Katholieke Universiteit-Leuven

Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte

HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Author(s): D. Zahavi
Source: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 59ste Jaarg., Nr. 2 (JUNI 1997), pp. 304-321
Published by: Peeters Publishers / Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40887694
Accessed: 23-12-2015 17:53 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Katholieke Universiteit-Leuven, Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Peeters Publishers and Tijdschrift voor
Filosofie are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Tijdschrift voor Filosofie.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY
AND
*
TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY
byD. ZahaVI (Copenhagen)

One of the problemsconfronting an interpretation of Husserl's late

phenomenology ishowtoreconcile Husserl's increasing
interest in thecon-
stitutive
contribution ofintersubjectivity
withhisintroduction oftheprimor-
dialreduction. Howisitpossibletocharacterize transcendentalintersubjec-
as
tivity thefoundation oftruthand true being( Hua VIII 449, Hua IX 295,
344), and to claimsimultaneously thatitis necessaryto isolatethe'sphere
ofownness'( thatis,theprimordial sphereencompassing everything which
canbe constituted withoutanycontribution
bytheego itself, fromanother
( Hua 1 124,Hua XVII 248), so thatone cangaina comprehen-
subjectivity
sionoftheconstituted Seinsgeltung oftheOther( Hua XV 270-71) ?
In a sense,theansweris relatively
straightforward.Husserlinsists thatthe
primordial reduction is undertakenformethodological reasonsin orderto

Dan ZAHAVI(1967): Studiesin Copenhagen,Wuppertal,Leuven,Bostonand Paris.M.A. in

philosopyfromUniversityofCopenhagen( 1991), Ph.D. in philosophy fromKatholieke Universiteit
Leuven( 1994). Employedas an assistant Professor ofCopenhagensince1995.Presently
at University
working on a bookconcernedwiththerelationbetweenself- awarenessand alterity.
* This done at theHusserl-Archives in Leuven,Belgium.I thankthe
studyis basedon research
ofthearchives,
director ProfessorS. IJsselingforthepermissionto quotefromHusserl's unpublished
manuscripts. Thanksalso to W.R. McKennafora numberofuseñilremarks. Quotationsfromthe
Husserlianaeditionarereferred to as : Hua, followedbyvolumenumberand pages.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 305

elucidatetheexactfounded-founding relationship betweensubjective and

intersubjective constitution.Thus,wearedealingwithan attempt ata precise
andappropriate introduction oí xhtfounded,butconstituting transcenden-
tal intersubjectivity, and Husserlcan consequentlymaintainthat the
thorough implementation ofthetranscendental reduction willultimately
leadus (ifnotsooner,thenlater)toa phenomenology oftranscendental in-
tersubjectivity (Huai 69, Hua IX245-246, Hua VIII 129, 176).
The mainproblemwiththisansweris, however,thatHusserl's strategy
seemsto remainvulnerableto a numberofsubstantial objections.Letme,
forthesakeofsimplicity, merely mentionthetwomostfundamental ones.
The firstis generalin natureand ultimately concerned withHusserl' s theory
ofconstitution. Thus,itmightbe askedwhetherHusserl's approachdoes
notwilly-nilly lead to a transcendental solipsism, insofar as itis impossible
to preserve theequalityand transcendence oftheOther,themomentone
startsto regardit as foundedand constituted. The secondis morespecific
in natureand questionstheexactrangeoftheprimordial sphere.Thus,one
mightaskifHusserldoes notoverestimate theconstitutive abilityof the
primordial ego, insofaras intersubjectivity is at play earlier thanHusserl
claims.
In thisarticleI wantprimarily to addressthesecondproblem.Taking
Husserl's analysisofhorizontalintentionality as mypointofdeparture, I
that
wishto demonstrate myperceptualexperience(constitution) of the
Otheris onlypossibleifa certainkindofintersubjectivity is presupposed.
Thus,itwillbe arguedthatintersubjectivity mustalreadybe at playprior
tomyconcrete experience oftheembodiedOther,and,consequently, that
thisexperience cannotbe effectuated primordially. This conclusion will be
supported bypassagesin Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, however, and
thusthearticlealso purports to presentone aspectoftheradicaland fun-
damentalintersubjective rethinkingofthephenomenological projectunder-
takenbyHusserlinthelastperiodofhisthought ; i.e. itwill be shown(once
more),thatHusserl' s finalwordson thequestionofintersubjectivity arenot
to be foundin the CartesianMeditations.
Although I willnotexplicitly thematize Husserl' s conceptofconstitution,
and althoughtheargument presented doesnotas suchattempt toprovethe

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
306 D. ZAHAVI

l theconclusion
(or uselessness)oftheprimordial
impossibility reduction,
will neverthelessbe of pertinencewhen it comes to a refutationof
transcendentalsolipsism: Ifthecontribution
oftheOtheris atplaypriorto
myconcreteexperience ofan Other,ifitis independentofmyfactualen-
counterwithan Other,intersubjectivitycannotbe reducedto a contingent
relation.Itmustbelonga prioritothestructureofconstituting
subjectivity.

1.
An examination ofHusserl' s analysis
oftheintentional structureofourex-
periencerevealsthathorizontal playsan important
intentionality rolein or-
dinaryperception. Byitsverynature,theobjectof( transcendent ) percep-
tionischaracterizedbyitsadumbrational givenness( cf.IdeasI § 42 ). When
an
perceiving object, it is to
necessary distinguish whichappearsfrom
that
theappearance,sincetheobjectis nevergivenin itstotality butalwaysin a
certainrestrictedprofile.Despitethis,theobjectofperception isexactly the
appearing objectandnotitsintuitively givenprofile.Thatis,perception fur-
nishesus witha fullobject-consciousness, eventhoughonlypartof the
2
perceivedobjectis intuitively given( Hua XVI 49-50). In orderto clarify
howthisispossible,Husserldescribes a kindofintentional awareness which
wepossessoftheabsentprofiles oftheobject- oftheobject'sinnerhorizon
( Hua VI 161). Themeaningofthepresent isdependent
profile uponitsrela-
tiontotheabsentprofiles oftheobject,and no perceptual awareness ofthe
objectwouldbe possibleifourawareness werestrictly restrictedto thein-
tuitivelygiven :

1. Fora defenceofHusserl'sconceptofconstitution cf.D. ZAHAVI,Husserlunddie transzenden-

talelntersubjektivität- EineAntwort aufdiesprachpragmatische Kritik( Phaenomenologica. Dor-
drecht,KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996). Letme add thatI actuallybelieveHusserl'sintroduc-
tionoftheprimordial reduction to achieveat leasttwoimportant tasks: 1. Itstresses
thenecessity
of
operating withan irreducible ifone istomakeroomforanycoherent
subjectivity notionofintersub-
, and 2. itrejectstheeasy'solution'ofsimplypresupposing
jectivity intersubjectivitydogmatically.
2. rora rullerpresentationorHusserls conceptorperception seeD . ZAHAVI, una
intentionalttat
Konstitution.Eine Einführungin HusserlsLogischeUntersuchungen (Copenhagen, Museum
TusculanumPress,1992).

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 307

Die uneigentlicherscheinendengegenständlichen Bestimmtheiten sind mit

aber
aufgefaßt, nicht Daß
dargestellt. sie mit sind,
aufgefaßt ist denn
evident, sonst
hättenwirgarkeineGegenständevorAugen,nichteinmaleine Seite,da dieseja
nurdurchden GegenstandSeiteseinkann.(Hua XVI 55 )

In otherwords: in orderfora perceptionto be a perception-of-an-object,

itmustbe permeatedbya horizontalintentionality whichintendstheab-
sentprofiles(Hua VI 161, Hua IX 183), bringingthemto a certainap-
presentation.
It ismycontention thatan examination ofthestructure ofthishorizontal
intentionality mustlead to a reestimation oftheconstitutive contribution
oftranscendental 3 To progress in theargument, itwillbe
intersubjectivity.
necessaryto clarify exactlyin whatwaytheabsentprofilesarehorizontally
present. What kind ofappresentation is at play? Ifwe areto considerthe
profilesfromwithina phenomenological perspective, we haveto account
forthenoetic-noematic correlation. Merelyto presupposetheirexistence
wouldbe a dogmaticmove,whichhas beenmadeimpossiblebytheeffec-
tuationoftheepoche.
Husserlsometimes characterizes thehorizonas a horizonoffacultative
possibilities( Vermöglichkeiten), and theabsentprofilesas thenoematic
correlatesoí mypossibleperceptions.Ifone attempts to followup on this
systematically, twoalternative interpretations seemviable: 1. The absent
profilesareappresented as profiles givenin pastorpossiblefuturepercep-
tions.Thus,thebackofthearmchair is appresented as thesidewhichI have
seen, orwhich I would be able to perceive in a future perception. 2. A dif-
ferent possibility is to claimthattheabsentprofiles areappresented as the
correlatesoffictitious co-present perceptions. Theyarecorrelated withthe
perceptions whichI wouldhavehad, ifit had been possibleforme to be

3. To givea completeand exhaustive accountofall theaspectsofhorizontalintentionality is a

taskwhichexceedstheaimofthispaper.Amongthefeatures whichfurther analyseswouldhave to
explore,butwhichareofno immediaterelevancefortheargumentdevelopedhere,a fewcan be
mentioned : 1. thedifferencebetweeninnerand outerhorizonand theirrelationto theworldas the
all-encompassinghorizon; 2. the relationshipbetweenthe horizon,time-consciousness, our
kinaesthetic and theconstitution
possibilities ofobjectivespace; and 3. theeideticstructure
ofthe
horizon.Foran examination ofsomeofthesetopicssee D. ZAHAVI : 'Husserl's Phenomenologyof
theBody', ÉtudesPhénoménologiques 19 ( 1994), p. 63-84.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
308 D. ZAHAVI

therenow(insteadofhere).4 Thus,theco-intended backofthearmchair

givenas the side whichI would have seen, if I had been
is fictitiously
facing theback now.It shouldbe emphasizedthatwe aredealingwitha fic-
titiousand notan actualizablepossibility, sincethefrontand thebackof
the armchair is principally
incapableof beinggivenperceptually forthe
sameconsciousness 3
simultaneously.
The vitalquestionis, however,whethereitherof theseaccountsare
phenomenologically acceptable.A closerexamination ofthefirstalternative
makesit clearthatit conceivesof theobjectas a unityin a seriesof tem-
porallyseparatedprofiles.Thisconception, however,doesnotmatchwith
ourexperience. WhenI perceive an armchair,I amnotperceiving something
whichat thatverymomentpossessesone actualprofile,and whichhas
previously possessedand willsubsequently possessvariousothers.The pres-
entfrontis nota frontwithrespectto a pastorfutureback,but is deter-
minedthrough itsreferenceto a presentco-existingback.Consequently, it
belongsto theverynotionofthetranscendence oftheobjectthatit,at any
givenmoment,possessesa pluralityof co-existingprofiles.As Husserl
himselfoccasionallyemphasizes,everyappresentation makesco-present
(mitgegenwärtig) (Hua 1 139,Ms. A VIII 12 2b & 28b) - andonlythisac-
countrespectsthe truetranscendence of the object. Apartfromthat,it
shouldbe recalledthatthecorrelation oftheabsentprofilewitha pastor
futureperception, insteadofprovidingus witha co-present back,would
present us withan additional past orfuturefront. Given that,thespecific

4. It is truethatthehorizontal appearanceofmyperceptualobject(and theimplieddifferenti-

ationbetweenpresentand absentprofiles)is correlated withmybeingsituatedin a central'here'
( Hua IV 158) ; and it is alsotruethattheobjectis onlygivenhorizontally, becauseitis in principle
impossible foranyperceiving subjecttobe situated'here'and 'there'simultaneously.Thisobservation
doesnotwarrant theconclusion, however, thatthehorizontal givennessoftheobjectmerely manifest
thefiniteness or corporeality of theobserver- and Husserlis knownforhis rejectionof anyan-
thropological interpretation ofthehorizontal structure.
Ultimately, itis theontologicalstructureof
theobject(itstranscendence andworldliness ) whichnecessitates
thatitcanonlybe givenfora subject
situatedin a 'here'. As Husserldeclaresin Ideas /, evenGod wouldhave to perceivethe object
throughitsadumbrations (Hua III 351).
5. To claimthatitis possibleto see thebacksidesimultaneously, namelyin a mirror, is ofcourse
to overlookthefactthatwhatis seenis a mirror imageand notthebacksideoftheobject.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 309

horizontal givenness oftheabsentprofiles cannotbe understood properly

6
bymeansofthefirstaccount.
The lastobjectionalso affects thesecondaccount,however.Forthisac-
count,iftrue,wouldleadtoa destruction ofthehomogeneity ofthepercep-
tualobject.Althoughperception onlygivesus a partialpresentation ofthe
object,the realityof the objectis a unifiedwholewhichwould be an-
nihilatedifitwerepartially composedoffictitious slices(whichwouldbe
thenoematiccorrelates oí thefictitious perceptions).It is, ofcourse,poss-
ible forus to imaginein detailtheabsentprofiles, and we probablydo so
moreoftenand moreunnoticedthanHusserlwerereadyto accept.7. But
evenifthisimaginative activity could takeplace withoutattributing the
positionalmodality fictitiousto theprofile,itstillwouldnotbe able to ac-
countforthehorizontalstructure oftheobject.Whereastheimaginative
'fillingout' is characterized bya certainarbitrariness, it necessarily takes
placeand unfoldsitselfwithinthehorizontal structure,thereality ofwhich
itpresupposes (Hua XVI 52). Whatthebacksideofthearmchair lookslike
is a matterofcontingency. Thatit has a backsideis a necessity and cannot
be accountedforbybeing correlated with a fictitious
possibility ; noteven
ifthe fictitious character of thiscontingent possibilityis disregarded. In
otherwords,therealityof theperceptualobjectimpliestherealityof its
-
perceptualhorizon,thatis thereality(and notmerefictitious or con-
tingent - character) oftheabsentprofiles, althoughthehorizonmightbe
open, i.e. , moreor lessdetermined (Hua XI 6, Hua I 83 ).
AlthoughHusserlseemstohavemadeuse ofbothaccounts in theLogical
Investigations (cf. Hua XIX 589-590),he soonbecame aware of theirprob-
lematiccharacter, however.Alreadyin hislecturesRaum und Ding from
1907he explicitly statesthatit is a naiveconstruction to claimthattheab-

6. I am indebtedto H. KOJIMA, 'The Potential oftheTranscendental

Plurality Ego ofHusserland
itsRelevance to theTheoryofSpace', AnalectaHusserliana8 ( 1978), p. 55-61, forthislastargument
and in generalforsomestimulating ideason horizontal
intentionality. The mostimportant influence
has,however, beentheclassicalarticlebyK. HELD,'Das ProblemderIntersubjektivität und die Idee
einerphänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie', in: U. ClAESGES& K. HELD (Hrsg.),
Perspektiven transzendentalphänomenologischer Forschung (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1972),
p. 3-60.
7. I thankD. Lohmarforthisobservation.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
310 D. ZAHAVI

sentprofilesare(ap)presented imaginatively ( Hua XVI 56), and in an un-

publishedmanuscript from1920-21,he statesthatthesystems ofpossible
perceptions correlatedto thetranscendent object cannotbe understood as
systemsofperceptions whichI havehad orcouldeventually acquire,norare
theymerefictions, butthatwe aredealingwitha distinctive and peculiar
kindof appresentations (Ms. A III 9 23b). Unfortunately, he does not
elaboratetheremark in thatmanuscript - buta studyofHusserliana XIII-
XV does suggesta thirdalternative.
The absentco-intended profilesmustbe understood as thecorrelatesof
possibleperceptions. Thesepossibleperceptions must,however,be com-
patiblewith my own actualperception, since theymustbe simultaneous-
lyactualizable; myhorizontalappresentation oftheabsentprofiles ofthe
objectmustpreserve theircharacter as actualco-existingprofiles.Bothmy
fictiousas well as mypreviousor subsequentperceptions lack thiscom-
patibility,however. The consequence is thatthe absentprofilescannotbe
correlatedwithmypossibleperceptions. However,inZurPhänomenologie
derIntersubjektivitätI Husserltentatively offersthefollowing solution:
Ein Subjekt kann gleichzeitignicht zwei Aspekte der orthologischenMan-
haben,aberverteilt
nigfaltigkeit aufverschiedene
SubjektekanneineMehrheit von
Aspekten seinundmusses sein,wennsiegleichzeitig
gleichzeitig dasselbeDingliche
(Hua XIII 377-78)
erfahren.
Die Erscheinung,die ichvon 'meinemStandpunkt'habe (Ort meinesKörpersim
Jetzt)kannichnichtvoneinemanderenStandpunkt haben,mitdemWechselder
Standpunkte ändertsichgesetzmässig die Erscheinung,
und die Erscheinungensind
evidentunverträglich. Ich kann die unverträgliche
Erscheinung haben zu einer
anderenZeit,wennicheinenanderenOrtimRaumeinnehme.Und ebensokann
ein 'Anderer'dieselbeErscheinung jetzthaben,derebenjetztan einemanderen
Orteist.(Hua XIII 2-3)
Die widersprechendeVorstellungwirdeinstimmig, wennich eben die Verdop-
pelungalsVerdoppelungnehme.Ichkanna priorinichthierund dortzugleichsein,
aberhierund dortkannein Gleichessein,ichhier,und eingleichesund dannauch
ein mehroderminderblossähnlichesIch dort.(Hua XIII 264)

In otherwords,theincompatibility
oftheco-existing canbe recon-
profiles
(Hua I 148), sincetheabsentprofile
ciledthroughanotherconsciousness
can be perceived
byan Other.Thus,ourhorizontal seemsto
intentionality

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 311

implya reference sincetheco-intended

to intersubjectivity, profilemustbe
understood as thenoematiccorrelate ofthepossibleperception ofan Other.
Thiswouldexplain,moreover, why Husserl in hisdetailed analyses ofthe
experienceof the Otheragain and again emphasizesthatit entailsan
awareness oftheprofiles presentto theOther(Hua XIII 297). WhenI ex-
periencesomeone,I am notonlyexperiencing anotherlivingbodysituated
'there',butalso positingtheprofilewhichI wouldhaveperceivedmyself
ifI had beenthere(Hua XIV 255, 287-88). Thus,myconcrete experience
oftheOthercan furnish my intentional object with an actual co-existing
8
profile.
It should,however, be evidentthatwe havestillnotreachedan adequate
clarification ofhorizontal intentionality.WhenI perceive an armchair, I am
perceiving a transcendent and horizontally givenobject. This specificman-
nerofgivenness does not,however,presupposethatI am simultaneously
perceiving someone,whoactualizestheabsentprofileoftheobject.That
is,myperception ofthearmchair is notdependentuponmysimultaneous
perception ofa co-perceiving subject.Moreover, thearmchair doesnotonly
havetwoprofiles.It has a vastifnot infiniteplurality of co-existing and
compatibleprofiles, and again,myperception ofthistranscendent object
is notdependentuponme perceiving an infinite pluralityof other subjects
simultaneously the
perceiving object. In other words, although thehorizon-
talgivenness oftheobject,thatis theveryobject-appearance entailssome
kindofreference to foreign subjectivity,it does not seem to presupposeits
actualpresence(existence),norit is apparently sufficientwithmerelyone
foreignsubject.
Husserlwaswellawareofthisproblemhimself, andheadmitsthata simple
reference to thefactualand concrete experience oftheOtheris insufficient,
sinceeveryperceptionof an object (also one undertakenin isolation)
presupposes a reference to thecontinualco-validation {Mitgeltung)ofin-

8. It is important not to misunderstand Husserlat thispoint.He is not claimingthatour ex-

perience of someone implies thatwe havea thematicand elaboratedpresentiation ( Vergegenwär-
tigung) oftheprofiles presenttothatperson( as Arpclaimsandsubsequently criticizes. Cf.K. Arp,
'Intentionality andthePublicWorld: Husserl'sTreatment intheCartesian
ofObjectivity Meditations'
,
HusserlStudies7(1 991), p. 91). Husserl'sclaimis, thattheOther'sexperience is co-validated
(in
Mitgeltung) whenwe experience him/her. Andthiscantakeplacewithout theOther'sprofiles being
intuitively given(to us) in anyway(Hua VI 307-08,Hua XIII 469, Hua XV 83-84).

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
312 D. ZAHAVI

tersubjectivity(Hua XV 497, Hua IX 394, Hua XIV 289); i.e., every

object-perceptionpresupposes at theveryleasta tacitreference
to Othersas
co-perceiving (Hua VI the
468). Consequently, analysis of the horizon
seemsto referus to theperceptions ( intentions
) ofa plurality
ofpossible
subjects,or as Husserlcallsit, to theopen intersubjectivity
:
AlsojedesObjektive,das mirin einerErfahrung
und zunächsteinerWahrnehmung
vorAugen steht,hat einen apperzeptiven Horizont,den möglicherErfahrung,
eigenerundfremder . Ontologischgesprochen, die ichhabe, ist
jede Erscheinung,
vonvornhereinGlied einesoffenendlosen,abernichtexplizitverwirklichten
Um-
von
fangesmöglicherErscheinungen demselben, und die dieser
Subjektivität
Erscheinungenistdie offeneIntersubjektivität
. (Hua XIV 289. Emphasisadded)

To summarize theargument : In thecaseoftranscendent perception thein-

tuitivelygivenis alwayspermeatedwithreferences to absentprofiles ( Hua
IX 183, 486). Everyperceptionrefers, withnecessity, to further possible
perceptions.These - in
perceptions being principle incompatible mywith
presentperception- are the perceptionsof possibleOthers.9 Conse-
quently,everyappresentation as well as everyobject-appearance, due to
theirhorizonedness, presuppose a referenceto the open intersubjectivity
(cf. Hua XIII 463).
Whatexactly doesthisconceptofopenintersubjectivity (i.e. ofpossible
Others) actually
entail? Isitnothighly problematic to characterize a possible
subject,respectivelya pluralityofpossiblesubjects,as constitutive ? Is con-
stitutionnotalwaysan activity undertaken bya (factualsubject? In a certain
way,thisistrue.WhenI perceivean objecton myown,myobjectofpercep-
tionisindeedconstituted bymealone.I am,however, onlyabletoperform
thisactivity
becausemyhorizontal intentionalityentailsstructural references
totheperceptions ofpossibleOthers,andprecisely forthatreason,thestruc-
tureofmyhorizontal intentionality is with
incompatible anysolipsism which,
inprinciple,woulddenythepossibility ofa pluralityofsubjects.10

9. Thisconceptoí possibility
resembles theone usedbyHusserlwhenmaintaining thattruebe-
ingalreadyon thepurepre-predicative levelrefers
a prioriKoa possibleintersubjective
verification
(Hua EX431, Hua XIV 289, 390, Hua XVII 243, Hua VI 469).
10. Thesereflectionscan be expressedin a different
and lesstechnicalmannerthatdisclosesa
between
poignantsimilarity Husserl's analysesand Merleau-Ponty' s theoryofperception(cf. M.
MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception,Paris,ÉditionsGallimard,1945,p. 390,406 ;

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 313

2.
We havenowreacheda stagein ouranalysis atwhichthefollowing ques-
tionhasto be answered : Is ourconcretebodilyexperience oftheOtherthe
conditionofpossibilityforthekindofopen intersubjectivity thatwe have
discoveredin ourhorizontal oris ittheintersubjective
intentionality, open-
nessofourhorizonthatenablesus to perceiveconcrete embodiedOthers?
The reasonwhythisquestionis centralis thatithas directimplications for
theearliermentionedproblemconcerning therangeand legitimacy ofthe
primordial reduction.
At firstglance,an examination ofHusserl's writingsseemstofavourthe
first Husserl's detailedaccountofand preoccupation
alternative. withcon-
cretecasesof empathy,and hisconsiderations concerning theprimordial
sphereand a numberofexplicitassertions, indicatethathe regards thecon-
cretebodilyexperienceof the Other be to the constitutivecondition of
possibilityforourreference to theopen intersubjectivity(cf. Hua I 153).
Husserlseemsto accountforthisconstitution in twodifferent ways:
1. Occasionally,Husserlwritesthatourlifeis furnished witha univer-
horizondue toourexperience
salintersubjective oftheOther(Hua VI 246),
andhe speaksabouttheconstitution ofthis horizonas a con-
intersubjective
tinualand never-ending process:
Die Konstitutionder Intersub-
konstituiert.
Alles Weltlicheist intersubjektiv
Welt istbeständigaufdem Marschund hat einen
und intersubjektiven
jektivität
entsprechenden Horizont,in demsie mirvorweggiltals immernochneueninter-
subjektivenSinnmitBeziehungaufneue Ichsubjekteannehmend.(Hua XV 45 )

Thus,Husserlmentions theexpansion ofourintersubjective

world-horizon,
whichtakesplacedue to ouriterative
experienceofourco-subjects
together
etc. (Hua VI 258, Hua XV 138, 176,439).
withtheirco-subjects,

M. Merleau-Ponty,Signes,Paris,ÉditionsGallimard,I960, p. 23, 214-16;M. Merleau-Ponty,

, Paris,Tel Gallimard,1964,p. 89, 187-88): The objectsthatI perceiveand
Le visibleet l1invisible
intendarecharacterized bya transcendence and a horizontalmannerofappearancethatrevealtheir
beingforothersubjects.Sincemyobjectofperception alwayspossessesprofilesthatcan be perceived
byothersubjects,it refers to themcontinually and is as a resultintrinsically
intersubjective.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
314 D. ZAHAVI

A closerlookreveals, however, thata different issueisatstakehere.We are

presented withan accountofourincreasing acquaintancewiththeplurality
offactual'Othersandtheirrespective fieldsofexperience. Although theseen-
counters canprovoke inour of n
important changes categories validities, they
certainlydo notclarify theconstitution oftheopenintersubjectivity ( asa for-
malstructure inourhorizontal intentionality). Husserlhimself seemstoad-
mit this, since he continuesthe above quoted passage fromZur
Phänomenologie derlntersubjektivitätlllby writing thatweareheredeal-
ing with an expansion of the meaning'objectiveworld',whichalready
presupposesan openhorizonofindeterminate Others( Hua XV 45-46).
2. An alternative accountoftheconstitution oftheopenintersubjectivity
(whichstilltakestheconcretebodilyexperience oftheOtheras thefoun-
dation,however)canbe foundifwe scrutinize Husserl's examinationofthe
situationin whichI experiencean Otheras experiencing me. Duringthis
experience, I can realizethatI can be givenfortheOtherin thesameway
as theOtheris givenforme : thatis, thatI myself am an Otherin respect
to theperceiving alter-ego.Thus,I can realizethatI am onlyone among
others(Hua XVII 245, Hua XV 645) :
Es verschwindetderUnterschied zwischenSelbstundfremdem Ich,derAnderefaßt
michals Fremdenauf,wie ichihnals fürmichFremdenauffasse, eristsichselbst
ein 'Selbst'usw.So erfolgt
Gleichordnung: eineMannigfaltigkeit in
gleichartiger,
gleichem Sinn sich
selbständiger, fühlender, wollender
Ich. (Hua XIII 243-44.Cf.
Hua XV 635).

This*becomingone amongtheothers'impliesa dethronement ofmyown

ego as thesolepole ofconstitution(Hua I157), and thisdethronementhas
farreachingconstitutive implications.Thus Husserl states
thatobjectivity
as
(conceived intersubjective can
validity) only be constituted
the moment
theego perceivesitselfas one amongtheothers,as a somebody(Hua XVII
245-47). Only after havingexperienced theOtheras someone,and myself
as a mere somebody,it is possible for me to constituteobjectivity.
ParaphrasingTheunissen - who has dubbed this transformation

11. Husserlanalysesthisproblemin his treatment

of the encounterbetweenhomeworldand
world.Cf. Hua XV 214, 428-37.
foreign

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 315

12
Veränderung (alteration) - we can saythatI can onlyconstitute objec-
tivitywhenI haveconstituted myself as one amongtheothers,and thusin-
tegratedeverybody (Jedermann} withinme (Theunissen 1977,p. 94).
We have claimedthat everyappresentation, as well as each object-
appearance due toitshorizonedness, impliesstructural references toan open
intersubjectivity.Does theconstitution of the category 'jedermann'account
forand foundthiskindofintersubjectivity ? Thattheprocessofalteration
playsa centralrolein Husserl' s reflections is indisputable, and itis certainly
also true,thatthefundamental change in the validity our experience
of
(fromsubjectiveto objective)whichoccursdue to our experienceof the
Otheris relatedintrinsically to thisprocess.Nevertheless, itmustbe main-
tainedthattheprocessofalteration neitherexplainsnorfoundsthekindof
intersubjectivity impliedin ourhorizontal intentionality. Quitetothecon-
trary: theprocessofalteration impliesa concrete encounter witha horizon-
tallyappearing embodied Other, and it consequently presupposes thekind
ofconstitutive referenceto intersubjectivity thatis inherent in horizontalin-
tentionality.
Ultimately, thisinsightbearson therangeoftheprimordial reduction.
Ifthehorizontal co-givennessoftheabsentprofiles refersus to theopenin-
tersubjectivity (sincetheseprofilesareto be understoodas profilesforan
openplurality possibleOthers),thenmyhorizontal
of intentionalityand,
consequently, my awareness of an
appearingobjectsimply priori a reference
to theconstitutive contribution offoreign subjectivity. Thus,theactualex-
perience of another embodied subject is founded uponan a priorireference
to theOther.Priortomyconcrete encounter withanother subject,intersub-
jectivityis alreadypresentas co-subjectivity. Againstthisbackground, it
must be concluded that an attemptto implementa transcendental
aesthetics primordially (Hua XVII 297, Hua I 173) is a failure,and, con-
sequently, thattheconstitution oftheOtheras an incarnated subject(as a
livedbody) cannotbe undertaken either. 13
primordially
12. M. THEUNISSEN, Der Andere,Berlin,Walterde Gruyter, 1977,p. 84.
13. Itwouldbewrong totakethisargument tobetheoutcomeofa regressive ( unphenomenological
)
examination oftheconditions forconcrete
ofpossibility The argument
intersubjectivity. in
consists
a concrete i.e. , at no pointhas it beenarguedthattheremust
analysisofhorizontalintentionality,
becauseconcreteempathywouldotherwise
be an a prioriintersubjectivity, be impossible.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
316 D. ZAHAVI

In
enough,Husserlseemsto haverealizedthiseventually.
Interestingly
themanuscriptC 17 II he writesas follows:
Natürlichstücktsichdie Weltnichtaus denprimordial Weltenzusam-
reduzierten
men. Jedes Primordialeist Reduktionsprodukt von einem intersubjektiv und
generativkonstituierten
Sinn,derSeinssinnistausderintersubjektiv zusammenstim-
mendenErfahrung einesjeden,einerErfahrung, die schonaufdie Intersubjektivität
Sinnbeziehung hat. Meine als
Erfahrung Welterfahrung (also jede meiner
Wahrnehmungen schon nicht
) schließt nur Andere als Weltobjekteein sondern
in
beständig seinsmäßiger Mitgeltung Mitsubjekte, Mitkonstituierende
als als , und
beidesistuntrennbar verflochten.(Ms. C 17 36a. Emphasisadded).

Thus,an examination s latemanuscripts

ofHusserl' reveals
notonlyfrequent
analyses oftheperformance ofthe co-functioning as a sup-
intersubjectivity
plementtohisinvestigations oftheconcrete oftheOther.
bodilyexperience
It is alsopossibletofindreconsiderations
concerningthehierarchy
offoun-
dation.Forinstance,whenHusserlwrites:
WennEinfühlung - istetwaauchda schondie Gemeinschaft,
eintritt die Intersub-
da und Einfühlung
jektivität dann bloß enthüllendes
Leisten? (Ms. C 17 84b)

EventhoughHusserltypically foundstheunthematic oftheco-

experience
functioning Otherin a thematicexperienceof the Other,thesignificant
passagejust quoted testifies, thathe, at theveryleast,came to question
whetheror not thisapproachwas phenomenologically adequate. Even
thoughthe concreteexperienceof the Othermightbe the conditionof
fora thematisation
possibility oftheopen anonymous it
intersubjectivity,
mustbe realized,thatour acquaintancewiththe Othersis notfirstand
foremostan acquaintance witha specialkindofintentionalobjects,butthat
theOthersarealreadypresentand co-functioning in ourhorizontalinten-
and thatthisintersubjective
tionality, horizontal
opennessis thecondition
ofpossibilityforourconcreteexperience oftheOther.15
To summarize : it is necessary
to distinguish
twodifferent kindsofrela-
tionwiththeOther( and correlatively twodifferent kindsoftranscenden-

14. ThisquestionHusserlanswerspositively a page later.

15. Cf. Hua XV 446, 455, 465, 492, 645 and K. Held, 'Das ProblemderIntersubjektivitätund
die Idee einerphänomelogischenTranszendentalphilosophie' , in: U. Claesges & K. HELD(Hrsg.),
Perspektiven transzendentalphänomenologisc herForschung (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff,1972),
p. 46-47.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 317

16To claimthattheconcrete
talintersubjectivity). oftheOther
experience
is foundedupon a priorhorizontalreference to theOtherdoes notimply,
ofcourse,thattheconstitutive contributioneffectuated byourconcrete ex-
perienceoftheembodiedOtheris alreadyaccomplished byourhorizontal
in theopenintersubjectivity.
participation Thereareirreducible differences
betweenthetwo.Whereasthecontribution oftheopenintersubjectivity is
at
primarily play in theformal structureofour intentionality,concretein-
tersubjectivity
(which forthe first allows
time dissensionandthusa sharpened
experienceofthealterityoftheOther)is thecondition forthe
ofpossibility
centralchangein ourcategories ofvalidity.The thematicexperienceand
constitution is onlypossibledue to ourconcrete
ofobjectivity experience of
the Other(as experiencing me and the same objectsas myself).Thus,
s analyses
Husserl' oftheconcrete bodilyexperienceoftheOtheranditscon-
stitutive
implications are by no meanssuperfluous, althoughtheyhave
turnedout to be analysesofa foundedexperience oftheOther.17

16. Actually,Husserlevenoperateswitha thirdtypeoftranscendental intersubjectivity.In ad-

ditionto theopen intersubjectivitythatis activein ourhorizontalintentionality, and theconcrete
experience oftheembodiedOther,whichis directly connectedto thechangein ourcategories of
validity,thereexistsa founded but differentand irreduciblethird kind of transcendental intersub-
thatbelongsto thelevelofgeneratively-handed-down
jectivity normality, conventionality, and tradi-
tion.To accountin detailforthisthirdtypeofintersubjectivity would,however, demandan examin-
ationofHusserl'suse ofthecategories normality, generativityand historicity and wouldexceedthe
spaceofthepresentpaper.An extendedanalysis can be foundin ZAHAVI1996.See alsoAJ. STEIN-
BOCK,'Generativity and Generative Phenomenology', HusserlStudies12 ( 1995), p. 55-79-
17. Myattempt toprovetheexistence ofan intersubjective dimension priorto anyconcrete bodily
encounter withtheOtherhasinvolvedan investigation ofperceptualintentionality. This,however,
^
is nottheonlyway.It is wellknown,thatHusserlalsooperateswitha conceptofinstinctual inten-
tionality,and he states
explicitly thatthere exist a theoretical
pre- and pre-active kind of intersub-
whichprecedesand makespossibleconcrete
jectivity, : ,,Nurkurzhinweisen
sociality kannichhier
nochdarauf,daß solcheVerbundenheit nichtnurdurchsozialeAktehergestellt werdenkann.Wie
die EinzelsubjekteihreAktivitätaufdem Grundeinerdunklen,blindenPassivität entfalten,so gilt
dasselbeauchvondersozialenAktivität. Aberschondie Passivität, das instinktive Trieblebenkann
intersubjektivenZusammenhang herstellen.So isteineGeschlechtsgemeinschaft in unterstem Grund
schonhergestellt durchdas geschlechtliche Instinktleben, mag es auch erstin der Erfüllung seine
wesentliche enthüllen." (Hua IX 514. Cf. IX 486, XV 593-94,Ms. E III 9 28b).
Intersubjektivität
The mostextensive accountofthisdimension can be foundin I. YAMAGUCHI, PassiveSynthesis und
bei EdmundHusserl(Phaenomenologica.
Intersubjektivität The Hague,Nijhoff,1982); J.G. HART,
ThePersonand the CommonLife(Phaenomenologica.Dordrecht,KluwerAcademicPublishers,
1992); and N. Lee, EdmundHusserlsPhänomenologiederInstinkte(Phaenomenologica.Dor-
drecht,KluwerAcademicPublishers,1993).

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
318 D. Z AHAVI

It shouldbe emphasizedthattheargument presented doesnotprovethat

itis impossible ( oruseless) to effectuatetheprimordial reduction. It might
very well be that there are domains,especially on the level ofpassivesyn-
thesis(forinstancewithinauto-temporalization and association),thatare
constituted bythesubjectprimordially. What has been demonstrated is
' ' thattheconcrete oftheOthertakesplacewithina con-
merely experience
stitutive dimensionalreadypervadedbyintersubjective references,thatis,
thatintersubjectivity is alreadyat playpriortomyconcrete experience ofthe
embodiedOther.If,however, horizontal intentionality(noeticallyas well
as noematically ) entailsstructural referencesto intersubjectivity,thenin-
tersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a contingent and factual relationbe-
tweenme and an Other.It mustbelonga priorito thestructure of con-
18
stituting subjectivity.
Thatthereference tointersubjectivity canbe foundprecisely inhorizontal
intentionality, that is in the interplaybetween and
presence absence,is no
coincidence. As Merleau-Ponty waslaterto pointout,ifintersubjectivity is
to be possible,theremustbe a priorintrasubjective alterity,thatis a con-
tamination ofabsoluteself-presence If I
and self-identity. am to meetthe
Otheras a self,I have to be able to face myselfas an Other.19This

18. It shouldbe clearthatthe accountgivenof Husserl's conceptof 'open intersubjectivity'

necessitatesa réévaluation ofthesimilarities and differencesbetweenHusserl's theoryand theac-
countsgivenbyHeideggerand Sartre.Not onlydoesHusserl' s conceptseemto beara certainaffinity
to Heidegger'sconceptoí Mitsein,Husserlalsoappearsto anticipate Sartre'sclaimthatourrelation
to theOtheras itmanifests itselfin thebeing- withand in theconcrete recognition oftheOtherare
twodifferent problems whichdemandseparateclarifications (J.-P.SARTRE, Beingand Nothingness ,
New York,Philosophical Library,1965,p. 248). It wouldalso eventually be necessary to confront
HusserlwithSartre'saccusation thattheattemptto introduce an a prioriconceptofintersubjectivity
negatestherealalterity and transcendence oftheOther(p. 249-250). Thistaskwouldexceedthe
limitsofthispaper(cf. howeverZAHAVI1996), butitcan be notedthatSartre'sreadingofHusserl
washighlyperceptive in at leastone respect.In Beingand Nothingness he writes: ,,Thuseachob-
jectfarfrombeingconstituted as forKant,bya simplerelationto thesubject,appearsin mycon-
creteexperience as polyvalent ; itis givenoriginallyas possessing
systems ofreference to an indefinite
pluralityofconsciousnesses ; it is on thetable,on thewallthattheOtheris revealedto me as that
to whichtheobjectunderconsideration is perpetually referred- as wellas on theoccasionofthe
concreteappearancesofPierreor Paul " (p. 233).
19. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception(Paris,ÉditionsGallimard,1945),
p. 402-3,413, 427-28; M. Merleau-Ponty. Signes(Paris,ÉditionsGallimard,I960), p. 215;
M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visibleet l'invisible(Paris,Tel Gallimard,1964), p. 74.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 319

thought alreadybe foundin Husserl,whofrequently

canhowever compares
empathy sincebotharekindsoftemporalizing
withmemory, presentiations
) ( Hua XV 588-589) :
( Vergegenwärtigungen
sozusagendurchEnt-Gegenwärtigung
Die Selbstzeitigung (durch Wiedererin-
nerung) hat ihreAnalogie in meiner Ent-Fremdung(Einfühlungals eine Ent-
Gegenwärtigung höhererStufe - die meinerUrpräsenzin einebloßvergegenwär-
VI 20
tigteUrpräsenz).(Hua 189)
Thusthereis a structural
similaritybetweenthede-presentation effectuated
byoriginaltemporalisationand theself- alienationtakingplacein empathy
(Hua XV 634), and Husserlseemsto haveconsideredthefracture of the
and
subject'sself-coincidence, the introduction of and
alterity absence in
itscore,all ofwhichis due to theprocessoftemporalisation, to be a con-
ditionofpossibilityforempathy,i.e. concreteintersubjectivity. 21
Althoughthistrainofthoughtdoes notentailthattheOtheris already
co-functioning in myauto-temporalisation, showsthatthe
it nevertheless
has beenprovidedfor,alreadyon a veryfun-
ofintersubjectivity
possibility
damentallevel,throughthe interplay of presenceand absencefoundin
temporality.

3.
ThatHusserlgraduallypaid moreand moreattentionto thematterof
transcendental is indisputable.
intersubjectivity Whetherthis'intersubjec-
oftranscendental
tivetransformation' phenomenology indicatesa decisive
breakwithhisearlieregologicalconceptofphenomenology as an apodic-
ticsciencehas been a matterof discussion.It has been claimedthatthe
wholenotionofphilosophy as a puresciencemustbe abandonedthemo-
mentthe transcendental foundationturnsout to be the nos cogitamus,

20. Cf. Hua I 144, III 325, VIII 175, IX 456, IX 536, XIII 188,XV 447, XV 641.
21. Forsimilarand relatedobservations cf.J. DERRIDA, La voixet le phénomène(Épiméthée,
1967), p. 40 ; J. DERRIDA,L 'écriture
etla différence(Éditionsdu Seuil, 1967), p. 195; R. Bernet,
La viedu sujet(Epiméthée,1994),p. 303-4; N. DEPRAZ,Transcendance etincarnation (Paris,Vrin,
1966), chap.V; J. BENOIST, Autourdu Husserl(Paris,Vrin,1994), chap.II; andJ.G. HART,who
evencharacterizes theretention and protention as 'feebleformsofempathy'( ThePersonand the
CommonLife,p. 225).

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
320 D. ZAHAVI

sinceit does notpossesstheapodicticity oftheego cogito.22Thusthenos

cogitamushas been takento be non-apodictic sincetheexperience ofthe
Otheris as fallibleas anyotherkindofspatialperception. 23Whereasit is
truethatHusserlian phenomenology doesin factundergodecisivechanges
due to theincorporation oftranscendentalintersubjectivity, theargument
presented is problematic. As we haveseen,itis necessary to distinguishtwo
different kindsof relationwiththe Other. One is the concreteand a
posterioriexperience oftheembodiedOther,whichlikeall otherpercep-
tionsispresumptive in character. Anotheris thea prioriand apodictical
characterofourrelation to theopenintersubjectivity.Thus,Husserlis quite
in
specific stating that the of
explication my transcendental horizonofthe
presentleads me to thetranscendental and actualco-present Othersand
theirhorizons,makingit obvious,thateveryego is characterized by an
apodicticand universalstructureof intersubjectivity (Hua XV 192).
Although it remains possiblethat eachand of
every my concrete experiences
oftheOtherturnsoutto be fallacious (Hua XIV 474-75 ), thisconsideration
doesnotwarrant anyconclusion concerningthenon-apodicticity ofthenos
cogitamus. Even ifI knew with that
certainty a universal plague had killed
all butmyself, myexperience wouldstillbe dependent
(as horizontal) upon
thecontribution oftranscendental (Hua
intersubjectivity 1 125,Hua XV 6,
Hua IV 81 ).24

22. D. Carr, The ,,Fifth Meditation" and Husserl's Cartesianism',Philosophyand

Phenomenological Research34(1973), p. 14-35.
23. D. CARR1973,p. 32-35.
24. mis interpretation can be supported byJJ.Cairns transcription ora conversation
ne hadwitn
Husserlthe4thofJune1932,whereHusserlstated: ,, ... it is an apodictictranscendental factthat
mysubjectivity constitutes
foritselfa worldas intersubjective. The otherselfis therefore
a necessary
intentional 'object'oftheabsolutely evidentstructure ofmyawareness. Furthermore thisotherself
is necessarilycoequalwithmyself.Mytranscendental self,byvirtueofitsevidentstructure, perceives
itselfas withoutanysuperiority overtheotherself.(I am an intentional objectforhim,as he is for
me ; he is an absoluteconstitutive consciousness, as I am). Thisis all partoftheapodicticfacticity
ofmytranscendental It doesnotdependon thefortuitous
subjectivity. ofa particular
constitution
objectofvalidEinfühlung in perception,butis simplyan explication ofthefactthatI do intenda
worldas necessarily intersubjective.(That is whatI meanbycallingit a world.Ifitwerenotinter-
subjective, itwouldnotbe a world.) Strictly it is an (open ? ) infinityofothersubjectswhichis re-
the
quiredby apodictic factual structure
ofmy transcendental consciousness,notone othersubject."
(D. CAIRNS, Conversations withHusserland Fink(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,1976), p. 82-83)

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HORIZONTAL INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY 321

The implicitreference to theperceptions ofpossibleOthersas inherent

to myhorizontal intentionalityindicatestheintrinsic intersubjectivestruc-
tureofthehorizon.Althoughthisstructure doesneither nor
prove presup-
pose the actualexistence of Others, important notice,thatwe have
it is to
onceand forall transcended a solipsistic positionclaimingthattheworld
could,in principle, be constitutedbya soleego,sincetheplurality ofposs-
ibleperceptions is a
implied quiteclearly plurality which I am in principle
of
incapable sustainingmyself. As mentioned already,they not my
are
possibleperceptions.
Husserleventually reachedtheconclusionthata radicalexamination of
thetranscendental egowouldinevitably lead to transcendental intersubjec-
; 25thetask of the articlehas been to some
tivity present provide arguments
forthisconclusion,showingin concretohowpartoftheveryintentional-
constitutivelifeoftheego is permeatedbytheOthers.

Summary:

Throughan investigationofHusserl's conceptofhorizontalintentionality,thearticle

basicallyarguesthatthe horizonis intrinsically and
intersubjective, thatit entails an im-
plicitreference
to theintentionsof possibleOthers. this it
Against background argued is
thatour perceptualexperienceof an embodiedOther,our factualencounterwiththe
Other,is notthemostbasicand fundamental typeofintersubjectivity.
On thecontrary,
it presupposesa typeof intersubjectivity
whichbelongsa priorito thestructure ofcon-
stitutingsubjectivity.

25. Cf. Hua VI 275, 472, Hua XV 17, 73-75,403, Hua IX 344.

This content downloaded from 159.237.12.142 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 17:53:33 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions