Seth Vandenberg

DIGIHUM 2126 Term Paper

My goal in this Essay is to show that Smalls’ claim that people who use others’
unsecured Wi-Fi networks are thieves, is a fallible argument. I begin with an overview of
Smalls’ understanding of theft and how it applies to the recently accessible technology that is
wifi. This will be followed by a focused discussion of multiple points on why the theories and
examples he presents do not support his thesis.
The primary goal of Smalls’ paper is to describe his rejections of four separate
arguments in support of the view that unauthorized access to a neighbour’s WiFi networks is
justifiable. The author asks; “can the use of a neighbour’s wireless Internet access be
considered theft?”(p. 179). Small begins with an introduction to the negligence of security
behind wifi technology and how it can be exploited to the extent of being considered theft. In
other words, “utilizing a neighbour's unauthorized wireless network to access the Internet is
nothing more or less than a case of theft” (p. 185).
To ensure these descriptions are clear, Smalls’ definition of theft is when a “person
dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently
depriving the other of the property” (p. 181). Small broadly explains the three central tenets
that make up the circumstances that would label someone as a thief and morally
irresponsible. “Firstly, the perpetrator must deprive an owner of what is rightfully the owner’s
property. Secondly, the perpetrator, in depriving the owner of their property, must have acted
with the intent to do so. And thirdly…the perpetrator must have acted dishonestly and is thus
open to moral sanction” (p. 181).
Based on these principles and Smalls’ definition of theft, he moves on to present
examples of arguments for “freeloading”. Freeloading is defined as someone who takes
advantage of other people's generosity without giving anything in return. In the first
argument, the freeloader argues that the network owner is signalling that it is acceptable for
the freeloader to use it. They also argue that the Microsoft Windows XP12 operating system
allowed for access to the strongest network, regardless of if it was secured. Another point
provided is that the freeloader's space is being compromised since the wifi signal trespasses
onto their property, giving them the right to gain access to it as a recompense. Lastly,
freeloaders argue that once the radio waves produced by the router leave private property, it
is to be considered public domain.
Having given 4 examples of why freeloaders may think these actions are okay, Small
then revisits and deconstructs those examples to explain why they are flawed. Small argues
that the example considering radiowaves intruding onto a freeloader's property is
undefendable. The author refers to the New South Wales law which states that when one
neighbour's tree encroaches into the airspace of another neighbour's property, “the owner in
no sense can claim ownership of these branches” or the fruit that it may provide (p. 184).
Considering this, it would seem that the freeloader has no right to internet access. Small also
counters the argument of if a network is unsecured then it implicitly invites public access by
comparing it to a neighbour's front door being left open. He argues that if it were morally
correct to connect to someone's open network and use their wifi, then it would be acceptable
to walk into a neighbour's house and take a piece of furniture. Readers ought to understand
the nature of theft in the realm of wifi accessibility as it is much different than we’ve
experienced in the past and can be interpreted in many ways.
Smalls’ claim that people who use others’ unsecured Wi-Fi networks are thieves is a
fallible argument due to the vagueness presented when discussing his central tenets of theft,
especially the first two principles. Small’s arguments against freeloaders also prove to
 Seth Vandenberg

provide a lack of intuition and reasoning. Small argues that the perpetrator must permanently
deprive an owner of what is rightfully the owner's property to be considered a thief. The
issue with this argument is the word “permanently”. The person borrowing the wifi is not
permanently depriving the wifi owner of access to the wifi, it is simply using bandwidth. The
usage of bandwidth may reduce the speeds of the wifi but simply does not deprive the owner
of it.
Small also states that “the perpetrator, in depriving the owner of their property, must
have acted with the intent to do so”(p. 181) but I do not believe the simple intent of using the
wifi is enough to constitute theft. The word intent is too vague in this context. For example, a
stranger's car breaks down in front of a house with open-access wifi and no cellular service
and that person takes advantage of the situation to use the wifi and request a tow truck. In
this situation, the direct intent to access the wifi should not be considered theft since any
reasonable person wouldn't mind providing this favour to someone in need. It would seem
unfair to label someone as a thief when they only intend to connect once and mean to cause
no harm. People who access free networks to avoid paying for the service should be
considered thieves, rather than someone in dire need of access to wifi for a few moments.
Small argues against 4 arguments for freeloading and proposes a multitude of
reasons as to why it is unethical. Most controversial, freeloaders claim that the radiowaves
emitted from the wifi-owners router infringe on their property's “air space” and can interfere
with their day-to-day activities. Because of this, freeloaders believe it is their right to have
access to this commodity since it is trespassing on their property. What the author fails to
acknowledge about the Wales law is that it likely does not apply to matters such as wifi since
it is a new technology and has yet to be understood fully. The author also states that the
freeloader has no right to the spoils produced by the wifi although it is infringing on their
property. Referring to the tree analogy, If the owner of the tree is irresponsible enough to
allow the tree to grow over a neighbour's property, I believe the neighbour should be allowed
to help themselves to what is on their property. The Wales law seems to be controversial in
reasoning, proving his argument to be fallible. Small also mentions that “most access point
manufacturers leave the security options their devices turned off”(p. 180). If a homeowner
was truly concerned about people borrowing their wifi they would take the initiative to turn
this setting on, such as a responsible property owner would trim their tree before it infringed
on someone's property. I believe that one of the reasons that people are reluctant to change
their settings on their equipment is because they are not afraid of people borrowing the wifi
since it is often unnoticeable and harmless, such as a neighbour picking an apple from a
nuisance tree.
In this essay, I have articulated two significant lapses in Smalls’ defence of his stance
on people using unsecured networks being labelled as thieves. The first problem was the
author's vagueness when describing the principles he uses when describing a thief, allowing
the reader to interpret the gray areas. The second problem was Smalls’ take on the
freeloader's argument on the radio signal trespassing onto their property, where the author
did not argue with enough compelling reasons to convince otherwise of interpretation.
Although I have not proven that connecting to unsecured wifi is morally permissible, these
arguments that Small presents are not enough to prove otherwise without further
elaboration.