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Jack Toldo

Dr. Philip Rose

Philosophy 34-2500-01

1 October 2019

A Deliberation and Account of Aristotle’s “Being”

Aristotle’s metaphysics is an inquiry into the substratum of reality; it is an examination of

being qua being. Metaphysics, as regarded by Aristotle, is a comprehensive study of what is

fundamental to nature and reality. It is the study of “substance,” the primal matter in which the

being of objects is situated. Aristotle disagrees with the notion that being can be grounded in

something perishable; being, he posits, must be grounded in something constant and everlasting.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle avers that since material realities are ipso facto impermanent, they

can not be sufficient grounds for being, and thus, “being,” must be grounded in something

concrete and eternal.

To understand Aristotle’s metaphysics, one must understand how it differs from the

normal sciences. Aristotle argues that every science can be broken into two parts, the material

and the formal. The material aspect of science is the subject of its study, i.e., the biologist studies

living things, the physician studies matter, and motion. The formal aspect is the view said

disciplines are studied under are: reality as living (biology) or reality as motion (physics.) For

metaphysics, the material object being studied is being, and consequently, the formal view under

which being is studied is being as being. Aristotle explains the uniqueness of metaphysics thusly,

“There is a science that studies being insofar as it is being, and also the properties of being in its

own right. It is not the same any of the so-called special sciences. For none of them considers

being quite generally, insofar as it is being” (Aristotle 4.1.) To surmise (and differentiate,)
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metaphysics from other sciences; biology studies living things as living, physics studies moving

things as moving, metaphysics studies being— as being.

Aristotelian metaphysics can be divided into four major sections: the four causes,

actuality and potentiality, substance, and God. Aristotle’s four causes are the material, the

formal, efficient, and final. The material cause is the substrate or the physical properties of an

object (diamond, steel, bronze.) The formal cause is the culmination of the material (wood) as a

generalized universal ideal, i.e., the idea of a “table” or a “statue.” The formal cause is also the

active power (ability) of the builder, which allows him to transform the wood into a table. The

efficient cause is the thing or object that necessitates something else. For our table, the efficient

cause would be the carpenter swinging the hammer and cutting the wood. The final cause is the

end or ultimate goal of an object. To refer back to the table; the final cause would be to make

eating and writing easier as it prevents us from having to hunch over.

Aristotle, then, turns to the idea of substance. He begins chapter seven remarking that

being has many senses; the primary kind of being Aristotle is interested in is substance. A

substance, according to Aristotle, would be a cat, an acorn, a human, a horse, etc. Substances are

people and things that bring about their own existence (the seed of their creation lies within.)

Substances, however, differ from what Aristotle calls “accidents.” Accidents are merely

descriptions or “adjective-like” in their role regarding substances. Accidents to Aristotle would

be colour, or, actions like sitting or walking. Actions refer to the features of substances.

Substances are more fundamental and important to Aristotle because the existence of substances

is prior to that of accidents; no accident can exist unless a substance exists for it to be in.

Aristotle says substances can be thought of in four ways; he says “the essence, the

universal, and the genus, seem to be the substance of a given thing, and the fourth of these cases
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is the subject” (Aristotle Book 7.3.) Aristotle, however, chooses to focus on the essence,

illustrating its primacy. He states, “The essence of a thing is what the thing is said to be in its

own right” (Aristotle Book 7.4.) Meaning, by nature, you are not a basketball player. However,

by nature, you are a human. Your essence (humanness) is mentioned in the very definition of

being human. So, essence is what you are exclusive of all other things. To Aristotle’s original

question, what is a substance? A substance, simplified, is an essence; however, Aristotle

specifies it is only primary essences that are substances, as seen “. . . that definition and essence

in the primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well,

only not in the primary sense” (Aristotle Book 7.4.) As well as here, “Therefore there is an

essence only of those things whose formula is a definition . . . but where there is a formula of

something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one

element in them of another element” (Aristotle Book 7.4.) Aristotle argues that essence, primary

essence, is substance if their definitional formula gives not an account of the specific, but the

general, and are independent and without qualification of other substances.

This eidos (essence) or primary substance that Aristotle is developing, is not the genus or

species that a substance belongs to, but rather a hylomorphic combination of the predicate form

and matter. With the creation of the hylomorphic notion (“being,” as a combination of form and

matter) Aristotle questions not why is a house, but rather, why “we ask why these things-for

instance,- bricks and stones- are a house” (Aristotle Book 7.17.) Aristotle ponders why bricks

and stones, the material cause of beings, constitute a formal categorization, and thus, being.

Aristotle answers by stating that the cause of being for a substance is the form or essence

predicated of the matter that constitutes that substance. The essence of a hylomorphic compound

is its form, not its matter; this is seen when Aristotle states “by “form” I mean the essence of
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each thing, and its primary substance” (Aristotle Book 7.7.) This is also seen when he says,

“when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence” (Aristotle Book 7.7.) Since the

form of substance makes something what it is, it logically entails that a substance of a thing is its

form.

The purpose of Book 7 (not only to confuse other classmates and me,) was to distinguish

between matter and form. The matter of a substance is the materiality it is composed of, whilst

the form of a substance is the combined whole. Consider an ingot of silver. The silver could

potentially be molded into a ring, or shaped into a fork. The matter (the silver) is linked with

potentiality, while the substance (the ring or fork) is linked with actuality. Aristotle, just as he

asserted the primacy of form over matter, also asserts the primacy of actuality over potentiality.

In Book 8, chapter one, Aristotle states that there are three kinds of substance:

There are three kinds of substance-one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is

eternal and another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men, and includes e.g.

plants and animals) . . . but the third [immovable] kind belongs to another science, if

there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds” (Aristotle Book 8.1.)

Aristotle explains that there are three kinds of substances, perishable, imperishable, and the

“immovable.” This “immovable” substance, is Aristotle philosophical conception of “God,”

which he calls an “unmoved mover.” Aristotle posits that the unmoved mover must, by

necessity, be eternal and everlasting, as shown when he states:

There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is

motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first

heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that
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which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without

being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.” (Aristotle Book 12.7.)

Aristotle, now coming to the conclusion of his arguments, states that the unmoved mover is

eternal, possesses full and unceasing actuality, and is prime substance. The unmoved mover is

not affected by any external forces or agencies; it is the first principle; it is what begets (or

moves) all other realities. So, how does Aristotle ground being in this entity? And why does he

choose to do so?

For Aristotle, one must accept that change exists. Change, ipso facto, implies a sequence

of events. A sequence of events implies an underlying structure of time (before and after.)

Aristotle also argues that there has been change and time ad infinitum. So, if change and time

have always existed and is eternal, it logically follows that there must be some primordial

substance or “mover” that keeps everything in motion. The support for this idea is shown when

Aristotle states, “Now nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present

to move it” (Aristotle Book 12.6.) This primordial substance, or “unmoved mover,” is where

Aristotle grounds the idea of being.

In his work, The Metaphysics, Aristotle attempted, and I would argue successfully so, to

ground being in a concrete way. Due to the nature of material beings, Aristotle avers that being

can not be grounded in them; to do so would result in a logical contradiction (material beings

possess potentiality, disqualifying them by definition.) To ground being, Aristotle argues that

one should imagine the universe as a cyclical chain of material events that are in forever motion.

For this motion to be eternal, there must be some guiding force or principle which allows it to be,

and in this force or first principle, we can ground our conception of being. Aristotle describes

this first principle or force of constant actuality as the “unmoved mover.” For Aristotle, this is
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where he grounds his idea of “being.” This first principle, or entity, possesses full actuality, and

guides or allows for the finite circular motion of events in the world to exist eternally.

Works Cited

Cahn, Steven M. Classics of Western Philosophy. Hackett Publishing Co, Inc, 2012.

Aristotle's Metaphysics, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/firstphilosophy.html.

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Cohen, S. Marc. “Aristotle's Metaphysics.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford

University, 15 June 2016,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#WhatSubs.

“The Unmoved Mover.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.,

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aristotle/The-unmoved-mover.

Nickny79. “‘The Unmoved-Mover’ in Aristotle's Metaphysics.” Owlcation, Owlcation, 2

Dec. 2011, https://owlcation.com/humanities/The-Unmoved-Mover-in-Aristotles-
Metaphysics.