!

J STORY OF
MODERN MANIPUR
(1826 • 1949)

• EDI'l'ED BY
DR.LAL DENA

1.991
•

ORBIT PUBLISHERS· DISTRIBUfORS

NEW DELHI· 110055
 1
Assertion of Re'surgent
l\faniPur,1826-1834
-LAL DENA

1.1. ·An Overview · of Relation,

1762-1819
M anipurentercd into a fo1111al relationship
.
the
British by signing a treaty on 14 September 1762. The
treaty was signed by · Haridas Gossain on behalf of
Bhagyachandra (Jai Singh), Raja of Manip_ur and by
Harry Verelst, Ghief of Chittagong factory, on behalf of
the East India Company. The circu11istances which led
to signing of the treaty need be stated here. Manipur was
repeatedly. attacked by the Bwmese. To make the situ-
ation ·worse, there was no any unity among the ruling
of Manipur. Sons murdered fathers and brothers
murdered brothers. In 1750, Garibniwaz abdicated the
throne of Manipur in favour of his son, Ajit Shah, son of
•
his second wife. In this way, Garibniwaz dishonoured the
legitimate claim of his eldest son, Shyam Shai, son of his
fll'St wife. Despite this humiliation, Shyam Shai
accompanied his father, Garibniwaz who had been to the
court to settle 8ome impending political dif-
between the two countties. At this time, it was
2 History ofModern Manipiu

rumoured that Garibniwaz intended to enthrone Shyam

Shai on their return to Manipur. Ajit Shah thus got his
father, Garibniwaz _and brother Shyam Shai murdered on
their way to Manipur. Without much difficult)'; Ajit Shah
became king of Manipur. But because of his involvement
in the murder of his father and brother, he was dethroned
by his younger brother, Bharat Shah who ruled for about
two years. After Bharat's death, the .throne of Manipur
was offered to Gour Shah, the eldest son of Shyam Shai.
Gour Shah was continually involved in a war against the
Bu1111ese. On one occasion, he broke his leg on his way
back from the war against the Burmese and thus _offered
the throne to his younger brother, Bhaigyachandra.
Ajit Shah, who had been residing all through those
period at Cachar, left no stone unturned to get back the
throne. He sought the help of British and the Raja of
Tripura negotiated on his behalf with the British autho-
·rities at Calcutta. Bhaigyachandra came to know Ajit's
plan and immediately sent his Vakil, Haridas Gossain to
Harry Verelst, chief of the Chittagong factory. Con-
vinced by .the ·eloquent arguments of Haridas Gossain,
Verelst decided to help Bhaigyachandra against the
Bu11nese. Thus, the successive Burmese invasions into
Manipur was the compelling reason which forced
Bhaigyachandra to the British help. Bhaigyachandra
was well aware of the fact that Manipuris lacked firea 11ns
and modem weapons. He also understood that his frontier
was not safe until and unless he was supported ·by a
superior power. Naturally, the choice of friendship fell
on the British authorities in India.
The signing of the treaty should also be seen in the
context of what happened in India and Europe as well.
British were engaged with France in the Seven YCars war
Asserti1'n ofResllTgenl Manipur 3
(1756 63). This had ·serious repurcussions on their
competition for colonial expansion particularly in India.
During the war, Alaung-paya king of Ava ( 1752-1760)
.was instigated by the French tq destroy the English
settlement .at Negrais, an island at the mouth of the
lrrawdy in 1759 on the allegation that the British supplied
arms to the Mons, one of the war-like tribes in Upper
Bu11na. As a result, about ten ·Englishmen and one
hundred Indians were killed. The British authorities in
India felt badly humiliated and were looking for ven-
geance of the atrocities at Neg1ais.
.It was at this critical juncture that Haridas Gossain
entered into a negotiation with Hariy Verelst and signed
the treaty. On the pan of British officials, political and
considerations were the motivating factors.
According to them the expulsion of Bu1n1ese from the
soil Manipur would enable British merchants to have
direct trade relations with Chinese merchants who
brought theii: goods down as far as Manipur, in any
quantities.they found a market for. Secondly,.an alliance
with Manipur would also enable the East India Company
to demand reparation from the Bu1111ese for the humili-
ation at Negrais.
According to the treaty, the British autho1 ities guar-
anteed military assistance to Jai Singh as and when
necessafy for the recovery of such land and effects which
had been taken away from him by the But 1nese. For such
assistance, Jai Singh was under obligation to meet all the
expenses of such troops. The two powers also agreed to
help each other and made a joint effort to get full
satisfaction for the injury which the English had suffered
at the hands of Bu1111ese at Negrais. Jai Singh was to
 •

regard the injuries which the English had suffered · or

likely to suffer in future injuries done to himself. It
was also agreed that there should not be any disturbance
or hindrance on the free movement of English traders and
·merchants into and through Manipur. The enemies of the
EngUsh were to be regarded as the enemies of Manipur
and vice versa. One clause of the treaty also mentioned
that Jai Singh was to grant lands to the English for the
construction of a factory and fon for the smooth.trans-
action of their business and protection .of their men.
Under the treaty, Jai Singh and.Verelst funher agreed
neither of them should enter into any S<>n of ag1ee-
mcnt with the Burmese king without the advice from the
other. Lastly, it was also agreed that the English troops
and the Manipuri forces should jointly move against
Bunna in case an injury was done to them. Manipur was
allowed to take full possession of Bumla and Jai Singh
was to make good to the English all such losses as the
latter might incur.
Having t}lus seen the te1ms of the treaty, it becomes
very clear that the English were in a more advantageous
position than. the Raja of Manipur. In fact it .was not a.
treaty signed between two equal powers. The basic
motive in seeking British assistance was the expulsion
of Bunnese from Manipur. In an effort to get rid of one
p<>wer, Jai Singh invited another power to come into
Manipur. Though Manipur might not surrender her
sovereignty to the British power, ·the treaty was a very
significant develop1nent in the relationship between
Manipur and British India. It paved the way for inter-
fere nee into the affairs of Manipur as and when British
autho1ities thought it
Assertion of Resurgent Manipur 5
The articles of the treaty were sent to H. Vansittart,
acting Governor of Bengal (who succeeded Robert Clive)
for confirrnation and with a request that a sufficient force
be also immediately· sent to Manipur to demand satis-
faction from the Burmese for all the injuries their nation
(British) had suffered at Negiais and Pegu. The board
met twice, first on 4 October, 1762 and again on· 11
October, 1762 toconsitlerthe proposals made by the Raja ·
of Manipur and the sending of an expedition threat. At
the same time, the· Goverrior info11ned the board that he
had received letters from the king of Delhi, Shah Alam
and his wazir Shuja-Ud-daulah, applying for
Bri.tish ·help to gai.n possession of the capital, Delhi. At
this critical juncture, the British officials did not think it
proper to detach any body ofEuropean troops to so distant
a country as Manipur. But neither did they want to lose
the opportunity of entering into an alliance·with Manipur
because this would enable them to demand reparations
from the Burtl}ese.
aritish. a_uthorities. at Fort William, Calcutta thus
decided to send companies of sepoy, four from
Calcutta and two from Chittagong. Accordingly, Verelst
accompanied the British troops which left Chittagong in
January, 1763 and reached Khaspur, then capital of
Cachar jn April, 1763. Owing to excessive rainfall and
epidemic, their march towards Manipur was . to be
abandoned. Moreover, because of the fresh confrontation
betwee.n. the East India Company and Mir Qasim. in
Bengal, the recall of the troops became inevitable. Thus,
Manipurdid not gain anything from the treaty materially.
Even then Jai Singh apologically.promised that he could
offer the produce of his country for meeting the expenses
 6 History of Modern Manipw

of the British troops which had never reached Manipur.

After the exile of Bhaigyachandra in for a short
while from Manipur, the relation between Manipur and
British was at a low ebb. However, on the regain of royal
power, Gourshyam, elder brother of Bhaigyachandra
reaffinned the treaty concluded on 14 September, 1762.
In his declaration, Gourshyam reiterated that he not only
confi1111ed the articles of the aforesaid treaty but also
under took to bear all the expenses as had already
incu11ed by the British in their recent march towards
. '

Manipur and all such expenses as hereafter might be

incurred.
On the whole, the tteaty the English a safe base
at Manipur from which they could further embark upon
their expansionist policy in South East Asia. Their
•
commercial gain from the treaty was no less. The British
merchants were guaranteed free bade facility in and
through Manipur. To enable them to do this, a contingent
of British force was to be stationed in Manipur and for
which a considerable space of land (about 800 cubic feet)
was also granted. The sole motive which prompted the
ruling king to seek British help was the menace
which still continued to pose danger to Manipur.
1.2. Seven Years' Devastation,
•
After Gourshyam's death, Bhaigyachandra fo11nally
became king of Manipur in 1764 and ruled uninterrupt-
edly for a period of 34 years. On his abdication in 1798,
Robinchandra was placed on the throneof Manipur. War
of succession again soon followed1 • ·

1. Bhaigyachandra (Jai Singh) had eight sons. Sanahal (who predett.ased his
father), Robinchandra, Madhuchandra, Tulsijit, Marjil. Daoji and
Gambhir Singh.

•
Assertion ofResurgent Manipur 7
Robinchandra was murdered by his brother Madhu-
chandra in 1801. By foiling the conspiratorial move of
his bonhers-Daoji and Gambhir, Madhuchandra tried
to strengthen his own position by offering the posts of
Jubaraj (heir apparent) and Senapati (Commander-in-
chieO to Chaurajit and Marjit respectively. Chaurajit
could not get along with Madhuchandra and by joining
hands with his brother Marjit, he captured the throne of
Manipur and Marjit was appointed . a Jubaraj and
Senapati. What happened to Madhuchandra also hap-
pened to Chaurajit. After an abonive attempt to oust ·his
brother Chaurajit, Marjit went to Bu11na to seek the help
of the Burmese king Bodawpaya (1779-1819). The
Bu1111ese readily complied with Marjit's request and a
large Bu11nese force invaded Manipur and placed Marjit
on the throne of Manipur in 1812.
Marjit thus Qwed his elevation to the throne of Manipur
to the Bu11nese supports. He ruled over Manipur as a
vassal of the Bu11nese king from 1812 to 1819. Once in
power, he wanted to get rid of the Bu1111ese domination.
He thought that he could rule over his country as an
independent king. On being summoned to pay homage
to the new Burmese king, Ba-gyi-daw in 1.819, Marjit
pleaded bis inability to attend the ceremony on the pretext
of the hostile intentions of his two brothers, Chaurajif and
Gambhir Singh who were then in Cachar. Naturally,
Marjit's failure to comply with the summon was taken
by Bur111ese officials as a sufficient ground for des-
patching their army tQ Manipur resulting in the defe.at
of MarjiL After Marjit's flight to Cachar, the Burmese
authorities put their own nominee, Jadu Singh, son-in-
 8 History ofModern Manipur
law of Garibniwaz and Shubol Singh, brother of Nar
Singh, as puppet rulers of Manipur.
In this way Manipur lost her sovereign power and this
. was mainly·because of the internal dispute and faction-
alism among the ruling princes of Manipur. ·Even at this
critical moment, the princes who took shelter in Cachar
did not think in te11ns of concened efforts to drive out·
the but.remained unreconciled among them-·
selves. So·the period from 1819 to 1821 has often been
referred to locally as Chahi Taret-Khuntakpa (Seven
years' Devastation).. The period .sig,iified .the high
water-mark of Burmese domination over Manipur. The
male population was reduced to a very low level, for
majority of them .forcibly to Bu11na. R.B.
Pemberton said •
that Manipur was "doomed...to the
•

devastating visitation. of Bu1.1nese .armies which have

'

nine or ten times _swept the country from one extremity

to the other with the apparent of
a whQm they found it· impossible permanently to
subdue''. It would, however, be wrong to say that
ipur alone was the victim of aggression. Of
Bu11nese suzerainty and dominati9n was felt. all over
Nonh-East I.ndia.
• It was the aim·of the Bui rnese court to include the whole
of Assam within the Burmese·empire and attempts were I

being made·to subjugate·all the eastern states one by one

particularly in such a period when British were engaged
elsewhere. ·1n fact, during the year (1819) the
Bui 1nese began to consolidate their hold over Assam.too,
by placing·Chandra Kanta as their own nominee. 2 Like
. .
2. Chandra Kanta succeeded his elder brother Kamalshwar Singh at the age of
14 yean. Pumanwlra Budha Gohain the defeaaed ruler of died in 1817
and was succeeded by hit son Rudranath.
Assertion ofResurgent Manipur 9
Marjit, Chandra Kanta owed his position to Bui 111ese. But
realising the high-handedness of the Bu1111ese generals,
Chandra Kanta now began to make ·persistent efforts
to drive out the Bui 111ese from Assam. In this way, the
fate of Manipur was closely inter-woven with what·
happened iri-As·sam.

1.3. Liberation Manipur from Burma and its after-

maths·
With the growing influence ofBu11na consequent upon
her occupation of Manipur, Cachar and Assam, the
attitude changed from one of the indifference to
alarm. In order to drive out the Bu1111ese and also to
defend e·ffectively nonh-eastern frontiers, the British
officials felt once again the necessity of allying them-
selves with the ruling princes of Manipur. Their calcu-
lation was that a stable and strong government·could be
established in Manipur which might act as a buffer state
between the British and the Burmese. But the question
was : with whom the negotiation was to be initiated? All
the three princes - Marjit, Chaurajit and Gambhir Singh
appealed to the British for help. But in Gambhir Singh
the youngest of the three, the. British found a bold and
aspiring s6ldier and rightly contended that the course of
events might render him an useful ally in Manipur. Under
these circumstances, negotiation between the British and
Gambhir Singh was resumed and David Scott, the agent
to the Governor-General, was entrusted with the task.
In the negotiation that followed, Gambhir first of
demanded the increase of his army before he embarked
on his march to Manipur. As the negotiation for increase
10 History of Modern Manipur
of Gambhir Singh's levy was going on, David Scott, in
his memorandum to the Governor-General-in-charge,
argued that the Manipuris could defend properly their
country against the Bu11nese with minimum help from
the British India. "Of all the various tribes and nations of
the eastern frontier", David Scott contended "the Man-
ipuris were the only race from whom any effectual and
valuable assistance could be expected, either offensively
or defensively against the powerful nation like the
Bui rnese. The Assamese and Cacharis are comparatively
of timid and effiminate character, whereas the Nagas,
Singphos, Khamitis and other tribes to the eastward of
Assam and Cachar were altogether of a warlike deposi-
tion, but they were perhaps too little advanced in the an
of civilization and of government to be able to make any
effective resistance against the eno1111ous enemies of the
Bu1111ese without a complete change of their social
condition which· would take a long time to achieve..."
Eulogising the bravery of Manipuris, David Scott went
to the extent of saying that they (Manipuris), being a
gallant race, could be compared with the Rajputs of
northern Hindustan, and they were sufficiently civilized
and advanced in the art of government.
Friendship with Manipur at such critical time was
expected to achieve two purposes in favour of the
First, it would ensure the security along the eastern
frontier; and secondly it would also enable the British to
impose favourable te1111s to the king of Ava at the time
of negotiation for peace. Fully convinced of Scott's
arguments, the .Governor-General-in-Council at Fort
William thus decided that all possible support in te1 ins.
of men and be given to Gambhir Singh.
 Assertion ofReswgent Mani.pur 11
Lord Amherst, Governor-General, endorsed the addition
to the Raja 's present forces, viz, 500 men of whom 200
should be pioneers and Gambhir Singh was also autho-
rised to purchase as many horses as were manageable.
At the sadte time, the high officials at Fort William also
·instructed Tucker, Commissioner of Sylhet, to advance
. one lakh of rupees to Gambhir Singh for the purpose. But
prior to the actual sending of the expedition to Manipur
under Gambhir Singh, the British officials invited views
from the military strategists on the question. Brigadir-
Genenil Shuldham, commanding eastern ff9ntier, was
asked to give his views on the proposed project of
Gambhir Singh' s expedition to Manipur and .whether the
support of Captain Dudgeon's local corps should be
given to Gambltir Singh on his march to Manipur.
Meanwhile, Shuldham met Gambhir Singh or1 13
December, 1824 and discussed with him the increase of
his levy upto 200 cavalry and 1OOO infantry of which 200
were to be pioneers. The raja assured him that the increase
of the levy coul.d be accomplished in a month.or six
weeks. On the question of resources and supplies
Singh said that anarchy and destruction caused
by the oppressive measures of the Bu11nese was so much
in Manipur valley.that he had to depend entirely on the
British. Regarding the strength of the Bunnese force in
Manipur, Garilbhir Singh told Brigadier-General
Shuldham that it might not exceed 100 fighting men.
Gambhir Singh was very optimistic that he would not
receive any opposition from Raghob Singh, the then ruler
in Manipur under Bu11nese protection.
Having got these info11nation, Brigadier General
Shuldham suggested to Tucker, Commissioner of Sylhet
that the increase of Manipur' s levy was to be postponed
12 History ofModern Manipur
for a time being. ·Thus, the Govemo.r-General-in-Council
Fort William decided upon the.detachment of a large
body of regular force under the direct command of
Brigadier-General Shuldham of sending Gamb-
hlr Singh's levy iri advance and..also postponed the·
granting o(_the amount of rupee$ one lakh to Gambhir·.
Singh 'for meeting the expenses of inc1 easing his infantry.
On 24 1825, the British under Shuldham
arrived
. at Bashkandi.. On 11 March, 1825, Shuldham
.

reported that "the state of the road is such that it is quite

impossible
. to send . on to the advance, either on
.

camels, bullocks, elephants or The unusual rains

also n1ade the march much mofe hopeless. .
Gambhir Singh and h.is 500 men decided to take
up the task which was consi9ered ·impossible by
Brigadier-General S·huldham and left Sylhet on 17 May,
1825, accompanied by a.British officer Lieutenant R.B.
Pemberton. They arrived at Bashkandi on 23 May, 1825.
Despite bad weather, .inadequate supplies and innumer- .
able hardships, they managed to reach the western limit
of the valley of Manipur on 10 June, .1825. The Bui rnese
forces had already evacuated the town of Manipur and
encamped themselv_es at •Andro, a place situated at the
eastern side of Imphal. Gambhir and his men occupied
Imphal without much difficulty. Emboldened with these
successes, Gambhir Singh·further moved on Andro but
found it evacuated. The Manipuri forces did not meet
any serious opposition from the Bu11nese anny. This was
so because the Bunnese were hard-pressed on all sides.
This is not to ·minimise the role of Gambhir Singh and
his men ·towards the liberation of their country. Their
trctining was not adequate and yet they accomplished
Assertion ofResurgent Manipur 13
what appeared to be impossible and what Brigadier-
General Shuldham's regular force had not ventured to
undertake. Lieutenant R.B. Pemberton who
accompanied Gambhir Singh that the success of
the campaign was due mainly to his (Gambhir's) energy,
perseverance and skill. At a time when there was a strong
need to strengthen what had just been Gambhir
Singh rushed back to Sylhet by the end of June, 1825
leaving behind 300 men and local armed volunteers to
garrison Manipur. Gambhir Singh perhaps thought _that
the continuous retreat of Bu11nese forces might only be
a tactical move and therefore needed a stronger and better
equipped forces to face any fresh attack from Bu1111a.
Gambhir Singh resumed his second campaign on 18
December, 1825. This ti1nc, he was accompanied by
Captain Grant. During his six month's stay at Sylhet,
Gambhir Singh could mobilize fresh rcinforce11ients
( 1500 mushkets and requisite number of 1ncn). On arrival
at Manipur, Gambhir Singh four.d that there were still
300 or 400 Bunnese soldiers in the Kabaw valley. After
a few days, the raja was again infonned of the withdrawal
.of the Bu11i1ese soldiers from the valley to Tammu, a
border town in Bu1111a. The valley was left under the
protection of 500 local people. Meanwhile, the Sumjok
raja mobilised about 200 men in and around Tammu to
Manipuri forces. It was here that the Manipuri
forces met a serious encounter and the advanced troops
whom Gambhir had sent early in January could hardly
make any penetration into the enemy's camp. Realising
the seriousness of the situation, Gambhir Singh and
Captain Grant lost no time to rush to the assistance of the
advanced forces and joined them on 18 January,
14 history of Modern Manipur
1826. On 19 January, 1826, the combined forces
assaulted the Bu11nese positions, and though the latter
made several spirited sorties to check the mounting
attacks from Manipuri soldiers, they were resisted with
greater spirit. By the night of 22 January, 1826, the
Bu11nese began their retreat and completely evacuated
the stockade. Captain Grant gave his eye-witness account
thus : "... the activity, judgement and skill he (Gambhir
Singh) has displayed on this occasion, have proved the
justice of the opinion previously entertained on his
merits. The steady gallantry which, without the usual aid
of cannon, could force a brave enemy to evacuate a
strongly fortified position is a very satisfactory illustra-
tion of the character of his followers ... ".
The liberation of Manipur from Bu11na was thus
accomplished by Gambhir Singh and his men with the
assistance of British. At the very outset, Lord Amherst,
Governor General, made it clear that since ManiJ'ur had
common boundary with Bu11na, the extension of British
influence over the country would be viewed with jealousy
and alarm by the court of Ava. He therefore argued that
the question of extending British protection over Man-
ipur be tak;n up only after receiving a detailed report
from the man on the spot, David Scott.
1.4. Period of Reconstruction
According to ·article 2 of the treaty of Yandaboo
concluded on 24 February, 1826, the king of Bu11na
agreed to recognise Gambhir Singh as the ruler of
Manipur. Obviously, the desire of the British officials in
India was that Manipur should be treated as an inde-
pendent kingdom. An independent kingdom, inhabited·
hy a people with a deep-rooted anipathy to the Bu11nese
Assertion ofResurgent Manipur 15
between Burma and British territories was conceived as
desirable from the British point of view. Moreover, the
British strategists also considered insecure and impolitic
to leave Manipur as a dependency of Bu11na. Later,
ord, the resident designate for Ava, reported that
Bu11na considerd Manipur as independent country and
urged ·the British to her as such. The Bu11nese
officials even expressed their desire that qambhir Singh
should not maintain European officials at his court.
Though the question of the presence offoreign officials
at Manipur was not settled the independent status of
Manipur was recognised by Bu11na. It must be recalled
that the Manipur levy was fo1111ed by Gambhir Singh with ,
500 soldiers recruited from the Manipuris, Nagas and
Kacharis with the sole objective of driving out the
Bu1111ese from Manipur. This force was armed and paid
by the British government and served under its directions.
It rendered a commendable service in the expuision of
the Bu1n1ese forces from Manipur. It thus liberated
Manipur from the Bu11nese and marched upto Kabaw
valley and occupied·it.
Gambhir Singh fo11nally became king of Manipur in
June, . 1826 with a tiny population of 10,000 only.
According to contemporary official account, many
villages were destroyed and their inhabitants had been
carried off captives by the Bu11nese and those who had
escaped had found asylum in Sylhet. Naturally, the task
of reconstruction of the ruined country fell on Gambhir
Singh. In bringing about stable condition and initiating
constructive works, Gambhir Singh was assisted by his
brother, Nar Singh. With the construction of new roads,
repair of old roads and reclamation of paddy fields
covered by dense grass for cultivation, Manipur gradu-
ally regained the position of the pre-war period.
 History of Modern Manipur
Gambhir .Singh the capital of Manipur at
I ,angthabal which was situated about 8 kilometres south
from Imphal and the head-quarters of Manipur levy was
also stationed there.
- Soon after the conclusion of the treaty.of Yandaboo,
the supreme officials at Calcutta decided to discontinue
the payment of Manipur levy. Yet, the supply of arms
and ammunition was continued. Because, the local
officials realised that the levy was indispensable to the
security of Nonh-Eastem frontier. They pointed out that
the levy lightly equipped, might at the proper season,
penetrate into Bu11na without any difficulty and might,
if necessary, funher advance on Ava.by a direct march
of fifteen days and strike at the very heart of the Bunnese
empire. Manipur was still considered·as totally incom-
petent to defend itself against ·a Bu1111ese invasion. Lord
William Bentinck, in his minute, 25 March 1833, argued
that if the ·British troops should be placed in it, adding
thus : "... we can hardly doubt that the felling of security
to the of Manipur generally be·greatly
increased
•
by the pe11nanent residence amongst them of
such a body".
·it was under these circumstances that two separate
treaties were concluded with Manipur. By the treaty of
1833, the British government agreed to give to the raja
of Manipur the line of Jiri river and the western bend of
the Barak river as a boundary. On the other hand, the raja
of Manipur agreed to the following conditions: First, the
raja was to remove his thanna from Chandrapur to the
eastern barik of the Jiri river. Second, the raja should not
obstruct the trade between Manipur and Cachar and
should not impose heavy duties on it. Third, the Nagas
were not to be prevented from selling or bartering ginger,

I
)
l

I
Assertion of Resurgen( Manipur 11
cotton, pepper and every other article of the Banskandi
and Udharban bazars. Fourth, the raja also agreed to
maintain and repair the road passing through Khopum as
and when the construction of the same had been finished.
Fifth, the raja was under obligation to fumish a quota of
Nagas to assist the construction of the road. Sixth, in the
event of war with the Bu11nese, the Raja should provide
hill poners to assist in transporting the ammunition and
baggage of British troops. Seventh, in the event of
anything happening on the eastern frontier of the British
territories, the raja should readily assist the British
government with his troops.

..