's translation)
If Aristotle speaks about a thing that has an accident rather than

an accidental compound when he reaffirms the conclusion of his
arguments in (A)-(D),38 one would expect him to have been speak-
ing the same way when he first offered those arguments But then
it is the semantic diagnosis of the fallacy of accident that applies
to Argument IA.
Thus, if (Cl) is the right way to understand 1031a25-28, we do
IA is still the first of the two arguments Aristotle offers in (A)-(D) and
then points out are fallacious. Accepting the semantic diagnosis of the
fallacy in it, thus, provides the first part of an explanation of why under-
standing the invalidity of the arguments offered in (A)-(D) allows one to
understand why their conclusion is true. According to (C2), the second of
these two arguments is Argument IC. As we shall see, the explanation of
why the truth of its conclusion follows from understanding its invalidity
depends on accepting the semantic diagnosis of the fallacy of accident in
Argument IA. No comparable explanation, however, is forthcoming if one
accepts the ontological diagnosis of the fallacy in Argument IA. Thus, no
matter which way one takes 1031a25-28, it is only if one accepts the se-
mantic diagnosis of the fallacy of accident as it occurs in the arguments of
(A)-(D) that understanding their invalidity will also allow one to under-
stand why their conclusion is true.
38Even Frank Lewis, an advocate of the ontological diagnosis of the
fallacy of accident, recognizes that this seems to be the way to understand
1031a22-28. He says of this passage that it shows either that Aristotle
doesn't always take an expression like 'a pale (one)' to refer to an acci-
dental compound or that Aristotle is speaking loosely in this part of Z 6
(1982, 30 n. 11, and 1991, 101 n. 27).
260
TWO KIN7DS OF ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE
have an answer to the main question that surrounds (A)-(D). One

can understand how Aristotle could have offered only arguments
he takes to be fallacious in support of the conclusion that things
said to be what they are with respect to an accident are not the
same as their essences, because the truth of this conclusion follows
from a diagnosis of the fallacy committed by these arguments. Even
though this turns out to be a rather indirect form of support, it is
still a way of supporting the claim that things said to be what they
are by accident are not the same as their essences.39
Just as important, it also follows from this diagnosis that (A)-
(D) is one place where Aristotle maintains that when A is said of
an A accidentally, the essence of a particular A does not include
the essence of the kind A. If (Cl) is the right way to understand
1031a25-28, then (A)-(D) is one place where Aristotle would en-
dorse all of the theses I have said he would accept.
3.2 The Second Version of this Solution
But what if (C2) is the right way to understand 1031a25-28? Ac-

cording to (C2), the first argument Aristotle considers in (A)-(D)
is still Argument IA, and thus an argument that commits the fallacy
of accident. As a result, the considerations offered above provide
the first part of an explanation of why a diagnosis of the fallacies
in the arguments that (C2) takes Aristotle to point out to be fal-
lacious also explains why the conclusion of these arguments is true.
Understanding why the second of these two arguments-Argument
IC-is fallacious, will complete the explanation.
Recall that what follows from steps (1) and (2) in Argument IC
is that the man who happens to be pale is accidentally the same as
the essence of a pale man.40 The most that follows from this is that
39This raises the question of why Aristotle would resort to such an in-
direct form of support. While I think this question can be answered, the
answer involves a question I have set aside in this paper-whether the
sameness relation between things and their essences that is Aristotle's main
concern in Z 6 is identity or the weaker relation of simply being the same
in substance. (It turns out that if this relation were identity, Aristotle would
have at hand an obvious, more direct form of support for his conclusion,
but he would not if it were the weaker relation of being the same in sub-
stance.)
40This follows if a pale man in Argument IC is a man who happens to
be pale. However, given the semantic diagnosis of the fallacy of accident
in Argument IA, this is how a pale man should be understood in Argument
IC.
261
NORMAN 0. DAHL
for any man who happens to be pale, it is an accident of his that

he is, or is a man, if and only if he is a pale man. Argument IC,
however, concludes more than this. According to (5), the essence
of a pale man is accidentally the same as the essence of a man.
This implies that for any man, it is an accident of his that he is, or
is a man, if and only if he is a pale man. The inference from (3)
and (4) to (5) fails because even though it might happen that every
man who happens to be pale can't be without being a pale man,
it could still be true that there is a man who isn't pale, and thus
is, and is a man, without being a pale man.
The first thing to note is that once one recognizes the invalidity
of this inference, one sees that something can be true of the es-
sence of a particular man (that it is accidentally the same as the
essence of a pale man) that is not true of the essence of the kind
man. That is, what is true of the essence of a particular A need
not be true of the essence of the kind A. There is, thus, a genuine
distinction between these two kinds of essence. Indeed, on one way
of describing it, what lies behind the fallacy committed in Argu-
ment IC is a failure to distinguish these two kinds of essence.
Once one recognizes this, one can go on to ask whether and
when the essence of a particular A will be the essence of the kind
A. One answer to this question is that if a particular A is said to
be an A accidentally, then the essence of a particular A won't be
the essence of the kind A, because it won't include the essence of
the kind A. As we have seen from the diagnosis of the fallacy of
accident in Argument IA, (A)-(D) is one place where Aristotle
takes an A that is said to be an A accidentally to be a thing that
happens to be an A. But a particular thing that happens to be an
A can be without being an A. Thus, when a particular A is said to
be an A accidentally, the essence of a particular A will not include
the essence of the kind A.
It also follows from these considerations that when a particular
A is said to be an A accidentally, a particular A will not be the same
as its essence. As we have already seen, the essence of a particular
A that in this context counts as its essence includes the essence of
the kind A. Furthermore, according to Argument IC, the relation
between a thing and its essence that is Aristotle's main concern in
Z 6 is simply the relation of being the same in substance. As a
result, a particular A will be the same as its essence just in case it
262
and its essence have the same essence.41 But if the essence of a
particular A that is said to be an A accidentally does not include
the essence of the kind A, then it and its essence won't have the
same essence. Things said to be what they are by accident, thus,
won't be the same as their essences.
Finally, once one understands the difference between the es-
sence of a particular A and the essence of the kind A when an A
is said to be an A accidentally, one can save the phainomenon that
Aristotle notes immediately prior to (A)-(D)-that each thing has
been thought to be the same as its essence (1031al7-18). Each
thing has been thought to be the same as its essence because peo-
ple have failed to distinguish the essence of a particular A and the
essence of the kind A. Each thing would be the same as its essence
if these two essences were always the same. But as the above ex-
planation of the fallacies committed in Arguments IA and IC
shows, not only is there a distinction between these two essences,
when an A is said to be an A accidentally, an A is not the same as
its essence. That is, one can now understand why each thing has
been thought to be the same as its essence, when in fact things
said to be what they are by accident are not the same as their
essences.
If (C2) is the way to understand 1031a25-28, then not only does
an explanation of the fallacies in the arguments offered in (A)-
(D) explain why their conclusion is true, it also "saves" a phaino-
menon surrounding that conclusion.
4. Conclusions
Thus, whether one accepts (Cl) or (C2) as the way to take

1031a25-28, understanding the invalidity of the arguments Aris-
totle offers in (A)-(D) and then points out are fallacious also al-
lows one to understand why the conclusion of these arguments is
true. Not only does this explain how Aristotle could have offered
only arguments he recognizes are fallacious in support of his con-
clusion without going on to provide any other support for this
conclusion, it also explains why (A)-(D) is one place where Aris-
totle takes things said to be what they are by accident to be things
that happen to have an accident and not accidental compounds,
41 Recall that I take an essence to be its own essence.
263
NORMAN 0. DAHL
it explains why Aristotle would maintain here that when a partic-

ular A is said to be an A accidentally the essence of a particular A
does not include the essence of its kind A, and it explains why (A) -
(D) is one place where Aristotle anticipates something like refer-
ential opacity. The puzzles surrounding Aristotle's claim at the be-
ginning of Z 6 that things said to be what they are by accident are
not the same as their essences end up providing a surprisingly rich
basis for understanding some important parts of Aristotles
thought. 42
University of Minnesota
References
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University Press, Clarendon Press.
Code, Alan. 1983. "On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About
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Cohen; S. Marc. 1988. Review of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Books 7-10, Zeta, Eta,
Theta, Iota, trans. Montgomery Furth. Journal of the History of Philosophy
26:312-13.
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Frede, Michael, and Gunther Patzig. 1988. Aristoteles, Metaphysics Z'. Mu-
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265

Two Kinds of Essence in Aristotle A Pale Man Is Not The Same As His Essence

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Philosophical Review

Two Kinds of Essence in Aristotle: A Pale Man Is

Virtually everyone will agree that according to Aristotle, for a par-

This paper develops one part of a paper originally presented to an NEH

characterized by those predicates that make something a man.

man together with one of his accidents, pallor.4 So understood, a

4See, for example, Lewis 1982 and 1991, and Matthews.

explain what is wrong with this inference. Since a musical man is

in their own right. Indeed, it is solutions to the puzzles that sur-

Metaphysics Z is meant to shed light on the nature of substance

(D) But it seems not. (1031a28)

A number of questions arise concerning this passage. Is the ar-

2. The Validity of Aristotle's Arguments

2.1 Aristotle's First Argument

To begin answering this question, let's start with the argument in

[Granted by anyone who thinks that each thing is the same

Since (5) appears to be false, we can reject what was assumed at

1In place of (4) one could substitute

(S) can in turn be taken to be a conceptual truth, true in virtue of the

There are three issues surrounding this argument that can be

should be taken to be part of a second argument alluded to as an attempt

15For example, things can be the same in number, species, or genus

and substance as his essence.'7 As there is some question as to

(1) A pale man is the same in (number and) substance as his

man are the same in (number and) substance. [From (3)

Or is it not necessary that things that are accidentally the same be

A number of considerations support this way of taking (B).

2.2.-Aristotle 's Second Argument

Text (C) at 1031a25-28, however, suggests an alternative to this

taking the extreme terms referred to here to be those in the inference to

2.2.1 Version One

According to (Cl), 1031a25-28 says,

Suppose that this is the right way to take 1031a25-28. Aristotle

(1) A pale man is the same in (number and) substance as his

21What follows is essentially the way Ross understands the argument

the essence of a musical man. [Granted by anyone who

Argument IA was fallacious because the inference from (1) and

Thus, if (Cl) is the way to take 1031a25-28, the only arguments

2.2.2 Version Two

Prospects may seem brighter if we take (C2) as the way to under-

(1) A pale thing is the same in (number and) substance as its

in (A) that it suggests. This is a version whose extreme terms are

(1) A pale man is the same in number and substance as his

what is the same in number and substance as a pale man, the

native version of the argument in (A) seems not to be valid after

(1) A pale man is the same in substance as his essence, the

As I indicated earlier, there is a question whether the sameness

What is more, Argument IC does not commit the fallacy of acci-

out that Aristotle has only considered arguments that he takes to

3. The Main Problem Surrounding This Passage, and Its Solution

Thus, whether one takes (Cl) or (C2) as the way to understand

29While the considerations I shall go on to offer do not depend on it,

The remainder of this paper will be concerned with providing

If we follow the manuscript tradition, we must take the implied subject to be

So understood, there is no reference to, and thus no endorsement of the

derstand why the conclusion of these arguments is true. Pointing

3.1 The First Version of this Solution

Suppose that (Cl) is the right way to understand 1031a25-28.

same in number and substance (De Sophisticis Elenchis 179a37-39).

33The following may help one see why this is so.

where the italicized occurrences of 'a pale man' occur in referentially

where again italicized occurrences of 'a pale man' occur in referentially