Topic: Bail Doctrine: A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need not wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable Facts: Herein petitioner, the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-1031 for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law pending before the Department of Justice (DOJ), charged respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority in connection with the grant of bail and issuance of a release order in favor of one Lourdes Estrella Santos. After the arrest of Santos, one of the respondents here, on May 24, 2000, she was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Rule 112, Section 7 of the then applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the preliminary investigation on May 31, 2000 at 2:00 PM. However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an Order of Release signed by respondent Judge Beldia who was then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, Regional Trial Court of Marikina City (RTC-Marikina City). Such bail was granted and approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor. Ruiz then filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long as the information has not yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Respondent Judge Beldia contends that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to apply for bail. The OCA was also informed that the records of release orders and bailbonds in her custody did not include the subject release order issued by respondent Judge Beldia. As such, she could not tell whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed by Santos. It is likewise confirmed that Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez were present and available on the day that Judge Beldia issued the release order. The OCA recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law in granting the bail of Santos HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez were present on May 30, 2000 to act on the bail application of Santos. When respondent Judge Beldia acted on the bail application of Santos on May 30, 2000, his designation was merely an "assisting judge" in the RTC-Marikina City, his permanent station being in Branch 57, RTC-San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. As such, his authority in the Marikina court is limited and he could only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the absence or unavailability of the regular judge. A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need not wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a judge could grant bail to a person lawfully arrested but without a warrant, upon waiver of his right under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as Santos had done upon her inquest. Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with which she was charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death. Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in accordance with established rules and procedure. Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this respect and must thus be held administratively liable. Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. In Cortes v. Judge Catral, the Court ruled that in all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought. Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules when he granted bail to Santos sans hearing and notice and without the latter having filed a formal petition for bail. Accordingly, the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process for which respondent Judge Beldia must be held accountable. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. PADERANGA vs. CA, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995 Topic: Bail Doctrine: Only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail Facts: On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. Upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co- conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992. A warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution. Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. A Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. Six months later,Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The CA then annulled the Decision of RTC. Issue: Whether or not the decision of RTC granting the bail of Paderanga is valid HELD: Yes. The Court held that bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard. The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED. DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE, G.R. Nos. L-32951-2, September 17, 1971 Topic: Bail Doctrine: The guidelines in the fixing of bail are as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Facts: Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. On January 14 1969, an application for bail was filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident . He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence. Respondent Judge granted the petitioner's application for bail fixing fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the recommended bail is excessive HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the said bail amount is excessive and is a clear violation of constitutional provision against excessive bail. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the required remedy. WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to costs. Topic: Doctrine: Facts: Issue: HELD: Topic: Doctrine: Facts: Issue: HELD: