COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS HAMPDEN, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET NO. 2279CV00393 wapoaiconmTy SPER CORT DARRYL MOSS, FLED Plaintiff MAY 10 2023 vs. ee Cr Defendants MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS COUNT 5 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT The plaintiff, Darryl Moss, brings this lawsuit by way of an amended complaint, asserting various causes of action, seeking monetary damages arising out of his claim that he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with the City of Springfield for exercising his rights to free speech. In response, the City of Springfield moves to dismiss Count 5 of the Amended Complaint under Rule 12. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Count 5 (Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims only) is Allowed. 1. City of Springfield The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act permits lawsuits against "persons" who intentionally interfere with another’s rights secured by the constitutions or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth. But a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of the MCRA. Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 591 (2001). For this reason, the Motion to Dismiss Count 5, brought on behalf of the City of Springfield, shall be allowed. 10-7 '92. Mayor Domenic Sarno Darryl Moss alleges that Domenic Sarno violated the MCRA. The MCRA provides that any person who interferes, or attempts to interfere, with another's exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth may be liable, so long as such interference or attempted interference was made by threats, intimidation, or coercion. Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., 406 Mass. 156, 158 (1989) In Layne the court recognized that an essential element of an MCRA violation is threatening, intimidating or coercive conduct. Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 821 (1985). Thus, to bring a claim under the MCRA, the plaintiff must show that (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the federal or state constitutions or laws (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’ Stone v. Caswell, 963 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D. Mass. 2013) quoting Hautfler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 504 (2006). The insertion by the Legislature of the requirement of threats, intimidation or coercion was specifically intended to limit liability under the Act. Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. Boylston, 419 Mass. 548, 565-566 (1995). Under the MCRA, threats are the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful; intimidation is the putting of another in fear to compel or deter conduct; and finally, coercion is the act of constraining one to do something he would not otherwise have done. The question of whether alleged actions constitute threats, intimidation or coercion for purposes of the MCRA must be evaluated by determining whether a reasonable person in Mr. Moss's situation would have felt threatened, intimidated or coerced. Meuser v. Fed. Express Corp., 564 F.3d 507, 520 (1st Cir. 2009).Here, Defendants argue that the complaint is devoid of any factual support for the allegation that Mayor Sarno violated Moss's rights "by means of threats, intimidation or coercion." And while the court would note that Moss blankly alleges that Sarno, by threats, intimidation or coercion, (see paragraph #33 of the amended complaint) violated his rights, the plaintiff fails to identify any threat or any act of intimidation or coercive conduct on the part of Sarno. Moreover, on this point, the court would note that the plaintiff's own opposition clearly states that the alleged wrongful investigation of his social media accounts was undertaken by Springfield Police Superintendent Cheryl Clapprood. And further, during oral arguments, plaintiff counsel acknowledged that when the plaintiff brought this conduct to the attention of Sarno, the mayor failed to take any action. Given the clear lack of any factual allegations in the amended complaint of threats, intimidation or coercion by Sarno, the Motion to Dismiss Count 5, brought on behalf of Domenic Sarno, shall also be allowed. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 5 is ALLOWED without prejudice. lustice of the Superior Court Dated: May g » 2023