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General English

GENERAL ENGLISH

FY BBA LLB(HONS) / SEMESTER I

Cultural Diplomacy: An analysis on American Indian diplomatic foreign


relations- Devyani Khobragade incident

SUBMITTED TO:

Dr. Rakesh Nambiar


Assistant Professor, NMIMS Kirit P. Mehta School of Law

SUBMITTED BY:

Avika Mukherjee
Roll No: D040
SAP Id: 81022019133

Kirit P. Mehta School of Law 1


General English

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SR.NO. PARTICULARS PAGE NO.

1. Introduction 3

2. History of Indo-US Relations 4

3. 6
Current perspective of the Indo-US Relations

4. Role of Culture in public diplomacy 7

Public opinion on India’s foreign policy and the


5. 9
factors affecting public’s views

The importance of political leadership relations


6. 10
with reference to Indo-US relations

7. US Foreign policy towards India after 9/11 11

Legal analysis of Devyani Khobragade incident


8. 12
with reference to International law

9. Conclusion 16

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1. Introduction
The connection among India and the United States has experienced numerous stages since
India acquired freedom in 1947. It has been inconsistent and restricted, notwithstanding the
chance for commitment between the two nations, and the common inclination for two liberal,
pluralistic popular governments to partner, Indo-US relations. For a long time, Washington's
international strategy dealings with New Delhi were assembled with Islamabad, and named
Indo-Pak, causing India a deep sense of disappointment. For pretty much the twentieth
century, US commitment with India was centred around India-Pakistan questions. The turn of
the 21st century has seen an emotional change in Indo-US ties via expanded security and
exchange commitment. Nonetheless, as Ashley Tellis calls attention to, a "pernicious
transnationalism" and not an essential vision directs the present connections.
In this paper, I battle that there were two periods throughout the entire existence of Indo-US
relations that came nearest to an organization dependent on essential vision and shared
understanding. The primary period was the one that followed India's 1998 atomic tests,
driving up to President Clinton's India visit in 2000, and the second, during the Indo-US 123
Common Nuclear Agreement. I contend that solid individual connections between political
initiatives, based on common regard and comprehension, are particularly significant for the
achievement of an Indo-US association given the way in which Indian unfamiliar strategy
dynamic happens. Without these, the Indo-US ties will be relations are amazingly
defenceless. To begin with, I give a short history of Indo-US relations to contextualize the
'transnationalism' that Tellis uses to portray them. Second, I give an overview of existing
viewpoints on the Indo-US association to contextualize this present paper's contention, just as
show that the contention has not been tended to yet. Third, I clarify the significance of
individual political administration associations in the Indian international strategy setting.
Fourth, I utilize two associations among Indian and American political initiative as proof for
my contention. Ultimately, I utilize the capture of Devyani Khobragade in New York City as
an illustration to show the weakness of the Indo-US relationship which comes up short on the
establishment of shared regard and comprehend
1.1 Research objectives
a) To analyse the role of culture in public diplomacy.
b) To elaborate on cultural recommendations for diplomatic negotiations.
c) To understand the US Foreign policy towards India after 9/11
d) To present a legal analysis of Devyani Khobragade incident with reference to
International law.
1.2 Research questions
a) What is the historical perspective to the current Indo-US Relations?
b) What is the public opinion on India’s foreign policy and the factors affecting public’s
views?
c) What is the importance of political leadership relations with reference to Indo-US
relations?
1.3 Methodology

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By keeping in mind, the nature of the topic and subsequent research questions, the researcher
used the method of a secondary research. While researching on the topic, various research
papers and internet sources have been consulted. The given topic has several aspects and to
cover the same, various articles and websites have been analysed.

1.4 Limitations
This research is not explanatory in nature as it is based on secondary resources like books,
journals, research articles etc. available online. The sources used are very limited in nature as
this paper is written during a global pandemic. It is not based on a practical research because
of time and money constrains. The sample used in the paper only recognises large
universities, because a larger size is associated with a greater learning process and a more
elaborate organisational structure.

1.5 Keywords

Diplomatic, Indo-US relations, immunity, foreign policy, political leadership.

2. History of Indo-US Relations


While several assert that Asian country and therefore the us square measure naturally suited
to be allies given their common values of democracy and liberalism, the connection remained
strained for abundant of the twentieth century. A legislative assembly analysis Service study
on US-India Security Relations highlights 3 necessary reasons for this: Cold War politics, the
United States’ favourable policies towards West Pakistan, and disagreements over nuclear
protocols.1 within the years following independence, Asian country developed a powerfully
anti-imperialist stance because of its colonial inheritance. This perspective semiconductor
diode Asian country to found the Non-Aligned Movement with some of alternative nations.
This philosophy of non-alignment and non-dependency tired of the us. The United States
conjointly felt that Asian country perceived to favour the USSR. India’s initial Prime
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had sturdy socialist and import substitution policies, that were
nearer to the Soviets’ conception of communism than yank laissez-faire economy.2 In an
especially politically charged conflict atmosphere, failure to align with the us unbroken
Indian and yank ties strained.
The Second warfare marks the start of Indo-U.S. official relations. when the japanese attack
on haven in Gregorian calendar month 1941, Americans accomplished the requirement for
India's co-operation in the war effort. The strategic importance of Bharat as a base of
operations against Japan was one of the chief factors that forced the Roosevelt

1
United States Congress. US-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, by K. Alan. Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto.
(Washington, D.C.: US, Congressional Research Service, 2013)
2
David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011)

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Administration to require interest within the Indian political drawback. within the summer of
1941, the U.S. Government united with Bharat and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland for the exchange of diplomatic personnel. In Gregorian calendar month
1941, Thomas H. Wilson was appointed the first U.S. Commissioner in Indian capital. Sir
Girja Shanker Bajpai was appointed India's Agent General in Washington.3 He was to act
underneath the general superintendence of Brits Embassy. The u. s. thought that the political
turmoil in Bharat might endanger the yankee forces which were to be sent to Bharat. In
Gregorian calendar month 1942, the govt. of the u. s. established the Office of War info
(OWI) in Indian capital. Henry, F. Grady came because the head of a technical mission to
create a survey of India's industrial potentialities and to recommend enhancements with a
view to increasing production. In due course, the u. s. equipped large quantities of American
merchandise to Bharat underneath the lease-lend program. Bharat conjointly equipped
merchandise to America in pursuance of its reciprocal aid program. yankee technicians took
half in constructing roads, airports, factories, etc. yankee troops were conjointly stationed in
Bharat in substantial numbers.
The two countries, although quite completely different from one another in their geographical
setting, race, culture and habits, love common ideals. they need each lived underneath
subjection to a typical power for a protracted time. each have fought smartly for his or her
independence, although with completely different methods. whereas the yank individuals
wear their freedom through violence and bloodshed, India has most well-liked the trail of
non-violence. presently when independence, Bharat tried to develop terribly friendly relations
with the u. s.. The Indian leaders acknowledged with feeling the positive role vie by the yank
President. The democratic ideals of America conjointly greatly fascinated the Indian leaders,
specially national leader, and that they tried to develop intimate relations with the u. s..
However, when the second warfare, the U.S. policy of containment of Communism and
India's policy of non-alignment didn't match along and have become their major source of
distinction. The refusal of Bharat to hitch the military alliances sponsored by the United
States and completely different stands taken by it on numerous international problems like
recognition of the Communist regime of China, the Korean Crisis, the American-Vietnam
war, and therefore the Afghan Crisis, were quite annoying to the yank leaders. On the
opposite hand the yank support to Pakistan on the geographical area issue in council and
grant of military aid to Pakistan with a read to meet the Communist threats, support to
European country on state Crisis and Support to Asian country on Bangladesh issue were
quite irritating to the Indian leaders.

3
Dheeraj Kumar, Indo-US Relations: Historical Perspectives, (Volume VIII Issue III), Strategic Insights

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3. Current perspective of the Indo-US Relations


There are a set number of researchers who right now investigate and compose on the Indo-US
relationship. It is critical to analyse existing points of view to acquire a better comprehension
of the subject. Ashley Tellis contends that it is in the United States' interest to help India
monetarily and militarily without anticipating a lot of reciprocation. US help to India's
monetary ascent, which advances provincial harmony and security, is commonly useful.
Tellis composes that the Indo-US common atomic arrangement was the most essential
understanding in setting up the potential for a productive organization. The Indo-US
association depends on the US looking to adjust China, and will profit by India's monetary
climb. Both the legislatures should attempt to make foundation al and administrative
structures that grant their residents to draw in with each other for productive and social joint
effort.4 However, ongoing Indo-US commitment has been contracted to 'transnationalism' in
light of sectoral interests, and the absence of a normal key vision, overwhelm. In particular,
there is space for participation between the United States and India in the financial and
military fields, particularly if the heads of the two states put forth a true attempt to follow the
each other.5 Tellis momentarily addresses the meaning of solid political connections driving a
strategic Indo-US association, however fundamentally focuses on framework level
advantages that the two nations can exploit through a more grounded organization. Schaffer's
perspectives reverberation Tellis' perception on the 'transnationalism' of Indo-US relations.
She finds that while there has been a lot of reciprocal commitment, India and the US actually
neglect to share a typical world vision. This error regularly prompts stalemates at worldwide
and multilateral gatherings on significant worldwide issues. Schaffer accepts that there are
issues encompassing wanted results from the relationship. For India, the Indo-US
organization addresses strength at home and in the encompassing locale. For the US, the
advantages are at the worldwide level. Indo-US disagreements originate from the conflict of
international strategy philosophies. The essential centre of Indian international strategy
underscores self-rule, adaptability and a longing to keep away from reliance on more
grounded powers. The US, then again, likes to rule over its accomplices.
This distinction has made a fracture. Schaffer communicates that the US can overcome this
issue by assisting India with turning into a worldwide initiative force.6 There is a lack of
engagement in coalition responsibilities just as an interest for regard and acknowledgment, in
any event, when physically frail. The approach ramifications of this demeanour is that there
can't be a profound political what's more, institutional collusion between the United States
and India. In any case, collaboration can exist when vital interests align.7 Another analyst,
Burns, composes that the US and India both try to spread majority rules system, extend
exchange and speculation, counter psychological oppression, and equilibrium China's
developing military force. He in this way accepts that US key interest will adjust with India
more than some other mainland Asian force in the 21st century. The second Obama
organization saw disintegration in the inexorably cordial Indo-US relationship. The new

4
Ashley J. Tellis, “Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in US-Indian Relations,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
5
Tellis, “Kick-Starting the US-Indian Strategic Partnership.”
6
Teresita C. Schaffer, India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (Washington,
D.C.: CSIS, 2009
7
Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, “Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy.” India
Review 11, no. 2 (2012): 76-94.

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Modi government is allowing the two sides to cooperate to restore their economies and the
common atomic arrangement.
The bipartisan idea of the support of an improvement in Indo-US ties ought to permit India to
move to the front line of US system in Asia.8 Malone makes a comparative contention. He
contends that the explanation for a superior post-1990 Indo-US relationship is "generally an
anecdote about rediscovering basic political values." American policymakers through the
twentieth century seen India as a revisionist power and not as an expected amazing majority
rule accomplice in Asia. In a post 9/11 world, the US followed a worth based methodology.
This methodology combined with the monetary chances that India's progression introduced
has driven to an assembly of interests between the two nations. Malone likewise composes
that the US considers India to be a chance to adjust China. In any case, he takes note of that
India and China have some regular interests that are against the West, as they are both
developing nations. The connection between the two nations establishes a particular
association and is at last unstable. Gilboy and Heginbotham hold a more extreme perspective
than Malone's, regarding the Indo-China-US relationship. They challenge the contention that
India and the US have uniting interests and set that India and China have converging interests
that will challenge US interests. They utilize experimental proof, for example, voting
examples and positions in multilateral associations, to show that India and China share more
tight bonds than India and the US They contend that the US ought to revamp its relationship
with India to guarantee more prominent correspondence. They declare that the US ought to
cut down on security collaboration with India and request more politico-financial
collaboration from India.9 All the contentions recorded above are applicable to understanding
the Indo-US relationship. Anyway, they to a great extent focus on the worldwide framework.
They offer contentions on why or why not Indian and US key interests will adjust utilizing
this foundational approach. Schaffer addresses the approach dealings between the two
countries, and Narang clarifies the Indian perspective that causes such a conflict. Tellis is the
one in particular who momentarily addresses the job that individual leadership conditions can
play in changing the Indo-US relationship. This paper goes on to investigate the significance
of such connections in moulding a key Indo-US relationship.

4. Role of Culture in public diplomacy


“Culture has been defined in several different ways. A classic definition of culture provided
by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) states that: culture consists of patterns, explicit and
implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the
distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the
essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas
and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as
products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action.”
“Spencer-Oatley (2008) more recently defined culture as a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and
values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are

8
Nicholas Burns, “Passage to India,” Foreign Affairs, September, 2014
9
George J.Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham. “Double Trouble: A Realist View of Chinese and Indian Power,” The
Washington Quarterly 36, no. 3 (2013): 125-42.

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shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member’s
behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviour.”10
Culture can subsequently be perceived as the basic worth structure that shapes a person's
mentalities and conduct as well as can likewise be noticed in the aggregate articulation of a
nation's establishments and its approaches. Lobby (1976) examined culture as comprising of
both express and implied levels of conduct. The unequivocal degree of culture alludes to the
practices and relics of a culture that are detectable. The implied level alludes to the worth
frameworks, the perspectives, and the standards of a general public that are not quickly
obvious however are show in the obvious pieces of a culture. Culture thusly resembles an icy
mass: Just like there is more to the chunk of ice than its discernible tip, there is something
else entirely to culture than the public showcase of conduct. To comprehend a culture, it is in
this way critical to focus to the recognizable bit of culture as well as likewise to the enormous
part of culture that isn't promptly obvious. Corridor noticed, 'Underneath the plainly saw,
profoundly express surface culture, there lies a entire other world, which when perceived will
eventually drastically change our perspective on human instinct' (p. 15).
In open discretion as well, the perceptible piece of a culture like the conduct of negotiators or
the positions they advocate unmistakably influence public strategy. Due to their profoundly
noticeable nature, these open and social procedures become the middle place of political
arrangements; next to no attention is paid to what exactly lies underneath the obvious
showcases, the basic qualities and convictions of a general public that impact the open
conduct of representatives. Besides, public tact regularly includes haggling with parties that
have diverse yet dedicated positions. Arrangement researchers propose that the best
arrangement isn't a compromise of positions, yet one that fulfills shared interests (Pruitt and
Lewis 1975; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). Past research has shown data trade about
inclinations and needs is a significant condition that prompts integrative arrangements (Pruitt
1981; Tutzauer and Roloff 1988; Pruitt and Lewis 1975). Then again, distributive conduct
(for example the utilization of dangers and positional proclamations, retaining information)
keeps parties from agreeing (Pruitt and Lewis 1975). A comprehension of the rival's
fundamental social qualities can highlight normal interests among parties, which works with
an integrative understanding that fulfills different gatherings' inclinations. For instance,
Bolewski and Rietig (2008) exhibited how China's political techniques lately are an ideal
indication of its social spotlight on 'Confucianism, face-saving, also, Guanxi or fellowship'
(p. 85). Bolewski (2008) likewise laid out the social attributes of various countries and
featured ways for American negotiators to successfully figure these characteristics
arrangement. In any case, notwithstanding the expanding proof that anxieties the significance
of understanding public culture, strategic moderators at times disregard the underlying social
qualities and mentalities that propel the positions nations embrace in leading public
discretion. This carelessness can seriously strain carefully developed connections as
represented by a new political episode involving the USA and India.

10
Alicia Fjällhed. 2021. Managing Disinformation Through Public Diplomacy. Public Diplomacy and the
Politics of Uncertainty, pages 227-253.

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5. Public opinion on India’s foreign policy and the factors affecting public’s
views
International strategy in India was for some time overwhelmed by the presidential branch. In
its initial a very long time under Nehru's Prime Ministership, international strategy was
plainly a space of world class as opposed to mass legislative issues—in any event until the
heart-breaking conflict with China in 1962. While its viability might be discussed, the mix of
Nehru's own height and his initiative of India's pre-prominent decision party supported the
homegrown authenticity of Indian international strategy. Famous legitimation implied that
popular assessment on international strategy was directed through the resistance individuals
from Parliament and the print media, which filled in as the vehicle for assessment creators.
Regardless of the mind larger part of the Congress in Parliament, Nehru's 'own
responsiveness to parliamentary analysis (even by person individuals)' was significant to
guaranteeing Parliament's part in international strategy.11
Baru contends that the Congress Party's strength and a serious level of agreement among
standard political parties implied that the media played a 'minimal job' and 'didn't impact
official speculation in any huge way12 (Baru 2009: 278). Along these lines, as agreement
went to more noteworthy antagonism with the discontinuity of the Indian commonwealth,
this changed. Raja Mohan (2009: 6–7) has contended that K. Subrahmanyam, a critical figure
in Indian security and international strategy circles, 'shown the unprecedented opportunities
for utilizing the force of the media not just in forming the public talk on international
strategy, yet in addition as an instrument to assemble tension on the legislators and
administrators choosing unfamiliar and public safety issues'.
Subsequently, while general assessment submitted in international strategy choices,
international strategy elites thusly considered inert popular assessment any place sensitivities
of specific segments of the populace made a difference, be it strict minorities (in forming
India's Middle East approaches), local gatherings (like Tamils towards Sri Lanka), or the
larger part local area (regularly reflected in firm stance positions opposite Pakistan). Surely it
very well may be contended that the dread of antagonistic popular assessment has made it a
lot harder for India to arrange regional debates with China, given the reality that such an
understanding can just happen with some give and take on the two sides. Changes in the
India's homegrown country, notwithstanding, recommend that general assessment is probably
going to assume a larger part in forming the eventual fate of India's international strategies.
To start with, India's political scene has gotten more divided. As a result, chief force has been
debilitating (particularly comparative with administrative and legal parts of government).
Furious discretionary rivalry has implied that swing citizens matter more for electing
achievement. Also, while international strategy may not appreciate issue notability with the
normal citizen, in the event that it is important more for the swing elector, popular assessment
on international strategy issues could turn into a more intense appointive issue.13 On the off
chance that India's present financial direction proceeds, the swing elector is probably going to
be metropolitan and more taught. For this segment, international strategy issues have more

11
Bandyopadhyaya, J. (2006). The Making of India’s Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
12
Baru, S. (2012). ‘The Influence of Business and Media on Indian Foreign Policy’, India Review, 8(3): 266–85
13
Holsti, O. R. (2004). Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, rev. edn. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.

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prominent notability, and consequently popular assessment on international strategy will have
more noteworthy (p. 301) weight. Along these lines regardless of whether international
strategy keeps on being a space of elites, should their perspectives vary altogether from those
of the populace, it could bring up difficult issues about the authenticity of the approach, yet in
addition its flexibility to changing political fortunes.
Given a rise publicly opinion polls, queries arise over however one ought to interpret them,
given the consequences of framing, priming, and therefore the like. What ar the relative roles
of political and policy-influencing elites, whether within the legislative or govt branches or
the fourth estate and opinion leaders? however will the govt make selective use of knowledge
and strategic manipulation to form public opinion? For that matter however do ‘opinion
leaders’ and opposition parties attempt to educate or manipulate public opinion?
There is broad agreement on the growing role of mass media in shaping popular opinion with
shifts within the media’s role from a passive mechanism that hep the general public of the
views of opinion-makers, to a more activist role. the previous was maybe particularly the case
of a people medium in Republic of India. progressively, however, the advent of 24/7 TV
news and therefore the electronic platforms has created the media associate freelance actor in
its claim, its priming effects on popular opinion evident in an exceedingly vary of cases,
someday bar, typically prodding the government to act and circumscribing the standard
autonomy of policy elites.

6. The importance of political leadership relations with reference to Indo-


US relations
At the beginning, it is important to arrange the Indian case inside existing theoretical writing.
Customarily, worldwide relations hypothesis to a great extent overlooks the job of people for
an accentuation on global frameworks. Valerie Hudson's book, Foreign Policy Analysis,
examines the significance of pioneers just as little gathering elements in international strategy
dynamic. She contends that international strategy strategies and exchange depends intensely
on an "comprehension of the other's worldview."14 Along these lines, both the
correspondence among administration and authority perspectives and mannerisms are
significant in comprehension perspectives. Jaswant Singh refers to the contrast between the
Chou Enlai-Kissinger and the Chou-Nehru relationship to illustrate this point. The Chou-
Kissinger relationship was exceptional contrasted with the failings of the Chou-Nehru
relationship. He accepts that this was directed to the development of the China-US
relationship, and the disappointment of the China-India relationship respectively.15
Individuals are considered much more fundamental in emergency or uncertainty.16
Understanding pioneer characters and conviction frameworks is valuable in commitment
strategies. The Indian way to deal with international strategy considers individual connections
between pioneers to impressively affect international strategy results. For India's situation,

14
Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2007),
15
Jaswant Singh, In Service of Emergent India: A Call to Honor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).
16
Andrea K. Grove, Political Leadership in Foreign Policy Manipulation Support Across Borders (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

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international strategy addresses the domain of a little and durable gathering with a typical
what's more, steady conviction framework. The United States has expectedly been seen as a
prevailing accomplice in most of its international strategy dealings. Wills alludes to America
as the harasser of the free world and contends that until "America's chiefs address countries
with respect, consideration and influence, we will need international strategy administration
of any kind."17
Considering India's international strategy goals of regard and self-rule, it is no surprise that
the Indo-US ties will be tense if America receives its customary methodology of international
strategy dealings. Drezner places that telling different nations that their activities are
nonsensical, in the event that they don't have similar objectives as the US, is "foolish
diplomacy."18 Given Narang and Staniland's portrayal of the way in which Indian unfamiliar
strategy choices are made, and the United States' predominant accomplice demeanor, there is
a characteristic inclination for the association to be temperamental. Individual connections
between heads of the two nations along these lines can possibly better Indo-US ties. Such
connections can advance common regard and a solid agreement of the others' perspective.
For India's situation, where international strategy dynamic is concentrated with the essential
center, such a system is significantly more powerful. In the following segment I set forth two
cases in Indo-US relations when such a methodology prompted land-mark progress. The
principal case is the connection between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh. The subsequent
case is that between George Bush Jr. also, Manmohan Singh.

7. US Foreign policy towards India after 9/11


Without a doubt, 9/11 made a change in outlook, which basically changed the idea of the
global system.19 This single horrible occurrence constrained the US to reorient and
reformulate its arrangements to the remainder of the world. As indicated over, the Bush
Organization exploited a lot this psychological militant assault to advance its pre-conceived
neo-con plan. President Bush reacted to the assaults with the announcement of a War on
Terror and later the articulation of 'Another National Security Strategy' in 2002 that came to
be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine turned into the cardinal standard of US
international strategy from the occasion of its assertion. It re-imagined US relations with
nations all throughout the planet. It helped in resuscitating and reinforcing US relations with
significant nations, including Russia, China, what's more, India, as every one of these states
confronted illegal intimidation and insurgency.20
There can be no rejecting that the September 11 assaults shook the South Asian scene. In a
meeting with Professor Stephen P. Cohen directed for this proposition, he said no piece of the
globe was influenced by 9/11 as much as South Asia.21 The Bush Organization assertion that
'everything has changed' surely had an incredible impact on the area. Prior to 9/11, the US

17
Garry Wills, “Bully of the Free World,” Foreign Affairs, March, 1999
18
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Most Annoying Tic in the American Foreign Policy Machine,” The Washington
Post, August 5, 2014.
19
7 John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience, Harvard University Press, 2002,
Boston, p. 77.
20
Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September-October), 2002, p. 19.
21
Interview with Stephen P. Cohen in Washington DC, December 7, 2012.

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worldwide vital need was to confront the 'China danger', however because of 9/11, need
moved to the conflict against worldwide psychological warfare and South Asia turned into a
point of convergence of US international strategy. As the occasions had quickly adjusted the
worldwide security climate, President Bush said: 'The entirety of this was brought upon us in
a solitary day, and night fell on an alternate world, a reality where opportunity itself is under
attack'.22 The occasions made South Asia the first and essential performance centre of US
strategy on the Battle on Terror, making the US resuscitate and rethink its relations with
nations in the locale. The War on Terror worked with the US military presence in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in any event, adjoining focal Asian nations interestingly. US
attaches with India were likewise worked with by the conflict, particularly in military-to-
military relations.23 Despite the fact that India offered unlimited help to the US worldwide
conflict against psychological oppression quickly, it couldn't offer what Pakistan had, and
this difference prompted the restoration Cold War mindset. The United States regarded
Pakistan as a cutting-edge state confronting Afghanistan and the Taliban, as it had confronted
Russians during the Cold War. Pakistan consistently reappeared as a key provincial player,
on the grounds that the circumstance again made it an imperative partner to the US. One sign
of this recharged significance was that Pakistan was given the situation with a non-NATO
ally.24 Over time the present circumstance changed, in any case, and Pakistan progressively
lost ground as India acquired expanded significance in US eyes. I will portray beneath how
far US strategy changed in the area and what the primary components behind this were.

8. Legal analysis of Devyani Khobragade incident with reference to


International law
8.1 Overview of the case
39-year-old Devyani Khobragade was the Indian delegate diplomat general in New York. She
was captured by the US government on December 12, 2013, on charges of visa
misrepresentation. In particular, she was blamed for lying on the visa application for her
Indian servant by expressing that the maid would be paid the overarching or material the
lowest pay permitted by law whichever was higher. Be that as it may, Khobragade, by and
by, paid the servant not exactly a large portion of the existing the lowest pay permitted by
law. In her grumbling, the servant asserted that she was made to work longer than 40 hours
per week, come up short on, and denied admittance to her identification and other significant
records. Khobragade argued strategic invulnerability yet as it happened she was qualified for
just restricted resistance in her position as a consular official. The Indian government moved
her to their UN mission in New York with the end goal for her to be qualified for absolute
invulnerability. In the interim, Khobragade was delivered on an obligation of $250,000. In
her assertion to the Indian media, Khobragade charged that she had not been concurred the
civilities because of an ambassador and had been truth be told abused what's more,
embarrassed as she was captured before her youngsters' school, strip searched, and housed

22
President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001
23
Poly Nayak, ‘US Security Policy on South Asia Since 9/11 — Challenges and Implications for the Future’,
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series, February 2005, p. 2.
24
Chou, David S., ‘US Policy Toward India and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Chou, David S., US
Policy Toward South Asia in the Post-Cold War Era, Sheng-Chih Book Co. Ltd, 2003, p. 47

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with normal lawbreakers. The Indian government in turn communicated its shock against her
treatment by the American specialists.
From the assertions gave by the Indian government, it created the impression that it was less
discussing whether a wrongdoing had been carried out by the negotiator or on the other hand
not yet rather it was fighting the way in which the capture and subsequent activities unfurled
(Vij 2013). Specifically, the Indian government resented the way that the representative had
been strip-looked, supposedly hole checked, and afterward housed with normal crooks, for
example, street pharmacists in jail. The US Attorney for the southern locale of New York,
Preet Bharara, safeguarded these activities by saying that standard strategy had been followed
in the capture and arraignment of the negotiator.25 Indeed, as indicated by Bharara, the
negotiator was broadened cordialities that would not have been concurred even to American
residents, for example, being permitted to hold her telephone to settle on telephone decisions
from the glow of the squad car and being offered refreshments (NDTV 2013). In light of their
evaluation of the circumstance, the Indian government requested that US authorities
apologize for the treatment of the representative and drop all charges against her. The US
offices, on their part, immovably would not apologize or on the other hand drop charges and
were shocked by the solid reaction of the Indian government (The Economic Times 2013b).
The US State office indeed mentioned the Indian government to forgo the resistance cover
agreed to Khobragade to empower her arraignment in the USA, which India speedily
declined. In the weeks that followed, this episode immediately gathered momentum into a
perplexing clash that saw numerous kinds of aftermath. For instance, India fought back by
boycotting an American legislative assignment that was visiting India, pulling out
concessions from mates of American representatives in India, and restricting advantages
agreed to consular staff like screening of movies, stopping benefits, and so on India
additionally removed one American negotiator accepted to have assumed a part in the capture
of Khobragade. The USA responded by cancelling an eagerly awaited visit of an energy
assignment to India. The occurrence arrived at a goal of sorts when Khobragade was
prosecuted by the American court on charges of visa extortion however was permitted to
leave the country and get back to India without being captured. She anyway faces capture
should she get back to the USA whenever. To give some political setting, India and the USA
have not generally appreciated a warm relationship. It is just in ongoing many years that the
two nations have set up a broad organization that incorporates financial, vital, military, and
social ties. To some extent, the ties have been reinforced by India's extending economy
joined with the debilitating of the USA–Pakistan relationship and different factors, for
example, manufacturing an essential organization to balance China's developing impact in the
Asian landmass (Tellis 2006).26 Sustained endeavours from the two sides including discourse
and consultation have made a difference the nations to bond as partners. Despite the fact that
the episode including the Indian negotiator has been somewhat settled, the episode created
adequate antagonism and sharpness to strain the connection between the two nations. It is
subsequently beneficial analysing this basic occurrence from a social point of view to acquire

25
Ghosh, O. (2014, January 10) ‘Devyani Khobragade: Was she victimized by the IndianAmerican U.S.
attorney, Preet Bharara?’, CNNIBN, http://www.ibtimes.com/devyanikhobragade-was-she-victimized-indian-
american-us-attorney-preet-bharara-1535118,
26
Tellis, A.J. (2006) ‘The evolution of U.S.-Indian ties: Missile defense in an emerging strategic relationship’,
International Security, 30, pp.113–151. doi:10.1162/isec.2006.30.4. 113

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a superior comprehension of it and furthermore to forestall such accelerations from occurring


in other political circumstances.

8.2 Evaluating Devyani Khobragade incident under International Law


“If we want to evaluate the Devyani incident the first thing that we should analyze that
whether Devyani would have right to get the diplomatic immunities and privileges because
according to Vienna Convention on Relation, 1961, the Non-Diplomatic officers are not
obliged to get the diplomatic immunities but if he or she is a diplomat or diplomatic staff then
he or she is obliged to get the immunity. Generally the Foreign office Prepares and publishes
a book known as “Diplomatic List’’ where the name of the diplomats were enlisted .If the
name of a person working on the diplomatic mission does appear on the list then that very
person will be considered as diplomatic staff and he will avail diplomatic immunities .The
purpose or object of the diplomatic immunities and privileges are not to benefit them
personally but to help them to ensure the effective function of the Embassy.”
In the event of Devyani she was presented on the Consulate General of India in New York in
2012 where she filled in as Representative Consul General and served there until December
18, 2013. She took care of ladies' issues just as political and monetary issues.27 There are a
few contrasts between the invulnerabilities of a consular official and political official as
Consular relations are administered by the Vienna show on consular connection The
Individual sacredness of consular officials are classified in the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relation. As an outcome criminal continuing could be brought against a Consular
Officer for a grave wrongdoing and at a similar time he will be the person will undoubtedly
show up under the watchful eye of the court. A consular official can be captured or kept, as
per Article 28 of Vienna show on consular connection the lone obligation of the accepting
State is to accord full offices for the presentation of the elements of the consular post. In any
case, on account of grave wrongdoing by the consular official the strategy could finish in
capture and confinement however not without informing the top of the department as Article
42 of VCCR additionally expresses that in the occasion of the capture or confinement,
forthcoming preliminary, of an individual from the consular staff, or of criminal procedures
being founded against him, the getting State will speedily tell the top of the consular post.
Should the last be himself the object of any such method, the getting State will advise the
sending State through the strategic channel.
Here for this situation prior to capturing Devyani no notification been served to top of the
office or he has not been advised. So, capturing Devyani without telling the consular head is
an unmistakable infringement of article 42 of the Vienna Convention consular connection by
the US authority. Other than article 41 given that consular officials may not be captured or
confined with the exception of a grave wrongdoing and following a choice by the able legal
power. Assuming, nonetheless, criminal procedures are organized against a representative, he
should show up before the skilled specialists. The procedures are to be led in a way that
regards his authority position and limits the burden to the activity of consular capacities and
under Article 43 VCCR their resistance from their ward is limited in both crook and common
issue to acts done in the authority exercise of consular capacities. A great deal of model could

27
"Indian Diplomat Re-Indicted in US Visa Fraud Case". ABC News. Associated Press. March 14, 2014.

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be discovered where the resistance's been considered for the offense however the issue for
Devyani’s situation is that her offense of deception in visa isn't done in true limit. In Koeppel
and Koeppel V Federal Republic of Nigeria,28 for instance, it was held that the arrangement
by asylum by the Nigerian Consul-General to a Nigerian public was a demonstration acted in
the activity of a consular capacity inside the importance of article 43 and along these lines
pulled in consular insusceptibility. So, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963
gave useful invulnerability to consular officials regarding acts acted in the activity of
consular capacities. Such invulnerability doesn't as it were getting just from the show yet in
addition is a section standard global law. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, 1963
and Vienna Convention on Diplomate Relation, 1961 have been officially received by the
United States and are, along these lines, in accordance with the US. Constitution, “the
incomparable tradition that must be adhered to." The U.S. Government legitimately will
undoubtedly guarantee that such advantages and invulnerabilities are regarded by its states
and districts. US. law with respect to strategic resistance has its underlying foundations in
England. The 1978 Act forced a more exact system and decreased the level of insusceptibility
delighted in by numerous people at conciliatory missions. From a down to earth perspective,
disappointment of execution could prompt harsher treatment of U.S. faculty abroad, since the
guideline of correspondence has, from the oldest occasions, been vital to discretionary
furthermore, consular relations.29
8.3 Conclusion/Final Decision
In International law strategic resistance isn't expected to fill in as a permit for people to abuse
the law and deliberately keep away from risk for their activities. The reason for these
advantages and insusceptibilities isn't to profit people yet to guarantee the productive and
successful exhibition of their authority capacities in the interest of the sending state. Carrying
out visa extortion or some other grave wrongdoing isn't just surprising yet in addition a lack
of regard to the respect and law and order of the accepting state. In this way, it is the
obligation of Diplomatic and Consular official to keep that at the top of the priority list. The
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, 1963 and Vienna Convention on Diplomate
Connection, 1961 obviously communicates structure for discretionary relations and consular
connection between free nations. Along these lines, capturing Devyani for grave wrongdoing
by United states authority without informing the top of the department is totally the
infringement of Vienna show On Consular connection.
So permitting kindnesses past what other American residents, for example, with around two
hours after her capture, authorization to settle on various telephone decisions to organize kid
care and sort out close to home matters is essentially not enough.30 Then again there is no
reasonable meaning of 'grave wrongdoing' or there is no rundown in the show that will
obviously represents which wrongdoings will be viewed as grave wrongdoing which now and
then make disarray as there are contrasts in estimation of seriousness in wrongdoing between

28
704 F.Supp. 521 (1989); 99 ILR, p.121
29
Diplomatic and Consular Immunity, Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities:
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf
30
Bharara, Preet (December 19, 2013). "Statement Of Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara On U.S. v.
Devyani Khobragade" (Press release). New York City, New York, USA: The United States Attorneys Office -
Southern District of New York. Retrieved December 23, 2013.
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/December13/KhobragadeStatement.php

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various nations. Other than the time Devyani left USA, she has lost the discretionary or
consular insusceptibility that she used to have, so there is no bar on bringing visa
misrepresentation charge on her now.

9. Conclusion
Despite the fact that the interface among culture and public discretion has been broadly talked
about (for example Zurovchak 1997; Bolewski 2008; Yun 2008), episodes like the one
portrayed in this examination question the degree to which chiefs really comprehend the
connection between the two. Public strategy endeavours can advantage from stretching out
past a shallow gesture to surface-level contrasts also, rather endeavour to comprehend the
hidden worth frameworks. For the situation of the Indian representative, the USA may feel
that they were advocated in arraigning the ambassador for overstepping American laws, yet
they were confused at understanding India's solid response to the case, particularly in light of
the fact that India was not contending that the ambassador was blameless. Albeit the Indian
government may have been angry with the real capture, the underlying driver of the
contention is by all accounts the way in which the negotiator was dealt with and as an
augmentation, how the Indian government was being dealt with. Thusly, the Indian
government was similarly perplexed by the US' unbending stand on the issue, not
understanding the fundamental estimation of correspondence and clinging to the standards
and laws in the USA. Albeit the discoveries of this investigation give bits of knowledge into
the part of culture in public discretion, it is imperative to bring up that the idea of this
investigation did not take into consideration a proportion of the social elements of India and
the USA.
All things being equal, we depended on the social profiles created by Hofstede (1980, 1991).
Albeit this methodology isn't surprising, there is a constraint related with the
conceptualization of the worth measurements as unidimensional. The builds of social
measurements could rather be multi-dimensional or comprised of numerous particular yet
related components. For instance, in hierarchical correspondence, the independence scale
could gauge develops like inclination to working alone, intensity, and independence. India
could gauge more individualistic on a portion of these variables and collectivistic on others
(Ramamoorthy et al. 2007). The multi-dimensional nature of the worth measurements may
likewise clarify why the USA and India have practically identical scores on vulnerability
avoidance yet show distinctive social propensities.
Eventually, if the USA and India need to fix the fracture brought about by this occurrence
and keep other comparable issues from springing up, it will be crucial for the two nations to
comprehend the social inspirations of one another's activities. Albeit the law can still follow
through to its logical end, nations should search for socially delicate methods of managing
with the issue and keep away from the costly and now and then humiliating aftermath that
face nations being referred to. This isn't to propose that laws of a nation ought to be changed
to oblige social sensitivities of different nations. What is recommended is that nations know
about social subtleties of collaboration which can keep an episode from encouraging into an

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emergency. A significant obligation of public discretion is to supportive of effectively diffuse


likely strains between nations. Winning the contention might be of little worth on the grounds
that as struggle and arrangement procedures go, a success lose result is certainly not an ideal
from a social perspective. Being aware of another's way of life might be the speediest method
to make companions what's more, prevail upon foes. It likely could merit the exertion for
countries to look past a hint of something larger for political accomplices.

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