INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of science refers to a philosophical branch of learning that is of interest to research

questions about the nature and the state of being valid of scientific knowledge and how that
knowledge emerged. The philosophy of science focuses on all the foundations, methodologies,
implications, and assumptions of science at a given procedure (Newall, 2004). According to Ruetsche,
the philosophy of science is a great variety of descriptions of “the scientific theories and the nature
of scientific explanation, confirmation, inter-theoretic reduction, and the like” (Ruetsche, 2006:555).
Philosophy of science is an area of philosophy that is hard to define, hence, it is a central concern of
both scientists and philosophers (Rosenberg, 2004).

Philosophy of science intends to inspect the difference between science and non-science and raise
awareness that philosophers have no agreement on the difference between non-science and
science. It also aims at assessing the issue of observation as a fundamental part of science in contrast
to non-observational which is considered non-scientific (Turmudi, 2016). Philosophy of science aims
to discuss thoughtful discussion on objectivism and subjectivism. It may all covers the limits of
scientific methods, issues of the scientific revolution, and the impact of those scientific methods on
society (Turmudi, 2016).

Philosophy of science extends with epistemology which refers to the study of knowledge, this is
based on science being among the best accessible method of obtaining knowledge (Klein, 2005). It
also extends with metaphysics and philosophy of mind and language because scientific theories
reveal the nature and functioning of matter and living things. Dating back to the development of
philosophy from Descartes to Kant via Newton, Leibniz, and Hume, and to Russell, Wittgenstein, and
the Vienna Circle, several factors played a vital role that is now appearing as crucial to the philosophy
of science, these factors include the problem of induction and the nature of space and time (Kelly,
2019).

In the philosophy of science, realism is considered a metaphysical theory (Psillos, 2007:211) and
epistemological (Bartolotti, 2008:96). Realism refers to a scientific theory that aims at producing true
and justified theories of the world, including its unobservable features. Realism may be any theory
that states that entities are not dependent on human minds, but rather exist objectively (Psillos,
2007:211). Realists base their theories on physical reality, their theories state that there is enough
reason based on the experience of phenomena in physical reality to affirm that objects do exist
(Bartolotti, 2008:96). Scientific realists deem their theories true, should they consist of an ability to
explain the subject matter effectively to which it relates and the high ability to generate testable
predictions. These abilities insinuate that indeed there is some connection between a certain entity
to which the theory refers and the theory itself.

In contrast to realism, is instrumentalism. This is the theory that focuses on a conception that the
sound judgment comprehension of reality as founded in human sensory observation is just exactly
how things are. Instrumentalism envisions reality as that understood in everyday life by human
beings through the five senses in preference to the not observed, not noticed reality that realists
emphasize as illustrated in their theoretical portrait of reality (Hung, 1997:213). According to Hung,
some realists are convinced that the observed take on reality is not completely true, they believe
that it is a twist of what is real (Hung, 1997:213). Instrumentalism refers to a theory that rejects
realism and denies that scientific theorizing is successful to a point that it produces true and justified
theories of the unobserved world.

According to instrumentalists, theories are said to be nothing but tools and instruments identifying
reliable means-end relations found in experience (Stanford, 2006). In the instrumentalist’s world, it is
believed that for scientific theories to be verified, multiple observations relating to certain facts must
be carried out (Dewey, 1984). However, based on Popper’s theory, some instrumentalists deny and
stand against the widely accepted dogma of inductivism the view that science starts from
observation and proceeds, by induction, to generalizations, and ultimately to theories (Popper,
1962).

In conclusion, the place of observation in scientific theory development for the “realists” and for the
“instrumentalists” regarding the philosophy of science, contradicts. Both realists and instrumentalists
observe scientific theory based on what is of interest to them and their surroundings. They perceive
the scientific theory differently proving that observation, is indeed anything we can see, hear, and
touch. However, it is not mandatory to choose between the scientific “realist” view or the common-
sense “instrumentalist” view of reality, but rather acknowledge them as two levels of perception of
the same phenomena although at different phases. Therefore, scientific theory development can be
observed by either the realists or instrumentalists and still be valid depending on the matter at hand.
In the philosophy of science, both realism and instrumentalism approach to scientific theory
development have been made respectable and have been acknowledged (Hung, 1997: 216).
REFERENCES

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