CASE1.

EDUARDO V. LINTONJUA, JR. and ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, Petitioners,

VS.
ETERNIT CORPORATION (now ETERTON MULTI-RESOURCES CORPORATION), ETEROUTREMER, S.A.
and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 144805, June 8, 2006

FACTS:
The Eternit Corporation (EC) is a business legally formed and registered in the Philippines and
manufactures pipe products and roofing materials. Eight different parcels of land were used for its
manufacturing operations, and Far East Bank & Trust Company served as trustee. Eteroutremer S.A.
Corporation (ESAC) held 90% of the shares of EC's stock. In 1986, the administration of ESAC wanted to
halt its operation in the Philippines due to the political climate. Michael Adams instructed Michael Adams to
dispose of the eight parcels of land, and Lauro G. Marquez showed the properties to him.

The Litonjua siblings offered to buy the property for P20,000,000.00 cash, but the latter did not
respond. On February 12, 1987, Glanville received a call from Glanville advising that the sale would no
longer proceed, and the Litonjuas wrote EC demanding payment for damages they had suffered on account of
the aborted sale.

ISSUE:
The court of appeals erred in holding that Marquez needed a written authority from respondent, and
not holding Glanville and Delsaux had the necessary authority to sell the subject properties.

DECISION:
The petition has no merit. A corporation is a juridical person separate and distinct from its members
or stockholders and must act only through its board of directors, officers, or agents. The property of a
corporation is not the property of the stockholders or members and must be sold without express authority
from the board of directors.

The petitioners failed to provide evidence of any Board of Directors resolution empowering Marquez,
Glanville, or Delsaux to sell or offer for sale the eight parcels of land owned by EC.
CASE2.
EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Petitioner,
VS.
EDWIN CUIZON and ERWIN CUIZON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167552, April 23, 2007

FACTS:

In January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly amounting to
P91,338.00 pesos. Respondents sought to buy from petitioner one unit of sludge pump valued at P250,000.00
with a down payment of P50,000. When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom, petitioner refused
to deliver the same without their having fully settled their indebtedness to petitioner. Despite this, respondents
proceeded to collect from Toledo Power Company the amount of P365,135.29. In October 1996, petitioner's
counsel sent respondents a final demand letter stating that their total obligations stood at P295,000.

Zero excluding interests and attorney's fees. Respondent EDWIN alleged that he was acting as a mere agent of
his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction with petitioner and the latter was aware of this
fact.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of Edwin in signing the Deed of Assignment binds his principal Impact Systems

Rulings of the court:

The Supreme Court held that in a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or
to do something in representation or on behalf of another with the latter's consent. The basis of agency is
representation, where the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on matters within the scope of his
authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were personally executed by the principal. The
parties do not dispute the existence of the agency relationship between respondents ERWIN as principal and
EDWIN as agent.
CASE3.
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners,
VS.
KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, UNIMARINE SHIPPING LINES, INC., PAUL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
RODRIGUEZ, ALBERT HONTANOSAS, AND BETHOVEN QUINAIN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166044, June 18, 2012

FACTS:
Unimarine Shipping Lines, Inc. (Unimarine) hired Keppel Cebu Shipyard to dry dock and perform ship
repairs on its vessel, the MV Pacific Fortune. They negotiated a reduction of P3.85M. Through its agent,
Bethoven Quinain, Unimarine obtained a P3M Surety Bond from Country Bankers Insurance Corp. (CBIC) in
accordance with the terms of the contract. CBIC extended the bond's expiration date, and Unimarine was
given letters requesting payment on its account. Quinain allegedly issued the surety bond in excess of his
power.

ISSUE:
Whether the principal should be held accountable for the actions taken by its agent without proper
authorization?
Rulings of the court:
The surety bond owes its obligation to the principal, and Quinain's acts were within the bounds of
the special power of attorney granted to him. According to Articles 1898 and 1910, the principal may be
bound by an agent's actions even though they are performed outside the bounds of his power if he ratifies
them, either explicitly or implicitly. However, the principal alone has the authority to approve them, and
CBIC should have been alerted of Quinain's commercial dealings. Therefore, there can be no ratification in
this situation.
CASE4.
SPOUSES FERNANDO and LOURDES VILORIA, Petitioners,
VS.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. Respondents
G.R. No. 188288, January 16, 2012

FACTS:
The Viloria spouses visited Holiday Travel Agency, a travel agency working for Continental Airlines, to
purchase plane tickets from Newark to San Diego. The travel agent, Margaret Mager, misled them into purchasing
the plane tickets believing that they cannot travel by train for it is fully booked. When they requested a refund,
Continental Airlines refused to refund the amount of the ticket. In its defense, Continental Airlines claimed that
the ticket sold to them is non-refundable because there is no agency existing between Continental Airlines and
Mager.
ISSUE:
Does a principal-agent relationship exist between Continental Airlines Inc. and Holiday Travel Agency?

Rulings of the court:

Continental Airlines did not dispute that if entered into an agreement with Holiday Travel, Holiday Travel
would enter into carriage contractz with third parties on Airlines behalf. HT was only acting as a representative
and CAI, not HT, was obligated to follow the terms of the carriage contracts. CAI had not claimed that HT had
exceeded its jurisdiction.
The Petition is DENIED due to the fraudulent false representations made by Viloria and Mager.
CASE5. Orbeta v. Sendiong, 463 SCRA 180 (2005)

Facts:
Maximo Orbeta sold a land to Juan Sendiong and Exequila Castellanes with all the improvement exist
thereon. The heirs of Orbeta filed a complaint for a recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals declared the sale null
and void and ordered spouses Pretzylou and Genosa Sendiong to restore the petitioners title and respective
shares of subject to land. The petitioners argued the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
granting a petition for annulment of a judgment.
Issues:
Whether the attorney-in-fact had the power to sign the verification and certification?

Rulings of the court:

Yes, The Court ruled that the agents signing therein of the verification and certification is already
covered by the provisions of the general power of attorney issued by the principal.
CASE6. Domingo v. Domingo, GR L-30573, October 29, 1971

Facts:
Vicente M. Dominggo granted his agent Gregorio Dominggo to sell his 88,477 square meters of land
at a rate of P 2 per square meter with an additional commission of 5% to total price. Teofilo Purisima was
appointed to look for a buyer, and Oscar De Leon acquired the property at a lower rate of P 1.20 per square
meter. When Gregorio sensed something fishy, he went to Vicente to claim his 5% commission, but Vicente
grabbed the original document and tore it to pieces. Gregorio then went to the Register of Deeds and
discovered that the buyer of the property was not named by Oscar de Leon but on his wife Amparo Diaz.
Issue:
Whether or not Gregorio is entitled for the 5% commission?

Rulings of the court:

The Supreme Court held that the law imposes upon the agent the obligation to make a full disclosure
or complete account to his principal of all transactions and other material facts relevant to the agency. By
taking such profit or bonus or gift or propina from the vendee, the agent thereby assumes a position wholly
inconsistent with that of being an agent for his principal, who has a right to treat him as if no agency had
existed. The fact that the principal may have been benefited by the valuable services of the agent does not
exculpate the agent who has only himself to blame for such a result by reason of his treachery or perfidy.
CASE7. Ace Navigation Co., Inc., v. FGU Insurance Corp., 674 SCRA 348

Facts:
Cardia Limited shipped 8,260 metric tons of cement on July 19, 1990, owned by PAKARTI, charted it
to SHINWA, entered a contract with SKY, forwarded to an agent of KEE YEH, and issued a Clean Bill of Lading.
Upon arriving at the port of Manila, HEINDRICH and ACENAV found out that out of 165,200 bags of cement
43,905 bags were in bad order. REGENCY and other respondents paid the consignee the amounts of P
427,036.40 and P 284,690.94.
On August 8,1991, the petitioner decided to file a case to co-insurers of the cargo which was
REGENCY, PAKARTI, SHINWA and SKY as the agent of the KEE YEE as reliable for the damages of the vessel.

Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence of the co-insurers of the cargo in keeping the safety of the vessel?

Rulings of the Court:

The co-insurers of the cargo SHINWA,PAKARTI, KEE YEH and SKY are liable for 70% of the damages
due to their failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the handling of the bag of cement entrusted to
them. ACENAV is responsible for 30% of the damage due to inferior packing.
CASE8. Banate v. Phil Countryside Rural Bank, (Liloan Cebu), Inc., 625 SCRA 21, (2010)
Facts:
The spouses Maglasang and Corte asked PCRB for permission to sell the properties they mortgaged
with the bank, but were denied. They then sold to Violeta Banate the subject properties for P1,750,000.00
and used the amount to pay the subject loan with PCRB. After settling the subject loan, PCRB gave the
owner's duplicate certificate of title of Lot 12868-H-3-C to Banate, who was able to secure a new title in her
name. However, PCRB carried the mortgage lien in favor of PCRB, prompting the petitioners to request a
Deed of Release of Mortgage. PCRB refused to comply with the petitioners' request, and the petitioners
instituted an action for specific performance before the RTC to compel PCRB to execute the release deed.
ISSUE:
Banate may request reimbursement for the price paid for the pertinent properties if the new
contract with Mondigo is deemed invalid if the first dispute is not resolved.
DECISION OR RULING OF THE COURT:
The court upheld the decisions made by the court of appeals in CA-GR on May 5, 2004, and on
December 19, 2003, dismissing the petitioners' request for a review on certiorari due to lack of merit. There
was no evidence supplied to corroborate the assertion that Mortgagors surreptitiously influenced the
transfer of ownership of Lot 12868-H-3-C.
CASE9. Alcantara v. Nido, 618 SCRA 333 (2012)
FACTS:
Revelen is the owner of an unregistered land with an area of 1,939 sq. meters located at Cardona,
Rizal. Petitioners offer to purchase a portion of the land and pay a down payment of 3,000 and the balance
was payable on installment. In 1986, petitioners occupied an additional 150 sq. meters of the lot and paid
₱17,500 before defaulting on their installment payments.
On 11 May 1994, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages and prayer
for preliminary injunction against petitioners. The RTC ruled that the sale was void and that rescission is the
proper remedy.
ISSUE:
The appellate court erred in ruling that petitioners are entitled to their counterclaims, particularly specific
performance.

DECISION OR RULING OF THE COURT:

The court ruled that the contract is void due to Article 1874 of the civil code, which requires a
written authority before an agent can sell an immovable property. A special power of attorney is also
necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired for
a valuable consideration. Petitioners are not entitled to claim for specific performance, as the agency must
be established by clear, certain and specific proof. There is no SPA executed when the petitioner paid to the
respondent, as there is no proof that Revelen authorized respondent to sell her lot.

CASE10. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), GR 166859, 169203, 180702, April

12,

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and 59 individual defendants for allegedly
purchasing 33,133,266 shares of SMC stock through 14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil
Mills and 16,276,879 shares through several corporations under his control. The Republic appealed
the case to the Supreme Court, which ruled that coconut levy funds are public funds and should be
reconveyed to the government.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire SMC shares in
violation of his fiduciary obligation as a public officer.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Cojuangco violated no fiduciary duties as a public officer and member of the Board of
Directors of the UCPB without competent evidence. Republic's burden to establish by
preponderance of evidence that respondents' SMC shares had been illegally acquired with coconut-
levy funds was not discharged.
The conditions for the application of Articles 1455 and 1456 of the Civil Code (like the
trustee using trust funds to purchase, or a person acquiring property through mistake or fraud), and
Section 31 of the Corporation Code (like a director or trustee willfully and knowingly voting for or
assenting to patently unlawful acts) require factual foundations to be laid out in appropriate judicial
proceedings.

CASE11. CA Agro-Industrial Devt Corp v. CA, et.al., GR 9007, March 3, 1993

CA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondents
G.R. No. 90027, March 3, 1993

Facts:
CA Agro Industrial Corp. and the spouses Ramon and Paula Pugao entered into an
agreement to purchase two parcels of land for a consideration of P350,625.00. The contract
stipulated that the titles to the lots shall be transferred to the petitioner upon full payment of the
purchase price and that the owner's copies of the certificates of titles, shall be deposited in a safety
deposit box of any bank. CA Agro and Spa Pugao then rented Safety Deposit Box No. 1448 of
Security Bank and Trust Company and signed a contract of lease with the bank, which contained
the following conditions: the bank is not a depository of the contents of the safe and it has no
interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it assumes absolutely
no liability in connection therewith. Mrs. Margarita Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner the 2
lots, but when they open the safety deposit box, no certificate can be found and CA Agro filed a
complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
WON the contract between petitioner and bank is a contract oflease (respondent) or
contract of deposit (petitioner)

RULINGS OF THE COURT:

The SC ruled that the contract for rent was a special kind of deposit, as the full and absolute
possession and control of the safety deposit box were not given to the joint renters. The law
authorizes banking institutions to rent out safety deposit boxes is adopted from the US and the Civil
Code provides that the depositary would be liable if found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay, or
contravention of the tenor of the agreement. The Court dismissed the complaint based on the fact
that the petitioner failed to provide competent proof that the Bank was aware of the agreement
between the petitioner and the Pugaos to the effect that the certificates of title were withdrawable
from the safe deposit box only upon both parties joint signatures.
CASE12. Triple-V Food Services, Inc. v. Filipino merchants Insurance co., GR No. 160544,
February 21, 2005
TRIPLE-V FOOD SERVICES, INC. Petitioner
VS
FILIPINO MERCHANTS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. Respondents
G.R. NO. 160544 FEB 21 2005.

Facts:
Crispa Textile Inc. provided Mary Jo-Anne De Asis with a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon
Model 1995. On the day in question, De Asis used petitioner's valet parking service and left her car
key at the valet desk. The car was never found and Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, Filipino
Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights, brought a damages
action against petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc. The complaint failed to adduce facts to
substantiate the charges of recklessness and carelessness in the safekeeping and possession of
the subject vehicle, and De Asis relinquished her rights when she accepted the free parking space.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a depositary of the subject vehicle

RULING OF THE COURT:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the plaintiffs, ruling that De Asis left the
automobile in question to petitioner's valet attendant while eating at petitioner's Kamayan
Restaurant. Petitioner cannot avoid obligation by claiming that no contract of deposit, insurance,
guaranty, or surety for the loss of the automobile was formed when De Asis used its free valet
parking service. The parking claim stub, which contains the terms and conditions of the parking, is
essentially a contract of adhesion drafted and prepared solely by the petitioner with no participation
whatsoever on the part of the customers. The Court will not hesitate to rule out blind obedience to
contracts of adhesion if they appear to be one-sided in the context of the facts and circumstances.