This article was downloaded by: [University Of Maryland]

On: 16 October 2014, At: 00:12

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Strategic Studies

Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20

The US‐led trade Embargo

on China: The origins of
CHINCOM, 1947–52
a
Frank Cain
a
Senior Lecturer in the History Department ,
University of New South Wales , Canberra,
Australia
Published online: 24 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Frank Cain (1995) The US‐led trade Embargo on China: The
origins of CHINCOM, 1947–52, Journal of Strategic Studies, 18:4, 33-54, DOI:
10.1080/01402399508437618

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399508437618

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all
the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our
platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors
make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of
the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and
Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,
demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
 or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study
purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,
reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access
and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014
 The US-Led Trade Embargo on China:
the Origins of CHINCOM, 1947-52
FRANK CAIN

CHINCOM (an acronym for 'China Committee') was the title given to
the US-sponsored body that supervised the measures by which Western
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

trade with China was embargoed. Although it was not formally established
until September 1952, the US had banned trade with China for some
years previously and had lobbied other countries to follow suit. The
UN resolutions of May 1951 to isolate China as a result of its becoming
embroiled in the Korean War also form an essential part of this trade-
banning process. Under US leadership, the West had already established
the procedures for strictly controlling trade with the Soviet bloc (known
as COCOM) and CHINCOM became an essential arm of this admini-
stration. COCOM was largely a secret body. The public and media of
the participating countries knew nothing of it and few members of
governments would have been aware of its functioning. COCOM became
very effective in curtailing all Soviet trade, that is Western exports to it
and imports from it. A brief review of the philosophy and functioning of
COCOM is essential for understanding the history of CHINCOM.

Origins of COCOM
COCOM evolved out of discussions and planning in both Congressional
and administrative circles between late 1947 and early 1948. It was
founded on the twin US concerns of a deep fear of Communism and the
necessity to rearm (or at least anticipate the possibility of a third World
War) in the face of an expanding Soviet empire. The fear of Communism
was deeply rooted in US culture. The origins lay in the firm responses to
the development of radicalism in the shape of trade unionism, socialism,
Bolshevism or the Industrial Workers of the World. These were all met
with tough suppression from officialdom, such as court-based injunctions,
vigilante attacks, jailings and mass deportations. The US firmly refused to
recognize the new USSR until 1933.
The volume of US trade with the USSR between the Wars had been small
and after 1945 was even smaller. In 1947 it amounted to $107 million,
consisting mainly of machinery and vehicles. In exchange the US bought
manganese, chrome and platinum. The first two commodities were used in
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.18, No.4 (December 1995), pp.33-54
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
 34 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

US steel-making, but by 1947 it was establishing other sources in order to be

independent of supplies.1 The USSR and its satellites were now declared
the 'potential enemy' and the National Security Council in December 1947
and the cabinet in March 1948 laid down the general policies to be followed
to stop the eastern trade. The US officials were aware of how American
exports of military aircraft and munitions manufacturing machinery to
Japan in the 1930s had rebounded against them in the Pacific War.2
Trade between Western Europe and Russia, however, had always
been substantial over the centuries. Germany, Britain and France had
conducted extensive trade in Russian timber, foodstuffs and oil in exchange
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

for European machinery and consumer goods. The US moved to curtail

this renewed trade in the immediate post-war years through the application
of the Marshall plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program
(ERP). When the Foreign Assitance Act to establish the ERP was before
Congress in March 1948, Senator K. Mundt introduced an amendment
[117(d)] to be known subsequently as the Mundt amendment. This
prohibited Marshall aid being given to any recipient country that exported
any product that might contain a US-supplied commodity that would
ordinarily be refused a US export licence.
In the same month, the administration drew up lists of goods the
export of which to the east was to be strictly controlled.3 The lists were
divided into four categories or classes. Class 1 included all military goods
such as guns, ammunition or tanks, or machinery for their manufacture,
such as special machine tools and extrusion presses, electronic equipment,
vacuum tube machinery, blast furnaces, oil drilling equipment, tractors,
trucks, merchant ships, and all strategic chemicals such as benzine,
sodium, mercury, all nitrates and nitric acid, tin, zinc, lead and copper.
Class 1A included military and semi-military items such as radio equip-
ment, ultra-violet equipment, broad-band communication equipment and
large pressure vessels. Class 2 contained products of industrial potential
to the East such as road-building equipment, excavators, engines, steel,
cast-iron and plate glass. In Class 3 were items regarded as important
in maintaining the basic economy such as office machinery, plumbing
equipment, needles and matches. Class 4 was the catch-all category
embracing all items not elsewhere listed.4
The European countries responded to the US pressures for a trade
embargo with the East by meeting at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris on 17
January 1949. From the nine countries in the OEEC seven representatives
attended from Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Sweden and
Switzerland. All these countries had trading links with Russia stretching
back a century or more. The British government had made general trading
and credit facilities agreements in the inter-war years with the Soviet
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 35

government. By December 1947 Britain had signed another trade agree-

ment with the Soviet government by which timber, grain, food and similar
commodities would be sold to the UK in exchange for commodities scarce
in the USSR such as tin, rubber, copper cables, aluminium, machines,
steel sheets and industrial diamonds.5
The meeting of the European countries expressed various degrees of
resentment at American demands. The Swiss respresentative firmly stated
that his government was not prepared to limit its exports in time of peace.
He said that it would adopt the stalling tactic of holding discussions with
US officials so that they 'would be able to spin out time and avoid taking
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

any definite decision'. The Dutch stated that most of the items on the
US list were subject to Dutch local licensing policy and suggested that
negotiations with the US progress slowly. The Swedes likewise proposed
delay. The French were then negotiating a new French-Soviet trade
agreement and said that they would inform the US that they 'were studying
a number of questions such as the exact meaning of the lists'. Washington
was to be put off by European delaying tactics.6 The British decided on
17 March 1949 formally to embargo exports to the East if only to allow
their trade discussions with the East to continue on a predictable basis.
The list of prohibited exports was that agreed at Anglo-French talks.7
The US moved to establish a European-based body to supervise these
trade controls. The British agreed to this as a means of preventing other
countries seizing sales surrendered by British firms. This new body was
called the Ad Hoc Consultative Group and was composed of senior
officials. But the US also wanted an enlarged body of intelligence experts
to monitor compliance including 'leakages due to transshipments'.8 A
Co-ordinating Committee consisting of junior officials was therefore
established which monitored trade on a daily basis. The name COCOM
was given to these highly secret administrative bodies based in Paris.9

The US Perception of Pre-Revolutionary China

US trade with China had never been extensive and the US did not expect
that the situation would change in post-war years. Table 1 indicates the
level of this pre-war trade.
While concentrating on mounting economic warfare against the USSR
and its allies, the US administration tended to ignore China, then
embroiled in the chaos of civil war. It was a war in which Chiang Kai-shek,
America's ally, was losing ground. This led to the expression of warnings
in Washington of possible Communist gains in the Far East, particularly
in China. North Korea had been under Communist control since the
invading Japanese surrendered in 1945. Lt.-Gen. A.C. Wedemeyer, who
 36 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

TABLE 1
VALUE OF EXPORTS (INCLUDING RE-EXPORTS) AND GENERAL IMPORTS OF
THE USA AND MAINLAND CHINA"1 ($ MILLION)

Exports Imports
1930 90 101
1933 52 38
1936 47 74
1939 56 62
1940 78 93

had succeeded the deposed Stilwell as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo

Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

and commander of the American Forces in China, was asked by President

Truman to submit a report on the Chinese and Korean situation. The
Wedemeyer report of September 1947 described in relatively optimistic
terms what in retrospect was the beginning of the Kuomintang collapse.
The General perceived the Communist problem contained to the north of
China in the following terms: 'The Chinese Communists may soon gain
military control in Manchuria and announce the establishment of a
government which might then be linked with Outer Mongolia, already
a Soviet satellite.' Wedemeyer did recognize the incompetence of the
Kuomintang and remarked how 'maladministration and corruption have
caused the loss of confidence in the Government and basic freedoms
of the people are jeopardised due to oppression by government police
agencies'. But he went on to recommend more US support for the
Generalissimo in the form of'munitions (most urgently ammunition) and
technical assistance' while reporting how 'American military advisory
groups now operate on a General Staff level'.
The economic problems perceived by the General were not all gloomy,
however. 'China will not exhaust her foreign official assets (US $327
million) until early 1949 at the present rate of imports and exports', and
he urged the mobilization of the 'privately held foreign exchange assets
from six hundred million to fifteen hundred million dollars'. The General
saw economic inflation as a looming problem which could be forestalled,
he suggested, by a US 'loan of two hundred million dollars in silver'. In
general he saw no problem which could not be solved with USfinanceand
administrative know-how in the following manner:
There should be created a central screening and planning agency
which with the assistance of United States advisers would approve
priorities for individual projects for which U.S. financial and technical
assistance would be made available. The success of any recon-
struction program is predicted on budgetary, tax and Army reforms
which the United States should assist in bringing about."
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 37

The appropriately named Committee of Two, comprising the Secretaries

of State (Marshall) and Defense (Forrestal), discussed aspects of the
Wedemeyer Report on 3 November 1947. Secretary Marshall declared
that the Report should not be made public 'as to do so would do much
more harm than good'. At this stage it was still estimated that the
Communists could be held at bay by providing increased quantities of
arms and equipment to the Nationalists. The Committee accordingly set
about having the War Assets Administration directed to hand over
military munitions and supplies to the Nationalist Chinese, including
surplus munitions in the Marianas: 'The 39 Division Program should
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

be considered completed', it concluded. Mr Butterworth of the State

Department prudently warned Marshall that this transfer of munitions to
the Chinese should not be raised at the forthcoming Council of Foreign
Ministers. He was joined by Under Secretary Draper of the Army who
advised with equal prudence that no publicity be given to 'private
manufacturers replacing ammunition which the Army may advance to the
Chinese pursuant to a private contract now being negotiated by the
Chinese with an American manufacturer'. The Committee noted the
presence in China of 6,180 US military and naval personnel remaining
there since the termination of hostilities.12
The Far East seemed to be awash with surplus US military equipment.
General MacArthur told William C. Bullitt that he had enough equip-
ment to supply ten divisions. Much of this was sent to the Nationalist
Chinese, some was retained by SCAP and the remainder sent to what
were described as 'other sources'.13 But the Nationalist forces continued
to retreat south. By November 1948 US military intelligence reported to
the Chief of Staff that Chiang Kai-shek still had an army of 2,325,000 as
opposed to the Communists' 1,433,000. However, the prognosis for the
Nationalists was not good, as the report went on to outline:
The most disturbing factor in the present situation of the Nationalists
is the widespread lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and his
government. Many loyal supporters and imperial observers are
convinced that China's only hope lies in supplanting the government
which by its blunders, corruption and incompetency has brought the
country to the brink of Communist rule.14

Exploring Trade Embargoes

Meanwhile in the Far East, the US military officials began accommodating
themselves to the forthcoming defeat of Chiang's forces, and in January
1949 they perceived the Nationalists' planned evacuation to Taiwan, to
 38 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

where their navy and air force headquarters had already withdrawn, as
beneficial to US maritime interests." The State Department's contingency
planning for the defeat included a report to the National Security Council
confirming the agreed US strategy that a Communist China should be
prevented 'from becoming an adjunct of the Soviet power'. But Japan's
future loomed more importantly for the State Department and it urged
that Japan's access to the surplus production of north China and Manchuria
be assured. However, lest Japan become a hostage, it warned that 'the
preponderant dependence on Chinese sources for Japan's food and critical
raw material requirements should be avoided' by developing alternative
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

sources. The Department recommended in a divide-and-rule proposal

that those forces should be 'augmented' in China that might 'operate to
create a serious rift between Moscow and a Chinese Communist regime'.
A trade embargo was the Department's most positive recommendation,
however. After the fall of Tientsin, the State Department had requested
US oil companies to curtail sales to the Communist-held areas and it had
asked the British goverment to request its oil companies to do likewise.
The Department had also requested the US company Northwest Air
Lines to cease negotiations with the Communist authorities for the joint
establishment of a domestic airline.16 The other embargo arrangements
were to apply to the items on the US-drafted COCOM 1A list consisting
of military arms and equipment. This was designed not only to stop the
Chinese rearming (a faint possibility since they had obtained most of the
US equipment given to Chiang's forces) but more importantly to stop new
equipment flowing to North Korea and the Soviet Union.17
The US administration sought assistance from the British government
from February 1949 to curtail trade with the Chinese Communists via
Hong Kong and sent a special mission from Washington late in June 1949.
The Americans pressed the British to impose export controls on goods of
direct military utility to the Communists and also to prevent the trans-
shipment via China to the USSR, eastern Europe and North Korea of all
goods on the COCOM 1A list. But, most importantly, the US sought
British agreement to these controls as a means of demonstrating Western
unanimity. It would, the officials said:
demonstrate western ability to control, and to restrict, if necessary,
strategic goods of key importance to the Chinese economy (a highly
selected group of IB list goods). We have stressed this third purpose,
pointing out that such controls would represent the most important
single instrument available for use vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists
in protecting vital western interest in China and the Far East.18
The British refused to place an embargo on non-military exports, a
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 39

position that was maintained following discussions between the British

Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State late in 1949. The British said
that the sanctions might 'jeopardise the position of Hong Kong and
substantial British investments in and trade with China'. They agreed to
control the 1A list of exports to China from the UK, Hong Kong and
Singapore, provided prior assurance could be obtained for similar actions
from the French, Dutch, Belgian and Philippine governments and SCAP.
Britain did, however, agree to collaborate with the US and Dutch
governments in persuading the major oil companies to refrain from
petroleum sales to China on a long-term contract basis and in excess of
normal civilian requirements. In addition the British agreed to exchange
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

information with the US administration on the movement of IB goods to

China with a view to joint consultation regarding corrective measures if
it appeared that 'the flow was excessive or injurious to our [the US's]
common interests'.19
Some officials in Britain were now beginning to count the losses caused
by the trade embargo. The so-called 117D Working Party of the London
Committee assessed the losses from the Board of Trade figures as £1.25
million, which were extrapolated from the losses incurred during the
previous year. Other losses, said the Board, were impossible to calculate,
such as the orders merchants declined to fill fearing the effects of the
bannings. The direct and indirect losses were estimated to be £5 million.
Trade with the East had totalled £44 million. These losses could not be
recovered, it was believed, because other countries would seize those
markets. The response of the Ministry of Defence to these startling
calculations bordered on the fatalistic. 'We must face the fact, I think,
that the loss of trade is permanent; what we have to ensure is that we do
not lose it to no purpose.'20

The US Responds to the Nationalists' Defeat

The collapse of the Nationalists was not unexpected in the US admini-
stration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived the Nationalists as having no
plans for a counteroffensive and to be divided among themselves. The
Chiefs did not believe that the Nationalist Government 'has, in fact, a
unified command, an effective over-all program of defense and attack,
and a practical plan of co-ordinated military action'.21
The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949 and
four weeks later the US administration launched its prepared plans for
embargoing nearly all US trade with it. The US hoped that Britain in
particular would also embargo some of its trade. US officialdom was
conscious that it would be US merchants, together with Japanese and
 40 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

some German, who would be sacrificing their revenues as the price for
implementing the administration's embargo policy. The State Department
officials perceived no military threat from a Communist China wracked as
it then was by civil war, natural disasters and the closure of the port of
Shanghai.22
The Chinese Communist victory was ascribed by US officials to the
USSR. The Joint Chiefs saw the Communist victory in China as repre-
senting 'the preponderance of power and influence of the USSR in Asia'.
China itself, the Chiefs admitted, was weak because it lacked armed
forces with strong logistical support and an economy capable of mobilizing
its strategic resources.23 The Truman administration responded by pre-
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

paring plans to spend large amounts of money in the 'general area of the Far
East'. This extensive area, President Truman misleadingly referred to as
'the general area of China'. It included 'Afghanistan, Burma, India, Indo-
China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand'. The
State Department stated that $75 million would be spent in this region of
the Far East 'to deter or prevent further encroachment of communism in
this area'.24 The Joint Chiefs proposed that this expenditure to hold back
the Communist tide should be allocated to the following countries and the
Chinese component be spent on what it termed 'covert aid'.

TABLE 2
AMERICAN PAYMENTS TO HALT THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM (US$ MILLION)

For direct and immediate usage2*

Indo-China 15
Indonesia 5
Thailand 10
30
As a continuing reserve
Malay States 5
Burma 10
China (including Taiwan and Tibet)* 30
45
•Restricted to covert operations.

The Secretary of State Dean Acheson produced another list of terri-

tories which would receive US backing in a speech on 12 January 1950.
The Aleutian Islands, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines were to be
included in what would be labelled the US defence perimeter; 'other
areas of the Pacific' (in which pundits immediately lumped Taiwan and
South Korea) would be aided, he added, under the UN Charter if they
were attacked.26
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 41

Meanwhile the administration confirmed its stand of refusing to recog-

nize China diplomatically. The State Department's objections were that
China would not 'observe outstanding treaties and other commitments of
the State' and that US diplomats might be humiliated or threatened.
The Communists, it concluded, had actually shown no wish 'to have US
recognition at this time'. The Chiefs of Staff agreed with the State
Department's reasons and added their own. These were that Chinese
domiciled in the US would be pressed to support Communist activities
and create internal security problems in the US and that 'Communist
aggression activities in the Philippines, Japan and South-East Asia' would
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

be encouraged. The French and their Indo-China problems were an

element in the State Department's reasoning because the French were
deciding then on the recognition question. In an effort to strengthen the
resolve of the French against recognition, it was to be pointed out to
their government the 'confusion among native elements that would result
from the recognition of a Communist regime in the midst of Communist
eradication campaigns (e.g., the case of Malaya when the British
recognised the Peking Regime).'27 Not being a colonial power in the then
accepted sense of the word, the State Department felt in a strong position
to read a lesson on the topic to their French friends.
These trade embargo policies received little publicity in Washington's
undeclared war against Communism. The more public announcements of
that campaign, such as the much-heralded National Security Document
NSC-68, contained no mention of it. The Document spoke of defeating
Communism with the tactics of 'roll back' and 'containment'. It has since
been judged to have expressed the 'hysterical view' of events in those
years. However, from the point of view of this study it is worth noting that
the Document's authors, Acheson and Paul Nitze, while drumming up
the. big battalions were quietly working away at the more practical, if
more prosaic, denial to Communist countries of minerals, metals and
manufacturing machinery.28

US Expansion of Trade Embargo

The embargoing of trade with China remained problematic for the US
administration. The imports of China were basic items such as oil or
steel goods, and Western firms were reluctant to cease selling these
commodities. They were not warlike equipment and COCOM regulations
placed them in category IB - to be controlled only quantitatively. How-
ever, for US firms, trade with China was more widely banned. The US oil
industry in particular had to stand by while mainly British firms took over
their markets in China. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, appealed
 42 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

to Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, to moderate this ban on US

firms. 'As you know', he wrote to Johnson, 'American oil companies have
a considerable investment in China ... Unilateral United States self-
denial would turn the market over to the British and expose American
personnel and properties to extreme jeopardy.'29
The US proposals for restoring the economies of Germany and Japan
ran into problems created by the embargo. When China sought to purchase
rails and locomotives from Germany and Japan the US administration
was confronted by the dilemma its ideology had created for it. The
Defense Department was in favour of reclassifying rails and railway
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

equipment from IB to 1 A. The State Department objected on the grounds

that the reclassification did not meet the agreed criteria. It. refused to
rescind the sale of 15,000 tons of German-made rails to China agreed to
by the Economic Co-operation Administration. 'The repercussions which
such a reversal would produce in Germany', it argued, 'might exacerbate
the difficulty of enforcing other and more important aspects of our
security program over the longer period ahead.'30 The Defense Depart-
ment remained adamant about the ban on railway equipment saying that
the rail network in the Soviet orbit (including China) 'was a direct
contribution to its war potential because of the utmost priority given to
those rail lines of primary military significance'. It also rejected the fears
of the State Department that the embargo controls would directly inter-
fere with East-West trade to a degree that would impede European
recovery.31 The Defense Department argued that more restrictive controls
should be placed on exports to China because it was more backward than
other Communist countries.
To retard the development of the war potential of China, it will be
necessary to extend the present pattern of restriction to include a
variety of less advanced equipment and materials required by such a
comparatively backward economy and not now covered by the IB
list.32
The so-called 'loss of China' rankled in the US administration and it
seemed to be a result of this dramatic event that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
developed a two-pronged response. One was to assist the forces of Chiang
as a direct satellite of the Soviet Union. President Truman had announced
support for Chiang's forces and the Chiefs added to this by declaring that
the 'continued successful resistance on the part of the Chinese Nationalists,
particularly in the Formosan area, is in the military interests of the United
States'. The client status of China in relation to the USSR was emphasized
by the Chiefs reporting on the flow of Soviet aircraft, landing craft,
ammunition and aviation fuel to China, and declaring that 'the aggressive
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 43

operations of the Chinese Communists, supported by Soviet aid, con-

stitute an increased threat to the already greatly weakened United States'
position in the Far East.' The Chiefs then sombrely declared 'that the
United States and the USSR are now, to all interest and purposes,
engaged in war - except for armed conflict.'33
With the Joint Chiefs of Staff holding such doom-laden perceptions of
events in China it was no surprise that the Far East tinder box exploded on
25 June 1950 when North Korean forces moved across the 28th parallel
into South Korea. With the commencement of the Korean War, the US
imposed an embargo on all exports to North Korea on 28 June. China was
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

affected disadvantageously by this development. In the words of a US

government publication, all current licences for US exports to China
were 'as a further precautionary measure' revoked on 20 July 1950. No
exception was given for this expanded US trade-war against China. The
US oil companies, convinced no doubt of having lost the battle with
their government to remain in China, now agreed to embargo petroleum
shipments to China from any sources.34
The US was not alone in conducting the war against North Korea.
Sixteen other countries also took part, but many in the Congress believed
that the European countries were exporting essential supplies to the East
which supported the North Korean forces. British Far East oil and
petroleum products were being sold to the East, including China, under
contracts signed before the COCOM restrictions had come into force.
Sales to Poland commenced with 180,000 tons in 1949 and were to expand
to 250,000 tons by 1953. The British could not break these contracts
because Poland was supplying food to Britain valued at £15 to £20 million
annually. The Dutch were in the same position in their oil sales to the
East, including kerosene sold to China. The Dutch wanted the US not to
embargo China in the same way as North Korea.35
US military intelligence was dismantling North Korean tanks by this
stage and not surprisingly found SKF bearings which were branded 'made
in Sweden'. The Swedes had been exporting their bearings for decades.
They wished to retain all the markets they held and one Swedish official
told the British ambassador in Prague that if they did not fill orders to
Czechoslovakia other West Europeans would. In any case the bearings
used in tanks are not specific for this application; the same bearings would
be used in other machines such as trucks.36 The US believed that this
discovery in Korea could be used as a lever 'in connection with our efforts
to obtain Swedish co-operation in restricting the export of war materials
eastwards'. It was viewed by the State Department as a means 'to press
for Swedish decision for greater co-operation in this field'.37
Members of Congress became over-excited in response to suggestions
 44 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

that Europe might be a back door for supplies to China and North
Korea. The more reactionary Republican Senators from the small states
such as Missouri, Nevada, Nebraska and Virginia sought to legislate to
stop all US economic and financial assistance to the European countries.
Officers of the Truman administration became alarmed. They managed by
tact and persuasion to turn a destructive move in this direction by Senator
Kenneth Wherry (Republican, Nebraska) into a less damaging resolution
which came to be known as the Cannon amendment on 27 September
1950.38 US officialdom planned to show these angry Congressional state-
ments to the Defence and Military Committees of NATO as a means of
impressing them with the political mood in Washington.39
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

US officialdom was more pessimistic about events relating to China

and North Korea than were European officials. In Anglo-American
discussions led by General Omar N. Bradley and Sir Oliver Franks, the
Americans claimed that the Chinese could intervene in the Korean War
at Soviet direction. The British disagreed, but the Americans declared:

believing Peking is at the present time under very strong Kremlin

influence and that the Kremlin might wish to involve the Chinese
communists in hostilities with the West [the US] considered such
possible Chinese involvement less unlikely.40

The US likewise disagreed with the British intelligence assessment that

the USSR would not be able 'to engage in general war before 1955'. The
US claimed 1952 as the more likely date. Both parties agreed to meet in
'a planned Joint Intelligence conference' on Soviet capabilities with a
possible meeting of collected Chiefs of Staff to follow.4' The British were
reluctant to tie themselves too closely to US military intentions. The
Korean War had compelled them to raise defence expenditure from eight
per cent of national income to ten per cent. This had required, the
government said, increased dollar imports, loss of exports and reduction
in local investment.42
By October 1950 when the North Korean troops were retreating
before the US-led forces pushing into North Korea, US officialdom was
expanding its already extensive stockpiling programme of strategic war
materials. The British were proposing to join this programme by stock-
piling enough supplies for one year of war (at an estimated cost of $1
billion). These stocks included rubber, cotton, lead, zinc, petroleum and
other basic commodities.43 George Marshall, the US Secretary of State,
was simultaneously seeking to have the Europeans deny more exports
to the East. Their refusal to do so previously had, as the Secretary of
Defense told Marshall, 'been of great concern to the people and to the
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 45

Congress of the US in recent months'. Marshall wanted only token ship-

ments of IB material (non-warlike goods, controlled only quantitatively)
and a 50 per cent reduction in what was left.44 The British had already
expressed concern about the US moving to 'a complete economic blockade'
which would substantially damage the British and other European
economies, particularly if the US was unwilling to replace the essential
commodities such as food, timber and coal obtained from the East or to
supply hard currency dollars to assist in their purchase.45
World tension escalated as Chinese forces moved into North Korea,
sweeping south to meet the US-led forces on 26 and 27 October 1950.
A week later the US imposed a complete embargo on all exports to
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

China, followed by the seizure of bank accounts and other assets owned
by the Chinese and the North Korean government or their citizens.
By December 1950 the US Department of Commerce had banned all
American ships and aircraft from China, Hong Kong or Macao regardless
of what they were carrying or where they had come from unless specially
authorized by the Department of Commerce.46
The Truman-Atlee talks held in Washington from 4 December 1950
continued to demonstrate how US officialdom perceived all political
events in the Far East as turning on Chinese actions. This led the
administration to consider seriously the use of nuclear weapons against
China and North Korea. Acheson, for example, declared that 'negotiations
with China would lead to Korea and Formosa becoming Communist •
states and to a loss of prestige by the United Nations and to possible
serious consequences in Japan and the Philippines'. The Chinese forces
were thrusting south by this time and Marshall suggested a strategy of
'blockade on the China coast, possible air action on certain points and
covert activities in Southern China'. The attending British military leaders
must have gasped at the General's recommendation and Lord Tedder
immediately declared 'that air action would mean a war'. He was joined
by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff who pointed out 'that owing to
the Sino-Soviet Treaty it meant war with Russia'.47 The British officials
urged their US friends to adopt a softer policy towards China. They
suggested negotiating with the Chinese and that the US should abandon
its refusal to have China admitted to the UN. They also sought to have
Russia brought into the negotiations. There was little response by the US
to these proposals.
The US Navy demanded the immediate rewriting of NSC 48/2 agreed
upon 12 months previously. This had all but banned trade totally with
China, but the Navy seemed to believe that even the small remaining
amount might allow 'aid and comfort from US sources to be given an
enemy'. The Navy was then having to assert itself more prominently. It
 46 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

feared the loss of power and influence with the possible incorporation of
its air arm into the newly-established US Air Force. The prominent
Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews declared that 'Communist
China has for all intents and purposes become an enemy of the US and
that US trade policy should be revised without delay'.48
Truman continued to rely on trade sanctions against the Communists
and in a letter a few weeks later to all policy departments he instructed
plans to be laid for thwarting 'Communist-imperialist aggression'. The
programme he wished to see implemented was summarized in his opening
paragraph:
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

It is necessary that we now take such measures as are feasible to

prevent the flow to countries supporting Communist imperialist
aggression of those materials, goods, funds and services which
would serve materially to aid their ability to carry on such aggression.
We must enlist the co-operation and support of other nations in
carrying out those measures; and in securing such support we must
stand ready to take such steps as may be necessary to minimize the
economic dependency of co-operating nations upon Communist
imperialist countries.49

Despite President Truman's alarmist prose, the suggestions from his

departments recommended little more than had already been discussed
and implemented in the war of export controls. Loose ends could be tied
up, it was suggested, such as having Sweden and Switzerland and the
Federal German Republic join more co-operatively in the multilateral
export control arrangements. In the case of China it was recommended
that the US should press for the application of effective controls through
the United Nations. The US should aim 'at achieving agreement on
economic sanctions by the maximum number of countries'.50
The US seemed to be convinced that the Chinese were drawing on
imported supplies, so ferociously did they renew their spring offensive
early in 1951. It was the Washington Post that later revealed that US
munitions were being used by the Chinese against America and its allies.
These had been supplied originally to Chiang's forces and taken over
by the Communists. Nevertheless, the US sought to enrol the West in
embargoing trade with China through a UN resolution. A Twelve-Power
Study Group, known officially as the Additional Measures (Sanctions)
Committee of the General Assembly, began investigating that proposal
early in 1951. The Joint Chiefs of Staff produced statistics from an
unrevealed source demonstrating how the West had increased its exports
to China as follows.
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 47

TABLE 3
WESTERN EXPORTS TO CHINA (US$ MILLION)

1936 90
1947 119
1948 53
1950 415
The five largest exports:
rubber 45
chemicals and drugs 29
iron and steel 20.5
vehicles and transport equipment 4.8
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

The Joint Chiefs concluded with the recommendation that the Western
nations be asked to deny all commodities and services to China that could
be used to support military operations.51 The Study Group was reluctant
to recommend UN sanctions against China while a peace settlement was
possible through the Good Offices Committee. By May 1951 two events,
perhaps not unlinked, led to the Group's resolving to support sanctions.
One related to the testimony of General MacArthur before the US Senate
that British supplies of petrol had passed to China via Hong Kong. It was
made to embarrass the Truman administration as much as the British, but
the allegation was immediately denied by the US Consul-General in the
colony. The South China Morning Post added that ships were bypassing
the colony and trading direct with China, including Japanese freighters
delivering iron and steel manufactured goods and other trade valued
at $16 million. Such trade, it added, would have been conducted with
MacArthur's approval. The other event was the attack on the British
government by the Opposition, led by Winston Churchill, alleging that
the government was exporting arms, explosives and other warlike material
to China. Both Attlee and Shawcross demonstrated that all the exports
were for civilian use - including the tinplate to be used for packing
preserved eggs for Britain. However, both the US and the UK government
were under pressure to expand the sanctions against China. The Study
Group soon after came down on the side of sanctions against China and
this was adopted by the Political Committee on 17 May 1951.52
The US China embargo applied to Hong Kong as well. The British
proposed to the State Department a series of surveillance mechanisms in
order to allow the colony's economy to survive. Britain admitted that
a small leakage to China could not be entirely eliminated. The British
pointed out that the Hong Kong population was suffering from the US
embargo and that civil disorder could erupt which could be exploited by
the Chinese and perhaps lose Hong Kong to the British. The British
representation was examined by the US administration, but the officials
 48 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

gave no relief to Hong Kong. The Defense Department, under Marshall,

claimed that the British could not stop the leakages and that Hong Kong
was in a 'precarious security position' and was not important to the
defence of the West. Further, US military intelligence 'and a Department
of Commerce on-the-spot observer' reported that the effects of the US
embargo on Hong Kong as described by the British 'are greatly
exaggerated'.53
The forced discontinuation of Hong Kong's trade with China con-
siderably affected the viability of the colony's economy. One estimate of
the decline is shown below.
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

TABLE 4
HONG KONG EXPORTS TO CHINA

Exports to China Exports to China as a

(HK$ Million) percentage by value of
all HK exports54
1948 280 17.7
1951 1,604 36.2
1952 520 18.3
1953 540 19.7
1954 391 16.2
1955 182 7.2
1956 136 4.2

The disruption in Hong Kong's economy through the denial of its

China trade led eventually to the development of small manufacturing
plants as a measure for retaining its economic viability. The damage to the
Hong Kong, but more importantly to the British economy, worsened the
tension between the two countries. Whereas the US administration
perceived a serious threat to Western interests by a more assertive China,
the British Labour government thought otherwise. This opinion was
expressed by Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, at the
US-British-French talks in September 1951. He remarked that 'Hong
Kong must trade with the mainland to live', and that 'he believed that
China was not a servile partner of the USSR and that he did not desire to
take any steps which would drive her closer to the Soviets.'55
Marshall and his department were unwilling to give the British any
leeway because of a reactionary Congress. The Congress was at this stage
dominated by right-wing Republicans riding the crest of electoral
emotions stirred by the rapid development of the Cold War. These
Congressmen chose to ignore the fact that, while the US economy required
no trading links, the Europeans had of necessity to retain these trade
connections even though Europe was riven by the Iron Curtain.
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 49

Coal, timber, grain, oil and foodstuffs continued to flow from the
East, and the West continued to pay for them with manufactures. These
established commercial links were viewed by some in Congress as 'trading
with the enemy behind the back of the US'. One of the more reactionary
members of the Senate, James Kerr had an amendment added to the
Third Supplemental Appropriation Act in 1951 to stop all aid to those
countries trading with the East in goods that could possibly be used
for war.
Such a move would have opened a breach between a more assertive
Europe and the US. This amendment was modified after serious lobbying
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

by Paul Hoffman, the ECA administrator, and Truman approved it on

2 June 1951. Meanwhile L.C. Battle (Democrat, Alabama) was preparing
a bill to maintain the ban on aid to Europe or countries exporting to the
East, but to permit exception to these provisions at presidential discretion.
The Mutual Defense Control Act (the Battle Bill) was passed on 21 August
1951. Presidential oversight did not displace continued Congressional
interest in what had become a politically populist issue.
The ever-watchful US naval intelligence began monitoring maritime
links between China and Poland. The Poles were rapidly expanding their
merchant fleet and trade within the Soviet bloc was being carried in Polish
vessels. These cargoes included railway equipment, steel, tractors, seamless
steel tubes, while rubber was picked up at Ceylon en route. Unconfirmed
reports had these Polish ships delivering bunker oil at Chinese ports.56
The US administration became concerned about Chinese imports of
rubber from British possessions. It was expected in some circles of the
administration that the election of a Conservative government in October
1951 would put a stop to such exports. Conservative spokesmen had been
critical of the export of machine tools to the Soviet bloc and rubber to
China while in opposition.
The British had announced in April 1951, in support of the US
embargo policy, that exports to China of rubber from Malaya and
Singapore would be restricted to a monthly quota of 2,500 tons. But in
May 1951 exports were discontinued altogether. The Ceylon government
thereupon sold 5,800 tons to China transported by Polish shipping. The
British High Commissioner made strong representations to the Ceylon
government on behalf of the US and its rubber-banning policy.57 US
officialdom believed that since China had few civilian motor cars all
rubber imports would be put to military use.
Negotiations between the two sides in the Korean War commenced on
10 July 1951, but fighting resumed and more permanent talks began
on 25 October. But the shock of fighting China still affected the US
officialdom. These same officials were also nursing the realization that
 50 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

Western countries had traded with China during the war. US intelligence
revealed that from Janury to September 1951 a total of 1,936 ships had
visited Chinese ports to discharge 9.5 million tons of cargo. Whereas 130
ships visited the ports in January, 259 visited in September. Aware that
their nation was a superpower now dominating Europe and the Far East,
the Chiefs of Staff proposed to the Secretary of Defense that the US
should avoid being too reliant on allies lacking dedication. This was
an important lesson that the Chiefs of Staff wished to make to the
administration. It was expressed in the following comment addressed to
the State Department:
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

From a realistic point of view, the fighting between the forces of

Communist China (satellite of the USSR) and of the United States
(including forces of the Western nations engaged in Korea) is
tantamount to war, with the scene of action confined to the area of
Korea. There is no assurance that the fighting will remain localized.
Additionally among the Western nations the United States is now
the dominant power in the Western Pacific. Consequently in any
conflict of interest arising between the United States and other
Western Powers which may affect the position of the United States
in the Far East, the United States should in its own interest insist
that United States security considerations in that area be over-
riding.58

China continued to be a problem for US security planners and they

gradually moved to set up a trade control organization which was
established on 15 September 1952 to be known as CHINCOM. It was to
function within the COCOM body in Paris. China had to be treated as a
special case for several reasons. Japan now demanded to be allowed to
resume trade with China. Western shipping continued to call at Chinese
ports and it was evident that China was drawing many of its imports
from the USSR which in turn drew them from the West. Many Western
governments were also becoming sensitive to questioning by their electors
of the policies of economic self-denial instituted under pressure from US
officials. Under these circumstances and accompanied by the ending of
the Korean War, the total ban on trade with China had to be relaxed by
the US. The US officials, however, insisted that all trading deals proposed
for China be examined on a case-by-case basis, as was being done with the
USSR. These duties became the functions of CHINCOM. The more
vocal members of Congress could now be more effectively quietened by
demonstrating to them how this large and elaborate bureaucracy watched
every shipment to the Soviet Union or China.
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 51

Summary
America's relationship with China, in which trade embargoing played
an essential part, incorporates much of the history of US involvement in
the Cold War. From being a wartime ally, however unreliable, China
quickly became a client state with the US arming and financing the
Kuomintang government in the civil war which was won by the better
organized and more popular Communists. The US reaction to this out-
come was twofold: to arm and finance other regions in the Far East, as a
measure for turning what it saw as a Soviet-led Communist tide, and to
institute an embargo on trade with China. Its reluctant allies, particularly
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

Britain who exercised some influence in the China trade through Hong
Kong, only reluctantly conformed. The philosophy of America's China
embargo differed from its European-oriented COCOM policy. Because
China's economy then operated at such a low level, US officials believed
that embargoing the very basic commodities, such as raw rubber or rail-
way lines, would hamper the Chinese economy more significantly than,
for example, stopping sophisticated equipment flowing to the USSR.
They were correct in this regard, but China avoided such restrictions by
drawing more heavily on the resources of the Soviet Union and its East
European satellites.
Although there was no formmal declaration of war against North
Korea the US fought it in the traditional manner, including the seizure of
Chinese and North Korean assets in the US. It was a policy that was not
followed by the other Western allies. This lack of fighting dedication by
the allies was perceived by the Congress as a serious weakness and its
members became convinced that the West continued to trade with China
behind the back of the US. The Battle Act was passed in order to give
Congress greater access in the oversight of officialdom's enforcement of
the embargo provisions.
As the Korean War wound down the US sought to replace the war
embargo by a COCOM embargoing model, to be known as CHINCOM.
Its allies, particularly Britain and Japan, with Germany close behind,
were all seeking entry to the potentially huge China trade. CHINCOM
became the technique for the US to maintain some influence and
surveillance of these trade links with its former undeclared enemy. The
philosophy of restricting a greater range of exports to China, because it
was so significantly underdeveloped, continued to be applied by the US.
This resulted in 400 items being banned from export to China while
264 made up the control list for the USSR. To what extent this denial of
access to Western technology and strategic commodities hampered the
development of China's economy is hard to say. The embargo certainly
 52 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

drove China into a firmer, if short-term, alliance with the USSR. That
question remains one to be answered along with the others that will
be solved as the details of the Cold War continue to be unravelled by
historians.

NOTES
1. Report on Trade Relations with Eastern Europe, 4 May 1948, CD26-1-4, Records of
the Secretary of Defense (hereafter Records), RG330, National Archives and Record
Agency, Washington, DC, hereafter NARA.
2. See reply by Counsellor Charles E. Bohlen to Senator W. Lee O'Daniel, 27 Feb. 1948,
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

CS/V661.119/2-348, Records, RG330, NARA.

3. Report by Munitions Board, National Security Aspects of Export Controls, 1 Jan.
1949, CD36-1-1, Records, RG330, NARA.
4. Report by Chairman Ad Hoc Subcommittee to Chairman Advisory Committee, 4 May
1948, CD26-1-4, Records, RG330, NARA.
5. Trade and Payments Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow,
27 Dec. 1947, (HMSO, London, Cmd.7297).
6. Cypher message British Embassy, Paris to Foreign Office, 17 Jan. 1949. FO371/77789,
Public Record Office, Kew, hereafter PRO.
7. Instructions to UK Delegation to OEEC Paris, 17 March 1949, FO371/77793, PRO.
8. UK Delegation to OEEC Paris to Foreign Office 22 June 1949, FO371/77798, PRO.
9. Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment, COCOM and the Politics of East-West
Trade (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992), p.80.
10. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Washington, US
Department of Commerce), 1975.
11. 'Report to the President - China - Korea, submitted by Lieutenant General A.C.
Wedemeyer, September 1947', Records, CGG-1-20, RG330, NARA.
12. 'Committee of Two, Minutes of the Meeting Held in Room 5142, The New State
Department Building on Monday, 3 November 1947, at 10.00', Records, CD3-1-23,
RG330, NARA.
13. Memo by John H. Ohly, 24 July 1948, Records, CD19-1-38, RG330, NARA.
14. Memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Deputy Director of Intelligence (Col.
C.W. Clarke), 2 Nov. 1948, Records, CD2-2-7, RG330, NARA.
15. Taiwan Possible Refuge for Chinese Nationalists', Report by Major General A.R.
Bollingto Chief of Staff, 28 Jan. 1948, Records, CD2-2-7, RG330, NARA.
16. 'Memorandum: Report on NSC41-US Policy Regarding Trade with China', Nov. 1949,
Records, RG330, NARA.
17. 'A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on United States
Policy Regarding Trade with China', 25 Feb. 1949, Records, RG330, NARA.
18. Enclosure with letter from Dean Acheson to National Security Council, 'Report to
the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on US Policy Regarding Trade
with China', 4 Nov. 1949, RG330, NARA.
19. Ibid., p.5.
20. Ministry of Defence to Foreign Office, 13 Aug. 1949. FO371/77803, PRO.
21. 'Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff Regarding Request on 15 August for US Military
Assistance', Records, CD6-3-30, RG330, NARA.
22. 'Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary for State on US Policy
Regarding Trade with China', 7 Nov. 1949, Records, RG330, NARA.
23. 'Memorandum for Secretary of Defense; The Position of the United States with
Respect to Asia', 29 Dec. 1949, Records, Box 38, RG330, NARA.
24. 'Memorandum on the Program for the General Area of China' from Louis Johnson,
 THE US-LED TRADE EMBARGO ON CHINA 53
10 Jan. 1950, Records, CD6-3-30, RG330, NARA.
25. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, 20 Jan.
1949, Records, CD6-3-30, RG330, NARA.
26. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol.II, The Roaring of the Cataract
(Princeton UP, 1990), Ch.13 provides a lengthy discussion of the motives and inter-
pretations of Acheson's speech.
27. 'Recognition of Chinese Communist Regime', 27 April 1950, Records, Decimal File,
July-Dec. 1950, RG330, NARA.
28. For an analysis of NSC 68 see Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 177-82.
29. Acheson to Johnson, 28 April 1950, Records, CD26-1-30, RG330, NARA.
30. Ibid.
31. 'Department of Defense Position with Respect to Strategic Rating of Railroad Trans-
portation Equipment', 8 June 1950, Records, CD091-51, RG330, NARA.
32. 'Defense Position with Respect to Issues Relating to Export Controls and Security
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014

Policy', June 1950, Records, CD091-31, RG330, NARA.

33. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Omar N. Bradley, 'Aid to Formosa',
2 May 1950, Records, CD9-4-29, RG330, NARA.
34. Trade Control System 1948-1956, Ninth Report to Congress, Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951, June 1957, p.32.
35. Foreign Office to UK Delegation EEC, Paris, 26 July 1950, FO371/87224, PRO.
36. British Embassy, Prague, to Foreign Office, 27 June 1950, FO371/87206, PRO.
37. H.R. Matthews, State Department to General Burns, 23 Dec. 1950, Records, CD092
(Sweden), RG330, NARA.
38. Trade Control System 1948-1956, p.8.
39. Memorandum for the Acting Chairman, Munitions Board: United States Military
Viewpoint on Common Export Control Policy, 22 Sept. 1950, Records, CD91.5 (Gen),
RG330, NARA.
40. Summary of US/UK Discussions on Recent World Situation, 20-24 July 1950,
Washington DC, Records, 4161, RG330, NARA.
41. Ibid.
42. The Times, 4 Aug. 1950.
43. Munitions Board Report on Stockpiling of Strategic Materials by the United Kingdom,
4 Oct. 1950, Records, CD092 (UK), RG330, NARA.
44. Marshall to JCS, Joint Secretaries and Munitions Board, 18 Oct. 1950, Records,
CD091-31, RG330, NARA.
45. Report on bipartite trade talks with Mr Acheson, 23 Aug. 1950, FO371/87222, PRO.
46. Trade Control System 1948-1956, p.33.
47. Report of Fifth Meeting, 8 Dec. 1950, FO371/83019, PRO.
48. Matthews to Secretary of Defense, US Trade with China, 7 Dec. 1950, Records,
CD092 (China-Communism), RG330, NARA.
49. Truman to Secretary of State, 28 Dec. 1950, Records, CD092 (Russia), RG330,
NARA.
50. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, War Potential of the Soviet Bloc, 20 Feb.
1951, Records, CD092 (Russia), RG330, NARA.
51. Mounting Imports into Communist China, 28 March 1951, Records, CD092 (Russia),
NARA.
52. The Times, 8, 16, 18 May 1951.
53. Marshall to Secretary of State, 9 April 1951, Records, CD091-31 (Hong Kong),
RG330, NARA.
54. Edward Szczepanik, 'The Embargo Effect on China's Trade with Hong Kong',
Contemporary China, Vol.2 (Hong Kong UP, 1958), pp.85-93.
55. Summary of Discussions at Tripartite Meeting, Sept. 1951, Records, CD092-13,
NATO (Gen), RG330, NARA.
56. Polish Merchant Martine and the Communist Chinese Military Potential, 24 Sept.
1951, East-West Trade Folder, Department of State Records, NARA.
57. Changes Proposed by JCS in Section IV (East-West Trade) of the Overall Negotiating
 54 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Paper for US-UK Talks, 2 Nov. 1951, East-West Trade Folder, Department of State
Records, NARA.
58. W.C. Forster to Secretary of State referring to JCS report, Additional Economic
Measures Against Communist China and North Korea, 21 Nov. 1951, Records,
CD092-3, NATO, RG330, NARA.
Downloaded by [University Of Maryland] at 00:12 16 October 2014