Ashtabula Schools Lawsuit Complaint

Case: 1:23-cv-00991 Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/16/23 1 of 47.
PageID #: 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SHELLEY CHAPMAN, )
c/o Friedman Menashe Nemecek & Long, L.L.C )
1360 E. 9th Street )
Suite 650 )
Cleveland, Ohio 44114 )
)
SEAN ALLGOOD, NATHANIEL JONES, )
ADRIAN MATHERS, ANDRE MILLER, and )
BRIAN SCRUGGS, )
c/o Attorney Martin P. Desmond )
P.O. Box 14052 )
Youngstown, Ohio 44514 )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
CHRISTINE SEUFFERT, )
6018 Hillcrest Ave. )
Ashtabula, Ohio 44004 )
)
ASHTABULA AREA CITY )
SCHOOL DISTRICT )
2300 Wade Ave. )
Ashtabula, Ohio 44004 )
)
and )
)
JOHN DOES 1-10, (In their individual capacities) )
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre
Miller, and Brian Scruggs, by and through their respective attorneys, file this Complaint against
Christine Seuffert, Ashtabula Area City School District, and John Does 1-10. In support of this
Complaint, Plaintiffs state as follows:

Case: 1:23-cv-00991 Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/16/23 2 of 47. PageID #: 2
STATEMENT OF VENUE AND JURISDICTION.
1. This action is brought pursuant to Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681, et seq.
2. This is also an action to redress the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Subject matter jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants the district courts’
jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
4. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which gives district
courts original jurisdiction over (a) any civil action authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress
the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; and (b) any civil
action to recover damages or to secure equitable relief under any Act of Congress providing for the
protection of civil rights.
5. Plaintiffs’ claims are cognizable under the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as
well as under Title IX.
6. The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in Ashtabula County, Ohio, which sits in the
Northern District of Ohio.
7. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b)(2), in that this is the judicial district in which the events giving
rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred.
PARTIES.
8. Shelley Chapman (“Chapman”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in
Ashtabula, Ohio.
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9. Sean Allgood (“Allgood”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
10. Nathaniel Jones (“Jones”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
11. Adrian Mathers (“Mathers”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in
Ashtabula, Ohio.
12. Andre Miller (“Miller”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
13. Brian Scruggs (“Scruggs”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
14. Christine Seuffert (“Seuffert”) is an individual residing at the address contained in the
caption herein. At all times relevant, Seuffert was employed by the Ashtabula Area City School
District (“Ashtabula City Schools”) as a teacher, coach, and/or school board member. At all times
relevant, Seuffert was acting under color of state law. Seuffert is sued in both her official and
individual capacities.
15. Ashtabula Area City School District (“Ashtabula City Schools” or “AACSD”) is a political
subdivision as defined in Ohio Revised Code § 2744.01, of which Ashtabula High School
(formerly) and Lakeside High School (currently) are subunits. At all times relevant, AACSD
employed Seuffert. AACSD is liable for acts and omissions taken under its customs, policies, or
practices. AACSD is also responsible for training and supervising its employees in carrying out
their duties in a lawful manner.
16. John Does 1-10 are individuals who at all relevant times, lived in and/or worked in the
Northern District of Ohio, and were employees and/or agents of AACSD. At all relevant times,
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John Does 1-10 were acting under the color of law. John Does 1-10 are being sued in their official
and individual capacities.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
17. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all prior paragraphs as if fully rewritten here.
I. Plaintiffs attended Ashtabula High School, participated in various athletic

teams, and graduated.
18. Shelley Chapman attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1985 and
graduated in the spring of 1988. While in high school, during the relevant times periods, she was
a minor teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Chapman played
girls’ basketball, volleyball, and ran track. After graduation, Chapman began coaching volleyball
at AACSD as an assistant coach.
19. Sean Allgood attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1986 and graduated
in the spring of 1990. While in high school, during the relevant time periods, he was a minor
teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Allgood played football,
basketball, and ran track. Following his college graduation, Allgood worked for Ashtabula
detention center and then the Ohio Department of Youth Services, before contracting with
Ashtabula Area Schools in 1997 and eventually being hired full-time as an enrollment officer in
2003. In the spring of 2021, Allgood accepted the interim athletic director position with Ashtabula,
which he held until January 2023, at which time he returned to the enrollment officer position.
20. Nathaniel Jones attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1986 and
graduated in the spring of 1990. While in high school, during the relevant time periods, he was a
minor teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Jones played football
and basketball.
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21. Adrian Mathers attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1985 and
graduated in the spring of 1989. While in high school, during the relevant time periods, he was a
minor teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Mathers played football
and basketball.
22. Andre Miller attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1986 and graduated
teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Miller played football and
basketball.
23. Brian Scruggs attended Ashtabula High School beginning in the fall of 1986 and graduated
teenager and had not yet turned eighteen years old. During this time, Scruggs played football and
basketball.
24. Christine Seuffert was a teacher and volleyball coach during the years Plaintiffs attended
Ashtabula High School. Seuffert was an adult at all times relevant. As their teacher, Seuffert had
the ability to exert control over Plaintiffs’ behavior and ability to participate in extra-curricular
activities, such as sports. Seuffert knew the Plaintiffs were students at Ashtabula High School who
had, at all relevant times, not yet turned eighteen years old.
II. Christine Seuffert began the process of grooming Plaintiffs by allowing them to
have access to her house and vehicle; providing alcohol to them; and engaging in
provocative, sexual behavior and activity with them.
25. In or around 1987-88, Andre Miller and Shelley Chapman started having social gatherings
and spending time together. Chapman, who had already become friendly with Christine Seuffert,
began taking Miller with her when she visited Seuffert’s house.
26. Seuffert provided alcohol to Miller when he would go to her house.
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27. Miller observed that Seuffert and Chapman had an intimate, sexual relationship.
28. Miller told his friends Allgood, Jones, Mathers, and Scruggs that Seuffert allowed him to
go over her house and provided him alcohol.
29. Soon after, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, and Scruggs also started going over to Seuffert’s
house, where Seuffert would provide them with alcohol.
30. Seuffert had the Plaintiffs over several times per week, especially following sporting
events. Seuffert provided alcohol for their consumption.
31. Seuffert eventually gave Plaintiffs permission to go into her house, even when she was not
present. Seuffert left a house key under the front door welcome mat.
32. Seuffert also gave the Plaintiffs access to her vehicle and permitted them to use it.
33. Over time, Seuffert became more and more promiscuous with the Plaintiffs.
34. On multiple occasions, Seuffert flirted with Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs and engaged in
physical acts such as touching their buttocks.
35. On multiple occasions, Seuffert encouraged Allgood to touch and fondle her breasts and
buttocks.
36. The sexual activity occurred during times that Seuffert provided the Plaintiffs with alcohol
and knew that the alcohol caused them substantial impairment.
37. Seuffert engaged in further sexual acts with Jones. In addition to engaging in similar
behavior as the others, Seuffert performed fellatio (oral sex) on Jones on two or three different
occasions. On one of those occasions, when Jones went to Seuffert’s house, she had him wait on
the couch while she showered. When she was done with the shower, she came into the room
wearing only a skimpy bathrobe. Seuffert sat on the couch with Jones, sexually touched and
stroked Jones’ genitals, and performed fellatio (oral sex) on him.
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III. Ashtabula High School officials became aware of rumors surrounding Seuffert
inappropriate conduct involving the Plaintiffs and failed to take any action to
stop or prevent it.
38. As the gatherings, drinking, and sexual activity became more and more frequent, rumors
soon started spreading throughout Ashtabula High School.
39. Ashtabula High School’s head boys’ basketball coach heard allegations/rumors that
Seuffert was providing alcohol and sex to high school students, including several of his players,
such as Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs. The head coach threatened to suspend the
players from the team if the allegations/rumors were true.
40. Ashtabula High School’s assistant boys’ basketball coach likewise heard
allegations/rumors that Seuffert was providing alcohol to high school students, including several
of his players.
41. Rather than investigate and/or report Seuffert for her wrong and unlawful conduct,
AACSD, through its employees and/or agents, threatened the victims of Seuffert to keep their
mouths shut. AACSD remained willfully ignorant of the rumors and conduct of Seuffert.
42. Based on the threats of suspension, Plaintiffs were led to believe that they were the
wrongdoers – not Seuffert – when in fact, Seuffert was the wrongdoer, and the Plaintiffs were the
victims of her illicit behavior.
43. Seuffert, as the responsible adult and teacher, should have been looking out for the well-
being of her students, not grooming them for her sick and twisted pleasures and desires.
44. In the face of the threats of being suspended from the team, which could adversely affect
their ability to attend college and their futures, the Plaintiffs understandably denied that the
allegations/rumors were true when asked by their coaches.
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45. After being made to feel like they were the wrongdoers, and the threats by school
administrators/coaches of suspension from the team, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs
stopped going to Seuffert’s house, stopped using her vehicle, stopped being supplied alcohol by
her, and stopped engaging in sexual activity with her.
46. This decision was made, and the acts ceased in or around 1989-90.
47. Based upon the threats from AACSD employees/administrators/coaches, which gave the
impression that they were at fault, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs kept their
victimization at the hands of Seuffert quiet and did not speak about it. They were left to struggle
and deal with the repercussions of Seuffert’s actions silently and alone. In fact, based on AACSD’s
failure to act, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs did not even recognize that they were
the true victims.
IV. Seuffert continued to pursue an inappropriate sexual relationship with Shelley

Chapman.
48. Unfortunately for Shelley Chapman, Seuffert’s exploitation of her continued even after the
male Plaintiffs were able to escape her grip.
49. Seuffert met Chapman during Chapman’s sophomore year of high school.
50. Seuffert served as Chapman’s home room teacher.
51. Chapman occasionally returned to Seuffert’s classroom during Chapman’s lunch period as
a way to be in a quiet space where she could decompress.
52. While in Seuffert’s classroom, Chapman often worked on homework, put her head down
to rest, or spoke to Seuffert, who appeared to be a supportive and safe adult.
53. Through these conversations, Seuffert learned that Chapman was emotionally vulnerable.
Seuffert learned that Chapman’s parents had separated the year prior, which was taking a toll on
Chapman’s mental and emotional wellbeing.
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54. Seuffert held herself out to be a listening ear, who by feigning empathy and compassion,
encouraged Chapman to trust her.
55. As the school year progressed, Chapman visited Seuffert’s classroom more and more
frequently.
56. As the visits became more frequent, Chapman opened up to Seuffert more. Chapman
revealed personal details about her home life.
57. As the year progressed, Seuffert secured more and more of Chapman’s trust.
58. Near the end of the year, Chapman and Seuffert discussed their plans for summer break.
Chapman told Seuffert that she liked to ride her bike to the beach, stay a while at the beach, and
then ride her bike back home.
59. Seuffert told Chapman that she lived not far from Chapman’s typical bike path, and invited
Chapman to stop by her home.
60. That summer, Chapman occasionally rode her bike to Seuffert’s home.
61. At the time, Seuffert lived on Michigan Avenue, a dead-end street located in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
62. During these visits, Chapman and Seuffert sat outside Defendant’s home and talked. On
one occasion, Seuffert gave Chapman her phone number and told Chapman to call her if she ever
wanted to chat.
63. Through these interactions, Chapman’s trust in Seuffert grew.
64. Chapman and Seuffert began to talk on the phone at night. At first, the phone calls were
brief. As the summer progressed, the length of the phone calls increased. By the end of the summer,
it was not unusual for Chapman and Seuffert to be on the phone for multiple hours.
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65. During Chapman’s junior year of high school, Seuffert was the head coach for the women’s
varsity volleyball team.
66. Chapman was a player for the girls’ varsity volleyball team.
67. When the volleyball team had away games, Seuffert occasionally drove her car to the game,
while the team and assistant coaches rode the bus to the game.
68. At the time, Seuffert drove a candy red 1986 Toyota Celica.
69. During that season, Seuffert occasionally invited Chapman to drive home from the games
with her. When asked, Chapman agreed, leaving her teammates to ride the bus while she rode with
her trusted coach and teacher.
70. Seuffert never asked any other player to drive home from the games with her.
71. Each occasion that Chapman and Seuffert drove home together, they were the only two in
Seuffert’s car.
72. Chapman frequently rode her bike to Seuffert’s home. There, Seuffert would invite
Chapman into her home, where Plaintiff and Defendant would talk and occasionally have dinner
together.
73. On several occasions, Seuffert provided Chapman with wine during dinner and encouraged
her to drink. At the time, Seuffert knew that Chapman was under the age of 21.
74. At school, Seuffert frequently gave Chapman hall and/or late passes. This occurred so often
that various teachers stopped accepting passes from Seuffert, yet no action was taken to investigate
the source of these passes.
75. During her junior year, Chapman was also a member of the women’s varsity basketball
team.
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76. Seuffert was not associated with the girls’ basketball team. As such, Chapman and Seuffert
did not see each other at practice as they did during volleyball season.
77. During basketball season, Seuffert began speaking more often at night with Chapman, both
via telephone and in person at Seuffert’s home.
78. At times, Chapman and Seuffert spent time together on Saturdays. Seuffert often picked
up Chapman from Martell’s Cleaners, which was located down the road from Chapman’s home,
and brought Chapman back to her house.
79. In the early stages of Chapman being at Seuffert’s home, Chapman and Seuffert typically
sat on the couch and watched television or movies together.
80. As Seuffert’s grooming of Chapman progressed, Chapman and Seuffert began sitting
closer to one another on the couch. Eventually, Seuffert began cuddling with Chapman on the
couch.
81. At all relevant times, Seuffert knew that Chapman was lying to her parents about her
whereabouts and encouraged the deceptive behavior to continue spending time with Chapman.
82. That summer, Seuffert picked up Chapman and took her to a parking lot that overlooked
the city. There, Chapman and Seuffert sat in Seuffert’s car and chatted.
83. Seuffert began allowing Chapman to drive her car. At the time, Chapman did not know
how to drive a car with a manual transmission. Seuffert taught Chapman how to drive Seuffert’s
car.
84. During Chapman’s senior year, Seuffert allowed Chapman to leave school with her car to
pick up food or run errands.
85. At the time, Seuffert had moved and lived in a house on Hillcrest Avenue in Ashtabula,
Ohio.
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86. Seuffert began visiting Chapman’s home. Each time Seuffert came to visit, it was late at
night, and she would sneak into Chapman’s home so that Chapman’s parents did not know she
was there. On occasion, Seuffert hid in Chapman’s closet to avoid being detected. While at
Chapman’s home, Chapman and Seuffert laid in bed together, cuddled, and engaged in sexual
activity in the form of touching each other’s breasts and genitals.
87. The aforementioned conduct also occurred at Seuffert’s home.
88. On one occasion, Seuffert was laying with Chapman in Chapman’s bed after having snuck
into the home. The two were holding and rubbing each other. Without warning, Seuffert lifted up
Chapman’s shirt and began sucking Chapman’s bare breast. Chapman did not consent to this
conduct and was shocked by the escalation of sexual activity. Chapman objected to Seuffert’s
unwelcomed conduct.
89. Seuffert knew Chapman was upset with her for the aforementioned conduct, causing her
to write Chapman several apology letters.
90. Weeks after Seuffert apologized to Chapman, the two began seeing each other romantically
again, Seuffert routinely kissed one another at their respective homes and occasionally while at
school.
91. Chapman often spent weekend nights at Seuffert’s home, where Seuffert engaged in sexual
activity with Chapman and encouraged Chapman to do the same.
92. Seuffert provided alcohol to Chapman and others, including the other Plaintiffs, and drank
with Plaintiffs. These occurrences happened both at Seuffert’s home, as well as public places such
as bars, restaurants, and clubs, as Seuffert became more emboldened.
93. Seuffert took Chapman to bars, restaurants, and clubs after volleyball games. These bars,
clubs, and restaurants were often located away from Ashtabula, so that Seuffert could avoid being
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seen in public with Chapman, as she knew her conduct was both morally wrong, and illegal. On
many occasions, Chapman was still in her volleyball uniform.
94. After leaving these bars and restaurants, it was not unusual for Chapman and Seuffert to
kiss in Seuffert’s car.
95. Seuffert often provided Chapman with love letters and gifts, such as concert tickets, a gold
monogram ring, and other things.
96. On New Year’s Eve, Chapman’s sister caught Seuffert sleeping with Chapman in her bed.
97. Chapman’s mother, upon discovering that Seuffert routinely picked up Chapman from
Martell’s Cleaners for no apparent educational reason, called the school to complain about
Seuffert’s interactions with her daughter. The reason Seuffert picked up Chapman from Martell’s
Cleaner was to avoid being seen picking up Chapman. Seuffert knew the relationship she had with
Chapman was illegal and took affirmative steps to avoid being caught.
98. Near the end of the school year, Seuffert invited Chapman and others to dinner at her home.
While having dinner, Seuffert, Chapman, and the others decided that they would skip school the
following day and go to Presque Isle in Pennsylvania. The following day, Seuffert drove Chapman
and the others to Presque Isle. When Seuffert arrived home and checked her voicemail, she had a
voicemail from Ashtabula High School, wherein Seuffert was asked about whether she and
Chapman were together, as the school knew all three students and Seuffert were absent from school
that day, and apparently knew enough to believe that Seuffert might be with the students outside
of school.
99. Throughout Chapman’s high school career, Seuffert groomed Chapman. Seuffert used her
position of power over Chapman to earn her trust, and then exploited and coerced her into a sexual
relationship.
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100. Multiple staff members at Ashtabula High School knew of the relationship between
Chapman and Seuffert, as they saw her drive Seuffert’s car, heard about Chapman staying the night
at Seuffert’s home, and heard about Chapman and Plaintiffs drinking with Seuffert. Because
Seuffert was well-liked amongst her peers, the school willfully ignored her grooming and illegal
conduct, and silenced Plaintiffs by threatening to discipline Plaintiffs if they reported Seuffert’s
conduct as true.
101. After Chapman graduated, Chapman and Seuffert continued to engage in a romantic
relationship, which included sexual activities. This relationship and sexual conduct were a direct
result of Seuffert’s years of grooming and convincing Chapman that the relationship was normal.
V. Seuffert’s untoward behavior with the Plaintiffs became public following the
delivery of an anonymous letter to the Ashtabula Area City School District.
102. In November 2021, an anonymous letter was sent to AACSD. The letter detailed Seuffert’s
unlawful and unethical behavior with her students, including that she provided them access to
house and vehicle, provided them alcohol to consume at her residence, and engaged in sexual
activity with them.
103. The letter further provided the names of several students who were victimized by Seuffert,
including Chapman, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs, among others.
104. In the months after the allegations became public, Chapman, Allgood, Jones, Mathers,
Miller, and Scruggs finally recognized that they were the true victims of Seuffert’s unlawful and
illicit actions, not the wrongdoers as AACSD made them originally believe. It was at this point
that they decided to speak up for themselves.
105. In November 2021, AACSD retained the services of Podojil Consulting and Professional
Services to conduct an investigation into the allegations contained in the letter. The investigation
was handled by Anthony Podojil Ph.D. (“Podojil”).
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106. As an agent of AACSD, Podojil interviewed several individuals, including Chapman,
Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs, all of whom confirmed that the allegations
contained in the anonymous letter were true.
107. Podojil also interviewed the former head and assistant boys’ basketball coaches, who
confirmed that they had heard the rumors when they were occurring and threatened to suspend the
players from the team if they were true. The coaches acknowledged that they took no further action
when the players denied that the rumors were true.
108. Podojil also interviewed Seuffert in the presence of her attorney. Seuffert denied the
allegations and provided a sworn affidavit to Podojil as part of the investigation. In the affidavit,
Seuffert (1) denied that students had free access to her house or vehicle; (2) denied giving alcohol
to her students; and (3) denied any sexual contact or relationship with any student during the times
alleged. Seuffert knew that her statements were false.
109. Despite Podojil’s investigation and report, which confirmed the allegations against
Seuffert, AACSD took no action against Seuffert, who was serving as a member of the school
board.
110. In January 2022, AACSD referred the matter to the Ashtabula County Sheriff’s
Department, which conducted an investigation led by Lieutenant Sean Ward.
111. Lieutenant Ward interviewed several individuals, including Chapman, Allgood, Jones,
Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs, all of whom again confirmed that the allegations against Seuffert
were true.
112. Lieutenant Ward interviewed the former head and assistant boys’ basketball coaches, who
again confirmed that they had heard the rumors when they were occurring and threatened to
suspend the players from the team if the boys spoke up and admitted that the allegations were true.
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113. Lieutenant Ward interviewed Seuffert in the presence of her counsel. Seuffert again denied
the allegations. Lieutenant Ward was also provided with a copy of Seuffert’s affidavit as part of
his investigation.
114. In the summer of 2022, Seuffert resigned from her position on the AACSD school board.
VI. As a result of Seuffert and Ashtabula Area City School District’s actions,
Plaintiffs suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm.
115. As a result of the unlawful and illicit conduct of Seuffert, John Does 1-10, and/or AACSD,
Shelley Chapman suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. For years, Chapman was unable to
establish meaningful relationships, both platonically and romantically, as she questioned her
sexuality, others’ motives for attempting to enter into relationships with her, and her ability to trust
others. As a direct result of Seuffert’s grooming and exploitation of Chapman, Chapman
underwent years of therapy and formed an addiction to alcohol. Chapman still struggles with
alcoholism. AACSD’s conduct of sweeping Seuffert’s conduct under the rug and blaming students
for being groomed only exacerbated these injuries and damages.
Sean Allgood suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. For years, Allgood suffered with alcohol-
related issues. Following disclosure of the anonymous letter, Allgood suffered embarrassment,
humiliation, and feelings of helplessness. Allgood’s cooperation with the investigations into
Seuffert caused him to be alienated by his employers and colleagues at AACSD where he works,
as well as facing retaliation from Seuffert’s supporters and friends. Allgood also suffers from post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of the victimization.
Nathaniel Jones suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. Jones suffers from alcoholism and
substance abuse issues. The victimization also affected Jones’s ability to have long-term
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relationships and caused an attraction to older women. The victimization also affected Jones ability
to concentrate causing problems with holding steady employment.
Adrian Mathers suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. Mathers experiences feeling of being
victimized, embarrassment, humiliation, and burden.
Andre Miller suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. Miller experiences feeling of being
victimized embarrassment, and humiliation.
Brian Scruggs suffered long-lasting and irreparable harm. For years, Scruggs suffered with
alcohol-related issues. Scruggs experiences the feeling of being victimized, embarrassment, and
humiliation. The victimization also affected Scruggs’s ability to have long-term relationships.
COUNT I:
Violation of Title IX (Against All Defendants)
121. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in all previous paragraphs as if fully
stated herein.
122. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), states,
in relevant part, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….”
123. Title IX is implemented through the Code of Federal Regulations, and in specific, 34 C.F.R.
Part 106. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) requires that, “a recipient shall adopt and publish grievance
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints
alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part.”
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124. Sexual harassment and abuse of students is a form of sex discrimination prohibited under
Title IX.
125. Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, including unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, non-verbal, and physical acts of a sexual
nature.
126. Title IX covers all programs of a school that receives federal funding, and covers sexual
harassment, including sexual assault, by school employees and students.
127. At all relevant times, AACSD was a public school district receiving federal funding, and
is therefore subject to Title IX.
128. Under Title IX, AACSD, through its employees, were required to promptly investigate all
allegations of sexual harassment, including sexual assault and abuse.
129. At all relevant times, Christine Seuffert was an employee of AACSD, who used her role as
a teacher and coach to groom, sexually harass, and sexually abuse Plaintiffs.
130. Seuffert’s sexual abuse, which included making sexually explicit comments to Plaintiffs,
grooming Plaintiffs, and engaging in sexual activity with Plaintiffs while they were minors, was
sex discrimination under Title IX.
131. AACSD and Defendants were therefore required to promptly investigate and address
Seuffert’s conduct.
132. Defendants had actual knowledge of the abuse and sexual misconduct committed by
Seuffert.
133. Specifically, Defendants had knowledge that Seuffert was engaged in an inappropriate and
illegal relationship with Chapman and the other Plaintiffs.
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134. Rather than report and investigate Seuffert, Defendants took affirmative action to blindly
deny the existence and/or speculation of sexual abuse and warned other Plaintiffs to remain silent
about the abuse committed by Seuffert. In other words, Defendants remained willfully ignorant of
Seuffert’s abuse towards Chapman and the others.
135. Given the outwardness of Seuffert’s actions towards Chapman, including allowing
Chapman to borrow her car from school grounds, asking Chapman to drive home from volleyball
games with her, and skipping school with Chapman, it would be implausible for AACSD to claim
it did not have reason to know about Seuffert’s abuse.
136. Given the outwardness of Seuffert’s actions towards the other Plaintiffs, including allowing
the Plaintiffs to have access to her home and vehicle, providing them alcohol, and engaging in
sexual activity with them, it would be implausible for AACSD to claim it did not have reason to
know about Seuffert’s abuse.
137. Nonetheless, Defendants did nothing to address Seuffert’s misconduct.
138. Defendants’ failure to respond promptly and adequately to Seuffert’s abuse constitutes sex
discrimination, in violation of Title IX.
139. By their acts and omissions, Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the sexual
abuse and harassment that Chapman and other Plaintiffs were experiencing. Defendants’ deliberate
indifference included, but was not limited to:
a. Failing to respond to Seuffert’s misconduct;
b. Failing to promptly and adequately investigate Seuffert’s misconduct and grooming
behaviors;
c. Actively discouraging male athletes from reporting and/or discussing Seuffert’s
misconduct;
19
d. Failing to adequately supervise Seuffert, after learning of her inappropriate
relationship with Chapman and the other Plaintiffs;
e. Failing to take corrective measures to prevent Seuffert from sexually abusing other
students.
140. Defendants’ failure to promptly and appropriately investigate, remedy, and respond to
Seuffert’s misconduct caused Plaintiffs to experience further sexual harassment and/or made them
liable or vulnerable to it.
141. Defendants’ failure to promptly and appropriately investigate, remedy, and respond to
Seuffert’s misconduct created a sexually hostile environment that effectively denied Plaintiffs
access to educational opportunities at Ashtabula City Schools.
142. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of Title IX, Plaintiffs have
suffered and continue to suffer emotional distress, mental anguish, fear, depression, anxiety,
humiliation, loss of self-esteem, and loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiffs have incurred and will
continue to incur expenses as a result of their injuries.
COUNT II:
Title IX Retaliation
(Against All Defendants)
stated herein.
144. Title IX and its implementing regulations prohibit retaliation against any person who
complains about what he/she reasonably believes to be a Title IX violation, who advocates on
behalf of Title IX rights and enforcement, and any person who cooperates in any investigation of
a Title IX violation.
20
145. Plaintiffs were engaged in Title IX protected activity in reporting Seuffert’s inappropriate
relationship with Chapman and other students.
146. Plaintiffs’ acts were protected by the anti-retaliation provision of Title IX.
147. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs by ordering them to not discuss Seuffert and her
grooming and/or other inappropriate conduct. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs by threating
removal from athletic teams if they did come forward with information about Seuffert.
148. Defendants’ adverse actions towards Plaintiffs were in direct response to, and were in
retaliation for, the exercise of their rights under Title IX.
149. Defendants’ adverse retaliatory actions against Plaintiffs violated Title IX and its
implementing regulations.
150. Defendants’ retaliation constitutes a per se violation of Title IX and left Plaintiffs
vulnerable to harassment that has limited their ability to participate in, and benefit from, the
Defendants’ educational programs and activities.
151. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of Title IX, Plaintiffs suffered
damages and continue to suffer damages.
COUNT III:
Denial of Due Process
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment
(Against All Individual Defendants)
stated herein.
153. Defendants’ failure to comply with the administrative requirements of Title IX deprived
Plaintiffs of their liberty interests in bodily integrity, and their property interests in an education,
without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.
21
154. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to violations of their liberty interests in bodily integrity,
and their property interests in their education, by failing to adequately investigate Seuffert, by
failing to appropriately discipline the Seuffert, and by failing to adequately train and supervise its
staff with respect to the handling of Title IX complaints, all of which created the danger that
resulted in Plaintiffs being harassed and/or abused by Seuffert.
155. Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to due process denied and/or limited
Plaintiffs’ ability to participate in, and benefit from, the Defendants’ educational programs and
activities.
COUNT IV:
Monell Liability for Failure to Comply with Title IX
42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Against All Individual Defendants)
stated herein.
158. Defendants were state actors working for AACSD, which is a federally funded school
system.
159. Defendants acted under color of law when they refused to thoroughly investigate Seuffert
and refused to discipline her, knowing that its efforts were ineffective in ending a clear and
persistent pattern of harassment and/or assault.
160. Defendants knew, or should have known, that they had a duty to respond to suspicions of
sexual misconduct, and that their response must comply with federal law as outlined in Title IX’s
implementing regulations.
161. Defendants’ failure to comply with Title IX amounts to an official policy of inaction.
22
162. Defendants’ official policy of inaction caused Plaintiffs to suffer deprivation of their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
163. Defendants’ official policy of inaction caused Plaintiffs pain and suffering including, but
not limited to, humiliation, depression, educational impacts, anxiety, and fear.
COUNT V:
Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
(Against AACSD and John Does 1-10)
stated herein.
166. At all relevant times to this action, Christine Seuffert was employed as a teacher and coach
at AACSD. As such, Seuffert was an employee and/or agent of AACSD.
167. Defendant AACSD and John Does 1-10 had an obligation to investigate and ensure that
Seuffert was fit to serve as a coach and teacher, and that she was not of the type of character that
would commit the sexual and/or other abuse that she committed.
168. Upon information and belief, AACSD and John Does 1-10 failed to adequately investigate
Seuffert and ensure that she was not of the type of character that would commit the sexual and/or
other abuse that she committed.
169. Defendant AACSD and John Does 1-10 also failed to take any steps to investigate, report,
stop, or prevent Seuffert from behaving inappropriately with minor students, including Plaintiffs.
170. Defendant AACSD and John Does 1-10 permitted Seuffert to have regular contact with
students, knowing or having reason to know Seuffert was engaging in inappropriate and/or sexual
23
conduct with Plaintiffs. AACSD and John Does 1-10 allowed this contact with conscious disregard
for the rights and safety of Plaintiffs.
171. Upon information and belief, AACSD and John Does 1-10 failed to perform an adequate
investigation of Seuffert prior to hiring her. In the alternative, AACSD and John Does 1-10 failed
to discipline and/or terminate Seuffert after acquiring knowledge that she was engaging in
inappropriate acts and/or relationships with Plaintiffs and other students.
172. In light of the actual knowledge of Seuffert’s inappropriate acts and/or relationship with
Chapman and the other Plaintiffs, AACSD and Joh Does 1-10’s retention of Seuffert as an
employee and/or agent, which allowed her to continue her grooming and inappropriate behaviors,
was reckless and with conscious disregard for Plaintiffs rights and safety.
173. Had AACSD and/or John Does 1-10 taken appropriate action after acquiring knowledge of
Seuffert’s conduct, Seuffert would have been terminated promptly, which would have, at the very
least, mitigated Plaintiffs’ injuries.
174. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligence and/or recklessness in its hiring,
retention, and/or supervision of Seuffert, Plaintiffs have required therapy, medical treatment, and
have incurred medical expenses.
175. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligent hiring, retention, and/or
supervision of Seuffert, Plaintiffs suffered, among other things, inappropriate and sexually charged
actions, an invasion of their right to privacy, severe and emotional pain and trauma, humiliation,
fear, and anxiety. These and other injuries are all a direct result Defendants acts and omissions.
Plaintiffs will continue to suffer damages as a result of these acts and omissions.
24
COUNT VI:
Negligence
stated herein.
177. Defendants had an affirmative duty to protect Plaintiffs from the sexual abuse and/or
harassment they suffered at the hands of Seuffert.
178. Defendants also had a duty to verify and evaluate each and every employee and/or affiliate,
and ensure each employee and/or agent, such as Seuffert, was not of the type of character that
would commit the sexual abuse and/or harassment that she committed.
179. Defendants had a duty to report, investigate, and/or discipline any suspected forms of
sexual abuse and/or harassment within its school and/or programs.
180. Defendant Seuffert had an affirmative duty to care for and protect Plaintiffs, which
included the duty to refrain from sexual harassing and/or abusing them.
181. Defendants knew or had reason to know that Seuffert was engaging in inappropriate
conduct, including sexual harassment and/or abuse with Plaintiffs and other students.
182. Despite this knowledge, Defendants failed to protect Plaintiffs by failing to report,
investigate, and/or discipline Seuffert for her inappropriate and sexually charged conduct towards
Plaintiffs.
183. Defendant Seuffert failed to protect Plaintiffs by sexually harassing and/or abusing them.
184. Defendants’ actions and/or inactions, fully contained herein, constitute a breach of the
aforementioned duties.
25
185. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs have incurred, and
will continue to incur, severe and permanent injuries, economic loss, medical care and related
expenses, fear and apprehension, loss of enjoyment of life, and other damages.
COUNT VII:
Negligence Per Se For Violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2151.421 and Other Statutes
stated herein.
187. Defendants had an affirmative duty to protect Plaintiffs from the sexual abuse and/or
harassment they suffered at the hands of Seuffert.
188. Defendants also had a duty to verify and evaluate each and every employee and/or affiliate,
and ensure each employee and/or agent, such as Seuffert, was not of the type of character that
would commit the sexual abuse and/or harassment that she committed.
189. Defendants had a duty to report, investigate, and/or discipline any suspected forms of
sexual abuse and/or harassment within its school and/or programs.
190. Defendant Seuffert had an affirmative duty to care for and protect Plaintiffs, which
included the duty to refrain from sexual harassing and/or abusing them.
191. Defendants knew or had reason to know that Seuffert was engaging in inappropriate
conduct, including sexual harassment and/or abuse with Plaintiffs and other students. Defendants
should have investigated and/or reported Seuffert for her conduct.
192. Christine Seuffert groomed and sexually harassed and/or assaulted Plaintiffs.
193. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2151.421, Defendants, at all relevant times, all had a duty
to report any and all suspected and/or actual abuse and/or neglect of Plaintiffs and/or any student.
26
194. Defendants, despite their knowledge of Seuffert’s actions, did not report Seuffert to the
appropriate authorities.
195. All Defendants breached their duties described herein. This breach constitutes negligence
per se.
196. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs have incurred and
will continue to incur severe and permanent injuries, economic loss, medical care and related
COUNT VIII:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10)
stated herein.
198. As contained herein, Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10 knew or had reason to know
about Christine Seuffert’s inappropriate behavior.
199. Despite this actual and/or constructive knowledge, Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-
10 refused to report, investigate, and/or discipline Christine Seuffert, thereby allowing Seuffert’s
harassment, grooming, and inappropriate behavior to continue.
200. Rather than take action to prevent further harm by Seuffert, Defendants AACSD and John
Does 1-10 approved, encouraged, or otherwise acquiesced Seuffert’s conduct, all while threatening
discipline against students who spoke out against Seuffert, or confirmed the truth of the rumors
surrounding Seuffert and Plaintiffs.
201. Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10 engaged in conduct that was so extreme and
outrageous as to go beyond the bounds of decency – conduct that can be considered utterly
intolerable in a civilized society.
27
202. Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10 and their acts caused severe emotional distress to
Plaintiffs.
203. At all material times, Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10 acted intentionally; to cause
emotional distress to Plaintiffs; and knew with substantial certainty that their acts would cause
severe emotional distress to Plaintiffs.
204. The mental anguish suffered by Plaintiffs is so serious and of a nature that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it.
COUNT IX:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against Defendant Seuffert)
stated herein.
206. At all relevant times, Christine Seuffert was a teacher employed by AACSD and was a
volleyball coach for the varsity women’s team.
207. The coach-player and teacher-student relationship within educational settings is legally
recognized as a relationship in which an inherit power imbalance exists.
208. At all relevant times, under Ohio law, an offender acting in loco parentis to another were
prohibited from engaging in sexual conduct with that “other person.” Conversely, the “other
person,” as a matter of law, was not able to give consent to sexual conduct.
209. The doctrine of in loco parentis treats school administrators as standing in the place of
students’ parents under circumstances where the children’s accrual parents cannot protect, guide,
and discipline them. See Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L. by & through Levy, 210 L.Ed.2d 403,
141 S.Ct. 2038 (2021); See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684, 106 S.Ct.
3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986).
28
210. Christine Seuffert exploited this power imbalance by grooming Plaintiffs. Seuffert’s
grooming consisted of, among other things, making sexually suggestive comments, touching
Plaintiffs inappropriately, inviting Plaintiffs over to her home, and eventually engaging in sexual
activity with Plaintiffs.
211. Christine Seuffert violated Plaintiffs’ right to privacy by engaging in inappropriate sexual
conduct with them, ranging from inappropriate and sexual comments to sexual assault, all of which
was inappropriate, nonconsensual, and/or was a result of coercion and power over Plaintiffs.
212. Seuffert’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond the bounds of decency
– conduct that can be considered utterly intolerable in a civilized society.
213. Christine Seuffert and her acts caused severe emotional distress to Plaintiffs.
214. At all material times, Christine Seuffert acted intentionally; to cause emotional distress to
Plaintiffs; and knew with substantial certainty that her acts would cause severe emotional distress
to Plaintiffs.
215. The mental anguish suffered by Plaintiffs is so serious and of a nature that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it.
216. The unreasonable, improper, and unlawful acts of Seuffert were made with willful and
reckless disregard of the consequences, with callous disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights and physical
and mental well-being, with legal malice, and with substantial certainty that the consequences
thereof would cause serious personal injury to Plaintiffs.
217. As a direct and proximate cause of Seuffert’s unlawful acts, Plaintiffs have incurred, and
29
COUNT X:
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10)
stated herein.
219. Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10 were negligent in their refusal to take action
against Seuffert for her inappropriate conduct towards students, including Plaintiffs.
220. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants AACSD and John Does 1-10’s negligence,
Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress.
221. The severe emotional distress of Plaintiffs as a result of the aforementioned negligence was
reasonably foreseeable.
222. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligence, Plaintiffs have incurred, and
COUNT XI:
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Against Defendant Seuffert)
stated herein.
224. Seuffert acted negligent in grooming and sexually harassing and/or abusing Plaintiffs.
225. As a direct and proximate result of Seuffert’s negligence, Plaintiffs suffered severe
emotional distress.
226. The severe emotional distress as a result of Seuffert’s negligence was reasonably
foreseeable by Seuffert at all relevant times.
30
227. As a direct and proximate result of Seuffert’s negligence, Plaintiffs have incurred, and will
continue to incur, severe and permanent injuries, economic loss, medical care and related expenses,
fear and apprehension, loss of enjoyment of life, and other damages.
COUNT XII:
Sexual Battery Under R.C. 2907.03
Pursuant to Civil Liability for Criminal Acts Under R.C. 2307.60 by Shelley Chapman
(Against Christine Seuffert & John Does 1-10)
stated herein.
229. At all relevant times, under R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), no person shall engage in sexual conduct
with another, not the spouse of the offender, when the offender is the other person's natural or
adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis.
3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986).
231. Under R.C. 2307.60, anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act may recover
full damages in a civil action.
232. R.C. 2907.01(A) defined “sexual conduct” as “vaginal intercourse between a male and
female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without
privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight,
is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.”
31
233. On multiple occasions, Seuffert routinely engaged in sexual conduct with Shelley
Chapman during Chapman’s high school tenure, while Seuffert was a person in loco parentis.
During most of Chapman’s high school career, she was a minor. At all relevant times, Chapman
was not the spouse of Seuffert.
234. Seuffert was a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or
serving Ashtabula High School; but Seuffert was not enrolled and did not attend Ashtabula High
School during the relevant time periods when the sexual battery occurred.
235. Shelley Chapman was enrolled and did attend Ashtabula High School during relevant time
periods when the sexual battery occurred.
236. Seuffert was Chapman’s athletic coach, instructor, and had temporary or occasional
disciplinary control over Chapman because she was a teacher at Ashtabula High School where
Chapman was a student. As such, she was a person in loco parentis of Chapman.
237. Seuffert engaged in sexual conduct with Shelley Chapman with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
238. Seuffert is not entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), because her acts and
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
239. John Does 1-10, improperly allowed the above-mentioned acts to take place and therefore
aided and abetted the commission of the crime.
240. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, Shelley Chapman has suffered
and will continue to suffer economic and non-economic damages for which Seuffert and AACSD
is liable, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering; and attorneys’ fees.
241. Seuffert and AACSD’s acts were willful, egregious, malicious, and worthy of substantial
sanction to punish and deter them and others from engaging in this type of unlawful conduct.
32
COUNT XIII:
Sexual Battery Under R.C. 2907.03
Pursuant to Civil Liability for Criminal Acts Under R.C. 2307.60 by Nathaniel Jones
stated herein.
243. Under R.C. 2907.03(A)(2) no person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the
spouse of the offender, when the offender knows that the other person's ability to appraise the
nature of or control his or her own conduct is substantially impaired.
244. At all relevant times, under R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), no person shall engage in sexual conduct
with another, not the spouse of the offender, when the offender is the other person's natural or
adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis.
3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986).
247. R.C. 2907.01(A) defined “sexual conduct” as “vaginal intercourse between a male and
female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without
privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument,
apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight,
is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.”
33
248. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual conduct with Nathaniel Jones, including
performing fellatio (oral sex) on Jones. Jones was not the spouse of Seuffert.
249. Seuffert knew Nathaniel Jones’s ability to appraise the nature of or control the conduct was
substantially impaired because Seuffert provided alcohol to Jones, a minor, when the sexual
conduct occurred.
250. Seuffert was a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or
serving Ashtabula High School; but Seuffert was not enrolled and did not attend Ashtabula High
School during the relevant time periods when the sexual battery occurred. As such Seuffert was a
person in loco parentis of Jones.
251. Nathaniel Jones was enrolled and did attend Ashtabula High School during relevant time
periods when the sexual battery occurred.
252. Seuffert engaged in the sexual conduct with Nathaniel Jones with malicious purpose, in
bad faith, and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or in wanton or reckless manner.
255. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, Nathaniel Jones has suffered and
will continue to suffer economic and non-economic damages for which Seuffert and AACSD is
liable, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering; and attorneys’ fees.
34
COUNT XIV:
Sexual Imposition Under R.C. 2907.06
Pursuant to Civil Liability for Criminal Acts Under R.C. 2307.60
stated herein.
258. Under R.C. 2907.06(A)(2), no person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse
of the offender; or cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the
offender, when the offender knows that the other person's ability to appraise the nature of or control
the offender's or touching person's conduct is substantially impaired. This provision carries a
criminal penalty.
260. R.C. 2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” as “any touching of an erogenous zone of
another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is
a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”
261. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Shelley Chapman,
including permitting Chapman to touch and fondle her breasts and buttocks, and touching
Chapman’s breasts and buttocks. Chapman was not the spouse of Seuffert.
262. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Sean Allgood, including
permitting Allgood to touch and fondle her breasts and buttocks. Allgood was not the spouse of
Seuffert.
263. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Nathaniel Jones, including
permitting Jones to touch and fondle her breasts and buttocks. Jones was not the spouse of Seuffert.
35
264. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Adrian Mathers, including
permitting Mathers to touch her buttocks. Mathers was not the spouse of Seuffert.
265. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Andre Miller, including
permitting Miller to touch her buttocks. Miller was not the spouse of Seuffert.
266. On multiple occasions, Seuffert engaged in sexual contact with Brian Scruggs, including
permitting Scruggs to touch her buttocks. Scruggs was not the spouse of Seuffert.
267. Seuffert knew Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre
Miller, and Brian Scruggs's ability to appraise the nature of or control the conduct was substantially
impaired because Seuffert provided alcohol to Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel Jones,
Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs, all minors, when the sexual contact occurred.
268. Seuffert engaged in the sexual conduct with Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel
Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
271. As a direct and proximate result of this unlawful conduct, Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood,
Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs have suffered and will continue
to suffer economic and non-economic damages for which Seuffert and AACSD is liable, including,
but not limited to, pain and suffering; and attorneys’ fees.
36
COUNT XV:
Contributing to Unruliness or Delinquency Under R.C. 2919.24
stated herein.
274. Under R.C. 2919.24(A)(1), no person shall aid, abet, induce, cause, encourage, or
contribute to a child becoming an unruly child. This provision carries a criminal penalty.
276. R.C. 2152.02(C)(1) defines a “child” as a person who is under 18 years of age.
277. R.C. 2151.022 defines “unruly child” as one who injures or endangers his/her health or
morals and/or one who violated the law.
278. On multiple occasions, Seuffert provided alcohol to Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood,
Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs, all children under 18 years of
age, for their consumption.
279. Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and
Brian Scruggs’s underage consumption of alcohol injured or endangered their health or morals and
is also a violation of the law. As such, Chapman, Allgood, Jones, Mathers, Miller, and Scruggs
were unruly children.
280. As such, Seuffert aided, abetted, induced, caused, encouraged, or contributed to Shelley
Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs
becoming an unruly child.
37
281. Seuffert engaged in the providing of alcohol to Shelley Chapman, Sean Allgood, Nathaniel
Jones, Adrian Mathers, Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs for their consumption with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
COUNT XVI:
Intimidation (Using a False or Fraudulent Writing) Under R.C. 2921.03 and
stated herein.
287. Under R.C. 2921.03, no person, knowingly and by filing, recording, or otherwise using a
materially false or fraudulent writing with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or
reckless manner, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public servant or witness in the
discharge of the person's duty. This provision creates civil liability under R.C. 2921.03(C).
288. In addition to the civil liability created under R.C. 2921.03(C), R.C. 2307.60 provides that
anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act may recover full damages in a civil action.
38
289. R.C. 2921.01(B)(1) defines “Public servant” as “Any public official.” R.C. 2921.01(B)(2)
also defines “Public servant” as “Any person performing ad hoc a governmental function,
including, but not limited to, a juror, member of a temporary commission, master, arbitrator,
advisor, or consultant.”
290. R.C. 2921(A) defines “Public official” as “any elected or appointed officer, or employee,
or agent of the state or any political subdivision, whether in a temporary or permanent capacity,
and includes, but is not limited to, legislators, judges, and law enforcement officers.”
291. R.C. 2921.04(E) defines “witness” as “any person who has or claims to have knowledge
concerning a fact or facts concerning a criminal or delinquent act, whether or not criminal or
delinquent child charges are actually filed.”
292. AACSD retained Podojil Consulting and Professional Services to conduct an investigation
into the allegations against Seuffert contained in the anonymous letter. Anthony Podojil, who
conducted an investigation, was performing an ad hoc governmental function of advisor and
consultant. Podojil was also acting as an agent of AACSD. As such, Podojil was a public servant.
293. As a result of conducting his investigation, Podojil was also a witness.
294. Lieutenant Sean Ward of the Ashtabula County Sheriff’s Office, who also conducted an
investigation into the allegations against Seuffert, was a public servant and witness.
295. During both investigations, Seuffert knowingly provided a sworn affidavit, which was a
materially false and fraudulent writing, to Podojil and Lieutenant Ward in an attempt to influence
and/or hinder them in the discharge of their duties.
296. Seuffert drafted and/or used the materially false and fraudulent writing with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton or reckless manner, to attempt to influence and/or hinder
Podojil and Lieutenant Ward, public servants and witnesses, in discharging their duties.
39
COUNT XVII:
Tampering with Evidence Under R.C. 2921.12
stated herein.
302. Under R.C. 2921.12(A)(2), no person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation
is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall make, present, or use any record,
document, or thing, knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public official who is or
may be engaged in such proceeding or investigation, or with purpose to corrupt the outcome of
any such proceeding or investigation. This provision carries a criminal penalty.
40
conducted an investigation, was performing as an agent of a political subdivision (AACSD). As
such, Podojil was a public official.
investigation into the allegations against Seuffert, was a public official.
307. During the investigation, Seuffert, knowing that an investigation was in progress, made
and/or presented a sworn affidavit, knowing it was a false, to Anthony Podojil and Lieutenant Sean
Ward with purpose to mislead them and/or corrupt the outcome of the investigation.
308. Seuffert made and/or presented the false affidavit with malicious purpose, in bad faith,
and/or in a wanton or reckless manner.
41
COUNT XVIII:
Falsification Under R.C. 2921.13
stated herein.
314. Under R.C. 2921.13(A)(3), no person shall knowingly make a false statement when the
statement is made with purpose of misleading a public official in performing the public official’s
official function. This provision carries a criminal penalty.
conducted an investigation, was performing as an agent of a political subdivision (AACSD). As
such, Podojil was a public official.
318. During the investigation, Seuffert knowingly made a false statement (via her sworn
affidavit) with purpose to mislead Anthony Podojil in performing his official function.
investigation into the allegations against Seuffert, was a public official.
42
320. During the investigation, Seuffert knowingly made a false statement (via her sworn
affidavit and/or her statement during the interview with Lieutenant Ward) with purpose to mislead
Lieutenant Ward in performing his official function.
321. Seuffert made the false statement with malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton
or reckless manner.
COUNT XX:
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
stated herein.
327. A “fiduciary relationship” forms when special confidence and trust is reposed in the
integrity and fidelity of another and there is a resulting position of superiority or influence,
acquired by virtue of this special trust. Camp St. Mary's Assn. of W. Ohio Conference of the United
43
Methodist Church, Inc. v. Otterbein Homes, 3rd Dist. No. 2-06-40, 176 Ohio App.3d 54, 2008-
Ohio-1490, 889 N.E.2d 1066 (March 31, 2008).
141 S.Ct. 2038 (2021).
329. By serving in loco parentis, a fiduciary duty was created between Defendants and
Plaintiffs.
330. As fiduciaries, Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty to act in the utmost good-faith, trust,
confidence, and candor towards Plaintiffs, and a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and
loyalty towards Plaintiffs and act in the best interests of Plaintiffs.
331. As fiduciaries, Defendants were obligated to ensure that they provided Plaintiffs with a
safe educational environment, one that was free from sexual harassment and/or abuse.
332. All Defendants knew or had reason to know that Seuffert was engaging in sexually charged
behavior towards Plaintiffs and other students, which included sexual harassment and/or sexual
abuse. Despite this knowledge, Defendants took no steps to protect Plaintiffs, breaching their
fiduciary duties.
333. As a direct and proximate result Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have incurred, and will
continue to incur, severe and permanent injuries, economic loss, medical care and related expenses,
fear and apprehension, loss of enjoyment of life, and other damages.
44
COUNT XXI:
Liability Pursuant to Respondeat Superior
(Against Defendant AACSD)
stated herein.
335. Defendants John Does 1-10 and Christine Seuffert, were, at all relevant times, employees
or agents of AACSD, acting within the scope of their employment and/or agency.
336. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal or employer may generally be held
liable for tortious acts committed by its agents or employees if such acts occur within the scope of
the employment relationship.
337. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the actions of AACSD employees and/or agents
are deemed to be the actions of AACSD, so long as the actions occur within the scope of the
employment relationship.
338. At all relevant times to this action, Defendants John Does 1-10 and Christine Seuffert were
acting within the scope of their employment and/or were using their employment in a manner to
further their tortious conduct.
339. To the extent Defendants were acting outside the scope of their employment, AACSD
ratified Defendants behavior by willingly turning a blind eye to Seuffert’s inappropriate and
sexually charged behavior.
340. Defendant AACSD is liable for the tortious behavior of the other Defendants, contained
herein.
341. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiffs have incurred, and will continue to incur, severe
and permanent injuries, economic loss, medical care and related expenses, fear and apprehension,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other damages.
45
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
342. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully requests the following relief from the
Court:
A. Declare that Defendants’ acts and conduct constitute violations of state and federal law;
B. Enter judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on all claims for relief;
C. Award Plaintiffs damages, economic and non-economic, including, but not limited to,
out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress,
humiliation, and inconvenience that they have suffered and are reasonably certain to
suffer in the future;
D. Award Plaintiffs punitive damages as appropriate for all intentional and malicious
violations of state and federal law;
E. Award Plaintiffs pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest lawful rate;
F. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees (including expert fees) and all other
costs of this suit;
G. Award all other relief in law or equity to which Plaintiffs are entitled and that the Court
deems equitable, just, or proper.
46
JURY DEMAND
343. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues within this Complaint.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Eric F. Long

ERIC F. LONG (0093197)
TYLER J. WALCHANOWICZ (0100115)
Counsel for Plaintiff Shelley Chapman
Friedman Menashe Nemecek & Long, L.L.C.
1360 East 9th Street, Suite 650
Cleveland, OH 44114
P: (216) 928-7700
F: (216) 820-4659
E: efl@fanlegal.com
E: tjw@fanlegal.com
/s/ Martin P. Desmond

MARTIN P. DESMOND (0077377)
Counsel for Plaintiffs Sean Allgood,
Nathaniel Jones, Adrian Mathers,
Andre Miller, and Brian Scruggs
P.O. Box 14052
Poland, OH 44514
Mahoning County
P: (330) 559-4505
E: mpmd4@hotmail.com
47

Ashtabula Schools Lawsuit Complaint

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Ashtabula Schools Lawsuit Complaint

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Case: 1:23-cv-00991 Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/16/23 1 of 47.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Complaint, Plaintiffs state as follows:

STATEMENT OF VENUE AND JURISDICTION.

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

protection of civil rights.

well as under Title IX.

Northern District of Ohio.

rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred.

8. Shelley Chapman (“Chapman”) is an individual, who at all relevant times, resided in

their duties in a lawful manner.

and individual capacities.

I. Plaintiffs attended Ashtabula High School, participated in various athletic

at AACSD as an assistant coach.

26. Seuffert provided alcohol to Miller when he would go to her house.

go over her house and provided him alcohol.

house, where Seuffert would provide them with alcohol.

events. Seuffert provided alcohol for their consumption.

physical acts such as touching their buttocks.

and knew that the alcohol caused them substantial impairment.

stroked Jones’ genitals, and performed fellatio (oral sex) on him.

soon started spreading throughout Ashtabula High School.

players from the team if the allegations/rumors were true.

victims of her illicit behavior.

allegations/rumors were true when asked by their coaches.

her, and stopped engaging in sexual activity with her.

the true victims.

IV. Seuffert continued to pursue an inappropriate sexual relationship with Shelley

male Plaintiffs were able to escape her grip.

50. Seuffert served as Chapman’s home room teacher.

a way to be in a quiet space where she could decompress.

to rest, or spoke to Seuffert, who appeared to be a supportive and safe adult.

Chapman’s mental and emotional wellbeing.

encouraged Chapman to trust her.

revealed personal details about her home life.

then ride her bike back home.

Chapman to stop by her home.

63. Through these interactions, Chapman’s trust in Seuffert grew.

varsity volleyball team.

her trusted coach and teacher.

the source of these passes.

via telephone and in person at Seuffert’s home.

and brought Chapman back to her house.

sat on the couch and watched television or movies together.

pick up food or run errands.

activity in the form of touching each other’s breasts and genitals.

87. The aforementioned conduct also occurred at Seuffert’s home.

to write Chapman several apology letters.

activity with Chapman and encouraged Chapman to do the same.

as bars, restaurants, and clubs, as Seuffert became more emboldened.

many occasions, Chapman was still in her volleyball uniform.

kiss in Seuffert’s car.

monogram ring, and other things.

activity with them.

that they decided to speak up for themselves.

was handled by Anthony Podojil Ph.D. (“Podojil”).

106. As an agent of AACSD, Podojil interviewed several individuals, including Chapman,

contained in the anonymous letter were true.

when the players denied that the rumors were true.

alleged. Seuffert knew that her statements were false.

Department, which conducted an investigation led by Lieutenant Sean Ward.

others. As a direct result of Seuffert’s grooming and exploitation of Chapman, Chapman

for being groomed only exacerbated these injuries and damages.