What is known to us as metaphysics is what Aristotle called "first philosophy.

" Metaphysics involves a study of the

universal principles of being, the abstract qualities of existence itself. Perhaps the starting point of Aristotle's
metaphysics is his rejection of Plato's Theory of Forms. In Plato's theory, material objects are changeable and not
real in themselves; rather, they correspond to an ideal, eternal, and immutable Form by a common name, and this
Form can be perceived only by the intellect. Thus a thing perceived to be beautiful in this world is in fact an
imperfect manifestation of the Form of Beauty. Aristotle's arguments against this theory were numerous. Ultimately
he rejected Plato's ideas as poetic but empty language; as a scientist and empiricist he preferred to focus on the
reality of the material world.
Metaphysics, or the parts still in existence, spans fourteen books. The early books give background information and
survey the field before Aristotle's time. He also describes the nature of wisdom: it begins with sense perceptions,
which must be translated into scientific expertise. Such knowledge requires the understanding of both facts and
causes, and wisdom comes only with an understanding of the universal principles and primary causes built on this
science. Aristotle's work in metaphysics is therefore motivated by this desire for wisdom, which requires the pursuit
of knowledge for its own sake.
By the fourth book he begins to attack some of the sophistry that has contaminated the field. One point that he
dwells on is the law of contradictions, which essentially asserts that something cannot both be and not be at the same
time. In particular, he is concerned with the relativism and even nihilism that would result from a metaphysics that
allowed contradictions. The relationship between form and matter is another central problem for Aristotle. He argues
that both are substances, but matter is potential, while form is actual. The two are not separate but intertwined, and
actuality precedes potentiality. Although the actual is produced from the potential, it is the actual that makes the
production possible.
Several of the books covering topics like contrariety, unity, the nature of mathematical objects, and others are
usually neglected, as they show less originality compared with the key points of the Metaphysics. Book XII, on the
other hand, is usually considered the culmination of Aristotle's work in metaphysics, and in it he offers his
teleological system. Before he draws any grand conclusions, he begins with the idea of substance, of which there are
three kinds: changeable and perishable (e.g., plants and animals), changeable and eternal (e.g., heavenly bodies), and
immutable. If all substances are perishable, then ultimate destruction of everything is inevitable. But Aristotle
asserts two imperishable entities: motion and time. If time were created, then there must have been no time before
the creation, but the very concept of "before" necessitates the concept of time. On the other hand, as he argued in his
works of natural philosophy, the only continuous motion must be circular. Thus he returns to the idea of the
Unmoved Mover, for only such a being could generate eternal circular motion. The Unmoved Mover is the ultimate
cause of the universe, and it is pure actuality, containing no matter since it is the very cause of itself. In order for the
Mover to be unmoved itself, it must move in a non-physical way, by inspiring desire.
Aristotle gives the Mover the name of God, but this figure is unlike most standard conceptions of a divine being.
Though Aristotle asserts that it is a living creature and represents the pinnacle of goodness, it also has no interest in
the world and no recognition of man, for it exists in a completely transcendent and abstract state. The activity of
God–if it can be called such–is simply knowledge, and this knowledge is purely a knowledge of itself, because an
abstracted being is above sense and experience and can know only what is best. Some have interpreted this to mean
that God, in knowing itself, implicitly knows everything else, but Aristotle flatly denied this view. In fact, he
believed, for example, that God would have no knowledge of evil. Thus Aristotle's conception is full of paradoxes.
God is the ultimate cause of everything in the world, but it also remains completely detached.

Plato, in his theory of forms, separates the sensible world (appearances) of the intelligible world (ideas) and the
intelligible world was the only reality, the foundation of all truth. But in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, at the heart of his
philosophy, such separation removes any intelligibility and meaning to the world. According to him, the
intelligibility is present in every being and in every thing. The world consists of substances. The substance can be
either matter or form, or a compound of both. The shape is that, in every being, is general, so intelligible. For
example the shape of a dog is what is common to all dogs. The matter is what is special, so unknowable.

There would be a hierarchy of beings, matter informally unknowable to the pure form perfectly intelligible (God).
This hierarchy justifies what Aristotle calls slavery by nature.

In this hierarchy of beings correspond a hierarchy of worlds. The sublunary world, with the center the earth, would
be the changing world of the compounds of matter and form, the world would the world supralunar almost immobile
beings almost immaterial, with, at its periphery, God as pure form.

Aristotle defines “first philosophy” (the first of the sciences) as the science of being qua being. Being can be said in
different classes of predicates: the substance (Socrates is a man), quality (Socrates is ugly), location (Socrates in the
agora), etc.. In short, as all categories of which list we are never given. These are the categories to be addressed by
the universal science, science of forms, which will be called “metaphysical” by the editor of Aristotle.

Aristotle collects a list of ten basic categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession,
action, passion.
Metaphysics: Book by Book analysis

Book I (A, Alpha, 980a-993a) First Causes and Principles

(1) Knowledge of sensation is to science. Wisdom (sophia) is the science of first causes and principles. (2) Wisdom
is the universal science, first principles and its end is the Supreme Good. It is born of wonder and has no end other
than itself. God has such wisdom.

Dialectic of earlier philosophers (3) Science of the primary causes can be divided into four like in Physics II, 3: 1.
Substance (ousia) or quiddity (to ti en einai), 2. Material (Hule) or substrate (hupokeimenon) 3. Guiding principle 4.
The purpose (telos). The pre-Socratic cosmologies physical causes sought in the matter. (4) First principles of
Empedocles and Democritus as materialistic. (5) Pythagorean and Eleatic. (6) Plato knew only the formal cause of
ideas and the material cause. (7) must be added the moving cause and final cause. The One with the Platonists and
the Good are “causes” of Ideas. (8) Criticism of Presocratics. (9) Critique of the Theory of Ideas of Plato (“we, the
Platonists”), the Third Man Argument. (10) The Four Causes seem to complete.

Book II (α, “small alpha ‘, 993a-995a) Principles of Physics

(1) Philosophy is theoretical science of truth. (2) It is impossible that there is an infinity of causes and species. There
must be a first principle of the generation that can not itself be destroyed. (3) Science can not all have the same rigor
and Physics has no method of mathematics.

Book III (B, Beta, 995a-1003) The 14 Aporias

(1) 14 List of paradoxes (and answers). (2) first. Is there a single science of causes or more? (Γ, 1) second. Is science
the principles of the demonstration? (Γ, 3) third. Is there a single science of all substances? (Γ, 2) fourth. Y is he
non-sensitive substances? (Λ, 6-10) fifth. Is the science of accidents? (Γ, 2). (3) sixth. The principles of beings are
they kind? (Z, 10) seventh. Are they kind or cash? (Z, 12). (4) 8th. Is there a separate form of the compound
individual? (Z, 8; Λ, 6-10, M, 10) ninth. What is the unity and identity of the formal principles? (Z, 14; Λ, 4-5) 10th.
The principles of corruptible beings are they the same as incorruptible beings? (Z, 7-10; Λ, 1-7) 11th. Being and the
One they are the substance of things or do they depend on a substrate? (Z, 16, I, 2, M, 8) (6) 12th. The principles are
of universal or individual? (L 13-15) 13th. The principles are in power or act? (Θ, 1-9) (5) 14th. Mathematical
objects (numbers and figures) are they substances? (M-N).

Book IV (Γ, Gamma, 1003a-1012b) Being as being logical and Principles

(1) Science sought studied being as being (to on he (i)). (2) The being is said in several senses, but is not a mere
homonym as defined relatively to a unit (pros hen). There is a primary philosophy of being and of the One, a single
science of contraries.

Principle of contradiction (3) Philosophy must also consider the axioms and principles of demonstration. (4) The
principle of contradiction can not be proved but it is possible to refute its negation. (5-6) Similarly, it is possible to
refute the relativism of Protagoras. (7) proof of principle of the excluded middle. (8) Critique that everything is
wrong or that everything is true.

Book V (Δ, Delta, 1012b-1025a) The Book of the different meanings

(1) Principle (arkhe). (2) Cause (aition). (3) element (stoikheïon). (4) Nature (physis). (5) Required (anagkaïon). (6)
One (hen). (7) Being (being, to be) expressed in several senses. (8). Substance (ousia) (9). Even (tauto) Other
(heteron) Different (diaphoron), similar (homoion) (10). Opposed (antikeimena), unlike (Enantia), specific otherness
(Hetera tô eidei). (11). Anterior and posterior (proteron kai husteron). (12) Power (dynamis). (13) Quantity (Poson).
(14) Quality (poion) (15) the Relative (pros ti) (16) Perfect (téléion) (17) limit (peras) (18) That by which (katho)
(19) Disposition (diathesis). (20) way of being (hexis). (21) affection (pathos). (22) Deprivation (stérèsis). (23)
Equity (ekhein). (24) from (ek tinos einai). (25) Party (bers) (26) Totality (holon) (27) Fragmented (kolobon) (28)
Gender (genos) (29) False (pseudo) (30) Accident (sumbébèkos).

Book VI (E, Epsilon, 1025b, 1028a) Being, accident and truth.

(1) Added to the Mathematics and Physics is a theoretical science Theology (philosophia theologikè), which
examines the leading causes eternal. (2) The being is said to be as true or as categories (substance or meaning of
accidents), or potential or actual. There is no science of accidents. (3) The accident quota, otherwise everything
would be necessary.

Book VII (Z, Zeta, 1028a, 1041b) The Substance

(1) A being is said in the original sense as substance (ousia). (2) What is substance among sensitive individuals,
elements, figures and ideas of the Platonists?

(3) The substance is either one. Quiddity (Z, 4-6, 10-12). 2. The universal (Z 13-14). 3. Gender. 4. The subject (or
substrate, hupokeimenon). The subject is either matter or form, or the individual compound (sunolon). We must start
sensitive substances.
(4) The quiddity (to ti en einai) is that each person is at home (kath’auto). Accidents and accidental attributes are out
of the quiddity. Substances and accidents are beings and the substances have namesakes in the original sense of the
definitions as the quiddity. (5) We can also define the nature of a substance composed of an accident. (6) Every
person is identical to its quiddity.

(7) There are different kinds of generation: Generation by nature, by art and by chance. (8) The matter and form are
not generated, there is that generation of the compound. (9) Similarly for changes according to categories other than
substance, according to the quantity, quality …

(10) The parts of the form are parts of the definition. (11) The parts of the shape and parts of the compound. (12)
Despite these parts of the definition, the unit has to be defined (An. Post. II, 3-10).

(13) The universal (“Animal”) is not a substance. (14) Idea (the animal itself) is not a substance.

(15) The individual and the idea is not definable. (16) The parties sensitive substances are not substances. The A and
be are not substances. (17) The substance is the principle and reason: it is the quiddity of the logical point of view,
which can be taken as formal causes, or final drive, but also the shape.

Book VIII (H, ETA, 1042a-1045A) Matter

(1) The matter also is substance. (2) The generation of the compound. (3) The definition and number in sensible
things. (4) The four causes in substances and in an event (eclipse). (5) The substrate material is to the contrary. (6)
There is a unity of the definition (Z, 12), despite the difference between form and matter, act and potency.

Book IX (Θ, Theta, 1045A-1052A) Being as power and Entelechy, being as true

(1) The power active and passive. (2) power with reason and without reason. (3) Critique of Megarics that reduce the
power to act. (4) The possible and the impossible. (5) The power requires an act. (6) The act, examples of
differences (infinity). (7) The transition of power to the entelechy. (8) The act is prior to potentiality. (9) Although
the power and act.

(10) Being as truth (cf. E, 4).

Book X (I, Iota, 1052a-1059a) The One and the Many

(1) A is said in several senses: 1. the continuous, 2. All, 3. The digital unit, 4. The specific unit (Universal) (2) The
One is a universal and not a substance, as being. (3) and A Multiple, Same and other. (4) An annoyance. (5) Equal.
(6) The multiple. (7) The intermediaries in the conflict. (8) The specific otherness. (9) The specific difference. (10)
The corruptible and incorruptible differ in kind.

Book XI (K, Kappa, 1059a-1069a) Summary of the being and becoming

Summary of B, Γ, E: (1-2) The aporia (B). (3-6) Unit of the science of being and logical principles (Γ). (7-8)
theology and the science of being, being by accident and being as true (E).

Summary of Physics: (9) The movement (Phys. III, 1-3). (10) Infinity (Phys. III, 4-7). (11-12) change (Phys. V, 1).

Book XII (Λ, Lambda, 1059a-1076a) separated substances and the Prime Mover

(1) There are three kinds of substances: 1. Sensitive substances corruptible, 2. Mobile eternal substances, 3. The
substance still. Physics studies the first two. (2) Substance means matter, form and privation. (3) The material and
shape are not generated. Y is there separate forms? (4) There must be a moving cause of all beings. (5) The act and
the power applied to all beings.

(6) There is a first unmoved mover. (7) God is as Good as the final cause of all things.

(8) There are many Intelligences of several spheres. (9) The Divine Intellect is Thought of Thought. (10) The
Supreme Good is separated and order at all.

Book XIII (M, Mu, 1076a-1087a) Critique of Platonic Ideas

(1-3) mathematics Things are not substances. (4-5) Critique of Ideas. (6-9) Critical Ideas of Numbers. (10) The idea
is not a substance.

Book XIV (N, Nu, 1087a, 1093b) Suite

(1) Principles, the One and the Many. (2-3) The numbers are not separated. (4) Numbers and Idea of the Good. (5-6)
the number is not a Cause.