CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ● Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v.

City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
○ motel case; concerned with right to property
○ City of Manila’s arguments
Inherent Powers of the State ■ Lawful purpose - minimize prostitution,
thrill-sekers, illicit sex
Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation ■ Means: registration, short time, etc.
rule-making power of Restrictions on Establishing a tangible ○ Court: Valid ordinance
the state to pursue property rights (land, government where you ■ re: lawful purpose - part of common good;
common good to the water, etc.) have people means regarding public morals
extent of posing that there will be an ■ re: lawful means - it did not prohibit the owners
constraints on our In order to spread the expenditure in the practice of business but only to regulate
rights wealth and everyone ■ re: rational connection between purpose and
gets the fair Those who will benefit means - yes; the purpose is public morality and
opportunity to avail of will bear the cost doing the means would force people to expose
the benefits of the (everyone) themselves
common good ■ Since property right, police power trump as
Share in the cost of there’s a higher common good
Concerned with the attainment of
ownership, possession, common good ● White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, Jan. 20,
use, or accessing the 2009
fruits of property ○ Petitioners reasoned that legitimate sexual behaviors are
being deprived by the ordinance
○ Court allowed the representation of the patrons of the
motel by owners because the issue here is privacy and if
Police Power the patrons filed a petition, it would expose themselves
which would mean the wavering of this very right of
General concepts privacy that they are supposed to petition for
○ Court used strict scrutiny as it is involved with right to
● Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970) privacy which was equated to liberty which is a preferred
○ Re: Reflector Law right
○ Calalang v. Williams identified police power with state ○ Court did not inquire about the public morality issue as
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with morality is dictated by the society which changes from
personal liberty or property in order to promote the time to time
general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be ○ Court stated that the ordinance is invalid
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to ■ Not reasonably necessary
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the ■ “The Ordinance makes no distinction between
state." places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit
○ Police power: a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men actions. A plain reading of section 3 of the
in organizing the state and imposing upon its government Ordinance shows it makes no classification of
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not places of lodging, thus deems them all
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group susceptible to illicit patronage and subjects
of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of them without exception to the unjustified
such salutary measures calculated to unsure communal prohibition. “
peace, safety, good order, and welfare. ■ “The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to
○ concerned with property rights curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
○ used Rational Basis Test fact be diminished simply by applying existing
○ Court ruled the Reflector Law as constitutional: laws.”
■ “The statute assailed is not infected with ■ “The Ordinance needlessly restrains the
arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or operation of the businesses of the petitioners as
caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a well as restricting the rights of their patrons
legitimate response, to a felt public need. It can without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
stand the test of the most unsympathetic rashly equates wash rates and renting out a
appraisal.” room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.“
Contemporary interpretation of limitations on police power ■ “Even as the implementation of moral norms
remains an indispensable complement to
1
 governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, and other countries and all other classes of
especially in the face of the norms of due Filipino workers for other countries.
process of liberty.” ■ The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being
confined to recruitment of domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong only.
○ However, Court suspended them temporarily as they were
General Tests for Validity of an Ordinance on Substantive Due legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of
Process (in rel. to police power) proper publication and filing in ONAR.

Rational Basis Strict Scrutiny Test Heightened or

Test immediate scrutiny ● JMM Promotion v. CA, 260 SCRA 319 (1996)
○ Re: Dept. Order directing the issuance an Artist’s Record
When to be used: When to be used: Hardly used by Ph Book, a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
NOT privileged PREFERRED right invoked courts; more contract of employment by the POEA (due to performers
rights (e.g. (e.g. privacy, speech, prevalent in US subjected to abuse and prostitution)
property rights) expression, press and jurisprudence ○ A profession, trade or calling is a property right within
religion) the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.
Actual test: Nevertheless, no right is absolite, and the proper
1) Lawful Actual Test: regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
purpose, Requirements: always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
2) Lawful means 1) Compelling, rather than exercise of the police power by the State.
3) a rational/ substantial, state interest, ■ Where the liberty curtailed affects at most
reasonable link and the rights of property, the permissible
between lawful 2) absence of less scope of regulatory measures is certainly
purpose or means restrictive means for much wider.
achieving that interest (no ○ On non-impairement of contracts
Burden of proof: other alternatives; must be ■ PASEI v. Drilon: The non-impairement clause of
on the petitioner least restrictive means) the Constiution must yield to the loftier
purposes targeted by the government.
(used in Edu v. Burden of proof: on the ■ Into every contract is read provisions of existing
Ericta) State law, and always, a reservation of the police
power for so long as the agreement deals with a
(used in White Light Corp. subject impressed with the public welfare.
v. City of Manila)
Protection of health

● Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers, G.R. No. 189185,

August 16, 2016
Protection of labor
● Phil. Assn. of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298
(1992)
○ Re: DOLE and POEA issuance temporarily suspending the
recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”
○ The questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police
power as delegated to the executive branch of
Government
■ The assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino landbased workers for
overseas employment.
■ The power to “restrict and regulate conferred by
Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of
police power”
■ In fine, other than the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for
Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other
class of Filipino workers either for hongkong
2
○ In order for an ordinance to be a valid measure of police
power, it must pass a formal and a substantive test
(Legaspi v. City of Cebu). For a formal test, the ordinance
must be:
1. Enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit
2. Passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law
○ One of two branches of delegated powers comprehended
in Section 16 of LGC: Police Power Proper
■ Authorizes the local government unit to enact
ordinances necessary and proper for the health
and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for
the protection of their property.
○ According to Legaspi v. City of Cebu, in order to declare
an Ordinance as a valid piece of local legislation, it
 must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely:
■ it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
■ it must be fair, not oppressive;
■ it must not be partial or discriminatory;
■ it must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
■ it must be general and consistent with public
policy; and
■ it must not be unreasonable.
a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and,
b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
[Inference] Basically, rational-basis test
(Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers; Beltran v. Secretary of Health)

○ According to SJS v. Atienza, a local government unit is

considered to have properly exercised its police powers Vulnerable sectors
only if it satisfies the following requisites:
■ (1) the interests of the public generally, as ● Drugstores Association of the Philippines v. NCDA, G.R. No.
distinguished from those of a particular class, 194651, September 14, 2016
require the interference of the State (pertains ○ Assailed: R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20)
to the Equal Protection Clause); and percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax
■ (2) the means employed are reasonably deduction scheme was adopted.
necessary for the attainment of the object ○ This is a case of police power; it is only in eminent
sought to be accomplished and not unduly domain (taking) where just compensation is required
oppressive (pertains to the Due Process ○ Petitioner was arguing that there was taking without just
Clause). compensation
○ However, there is no taking because, in eminent domain
○ City of Manila v. Laguio Jr.: a valid classification must (Art. III, Sec. 9), there is the taking of private property,
be: but in this case, it is merely the diminution of profits,
■ based on substantial distinctions; not taking private property
■ germane to the purposes of the law; ○ Right: property right
■ not limited to existing conditions only; and ■ Bottom of hierarchy
■ equally applicable to all members of the class. ○ Test: rational-basis test
■ Purpose: well-being of PWDS
○ Moreover, the reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency ● Lawful? YES, they lack capacities
of the justification given by the Government for its ■ Means: 20% discount - LAWFUL
conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. ● Lawful?
● Re: equal protection clause
○ Petitioner: Means is
● Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November oppressive, arbitrary,
25, 2005 discriminatory because why
○ Re: closing down of all blood banks are they being burdened as
○ Police power of the state is validly exercised if compared to other
■ a) the interest of the public generally, as businesses who are not
distinguished from those of a particular class, burdened
requires the interference of the State; and, ○ A class of businesses -
■ (b) the means employed are reasonably drugstores - are being
necessary to the attainment of the objective burdened
sought to be accomplished and not unduly ■ STILL LAWFUL, does not violate equal
oppressive upon individuals. protection clause because there was a
○ The Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law substantial distinction between the businesses
for the protection of public health by ensuring an enumerated in the law; classification involves
adequate supply of safe blood in the country through basic services that are needed by PWDs
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires ● Re: due process
the interference of the State given the disturbing ○ Petitioner said that almost
condition of the Philippine blood banking system. everyone can certify to be a
person who’s PWD
■ STILL LAWFUL; Court stated that there are
Police power of the state is validly exercised if different types of disabilities, some disabilities

3
 are readily apparent without needing
certification or specialist
○ Some though needs
certification from specialist
■ THUS, not arbitrary accdording to Court; the
law clearly spells out the process of
ascertaining the disability
● Re: Private business are the ones
being burdened in behalf of the State
○ Not true, because they get
tax credit back from the
State
■ Rational connection - YES
● Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. DSWD, G.R. No. 199669, April
25, 2017
○ Assailed: Provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered as compensation to private establishments for
the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior
citizens and PWDs.
○ Comparing from Drug Stores Association, tax deduction
from gross income in this case
■ (in the previous case, State wont be really
getting taxes)
■ Now, greater revenues for the State but less
revenues for drug stores
○ STILL lawful purpose
○ Means (now being questioned) - not oppressive; lawful
■ They still get the discount back as they can just
mark-up their prices and pass the burden to the
customers
○ The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class
of their own (Art 13, Sec 11) and deemed it a priority to
address their needs.
○ It needs no further explanation that PWDs have special
needs which, for most, last their entire lifetime. Their
disability deters them from living their full potential.
○ Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare. providing aid for the
disabled persons is an equally important State
responsibility.
○ The power being exercised by the State in the
imposition of senior citizen discount was its police
power.
■ Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, just compensation is not required in
wielding police power. THERE IS NO TAKING
INVOLVED, only imposition of burden. The
measure is fair and reasonable and no credible
proof was presented to prove the claim that it
was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory,
there must be taking of property without just
compensation
4
○ Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi:
five circumstances must be present in order to
qualify "taking" as an exercise of eminent domain.
■ First, the expropriator must enter a private
property.
■ Second, the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary
period.
■ Third, the entry into the property should
be under warrant or color of legal
authority.
■ Fourth, the property must be devoted to a
public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
■ Fifth, the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property
○ The law does not place a cap on the amount of mark up
that covered establishments may impose on their items. it
is not the law per se which occasioned the losses in the
covered establishments but bad business judgment.
Five circumstances must be present in order to qualify "taking" as
an exercise of eminent domain:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period.
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property
(Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi)
● SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
○ Re: Curfews
○ Vague (all ordinances); Court disagreed
■ Court said it is not vague
■ Petitioners did not point the particular
provisions which are vague; unless it is a facial
challenge that questions the entirety of the
ordinance
○ Overbreadth - NOT APPLICABLE
■ Court did not give credence as it said that the
overbreadth challenge to speech cases (only in
freedom of expression) and therefore cannot be
applied
○ Parens patriae
■ Primary right of parents in rearing the youth
■ In the situation when the parent is absent
■ Valid exercise of parens patriae
○ BUT
 ○ Deprives the youth of their right to liberty and right to
travel - WHAT PROMPTED THE COURT TO TEST
■ Court said there are preferred rights at stake:
freedom of religion (prohibits attendance of
religious activities), freedom of assembly (right
to participate and express oneself in an
assemblies conducted by SB), and freedom of
expression (anything non-religious)
■ Also right to education, right to work
○ STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
■ Compelling state interest to protect the
children? NO
● Court rejected the ordinances that
has the compelling state interest to
penalize (against Juvenile Justice
Act and the duty of the State to
protect the children)
○ Manila Ordinance - LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS? NO
■ In violation of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Act
as it penalizes (admonishment and fine
which are penalties)
● To penalize minors is contrary to the
Consti
■ Selective when enumerating religious activities
● Showed bias to certain religious
activities; against freedom of religion
■ Did not allow participation in civic activitites
○ Navotas Ordinance - LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS? NO
■ Did not narrowly pin down the least
restrictive means like in Manila ordinance
■ A bit better as it provided more exceptions, but
the attempt did not result to the narrowing of
restrictions
○ Quezon City ordinance
■ Favored; provided very narrow coverage
■ Not penalizing
■ Just focused on the protection of the child
■ Provided exceptions whenever there is
opportunity for adult intervention
● *NOTE: Curfews during war time, when AF have been called out or
time or Martial law are completely different from curfews enacted
under parens patriae.
● It is under the power of the LGUs to enact curfews under the
general welfare clause.
● Nature of emergency tempers the application of right.
○ E.g. lockdown and inability to go to Church during
pandemic
○ Scientific evidence as important
Improper use of police power
● National Development Corp. v. Phil. Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA
257 (1990)
○ Assailed: PD 1717, a Marcos issuance, ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
5
administered mainly by the National Development
Company.
■ Section 4(1) extinguished all mortgages and
other liens attaching to the assets of AGRIX. All
"unsecured obligations shall not bear interest"
and in Subsection (iii) that "all accrued
interests, penalties or charges as of date hereof
pertaining to the obligations, whether secured
or unsecured, shall not be recognized."
○ PD not a valid exercise of police power
○ No lawful purpose - vague and favored a particular
class of persons; would have been fine if there are
substantial distinction between investors; but there were
no distinction
■ Should have rehabilitated a whole class of
bankrupt organizations; but it’s only singular;
thus discriminatory
○ Means were oppressive because mortgages and all the
interests that are accrued with it are property rights
protected under the law
Eminent Domain
General concepts and interface of eminent domain and police power
● Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343 (1989)
○ Main features of Agrarian reform: Retention Limit - 7
hectares
■ State will take the excess and they are going to
distribute to the landless the excess
■ Problem: is just compensation
○ Payment made in cash (just compensation)
○ Petitioner’s arguments - invalid legislation
○ Court: As society is growing more complex, the
power of eminent domain and taxation are often
used to implement police power
■ Police power was essentially enlarged
■ Under certain circumstances eminent
domain and taxation can be the “lawful
means”
○ Present case
■ Lawful purpose: addressing inequities
■ Lawful means: redistribute land
● eminent domain now becomes the
mechanism or operationalization of
the lawful means
■ Totality of it is police power but since it
amounted to a taking, it must fulfill the
requirements of the Constitution
● Public use - This will go to
individuals BUT Court reasoned out
that public use, is for public purpose
which is for PUBLIC INTEREST
(expanded public use). It did not
matter who immediately benefited
but as long as in line with public
interest
● Just compensation - Landbank
bonds - There was not enough cash
 in the present case as government
was bankrupt at that time so they
paid through Landbank bonds
● SC justified the bonds by:
○ Saying that bonds and
money are no different as
they are both negotiable;
you both exchange them
for value
○ Court will allow manner of
payments as long as they
are negotiable
○ [Only difference is bonds
are not yet due for
payment; unlike cash which
are due rn]
● Court stated that the payment of
bonds are fair and just because the
landowners still have the recourse to
the Courts if they are not satisfied
with the assessment of government
○ AGRARIAN REFORM AS MANIFESTATION OF POLICE
POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Who may exercise eminent domain
● MORE v. PECO, G. R. 248061, September 15, 2020
○ EQ: Can MORE be given the power of eminent domain to
take the property of PECO?
○ PECO: Secs. 10 and 17 as unconsti for violating due
process (argued that it is motivated by greed) and equal
protection
○ MORE: there is valid and lawful purpose to ensure that
there will be no interruption in transition
○ SC: Same thing happened before; PECO was allowed to
take over the private properties of previous franchise
owner (there was already a precedent before this present
case)
○ Court allowed MORE to be the one to take (instead of the
State) because there is an urgent need. If State takes, it
will be MORE who’ll pay. State basically delegated the
power of eminent domain to MORE as long as there is a
public use.
○ Thus, there can be a taking by a private persons as
delegated by the State; in the same way that the
government can delegate eminent domain to LGUs
○ EMINENT DOMAIN CAN BE DELEGATED
○ The benefit will ultimately be for the public because
MORE’s system hasn’t been set up yet
○ Taking is complete but just compensation can still be
settled; this latter matter will be resolved in the TRIAL
COURT
○ What was resolved here is the validity of taking
○ What about real properties already expropriated by PECO
- taking of PECO’s distribution system is valid
■ Land where distribution system will be passed
on to MORE (both rights and obligations)
6
■ The termination of the franchise of PECO did not
mean that the public purpose for which the
distribution system (including the public lands
and spaces to which it is attached) was installed
automatically ceased.
■ PECO’s distribution system is no ordinary
private property for it has been historically
burdened with the public interest of electricity
distribution. Even maintaining possession of the
distribution system must be for the original
public purpose for which the privilege of
installing it was granted.
Taking and just compensation
● Reyes v. NHA, 395 SCRA 494 (2003)
○ The Court cannot give back the land. When expropriated,
taking is complete. Only the just compensation is lacking
on this part so the former owners are owed still
■ Can only be reversed for a taking that’s not for
public use
● In this case, it was indeed for public
use
■ Essentially, only the payment of just
compensation is due the petitioners’ way as the
properties/lands expropriated under the power
of eminent domain, by being occupied, utilized,
and exercised dominion over by the NHA
already fulfill the “taking” and are thus now for
its use; recovery of the expropriated lots is
not an entitlement due the previous
landowners just because they haven’t been
paid yet.
○ Former owners can only ask for specific remuneration
(just compensation) from NHA
○ Court found that the refusal of respondent NHA to pay
just compensation, allegedly for failure of petitioners to
pay capital gains tax and surrender the owners’ duplicate
certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.
■ First, under the expropriation judgment the
payment of just compensation is not
subject to any condition.
■ Second, it is a recognized rule that although
the right to enter upon and appropriate the
land to public use is completed prior to
payment, title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation.”
○ Just compensation = market value
Statutory limitations on taking
● City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar, 350 SCRA 487 (2001)
○ Wanted to expropriate 3 unjoint parcels of land for
socialized urban housing for onsite development
○ The issue is whether or not the land of the respondents
can be expropriated - NO
 ○ The City of Mandaluyong did not exhaust all means
of acquiring the land by only trying a negotiated
purchase. Furthermore, the respondents were
exempt from expropriation as they were small
property owners.
○ Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be
acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the
following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping,
(3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5)
donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement;
(7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode
of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall
be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by
small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
○ They mean that the type of lands that may be acquired in
the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in
the modes authorized under Section 10.
○ In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in
the instant case, may be acquired only in the modes
under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
○ R.A. No. 7279 introduced a limitation on the size of the
land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The
law expressly exempted "small property owners" from
expropriation of their land for urban land reform
○ "Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1)
those owners of real property whose property consists of
residential lands with an area of not more than 300
square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square
meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not
own real property other than the same.
RA 7279 or Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992:
Section 9
SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. – Lands for socialized housing
shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal
Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Section 10
(7) Modes of acquiring lands for socialized housing
(1) community mortgage;
(2) land swapping,
(3) land assembly or consolidation;
7
(4) land banking;
(5) donation to the government;
(6) joint venture agreement;
(7) negotiated purchase; and
(8) expropriation.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions:
(a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted; and
(b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from
such acquisition.
Section 3
Small-property owners" are defined by two elements:
(1) those owners of real property whose property consists of
residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other
urban areas; and
(2) that they do not own real property other than the same.
● Lagcao v. Labra, 440 SCRA 279 (2004)
○ LGUs DO NOT HAVE INHERENT POWER OF DOMAIN
■ Local government units have no inherent power
of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature
○ LIMIT TO POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
■ There are two legal provisions which limit the
exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
○ EMINENT DOMAIN; MUST NOT TRAMPLE DUE PROCESS
■ The due process clause cannot be trampled
upon each time an ordinance orders the
expropriation of a private individual’s property.
The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy
simply because public use or public purpose is
invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation
has been fixed and determined
○ STRICT STATUTORY LIMITATION ON THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
■ In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the
Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs.
City of Manila, we ruled that the above-quoted
provisions are strict limitations on the exercise
of the power of eminent domain by local
government units, especially with respect to (1)
the order of priority in acquiring land for
socialized housing and (2) the resort to
expropriation proceedings as a means to
acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the
order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation
 proceedings may be resorted to only after
the other modes of acquisition are
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
is mandatory because these are the only
safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of
private property against what may be a
tyrannical violation of due process when their
property is forcibly taken from them allegedly
for public use.
Taxation
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
● In general: Right to due process and equal protection
● Taxation can be used as a lawful means to a lawful purpose
Principles
● Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654 (1984)
○ Gross income taxation
■ Sison alleged that he would be duly
discriminated against; arbitrary, class legislation
● Gross income earners vs. gross
compensation earners
■ Invoking the principle of uniformity
○ Uniformity in taxation is same as equal protection
applied to taxation
■ Substantial distinction that give rise to valid
classifications
■ Uniformity not for everyone, but for those
belonging to the same class
○ Classifications
■ Gross income earners - Tax is levied when they
file their returns
■ Gross compensation earners - tax levied even
before their salary is released
○ There will only be a violation if you all belong to the same
class but you are treated differently to those in the same
class
○ Also, re: due process
■ May be invoked where a taxing statute is so
arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution
■ Where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public
purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so
harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack
on due process grounds
● Reyes v. Almanzor, 196 SCRA 322 (1991)
○ Owner (JBL Reyes) is paying more in real property tax
than he’ll be getting income from tax because he cannot
increase the rentals because his property was covered by
PD 20 that prohibited increases in rentals
○ Properties were then reassessed resulting in increase in
tax rates
8
○ Note: properties around JBL that also had increased tax
rates were not affected by PD (prohibition to increase
rental rates). Only JBL’s were affected
○ Taxation is thus not uniform: substantial distinction
between JBL and other’s property is that properties owned
by JBL were covered under PD 20, while those others are
not covered
■ JBL is under rent control law; others were not
subject to this
● Income is not material to real property tax; but it is the law itself
in this case that classes it differently
○ Although income is not material in the ordinary sense, but
because it is something that is created by the law (being
covered by PD 20); thus, we have to consider it as a
substantial distinction
○ Classification as direct consequence of the application of
the law on property
● Looking at the properties it would also be INEQUITABLE;
oppressive
○ Di na makabayad kasi wala na ngang income
○ This is not a stand-alone argument tho so the Court had
to look at the uniformity aspect
1) Taxes classified, assessed, and imposed are imbued with
presumptive regularity. Burden to submit concrete evidence to
prove irregularities rests on the petitioners. Moreover, laws
granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against the
grantee.
2) Uniformity has been defined as that principle by which all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate (Churchill v. Concepcion).
3) Taxation is said to be equitable when its burden falls on those
better able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected.
4) What limits the taxation power?
a) Adversely effecting as it does property rights, both the
due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution may properly be invoked to invalidate in
appropriate cases a revenue measure.
b) The due process clause may be invoked where a taxing
statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be
shown to amount to confiscation of property. That would
be a clear abuse of power (Sison v. Ancheta).
c) Taxing power has the authority to classify properties for
purposes of taxation, but the government's act must not
be prompted by a spirit of hostility, or at the very least
discrimination that finds no support in reason. The law
must operate equally and uniformly on all persons.
5) (Not in the case) Only Congress can provide exemptions. (Not
executive power)
Exemptions from taxation
● Lung Center v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA 119 (2004)
○ There were portions of the lung center that is being
leased out to private entities.
 ■ Lung center making money from commercial
businesses
■ QC thus says that it’s taxable
○ Lung center has to prove (under Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI)
■ That it is a charitable institution
■ Property actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.
○ Court said yes for first condition.
○ For 2nd, Court did not look at the property as a whole but
separately
■ What is not used for charitable purposes will be
taxed
■ What is being used for charitable purposes will
be exempted; determined square meter by sq.
meter
■ The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to
prove that the entirety of its real property is
actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes. While portions of the
hospital are used for the treatment of patients
and the dispensation of medical services to
them, whether paying or non-paying, other
portions thereof are being leased to private
individuals for their clinics and a canteen.
Petitioner's evidence shows that it collected
P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and
P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.
■ The only portion of the real property exempt
from taxes are the areas occupied by the
hospital and portions of the hospital used for its
patients, whether paying or non-paying.
○ Article VI, Section 28 (3) Charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
■ What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive
use of the property for charitable purposes is
the direct and immediate and actual application
of the property itself to the purposes for which
the charitable institution is organized. It is not
the use of the income from the real property
that is determinative of whether the property is
used for tax-exempt purposes.
■ The tax exemption provided covers property
taxes only.
○ Laws granting exemption from tax are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is
the exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to
an appropriation.
9
To be exempted from tax under Art. VI, Sec. 28 (3) of the 1987
Constitution, the following has to be proven
1. That it is a charitable institution
2. Property actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes.
To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable
institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered
include:
● the statute creating the enterprise,
● its corporate purposes,
● its constitution and by-laws,
● the methods of administration,
● the nature of the actual work performed,
● the character of the services rendered,
● the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and
● the use and occupation of the properties.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as
such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from
paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or
receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received
is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is
intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of
the persons managing or operating the institution. The money
received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be
devoted to public trust purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or
benefit.
(Lung Center v. Quezon City)
● National Power Corp. v. City of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259
(2003)
○ LGUs can tax as long as it does not duplicate what the
national government has already imposed
○ In the case at bar, Section 151 in relation to Section 137
of the LGC clearly authorizes the respondent city
government to impose on the petitioner the franchise tax
in question.
■ SECTION 137. Franchise Tax -
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any
law or other special laws, the province may
impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise,
at a rate exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for
the preceding calendar year based on the
incoming receipt, or realized, within its
territorial jurisdiction.
■ SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. -
Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the
city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges
which the province or municipality may impose:
Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized
and independent component cities shall accrue
 to them and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of this code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may
exceed the maximum rates allowed for the
province or municipality by not more than fifty
percent (50%) except the rates of professional
and amusement taxes.
○ Verily, to determine whether the petitioner is covered by
the franchise tax in question, the following requisites
should concur: (1) that petitioner has a "franchise"
in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and
(2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under
this franchise within the territory of the respondent
city government.
■ Petitioner fulfills the first requisite.
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7395, constitutes petitioner's
primary and secondary franchises. It serves as
the petitioner's charter, defining its composition,
capitalization, the appointment and the specific
duties of its corporate officers, and its corporate
life span. As its secondary franchise,
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended, vests
the petitioner the following powers which are
not available to ordinary corporation.
■ Petitioner also fulfills the second requisite.
It is operating within the respondent city
government's territorial jurisdiction pursuant to
the powers granted to it by Commonwealth Act
No. 120, as amended. From its operations in
the City of Cabanatuan, petitioner realized a
gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992.
Fulfilling both requisites, petitioner is, and
ought to be, subject of the franchise tax in
question.
○ To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on
the ownership but on the exercise by the
corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable
entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise,
and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its
charter, petitioner was created as a separate and distinct
entity from the National Government.
○ [DISC] Privileges can be revoked anytime by the State
acting through LGUs
○ Franchise tax is business tax and it’s the LG that imposes
this tax. As such NAPOCOR is subject to tax
To determine whether the petitioner is covered by the franchise tax
in question, the following requisites should concur:
(1) that petitioner has a "franchise" in the sense of a secondary or
special franchise; and
(2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise
within the territory of the respondent city government.
(NAPOCOR v. City of Cabanatuan)
10
Bill of Rights
Due Process
Due process
● Substantive - law itself
○ Must not be unreasonable, oppressive nor arbitrary
○ Usually start with rational basis test
● Procedural
○ Person should be (1) given notice and (2) given the
chance to be heard
Limitations of due process
● Rubi v. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)
○ Problem before: growing population in Luzon and the
need for more arable land for rice production to feed
people, but ofc as population grows, there’s less land but
demand goes high
○ Purpose of the ordinance:
■ Lawful purpose: to protect the Mangyans from
the newly-arrived settlers from mainland Luzon
● Mandate of the state to protect these
vulnerable people
● Non-Christians as not in the same
level of education and those with less
level of education has to be protected
from those with higher level of
education
■ Means: Herd them into reservations directly
related to the purpose
● put in reservations for education (in
the same way as native Americans)
● Relocate them so they can go to
regular schools
● Under supervision of authorities so
their chances of being exploited is
less
○ Ruling: Constitutional
■ Lawful purpose related to lawful means
Substantive and procedural due process
● Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
○ Amendment prohibited the transfer of carabaos which
resulted for the purpose to remain the same but for the
means to be altered.
■ Before, there was a ban on slaughter for those
still fit for work or breeding
■ Now, regardless of the purpose of cow, there is
a ban on the transport of the cow from one
province to another; basically, absolute ban on
transfer
○ Rational connection was lost after amendment
■ The absolute ban on transfer would not prevent
carabaos from being killed
○ E.O. 626-A is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
 is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
○ Due process (procedural) is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
■ The EO does not prescribe any trial and the
property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared as
forfeited to the government.
■ That seized property shall “be distributed to
charitable institutions… as the [Commission]
may see fit” - dangerous condition; does not
provide the usual standard and reasonable
guidelines, or the limitations
● The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of
powers.
● There is an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the
aforementioned officers, who are
granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties that
were seized arbitrarily
Minimum requirements of due process: (1) notice and (2) hearing
Exceptions:
● Need for expeditious action (e.g. mad dog on the loose which
may be killed on sight due to the immediate danger it poses)
● Those inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed
(e.g. pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs)
● In the interest of public health (padlocking of filthy restaurants)
● To protect the public morals (padlacking of bawdy houses)
● Passport of a person to sought for a crim. offense can be
canceled without hearing.
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or
the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
(Ynot v. CA)
● Corona v. United Harbors Pilots Association, 283 SCRA 31
(1997)
○ one-year cap on all appointments to all harbor pilot
positions in all pilotage districts. This meant that all pilots
shall be subject to an annual performance review to
determine whether or not their employment will be
renewed. Prior to the issuance of the AO and MO, all duly
11
licensed pilots had security of tenure until they reach the
mandatory age of retirement (70), unless at any point
they have been found to be physically or mentally unfit.
Corona (OP) held the implementation of the issuances in
abeyance pending review, but he subsequently lifted such
an abeyance and held that these were valid on the ground
that PPA is mandated to "control, regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district."
○ Respondents were denied due process
■ In order for an act to qualify as a
deprivation of another party's right to due
process, two conditions must concur:
● (a) there is a deprivation, and
● (b) such deprivation is carried out
without proper observance of due
process.
■ Both of these conditions are present in this
case.
○ PPA only followed procedural due process.
● PA failed to observe substantive due process by impinging
on a vested right, which in this case is the sole and
exclusive right of herein respondents to the exercise of
harbor pilotage.
○ Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right.. Only after the completion
of requirements (exams and OJTs) shall he be
issued a license, which allows him to engage in
pilotage until the age of 70.
○ It is readily apparent that the assailed AO
unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to
enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement.
○ The pre-evaluation cancellation policy espoused
by the AO is unreasonable, constitutionally
infirm, and a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
● [DISC] SC: against due process for being unreasonable
and oppressive
○ They would get suspended every year as they
take the tests annually - no continuity in license
- automatically expires in one year (as opposed
to driver’s license na renewal lang)
○ They are given license for one year; for license
to be renewed, they have to get assessed
before they get another license; process takes
3-6 months
○
In order for an act to qualify as a deprivation of another party's
right to due process, two conditions must concur:
(a) there is a deprivation, and
(b) such deprivation is carried out without proper observance of due
process.
(Corona v. United Harbors Pilots Association)
● Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
○ ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
○ Publication is indispensable in every case
■ The phrase “unless it it otherwise provided”
refers to date of effectivity, NOT whether or
not it had to be published
■ But Legislature can shorten or extend the
15-day period, as long as it’s not
unreasonably short
○ Dispensing with publication altogether would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it.
■ lack of publication would result for persons not
aware to be prejudiced as a result - not for their
failure to comply - but simply because they did
not know its existence
○ Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern,"
and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
○ All statutes, incldg. those of local application and
private laws, shall be pubiished as a condition for
their effectivity
■ “laws” refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application
■ Even those referring to specific persons only
may be of public interest and should therefore
be made known to the public
● A law with no bearing on the public is
invalid anyway
○ as an intrusion of privacy
○ as class legislation
○ as ultra vires act (beyond
the authority) of legislature
■ This rule covers: PDs, EOs, Admin rules and
regulations, City charters, Circulars by Monetary
Board if they are meant to “fill in the details” of
the Central Bank Act
■ This rule does NOT cover: Interpretative
regulations (e.g. other circulars by Monetary
Board), Internal matters, municipal ordinances
(these are covered by the Local Government
Code)
○ Publication must be in FULL or it is no publication at
all.
○ Published in Official Gazette - despite erratic releases
and limited readership as it is the one required/authorized
by law.
○ Publication must be as soon as possible.
○ Internal regulations -> ONAR
12
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)
● Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the
Sandiganbayan, with “jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law.” Petitioner assails the validity
of the PD creating the Sandiganbayan.
○ Effectively robs the ability to appeal questions of facts (for
public officials convicted, there’s no appeal to CA; only
SC; SC is not a trier of facts but only answers question of
law )
● PD 1486 valid
● Classification satisfies the test: that it “must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.”
○ Constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan in
relation to dishonest in public service.
○ It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such
court ought to have been aware as far back as January
17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force,
that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public
official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
● What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in
criminal proceedings?
○ Arnault v. Pecson: “a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.”
○ In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if
the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded
against and what charge he has to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is
not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him
to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in
accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of
course, that the court that rendered the decision is
one of competent jurisdiction.”
● There should be no doubt that a review by certiorari of a
decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for a strict
observance of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
○ [DISC] there are safeguards in the Sandiganbayan level->
3 judges & when no unanimous, go to 5 judges, then go
to SC
○ [DISC] Court considered the right of appeal as statutory
(not in the Consti; except for those provided under Art.
VIII, Sec. 5) as it’s bc not in Consti, it’s not really part
and parcel of the due process
○ It is something from the Congress; it’s in the Congress’
wisdom whether they allow for appeal or not
● [DISC] Court will only bend backwards when it is shown that there
is grave abuse discretion on the part of the Court
Administrative due process
● Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940)
○ Ang Tibay laid off employees due to a shortage of leather
but it was stated that employees laid off were members of
NLU while no members of the rival labor union (NWB)
were laid off. The ablidity of this lay off was then
questioned.
○ The case should be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations for further proceedings
■ We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no
substantial evidence that the exclusion of the
89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity.
○ The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.” The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would
be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. not go far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence."
○ The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
○ [DISC] SC: Re: disputes on money claims delegated to
CIR as a violation of Consti? No, agencies do not violate
because they are performing quasi-judicial functions and
they are vested with such powers by the Congress (based
on the law that created it)
■ But since they have quasi-judicial functions,
they are bound by administrative due
process
“Cardinal primary” requirements in administrative proceedings
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s
case and submit evidence in suppor thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (both
accuser and accused)
3) The decision must have something to support itself;
4) The evidence must be substantial (“Such reasonable evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion”);
5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least, contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
13
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decisionin such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered (Bernas 115)
(Ang Tibay v. CIR)
● Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA, 119 SCRA 112 (1991)
○ We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section
7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order
may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes
discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes
exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
○ On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove
that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex
parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough
if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do
exceed "the allowable standards set by the
[NPCC]." - [DISC] based on PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE
■ as long as there is scientific basis; which in this
case came in form of the 2 reports
○ Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet
been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the
Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
when it finds at least prima facie proof that the
wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal
or plant life."
○ it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie
evidence that the effluents from Solar's plant exceeded
the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC and that there was adequate
basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order.
■ Petitioner Board appears to have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce
the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar,
on the other hand, seemed very casual about
its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River
○ It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here
saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ
of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing
before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected
by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the
Board must hold a public hearing where such
establishment would have an opportunity to
controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That
 such an opportunity is subsequently available is
really all that is required by the due process clause of the
Constitution in situations like that we have here.
● Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523 (1990)
○ [DISC] Students not allowed to re-enroll for rallying;
School said that they did not allow to enroll due to
academic delinquency (failing grades)
○ School argues private education is contractual - by
semester
■ Indeed, private school can bar students to
enroll
■ But this is not purely contractual
■ The Court emphasized that the contract
between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract as it is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by
the Constitution to education and the grant to
the State of supervisory and regulatory powers
over all educational institutions.
■ Under Paragraph 107: except in the case of
academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed
to be qualified for enrollment for the entire
period they are expected to complete their
course without prejudice to his right to transfer.
■ Villar: the right of an institution of higher
learning to set academic standards cannot be
utilized to discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech
and assembly,
○ SC: Student has the right to enroll has the right to
complete and his course
○ While the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so
far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. The
Court also cited Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines wherein it was held that the exercise of the
freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring
students from enrolling.
○ The Court held that while the highest regard must be
afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students.
Thus, when students’ behavior disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others, they are not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. Nonetheless, as stated in
Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
concerning this requires observance of procedural due
process.
○ The Court cited Guzman’s minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process: (1) students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the
right to answer the charges, with the assistance of
14
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right
to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
○ The Court also held that it does not appear that the
petitioners were afforded due process. The Court sees the
decision to refuse petitioners re-enrollment because of
failing grades as a mere afterthought. It is not denied that
what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 which
were led and/or participated in by petitioners. This
exclusion of students because of failing grades when the
cause for the action taken against them is undeniably
related to possible breaches of discipline is a denial of due
process
○ In line with the Court's ruling in Malabanan, the
petitioners could be subjected to disciplinary proceedings,
but the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the
offense. In addition, following Guzman, penalty must be
imposed only after the requirements of procedural due
process have been complied with.
Guzman’s minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process
(1) students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case.
+ penalty should be proportionate
Equal Protection
[DISC]
● Premised on the recognition of diversity
○ Not all about everyone being treated equally
● Substantial distinctions that give rise to valid classifications
○ Reasonable classifications
■ Distinctions must not be unreasonable,
whimsical, arbitrary nor whimsical
■ To know if reasonable, there should be a lawful
purpose (in accord with the Consti) and the
lawful means is the valid classification to attain
that lawful purpose
 ■ Classifications should be looked at in view of
their purpose to see if they are valid
● Nature of classification - vertical or horizontal? Relative
constitutionality
■ Are the classifications vertical? (within a
particular group of persons)
■ Horizontal? (cuts across different groups of
persons but pertaining to the same class)
● Context for classification
● Treating everyone in the same way may actually be a violation of
equal protection
General principles; relative constitutionality
● Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP, G.R. 148208,
Dec. 15, 2004
○ Central Bank Act - created new Central Bank
■ Assailed: compensation for salary 19 grade
below (rank-and-file employees) under SSL;
salary grade 20 and above (officers) are
exempted
● BSP officers will have higher salaries
will have salaries comparable to
private banks
○ SC: not violative of equal protection (under vertical
analysis)
■ Substantial distinction: the officers are the ones
with the authority to make decisions for which
they can be held accountable (a.k.a removed if
their decisions led to substantial money lost)
● Meanwhile, rank-and-file has the
security of tenure
■ Such substantial distinction lead to the valid
classifications of (1) Officer and (2)
Rank-and-file
■ Purpose of the law: to recruit and retain the
best and brightest in the financial sector
● Germane to the purpose of law? Yes
○ (under horizontal analysis) The enactment,
however, of subsequent laws — exempting all other
rank-and file employees of GFIs from the SSL —
renders the continued application of the challenged
provision a violation of the equal protection clause;
Another: There were laws for government financial
institutions where rank-and-file employees were
exempted
■ While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure
well within the legislature's power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting
all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs
leeched all validity out of the challenged
proviso.
■ Concept of Relative Constitutionality
● The constitutionality of a statute
cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of
its provisions with applicable
15
provisions of the Constitution, since
the statute may be constitutionally
valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to
another.
● A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because
of altered circumstances.
○ If a statute in its practical
operation becomes
arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though
affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in
the light of changed
conditions.
■ Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 +
8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 = consequential
unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
■ In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of
treatment cannot be justified on the mere
assertion that each exemption (granted to the
seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy
determination by the legislature.".
● It is against this standard that the
disparate treatment of the BSP
rank-and-file from the other GFIs
cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as
regards the exemption from the
coverage of the SSL, there exist no
substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file
from the other rank-and-file of the
seven GFIs. There are no
characteristics peculiar only to the
seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied.
■ It is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso
anathema to the equal protection of the law,
and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
● It’s the prerogative of Congress but
the laws that it created subsequently
legislated showed the intent that it
wanted to do away already with the
classification. -> evolution of
legislative innovation
● Congress’ acts with other GFIs shows
its intentions of doing away with said
classification
Valid classification - The classification should:
 objective, i.e., to free the national economy
1) be based on substantial distinctions which make for real from alien control and dominance. It is not
differences necessarily unreasonable because it affects
2) that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; private rights and privileges.
3) that it must not be limited to existing conditions only (present ○ The test of reasonableness of a law is the
and future); and appropriateness or adequacy under all
4) that it must apply equally to each member of the class. circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test,
(Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP) the disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the
Classifications constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
■ The law is made prospective and
● Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) - CITIZENSHIP recognizes the right and privilege of
○ [DISC] Socioeconomic issue addressed: free economy as those already engaged in the
1) Chinese were controlling retail trade and other occupation to continue therein during
sectors in the economy the rest of their lives; and similar
2) And to integrate Chinese into the mainstream recognition of the right to continue is
● RA 1180, in effect, nationalizes the retail trade business accorded associations of aliens. The
right or privilege is denied only to
(e.g. prohibits non-Filipino citizens and the corporations
persons upon conviction of certain
they own from engaging in the retail trade)
offenses.
○ [DISC] law here essentially incentivizing
○ State can do this bc State can demand loyalty
Chinese to naturalize as Filipinos, especially
from its citizens (e.g. in times of conflict; to
those engaging in commercial activities
defend)
● Discussion of EP
■ Nationalistic tendency is manifested
○ The equal protection clause is not infringed by
in various provisions of the
legislation which applies only to those persons
Constitution. The nationalization of
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
the retail trade is only a continuance
to all persons within such class, and reasonable
of the nationalistic protective policy
grounds exist for making a distinction between
laid down as a primary objective of
those who fall within such class and those who
the Constitution. It cannot therefore
do not. The Power of the legislature to make
be said that a law imbued with the
distinctions and classifications among persons is
same purpose and spirit underlying
not curtailed or denied by the equal protection
many of the provisions of the
of the laws clause.
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid
● SC: did not violate equal protection
or unconstitutional.
○ Distinction using citizenship is valid one
■ The classification in the law of retail
● Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
traders into nationals and aliens is
(1974) - RELIGION
actual, real and reasonable. All
○ RA 3350 makes it so that requirement that employees be
persons of one class are treated alike,
automatically part of the Union not cover members of any
and it cannot be said that the
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
classification is patently unreasonable
in any such labor organization.
and unfounded.
○ Victoriano, an INC member (INC prohibits its members
■ A question of loyalty - Court accepted
from joining unions) wanted to opt out of the Union but
the argument that FIlipinos will have
Union didn’t want to accept his resignation. Company
a higher loyalty and contribute to
stated that, unless Appellee could achieve an
increasing national economy as
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
opposed to alien who’s intention is to
constrained to dismiss him from service.
remit to alien country
○ RA does not violate the constitutional provision on
○ Objective of the law: national economy
freedom of association
protected
■ Law still leaves to said members the liberty and
○ Means: give incentive to Filipinos and force
the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with
aliens to show their loyalty by investing and by
labor unions.
being part of PH society
■ Act indeed impairs rge obligation of the contract
○ The law in question is deemed absolutely
embodied in its CBA with the Company,
necessary to bring about the desired legislative
HOWEVER, Legislation impairing the obligation
16
 of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted
for the promotion of the general good of the
people, and when the means adopted to secure
that end are reasonable.
■ Purpose of RA 3350:insure freedom of belief
and religion
■ SC: Means adopted by RA 3350 to achieve this
purpose - exempting the members of said
religious sects from coverage of union security
agreements - REASONABLE
○ Applying the 4 elements of a valid classification, The Act
classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those
who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions
cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose
religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions.
■ There is such real distinction in the beliefs,
feelings and sentiments of employees.
■ Employees do not believe in the same religious
faith and different religions differ in their
dogmas and canons.
■ Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere
ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry
with them practical consequences and are the
motives of certain rules of human conduct and
the justification of certain acts.
■ ​The classification, introduced by Republic Act
No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial
distinctions.
○ The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who
cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions,
from being deprived of their right to work and from being
dismissed from their work because of union shop security
agreements.
○ Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its
application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be
effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the
law is applicable exist.
■ As long as there are closed shop agreements
between an employer and a labor union, and
there are employees who are prohibited by their
religion from affiliating with labor unions, their
exemption from the coverage of said
agreements continues.
○ The Act applies equally to all members of said religious
sects; this is evident from its provision.
○ [DISC] SC: part of the dogma of a particular religion
which the Court cannot even inquire into
■ If the SC compel the religious group to say why
they do not allow this thing, they are violating
their right
■ It is not against public policy; under freedom of
association - to join or not to join
17
● Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980) - AGE
○ Retired elected provincial, city or municipal who received
their retirement pay shall not be allowed to run for the
same position
○ SC:
■ Substantial distinction:
● They already voluntarily opted for
retirement and availed of their
retirement benefits; they were the
ones that put themselves in a
separate class; they’re already
enjoying fruits of such retirement;
not the age but the fact of availment
of retirement
● Classes: (2) Those over 65 who have
already availed of their retirement
and (2) those who have not
■ In respect of election to provincial, city, or
municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the
time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification.
■ But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local
official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office,there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
■ The tiredness of the retiree for government
work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again. It is for this very reason that
inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision.
■ The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question
being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be
considered invalid "even it at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by
theoretical inconsistencies"
● Ang Ladlad v. Comelec, G.R. 190582, April 8, 2010 - GENDER
○ Partylist registration was denied on moral grounds
○ Partylist was advocating for the recognition of their sexual
orientation and gender identity
○ COMELEC: LGBTQ as nonexistent class; only male and
female
○ SC: COMELEC not right; Ang Ladlad met all of the
requirements for partylist.
■ The SC held that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
complied with the legal requirements for
accreditation under R.A. No. 7941 or in the
 guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Aside from its
moral objection and its belated allegation of
non-existence, COMELEC never found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under the requisites
under R.A. No. 7941 or the guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani.
● In Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court held
that the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not
exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.
● [DISC] It is not within the province of
the COMELEC to disqualify based on
moral grounds (should only be those
in party-list law)
○ The Court held that COMELEC’s use of the Bible and the
Quran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad gravely
violated the non-establishment clause under Section 5,
Article III, 1987 Constitution, which calls for government
neutrality in religious matters.
○ The Court held that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike
and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest.
■ The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Therefore, these
"generally accepted public morals" have not
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of
law. The assailed resolutions have not identified
any specific overt immoral act performed by
Ang Ladlad.
○ HOWEVER, the Court does not agree (with the OSG)
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of
the equal protection clause nor is it prepared to single out
homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment (unnecessary to make ruling in
this case).
○ The SC held that there has been a transgression of Ang
Ladlad’s fundamental rights insofar as the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with
other equally-qualified party-list candidates.
● Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)
○ Oil deregulation opened the field to new players
○ Now 2 classes:
■ Big 3
■ New players
18
○ 4% differential in tariffs (Crude Oil 3% while, importation
is 7%)
■ The problem was that the new players were
engaged in the importation of refined petroleum
products and distribution, while Big
○ RA effectively resulted in the oligopoly of the big 3 oil
companies can actually fix the prices
○ Intention of the law: more new players resulting in
competition that will lead to lower prices
○ Tatad argued that the classification under Oil Deregulation
Law is not germane to the purpose of the law
○ Classification were applied to taxes and duties
○ SC: tariff differential germane to the law; is a
classification by itself in violation of the equal protection?
NO
■ Our Decision did not hold that the 4% tariff
differential infringed the equal protection clause
of the Constitution even as this was contended
by petitioner Tatad. Rather, we held that said
tariff differential substantially occluded the
entry point of prospective players in the
downstream oil industry. We further held that
its inevitable result is to exclude fair and
effective competition and to enhance the
monopolists ability to tamper with the
mechanism of a free market.
● [INFERRENCE] Unconsti not bc it
violates EP clause but because the
result of the law’s implementation
goes against its very purpose
■ Especially for the purpose giving incentives for
the new players
■ However,instead of giving incentives, it equally
consolidated the oligopoly of the three with
vertical integration
● In an industry where thre is vertical
integration and you give lower tariff
from the sources, it makes it
impossible for the newer players to
compete with the big 3
■ Crude Oil 3% while, importation is 7% (4%
differential)
○ Court will not pass on the wisdom of that but Court stated
to Congress that this is the effect which later on led for
the Congress to amend the law.
● Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. 179267, June 25, 2013
○ Whether male or female partner can be a victim of
Anti-VAWC law
○ Applying elements of EP
1) Substantial distinction
● Historical unequal power relations
● Police data showed violence against women
● Gender bias (prosecution thinking it’s a private
matter; dismisses the violence being committed
against women)
2) Germane to the purpose of the law; 3) not limited to
existing conditions only; 4) apply equally to all members
 ● Purpose: address violence committed against
women and children
○ Acts enumerated in the RA re
physical, sexual and psychological
violence and economic abuse are
attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and
dynamics of battery
● While men can be considered victims, numbers
are negligible compared to the overwhelming
number of women victims
● Petitioner: singles out the husband or father as
the culprit - Court: no merit
○ “against a women with whom the
person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship”;
gender-neutral word “person”,
encompasses even lesbian
relationships
● On due process:
○ Petitioner: PO violative of due process; on the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the
husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened - Court: no
○ POs: time is of the essence; court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle
but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC
or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur; need not be any fear that the judge may
have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
order; the victim is required not only to verify
the allegations in the petition, but also to attach
her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
○ Constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, among
which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security
○ Essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. “To be heard” does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process
19
● Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. 192935, Dec. 7,
2010
○ Law created PTC to investigate corruption during PGMA’s
administration
○ PCGG is sui generis; it’s a class in itself
○ The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is
to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
○ The Arroyo administration is just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own.
■ Not including other past administrations
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction.
■ The differentiation may label the commission
only as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
○ Though the OSG enumerates several differences between
the Arroyo administration and other past administrations,
these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the
restriction of the investigation to the "previous
administration" only.
■ Widespread corruption is not inherent in, and
do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration.
○ The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate
all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down
for being unconstitutional.
○ Sir’s input: you can investigate the incidents themselves
rather than stipulating Arroyo admin so that she’ll not be
singled out
Search and Seizure
Requirements for a warrant and the exclusionary rule
Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”
● Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
○ Harry Stonehill involved in bribery scandal in three
administrations
○ Re: Standing
■ The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely
 personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
○ SC: Police went on a fishing expedition
○ In this case the search warrant was issued before the
proceedings which is wrong; remember that search
warrant is an issuance of the Court
○ Requisites of a valid warrant:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
○ None of these requirements has been complied with
in the contested warrant.
■ The warrants are TOO general; no particular
offense stated - for “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code
■ Things to be seized also too general - did
not describe the specific items to be seized,
cash money not mentioned in the warrant were
seized, items not delivered to court
● things written in the warrant: Books
of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
■ The warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things
to be seized be particularly described — as well
as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
■ As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do
not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioner.
○ Old rule: Moncado doctrine - abandoned in this case as it
will fuel fishing expeditions and will violate right to privacy
20
○ Exclusionary rule: If the search is invalid, the fruits
of the search is invalid; thus evidence is
inadmissible
● [DISC] Proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures have to be raised by the respondent, not the Court.
If the respondent didn’t raise it, then it is deemed waived.
● [DISC] Only the Court can direct the intrusion to the privacy
of the person.
Requisites of a valid warrant:
1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; and
2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
Exclusionary rule: If the search is invalid, the fruits of the search is
invalid; thus, evidence is inadmissible.
(Stonehill v. Diokno)
● Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
○ WeForum - only newspaper critical of Marcos; ran by Joe
Burgos
○ General Ver wanted to close down the publications of Joe
Burgos
■ By applying for search warrants
○ The warrants for WeForum and Metropolitan Mail
■ Burgos having paraphernalia committing
subversion (membership to an organization that
wants to overthrow a government)
○ Probable cause -
■ Defined as: “...such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
■ Mere generalization will not suffice.”
■ The Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified.
○ No probable cause found - no connection between
offense alleged and things to be seized
■ When the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar,
the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged
 subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish.
■ The Court held that the search warrants,
containing mere generalizations and the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla’s application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used
as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended . . . ", is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause.
■ Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a
grave error for respondent judge to have done
so.
■ [DISC] The things to seized were printing
equipment and paraphernalia but they are not
in any way related to the crime of subversion
(subversion means membersh
● To prove subversion, what should
have been seized are membership
documents
Probable cause
● Defined as: “...such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
● The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
(Burgos v. Chief of Staff for both; Caballes v. CA for first bullet point)
Right against whom unreasonable search and sezizure against State and State
agents - public officials
Not applicable to searches by private persons
● People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
○ Swiss national, Marti that wanted to send something
through Reyes, carrier. Reyes opened package according
to standard procedure, to make sure it’s not contraband
■ Saw dried goods that smelled peculiar -> sent
to NBI which discovered that it’s marijuana
○ Marti claimed that there was no warrant, unreasonable
search and seizure; thus, evidence would be inadmissible
○ SC:
○ But in drugs cases, the evidence is the very thing
21
○ The Court first acknowledged that any evidence obtained
through unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
inadmissible as evidence, as it has ruled in jurisprudence.
In all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the
medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies. As opposed to in this case, the
discovery of the evidence sought to be excluded
was made by a private person who was acting in
private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities.
■ Opening of packages was an act by a private
individual even if the thing was turned over for
review, for investigation
■ This is part of SOP
○ Protection against unlawful searches and seizures
can only be used against agents of the state and
cannot be against private persons
■ In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of
Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures
applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
○ it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. the
mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution.
■ [DISC] Security guard searches are valid
RULE 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Warrantless searches
● People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998)
○ An Aling Rosa was arrested in a bus station, after an
informant tipped police that she would be carrying a bag
filled with marijuana. Said officers approached and
searched her belongings without a warrant, while she was
crossing the street.
○ The Court ruled that the search and seizure was illegal
and unconstitutional. NARCOM officers argued that they
had no time to obtain a warrant, but their search did not
fall under the exceptions that allow a warrantless arrest
○ NOT incidental to lawful arrest
■ No legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect
a warrantless search of accused-appellant's
bag, there being no probable cause and the
accused-appellant not having been lawfully
arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being
incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being
not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles
seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant.
■ A lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings. Where a search is
first undertaken, and an arrest effected based
on evidence produced by the search, both such
search and arrest would be unlawful, for being
contrary to law.
○ also NOT under plain view
■ he marijuana was obviously not immediately
apparent as shown by the fact that the
NARCOM agents still had to request
accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain
its contents.
○ also NOT under moving vehicle
■ No moving vehicle to speak
accused-appellant was apprehended several
minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner
bus; she was accosted in the middle of the
street and not while inside the vehicle
○ also NOT under stop and frisk
■ there was no observable manifestation that
could have aroused the suspicion of the
NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street when apprehended. Unlike in the
abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never
attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents
when the latter identified themselves as such
○ also NOT under exigent and emergency
circumstances
■ not applicable in this case; this was applied in
coup d’ etat where there is a team being fired
at; general chaos and disorder prevailed in that
case; in short, there was probable cause to
effect a warrantless search of the building in
said case
○ also NOT consented warrantless search
■ Court here basically mentioned another case
where police asked what the woman was
carrying and that the woman gave her reaction
to the police; the difference, however, is there
is probable cause in the aforementioned case
and there is NONE in the present case
■ accused’s handing over the bag cannot be
construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search
■ silence is not consent; implied acqiuescence as
mere passive conformity
■ to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual
intention to relinquish the right
○ Also presumption of regularity of the performance
of duty NOT appreciated if search was conducted
irregularly i.e. without a warrant
○ There was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents
not to procure a search warrant considering that they
had more than twenty-four hours to do so.
■ Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a
search warrant, they could have secured one
without too much difficulty, contrary to the
assertions of the Solicitor General. The person
intended to be searched has been
particularized and the thing to be seized
specified. The time was also sufficiently
ascertained to be in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to
be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized
was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to
be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM
agents purposely positioned themselves near
the spot where Victory Liner buses normally
unload their passengers. Assuming that the
of;
NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them
from securing a search warrant. The above
particulars would have already sufficed. In any
case, this Court has held that the police
should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be
seized, wherever and whenever it is
feasible.
22

7 Warrantless Searches (Exceptions to the constitutional
proscriptions against warrantless searches and seizures)
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
(Seems to be under Sec. 13 now: “Section 13. Search
incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.”)
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
d. "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
(People v. Aruta)
● Valmonte v. De Villa, 173 SCRA 211 (1989)
○ Re: Because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and
of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order.
○ No proof has been presented before the Court to show
that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
■ The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of
the circumstances involved.
23
■ [DISC] Not the checkpoint by itself but the
manner in which policemen conduct themselves
in a checkpoint that makes it a valid warrantless
search
○ The constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved.
■ Court refuses to make a blanket rule; only
looking at it based on personal violations
○ Petitioner's general allegation that he had been stopped
and searched without a search warrant by the military
manning the checkpoints without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against
unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable
the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not
all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
■ Where, for example, the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search.
○ The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to establish effective
territorial defense and maintain peace and order.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, for public security.
■ Court may take judicial notice of shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in
such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the
very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and
an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
○ True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
 discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
○ [DISC] Checkpoint is not an exception for warrants
■ [DISC] Search is a plain view
● Policemen are not allowed to make a
person step out UNLESS there is a
contraband (e.g. guns, bladed
weapons, marijuana).
● Police cannot open the trunk of the
car (security guards can though)
● Also not allowed to search when the
gun is readily apparent (e.g. inside a
bag where you really can’t make that
the content is a contraband)
● Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
○ COMELEC gun ban, candidates who’ll violate will be
disqualified. HREP sgt. at arms requested the return of
the firearms issued to petitioner. Petitioner asked driver to
return said firearms. Driver was caught at checkpoint.
Petitioner called upon to explain. City Prosecutor
recommended to dismiss. COMELEC directed filing of
information against petitioner and driver anyway for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code and to show cost
why he should not be disqualified to run. Petitioner lost
elections anyway. Court still decided to rule bc of the
matter on warrantless search.
○ COMELEC argues that gun ban is mala prohibita; intention
of offender immaterial.
○ SC: search was not valid; candidate cannot be
disqualified
○ Plain View - NO [unclear whether this is plain view or
moving vehicle]
■ limited to visual inspection, but police opened
trunk and opened bag inside
■ Note that the firearms were packed neatly in
their gun cases and wrapped in a bag in the
trunk.
■ An extensive search without warrant could
only be resorted to if the officers
conducting the search had reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search
that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched.The
existence of probable cause justifying the
warrantless search is determined by the facts of
each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the
warrantless search in situations where the
24
smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or
where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
○ Consent - NO
■ The seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the
search DOES NOT constitute an implied waiver
■ Petitioner could not have marshalled the
strength to refuse (14 armed policemen); not
possible to give voluntary consent in such
intimidating environment
■ In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if
there was any, could not be more than a mere
passive conformity on Arellano's part to the
search, and "consent" given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances is no consent within
the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
○ GENERALLY - Accused CANNOT be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return the two firearms, on basis
of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of
his car.
■ In the case at bench, we find that the
checkpoint was set up 20 meters from the
entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence
to show that the policemen were impelled to do
so because of a confidential report leading
them to reasonably believe that certain
motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged
in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in
organizing special strike forces. Nor, as
adverted to earlier, was there any indication
from the package or behavior of Arellano
that could have triggered the suspicion of
the policemen.
■ Absent such justifying circumstances
specifically pointing to the culpability of
petitioner and Arellano, the search could
not be valid. The action then of the policemen
unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy
and the security of his property, in violation of
Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for
any purpose in any proceeding.
● Caballes v. CA, 373 SCRA 540 (2002)
○ Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on
patrol in Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves. They flagged it down and
with the driver’s(appellant) “consent” they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC).
They weighed 700 kilos and were valued at P55,244.45.
 The RTC found Rudy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of theft, this was affirmed by the CA.
○ Moving vehicles - NO
■ Search of a moving vehicle at checkpoint:
A checkpoint may either be a mere routine
inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
■ In this case the police officers did an extensive
search because they had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable
wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
■ When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to
an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law offender or
they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. (examples were the
smell of marijuana coming from a package,
having intel from an informant, confidential
information/reports, etc.)
■ Here, the police officers who were on routine
patrol became suspicious when they saw that
the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon. (having no confidential
report or tipped information) - NO probable
cause; mere suspicion
○ Plain view - NO
■ Plain view doctrine: …an object is in plain
view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. In other words, if the package is such
that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view
■ The cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks and covered
with leaves; cannot be discerned visually
○ Consented search - NO
■ Consent must be unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion
■ It is a fact determined by the totality of the
circumstances (determination of this includes
characteristics of age, location, demeanor,
education, demeanor of police, environment,
vulnerability, etc. It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given.
■ …to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved
25
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
■ Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him
I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive."
■ The statements of the police officers were not
asking for his consent; they were declaring to
him that they will look inside his vehicle.
○ “Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining
evidence on record are insufficient to sustain petitioner's
conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.”
● Others: “The fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior
of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police authorities
do not sufficiently establish probable cause.” (People vs. Chua Ho
San)
Search of a moving vehicle at checkpoint: A checkpoint may either be
a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
A routine inspection consists of instances where
(1) the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection8 and
(6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law offender or they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be
searched.
Plain view doctrine: an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view
On Consent

State has burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given.
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether he was in a public or secluded location;
(3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
To constitute a waiver [to consent], it must first appear that
(1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Consent must be EXPRESSLY manifested and with WHOLE volition.
(Caballes v. CA)
● People v. Sapla, G.R. 244045, June 16, 2020
○ Police officers received a tip (11:30 am) from an
anonymous informant providing information on a male
individual transporting marijuana. In the same day at
1:20pm, officers from related departments gathered and
later on flagged down a passenger jeepney where they
saw the accused matching the description prvided by the
anonymous tup. Officers asked Sapla to open the sack
and the officers saw 4 bricks of fried marijuana leaves.
○ SC: No valid search and seizure conducted by the
police officers.
■ As a rule, a search and seizure operation
conducted by authorities is only reasonable
when a court issues a search warrant after it
has determined the existence of probable cause
(done by reviewing the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case).
■ Any deviation or exemption from this rule is not
favored and is strictly construed against the
government.
○ According to People v. Comprado, warrantless seach and
seizure of a moving vehicle is allowed because it is
impractical to secure a warrant for a vehicle that can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction of the
court where a warrant may be sought.
26
○ HOWEVER, the search herein is generally limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle
is limited to visual inspection.
■ Comprado held that the search is not a
“search of a moving vehicle” insofar as a
“search of a moving vehicle” targets a
vehicle, not a specific person. Moreover, in
this type of search, the vehicle was
intentionally used as a means to transport
illegal items.
○ In this case, the target of the search was the person who
matched the description given by the tip. Hence, the
search conducted by the officers on Sapla cannot be
characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.
○ Nevertheless, even if the search conducted can be
characterized as a “search of a moving vehicle,” the
operation still CANNOT BE DEEMED A VALID warrantless
search of a moving vehicle.
○ THUS, Inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.
○ The police CANNOT conduct a warrantless intrusive
search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified
tip relayed by an anonymous informant.
■ A more extensive and intrusive search that
goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle
necessitates probable cause on the part of
the apprehending officers.
■ In this case, the sole circumstance that
engendered probable cause was the
information they received through the RPSB
Hotline from an anonymous person.
■ The Court also addressed divergent lines of
jurisprudence, and settled that the cases
adhering to the doctrine that exclusive
reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip
cannot engender probable cause that
permits a warrantless seach of a moving
vehicle that goes beyond a visual search
should be the prevailing and controlling
line of jurisprudence.
■ Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely
dangerous and perilous precedent where an
unverified information can be made the basis
for authorities to undertake extensive and
intrusive searches – everyone would practically
be at the mercy of informants.
■ In this case, the police merely adopted the
unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion of
another person, i.e., the person who sent the
text through the RPSB Hotline.
■ Apart from the information passed on to them,
the police simply had no reason to reasonably
believe that the passenger vehicle contained an
item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction.
○ Therefore, the warrantless search conducted on
accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful
search of a moving vehicle. ACQUITTED
Privacy of Communication
Ganaan v.CA, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
● Eavesdropping via telephone extension is not a form of wiretapping
and is therefore NOT punishable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act
● Telephone extensions are not within the meaning of the law as the
term “tap” implies an act or device used to intercept or record
communication between parties and that, according to US
jurisprudence, the act of receiving calls from an extension telephone
is akin to “hold out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it”
● Telephone extension - no expectation of privacy (at that time)
everyone who had telephones should be aware that the probability
of another person can hear
● Cited in Ramirez v. CA: the use of a telephone extension for the
purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, following the principle that "penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused."
● [DISC] Nature of the medium is considered
Ramirez v. CA 248 SCRA 590 (1995)
● Tape recorder
● Section 1 of R.A. 4200L It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
● The applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly
mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
● The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
● Senate Congressional Records, Senator Tañada:
○ This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
○ it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using
it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
○ A party secretly recording a public speech is not
contemplated by the bill to be punishable. What’s
contemplated is the communication between one
person and another person - not between a speaker
and a public.
A
● [DISC] There is an expectation of privacy because the recording
happened in the office of the respondent - private conversation
27
○ [DISC] One party surreptitiously and intentionally
recorded the private conversation. No knowledge of tape
recorder. If that is to be used, the other person must be
given th opportunity to accept or reject the recording of
the conversation
Right to Privacy
● Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)
○ Re: ID System; Biometrics
○ SC: AO violates the right to privacy.
○ The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.
○ SC emphasized that the right to privacy is expressly
recognized in Sec. 3(1), Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution
and other facets of the right are protected in various
provisions in the Bill of Rights (Sec. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17);
that zones of privacy are protected in the Civil Code and
Revised Penal Code (see pp. 157-158); that the invasion
of the right is an offense in special laws (Anti-Wiretapping
Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, the Intellectual
Property Code, etc.); and that privileged communication
or privacy of certain information is recognized in the Rules
of Court.
○ Privacy as a fundamental right; burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn (strict scrutiny
used here).
○ Purpose of AO - (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities; and (2) the need
to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services
■ SC: debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough
○ What is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308—which
if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy
in clear and present danger
○ NOT NARROWLY DRAWN
■ No parameters on what will be collected,
Uses of information are not limited - A.O.
No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who
will seek its coverage. It does not state whether
encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes.
■ The indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give
the government the roving authority to
store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.
■ The order does not tell in clear and
categorical terms how the information
gathered shall be handled.
 ■ It does not provide who shall control and access
the data, under what circumstances and for
what purpose
■ Computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. but there
are no controls to guard against leakage of
information.
■ The lack of proper safeguards in this regard
of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual’s liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination;
it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by
government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
■ Hence, the possibilities of abuse and misuse
of the PRN, biometrics, and computer
technology are accentuated considering that the
individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded.
■ [DISC] Does not state who will be accountable
for the personal info; did not provide a system
of redress
● This Decision also rejects the argument of the Solicitor General
that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics technology.
○ Indeed, as technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases. However:
○ A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum
standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred
from its provisions.
○ On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually
unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds
of the ID System. Nor do the then existing laws provide
adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
● Lastly, this Decision rejects the Solicitor General’s insistence for the
validation of the rational relationship test. - cannot be; preferred
right entail use of strict scrutiny
○ A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy
purpose, but it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is
not narrowly drawn.
● The SC also underscores that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good. To
reiterate, it merely requires that the law be narrowly focused
and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. Any
law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this
Court to strict scrutiny.
28
The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a
two-part test:
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and
(2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.
The factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of the
expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
diminish this expectation
Data privacy
Republic Act No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act of 2012)
Reasonable expectation of privacy
● Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988)
○ Film: “Four-day Revolution” which Enrile did not allow his
name to be included in so the film featured a fictitious
character based on him.
○ SC:
○ Applying the clear and present danger test: the
respondent judge was too hasty in making such
issuances, for the projected motion picture was not yet
complete and was not yet exhibited to any audience.
Neither the private respondent nor the respondent judge
knew what the completed film would look like. Hence,
there was no “clear and present danger” of any violation
of any right to privacy that private respondent could
lawfully assert.
○ “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor is
it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is
compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role
played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the
constituent events of the change of government in
February 1986.
○ The Court ruled that the extent of intrusion upon the life
of private respondent would be limited in character. The
extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the
synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described
as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that
film a truthful historical account.
○ Private respondent is a public figure.
■ A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has
long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute of ap ublic
character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy
cannot be invoked resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest.
The interest sought to be protected by the right
of privacy is the right to be free from
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of
 an individual which are outside the realm of
legitimate public concern.
■ Public figure includes anyone who has arrived
at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person; [DISC] when the public
has legitimate public interest about you and
information about you
■ The right of privacy of a "public figure" is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary
citizen.
○ It was also held that there was no liability when they were
given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within
the scope of the public interest they had aroused. - E.g.
News, information or education, entertainment and
amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and
broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human
activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the
public scene in newsreels and travelogues.
○ In this case, the private respondent is a “public figure”
because of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in
February 1986. Because his participation therein was
major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played
by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The
right of privacy of a “public figure” is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private
respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple
private citizenship. He continues to be a “public figure.”
After a successful political campaign during which his
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or
indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he
sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.
○ Reconciling the freedom of speech and expression and the
right of privacy:
■ The line of equilibrium may be marked out in
terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events. There
must be no knowing or reckless disregard of
truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must
also be no presentation of the private life of the
unwilling private respondent and certainly no
revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal
facts.
■ Furthermore, to the extent that “The Four Day
Revolution” limits itself in portraying the
participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution to those events which are directly
and reasonably related to the public facts of the
EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent’s privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal
may be carried out even without a license from
private respondent.
29
○ [DISC] Enrile’s expectation of privacy is reduced only to
matters which are purely personal i.e. his relations not
relating to his public life.
● Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No.
157870, Nov. 3, 2008
○ Re: Constitutionality of Dangerous Drugs Act
○ Sec. 36 (c) and (d) (relating to students and employees)
are not constitutional.
○ ON STUDENTS: (1) schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2)
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting
in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and
well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge
such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just,
and non-discriminatory.
○ Provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as
a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies.
○ Compelling state interest: safety and interest of the
student population
○ ON EMPLOYEES
○ In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
○ Given that the drug-testing policy for employees –– and
students for that matter –– under RA 9165 is in the
nature of administrative search needing what was referred
to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures", the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable.
○ Factors to consider in the matter of reasonableness
■ Nature of the privacy interest (context e.g.
workplace)
■ Character of intrusion authorized by challenged
law (narrowly drawn?)
■ compelling state interest
○ Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
■ Reduced expectation of privacy - in office or
workplace - The employees' privacy interest in
 an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the company's work policies, the collective measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by duty; and
management and the bargaining unit, and the (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
inherent right of the employer to maintain admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office ● Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
29, 2014
degree of impingement upon such privacy
○ Re: minor students uploading pictures of them in
has been upheld.
underwear in Facebook
■ Compelling state interest - To the Court,
○ SC: STC (school) did not violate the right to privacy
the need for drug testing to at least
of students
minimize illegal drug use is substantial
○ Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his
enough to override the individual's privacy
or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
interest under the premises.
user, in this case the children of petitioners
■ Well-defined limits – The intrusion into the
manifest the intention to keep certain posts private,
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
through the employment of measures to prevent
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention
against embarrassing leakages of test results,
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of
and is relatively minimal. Sec. 36 of RA 9165
the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
and its implementing rules and regulations
these privacy tools is the manifestation in cyber
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
specifically directed towards preventing a
informational privacy.
situation that would unduly embarrass the
○ A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy
employees or place them under a humiliating
tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or
experience.
profile detail should not be denied the informational
● Nobody singled out
privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
● Test conducted by trained
choice.
professionals in access-controlled
■ Considering that the default setting for
laboratories monitored by DOH to
Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised
safeguard against results tampering
that the photographs were viewable to
and to ensure an accurate chain of
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
custody
petitioners’ children positively limited the
● Access to the drug results shall be on
disclosure of the photograph. If such were the
the "need to know" basis; that the
case, they cannot invoke the protection
"drug test result and the records shall
attached to the right to informational privacy.
be [kept] confidential subject to the
■ It is well to emphasize at this point that setting
usual accepted practices to protect
a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is
the confidentiality of the test results"
no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
■ If RA 9165 passes the norm of
another user who is not Facebook friends with
reasonableness for private employees, the
the source of the content.
more reason that it should pass the test
■ Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even
for civil servants, who, by constitutional
a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only"
command, are required to be accountable
cannot easily, more so automatically, be
at all times to the people and to serve
said to be "very private," contrary to
them with utmost responsibility and
petitioners’ argument.
efficiency.
■ Internet consumers ought to be aware
that, by entering or uploading any kind of
On reasonable expectation of privacy of STUDENTS data or information online, they are
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with automatically and inevitably making it
respect to their students; permanently available online, the
(2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and perpetuation of which is outside the ambit
are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, of their control. Furthermore, and more
guardians, and schools; importantly, information, otherwise private,
(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened,
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such read, or copied by third parties who may or
may not be allowed access to such.

30
 ■ We cannot afford protection to persons if
they themselves did nothing to place the
matter within the confines of their private
zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and
to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site’s layout often.
○ Without proof that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist
that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
○ Had it been proved that the access to the pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
user’s contact list has been screened to limit access
to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the
result may have been different, for in such instances,
the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
○ STC did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors.
■ Respondents appending said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court
is not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights.
○ STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty
of teaching its students to be responsible in their
dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in
OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified
in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the
process, it violated the students’ rights.
○ Considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children
are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation
of the parents in disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations.
● Cadajas v. People, G. R. No. 247348, November 16. 2021
○ Cadajas tried for child pornography
○ Cadajas made a 14-year-old girl send him nudes
○ Defense of Cadajas - cannot be used; evidence
inadmissible bc password account is protected and
because there is no consent and warrant; volated the
rules against seizures - UNTENABLE
○ Flaw in Cadajas he gave his password to the minor. AAA
showed these photos to her mother.
○ Did the mother violate Cadajas’ right to privacy? NO
■ Photos obtained by private individual
31
■ Article III of the Constitution must affect only
those pieces of evidence obtained by the State
through its agents
■ Where private individuals are involved
(governed by the Civil Code) =
admissibility cannot be determined by the
provision of the Bill of Rights
■ The Bill of Rights was intended to protect
private individuals against government
intrusions. Hence, its provisions are not
applicable between and amongst private
individuals.
■ Exclusionary rule is not applicable as the
evidence was obtained by a private
individual.
■ EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE
○ Petitioner’s expectation of privacy: his Facebook
Messenger account is password protected, such that no
one can access the same except himself.
■ However, considering that he voluntarily
gave his password to AAA, he, in effect,
has authorized AAA to access the same.
● While the messages and photos were
taken from the Facebook Messenger
of petitioner because AAA was forced
by BBB to do so, such does not
deviate from the fact that petitioner
allowed another person to access his
account. When he gave his
Facebook Messenger password to
AAA, he made its contents
available to AAA, and the latter
would then have the latitude to
show to other persons what she
could access, whether she be
forced to do so or not.
■ Thus, there is no violation of privacy.
Freedom of Speech
Principles
Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008
● NTC issued a press release stating that continuous airing or
broadcast of the said taped conversations (Hello Garci scandal) by
radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
● Gonzales v. COMELEC: free speech and free press may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship and punishment unless there be a
clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
● Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans: all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.
● Freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an unbridled
license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom
● Clear and present danger test ○ There is no showing that the feared violation of the
○ This sees that speech may be restrained because anti-wiretapping law endangers the national
there is substantial danger that the speech will security of the State.
likely lead to an evil the government has a right to ○ The mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and
prevent. It requires that the evil consequences of the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior
sought to be prevented must be substantive, restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
extremely serious and the degree of imminence ○ Therefore, the press statements at bar are acts that
extremely high should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
● Press freedom is part of the larger right of free discussion and forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
expression press.
○ Freedom of the press deserves extra protection.
● Present case
○ Needs to be subjected to the clear and present danger Content-neutral Content-based
rule, as they are content-based restrictions
■ Is it an evil that the State has the right to merely controls the time, place or restriction is based on the subject
prevent? manner, and under well defined matter of the utterance or speech
● Are they attacks against the very standards
existence of the State: rebellion, strictest scrutiny
sedition, invasion, etc.? NO not designed to suppress any
● NOT the evil that the State has the particular message only when the challenged act has
right to prevent (if at all, it wii just overcome the clear and present
lead to the downfall of the current substantial government interest danger rule will it pass
admin) required constitutional muster
○ Evil sought to be prevented in this case: the airing of a
tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping test: intermediate government has the burden to
law. The Court held that the respondents who have the review/approach overcome the presumed
burden to show that their acts do not abridge freedom of unconstitutionality; government
speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and Gov’t regulation justified if: must show the type of harm the
present danger test 1. within constitutional speech sought to be restrained
■ First, the various statements of the Press power of the Government would bring about, otherwise the
Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in 2. it furthers an important prior restrained will be invalid
the tape recording. or substantial
■ Secondly, the integrity of the taped government interest regulation must serve an important
conversation is also suspect (Press Secretary 3. if the government or substantial government interest,
showed 2 versions). interest is unrelated to unrelated to the suppression of free
■ Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the the suppression of free expression
who's and the how's of the wiretapping act is expression
ambivalent (different versions). 4. if the incident restriction incidental restriction on speech
■ Fourthly, it is even arguable whether its airing on alleged freedom is no must be no greater than what is
would violate the anti-wiretapping law. greater than is essential essential to the furtherance of that
● Thus, the Court ruled that not to the furtherance of that interest
every violation of a law will interest
justify restraining the exercise of (Chavez v. Gonzales)
freedom of speech and of the
press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain Limits of State intervention
freedom of speech and of the press. ● Social Weather Station v. Comelec, 357 SCRA 496 (2001)
Instead, the totality of the injurious ○ Assailed: R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act) which bans the
effects of the violation to private and publication of surveys affecting national candidates 15
public interest must be calibrated in days before an election and surveys affecting local
light of the preferred status accorded candidates 7 days before an election. This law is argued
by the Constitution. to be necessary o prevent the manipulation and
● The need to prevent violations corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
cannot per se trump the exercise erroneous surveys and that the restriction is minimal in
of free speech and free press, a duration and scope.
preferred right whose breach can ○ SC: unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech
lead to greater evils. expression, and the press

32
 ■ (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression,
■ (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and
■ (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than
the suppression of freedom of expression.
○ No clear and present danger in this case - no evidence will
support the conclusion that the survey will result in the
bandwagon effect
○ It’s up to the people to vote
● GMA Network, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357
○ Assailed: COMELEC resolution - Limit aggregate (before,
interpretation was per station but now it’s aggregate)
time (120 mins for whole campaign period) for broadcast
and radio ads of candidates and pol. parties as COMELEC
wanted them to avail the COMELEC spaces - ultimately to
level playing field
■ COMELEC hour is during dead hours
■ So if you have the money, you wanted to have
your 30-secs during the peak hours
○ SC struck this down
■ There is a violation of the freedom of speech -
restricts the means of candidates to express
their ideas
■ the adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime
limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
■ The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people.
■ also unreasonable when PH has lots of
languages and dialects spoken
■ Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is
arguably the most cost effective medium of
dissemination. Even a slight increase in
television exposure can significantly boost a
candidate's popularity, name recall and
electability." If that be so, then drastically
curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively
reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably
curtail his freedom to speak as a means of
connecting with the people.
○ Rational Basis Test was used (pero Sir said na dapat strict
scrutiny)
○ [DISC] Strict Scrutiny
■ [DISC] Compelling interest YES - level playing
field [In conflict with case that stated that
leveling of playing field does not constitute
compelling state interest which would justify
such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties]
■ [DISC] Means - UNREASONABLE, wala na halos
oras for ad, just imagine]
33
● Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728
○ Re: Diocese of Bacolod’s Tarpaulin - Team Buhay & Team
Patay on RH Bill that COMELEC wants to remove on the
basis of it being oversized
○ COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.
○ The size of the tarpaulin matters. The form of
expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
■ Size limitations during elections hit at a core
part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin
is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
■ The assailed regulation is thus content-based.
○ The regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party which
are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social
issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional.
■ In the case, the tarpaulins of the petitioner
consists of a social advocacy and the law on
the fixed size for election posters or
tarpaulins will amount to the abridgement
of speech with political consequences.
○ This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of
speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an
election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be
constitutionally valid only if what is regulated is
declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for
its principal object the endorsement of a candidate
only.
○ The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard
and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d)demonstrably the least restrictive
means to achieve that object.
○ The regulation must only be with respect to the
time, place, and manner of the rendition of the
message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it
will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.
[DISC] Levels of analysis
1. Classification - content-based or content-neutral?
a. If content-based - Apply clear and present Danger Test
i. If walang present danger, apply strict
scrutiny
b. If content-neutral - Apply intermediate approach
 People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 544 (1999)
● Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014 People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 131036, June 20, 2001

Right to Bail
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
Is there unprotected speech? Padaranga v. CA, 247 SCRA 741 (1995)
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da’wah Council, G.R. No. 135306.  January 28, Rights of the Accused
2003 People v. Calma, 295 SCRA 629 (1998)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14 (1973) People v. Flores, 394 SCRA 325 (2002)
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989) People v. Murillo, 434 SCRA 342 (2004)
Demata v. People, G.R. No. 228583, 15 Sept 2021 People v. Rivera, 362 SCRA 153 (2001)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) In re: Request for Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Republic Act No. 11930 Case Against Former Pres. Joseph Estrada, 360 SCRA 248 (2001)

Freedom of the Press Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo

Chavez v. Gonzales, supra Ilusorio v. Bildner, 322 SCRA 169 (2000)
In re Emil Jurado, 243 SCRA 299 (1995) Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, Oct. 7, 2008
Lozada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 184379, April 24, 2012
Freedom of Assembly Navia v. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012
Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983) Caram v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 6, 2014
Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169848, April 25, 2006 Sanchez v. Darroca, G.R. No. 242257, June 15, 2021
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
Speedy Disposition of Cases
Right to Information Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 146368, Oct. 18, 2004
Legaspi v.Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149 (1999)
Valmonte v.Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989) Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 Right Against Self-incrimination
Province of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Chavez v. CA, 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Freedom of Religion Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools, 219 SCRA 256 (1993) Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929)
Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003)
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary, Non-imprisonment for Beliefs; Involuntary Servitude
G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003 Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851 (1940)
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phils. 201 (1937)
Re Letter of Valenciano, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishment
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Lim v. People, 390 SCRA 194 (2002)
Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel Lito Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)
Silverio v. CA, 195 SCRA 760 (1991) Non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt or poll tax
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989) Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
Double Jeopardy
Freedom of Association People v. Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
In re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554 (1978) People v. De la Torre, 380 SCRA 596 (2002)
SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) Ex Post Facto Law Bill of Attainder
People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Non-impairment of Contracts
Ortigas & Co. v. CA, 346 SCRA 748 (2000) Academic Freedom
Miriam College v. CA, 348 SCRA 265 (2000)
Access to Courts Morales v. U.P. Board of Regents, 446 SCRA 227 (2004)
Acar v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-21707, March 18, 1967 Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 (1976)
De La Salle University v. CA, G.R. No. 127980, Dec. 19, 2007
Custodial Investigation Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993
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Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019

Human Rights
Commission on Human Rights
Carino v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
Simon v. CHR, 229 SCRA 117 (1994)

Civil Liability for Violation of Rights

Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 (1975)
Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 299 (1988)
MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 (1994)

UN Treaty Bodies
Wilson v. Executive Secretary, G. R. No. 189220, December 7, 2016

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