JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

FACULTY OF LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - II

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

SUBMITTED TO-

DR. ASAD MALIK

SUBMITTED BY-

MOHD KAMRAN ANSARI

B.A.LLB. (H) (REGULAR) IVth Semester

BATCH- 2020- 2025

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................3

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPEEDY TRIAL IN INDIA......................................4

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SPEEDY TRIAL.........................................................5

DELAY IN TRIAL PROCESS..................................................................................................7

REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CASE OF DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS.................................8

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL.......................................................9

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................11

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INTRODUCTION

Administration of justice is not limited to the conviction of the guilty person and acquittal of
the innocent one but it also deals with a fair and speedy trial. The Attorney General, Mr K.K.
Venugopal, while addressing an event conducted by the Supreme Court Bar Association
opined that the primary impediment towards building an effective justice delivery system is
“the burgeoning pendency of cases at all levels of judiciary.”

The right to speedy trial finds its first mention in the landmark document of English Law, the
Magna Carta. It is one of the basic human rights as without speedy trial justice cannot be said
to be done. It is a concept that deals with speedy disposal of cases to make the judiciary more
effective and to impart justice as fast as possible.

The Indian judiciary has played a significant role in protecting the rights of the people and it
has tried to give right to speedy trial a constitutional status by bringing it within the purview
of Article 21 of our Constitution. There are a catena of pronouncements of the Supreme Court
and High Courts on the subject of trial wherein the Courts have questioned the delays and
discharged the accused. One of the landmark pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court,
relating to the right to speedy trial, was made in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India1 wherein the Hon’ble Court held that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonable
quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair, or just and it would fall out of Article 21.
Thereby the Hon’ble Court, through judicial activism, tried to bring right to speedy trial
within the purview of fundamental rights mentioned under Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution.

Furthermore, the right to speedy trial has also been endorsed in almost all international
charters and conventions. Most notably, one of them was ratified by India on 10, April 1979,
which was International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Directive
Principles of State Policy, Articles 38(1), 39 and 39-A of the Constitution of India and India’s
international legal obligations guarantee the delivery of justice on time. No existing law,
however, specifically provides for any timeframe for the conclusion of the trial and if any
timeframe has been provided in any statute, then it is ‘directory’ not ‘mandatory’.

1
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597

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The Judiciary being the ultimate protector of human rights and the final resort for
dispensation of justice, the citizens of India look up to this institution with great respect and
eternal hope. This casts a very heavy responsibility on the entire judicial system to live up to
the expectations reposed in it and to maintain the sacred aura attached to it unsullied. The role
of the judiciary places enormous responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts and the
development of the nation is equally dependent on the dynamism and the innovativeness of
the judicial system.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SPEEDY TRIAL IN INDIA

The jurisprudence of speedy trial is based on the principle that the accused should not be
harassed by the legal system for an unreasonable period and the victim should get justice as
early as the legal system can provide it.

In India, the concept of speedy trial was introduced during the medieval era, when Mughal
Emperor Aurangzeb passed the ‘Fatwa Namgiri’ which instructed that no person shall be
arrested without permission of the Kazi and justice shall be done quickly after the arrest of
the accused and no person could be anguished in jail for an indefinite period unless the guilt
is proved. The fatwa also provided that the Kazi could grant bail.2 The modern concept of
speedy trial was, however, developed in the USA, wherein the main focus was laid on
balancing the right of the accused and the demand of justice for the victims of the crime. In
the USA, the 6th Amendment of the Constitution provides right to speedy trial which was
further ensured by the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 1974.3

The pre-emergency Indian Supreme Court did not develop any extensive jurisprudence in the
field of basic human rights. But the post–Emergency Supreme Court turned active and
militant in this field. It evolved a new regime of Fundamental Rights which are not expressly
present in the Indian Constitution, e.g., right to speedy trial emerged as an independent
fundamental right.

After independence for two decades, courts were not very much concerned with the length of
time an undertrial prisoner spent in prison, but what they maintained was that the prosecution
had to justify the continued detention of the undertrial. But the post-emergency Supreme
Court recognised the importance of not letting the incarcerated languish behind bars and
2
S.P. Singh and Krishan Kant Dwivedi, Speedy Trial in constitution of India, Journal of Constitutional and
Parliamentary Studies 256, 256-270 (2012).
3
Federal Trial Act, 1974 (88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, 18 U.S.C. ss 3161-3174).

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evolved a series of Fundamental Rights that were not expressly present in the Indian
Constitution. This included the Fundamental Right of Speedy Trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution.

The judgement of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar 4 formed the basis of the concept of
the right to speedy trial. In this judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where under
trial prisoners have been in jail for a duration longer than prescribed, if convicted, their
detention in jail is totally unjustified and in violation of fundamental rights under Article 21.
In this case, the Apex Court held that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit
in the right to life and personal liberty provided under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
In its decision, the court-mandated greater access to bail, more humane living standards and a
significant reduction in time from arrest to trial. The court observed that no procedure which
does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair and just as
interpreted in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.5

Further, the Supreme Court through its various judgements has observed that speedy trial is
an inherent part of right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21
provides that “no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to
the procedure established by law”. Justice Krishna Iyer, in the case of Babu Singh v. State of
U.P.6 held that “speedy justice is a component of social justice since the community, as a
whole, is considered in the criminal being finally punished within a reasonable time and the
innocent being absolved from the inordinate delay and ordeal of criminal proceedings.”

The terms ‘Life and Liberty’ are very comprehensive terms and if interpreted include a
person’s right to a speedy trial. ‘Life and Liberty’ are for the living. Every person has a right
to live a free and healthy life. Delay in proceedings violates people’s right to life and personal
liberty and leads to mental anguish. Their worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance due to
undue delay should be minimised.7

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SPEEDY TRIAL

The Preamble of the Indian Constitution enjoins the State to secure social, economic and
political justice to all its citizens. Article 38(1) provides that the State should strive for a

4
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, 1979 AIR 1369.
5
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
6
Babu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978 AIR 527.
7
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, 1979 AIR 1369.

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social order. While interpreting this provision in the case of L. Babu Ram v. Raghunathji
Maharaj8 the Supreme Court held that ‘social justice’ would include ‘legal justice’ which
means that the system of administration of justice must provide a cheap, expeditious and
effective instrument for the realisation of justice by all sections of people irrespective of their
social or economic position or their financial resources. Article 39-A mandates the
State to provide legal aid. It further states that “the State shall secure that the operation of the
legal system promotes justice … to secure that opportunities for securing justice are not
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.” The constitutional
commitment to speedy justice flows from the combined reading of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of
the Constitution.

However, there is no specific legislation in the Indian legal system which ensures the right to
speedy trial. But regards the investigation and the trial, the need for speedy trial is
underwritten in express terms or by unequivocal necessary implication and indeed, permeated
the whole gamut of the code in the said context. Under Section 309 of CrPC, every inquiry
or trial should be held “expeditiously” and when the examination of witnesses has once
begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses have been
examined. Apart from this, there are various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
which ensure speedy trial and an early investigation the following are mentioned as under:

 Under Section 157(1) of Cr.P.C. every officer in charge of a police station is bound to
proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if
necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender.
 Section 167(2) (a) of Cr.P.C. provides that no magistrate shall authorise the detention
of the accused person in custody for total period exceeding;(i) 90 days, where the
investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, life imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years;(ii) 60 days, where the investigation
relates to any other offence, and on the expiration of such period as case may be the
accused shall be released on the bail.
 Section 173(1) of Cr.P.C. Provides that every investigation under chapter XII shall be
completed without unnecessary delay.

8
L. Babu Ram v. Raghunathji Maharaj, AIR 1976 SC 1734.

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  Section 173(1A) of Cr.P.C. Provides that the investigation in relation to rape of a
child may be completed within three months from the date on which the information
was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station.
 Section 207 of Cr.P.C. Casts a duty on the magistrate that a copy of (i) the police
report;(ii) FIR recorded under section 154 (iii) statement recorded under section
161(3) of all persons(iv)confession and statement recorded under section 164(v) any
other document forwarded to the magistrate with the police report under section
173(5), shall be given to the accused free of cost.
 Section 309 (1) of Cr.P.C. Provides that in every inquiry or trial the proceeding shall
be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been
examined. It also provides that when the inquiry or trial relates to an offence under
section 376, or 376-A or 376-B or 376-C or 376-D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
the inquiry or trial shall, as far as possible be completed within a period of two
months from the date of filing of the chargesheet.
 Section 468 of Cr.P.C. Provides bar in taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation. Sub section (2) provides limitation period as (a) 6 months, if the offence is
punishable with fine only (b) 1 year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year (c) 3 year, if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

DELAY IN TRIAL PROCESS

The main purpose of a speedy trial in criminal jurisprudence is to ensure justice to the victim
and protect the accused from unnecessary incarceration before his conviction. The Supreme
Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Pujanji 9 observed that while deciding
the question of whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial, the Court is entitled
to take into consideration whether the delay was unintentional, caused by overcrowding of the
court’s docket or understaffing of the prosecutors and whether the accused contributed a fair part
to the time taken. The Court, in this case, held that it is not unmindful of the delays caused by
the tardiness and tactics of the prosecuting agencies. The court knows of trials which are over
delayed because of the indifference and somnolence or the deliberate inactivity of the
prosecuting agencies. Sometimes when the evidence is of a weak character and a conviction
is not a probable result, the prosecuting agencies adopt delaying tactics to keep the accused

9
State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Pujanji, 1981 AIR 1675.

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persons in incarceration as long as possible and to harass them. This is a well-known tactic in
most conspiracy cases. Again, an accused person may be seriously jeopardized in the conduct
of his defence with the passage of time. Witnesses for the defence may become unavailable
and their memories too may fade like those of the witnesses for the prosecution. Some of the
popular reasons which can be responsible for delay in trial are listed below:

 On the part of the judicial system like pendency of cases, the vacation of court, judge
population ratio, independence of the judiciary.

 On the part of the counsel like taking adjournments, lengthy arguments to impress
clients, no preparation of the case.

 On the part of the accused like absconding, non-cooperative behaviour, etc.

REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN CASE OF DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS

The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right inherent under Article 21 of the constitution
which provides for the right to life and personal liberties. Our Constitution provides that
whenever there is a violation of fundamental rights, a person can move to the Supreme Court
under Article 32 and to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.  

In Sheela Barse v. Union of India10, the Apex Court held that if an accused is not tried
speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an
unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental Right to Speedy Trial would be
violated unless, of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a
superior court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The
consequence of violation of the fundamental Right to Speedy Trial would be that the
prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the
fundamental right.

In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka11, the Apex Court held that it is the
constitutional obligation of the State to dispense speedy justice, more so in the field of
criminal law, and paucity of funds or resources is no defence to denial of the right to justice

10
Sheela Barse v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1773.
11
P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856.

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emanating from Articles 14, 19 ad 21 and the Preamble of the Constitution as also from the
Directive Principles of State Policy. The Court, in this case, laid down certain guidelines and
held that the powers conferred under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure shall be exercised by the criminal courts to effectuate the Right to Speedy Trial. To
seek appropriate relief and directions, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of
Cr. P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has emphasized the above propositions again and again in
its judgements. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab12, the Supreme Court held that the concept
of speedy trial is an essential part of Article 21 of our Constitution. This right to speedy trial
begins with the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration and continues at all the
stages of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that prejudice caused by the
impermissible and avoidable delay can be averted. 

However, the seven Judges constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik13, held that ‘it is neither advisable nor feasible  to  draw or prescribe
an outer time-limit for the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.” In another case of State
of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar14, a seven judges bench of the Supreme Court held that
“the necessity of a speedy trial is too vague and uncertain to form the basis of valid and
reasonable classification. It is too indefinite as there can hardly be any definite objective test
to determine it. It is no classification at all in the real sense of the term as it is not based on
any characteristics which are peculiar to persons or to cases which are to be subjected to the
special procedure prescribed by the Act”.

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SPEEDY TRIAL

In the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar15 speedy trial was accepted as a
fundamental right. Justice P.N. Bhagwati observed that: “Even under our Constitution,
though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the
broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India16. We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on
12
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1961 AIR 1787.
13
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik, 1988 AIR 1531.
14
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.
15
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, 1979 AIR 1369.
16
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.

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every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that
Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the
procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a
procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his
fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental
right and secure his release.”

After the declaration of the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right the question arose
before the court as to at which stage such right can be exercised by the concerned parties. The
Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak17 observed that the right to speedy trial
derived from Article 21, encompasses all stages of the trial (namely - investigation, inquiry,
trial, appeal, revision and retrial).

The Apex Court further developed the jurisprudence of unreasonable delay because such
delay violated the right to speedy trial of the accused but the question arose as to what
constitutes unreasonable delay. The answer to this question was provided in the case of P.
Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka18 wherein the Court identified three factors to
recognize whether the accused has been deprived of his right to speedy trial. The factors are
as follows: (a) length of delay; (b) justification of the delay; (c) accused’s assertion of his
right to speedy trial and; (d) prejudice caused to the accused by such delay.

Another difficulty arose in the form that the criminals were using the right to speedy trial as a
weapon and the criminal justice system was not serving its purpose. So, the Apex Court in the
case of State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji19 held that in deciding the question
whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial, the court is entitled to take into
consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and
whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. The court
is also entitled to take into consideration whether the delay was unintentional, caused by
over-crowding of the court's docket or under-staffing of the prosecutors. If the accused is
found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it could be said that the
accused had thus been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself, the conviction
would certainly have to go. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling

17
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701.
18
P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856.
19
State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji, AIR 1981 SC 1675.

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the Court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no
justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only.

In the case of Lallan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar 20 the Court held that though speedy trial is
the sine qua non of Article 21, but when grave miscarriage of justice is committed by the
Police Officer, the ground of delay of disposal of cases would not scuttle the miscarriage of
justice. In Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar21 it was held that in offences punishable with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, the court shall close the prosecution
evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the
accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not.

CONCLUSION

The principle of ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ forms the basis for the right to speedy trial
and similar rights which are recognized to expedite the legal system as it will be unfair for the
injured party to have to sustain the injury with little hope for resolution. The judiciary plays
an important role in India’s democracy and all its implications must be imported into the
judicial process. A sense of confidence in the courts is essential to maintain the fabric of
ordered liberty which can be maintained by generating confidence in the masses that the
Courts will not vindicate their rights and people come to believe that the Courts will fulfil
their primary function to protect the people.

In the initial days after the independence, speedy trial was not so important but after the
period of emergency, the Courts started taking interest in providing speedy trials to prevent
unnecessary harassment to the parties to a criminal proceeding. The Apex Courts through its
judicial pronouncements held that speedy trial is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the
constitution and hence no person shall be deprived of his life and liberty without the
procedure of law and the procedure of law must be ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’, and ‘just’. 

The right to a speedy trial is available at all stages namely, investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial. The Supreme Court in its various judgements emphasised that a
person can approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Court under Article
226 to enforce the right to a speedy trial. However, the Court at various times refused to fix a
time limit under which a trial has to be concluded. However, there exist various reasons for

20
Lallan Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR2006 SC 3376.
21
Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 3281.

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the delay in the trial. Though the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, it still requires
empirical study and comprehensive law for its meaningful application. The role of the
judiciary places enormous responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts. The development of
the nation is equally dependent on the dynamism and the innovativeness of the judicial
system. Hence, there is an urgent need to ensure that no justice is delayed and the situation
existing today is remedied soon.

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