The Atlantique Episode

R.V. Phadke

Introduction
The Indian Air Force (IAF) shot down a Pakistan Navy MRASW/
ELINT Atlantique on August 10, 1999, over the Rann of Kutch. Coming
as it did in the immediate aftermath of Kargil, the episode was bound
to make waves in the national and international media. Air violations,
at least in the subcontinent are a routine affair but when an intruder is
shot down, he hogs the limelight. Artillery shelling, causing as many
casualties, on the other hand, is taken, as it were, in its stride. Not only
did the US spokesperson think it a fit moment to rap India for over-
reaction but even some Indian defence analysts found fault with the IAF
and the government for shooting down an unarmed aircraft. India was
caught on the backfoot in the glow of the Kargil victory, said some
editorials. The IAF was once again in the dock. The Pakistani media was
quick off the mark in attracting international attention and largely
succeeded in obfuscating the issue of the air violation itself and managed
to highlight the "brutality" and "trigger happy" nature of the IAF fighter
pilots. The international electronic media like the BBC even managed to
beam pictures of Indian soldiers and airmen running with bits of the ill-
fated aircraft's wreckage to further confuse the issue. Had the Atlantique
indeed intruded? Was the wreckage in Pakistani territory? Was it a
disputed area? This short paper aims to answer some of these' questions
while placing in perspective the role of the IAF in defending the air
space of the nation.

The Procedure
Given the state of Indo-Pak relations, the IAF has had to maintain
an air defence alert continuously for the last four decades or more. The
IAF usually has a pair or more of its air defence fighters on alert at its
forward IAF airfields. These fighter pilots are not only experienced but
are trained to take action as per laid down procedures whenever ordered
to do so. The two pilots usually stay in their underground bomb shelters
in close vicinity of the fully armed fighter aircraft themselves, located
Air Cmde R.V. Phadke is a Senior Research Fellow at IDSA.

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 in "blast pens"—huge concrete structures. The IAF also has many ground
based radars of different variety and performance that are continuously
watching the skies for any signs of air violations. Scheduled traffic such
as commercial airliners mat usually follow pre-determined routes are
automatically cleared and as long as they follow their flight plans
accurately, the fighter controllers—the IAF officers manning radars—
allow them to go about their business unchallenged. Similarly, a very
large number of other aircraft belonging to the IAF and other civilian
operators routinely fly and are given assistance when needed. Scheduled
international traffic coming across national borders also follow the laid
down procedures and report their position so that the civil aviation
authority and the IAF radars know exactly where they are and what
they intend doing. In case the radar detects an unknown aircraft—called
the "track" in the IAF lingo—the fighter controller immediately alerts
the pilots at the ORP—Operational Readiness Platform—of the nearest
IAF bases and starts to investigate the matter. Quite often it turns out
to be a friendly aircraft that had delayed reporting its position, and the
ORP pilots are instructed to stand down, i.e. their alert status is lowered.
But in case the track is confirmed to be unknown, the fighters are
scrambled—i.e. instructed to immediately get airborne and proceed to
the point in the sky where the unknown track is expected to be. On
getting airborne, the fighters are directed till they make visual contact
with the track which, in the meantime, through a process of co-relation
is declared unfriendly or unknown (probably hostile at times). Having
made visual contact, the fighters relay the information about the type,
speed markings (ownership of the aircraft), and await further instructions.
It is the track behaviour that decides the follow-up action. In short, the
IAF Air Defence Network carries out the process of detection,
identification and interception of the unknown track. The laid down
procedures—or the SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures)—now require
the fighter leader to contact the unknown intruder on a pre-designated,
internationally known R/T (radio/telephony) frequency to instruct him
to follow the directions of the fighters. In case such R/T contacts are not
possible, the fighters "show" themselves and give visual signals to the
intruding aircraft to follow them. In case the intruder is not in contact,
he can reduce the speed of his aircraft and lower his landing gear to
indicate that he is ready to abide by the orders of the fighter leader and
is now escorted to land at the nearest suitable base. In the rare event
that the intruder refuses to follow orders, he is naturally declared hostile
and the fighters are now free to take action to shoot down the aircraft.
There is, however, an important difference. In case it was a commercial
airliner that was genuinely lost, its markings would normally ensure its

1216 Strategic Analysis/October 1999

safe passage, but in case it is confirmed to be a military aircraft (and in
this case belonging to the Pakistan Navy), the fighters cannot allow it
to return to its own territory or simply go away. Imagine, if it is a
sophisticated fighter such as the F-16 or the Mirage V/III, the time
available to complete all these actions is very small, and in all probability
the intruder will open fire or take evasive action the moment he sees
that two IAF fighters are in close proximity. It is, therefore, extremely
critical for the IAF fighters on air defence alert to ensure their own
safety while all these actions are being taken. As happens quite often
during peace-time, Pak fighter aircraft intrude a few kilometres and
turn back the moment their own ground radars detect IAF fighters
proceeding towards them. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has been
routinely indulging in such provocative activity to test Indian reaction
and to learn more of the IAF's readiness and indeed its overall posture
and strategy; hence, 52 air violations in the last 12 months.
The Incident
On August 10, 1999, at about 10:51 hours, the fighter controller
detects a large blip on his radar screen moving close to India's border.
He alerts the fighters at Naliya and watches the behaviour of the Pakistani
aircraft that not only keeps flying towards the border but makes a few
turns, each time entering Indian air space. The fighters are scrambled
and soon reach the spot only to find that it is a Pakistan Navy's
Atlantique. The IAF pilots, as indeed, pilots of all air forces, are trained
to recognise and identify aircraft. The Atlantique of French origin is a
highly sophisticated maritime reconnaissance aircraft that is equipped
with weapons such as bombs, depth charges, sonar buoys, torpedoes
and even air defence and anti-ship missiles (side winders and Exocets).
The main role of this aircraft is to keep a close watch on maritime
activity in the area of interest, usually international waters, and equally
important, gather electronic intelligence with the help of an array of
equipment fitted on board to monitor conversation, jam R/T and identify
and analyse various frequencies and other parameters of the IAF and
Indian Navy (IN) radars so as to build a threat library. This information
is of vital importance in war as it is used to jam Indian weapon control
and early warning radars.
In this case, the Atlantique flew over Indian territory for some time,
and intruded as much as 10 km, not only violating Indian air space but
also the April 1991 agreement between India and Pakistan that forbids
military combat aircraft from flying within 10 km of the border except
with prior permission. The IAF fighters attempted an R/T contact but
when the Altantique captain did not obey even the visual signals and

The Atlantique Episode 1217

try to go back, they shot it down with one R-60 air-to-air missile. The
missile hit the left engine and the disabled aircraft travelled a few
kilometres before eventually crashing very near the border. The wreckage
was thus strewn on both sides of the border. It is not as if it was a hasty
decision. It was only after the Atlantique had been continuously tracked
for over 25 minutes, 17 of which were spent over Indian territory, that
the intruding military aircraft was shot down, and that too after its
captain refused to follow the visual signals of the fighter leader to land
at Naliya. A total of 16 personnel, five officers and eleven other ranks
lost their lives.
The Aftermath
It is quite evident that it was a deliberate and a premeditated action
on the part of Pakistan to allow its ELINT aircraft to snoop around in
Indian air space. Having gathered vital intelligence on the IAF's radars
and other electronic sensors, the Atlantique would have got away scot-
free if the IAF fighters had not destroyed it. The price the IAF would
have had to pay in lives and equipment if the Pakistan Air Force/
Pakistan Navy had used all the information thus gathered, is, of course
incalurlable. It is also evident that Pakistan did not expect the IAF to
shoot down the Atlantique simply because the Indians have been known
to never take such drastic action. The Pakistani claim that it was an
unarmed aircraft on a training mission also holds no water. The Pakistani
minister of information first described the Atlantique mission to be on
routine surveillance and later called it routine training. In any case,
neither of the two countries' armed forces carry out training in close
proximity of the border. The area over which the incident occurred has
a clearly demarcated border and is at least 30 km east of the disputed
area of Sir Creek. The IAF has released the radar chart, clearly indicating
the extent of air violation and, indeed, its intent.
Those who called it unequal "combat" are unfortunately overcome
by emotions. In the event that it was an Indian aircraft that had
inadvertantly crossed into Pakistani air space, they would undoubtedly
have forced it to land or shot it down, and in both eventualities, would
have raised a storm in the international media. There is also no case for
Pakistan to demand US$60 million in compensation simply because a
military aircraft cannot expect a right of passage into the air space of
another sovereign country for intelligence gathering missions. The USA
did not ask the erstwhile Soviet Union for compensation when the latter
shot down its U-2 spy plane which was indeed unarmed. Gary Powers,
its pilot, was also released only in exchange for a Soviet spy. Pakistan,
or for that matter any other country, cannot sermonise India for not

1218 Strategic Analysis/October 1999

 following the 1991 treaty on air violations because in case the IAF had
allowed the Atlantique to go back unscathed, and lodged only a protest,
Pakistan would have simply denied that its aircraft ever violated Indian
air space. It is pertinent to note that the Pakistanis had shot at and
damaged a Canberra unmanned reconnaissance aircraft whose flight
details had been conveyed to them as per existing bilateral agreements
in the early days of Kargil.
Another aspect of this unfortunate episode is the urgent and all
important need for media management. Indian authorities were once
again too late. All that the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesman
provided as late as at 1730 hours on August 10, 1999—some six hours
after the incident—was a tame and almost hesitant confirmation that a
Pakistani aircraft was shot down, by which time the other side was busy
briefing the international media and foreign military attaches, giving
their side of the story. Some Indian commentators also raised the point
of there being inadequate political control over the IAF. It is well known,
that when a country places its air force on an air defence alert, certain
standard procedures are laid down that permit freedom of action to its
armed forces within the laid down framework. It is both impractical
and highly undesirable to expect political decisions in a fast developing
situation such as air violations in a sensitive area and time. No sane and
thinking Indian should entertain any doubt about the legitimacy or
morality of the Indian action for such doubts would have a serious
adverse impact on the minds of the guardians of the nation's air space.
When faced with such grave situations where a delay of seconds can
result in loss of life, and more importantly, strategically vital information,
the fighter pilot neither afford the luxury of hesitation nor prior clearance
from New Delhi. Air defence of the country is one of the most important,
if not the most strategic function of the IAF and it can achieve strategic
deterrence only through well thought out, precise, timely, yet decisive
actions. The loss of 16 Pakistani lives is, indeed, most unfortunate, but
the responsibility is fully and squarely of Pakistan alone.

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