SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASES

DR. NIXON L. TREYES, PETITIONER, V. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET
AL., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020

FACTS:
Rosie Larlar Treyes died intestate and without a child. Rosie’s siblings sent a letter to Dr. Nixon Treyes, the husband of
Rosie, inviting him for a conference for the settlement of estate of Rosie. Treyes ignored the letter and executed two
affidavits of self-adjudication which he registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal, and San Carlos, Negros
Occidental, transferring unto himself 14 properties, as sole heir of his decedent-spouse. After sending a second letter,
it was found out by the siblings that the properties of Rosie were already transferred to Treyes.
The siblings Larlar filed an action for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs, conveyance of ownership
and possession, partition, and damages, before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
A first service of summons was served on Treyes, which he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. A re-service of summons was served to Treyes which then he filed another
Motion to Dismiss arguing that the private respondents’ Complaint should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1)
improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and,
corollarily, lack of real parties in interest, arguing that the petitioners have not established their right to succession
and thus lacking the personality to file the complaint; prescription on the ground that the action for recovery of
properties of the heirs has prescribed, and improper venue for the complaint was filed before the RTC of San Carlos,
Negros Occidental.

The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting Treyes to file before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, however, denied the same.

ISSUE and HOLDING:

1) Whether the action should be dismissed for improper venue

No, the action cannot be dismissed for improper venue. Invoking rule 73 to allege improper venue is entirely
inconsistent with Treyes’ assertion that the complaint filed is not a special proceeding but an ordinary civil action.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the rules provides that all defenses and objections not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in an
answer shall be deemed as a waiver with exception to the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
prescription, res judicata, litis pendentia. Likewise under Rule 15, Section 8, it provides that a motion attacking a
pleading, order, judgment shall include all objections available, else such objection not raised shall be deemed waived
(exception: the 4 grounds of motion to dismiss).
In this case, in the first motion to dismiss, Treyes only raised lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner. The defense for
improper venue was very much available at the time of filing. Thus, raising the defense of improper venue although
would not have been prejudicial to the petitioner, there is no valid justification for the failure to invoke such defense.

2) Whether the action has prescribed

No, the defense of prescription of the complaint has no merit. Treyes invoked prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is
inconsistent with his main theory that the complaint is an ordinary civil action and not a special proceeding. The
provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is applicable only:

1. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and
2. when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
The court held that both requirements are absent in this case; thus, the prescriptive period on constructive trust
under the Civil Code, particularly under implied constructive trust, applies, and not the prescription on Special
Proceedings.

The Civil Code identifies 2 kinds of Trusts:

1. Implied – by operation of law

2. Express – by intention of the parties

Under Implied Trust, there are two more categories:

1. Resulting Trust
– disposition of property which raises an inference that he does not intent the person holding the property to have
any beneficial interest
2. Constructive Trust
– subject to equitable duty to convey to another, on ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it
– The duty to acquire property arises because of fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, wrongful disposition, breach
of fiduciary duty.

In an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust, the law provides a prescription of 10 years from
issuance of the torrens title over the property, which is based in article 1144 of the civil code. This issuance of title
operates as a contructive notice to the whole world, which the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time of such issuance.

3) Whether there is a need for prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding prior to filing an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of property.
No. Treyes contends that the petitioners have not established their right as legal heirs and is a prerequisite to an
ordinary suit; hence, their action for reconveyance should be dismissed.

The court held that the establishment of right of the heirs is conferred by law and there is no need for judicial
confirmation to establish petitioners as heirs. It was already established by the petitioners that they are heirs ipso
facto jure, thus there is no need for any judicial confirmation. The complaint alleges that their rights over the
properties is by virtue of their being siblings of the decedent.
In Article 777 of the Civil Code, it substantially provides that rights of succession is transmitted upon the moment of
death of the decedent. This much to say that the title or rights is immediately passed to the heirs upon death. Thus, the
heirs have legally been deemed to have acquired ownership over the estate of the decedent, without need of any
declaration.

In partition, even before a property is judicially partitioned, heirs are already deemed owners and without need for
prior separate judicial declaration of their heirship.
In a summary settlement of estates, heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of estate of decedent amongst
themselves through execution of a public instrument without prior declaration in separate judicial proceeding that
they are heirs of the decedent.

Article 1001 likewise provides that brothers and sisters or their children who survive with the widow or widower are
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, the other half to the surviving spouse.
Here, the petitioners have already established their filiation with the decedent and therefore there is no need for a
declaration of heirship through special proceedings. The need to institute a separate special proceeding for
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality as when parties in a civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship.
Further, in this case, the plaintiffs do not really seek to establish their right as an heir but seek the enforcement of
their rights brought about them being heirs by operation of law, as provided under Article 777, in relation to Article
1001 of the Civil Code.

Hence, the petition is denie

G.R. No. 16680           September 13, 1920
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.
Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are
admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in
"special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an
administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a
deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint
assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of
assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section 57-62 of Act
No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and
(e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act No. 2369
provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190 provide for the
appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any
possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial.
Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by said section
154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives us an
interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an "action" and a "special proceeding."
Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every other remedy
furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."
In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature itself, we are
driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding," and that when the
Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special proceeding."
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal demand of one's
legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be
given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate
testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d
ed., sec. 1.)
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of
First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby overruled and the prayer
of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge
appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any
finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 92436
July 26, 1991

FACTS:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at
Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona,Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of
registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application
was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.

• In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh."6"). In the subdivision plan, each
resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which
is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete,
the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
• In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property-
OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already
deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
• On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of
the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee
immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
• In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally partitioned
theproperty. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs
were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his father.
• Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as shown by the Torrens
title over the land.
• Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land
for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.
• The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavino’s children had a
written partition agreement. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?

Held:
NO.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral,
was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez
vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities
does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by
the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a
conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but
rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir
accepting and receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly
sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or
another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent, 26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co- ownership by the heirs.
The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the
portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmaci Gardiola is his share in the estate of
his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael
Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as
mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could
transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his
father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a
right in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or
right to property. Thus, since he never had any title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did
not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over
the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, the latter cannot give them what he never had
before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did
petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership nor did possession of the lot from the
time Rafael Reyes, Jr. die. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was
only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that
private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13
1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint
was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden
on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance
of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
CUENCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-24742, 26 OCTOBER 1973

Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at Manila. He was survived by his widow and their two minor sons, all residing in
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age
and residing in Cebu.

Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with CFI Cebu, alleging that the late senator died
intestate in Manila; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

A week after the filing of the Cebu petition, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the CFI Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. Having learned of the intestate
proceeding in the Cebu court, filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss as well as an Opposition to
Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator. The Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution
on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue, considering that the CFI Cebu already acquired jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion were
both denied. CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish.

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate,
both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of
venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which
otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court
with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and
deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction
— indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of
residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given
by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. However, the Cebu
court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent
and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings.
VICENTE URIARTE vs. CFI, et. al.G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

Facts:
Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite, a non-
resident alien, in CFI Negros Oriental, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural son of the decedent and
his sole heir. Petitioner had previously initiated an action before the same court for compulsory acknowledgment as
natural son but there was no final judgment yet. Private respondents, nephews of the decedent, filed an
opposition
alleging that the decedent had left a will in Spain. Later, the same respondents filed a petition for probate in CFI
Manila using the alleged last will of the decedent, and then filed a motion to dismiss the special proceedings in CFI
Negros Oriental. The CFI Manila allowed the petition for probate, and the CFI Negros dismissed the intestate
proceeding. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration in CFI Negros which was denied. He also filed an
omnibus motion in CFI Manila asking for the dismissal of the probate proceeding on the ground that it was the CFI
Negros that took first cognizance of the case. Said motion was denied by CFI Manila. Hence this petition for certiorari
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion of the two courts CFI Manila and Negros Oriental.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the special proceedings in CFI Negros was proper; and
2. Whether or not CFI Manila has jurisdiction to probate the alleged will.

Held:
On the first issue, it was proper that the intestate proceeding in Negros CFI be discontinued because of
the fact that the decedent had left a will. It is well-settled that testacy is favored over intestacy, and that any intestate
proceeding may be terminated at any time when it is discovered that the deceased had left a will. However, the proper
thing the private respondents should have done was to file the petition for probate in CFI Negros which was already
hearing the intestate proceeding. The issue now is improper venue, not jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is
now guilty of laches for failing to timely object to the filing of the petition for probate in CFI Manila. It is settled that
questions of venue may be waived when not timely objected to. Hence, the CFI Manila may continue with the probate
case, without prejudice to petitioner's successful action for his compulsory recognition as heir. Petition for certiorari
was denied.
Reynoso vs. Santiago

Facts:
Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in the Court of the First Instance of
Quezon for the administration of the property of the deceased. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora
Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son respectively, opposed the application and filed a document,
which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a counter petition for its probate. Upon
trial the court rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on the appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of
the court below, found the will authentic and drawn with all the formalities of Law.

Thereafter Victorio Reynoso And Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special proceeding and another
under a separate and new docket number (3107) and with a different title. The first prayed that the special
administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No. 2914, be ordered to
turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of copra, nuts and other agricultural products to
Victorio Reynoso, and to render an accounting within a reasonable time, It also asked for the closing of the intestate
proceeding. The other petition prayed that the estate be administered and settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and
that Victorio Reynoso be appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and testament. It also contained a prayer
for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the new executor of the properties that came into
possession Aincluding the proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

The two petitions were decided separately by Judge Santiago on April 20, 1949. With respect to the opening of
another expediente, His Honor believed that the proposed change or substitution was "not only unnecessary but
inconvenient and expensive." An intestate proceeding like special proceeding like special proceeding No. 2914, he
said,
Could and should and should be converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente without the
necessity of changing its number, name or title.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the opening of a testate estate of the decedent is proper?
2. Whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as the administrator of the estate?

Ruling:
1. The petition has no merit. Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued and a new
proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies
within the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any heirs or
creditors.

2. Yes. If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not
materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the
suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he
represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability
as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of the claims."

Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance with the final decision
of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an
albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator. The appointment of a regular
administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important duties
devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator cannot perform, and there are many actions to be
taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.
Roberts v. Leonidas (April 27, 1984)
Ramon Aquino, J.:
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

PROBLEM:
A will already probated in Utah was filed before Manila CFI Branch 38 while intestate proceedings for the same estate
were ongoing in Manila CFI Branch 20.

HELD: The two proceedings must be consolidated and the testate proceeding should be continued. It would be
anomalous to undergo intestate proceedings when the deceased died with two wills.

FACTS:

EDWARD Grimm, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, was
married twice.
*FIRST MARRIAGE (divorced) = Juanita Kegley Grimm (MRS. GRIMM). Children: JUANITA Grimm Morris and ETHEL
Grimm Morris.
oSECOND MARRIAGE = MAXINE Tate Grimm. Children: Edward Miller Grimm II (PETE) and LINDA Grimm.
Jan. 23, 1959 – Edward executed 2 wills, one for his Philippine properties (PH WILL) and one for his properties
abroad (FOREIGN WILL).
oEdward described his Philippine properties as conjugal property of his second marriage.
oIn the PH will, Juanita and Ethel were given their legitimes.
oThey were not given anything in the foreign will, because according to Edward he had already given them their
legitimes in the PH will.
oThe rest of the 2 wills favored Maxine and her children
Nov. 27, 1977 – Edward died in the Makati Medical Center.
Jan. 9, 1978 – Ethel instituted intestate proceedings for Edward’s estate before Manila CFI Branch 20.
oEthel was named special administratrix.
oMaxine admitted that she was notified of the proceedings
March 7, 1978 – Maxine presented the 2 wills for probate before the 3rd Judicial District Court of Tooele County,
Utah, USA.
oJuanita and Ethel were notified of the proceeding
March 11, 1978 – Maxine, through ACCRA, moved to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground that Edward’s
wills were being probated in Utah.
 April 10, 1978 – Utah court admitted the 2 wills to probate.
April 25, 1978 – COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS
omade in Utah with knowledge of the intestate proceedings before the Manila CFI
osigned by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in
fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita and Mrs. Grimm
oSTIPULATIONS
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as administrators of Edward's Philippine estate
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000
plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa, Manila.
Computation of the "net distributable estate"
Recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the ACCRA law firm
Pete, Linda, Ethel and Juanita "shall share equally in the Net DistributableEstate"
Ethel and Juanita should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share.
Included a supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978
May 23 and June 2, 1978 – Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, CFI Branch 20 (intestate court) allowed Maxine
to withdraw her opposition. Maxine, Pete and Ethel were appointed administrators of the estate. The court ignored
the will already found in the record (I think it was there because it was submitted together with the compromise).
March 21, 1979 – Maxine, Pete and Ethel, acting as administrators, sold one of Edward’s businesses (Palawan Pearl
Project) for P75,000, to a company named Makiling Management Co. [whose incorporators were Ethel, her husband
Rex Roberts and Maxine’s former lawyer William Limqueco]
oThe admins also sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation to Joseph Server and others for P1,546,136.
July 27, 1979 – Branch 20 Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the Edward's Philippine estate and
one eight (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in that order. (anlabo mo
judge)
August 9, 1979 – Maxine, through a new lawyer, moved to defer approval of the partition(as per the Utah agreement
ata). Court considered it moot because the shares had already been adjudicated in the July 27 order.
April 18, 1980 – Juanita moved for accounting of the estate’s properties filed a motion for accounting to facilitate
partition and close the present intestate estate.
June 10, 1980 – ACCRA filed appearance as collaborating counsel for Maxine
Sep. 8, 1980 – Maxine, through Rogelio Vinluan of ACCRA, filed the assailed petition for probate of the 2 wills
already probated in Utah. The case was heard before Manila CFI Branch 38
oALLEGATIONS
Maxine and her children were defrauded due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal
the intestate proceeding is void because Edward died testate
the partition was contrary to Edward's wills
oPetition also asked that:
the 1979 partition approved by Br. 20 be set aside and the letters of administration be revoked
Maxine be appointed executrix
Ethel and Juanita be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine
Ethel moved to dismiss, Judge Leonidas denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
oRELIEFS SOUGHT:
Dismissal of the testate proceeding, OR
Consolidation of the two proceedings in Branch 20
That the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate

ISSUE (HELD):
Can a petition for allowance of wills and annulment of partition - approved in an intestate proceeding by one branch
of the CFI - be entertained by another branch (after a probate in the Utah district court)?
(YES)
RATIO:
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Edward died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (NCC 838; ROC 75, Sec. 1).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara and Baluyot vs. Pañ o).
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file her answer to the petition anyway.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied, CFI affirmed.
Advincula vs. Teodoro
99 SCRA 413, G.R. No. L-9282, May 31, 1956

FACTS:
Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular administrator of his deceased wife’s estate.
After he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceased’s will.
Emilio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the signature was not his wife’s and even if it was, the same
was procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed
administrator in lieu of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and
unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate”. The court ruled in favor of Enrique’s
motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was denied so he instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the
lower court’s order.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction in
granting Lacson’s motion.

HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson was named
executor of the deceased’s will. This provision, however cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted to probate.
The discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facto nullify letters of administration already issued or even
authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is “proved and allowed by the court”. Furthermore,
the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to the
deceased’s estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because from the
viewpoint of logic and experience, as stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be administrator of the estate in
the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving
spouse if a forced heir of the deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property a part from his share of the other half thereof
as heir of the deceased since “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-40502 | November 29, 1976 | Martin, J.)

NATURE OF THE CASE: A petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pañ o from further acting in the case.

FACTS: Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba, presided by Judge Malvar, a petition moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate of Garcia, who died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court."

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa, contending that the order appointing Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction and prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate,
in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground, that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading
and/or incomplete misrepresentations and has adverse interest against the estate.

Judge Malvar ruled denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Fule and that Preciosa had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special
and regular administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of
previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed
for.

Preciosa and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna. Court of Appeals affirmed stating the CFI of Calamba Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue is improperly laid

HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the substance of
the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be
waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with
jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases, it may be
waived or stipulated by the parties.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court. Amado G.
Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.

With that, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore, Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a
special administratix.
WHEREFORE, the petitions of petitioner Fule are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
NOTE:
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, and the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Dacoycoy vs. Hon IAC
G.R. 74854
Facts:
Dacoycoy, a resident of Cainta Rizal, filed a case for annulment of deeds of sale against De Guzman before RTC
Antipolo Rizal. It involves a parcel of riceland in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan. He prayed for the surrender of
the produce and damages against De Guzman due to the latter’s refusal.
Atty: De Guzman (defendant) failed to file a Motion to Dismiss as a defense is a waiver. (He has obligation to object to
the improper venue if he objects so).
But the RTC dismissed the complaint of Dacoycoy due to improper venue. Reason: Case should have been filed with
RTC Pangasinan, not Rizal because the action involves title to real property (Rule 4 Section 1).
Dacoycoy appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed RTC. Hence the appeal to SC.

Issue:
May the trial court motu proprio (without a formal request from another party) dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue? No.

Ruling:
Rule 4 Section 4 of ROC: Venue may be waived expressly or impliedly (both in inferior courts as well as in the RTCs).
Here, Atty. De Guzman impliedly waived the venue by his failure to challenge the venue in a motion to dismiss,
allowing the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered.
RTC Rizal would still have jurisdiction because it is a “proper court which has jurisdiction,” (BP 129 Section 19),
although not in the area where the property is located, because the latter may be agreed upon by the parties as in this
case.
De Guzman cannot challenge belatedly the wrong venue whether on appeal or in a special action. The venue cannot be
said to be improperly laid unless the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss.
Even though the venue may be wrong, it may be acceptable when parties, for whom convenience the Rules have been
devised, agreed.
The dismissal is a plain error, attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja
July 25, 1955| Bautista Angelo

Facts:
Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent
by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is
being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and
administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate
proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands
has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by
the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with the harvest.
The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the disputed
lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with
prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose
de Borja?

Held: No. In Franco vs. O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an
ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed
upon in testate or intestate proceedings”[1] or stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to be
his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings”.[2]

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the
question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending in
the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity of said
properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one can
hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972
MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
UY KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG and RELIABLE REALTY
CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.
Petitioner in his own behalf.
J. Natividad & Associates for respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:p
Manuel Y. Macias, the petitioner-appellant, asserted in his petition for review by certiorari against respondents Uy
Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila
Court of First Instance that he had filed a complaint against the respondents on April 30, 1969, seeking the annulment
of a deed of sale, reivindication, and damages (1) He is a beneficiary of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson's estate while
Special Actions No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance and Special Proceedings No. 57405
before Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance are being resolved regarding Julian Wolfson's inheritance. He
filed an appeal with the Supreme Court in Special Proceedings No. 63866 against the order dated December 27, 1967
appointing Ricardo Vito Cruz as auxiliary administrator. No. L-29235;
(2) that in Special Proceedings No. 67302, which was originally assigned to Branch VI but was later transferred to
Branch VIII and consolidated with Special Proceedings No. 63866, he was named as the special administrator of
Rosina's estate. However, the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissed the said Special Proceedings No. 67302 in an
order dated February 20, 1967, which he also appealed to the Supreme Court and docketed as G.R. No. L-28054;
(3) that he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49877/T-158,
49878/T-158, 49879/T-158, 49880/T-158, and 49881/T-158, all issued in the name of Rosina and covering five
adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila, in order to protect his interest as such beneficiary in the estates of Rosina and Julian;
(4) That on April 16, 1969 (p. 73, rec. of L-30935), Judge Manuel P. Barcelona, who was presiding over Special
Proceedings No. 63866, gave respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz permission to sell Rosina's real estate on his own motion
in order to pay estate and inheritance taxes, real estate taxes, and administrative costs;
(5) Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz arranged the sale of the aforementioned lots with Dependable Realty Corporation,
which was prepared to pay P400,000.00 for the properties as long as the notice of lis pendens noted on the titles
pertaining to said lots is removed;
(6) that on April 15, 1969, Judge Manuel Barcelona in Special Proceedings No. 63866 granted respondent Vito Cruz's
request and ordered the cancellation of the aforementioned notice of lis pendens (Schedule "C" of petition, p. 43, rec. );
(7) that petitioner Vito Cruz signed a deed of sale over the aforementioned properties in favor of Reliable Realty
Corporation, which was run by petitioners Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong;
petitioner Judge Manuel P. Barcelona then approved the deed of sale in an order dated April 24, 1969;
(8) That upon the cancellation of T.C.T. Nos. 49877, 49878, 49880, and 49881, the Register of Deeds issued T.C.T. Nos.
96471/T-757, 96472/T-757, 96473/T-757, and 96474/T-757 in favor of the respondent Dependable Realty
Corporation;
(9) That the aforementioned orders of April 16, 1969, and April 24, 1969, were issued without providing the
petitioner with adequate notice and without or in excess of the Presiding Judge's jurisdiction in Special Proceedings
No. 63866 because he had been stripped of that jurisdiction as a result of his appeal in G. R. No. L-29235, (p. 32, rec.);
(10) He caused a notice of adverse claim to be filed on April 30, 1969, for the properties covered by T.C.T. Nos. 96471,
96472, 96473, and 96474 (p. 34, rec.); and
(11) that he expended at least P10,000.00 in order to safeguard and uphold his inherited rights to Rosina's estate;
and requests that the court rule that (a) the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots is invalid, (b) the transfer
certificates of titles issued in Reliable Realty Corporation's name be revoked, (c) the aforementioned five lots be
recognized as his distributive share of Rosina's estate, and (d) new transfer certificates of title be issued in his name
by the Manila register of deeds. . (d) ordering private respondents to pay him P10,000 in actual damages, P100,000 in
moral damages, P20,000 in exemplary damages, P50,000 in attorney's fees, and P20,000 in exemplary damages, plus
legal interests on all of the aforementioned values.
Appellant Macias' complaint was filed in Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. Private respondents Reliable
Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, and Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss
(Appendix "B," pp. 44–50, rec.) it on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of
the suit; the complaint states no cause of action; there is another that;
(1) The Manila Court of First Instance's Branch X lacks jurisdiction over the case because the Special Proceedings Nos.
63866 and 57405 before those courts are still pending, and the petitioner's alleged claim of beneficiary interest in
Julian and Rosina's estate depends on whether or not the probate court in those Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and
57405 recognizes that interest;
(2) despite the fact that he appealed to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII
dismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302, which was then pending before Branch IV, Branch X, which coordinates
with Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, does not have the authority to annul the questioned orders
issued by Branch VIII under the current legal precedent later transferred to Branch VIII (L-28054), from the order
dismissing Macias' claim of beneficiary interest in Rosina's estate and appointing respondent Vito Cruz as ancillary
administrator of Rosina's estate in the same Special Proceedings No. 63866 (L-29235; Annex "A", pp. 51-60, rec.) as
well as from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch IV dismissing Macias' petition for relief from the order
(3) Manuel Macias, the petitioner, is not a legitimate party in interest because he is not Rosina's beneficiary, legatee,
creditor, or even an heir. He bases his claimed right to share in Julian's estate, who passed away intestate on June 15,
1964, solely on the latter's letter to his sister Rosina, in which he expressed the hope that after his affairs were settled,
Rosina would give the petitioner Manuel Macias P500.00, Faustino A. Reis and Severino Baron P10,000.00 each,
Dominador M. Milan P1,000.00, and Vicente D. Recto P1,000.00. The aforementioned memo is not a will. Rosina
regrettably passed away on September 14, 1965, preventing her from carrying out her brother Julian's request. The
petitioner lacks the authority to bring the current case since he has not been recognized as Julian's heir or legatee in
Special Proceedings No. 57405 or Rosina's in Special Proceedings No. 63866. The aforementioned motion to dismiss
was followed by a supplement that claimed there was no cause of action against the private respondents Uy Kim,
Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, and Manuel Sosantong because the buyer, the Reliable Corporation, had a different
personality from those of its incorporators.
Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for intervention in said Case No. 76412 on June 4, 1969, reiterating the
grounds for the other private respondents' motion to dismiss as stated above and emphasizing that this petition for
relief from judgment seeks the nullification of the classification made by the presiding judge of branch x in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 on April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admitted by presiding judge of branch x of Branch VIII's
Manuel Barcelona, the presiding judge, in the aforementioned Extraordinary Procedures No. 63866 (Annex "B", pp.
96-97, rec.).
On June 14, 1969, the petitioner-appellant filed his response to Vito Cruz's intervention request as well as the motions
to dismiss filed by respondents Dependable Realty Company and its incorporators.
In an order dated June 30, 1969, Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of Branch X granted the motion to dismiss and
immediately dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 76412, but he rejected the motion's request for the
cancellation of the notice of adverse claim, which petitioner-appellant Macias had caused to be noted on the titles
issued in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation. As a result, Macias appealed from the ruling.
In this case, the respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, and Manuel
Sosantong filed their motion to dismiss the current petition on December 12, 1969 on the grounds that Branch X of
the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint because the said Branch X lacks
authority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a coordinate branch of the Manila Court of First Instance; that the
petitioner-appellant is and that the appeal is currently pending before this Court in L-30935 (pp. 87-97, rec.; pp. 4, 15,
appellant's brief; emphasis supplied). The order of Judge Barcelona of Branch VIII authorizing and approving the sale
of the lots in favor of respondent Reliable Realty Corporation was issued on April 16 and April 24, 1969, respectively.
Respondent Vito Cruz embraced the primary respondents' petition to dismiss, dated December 12, 1969, as his own
motion to dismiss and/or answer in a manifestation dated and filed on December 19, 1969. (p. 102, rec.).
A response to the request to dismiss was submitted on December 18, 1969, by the petitioner-appellant (pp. 104-108,
rec.).
The request to dismiss the petition for review and certiorari was rejected in Our Resolution dated January 23, 1970.
(p. 123, rec.).
Private respondents Dependable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co, and Manuel
Sosantong adopted their petition to dismiss filed on December 12, 1969 as their response in a manifestation dated
February 13, 1970. (p. 133, rec.).
On June 30, 1969, respondent Judge Jose L. Moya issued the order that is being appealed.

According to the complaint, Special Proceeding No. 63866 is currently ongoing in Branch VIII of this Court to settle the
inheritance of the late Rosina Marguerite Wolfson. The plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of her
estate. and that the plaintiff has appealed the order approving the sale to the Supreme Court, and that it is established
that only the branch of the Court of First Instance that rendered the judgment or issued the order has the authority to
set aside a judgment or order, and that any other branch, even one in the same judicial district, that attempts to do so
exceeds its authority (Tuason v. Judge Torres, 21 S.C.R.A. 1169, L-24717, December 4). (Branch VIII)in this case;
Finally, the lawsuit is dismissed since the Supreme Court has already been granted jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's
appeal, and no lower court should try to decide the identical issue that was presented to the Supreme Court.
The only issue raised by a motion to dismiss is whether the complaint filed in the action is sufficient, so the request in
the motion to dismiss for the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim that the plaintiff had caused to be annotated
on the titles to the lands on account of the current action is denied.
The current petitioner-claim appellant's is unfounded, and the decision that was previously appealed against should
stand.
According to Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates
of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts," so all inquiries pertaining to the
settlement of the estate of the late Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of
First Instance, which was then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals. This Court
provided the following justification for said Section 1 of Rule 73:
This law's justification is crystal clear. A deceased person's estate settlement in court only counts as one proceeding.
For the administration of that estate to be successful, it is essential that there be only one accountable body—a court
—with exclusive control over every aspect of the process. It would be confusing and time-consuming to assign it to
two or more courts, each of which would operate independently.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in the public interest for the better
administration of justice. For that reason the parties have no control over it. 1
On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge to the validity
of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, delegate or party in
interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall
take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution
and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, ... . 2
This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo,3 thus:
... The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or
through the process of administration. (See articles 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the estate of a
deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the heirs are that will receive the net
assets of the estate and the amount or proportion of their respective shares. ...
It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint
against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by
Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over Branch VIII of the same court.
Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first acquired
jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first
instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts. Thus, in the 1970 case of De Leon vs. Salvador,4 Mr. Justice
Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled:
The various branches of a Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority
and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with the respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments, by means of injunction. 5
In the words of Mr. Justice Fernando, also in behalf of the Court, "any other view would be subversive of a doctrine
that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial
actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to
interfere with each other's lawful orders. ... This is to preclude an undesirable situation from arising one, which if
permitted, as above pointed out, would be fraught with undesirable consequences, as already indicated, for the bench,
no less than for the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction. 6
Appellant claims that his action in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance, is not for
the annulment of any judgment or order of Branch VIII of said Court and that nowhere, either in the prayer or in the
body of his complaint, does he seek for the annulment of any order of Branch VIII (p. 8, appellant's brief). This
pretension of appellant is belied by paragraph 8 of his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 alleging that the order dated
April 15, 1969 directing the register of deeds of Manila to cancel the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by
the appellant on the titles covering the five (5) lots and the order dated April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale were
both issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866, without due notice to and hearing
of appellant; and further belied by paragraph 9 of the same complaint alleging that the acts of the buyers of the
aforesaid five (5) lots in causing the cancellation of appellant's notice of lis pendens in obtaining the registration of the
deed of sale, in procuring the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles over the five (5) lots in the name of
Rosina, and in securing new transfer certificates of title in the name of defendant Reliable Realty Corporation, are all
null and void ab initio, because (1) of the pendency of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235 for said appeal divested the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of any jurisdiction in Special Proceedings No. 63866 to sell the properties in question
notwithstanding the order of April 24, 1969 approving the deed of sale, (2) the orders dated April 15, 1969 and April
24, 1969 directing the cancellation of appellant's notice of lis pendens and approving the deed of sale may not be
registered as they have not become final and will not become final by reason of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235, and (3)
he was not notified of the petition to sell any portion of Rosina's estate (pars. 8 & 9, Appendix "A", pp. 30-34, rec.). It is
patent that by the aforesaid paragraphs 8 and 9 of his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X, appellant
impugns the validity of the aforementioned orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No.
63866.
Furthermore, in his motion to the Honorable Executive Judge of May 5, 1969, appellant averred that he filed his
complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 to nullify and set aside certain orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona of Branch VIII in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 over the testate estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and prayed that said Case No.
76412 should not be assigned to either Branch VIII or Branch IV (Annex "A", pp. 21-22, appellant's brief). Said motion
could not refer to orders of Judge Manuel P. Barcelona other than the aforecited orders of April 15, 16, and 24, 1969 in
Special Proceedings No. 63866.
This appellant impliedly admits on pp. 3-4 of his reply brief which is further emphasized by his statement that the
only purpose of his motion dated May 5, 1969 was "to keep the action away from possible prejudgment by the
abovementioned branches of the court below (referring to Branch IV and Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance)."
But even without considering paragraphs 8 and 9 of appellant's complaint and his motion dated May 5, 1969 in Civil
Case No. 76412 before Branch X, his prayer in the same complaint for the nullification or rescission of the deed of sale
covering the five lots in question cannot be decreed without passing upon the validity of the orders of the Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 cancelling his notice of lis pendens authorizing the sale and
approving the sale. And, as heretofore stated, under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the Presiding Judge of
Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon the validity of said orders of
the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, which court, as the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its
liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof.
Appellant's insistence that in Civil Case No. 76412, he seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the
decedent Rosina, all the more removes the said case from the jurisdiction of Branch X; for as heretofore stated, the
distribution of the estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. He must therefore seek his remedy
in the same probate court — Branch VIII — which is hearing Special Proceedings No. 63866, instead of filing a
separate civil case in Branch X.
Moreover, his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in G.R. No. L-30935, entitled Macias vs. University of
Michigan, et al., wherein he questions the validity of the aforesaid orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in
Special Proceedings No. 63866, amply covers the same subject matter and seeks substantially the same relief as his
complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 and the present petition (see pars. 26, 28, 30-40, and the prayer in this petition, pp.
13-34, rec. of L-30935). .
Appellant himself states that the decision in the three cases he filed with this Court namely, G.R. Nos. L-29235, L-
28947 and L-30935 will answer the question whether he has legal interest in the estates of Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson and Julian A. Wolfson (pp. 21-22, appellant's brief).
The cases he cited, as correctly contended by appellees (Lajom vs. Viola, et al., 73 Phil. 563; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.
855; Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; and Quion vs. Claridad, L-48541, January 30, 1943, 2 O.G., No. 6, June, 1943,
p. 572, 74 Phil. 100), are not applicable to and therefore do not govern the instant case, because the actions therein
were filed by the preterited heir or legatee or co-owner long after the intestate or testate or partition proceedings had
been closed or terminated. In the case at bar, Special Proceedings No. 63866 is still pending in the probate court —
Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance — where appellant should present, as he has in fact presented, his
alleged claim of legal interest in the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, which claim, if valid, will certainly entitle
him to all notices of all petitions, motions, orders, resolutions, decisions and processes issued and/or promulgated by
said probate court. There is no order by the said probate court terminating or closing Special Proceedings No. 63866.
However, in the recent case of Guilas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et al.,7 WE reiterated the rule:
... The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29,
1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-61).
Even in the case of Quion, etc. vs. Claridad, et al., supra, invoked by appellant, WE ruled that the intestate proceedings,
although closed and terminated, can still be reopened within the prescriptive period upon petition therefor by a
preterited heir.
The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering the same subject
matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is
still unsure of himself in the practice of the law, the same may be regarded with some understanding. But considering
appellant's ability and long experience at the bar, his filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and
should merit rebuke.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner-appellant. Let this be entered in his personal record.
[ GR No. 60575, Mar 16, 1987 ]
FRANCISCO E. POBRE v. JUDGE ARSENIO M. GONONG +

ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for preliminary injunction,
seeking to annul and set aside the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch IV (now Regional Trial
Court) through Respondent Judge, dated February 19, 1982, February 24, 1982, and July 29, 1982, which ordered,
allegedly without trial, (1) the exclusion of certain parcels of land from the administration of the regular administrator
of the estates of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita Pobre, in Special Proceedings No. 754-IV, and likewise (2)
ordered that possession of said properties be maintained in favor of Private Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes.  The
petition also assails the order of Respondent Judge, dated April 15, 1982, enjoining Petitioner to desist from
interfering with the possession of the properties excluded from the Inventory, and ordering the tenants of the estates
to deliver all shares of the harvests from said properties including 3 sheep to respondent Iluminada P. Llanes, under
pain of being declared in contempt of court.
It is indicated that the parties-litigants in this case are related to each other, tracing their common ancestry from the
original owners of the properties involved, who appear to be Bonifacio Pobre and Irene Blanco, to whom was born an
only son, Isidoro Pobre.  Petitioner avers that Irene Blanco predeceased Bonifacio Pobre and
later Bonifacio Pobre married Teresa Blanco, to which marriage Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre were born
(Memorandum of Petitioner, Rollo, p. 135).  Maxima Pobre later was married
to Basilio Quianzon.  Isidoro Pobre married Maria Evangelista and out of this marriage were born the
following:  Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre; Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes; Violeta Pobre; Josefina Pobre;
and Cresencio Pobre.
After the death of Bonifacio Pobre and later, Teresa Blanco, all properties left by them intestate, consisting of 35
parcels of untitled agricultural lands, located mostly in the towns of Paoay and Pinili, Ilocos Norte, were inherited by
Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita Pobre.  Maxima Pobre de Quianzon died on January 19, 1959 without any issue
and without any will.  Thus, Jovita Pobre inherited the entire estate of her sister, Maxima.
Upon the death of Jovita Pobre on August 5, 1976, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre,
Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes, Violeta Pobre, Cresencio Pobre, who are all children of the late Isidoro Pobre,
(half-brother of Jovita Pobre and Maxima Pobre de Quianzon) became the surviving heirs of the intestate estate
of Jovita Pobre as they were the latter's nephews and nieces.
On May 28, 1977, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, praying that after due hearing and publication, letters of administration be issued to him for
the administration of the intestate estate of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre, and that the said estates
of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre be settled and distributed among their legal heirs.  This Intestate
Proceedings was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 754-IV.
On October 7, 1977, Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes, assisted by her husband, Felix G. Llanes, filed her opposition to
the Petition.  She alleged that Maxima Pobre de Quianzon was only an illegitimate child of the
deceased Bonifacio Pobre; that Jovite Pobre was the only legitimate child of the spouses Teresa Blanco
and Bonifacio Pobre and, therefore, it should be Jovita Pobre alone who should succeed to the entire estate left by her
mother Teresa Blanco, except for such portion that may be alloted to an illegitimate child as prescribed by Art. 895 in
relation to Article 983 of the New Civil Code; that at the time of the death of Maxima Pobre, her only legal heir was her
husband Basilio Quianzon; that Petitioner Francisco Pobre and the other heirs mentioned in the Petition are
precluded from inheriting the estate of Maxima Pobre who was an illegitimate child; that
furthermore Jovita Pobre had disposed of all her properties before her death and Respondent spouses Llanes,
acquired by purchase from Jovita Pobre parcels 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 (to the extent of 1/3 of the whole
only) and parcels 25, 26, 27, and 32, in the Inventory of Properties co-owned by
Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita B. Pobre; and that Francisco Pobre was disqualified to be appointed as
administrator.
The lower court on February 20, 1978, appointed the Clerk of the lower court, Atty. Julian Duco, as special
administrator of the intestate estate in question but on January 13, 1979, said appointment was revoked and
petitioner Francisco Pobre was appointed administrator of the estate.  The latter then submitted to the Court an
Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the decedents Maxima Pobre and Jovita Pobre.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of January 13, 1979 appointing Francisco E. Pobre, as the regular
administrator was filed by Respondent Iluminada Llanes who insisted that they are the legal owners and possessors
of the real properties in the Inventory to the extent of one-third of the whole of the real properties in paragraphs 3, 5,
6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 of said Inventory and the whole of those in paragraphs 25, 26, 27 and 32 of the same.
On November 16, 1979, the lower court issued an order denying said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
This development led Respondent Iluminada Llanes, along with her husband and her daughter Evangeline Llanes to
file an independent Civil Action to Quiet Title with damages in Branch IV of the CFI of Ilocos Norte, alleging therein
that respondent spouses purchased most of the lots in question from deceased Jovita B. Pobre; that the other lots were
donated by the late Jovita Pobre to Evangeline P. Llanes, daughter of the spouses Iluminada Llanes and Felix Llanes.  It
was, therefore, prayed that the properties described in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of their complaint be excluded
from the Inventory of the Estate of Jovita B. Pobre and that a judgment be decreed in their favor, declaring them as the
absolute and exclusive owners and legal possessors of the stated properties.  This case was docketed as Civil Case No.
1128?IV in the lower court.
In his Answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 1128-IV, Francisco Pobre disputed the claim of Llanes regarding the
ownership and possession of the properties in question.  He contended that the instruments of sale and donation in
favor of the Llaneses are fictitious, that the house and lot claimed in the said Civil Case No. 1128-IV by
respondents Llanes is titled under O.C.T. No. 0-44 which is still registered in the name of Teresa Blanco; and that the
properties allegedly sold by the late Jovita Pobre to the Llaneses were not exclusive properties of Jovita Pobre, as the
same were owned by Teresa Blanco.
Civil Case No. 1128-IV is said to be still pending in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 754-IV, Respondent Iluminada P. Llanes filed on September 10, 1980 a Motion
to Exclude from the administration of Petitioner the properties being claimed by her.
The lower court treated said motion as a Motion-Complaint and thus Petitioner Francisco Pobre filed his Answer
thereto.  He once again denied the allegations of movant Llanes and stressed the fact that the properties covered by
O.C.T. No. 0-44 are still registered in the name of Teresa Blanco.  He insisted that the other properties were never
validly transferred to Oppositors as the referred deeds of conveyances are fictitious.
On January 22, 1981, Respondent Judge issued an order denying respondent Llanes' motion to exclude
properties.  However, under date of August 29, 1981, respondent Llanes, through counsel, filed a pleading entitled
"Rejoinder to:  Motion to Exclude Oppositor's Properties from Administration and Rejoinder to:  Opposition for
Admission to Inventory and Appraisal of Real Estate Dated December 12, 1980 and January 15, 1981 (See page
71, Rollo).  To this pleading, petitioner filed his Reply.
Respondent Judge, in his order of February 19, 1982, reconsidered his order of January 22, 1981, and his order of
November 16, 1979.  His finding was that respondents Llanes have been in actual possession under claim of
ownership of the properties in question to the extent of 1/3 of the whole of Lots 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 and
the whole of Lots Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 32, in the Inventory.  He ordered, therefore, that these properties be excluded
from the inventory under administration, and maintained the possession asserted by Iluminada Llanes.
On February 24, 1982, the lower court issued an order amending its February 19, 1982 order by directing the total
exclusion from the inventory of the properties under administration to the extent of not only 1/3 of each of said lots
but the whole of each of Lots 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, and 35, and
1/3 of parcels 23, 24, and 27; and ordering also that the possession thereof by respondent Iluminada Llanes be
maintained (Annex N, Rollo, p. 76).
Petitioner herein filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order but the same was denied by the trial court in
its order dated March 19, 1982.
On April 25, 1982, the lower court, acting on the Manifestation filed by counsel for respondent Llanes, issued an order
directing Administrator Francisco E. Pobre to desist from interfering with the possession of the properties excluded
from the Inventory and ordered the tenants of said properties to deliver the owner's share in the harvests thereon
to Iluminada Llanes and not to Francisco Pobre.
As the motion for reconsideration of Administrator Francisco Pobre was denied, the present petition
for Certiorari was, therefore, filed with this Court.
Under the Resolution of April 13, 1983 (Rollo, p. 125) of this Court, the Petition was given due course.
Petitioner avers in his Petition that the issues are:  (1) whether or not the Court orders, alleged to have been issued
without trial, excluding the properties claimed by respondents Llanes from the Inventory submitted, are null and
void; (2) whether or not the exclusion of the properties in question by virtue of the court orders of February 1982,
allegedly to be based mainly on the "Special Administrator's Inventory-Report on the Status and Possessors of
Properties" was arbitrary; (3) whether or not private respondent's claims of possession and/or ownership based on
the alleged documents of sale, donation and oral contract of sale have any factual or legal basis.
On the first issue regarding denial to petitioner of his right to due process because there was no actual trial conducted
on the Private Respondents' motion-complaint and the Respondent Court simply disposed of the matter by issuing the
orders of exclusion complained of, Petitioner argues that pursuant to the pronouncements in the case of Coca vs.
Pangilinan, L-29547, January 31, 1978 (81 SCRA 278-286), "it became the duty of the trial court, after the issues have
been joined and no amicable settlement has been reached, to receive evidence or conduct a full dress hearing and if
necessary to pass upon the validity of the donations of the portions of the estate." Petitioner contends that if a hearing
had been held, due process could have been rightfully accorded him and his co-heirs.
We find no merit in the above submissions of Petitioner.
Due process was properly observed by the Respondent Judge because Petitioner in fact made a Reply to private
respondents' pleading, entitled "Rejoinder to:  Motion to Exclude Oppositor's Properties from Administration and
Rejoinder to:  Opposition for Admission to Inventory and Appraisal of Real Estate dated December 12, 1980 and
January 15, 1981."
Further to this, in the order of February 24, 1982, it appears that the case was called for hearing on said date, but
only Oppositor's counsel, Wilfredo Guerrero, appeared; that Petitioner-Administrator, through counsel, was notified
of the hearing of the motion for reconsideration, amending the order of February 19, 1982, but neither petitioner nor
his counsel appeared.  Thus, Respondent Judge amended his order of February 19, 1982, so that the whole of parcels
3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35; and one-third of parcels 23, 24, and 27
were excluded from the Inventory and the possession thereof in Oppositor Iluminada Llanes was maintained (Annex
N, Rollo, p. 76).  Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was later denied for want of merit (Annex
O, Rollo, 77).
Another hearing of the case was called on April 15, 1982 but only Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero for Private Respondents
herein appeared.  Petitioner and his counsel were both absent.
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but
the denial of opportunity to be heard (Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
663).  Respondent Judge afforded Petitioner and his counsel ample opportunity to be heard at the hearings of
February 24, 1982 and April 15, 1982, but Petitioner and his counsel were absent at those hearings.  The fact remains
that petitioner was afforded opportunity to be heard and he even later filed motions for reconsideration of the
challenged orders.  Even assuming that Petitioner was not given prior notice of the various motions of private
respondents or her rejoinders, it has been held that there is no denial of due process where the adverse parties were
given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of an order which was issued pursuant to a petition filed
without prior notice to them (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, L-25897, August 21, 1976, 72 SCRA 388).
As the assailed orders of February 19, 1982, February 24, 1982 and April 15, 1982, do not appear to have been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, said orders cannot be set aside.  In said orders, Respondent Judge provisionally passed
upon the question of exclusion of property from the Inventory.  His conclusions regarding the ownership of said
properties are not final but provisional.  In Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 606, this
Court stated:
"x x x even with such presumption and refusal, the respondent court still acted within its jurisdiction and not with
grave abuse of discretion.  After all, the jurisprudence and rule are both to the effect that the probate court 'may'
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not 'should'.  The obvious reason is the probate court's limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or exclusion from the
inventory of property, can only be settled in a separate action.  Hence, even if respondent court presumed all the way
that the properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's estate, that would not prevent nor defeat
petitioner's remedy in a separate suit." (Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-62431-33, August
31, 1984, 131 SCRA 606, 608).
The final determination of the ownership of the properties in question in the case at bar, is not to be made in the
Intestate Proceedings, Sp. Proc. 754-IV, but in Civil Case No. 1128-IV which is the separate Civil Action to Quiet Title,
filed by respondent Iluminada Llanes in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.  The assailed orders of exclusion in
the intestate proceedings are merely interlocutory orders, because the question of title of the properties excluded
from the Inventory of the Administrator cannot be determined by the intestate court.  In an earlier case, this Court
held:
"We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order.  It was interlocutory in the sense that
it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.  The probate court in the inclusion incident
could not determine the question of title." (Valero Vda. de Rodriquez vs. Court of Appeals, L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91
SCRA 540).
Reliance of Petitioners on the pronouncements made in the case of Coca vs. Pangilinan, L-29547, January 31, 1978 (81
SCRA 278-285) that after the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement had been reached, the
probate court should receive evidence or conduct a full dress hearing on the motion in the form of complaint, is not
applicable to the case at bar.  In Coca vs. Pangilinan, the appellees therein did not institute a separate action to
determine the ownership of the twelve (12) hectares or portion of the estate involved.  Because of this circumstance,
it was ruled that it would be just, expeditious and inexpensive solution to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to
file in the intestate proceedings, a motion in the form of complaint setting forth therein their claim for the twelve (12)
hectares portion which the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, should then file their Answer thereto.  After the issues
have been joined and no amicable settlement reached, the probate court should receive evidence.
However, in the case at bar, there was already a separate action that had been filed by respondents Llanes in Civil Case
No. 1128-IV of the CFI of Ilocos Norte for the quieting of title over the properties excluded from the Inventory before
the assailed orders in this case were issued.  Respondent Llanes opted to file a separate civil action and this was aright
she could exercise.
"The general rule is that question of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding.  However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate
court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment
thereon." (Sebial vs. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 385).
The second issue raised by Petitioner Administrator as to whether or not the exclusion of the properties in question
by the lower court was arbitrary for being based mainly on the Special Administrator's Inventory-Report on the Status
and Possession of Properties, which report has no valid basis.  Petitioner is raising a factual issue which is not a
proper subject of certiorari proceedings. (Ygay vs. Escareal, L-44189, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 78, 82).
As to whether or not private respondents' claim of possession and/or ownership based on the alleged documents of
sale, donation and oral contract of sale has any factual or legal basis, again the same should not be resolved at this
time and by means of a special civil action for certiorari.  The resolution of the conflicting ownership claims should be
threshed out in the separate civil action (Civil Case No. 1128-IV), already filed by Private
Respondent Iluminada Pobre.  On a similar question, We ruled:
"Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected
under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir
of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the
respondent administrator against the petitioner and not in the intestate proceedings." (Quizon vs. Ramolete, L-51291,
May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495; 501).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasquez vs. William George

FACTS: Maria Velasquez Vda. De George and her children appealed from the decision of the CFI of Bulacan, which
dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are the widow and legitimate children of the late Benjamin
George whose estate is under intestate proceedings. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 5 defendant-
mortgagors (D-Mors) are officers of the Islan Associates Inc. Andres Munoz, aside from being the treasurer-director of
said corp., was also appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of Benjamin George in the above special
proceedings. In life, the latter owned 64.8% or 636 shares out of 980 shares of stock in the corp. Without prior
approval from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, the D-Mors executed a Deed of First
Real Estate Mortgage (DFREM) in favor of the defendant-mortgagee (D-Mee) Erlinda Villanueva, covering 3 parcels of
land owned by Island Assoc. In said Deed, the D-Mors also expressly waived their right to redeem the said parcels.
Subsequently, a power of atty (POA) was executed by the D-Mors in favor of Villanueva whereby the latter was given
full power and authority to cede, transfer and convey the parcels of land within the reglementary period provided by
law for redemption. A certificate of sale (CS) was executed in favor of Villanueva after she submitted the highest bids
at the public Auction. This led to the execution of a Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership (ACO) by
virtue of which TCTs covering the 3 parcels were cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of Villanueva. Plaintiffs
therefore filed a complaint for the annulment of the DFREM, POA, CS, ACO and the new TCTs. Villanueva contends that
the plaintiffs-appellants have no capacity to file the complaint because the general rule laid down in R87, sec3 of the
Rules of Court states that only the administrator or executor of the estate may bring actions of such nature as the one
in the case at bar. The only exception is when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act,
which exception does not apply in the present case. TC dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiffs-appellants have the capacity to file the complaint?

HELD: Yes. The contention that the proper party to file the complaint is the administrator of the estate of Benjamin
George is without merit. The administrator, Andres Munoz, is the same person charged by the plaintiffs-appellants to
have voted in the Board of Directors without securing the proper authority from the probate court to which he is
accountable as administrator. In Ramirez vs Baltazar we ruled that since the ground for the present action to annul
the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which
the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be far fetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the
action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring
the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings
for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to
the deceased.” The case at bar falls under such an exception.
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118904          April 20, 1998
Facts:
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at
Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime after
the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s
birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the
complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a
share in the produce of the land.
Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures
where the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue
and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow
testified that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. As proof
that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of
loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with
Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.
On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was not married when he died in
1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his brother married anybody and denied that
Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never
been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.
Ruling:
The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir
of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during
the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).
When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of
a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock,
the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records
of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present
it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a
marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise
to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.
The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s self- serving negations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial courts decision is REINSTATED.
Henry Litam vs. Espiritu

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of RIzal. On April 24, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam filed a petition stating that
the petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam and the deceased was survived by 8 children by a marriage celebrated in
China in 1911 with Sia Khin, that after the death of Rafael Litam, petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the
decedent had contracted in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, that the decedent left as his
property among others 1/2 share in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera and that the
decedent left neither will nor debt. Petitioner prayed that after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be
issued to Marcosa Rivera.

Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-petition substantially denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin as well
as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition, asserting that the properties described are her
paraphernal properties and praying that her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased.
The Court granted Marcosa Rivera’s petition and Arminio assumed as administrator of the estate. He submitted an
inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam and said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the
petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in April 1952. Gregorio, on November 1952, filed a motion for the removal of Arminio
Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned estate. Meanwhile, Remedios Espiritu was appointed as guardian of
Marcosa who was declared incompetent. Gregorio Dy Tam filed Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court against Espiritu
and Arminio Rivera. He reproduced substantially the allegations made in his petition in April 1952 stating that the
properties in dispute are conjugal and are more than those specified in the inventory.

The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 2071. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Are appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam?
Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question or do the same constitute a common property
of her and the decedent?

Ruling:
SC said the appellants failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by marriage with Sia Khin. It
appears from the evidence presented by the defendants that there was no such marriage between Rafael Litam and
Sia Khin and that the plaintiffs named are not children of the deceased. The various official and public documents
executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other
than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the marriage certificate, it was clearly stated that he was single when
he married Marcosa Rivera. In the sworn application for alien certificate or registration, Rafael Litam unequivocally
declared under oath that he had no child.
Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the opinion of the
Court is the competent and vest evidence of the alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given for the
non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing of its loss.

It is therefore the findings of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said
decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife.

Appellants maintain that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of Bigamy, that he had wilfully and maliciously falsified
public and official documents and that although appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera, the
decedent had succeeded for 30 years in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations
with the other. The Court said the same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest
possible kind, not only because it entails the commission by Rafael Lita of grave criminal offenses which are
derogatory to his honor, but also because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of
defences. The proof for the appellants herein does not satisfy the requirement.
It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her
separate and exclusive money. Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence. Rafael declared under
oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the properties were her exclusive and separate money. It was also
acknowledge by Rafael that he had not given any money to his wife, and that they have actually adopted a system of
separation of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other.
These declarations and admission of the fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs
and successors in interests and third persons as well.
G.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO vs. LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA

FACTS:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the CFI of Tarlac for the administration of his
property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor,
was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio
Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs.
Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said
deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her
mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his
deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his
mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the
intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of
said deceased.
The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the
appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness,
there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant the
administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right
than the applicant. The trial was had and the court finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted
and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies,
with the consequent appointment of an administrator. (NO)
RULING:
1.)
We have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that when a
person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one
should he fail to name an executor therein.

This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally
amended. According to Section 596, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. According to Section 597 , if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos,
the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition
and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among
themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they
cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When
the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the
costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing
debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate
among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the
same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the
administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate
who have not
received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property,
real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. We conceive of no
powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. There is no weight in the
argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so
that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in
the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary
party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is
not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted — an administration which
will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.
CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ v. GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ, GR No. L-23002, 1967-07-31

Facts:
This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in
Civil Case No. 2565, which she commenced on May 28, 1962, to secure declaration of nullity of two contracts
executed... on January 24, 1934 and for recovery of certain properties.
On May 28, 1962, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
naming as... defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion Bautista vda. de
Rodriguez, as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and Antonio Diaz de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera,
as guardians... of the minors Marfa Ana, Mercedes, Margarita, Mauricio, Jr. and Domingo (Children of Mauricio
Rodriguez who had also died).
In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the material allegations of the complaint, but also set up as
affirmative defenses lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches.  As counterclaim, they asked for...
payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid balance of the earnings of the land up to August 15, 1962 in the sum of P
3,000.00  for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On October 5, 1963, judgment was rendered for the defendants.
Issues:
Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is that they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent
for lack of consideration.
Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio
or inexistent for lack of consideration?
Ruling:
We do not find them to be so.
Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a definite price in money, such undertakings constituted
in themselves actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the fishponds.  That the prices were not paid
(assuming... ad arquendo that Concepcion Martelino's testimony to this effect is true) does not make the sales
inexistent for want of causa.
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in order to
circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334, paragraph 1, of the
Civil Code of 1889, then... prevailing.
The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code, for as declared by the same
Spanish Court
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and
1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non... oritur actio, denying all recovery to
the guilty parties inter se.  And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade the legal
interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already... cited.
That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration of the purpose of the
contract was expressly recognized by this Supreme Court
Principles:
the consideration (causa) need not pass from one (party) to the other at the time the contract is entered into.  x x x
The consideration need not be paid at the time of the... promise.  The one promise is a consideration for the other.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup, petitioners, v. The Court of Appeals and Felisa Sinopera,
respondent, G.R. No. L-10474, 28 February 1958.

The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and
nieces living at the time of his death.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one
based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the
deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which
has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the
action was instituted.

FACTS:
-Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left 4 parcels of land in San Manuel, Pangasinan. He left as heirs his
widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters.
- On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased
Teodoro Tolete left no children or ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or
nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, alone to inherit the above properties".
- On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
P10,000. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000.
- In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete
(Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the
present action on June 20, 1950. - The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the
affidavit of adjudication and the invalidity of the sale. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the
complaint states no cause of action; and that if such a cause exists the same is barred.
- The CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication and the deeds
of sale as all null and void. The case was appealed to the CA. It held that the sale is valid as to the one-half share of the
land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to
the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
RULING: YES. It is argued that as the action was instituted almost 4 years after the affidavit of adjudication was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed
and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of 2 years as prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.,
855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows: SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate.
— If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with
the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his
lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office
of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
-There are two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or
more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement.
- This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause
"and not otherwise."
-By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement.
-On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement
on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
-There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby.
-As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the
estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and
both the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
-But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
settlement, there is no direct or express provision. Thus, it is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years.
-To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without
any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.
-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It
cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had
no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
-Hence, the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition
after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part
in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply
with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the
Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of
his death.
Ignacio Gerona, et al vs Carmen de Guzman, et al G.R. No. L-19060. May 20, 1964

Facts:
Petitioners, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, allege in their complaint for
reconveyance that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife,
Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente,
Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that subsequently after the death of Marcelo,
respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently misrepresenting
therein that they were the only surviving heirs, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs;
that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of
land in their own name; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of this
case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents share in said properties but the respondents refused to
heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners’ mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled
to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners’
action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Issue: WON the petitioners’ action is barred by the statute of frauds.

Ruling:
Yes the SC held that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting
from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-
heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an
adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by
the possessor of the property. When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating therein that
they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby
excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them.
Hence, the action for reconveyance should have been filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, in 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register
of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement constitutes constructive notice to whole world.