THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF

THE NEGOTIATED ORDER

PETER M. HALL
DEE ANN SPENCER-HALL

A BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL question has always been: Under what

social conditions does a phenomenon occur? This article explores
that question with reference to when the negotiated order per-
spective is an apt description of an organization. Early work on
which the perspective is based challenged the stable, structured,
functionalist view of organizations by clearly depicting continuous
ongoing dynamic change via negotiations in medical, profes-
sional, and hospital settings (Strauss et al., 1963, 1964; Bucher
and Stelling, 1969; Bucher, 1970). Several sympathetic critics,
while supporting the attention to process, an action orientation,
and participants’ perceived and constructed reality, have severely
questioned the assumption, implication, or assertion that every-
thing is negotiable in organizations. They argue that there are
limits to negotiation and that users of the perspective should give
more importance and influence to the effects of social structure
and power (Benson, 1977a; Day and Day, 1977).
Responses by proponents of the theory have argued that the
issues of the limits, extent, and significance of negotiations in
organizational life are empirical questions (Maines, 1977; Strauss,
1978). They aver that no one ever said everything was equally
negotiable at any given period of time or negotiable at all. &dquo;One of
the researcher’s main tasks, as it is that of the negotiating parties
themselves, is to discover just what is negotiable at any given
time&dquo; (Strauss, 1978: 252, emphasis in original).

AUTHORS’ NOTE The work on which this article is based was performed pursuant
to grant NIE-G-78-0042 of the National Institute of Education It does not,
however, necessarily reflect the views of that agency Versions of this article were

328
 329

The research data reported here are based on a comparative

study of two public school districts. The observations revealed
differences in the extent and circumstances of negotiative activity
and structural, organizational, and interpersonal limits on negoti-
ations between and within those school systems. For example, we
found that much of school life was routine and nonnegotiated,
while the area of special education was replete with negotiation.
Using those kinds of differences and observed constraints in
conjunction with the earlier work on hospitals (Strauss et al.,
1964) helps us project some propositions about the social con-
ditions that facilitate or hinder negotiation. The article is organized
in the following manner: (1) a brief description of the research
sites, (2) an account of the differences between the districts
that affect the extent of negotiation, (3) the limits on negotia-
tions in school systems, (4) the social conditions of negotia-
tion, and (5) a conclusion. The abiding question throughout is not
whether everyone participates m negotiation equally and with
equitable results, or whether hospitals, public schools, or busi-
nesses are or are not negotiated orders, but when, how, and why

participants engage in negotiative activity.

COOLEY CORNERS AND MEADMONT

The public school systems of two moderate-sized Midwestern

communities, Cooley Corners and Meadmont, were studied for
two years using a combination of observation, interviewing, and
analysis of documents and newspapers.’ Both communities were
conservative and traditional in their social, political, and religious
outlooks. The major economic activities of both communities were
service, marketing, and government. Each had light industries,
colleges, hospitals, shopping malls, fast-food strips, country clubs,
community theaters and symphonies, various media, bars and
taverns, and numerous churches. Both were 90% white and 10%
black. Some significant differences between the two were that
Meadmont was twice as large as Cooley Corners (-50,000 to
-25,000), was more affluent and had a larger white-collar popula-
tion, and was growing while Cooley Corners was losing popula-
tion. In addition, the white population of Meadmont was more

presented at the American Educational Research Association meetings, Los

Angeles, April 1981, and at the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction
symposium, University of Dayton, April 1982 We are grateful for the helpful
comments of K Benson, H Boland, G Fine, R Hall, D Maines, J Thomas, M
Wardell, L Zurcher, and an anonymous reviewer
330

religiously and ethnically organized and divided than in Cooley

Corners. The latter, on the other hand, has had a long history of
discrimination against blacks.
Cooley Corners and Meadmont schools were formally governed
by six-member elected boards of education and administered by a
superintendent and two assistant superintendents. Both experi-
mented with some educational innovations in the 1970s but were
returning to more traditional instruction and curriculum. Because
of annexations, both districts were larger than the city population.
Significant differences between the districts were size, complex-
ity, age of facilities, growth, test scores, interscholastic competi-
tive success, moraie, and desegregation. The Meadmont district
had about 8000 students, 500 teachers, and 12 schools to 4000,
300, and 9, respectively. Meadmont’s district organization showed
an extra level with more directors, coordinators, and committees.
Most Meadmont schools were built after 1950, while Cooley
Corners’ schools, in general, predated World World II. Cooley
Corners’ student population was decreasing, while Meadmont’s
was growing. Standardized test scores in Meadmont schools
were well above national norms, while those in Cooley Corners

approximated the means. Meadmont’s high school has had re-

markable success in extracurricular interscholastic competitions,
while Cooley Corners High has had losing records and few prizes.
Spirit, morale, and satisfaction were significantly higher in Mead-
mont’s schools, district organization, and the general community,
while Cooley Corners presented an opposing counterimage. Fin-
ally, desegregation was easily accomplished in Meadmont but
systematically resisted until grudgingly accepted in Cooley Cor-
ners.

DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES

BETWEEN THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS

The negotiated order might be summarized as a &dquo;process of

social interaction in the course of which the participants are
continuously engaged in attempting to define, establish, main-
tain, and renew the tasks they perform and the relationships with
others which the tasks presuppose&dquo; (Freidson, 1976: 311). This
process was more in evidence in Meadmont than in Cooley
Corners at each level of the system, between the levels, and
between the district and the community. A greater proportion of
organization members in Meadmont were involved in and at-
tempted to assert themselves in the operation of the system than
 331

in Cooley Corners. Although both districts faced similar situa-

tions, Meadmont’s decision-making and general organizational
operations encouraged and showed greater autonomy, participa-
tion, and negotiation, while the Cooley Corners district tended to
show central concentrations of power, decisions imposed from
above, and fatalism and passivity throughout the system. Such a
description is relative, because in Meadmont those with power
and resources tended to control the extent, participation, and
outcomes of the process. Nevertheless, on the basis of our
observations and analysis we concluded that the Meadmont
school district was more like a negotiated order than the one in
Cooley Corners. To support that conclusion, we will briefly com-
pare system differences between the superintendents, the boards
of education, the directors, the principals, the teachers, and the
community contexts.

THE SUPERINTENDENTS

Rob Simpson became superintendent of the Meadmont district

less than a year before our research. He was a newcomer to
Meadmont who succeeded a man who had ruled the district for
over two decades with an iron hand. Simpson was charged by the
board to have an open, responsive administration with an empha-
sis on communication. He accepted that responsibility and pub-
licly made communication his primary goal. He appeared to others
as a receptive listener and began to receive expressed concerns,
issues, and problems that had been previously suppressed. Simp-
son’s style of administration was opposite to that of his predeces-
sor. He decentralized authority, delegated responsibility to others,
and assumed that some problems could be solved without his
involvement. He entered the organization with plans for gradual
change which he revealed slowly to his subordinates and the
board. He then entrusted them to plan and implement those
changes. Simpson was generally a cautious, conservative person
who avoided confrontation and sought compromise. The fact of
his being an organizational outsider, being charged with being
responsive, bringing old problems into the open, delegating au-
thority, encouraging subordinate activity, instituting some change,
and being willing to compromise all encouraged and facilitated
negotiative activity.
Herman Jameson, in Cooley Corners, acted in ways that
constrained negotiations. He managed the affairs of the entire
district. Moving from the high school principalship in somewhat
332

murky political circumstances, Jameson succeeded a man who

was forced to resign and who had shaken the system, terrified
numerous personnel, and intimidated the board. Jameson sought
to create an atmosphere of calm and credibility and to demon-
strate that he was a legitimate and capable administrator. He
planned few internal organizational changes but took on a major
external one to prove his effectiveness. He became increasingly
controlling and clearly dominated board meetings. He did not
delegate responsibility. In fact, he assumed responsibilities that
were formally those of his assistants. He would also frequently
walk into their offices when they were meeting with others to find
out what was happening. He chaired and ran all principals’
meetings. At public meetings, he answered questions that were
addressed to others. He controlled information, dominated organi-
zational meetings, and centralized power. Jameson’s system of
organization and his style of leadership inhibited other partici-
pants in the system and hampered negotiation.
It is critical to point out that the differences in administrative
style between Simpson and Jameson and consequent negotia-
tions were a result of the past history, structure, and problems of
the organization, the nature of their managerial succession, the
responses by other participants, the new superintendents’ needs
to accumulate resources for power, and their strategic decisions
about how to do that. They were not simply personality differ-
ences. In other words, there was interaction of organizational
structure, distribution of resources, strategic thinking and behav-
ior, and problematic situations that led to variation in negotiations.2

THE BOARDS OF EDUCATION

Members of the Meadmont school board took a more active

interest in the district than did their Cooley Corners colleagues.
They were better informed about education in general and about
the local district. They attended regional, state, and national
meetings more frequently. They were more willing to search out
issues, respond to community concerns, and act independently of
the administration. They believed they were more in control of the
district than did the Cooley Corners board and therefore asserted
themselves and engaged in negotiation more. Structural differ-
ences facilitated this involvement. The Meadmont board met at
least twice as often a month as did their counterpart. One of these
extra meetings was a study session where informal discussion
and policy planning occurred. This was absent in Cooley Corners.
 333

In addition, Meadmont board members spent more time talking to

each other outside of meetings about school matters. Some were
willing to do the organizational and political work necessary to
form coalitions. Cooley Corners board members were more likely
to take their concerns individually to the administration and be
&dquo;cooled out.&dquo;
Both boards had three-member coalitions, but the Meadmont
one was more effective. The coalition in Cooley Corners consisted
of one man and two women. Jameson believed the women would
retreat under offensive behavior. He acted under that premise,
defeated the coalition, and left the one man furious at the women
and therefore divided. In Meadmont, the three men who made up
the coalition strongly resisted administration pressure, developed
additional resources, and forced the administration to compro-
mise. In sum, because of their role definition, their political efficacy,
their structural opportunities, and their alliances, the Meadmont
board took part in more negotiative activity but also encouraged
it throughout the system by attempting to implement their formally
designated authority.

THE DIRECTORS

The Meadmont school district had an additional organizational

level because of its size. There were separate directors of elemen-
tary education, buildings and ground, transportation, community
relations, special education, secondary education, and health
services. Cooley Corners had no one responsible for community
relations, secondary education, or health services. An assistant
superintendent was responsible for elementary education, build-
ings and grounds, and transportation.3 Cooley Corners did have a
director of special education, but his activities were structurally
limited in comparison with Meadmont.4Each of the Meadmont
directors had some degree of autonomy, and the complexity of
their relations with each other, their superiors, and the building
principals and staff led to a great deal of negotiative activity. For
example, special education and elementary education directors
were frequently jointly involved with building principals about
additional personnel, space, materials or parent and staff com-
plaints. Also, the director of elementary education met frequently
with principals or committees of teachers over instructional
methods, textbook selection, space or personnel problems, and
external accreditation. Conflicting demands, structural contradic-
tions, and divergent role definitions led to negotiations; involving
334

the directors of health services, community relations, and second-

ary education. The difficulties of coordinating and integrating
multiple overlapping but semiautonomous roles dealing with
unclear situations and organizational problems led to numerous
discussions, efforts by participants to assert their interests, and
consequent negotiations. The fact that there were more people in
the Meadmont schools with specified responsibilities led to the
structural facilitation of different perspectives and negotiations.

THE PRINCIPALS

Meadmont’s building principals were significantly more in-

volved in organizational processes than those in Cooley Corners.
They had recently hired five young principals, most of whom were
pursuing doctorates and had career mobility aspirations. Collec-
tively, they had an organization that met without superiors
present and relayed formal requests for better salary and working
conditions. They were also lobbying the central administration for
more autonomy and flexibility in budget formulation and disburse-
ment at the building level. Formally, they met once a month with
the director of elementary education to deal with matters of
common concern.5 Their drive for autonomy, their collective

organization, their freedom from commitment to past traditions,

their educational pursuits and orientation to instructional change,
together with good relations with the director of elementary
education, led to numerous contacts, informal arrangements, and
formal agreements.
In contrast, the elementary principals in Cooley Corners were
older, less educated, less assertive, and unorganized. They never
made collective requests or met without the superintendent.
Because of their role definition and declining enrollments, they
were not likely to make requests of the central administration, and

they discouraged their teachers from doing so. The result was a
low degree of assertiveness and negotiative activity.
The high school principals behaved in ways that had opposing
effects on negotiation. Ernest Palmer, the Meadmont principal,
viewed one of his primary roles as mediator and negotiator. The
central administration also saw him that way. In addition, he
prided himself on the development of extracurricular activities
and left routine matters and the curriculum to one of his assis-
tants. Over time, he had allowed a number of faculty freedom to
develop their own special programs. He recognized the tensions
that those &dquo;prima donnas&dquo; and special interests caused but
 335

regarded the consequent conflict, compromise, and resolution as

a necessary consequence of an excellent high school. AI Lindsey
at Cooley Corners High tooK pride in &dquo;running a tight ship.&dquo; He
was very bureaucratic as an adminstrator, conservative and
traditional as an educator, and strict as a disciplinarian. He was
perceived by his teachers and the board as inflexible and unap-
proachable. At the same time, he busied himself in ways that kept
him uninformed about occurrences in the classrooms or around
the school.
The intermediate level (grades 6-9) presented a more compli-
cated picture. One junior high principal in Meadmont was viewed
by his staff as ineffective. They developed two ways of dealing
with him. The first was to choose a teacher whom the principal
respected to negotiate for them. The second was to work out
numerous arrangements among themselves which precluded the

necessity of consulting the principal. The other junior high princi-

pal was extremely supportive of his staff and supported by them.
He did not hesitate to make requests or demands of his superiors.
His building had more resources as a result of his lobbying.
However, he regarded it as his building and his staff, and he
tolerated little internal assertion or dissent. Thus, one junior high
had negotiation across levels but not inside, while the other had
much internal negotiation but little external to it.
The intermediate school principal in Cooley Corners was known
for his rigid adherence to rules and procedures by teachers,
administrators, and board members. He succeeded a principal
who allegedly allowed a clique of teachers to run the school, and
if problems occurred he would issue an edict. This principal had
aspirations for higher administration and did not make demands
or requests to the central administration for his staff. He defined
himself as an administrator whose job was to keep the school
running smoothly.6 The net effect, for varying reasons, was
greater negotiative activity in Meadmont’s intermediate schools
than in Cooley Corners.

THE TEACHERS

Meadmont’s teachers were more militant, better organized,

more confident, and showed a greater sense of pride in their
district than those in Cooley Corners. An active and vocal nucleus
of teachers, primarily at the high school, had tripled the member-
ship in an insurgent teachers organization. They were challenging
the traditional, recognized teachers’ association and were viewed
336

as a serious threat by the administration and the board. They were

making salary demands as well as taking on old unresolved
problems and proposing new changes. Their recent successes
had heightened their sense of efficacy and involvement in present
and projected future negotiations. More generally in Meadmont,
the teachers’ views of themselves and the district led to more
active participation in organizational committees and their own
organizations. Teachers in Cooley Corners had basically adapted
to the system. Participation was low in their community teachers’
association. Most had generally negative attitudes toward imple-
menting change or asserting themselves. Many of them expected
failure in the classroom, stagnation in the system, and rejection or
apathy from the community. While Meadmont’s teachers were
not without some of these same feelings and behaviors, they did
show greater collective and individual assertiveness.

THE COMMUNITY CONTEXT

Meadmont’s community generated more pressures on the

district than did the community of Cooley Corners. For example,
Meadmont has a large parochial school system supported by a
vocal, organized, religious community. There has been a long
history of opposition to public schools from this sector of the
community. During the course of our study, extensive conflict,
discussion, and negotiation occurred over bond issues, busing,
and school finances. While Cooley Corners had parochial schools,
at no time were they the subject of concern to the public schools.
Meadmont’s successful extracurricular programs generated strong
community booster groups who lobbied the administration and
board on a number of occasions. Cooley Corners’ booster groups
were small and powerless or nonexistent.
A review of each level has indicated that negotiative activity
was more common in the Meadmont school system than in

Cooley Corners. It was for this reason that we argued that the
former was more like a negotiated order than the latter. We say
&dquo;more like&dquo; because the process defined by Freidson, which we
took to constitute the negotiated order, was absent from many
situations we encountered during the research in both districts. In
the next section we will discuss some factors that act as limits
and obstacles to negotiation in school systems.
 337

LIMITS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN SCHOOL SYSTEMS

Much of the behavior we observed in both districts was not

negotiation. It was habitual, routine, regularized, expected, and
compliant in nature. Most participants were not continuously
engaged in developing their tasks or relationships or asserting
themselves. They were more likely to either be obeying others or
playing their prescripted roles. In this section we suggest the
following structural and organizational reasons that led to stabi-
lizing behaviors, reinforcing organizational role relationships, and
constraining negotiation: the daily life of schooling, the classroom
unit of focus, the distribution of power, the gender composition of
the system, the effect of the past, the direction of organizational
commitment, and the structural context of public education.

The daily life of the school building was characterized by ritual,

practicality, segmentation, and superficial intermittent interaction
(see Lortie, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Kamens, 1977).
Teachers and students, often bored or fatigued, routinely moved
through the day’s periods. At best, most teachers saw their
colleagues or superiors only in passing. Administrators were
often out of the building and therefore saw limited numbers of
staff, students, or parents. Lunch times and planning periods
tended to be short and hectic. Discussions in teachers’ lounges
were mostly about nonschool matters. At day’s end, most staff
wanted to leave to escape, relax, or attend to family affairs. After-
school meetings were never eagerly desired. Their primary con-
cern during the day had been to make it the the end-a very

practical orientation. Doing that was done mostly in isolation from

colleagues and superiors. Hence, the structural situation pre-
sented few opportunities for negotiation.

The unit of operational focus of the school is the classroom,

whereas in the hospital tt is the &dquo;case.&dquo; A case focus involves the
simultaneous coordination of a number of staff personnel that
allows for interpretations, differences, and negotiation. Despite
the rhetoric of individualization in schools, collectivization of
&dquo;treatment&dquo; in the classroom leads to the suppression of dif-
ferences and the encouragement of standardized routine group
interaction.

The distribution of power, formal and perceived, inversely

affected negotiations. Those lacking resources or who thought
338

they were weak restrained themselves. Most teachers defined the

administration and the board as a distant, omnipotent &dquo;they.&dquo;
Teachers who did assert themselves as individuals had extra
resources due to teaching reputation, social class position, or
extraorganizational lobbies. Most, however, interacted passively
with their principal. While principals had more power than
teachers, they often complained about an unresponsive superior,
broader political realities, or budget restrictions. Few dared go
over the heads of their superiors because administrations m both
districts became livid if the &dquo;chain of command&dquo; was violated.
Negotiations were more common at higher organizational
levels because participants had more authority, responsibility,
and resources. However, despite the formal distribution of author-
ity, in fact, the central administration had more power than the
board.7 Because of limited time commitments, part-time involve-
ment, and partial knowledge, the board became dependent on the
administration. Through the use of professional ideology and
educational expertise, the administration defined issues as tech-
nical and nonnegotiable. The board tended to accept, literally and
figuratively, the agenda constructed by the superintendent. Most
board members went from meeting to meeting with limited
challenges to the administration. Board members’ decision-making
and policy-formulating responsibilities were distinctly limited, and
as a consequence, so was their negotiative activity.s

The distribution of sexes paralleled the authority hierarchy.

Women were virtually absent at higher administrative levels but
constituted two-thirds of the teachers. Few women aspired to
administrative positions. Those who did were defined as cold,
pushy, or brassy. Most female teachers, particularly older ones,
were passive, deferential, and compliant. They matched the

description of semiprofessional women in organizations run by

men, reflecting socialization, sex roles, family organization, and
cultural values (Simpson and Simpson, 1969). More militancy
was observed among younger, better-educated female teachers,
but their strength was limited by numbers and turnover.9 The net
effect was less resistance, self-assertion, and negotiation.

The weight of history and tradition, together with perceptions

of community attitudes and organizational resources, constrained
organizational members. People had developed patterns and
views that conditioned them not to offer alternatives. &dquo;You can’t
teach evolution or have sex education in this town&dquo;; &dquo;They won’t
be seriously or professionally committed to staff development or
 339

inservice training.&dquo; In addition, an earlier commitment of re-

sources (building a junior high and not a high school) or the failure
to have obtained more at an earlier, more propitious time (failure
to build elementary schools in the 1950s) constrained the sys-
tems. Old buildings, weak administrators, no junior highs, and a
poor salary schedule contributed a sense of barriers that could not
be transcended.
The external situation reinforced the weight of history and
tradition. Fewer people have children in public schools and
thereby a vested interest in them. This condition leads to declining
support and exacerbates problems of credibility, legitimacy, and
adequate resources. In addition, participants at all levels com-
plained about federal and state mandates that restricted their
flexibility. Increasing numbers of teachers have been leaving the
districts and teaching elsewhere due, in general, to low salaries.
Declining enrollments, loss of public support, external govern-
mental restrictions, teacher burnout, and flight are part of a period
of retrenchment where resignation and acquiescence are more
common than assertiveness and negotiation.

The focus of organizational attention and commitment limited

negotiations. Both districts were continuously and heavily in-
volved in election campaigns to pass bond issues to build new
schools (Hall, 1981). Most board and administration time was
devoted to this issue. While negotiations did occur around the
bond proposals and campaign, there was less time to consider
other issues. The latter were tabled, ignored or given short shrift.
In addition, the board and the administration tolerated no lower-
level opposition to the bond issues. People who had other issues
to propose restrained themselves for fear of &dquo;not being a good
team player,&dquo; &dquo;bringing bad news,&dquo; or disturbing the preoccupa-
tion of &dquo;the boss.&dquo; Finally, the bond issues were to be solutions to
a multiple set of problems, so people withheld their plans or ideas.
The effect of this overriding problem was to preclude the emer-
gence of others and consequent negotiation.
The limits on negotiation constituted a significant and strong
part of the everyday life of school district operation. It is now
useful for purposes of contrast to discuss circumstances that
facilitate negotiation. A brief review of the original psychiatric
hospital study and our observations of the organization and
operation of special education make the differences quite clear.
We will then formulate and discuss some general statements
about the relationship between social conditions and negotia-
tions.
340

SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND NEGOTIATION

Negotiations will occur in situations characterized by change,

uncertainty and ambiguity, disagreement, ideological diversity,
newness and inexperience, and problematic coordination. The

summary by Strauss of the earlier study makes this clear (1978:

107-122). In the late 1950s numerous changes occurred in
treating the mentally ill and in psychiatric institutions. Strauss
and his colleagues studied a hospital in which a new superinten-
dent desired innovations in treatment on the wards. He recruited
young psychiatrists who were inexperienced with state hospitals
and offered them other professionals, staff, and much autonomy.
The psychiatrists not only had to implement their therapeutic
philosophies but also organize the staff into a team. Much of what
they confronted was novel, unclear, and involved resolving differ-
ences, coordinating diversity, and negotiating.
Negotiations were quite prominent in special education in
schools because of similar characteristics and conditions 10 It was
a relatively new educational area in terms of theory and practice.
It involved numerous staff with different specialties and knowl-
edge. Because of specialized training and more advanced de-
grees, special educators conceived of themselves as more like
true professionals than typical teachers. They dealt with their
students on an individual-case basis. Placement and the develop-
ment of the Individual Educational Program were the result of
committee decisions involving reports from specialists and class-
room teachers and discussions of alternative diagnoses, prog-
noses, and programs. Federal and state mandates for special
education programs created problems of adequate space and
personnel that led to negotiations between special education
teachers, principals, and central administrators. The mainstream-
ing requirement put an extra burden on some regular teachers
(for example, art, music, physical education, social studies) be-
cause they frequently found these children difficult to handle in
the classroom. This led to consultations with the principal or
special education teacher about how to manage the child. All of
these factors were conducive to negotiation and represented
dramatic differences from typical school situations.
Drawing on the descriptions of the psychiatric hospital and
special education, the differences between the two school sys-
tems, and the structural limits and constraints in schools provide
an evidentiary basis to suggest the circumstances that affect the
occurrence and extent of negotiations.&dquo; First, activities that are
variable, individualized, publicly performed, and that involve team-
 341

work and coordination will show more negotiation than those that
are routinized, performed individually, and in isolation. Much of
classrooom teachers’ daily activity is highly routinized and in-
volves little if no negotiation. On the other hand, the &dquo;case&dquo;
nature, novel circumstances, and coordination of specialists led to
negotiation m the hospital and in special education. We suggest
that those public schools with open classrooms, team teaching,
individualized instruction, and coordinated departmentalization
would be more like a negotiated order than the traditional public
school. In the former, there are more unknown or variable factors,
and more conjoint effort is required from people to be successful.
If people are publicly accountable and must act under unclear
conditions, it seems logical that they will negotiate. If, however,
others are only minimally necessary and the activity is clear,
known, and simple, little negotiation should occur.
Second, the greater the size and more complex the organiza-
tion, the greater the degree of negotiation. Larger organizations
are more likely to have critical masses of individuals who can
effectively act as units. Greater complexity will probably create
more subinterests that differ with those at the top. Both should

generate greater attention to coordination. People can feel freer to

act on their own or subgroup interests because they are not
monitored as easily. Smaller and simpler organizations should
have fewer separate interests, less autonomy, and be more easily
monitored and managed. Comparing Meadmont and Cooley Cor-
ners supports this conclusion. Studies of small rural school
districts where there is a superintendent, a principal, and K-12 in
one building show an absence of internal negotiation. There,
centralized decision making and pervasive surveillance severely
limit autonomy and participation (McCarty and Ramsey, 1971).
Third, equality, broader dispersions of power within an organi-
zation, and efficaciousness are conducive to negotiation, while
strong degrees of asymmetry, concentrations of power, and
fatalism are not. Power constrains the occurrence as well as the
results of negotiation. Professionals in mental hospitals are more
likely to feel relatively equal than are teachers when compared
with principals or superintendents. Teachers are more likely to
negotiate with each other than with superiors. Teachers who did
negotiate with superiors tended to have outside resources or
alternatives to increase their influence. But in systems where
power is more dispersed, all participants, including teachers, are
more likely to engage in negotiation than in systems where it is
concentrated. In Meadmont, Simpson decentralized authority and
dispersed power, while in Cooley Corners, Jameson centralized
342

and concentrated power. In some smaller rural districts, teachers

face unconstrained, concentrated power, which results in fear
and absolute compliance (Spencer-Hall, 1982).
However, ineffective use of power is conducive to negotiation
by subordinates. Weakness, inadequacy, inattention, indecisive-
ness, and ignorance by principals all stimulate or reinforce
assertiveness in teachers. Schools with weak, permissive, or
absent principals resulted in teachers negotiating arrangements,
discussing problems, and running the school. Similar patterns
were found in some superintendent-board and director-principal
relationships.
People who view themselves as efficacious and their organiza-
tion or unit as successful are more likely to engage in negotiations
than those who do not. There is a sense that one is doing
something important, and that one’s self is linked to organiza-
tional accomplishment. Presumably that was true in the psychi-
atric hospitals because of the implementation of new, exciting
therapeutic philosophies. Greater concern about those lead a
person into a more active role in the organization. If efficacy and
success lead to negotiation, failure and a sense of weakness lead
to retreat and accommodation. Participants will reject responsibil-
ity and identification with the system. They will behave with
minimal motivation, passively, and fatalistically. Many of the
differences between boards and teachers in Meadmont and
Cooley Corners exemplified those points.
Fourth, leadership that delegates authority, tolerates individu-
ality and the development of semiautonomous programs, favors
compromise over confrontation, and defines itself as a mediator
will encourage negotiations more than leadership that centralizes
authority, discourages innovation and development, and practices
domination. The former not only allows the creation of subgroup
interests, but the appearance to others of their acceptability. This
encourages wider involvement in discussion and decision mak-
ing, as well as more assertiveness. Bureaucratic rigidity and
authoritarian dominance suppress involvement. Being willing to
be a mediator legitimates the expression of differences and
broader participation. Limiting the opportunities by holding fewer
meetings, dominating discussion, discouraging autonomy, and
presenting oneself as decision maker all prevent negotiative
situations. Administrators who resist both making decisions and
encouraging others to to do so facilitate negotiation.
Fifth, an organization that is planning or undergoing change
will show negotiation more than one tending toward stability or
emphasizing tradition. Not only does proposing or implementing
 343

change create new situations, problematic coordination, and

differences over alternatives and implications, but it also creates
conditions where others fo.esee possibilities of proposing other
changes. Typical strategies of planned change involve affected
participants. Greater effort is needed to control the change, but it
should show evidence of negotiation. In addition, new programs
never work the way they were intended because of emergent con-

tingencies, problematic connections between theory and practice,

and altered balances of power. Negotiation is one way of working
out those problems. Stable systems presumably have worked
through most of those issues
Administrative succession, particularly if it involves an outsider
following an authoritarian leader, can be conducive to negotia-
tion. Succession marks an interruption and ambiguity in policy-
making, organizational operation, and leadership. New leaders
may have change agendas of their own but may have to defer
somewhat to others until they accumulate sufficient knowledge
and resources. In addition, other units and interests may use the
situation to present their problems or increase their power.
Boards of education probably tend to be more forceful with new
superintendents Over time, however, most superintendents sta-
bilize their position and dominate their boards.
Sixth, professionals in organizations likely to engage
are more
in negotiations than semiprofessionals. Professionals include
physicians, psychologists, and educational administrators, whereas
semiprofessionals are exemplified by nurses, social workers, and
teachers. Professionals have longer training, more legitimated
status, more right to privileged communication, more of a body of
specialized knowledge, and more autonomy from supervision or
societal control than semiprofessionals (Etzioni, 1969). Teaching,
for example, is not prestigious. Classroom teachers are subject to
control by administrators and boards and do not control their
training, licensing, or materials or techniques used in the class-
room. In addition, the body of expert knowledge that teachers
claim is weakly supported (Parelius and Parelius, 1978). Profes-
sionals gain power and self-confidence through the combination
of expertise, status, ideology. Their sense of autonomy and of
being in control lead them to assert themselves, make sugges-
tions, create situations, and strive for dominance, all of which
contributes to negotiations. Semiprofessionals recognize the bu-
reaucratic structure and authority hierarchy that limits their auton-
omy. They also remain insecure about their status and training
and tend to defer to professionals. Nevertheless, the particular
rhetoric of teachers as professionals usually restricts them from
344

asserting themselves collectively. In Cooley Corners especially,

but commonly in Meadmont, too, teachers resisted organizations
that might be labeled unions because &dquo;teachers are professionals
and not workers.&dquo; We suggest that organizations with a large
proportion of semiprofessionals controlled by professionals are
characterized by less negotiation than those with a larger propor-
tion of professionals throughout the organization-for example,
schools versus hospitals.
Seventh, the greater the focus of organizational attention and
commitment of resources, the less the degree of negotiation,
particularly if the issue involves the external environment. The
presence of a moderate number of issues with moderate intensity
is likely to generate the greatest degree of negotiation. Concern
with unity in the face of external conflict or a single dominant
issue prevents the emergence of internal differences and at-
tendant negotiation. On the other hand, issues of moderate
intensity are believed to be important enough to require attention,
but not so important as to justify a single imposed solution. The
life of the organization is not threatened, so alternatives can be
tolerated.

CONCLUSION
The theoretical issue directing this research was under what
conditions negotiative activity occurs. The comparative and retro-
spective evidence indicates that it is related to (1) the nature and
organization of operational tasks; (2) organizational size and
complexity; (3) the distribution, use, and effectiveness of power;
(4) leadership and administrative style; (5) the degree of organiza-
tional change; (6) the nature and relationships of organizational
personnel; and (7) the number and significance of organizational
problems. These are clearly important factors that should be
examined and tested in future studies using the negotiated order
perspective.
In addition, however, no study is without its limitations or
ambiguities. Those that we can address only briefly include (1) the
effect of the environment, (2) the applicability of the findings to
other organizations, (3) the effect of organizational growth or
decline on negotiations, and (4) other organizational variables that
might effect negotiations. First, our analysis tended to focus on
the organization (the school district) as the basic unit. Current
organizational theory has been emphasizing the effect of varying
environmental conditions and dependences on organizational
 345

processes (Meyer et al., 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The

environments we observed were reasonably benign in compari-
son with other school districts (Cuban, 1976). A more complete
and realistic analysis would conceptualize environment more
explicitly and include constraining, uncertain, and turbulent con-
ditions that would heighten the focus on extra- and intraorganiza-
tional negotiations and their interrelationships. Second, our find-
ings deal explicitly with school systems. J. Thomas (personal
communication) has stated that some of our results do not apply
to prisons. Numerous typologies and taxonomies or organizations
have been proposed because not all organizations are identical
(Blau and Scott, 1962; Pugh et al , 1969; Mintzberg, 1979). While
such systems are problematic, they do point to the conclusion that
different kinds of organizations should show different properties,
and we thus assume different degrees of negotiation. Third, given
our data, we speculated that negotiation was greater in a growing

organization than in one that was declining and retrenching

(Meadmont v. Cooley Corners). Pfeffer (1981), however, asserts
that organizational politics, a presumed analogue to negotiative
activity, is more likely in the latter case. He argues that those
threatened by cutbacks mobilize and resist, while people in
expansive situations take their unit’s growth for granted. In our
study, we believed that decline reinforced passivity and growth
encouraged efficacy. Further empirical work will be necessary to
determine the relationship between direction of change and
negotiations. Fourth, there are a number of traditional organiza-
tional variables, as well as alternative models, that should be
examined with reference to the negotiated order. In addition to
size and complexity, one might look at formalization, centraliza-
tion, and structure of communication. We would hypothesize that
the greater the degree of formalization, centralization, and formal
and vertical communication, the less the occurrence of negotia-
tion. Finally, if the negotiated order perspective is viable, it should
be evaluated against models that see organizations as anarchies
(Cohen and March, 1974), dialectical (Benson, 1977b), and/or
political (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). Each of the various
models implicitly or explicitly says something about bargaining,
negotiating, control, and autonomy. An interesting experiment
would be to have different perspectives applied to the same type
of organization or the same organization and see what emerges
as distinctive and,useful from each perspective.
The integration of macro and micro perspectives is the most
important current sociological issue. The negotiated order has
346

always been altercasted as being micro (Zey-Ferrell and Aiken,

1981). Maines (1977) has suggested that successively overarch-
ing, intersecting, and interacting negotiative contexts is one form
of resolving the apparent split. Strauss (1978) has argued that the
specification of the structural context and the negotiative context
surrounding the actual negotiations answers the criticism about
lack of attention to structure. We believe that those responses are
improvements, but they remain partial and unclear. We sensed
our own limitations at dealing with the environment, that is, with
structural context. That work IS left to be done. However, we
believe the findings and propositions from this study do contribute
to the explication of an intervening level, the organizational
context. It does constitute one of those overarching contexts but is
neither negotiative nor structural (or societal, in the way Strauss
uses it). The organizational context does delimit the negotiative
context and the consequent form of negotiation. It also mediates
and potentially acts on the structural context. Further study and
formulations need to be undertaken to clarify the relationships
between negotiations and the various contexts. Such answers
would do much to overcome disparate sociological approaches.

NOTES

1 More detailed information about the communities and school systems and
results of the study can be found in Hall and Spencer-Hall (1980)
2 A discussion of the relationship between organizational structure, mana-
gerial succession, power, and strategic behavior of these superintendents is
presented in Hall and Spencer-Hall (1982a) Simply stated, Jameson’s selection
resulted in a split board, charges of a prearranged deal, and questions about his
youth and lack of administrative experience He had to demonstrate that he was a
credible and legitimate superintendent This he did by being omnipresent and
controlling Simpson, on the other hand, as an outsider with information and
organizational relationships, had to win over the loyalties of those committed to
his predecessor and introduce change slowly in order not to cast doubt on
programs and practices the community and district had come to take for granted
3 Assistant superintendents in both districts, in general, acted in bureau-
cratic ways that dampened negotiation They were likely to cite rules and
regulations, tradition, budget restrictions, or to shield the superintendent from a
proposal or contact In other words, "no" was their favorite word The Cooley
Corners assistant superintendent responsible for these activities became the
source of a major conflict between a coalition of board members and Jameson
The board members wanted him fired for incompetency Jameson sided with the
assistant but stripped him of most of his duties Many of those left to him were
done by Jameson anyway, such as overseeing new construction
 347

4 Cooley Corners, contrary to federal and state regulations, taught its special
education program in a separate building Students were not mainstreamed, that
is, they did not take those classes with regular students that their abilities would
allow, such as physical education and music This separate facility and lack of
mainstreaming meant that there were fewer contacts between special education
personnel and other administrators and staff Cooley Corners was forced to alter
this system of special education shortly after our study concluded
5 One principal remarked to us that the real issues were decided in the
central administration parking lot after the formal meeting They would stand
around, discuss their positions, and come to some agreement before returning to
their buildings
6 This principal had little identification with his staff. He was trying to
impress his superiors by his bureaucratic orientation The central administration
saw him as "not too bright" and overly rigid However, Jameson, after becoming a
superintendent in another district, hired this principal as a director of elementary
education
7 Studies have consistently shown that superintendents come to dominate
school boards because of monopolies on information, expertise, and personnel
(Zeigler and Jennings, 1974, Tucker and Zeigler, 1980) Lay control is a myth
ritualistically enacted at public board of education meetings
8 Board members could be more involved when the issue was external and
noneducational-that is political or financial—and when the superintendent was
new in the position Simpson, for example, over time came to assert greater
control over the organization and the board, particularly when they had finished
dealing with a proposed bond issue One board member did try to raise an issue in
a public session that was defined as educational He was humbled by an
administrator and avoided any such public discussions after that He drew no
support from his fellow board members
9 Female teachers in other parts of the state and country do behave
differently in terms of unionism, militancy, and assertiveness The majority of
female teachers, particularly elementary ones, in Cooley Corners and Meadmont
did, however, reflect the traditional feminine role and were consonant with the
conservatism of the surrounding community
10 Our discussion here is more characteristic of Meadmont than Cooley
Corners for reasons mentioned in note 4 However, some of the described
negotiations were observed in committees making decisions about placements
and programs for referred students
11 Firestone (1980) says that any given school might be organized like a sect,
hospital, legislature, anarchy, or rational bureaucracy He found an elementary
school to be more bureaucratic than a high school, for example Thus, within any
kind of organization one could find different structures with differential conse-
quences for negotiative activity

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PETER M HALL is Professor of Sociology and research associate, Center for Re-
search in Social Behavior at the University of Missouri-Columbia He has recently
published articles on political sociology, symbolic interaction, and (with Dee
Spencei-Hall) on how school systems identify and handle problems Current
scholarship involves asymmetric relationships, the integration of macro-micro
perspectives, the development of symbolic interaction, and (with Dee Spencer-
Hall) a monograph from the Meadmont-Cooley Corners school districts study
DEE SPENCER-HALL is Associate Professor of Sociology at Central Missouri State
University Recent publications have been on dramaturgy in the classroom and
teacher-student interaction She recently completed a study funded by the
National Institute of Education on the relationship between work and home of
female teachers using a variety of qualitative methods A monograph from that
study is currently being prepared

Because of length constraints, &dquo;Social Science Fieldworkers at the University

of California Hold Conference and Form Association,&dquo; by John Lofland, will be
held for the January 1983 issue of Urban Lde