Table of contents

Introduction...............................................................................................................1

Politico-strategic interests in the Middle East before 9/11........................................7

George W. Bush and the aftermath of 9/11.............................................................12

Israel and Iran in proportion....................................................................................17

Israel: from protection to self-sufficiency............................................................18

Iran: from containment to coexistence.................................................................23

Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the

Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring........................................................26

Conclusion...............................................................................................................36

Bibliography............................................................................................................38

1
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that in the past decades the United State’s
interests in the Middle East have changed, especially after 9/11. This thesis will present the
geopolitics of the Middle East and how the American interests have changed in the region after
9/11. Without doubt, this region has been in the attention of the whole world in recent years,
especially due to its events which makes peace impossible: the wars from Iraq and Afghanistan,
the conflicts between Israel and Palestine, Iran’s nuclear program, the Arab Spring and terrorism.
During the decades since U.S. intervention in the Middle East, starting mainly after the
Second World War, there have been five primary components that have defined the map of
American interests in the region: oil, the security of Israel, geopolitical interests, the War on
Terror and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These interests arose over time
and are subject to strategic changes and fundamental transformations which might help explain
the recent withdrawal in American policy and might indicate the directions of U.S. policies with
regard to the region in the future. Since the transfer of power from G. Bush to B. Obama, a
change of perspective and approach has been clearly made regarding the US interests in the
Middle East.
The states of the Middle East are by many considered third world states rightfully, they
are the leftovers of the colonialist regimes, which formed them disregarding the preexistent
political, social, economic and ethnic problems. These states cannot act independently, either
internally or externally, since they are forces to deal with pressures coming from both sides. The
societies do not and cannot separate internal political, social and economic agendas from foreign
policy ones, in their case the national and international fields overlap. For developing states, such
as the ones in the Middle East, dealing with internal threats represents a more important issue
than regional or international geo-strategic objectives.
The change is of approach by the United States is obvious, especially if we look into the
past: during the Cold War, U.S. interests in the region where quite persistent and stable: keeping
the oil flow persistent from the Persian Gulf at a reasonable quantity and price, protect the
security of Israel (the only democracy in the region), and keep the Soviets apart as much as
possible from the region (bipolar balance of powers, checks and balances). I will name this as the
default assumption of interests of the US in the region, which suggests a continuity of which

2
some say little has changed. Many argue that the flow of oil is still the most critical interest in the
region, made even more critical perhaps by the global demand and the world’s predominantly
liberal trading system1.
Only after World War II, Middle East began to be perceived according to its true nature:
a land of violence, terrorism, nationalist opposition. The wars between Israel and its Arab
neighbors, along with theoretical directions and perception initiated by Samuel Huntington’s
"Clash of civilizations" shaped Western conscience into a clearer and closer to reality vision of
Middle East as a region with intense political strife, regime instability, religious and ideological
clashes, ethnic disagreements, economic hardship and a constant erosion of infrastructure of all
levels2.
Israel’s security is still a principal Western and especially an American interest. In
present times, they need to make sure that no other state will have hegemony over the region,
with the interests of the USSR having disappeared after its dissolution; the attention is now put
on Iran. A shift on approach has been made in the region due to terrorism, dealing with it has
mutated from instrumental to apocalyptic forms. In the given context, the U.S. effort to promote
democracy and socioeconomic reform in the region is seen not as a new interest, but rather an
instrumental approach to achieve the existing ones. Between its founding in 1948 and the war of
1967, Israel was viewed as a powerless infant state, which could not survive without help from
its big brothers, mainly the United States who assumed its role as protector of the country.
However, this image soon changed after its sweeping victory in the well-known Six-Day War. In
this case Israel was attacked and its war response was normal, they have showed their military
capability and superiority to the Arabs. Within six days, the Israelis reoccupied the Sinai
Peninsula, captured the Golan Geights in Syria and a piece of Jordan and took over the whole
city of Jerusalem, which it had shared with Jordan. After the 1967 war, the UN Security Council
passed resolution 242 as the basis of solving the conflict: Israel would return the land it occupied
in 1967 in return for peace and recognition. However, with its own interpretation of resolution
242, Israel's occupation was prolonged and other facts were introduced that further complicated
the conflict.

1
Seel Gal Luft, “Selling out”, The American Interests, July August 2008, [Accessed on 19 March 2017]. Available
from: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2008/07/01/selling-out/
2
Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs Article 1992 and Samuel Huntington, “The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order”, 1996.

3
 As far as the Middle East is concerned, the Western perception of the structure of
international system or on financial constraints, overlooking the fact that the foreign policy of an
Arab state is closely intertwined with complex internal and external environments. In the realm
of foreign policy decisions there is always a clash between decision makers' goals and
constraints. In this sense, the capacity to reach objectives depends on the means at disposal but
also on constraints, which in many cases take the form of the strength of other political actors.
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the two competing powers, United States and
USSR tried to have as much influence in the region and allies. The main argument at the time
was oil but most important the balance of powers. They tried not to lead the other to get more
influence in the area as by creating allies, the balance of powers might shift. This is the case of
the Iran-Iraq war which started in 1980. They each supported one part for this reason, supplying
weapons and money subtly in order to balance the two so that the situation will not degenerate.
This is also the reason why the war lasted for so many years, basically until the position of USSR
was seriously questioned and the conflict ended shortly before its definite collapse.
For a fleeting moment in the early 1990’s, peace and world order seemed within reach.
The end of the Cold War and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union removed the preceding
half century’s major causes of international tension. After the collapse of the USSR, the United
States become the major poll of power on the international arena and also the key player in
Middle East politics. President George H. W. Bush proclaimed a new world order under the U.S.
leadership. State Department official Francis Fukuyama hailed the “end of history”, the absolute
triumph of capitalism and democracy over fascism and Communism, beyond which no great
ideological conflicts could be imagined.3
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States of America kept a reserved
foreign policy, keeping its actions out of most parts of the World, the only exception being the
Middle East. After a period of stumbling and uncertainty, the Republican administration of
George W. Bush which used the opportunity created by the devastating terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, to effect the most revolutionary changes in U.S. foreign policy since the
Truman Doctrine of 1947.4 America’s view of the world changed dramatically and perhaps
permanently by this event.

3
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History and the Last Man”, The Free Press, New York, 1992.
4
George C. Herring From Colony to Superpower: U.S. foreign relations since 1776, Oxford History of the United
States , 2008, pp. 957

4
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 are highly important as they mark the change of U.S. foreign
policy, especially in the Middle East, moment which I will consider moment 0 of my thesis. In
the following pages I will briefly analyze the interests U.S. had before moment 0 and how much
they changed after this period. So I will start from the presumption that the interest changed, fact
proved by their actions, but I will analyze on what degree, how much and with what implications
for the Middle East.
So, after I have mentioned moment 0, Bush sought to make up for his own lack of
preparation by naming what seemed a strong national security team. Appointment of the
immensely popular Colin Powell as secretary of state, the first African American to hold that
position, was well received by internationalist as he was opposing the use of force for
humanitarian purposes. But the real power rested with the Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. They worked together since Nixon’s mandate and
they shared his view that national security policy was a top priority, Cheney was to become te
most powerful vice president ever.
They had opposed Kissinger’s policy of detente. They believed that the United States
must maintain absolute military supremacy and use its power to promote its own interests, not
permitting the niceties of diplomacy or the scruples of allies to get in the way. Above all, they
shared an especially assertive form of nationalism.5
The 9/11 attacks were not random acts of violence. Bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization
aimed to restore traditional Islam to its rightful place in the universe. Their immediate goal was
to eliminate the “near enemy”, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Jordan. Because the
United States backed the rulers of these nations, thus ensuring their survival, it became the “far
enemy”6.
An administration seemingly unfocused and floundering suddenly found purpose and
direction. Experts warned that terrorism represented a new kind of non-state threat not to be dealt
with by conventional means, but Bush and his advisers responded in entirely traditional ways.
Confounding those who only recently had dismissed him as a lightweight, the president gave a
powerful address before a joint session of Congress, rallying the nation behind an all-out global
war “to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil” 7. The analogue of war was familiar to the
5
James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, Vinking Penguin, New York, 2004, pp.163
6
George C. Herring From Colony to Superpower: … pp. 959
7
New York Times, July 25, 2004; The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (New York, 2004), 254–77

5
Americans and therefore reassuring, but it proved problematic in confronting a very different
enemy.
The next step for the administration was to mobilize military forces and to strike Bin
Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that sheltered him in Afghanistan. This was the
response of the United States in front of the attacks and so, a new period of foreign policy
against terrorism and subsequently in the Middle East, at the origins of terrorism. What is to be
mentioned here is the way in which the United States proceeded to declare war in Iraq.
Diplomacy in order to gain the support and approval from the United Nations failed in this case,
so President Bush announced the start of hostilities against Iraq, after urging Saddam Hussein to
resign several times. The United States will have its war, but without the support of close allies
and the United Nations. Daalder and Linsday’s view upon the matter is that this was a bold and
risky move that would decisively affect the Bush presidency and indeed world history8.
Even if the interests in the region have shifted, basically if we take some aspects in
consideration we may say that they remained quite close to the original idea. If we take Russia
from the landscape and add instead Islamism, terrorism, civil wars, Arab dictators and
authoritarianism, this premise can be put as righteous.
Israel had one through daring by gambling by starting the war before it could be attacked.
For the first time in its history, Israel had secure borders. It was now difficult for Arab guerrillas
to raid into Israel, now Israeli artillery sat atop of the Golan Heights able to threaten Syria. The
victory of 1967 brought Israel new problems that would persist for a generation. In 1948, Israel
had ethnically cleansed itself of a Palestinian Arab population but now in 1967 it could not
simply drive out by force more than one million Palestinians who lived in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, what came to be known as the occupied territories.
The US interests in the region focused mainly on creating stability and security are
influenced by problems like the impact of water distribution management on the relations among
stated (especially Arab-Israeli ones) terrorism, regional balance of power, Arab concepts of
power and governance as well as relations and interests between the Unites States and Israel and
the low degree of the former's methods of implementation. The overall picture of failed deadlines
on both parties involved, the increase in the number of settlements, constant hostilities, the
relentless agitation provoked by the Palestinian media and education against Israel, is added then
8
Daalder and Linsday, “America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy”, Brookings Institution Press,
Washington D.C., 2003.

6
what in received as a complex yet sober picture of a conflict which, faced with so many ongoing
risks and shifting policies throughout the years, as I will be presenting later on.
The American objectives in the Middle East rest on the politico-strategic, economic and
cultural interests of the United States, which extend throughout the area. Bringing peace, stability
and freedom were among the primary objectives of America in the region, to which recent times,
especially after 9/11 can be added the fight against terrorism. The Americans like to think that
support for democratic practices lead to mutuality of interests with the Middle East. Despite
military evolution and situation changes, the Middle East still occupies a vital strategic position.
Even if oil deposits have been discovered elsewhere on the globe, it still remains a vital supplier
for Europe and Asia, and will probably remain so. My supposition is that the Middle East will
continue to play a very serious role in Western political, economic and strategic thinking.

Politico-strategic interests in the Middle East before 9/11

7
 As to begin this chapter I will say that the analysis of the power dynamics in the region of
the Middle East cannot ignore the necessity of a regional order. In order to understand the causes
of today’s situation in the region I must make a brief introspection of the 20 th century of why and
how the situation degenerated in the most fragile geopolitical area of the globe. Hopefully this
will shed a light upon the Arab uprisings we have witnessed in the last century and why the
relative stability of the region is crumbling.
The United States has long sought the Middle East as important, both strategically and
politically. Mainly after the Second World War, the Middle East and especially Saudi Arabia has
been the main source of providing petrol to the U.S., a resource of vital importance. In addition,
there are long-standing cultural interests which the United States has in the region. All Western
civilization owes a cultural, intellectual and spiritual debt to the Middle East, the cradle of some
Western civilizations.
In short, there are many reasons why the United States should be concerned about the
Middle East and the peace, welfare and orderly developments of its many peoples, as a matter of
its own self-interest and standing, broadly conceived, with all the countries of the area. The end
of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Iraq seemed to strengthen the
administration’s hand. The Palestinians would no longer have an arms supplier. By easing the
threat from Iraq, the United States presumably gained greater leverage with Israel.
In the twentieth century, U.S. policy toward the Middle East was often based on religion
(period of WW1) and power politics. During World War I, Theodore Roosevelt insisted that the
United States would be disregarding its ideals of democracy and human rights if it did not
declare war on the Ottoman Empire as it had done with the other two Central Powers. President
Woodrow Wilson's refusal to do so was a fateful decision 9. The end of the war caught France and
Britain with numerous troops in the region, while America had none. As a result, the United
States had no role in the new Middle East controlled by the French and the British.
At the same time, Wilson put accent on the Christian faith in endorsing Britain's
November 1917 Balfour Declaration. This evidenced for the first time the official support for
Zionism and establishing a Jewish territory on the territory of Palestine, goal to be later achieved.

9
Michael Oren, “The History of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, The Washington Institute, online, 28
March 2007 [Accessed on 2 March 2017]. Available from:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-history-of-u.s.-foreign-policy-in-the-middle-east

8
Similarly, faith in democracy helped move the United States to support the liberation of the
Middle East from British and French colonialism following World War II.
Harry Truman took pride in helping to re-create a Jewish nation by making the United
States the first country to recognize the state of Israel. He did so, however, only for these
reasons, rather than in response to the entreaties of both Jewish lobbyists and his one lifelong
Jewish friend. This illustrates how modern-day U.S. support for Israel is part of a long history of
popular, partly faith-based sympathy for Jewish restoration to the Holy Land -- and of support
for the spread of democracy in that region10.
The apparent equilibrium of the Middle East was upset by the interdependent commercial
relations with the West in the region: the case of both Gulf Wars was not only a classical
demonstration of how Western economic and military agendas interrelate (the American military
involvement in the Gulf due to economic motivations), but also a proof that only there issues
pertaining to the military and economic fields are subjects of particular concern for the West.
They planned to recover and to bring stability in the region by creating at least 1 powerful
democracy, but they didn’t manage to do this precisely. Americans focus primarily on the
military and political aspect of the war in Afghanistan in the 1980's but also took in
consideration the balance of powers, a way of containing and keeping the status quo of the
bilateral world.11
Today’s interest for the United States is not the security of the physical flow of oil, but
rather its price. The days of cheap and easy obtainable oil are over, and the wealth transfer in
recent years transferred to rather more irresponsible political actors: Iran, Russia, Venezuela and
the Arab countries which are the real problem, as they produce terrorist groups. So, the US
interest today is to make the oil flow as economically and hence politically irrelevant as possible
in the shortest possible timeframe by breaking the petroleum monopoly on transportation fuels.
But, as suggested, this is not difficult: Even oil exporters who have gained more control
over their own resources will not act contrary to their financial interests, and no power can
prevent the U.S. Navy from keeping the sea-lanes open. Even a temporary closure in the event of
U.S.-initiated military action against Iran would be just that—temporary–and the world’s
strategic petroleum reserves are already nearly adequate to cope with even a several month

10
Security and U.S. Interests in the Middle East By Paul Salem, Vice President for Policy Analysis, Research &
Programs - The Middle East Institute, Dec 16, 2016, YouTube video: https://youtu.be/i9G41qkye1I
11
Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policies of Middle East States”, Boulder USA, 2002, pp. 19

9
disruption (and can be made more than adequate for such a contingency with little additional
effort). The argument that keeping the oil flowing is still the number one U.S. interest in the
Middle East constitutes a generic confusion and a missed opportunity: It is a “solution” to a
problem that no longer exists, and a misdirection of attention away from a different problem that
we desperately need to solve.
The first important step put by the United States in the Middle East was made in 1945,
mainly as a consequence of oil, Israel and the USSR 12. These were and continue to be the main
interests whom they seek to protect or guard against. The "Arab order" is a topic that interests
our discussion. The first Arab-Israeli war and Israel's declaration of independence, which caused
the defeat of the Arab forces which gave the Arab peoples a moment of reflection upon the
situation. Following these events, the term "Middle East" began to be questioned within the
context of Arab nationalism.
Despite the fact that there are overwhelming considerations today that the US failed in
the Middle East, if we think of a period prior to 9/11, the country has actually done a pretty good
job at protecting those interests. The Soviets never really made inroads in the Middle East, and
eventually collapsed. The oil kept flowing from the Persian Gulf. And there was even progress
on the Arab-Israeli peace process, progresses coordinated by American Interests.
For a better understanding of when, how and with what impact the United States
intervened in the Middle East I will list them, including some views upon the events. I have
chosen some which I consider to be highly relevant, as I cannot include all:

 1947: The U.S. facilitates the pass of a UN resolution partitioning Palestine into a Zionist
state and an Arab state, giving the Zionist authorities control of 54% of the land. At that time
Jewish settlers were about 1/3 of the population.
 1948: War breaks out between newly proclaimed state of Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and
Syria, who had moved troops into Palestine to oppose the partition of Palestine. The U.S.
quickly recognizes Israel.

12
David Miller, “The Politically Incorrect Guide to U.S. Interests in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy, online,
August 2012 [Accessed on 7 April 2017]. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/15/the-politically-
incorrect-guide-to-u-s-interests-in-the-middle-east/

10
 1957: The US Congress approves the Eisenhower Doctrine, which stated "the United States
regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence
and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."13
 1960: U.S. supports anti-government Kurdish rebels in Iraq in order to undermine the
government and the leader, an army general who had restored relations with the Soviet Union
and lifted the ban on Iraq's Communist Party.
 1966: U.S. sells its first jet bombers to Israel, breaking with 1956 decision not to sell arms to
the Zionist state.
 1967: Israel launches the Six-Day-War with weapons and support from the United States.
 1973-1975: U.S. supports Kurdish rebels in Iraq in order to strengthen Iran and weaken the
then pro-Soviet Iraqi regime. When Iran and Iraq cut a deal, the U.S. withdraws support and
denies to the Kurds refuge in Iran.
 1979: the United States supports the revolutionary acts of Iran.
 1979: U.S. President Jimmy Carter designates the Persian Gulf a vital U.S. interest and
declares the U.S. will go to war to ensure the flow of oil14.
 September 22, 1980: Iraq invades Iran with tacit U.S. support, starting a bloody eight-year
war. The U.S. supports both sides in the war providing arms to Iran and money, intelligence
and political support to Iraq in order to prolong the war and weaken both sides, while trying
to draw both countries into the U.S. orbit.

Besides those presented above I will also mention The Yom Kippur war, which was one
of the dangerous episodes of the Cold War, moment in which both America and Russia fueled
the fighting with massive air lifts of arms and it was a real danger that Russian and American
forces would come into direct conflict. Even if in the beginning it appeared that the war will go
in favor of the Arabs, ultimately Israel managed to seize more territories and consolidate its
position.

13
“U.S. Intervention in the Middle East”, Information Clearing House, online article, [Accessed on 9 April 2017].
Available from: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6308.htm
14
Michael T. Kiare, “The Carter Doctrine Goes Global”, The Progressive magazine, December 2004, online article
[Accessed on 25 April 2017]. Available from:
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/Carter_Doctrine_Global_Oil.html

11
 Furthermore, I would like to end this part with the “Iraq Liberation Act” of 1998 15. I have
chosen this as highly important here to underline the interests of the U.S. in the region, mainly to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. Through this act, they were willing to give 100 million dollars to
groups attempting to overthrow Saddam. This is one direct act of their intentions and future
prospects in the region.

George W. Bush and the aftermath of 9/11

15
“U.S. Intervention in the Middle East”, Information Clearing House, online article, [Accessed on 9 April 2017].
Available from: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6308.htm

12
 This chapter will focus on how the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the Bush administration
changed the foreign policy of the United States regarding the Middle East and how this moment
can be seen as moment zero of revolution in foreign policy.
In contrast with the attempts to get diplomatic support and approval of the UN Security
Council in declaring war and invading Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom proved a textbook
operation, once more displaying the fearsome power of America’s high-tech military machine.
Washington went to great lengths to publicize the contributions of 26 countries, a coalition of the
willing.16 This was a clear remark for the countries which refused to fight alongside them.
Furthermore, aside British operations in southern Iraq, it was an exclusive US show of military
capability.
The idea of overthrowing Saddam Hussein was not new to the US. It was not new even
during the Gulf War. This objective of intervention in Iraq was actually developed in the late
1970’s in the Cold War period when the United States saw Iraq a democratic cornerstone in the
Middle East. In that context, the idea of democratization of Iraq seemed like a good objective in
a bipolar world where the Soviet Union had influence in the area. The thing was that they hoped
Iraq will become itself an exporter of democracy in the area. Furthermore, they were aware of
the danger Iraq can pose in the region with its development of nuclear weapons and chemical
ones tested directly on its population. One step in this direction is represented under the form of
the Iraqi Kurds who have created in their American protected enclave of northern Iraq a
comparatively open society judging by the Middle Eastern standards.17 On the downside of this
strategy is the fact that the United States also did not put much attention into their strategy to get
out. As a matter of fact it is easy to invade a country, but how do you get out becomes the
problem. When you are a superpower and claim to be a protector of democratic principles,
invading another country may not be a good example, as they destabilized the apparent stability
of the region.
If we take into consideration this strategy of the US, George Bush was just inherited this
idea of intervening in Iraq from the Clinton administration. The intervention on Iraq was not
possible up to that moment due to reasoning. The US just needed a motivation and a willing

16
George C. Herring From Colony to Superpower: U.S. foreign relations since 1776, Oxford History of the United
States , 2008, pp. 951
17
Bill Keller, "The Sunshine Warrior", New York Times Magazine, [Online]September 22, 2002. Available
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/magazine/the-sunshine-warrior.html?pagewanted=all

13
president to assume the risks of an armed conflict. The 9/11 event just proved to be the perfect
one in convincing George Bush to authorize the invasion of Iraq.
They just needed evidence to justify that Iraq was on the verge of using mass destruction
weapons, so as to justify the great sacrifice, or the prospect of establishing in Iraq an outpost of
democracy. In the end it came down to a careful weighing of the “costs of action versus the costs
of inaction, the cost of acting now versus the costs of action later”18.
The 9/11 events showed that the Middle East was a highly fragile area, with artificially
created borders, situation created mainly after the First World War. Its states are weak and
politically unstable. Even if the invasion of Iraq did not immediately trigger a chain reaction, the
fragility of the region was proved, with the country’s boundaries being dramatically changed
ever since.
Before waging war on Iraq, the first thing Bush did was to form a war cabinet and to take
action in Afghanistan, in order to attack the Talibans which were controlling a big part of the
country and helping Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group. He took this action having the idea
of removing the terrorist group at its roots. This military action proved to be a long lasting one,
up to 2014. This was also a reason a couple of years after its start of popularity loss for the US
president.
The position of the Bush administration regarding Islamic states in the war against
terrorism moved to a more subtle and altogether cautious level in order not to make regional
conflicts worse than they already are and the political gains would not be outweighted by the
costs of more serious conflicts stemming.
This policy proven difficult to apply in the Middle East, where the already overheated
debate about military intervention in Iraq enflamed the Israeli-Palestinian war and forced US to
enter the bloody dispute, which is uncertain in direction, goal that measures adopted.
The first American troops reached Baghdad on April 7, less than three weeks after the
war begun. Four days later, the statue of Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein was put to the ground.
This has an important meaning, as it marked the end of authoritarianism in Iraq and that they
managed to win the war in less than a month. This moment is highly important as from this
moment on they should have assumed their role in the region, as such actions have left a

18
Bill Keller, "The Sunshine Warrior", New York Times Magazine, [Online]September 22, 2002. Available
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/magazine/the-sunshine-warrior.html?pagewanted=all

14
permanent mark on Iraq, but also in the whole Middle East indirectly. The US failed lamentably
to conquer and secure Iraq and its implications can be seen even today, almost 2 decades later.
Celebrations of victory and talks about a new US imperium quickly faded with the fall of
Iraq’s capital. They ineffectively tried to secure the city and failed without sending additional
troops. Without having sufficient forces deployed in the area they couldn’t maintain order,
producing in this way violence, lawlessness, looting, including the theft or destruction of
priceless antiquities. This state of anarchy evolved into a sustained guerilla opposition. He saw
the overthrow of Saddam and his was on terror as a domino effect which will effectively export
democracy19.
A war whose first stage was fought so effectively went sour so quickly because detailed
planning for military operations was not matched by equally thorough preparation for the critical
postwar period. They believed their own wildly optimistic rhetoric that GIs, as in World War II,
would be welcomed as liberators. One official spoke of a “cakewalk.” The “planners” were
confident that U.S. forces could overthrow the regime, turn over the government to Iraqi exiles,
and get out within three months.20 Needless to say that this was not the case and the troops were
retreated after Bush has finished his mandate.
Beside the failure in maintaining order in the occupied are, the public support for war at
home began to decline in the spring of 2004. This drop of support was faster than in Korea and
Vietnam, although the casualties were far fewer. Once Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction
were nowhere to be found, the ostensible reason for war was crumbling. Here it can be observed
the stubbornness of George W. Bush who refused to change the course of events and was
determined to remain in Iraq, and this was the case until the of his mandate.
The overthrown of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in April 2003, created the perfect
opportunity for the Iraqi people to establish a democratic state, as also in the vision of the United
States which wanted to create from Iraq a democratic cornerstone in the area. Not later than 2
years, National Assembly elections took place on 30 January 2005, with nearly 60% of voters
casting their ballots. I wanted to show here a high presence at the voting stations, taking into
consideration the fact that there were threats of violence from behalf of the insurgents. So, the
will of the people for a democratic state was shown, with a high voting presence which is
19
Pierre Tristam, “The U.S. and the Middle East Since 1945 to 2008”, online article 2 May 2017, ThoughCo.
[Accessed on 14 May 2017]. Available from: https://www.thoughtco.com/g00/us-and-middle-east-since-1945-
2353681?i10c.referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.ro%2F
20
James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 53–74

15
nowadays not acquired by many long-lasting Western democracies. On the 15th of October, the
Iraqi population approved a new constitution, providing them with a basic charter for the well-
functioning of the new state. These events happing in anticipation of the December’s general
elections, under violence and groups of insurgents fighting for the “independence” of Iraq and
non-foreign intervention.21
Here we have the basic definition of US ineffectiveness and lack of anticipation and
consideration. In their bold strategy of invading Iraq they did not balance well the effects and
how they will control the power and to whom will they give it afterwards.
In Iraq we have a particularity of the area, a particularity of the Arab world which lets
religion to get involved into politics, a geopolitical area where there is no strong trace of
consolidated liberal democracy22 and in some cases of any signs of democratic rights or
principles. Only in few countries the high-level decision-makers had to compete in serious
democratic contests, but not actually having the basic liberal democratic principles. Even if many
official regimes there use the word “democracy” often, it is not used in the common sense of
liberal democracy. To be mentioned here a declaration of one member of the royal family of
Bahrain which said: “We have already given them democracy, but now they want
participation”23. This clearly shows that the term democracy is not known in its basic sense and
rulers of use the term to show openness to the people and that they offer western ideas.
Regarding the foreign policy of George W. Bush, I want to underline that he was fighting
on two fronts of ideology. On the one hand he was talking about democracy in Iraq and
Afghanistan; he was on the other hand supporting the repressive regimes of Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan. On the long run, his policies and ineffectiveness put his options to the question, not
only by foreigners but also by those who voted for him. His democracy promotion plan for the
Middle East was short-lived. The credibility of his democracy campaign was short-lived. With
Iraq falling into civil war by 2006, Hamas winning elections in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah
winning immense popularity following its summer war with Israel, Bush’s revolution in foreign
policy was dead. The US military surged troops into Iraq in 2007, but by then the majority of the

21
Hala Fattah, Frank A brief history of Iraq, Facts on file, New York, 2009, pp 246-258
22
Volker Perthes, “Is the Arab World Immune to Democracy?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Volume 50,
Issue 6, 2008, pp. 151-160.
23
Katja Niethammer, The King’s Democracy:Institutional Transformation, Conflicts of Identities and Discourses on
Democracy in Bahrain’s Reform Process, doctoral thesis, FreieUniversitat Berlin, 2007. Page 161.

16
American people and many government officials were widely skeptical that going to war in Iraq
was the right thing to do in the first place.
As a conclusion upon this chapter, the terrorist attack of 9/11 changed forever the
international arena and the concepts of terrorism. In my opinion, George W. Bush had a noble
goal of introducing democracy into the Middle East, but it is highly unlikely that one can achieve
this through unilateral initiatives and preemptive war. The presidency of Bush transformed
American politics, its economy, and its place in the world, in an unpredictable way. He became
the subject of controversy outside and inside the country. His controversial election and policies,
especially the war in Iraq, deeply divided the American people. Arguably his greatest moment as
President was his initial, heartfelt response to the tragedy of the 9/11 attacks. Soon, however, his
administration was overshadowed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush’s place in
U.S. history will be debated and reconsidered for many years to come.

Israel and Iran in proportion

In this chapter I will be presenting 2 different cases of countries of the Middle East with
important American interests. I have chosen the two in order to show both perspectives of

17
approaches in the region, and also because they are in such big opposition with one another. I
will present in the following pages the geopolitics of the countries, their politics and relations
with the outside and why are they important players for the American interests in the region.
Israel is a unique case of a society that maintains democracy despite the conditions of
protracted war, the demands of the security considerations, the prominence of the military elites
in decision-making bodies and the allocation of resources to ongoing military efforts. Since its
creation, Israel has been constantly depicted as a nation-in-arms. There are several circumstances
assumed to justify this description, the most obvious being the constant threat and presence of
the military conflict in the regional area. Born into battle, Israel has ever since been almost
continuously engaged in some form of violent military confrontation. War has been central to the
consolidation of the state and to the formation of the collective identity of most Israelis 24.
Military service was and is still seen as a national privilege, not just a legal obligation.
On the other hand, Iran represents the other pole of interests and conflict. Throughout
time, Iran has been a key player, especially after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which changed
definitively its course of politics regarding its foreign policy, a change that implicitly changed
the US approach regarding it. Because of the difference between the two I have chosen to present
them in a comparative perspective.

Israel: from protection to self-sufficiency

It is a historical fact that Israel does indeed possess a very special relationship with the
United States since 1948, when President Truman and the U.S. Congress decided the location of
the new Jewish state. Since then, Israel's political, economic and military developments have

24
Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years” Comparative Studies in
Society and History Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 264-285

18
been invariably linked to those of the U.S. As Israel has grown more militarily powerful, it has
also become a strategic ally that enjoys the special status of major non-NATO ally.
Since the creation of the State of Israel, it has been a center of conflict in the Middle East.
Six wars, four generations, incalculable pain and countless deaths have taken place since Israel
gained its independence fifty years ago. For years extending back and beyond modern times, the
official issue in the Middle East has been over land. Now, it has shifted to being a battle over
national rights in the past. Between its founding in 1948 and the war of 1967, Israel was viewed
as a powerless infant state, which could not survive without help from its big brothers. However,
this image soon changed after its sweeping victory in the well-known Six-Day War. Within six
days, the Israelis reoccupied the Sinai Peninsula, captured the Golan Geights in Syria and a piece
of Jordan and took over the whole city of Jerusalem, which it had shared with Jordan. After the
1967 war, the UN Security Council passed resolution 242 as the basis of solving the conflict:
Israel would return the land it occupied in 1967 in return for peace and recognition. However,
with its own interpretation of resolution 242, Israel's occupation was prolonged and other facts
were introduced that further complicated the conflict. Chief among these were Israel's practice of
building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories which disrupted the cardinal formula of
"land for peace" and intensified the Palestinian national feeling.
After the War of Independence, Ben Gurion claimed that the most effective way to
reconstruct the Israeli nation in a short span of time was primary by the army. As a result, no
area of life escaped the non-military use of the military, a thing that led to the) expansion of the
role of the army in such a way that it was able to intervene in the process of nation building
(partial militarization of the civil sector) and increasing the influence of Israel’s civilian
influence and involvement in the military sector. Thus, the military and civil sector interacted
and benefited from reciprocal influence.
The concept of nation-in-arms was in fact a way of surviving in a hostile strategic
environment, geopolitically speaking25. It was born out of fear that an army would produce
military technocratic elite estranged from the society and its needs, and the desire to have an
army that would draw its strength from the people and not from political influences. The Israeli
leadership designed the army as a means for integrating the new immigrants into the nation, the
soldier thus becoming the right-hand of the civilian. The security of the country was based on
25
Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years” Comparative Studies in
Society and History Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 264-285

19
training the entire nation and military action was seen as the only viable alternative of
overcoming the Arab threats. This mentality has its roots in Ben Gurion’s statement that if Israel
was not willing to become a fighting nation, it could not be a living nation and certainly not an
independent nation. While the first years of the state can be described as a period of non-peace,
after the mobilization of the whole country the Israeli state was equipped and ready for obtaining
peace. And so it does when Ben Gurion decides on the 23rd of December 1955 that the country
must go to war.
As a result, the Israel Defense Forces launch Operation Detonation to provoke Nasser
into starting the war and when it did, it was the hour of the whole nation! It was a quick,
offensive and nevertheless successful war. The victory of the 1956 Sinai Campaign fostered the
creation of a mass army, the existence of blurred lines between the civil and the military and the
acknowledgement that war is not always the less-preferred choice and peace is not always worth
the price. Israeli military sociology scholars go further in glorifying the concept of nation-in-
arms, stating that it enables the regular civilian life under war conditions, providing a link
between the needs of the nation and the interests of the army all while preventing military coups
and encouraging democracy26. In conclusion, the concept of nation-in-arms is a brilliant strategy
composed of rational and emotional elements which deals with the business of the war in the
spirit of the nation. In Israel, every citizen was certain of its place in defending this small country
surrounded by aggressive neighbors.
Its very own creation and especially independence led to many conflicts between those
who supported the creation of the state of Israel and the Arab countries. This led to a permanent
state of tension which I have presented above, disastrous humanitarian effects, refugees,
casualties and destruction of infrastructure.
At the beginning of the Cold War, up to 1961, Israel’s survival was a moral imperative of
U.S. policy, but the task was considered by most American analysts to be a diplomatic liability
because it constituted an advantage to Soviet efforts to win over Arab clients. Even the
Eisenhower Administration, which was cool to close relations with Israel for precisely this
reason, would not have stood by as Israel was destroyed in war. So, at the time, Israel was the
most important country for the Americans in the Middle East, and they ought to support it in

26
John Bright, “A History of Israel: With an Introduction and Appendix by William P. Brown”, 4th edition,
Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000, online [Accessed on 20 May 2017]. Available from:
http://individual.utoronto.ca/mfkolarcik/jesuit/JohnBrightIntroAppend2.pdf

20
order not to lose ground in front of the Soviets. During the 1960s the U.S. was guaranteeing
Israel’s security. One of the reasons might have been the use for practical as the revolution in
U.S. policy of Nixon began in 197027.
In its early years of formation, Israel was in a permanent threat from behalf of its
neighbors, especially in the given circumstances that of its Arab neighbors getting close to the
USSR. Today, Israel’s survival is no longer threatened by neighboring states aligned with a great
power. This is thanks largely to Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and an
“understanding” with Syria, and of course the dissolution of the USSR. But while Israel’s
territorial borders are more secure than ever, it now faces three other threats that, when taken
together, are potentially existential in nature: sub-state threats from Palestinian and salafi
terrorism; a potential WMD28 threat from Iran. To all of these it is added their continuous effort
to even legitimize their very own existence. It is ironic that precisely at a time when Israel has
emerged victorious in securing its physical state-to-state borders it still need US aid with Iran
and Palestinian nationalism.
At the same time, United State’s interest in protecting Israel is less than before. What this
means is that the U.S. interest in protecting Israel’s security remains, but it has become a
different task conceptually from what it was thirty or forty years ago. The United States must
still wage a reputational competition in which Israel figures as a key stake. Iran wishes to take
Israel hostage in any confrontation with the United States, ensuring that any U.S.-Iranian conflict
automatically opens “fronts” against Israel via Iranian proxies. The United States has an interest
in foiling this strategy and turning it back on itself, using Israel as a instrument to weaken Iranian
power and prestige (as, for example, in destroying furtive nuclear facilities in places like Syria).
It can be considered that on a smaller scale, Iran has substituted the USSR in the past, but
with less capability. Iran proffers no global ideology, but rather produces its own hate in the
Arab and particularly Sunni worlds. Israel will not be surrounded by Iranian client states; indeed,
it has objective allies in most Sunni Arab states in opposing Iranian ambitions. Iran has no rack
of nuclear weapons and global-reach military power like that of the Soviet Union, and most
probably never will29.

27
Adam Garfinkle, “Redefining Interests in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1 October 2008,
online [Accessed on 18 May 2017]. Available from: http://www.fpri.org/article/2008/10/redefining-u-s-interests-in-
the-middle-east/
28
Weapons of mass distruction

21
 On the other hand, while the balance of power may favor the United States over Iran
compared to the Soviet Union, the balance of interests favors Iran. Unlike the Soviet Union, Iran
has regional power, defined by historic roots and geographic presence in the Middle East. The
Soviets could have been pushed back and survive, while the Iranian regime cannot. Its relative
power is less, but its level of determination to prevail is greater. Iran was and will most probably
continue to be a danger in the area for Israel but also for the stability of the region.
The Western interest in the Syrian civil war has mainly been about ensuring Israel’s
regional security. The Shi’a resistance axis in the Middle East, comprised of Iran, the Syrian
regime and their Lebanon-based proxy Hezbollah, posed an existential threat to Israel; a fact
which the Israel’s defense community realized for the first time during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah
War in Lebanon.
Even so Israel has evolved tremendously in the region and got self-sufficiency from the
United States and is more capable of protecting itself. America’s relationship with Israel is one
of the oldest in the region, beginning with 1948 but got stronger after 1967. This relationship
went far beyond economic and strategic interest; it evolved into some sort of American culture
and a matter of domestic politics.  This was embodied in full form at the last annual conference
of Israeli lobby AIPAC, where candidates for the presidency, among them Donald Trump,
competed to show who holds the most extreme positions in support of Israel 30. However, the
strategic relationship has changed. After the Camp David Accords and the dismantling of Iraq
and Syria, Israel no longer faces any real threat from Arab states; rather, it has great strategic
relations with many of them and the threat of the Iranian nuclear program has been dealt with,
albeit recently, in the agreement of the nuclear P5+1 nations. Israel built strong military
capabilities with American help but no longer needs the deployment of American military forces
or its direct participation in Israel’s protection. Israeli security self-sufficiency and the fading
military threats are reducing the need for America’s presence in the region31.

29
“Could Israel go it alone on Iran?”, AlJazeera, online article 19 December 2013 [Accessed on 20 March 2017].
Available from: http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2013/11/97891.html
30
Paul Salem, “The Shrinking map of American Interests in the Middle East”, online article on Watching America,
7 April 2016 [Accessed on 28 April 2017]. Available from: http://watchingamerica.com/WA/2016/04/22/the-
shrinking-map-of-american-interests-in-the-middle-east/
31
Ibidem

22
Iran: from containment to coexistence

In this part of my thesis I will be presenting the Iranian case, with its relations with the
U.S. The relations between the United States with Iran is one exposed with many diplomatic
confrontations, sanctions and it is defined by pragmatism.
The oil mining, dispensation and loading services are mostly located on sea platforms and
are truly important to the economies of the Gulf States. But in an age of extremely precise
missiles and technologically advanced aircrafts, the safeguarding of these seemingly vulnerable
assets against bombshell assaults represents a significant issue. Iran represents one of the most
powerful armed state actors of the area and has traditionally intended to expand its authority over
the Arab coast of the Gulf. However, doubts of military disagreements ended, more or less, after
the Iran-Iraq war.
The position of the U.S. in Iran focuses on three areas: support for terrorism, violent
opposition to peace in the Middle East, and the development of weapons of mass destruction.
Beside these primary interests, there are secondary ones, like concerns for human rights,
especially relatable with Iran’s minorities. In present times, Iran’s position is well established: its
government has consistently rejected direct diplomatic contacts with Washington while sanctions
remain in place and while pre-revolutionary financial claims remain outstanding. Tehran also
vigorously disputes the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and a host of American policies
toward the region, past and present32.
When speaking about Iran in the context, the first thing that must be mentioned is the
1979 revolution which transformed Iran from a pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the region into
one of the leading threats to the regional status quo. Islamic Iran exported its revolution through
subversion of its neighbors and also waged a war to defend the country from the Iraqi invasion.
Faced with such a situation, America will eventually go to political, military, and economic
containment of Iran.
No clear policy choices from both sides were produced, especially with Iran’s changing
politics after the ceasing of fire with Iraq and the death in 1989 of the revolutions leader,
Ayatollah Khomeini, all which did not decisively alter Iran’s antagonism. To be mentioned here

32
Suzanne Maloney, “America and Iran: From containment to coexistence”, Brooklyn Policy Brief Series, 15
August 2001 [Online], accessed on 12 May 2017. Available from: https://www.brookings.edu/research/america-and-
iran-from-containment-to-coexistence/

23
that even not bluntly, the United States provided Iraq with weapons in order to create a balance
in the region. At this moment the interests were to sustain the balance of powers as on the one
hand they supplied Iraq and on the other part, the USSR was helping Iran; with an odd situation
of the US which during different periods sustained both sides33.
Iran’s inflexibility, particularly on the Arab-Israeli peace process, triggered U.S.
sanctions under the Clinton’s administration’s policy of containment, both of Iran and Iraq.
Legislation and presidential directives severed most remaining economic ties with Iran in the
mid-1990 in an effort to reduce its government revenues. Washington sought to expand
international adherence to its embargo via diplomatic pressure, most notably through the 1996
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which threatens secondary sanctions against investors in Iran’s energy
sector.
During the Cold War, the Soviets were as likely as the United States to dominate the
region of the Middle East, if not through literal occupation then by essentially denying Western
access to the region and its resources. The idea that Iran has a comparable potential ability is far-
fetched. We are not going to see the revival of the Archaemenid, Sassanid or Safavid Empires.
Iran cannot seize and hold territory in the Sunni world; it cannot convert the Sunni world to Shii
Islam; it cannot amass enough allies to deny the United States access to the region. Note that the
U.S. Department of Defense supplemental in most recent years has been larger than the entire
Iranian defense budget. Moreover, Iran is a multiethnic and a vulnerable society, with a second-
rate economy and a third-rate scientific-technical infrastructure34.
So, Iran cannot be compared with the Soviet Union as a strategic problem. It is a serious
problem for other reasons, such as its support towards terrorism, which undermining the stability
of Iran itself. Furthermore, Russia and China help create a regional balance in which none of the
countries of the Middle East can be a regional hegemon.
While Iran believes that it is winning in the region, which encourages further
expansionist policies, Saudi Arabia feels that it is losing ground to Iran, which encourages it to
engage in policies of defensive resistance. This perception gap is destructive of the necessary

33
“ CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy”, The New
York Times, 23 September 1990 extract [Accessed on 7 April 2017]. Available from:
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-
with-us-envoy.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=4&pagewanted=print
34
The World FactBook, Central Intelligence Agency, Middle East: Iran, Online[Accessed on 27 March 2017].
Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html

24
regional consensus. Here, the United States in particular has often misunderstood or dismissed
regional grievances in regard of Iran. For the U.S., the Iranian question was reduced to
containing its nuclear program. Paradoxically, Iran was content with this: the more Iran was
reduced to the nuclear file, the more its contentious regional policy went unseen by the external
actors. In contrast, for the powers in the region, the Iranian question was less about its nuclear
aspirations and more about its regional policies.
President Obama’s Iran policy is emblematic of his inability to protect America’s core
strategic interests. His support for a tenuous long-term agreement to limit Tehran’s nuclear
program above all other interests has alienated Sunni Gulf allies and Israel both fearful of an
eventual Iranian nuclear capability. The Administration has become so confused over what
regional approach to pursue that it fears taking authoritative action letting events drift
disastrously. Its policy of “strategic restraint”35 increasingly jeopardizes its efforts to preserve
Israeli and Gulf security and derail Iran’s nuclear program. The Administration’s abrupt
cancellation of planned military strikes against Damascus for its use of chemical weapons last
September in favor of a Russian backed chemical weapons disarmament plan must reassure Iran
that the U.S. government is unlikely to attack Tehran’s nuclear facilities if it breaches the recent
accord freezing its program. The President’s strategic restraint policy in the Middle East has
contributed to growing regional unrest.
From Syria to Yemen, from Lebanon to Iraq and to the Gulf, Iran’s expansionist policies
and militia armies have generated anxiety. In fact, if the curbing of Iran’s nuclear programme
allows the West to acknowledge the deleterious impact of Iran’s regional policy36, and then it is a
welcome development. In this given context, if the US administration decides to act against Iran,
it will surely make regional allies as of their unwelcomed regional adventures.
So far I have shown that the Middle East is an important geopolitical area and of interest
for the U.S. global strategy. This is not necessarily because of the region’s ability to challenge
the global power balance as they are still regarded as small players but the cumulative interests

35
Mackubin T. Owens, “Principle and Prudence in American Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy Research Institute,
online article, January 2014 [Accessed on 27 March 2017]. Available from: https://www.fpri.org/docs/Owens_-
_Principle_and_Prudence_in_US_Foreign_Policy.pdf
36
Wadah Khanfar, “Democracy is still the answer for the Arab World”, ChathamHouse Royal Institute of
International Affairs, online, February and March 2017 [Accessed on 27 April 2017]. Available from:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/democracy-still-answer-arab-world

25
makes it important37. My own view is that the Middle East it is a serious but vastly exaggerated
threat.

Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign

policy in the Middle East in the context of the Arab Spring

In this chapter I will be presenting the foreign policy of Barak Obama and how it
influenced the Middle East. Unlike his predecessor, he had a different view that was seen from
the start of his mandate. Unlike Bush, he had a different strategic vision and different options for
the national security of the U.S. He understood that the occupation of Iraq and the excesses of
the war on terrorism had left the United States extended to far, especially in the context of
economic crisis. He proceeded with the “rightsizing” the United States presence in the region,

37
Adam Garfinkle, “Redefining Interests in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1 October 2008,
online [Accessed on 18 May 2017]. Available from: http://www.fpri.org/article/2008/10/redefining-u-s-interests-in-
the-middle-east/

26
also challenging allies to take greater responsibility for their own security38. Even if contested,
his strategy was clear and coherent, and let him take other initiatives in a new problem which he
saw as a threat to national security: Iran’s nuclear weapons program, terrorism, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
Barack Obama gave a speech at the University of Cairo, in 2009, when he said that he
seeks a new beginning between the United States and the Muslims around the world 39. I consider
that he wanted this in order to move past the 9/11 legacy left by Bush, invasion of Iraq and their
“war on terror”. Even if the begging seemed promising, the chain of events brought up new
circumstances and dilemmas.
Regarding Palestine, who was always a sensitive spot of foreign policy, not only for the
US, but for every country, Obama altered the problems by naming the situation of the
Palestinians “intolerable”. Furthermore, he blinked first in the confrontation with Israel's Prime
Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, over whether settlements in the occupied territories would have
to stop before peace talks could resume. The hopes for a resolution of the conflicts were fading
away.
Regarding Iran, from the beginning Obama tried to reach out to them. He tried sending
friendly messages to its peoples and to show openness in negotiations with Iran’s government.
Regardless of these efforts, this strategy has failed, leading to tougher sanctions and a covert war.
In some prospects, the future failure of diplomatic relations might lead to catastrophic
confrontation over Iran’s nuclear programme.
In the Middle East we can also speak about border problems, mainly due to Western
interests or lack of consideration after WW1. The area of influence was drawn then, but not only
that, but borders newly drawn only created discontent from the Arabs. They did this without
taking into consideration ethnic, religious or any sense of identity of the local populations. At
core, even the uprisings of 2011 had the inequity of the aftermath of World War 1. There is a
new generation that has inherited acute socio-economic and political problems that it did not

38
Marc Lynch, “Obama and The Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2015
issue, online [Accessed on 12 April 2017]. Available from:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/obama-and-middle-east
39
“Barack Obama, the Arab spring and a series of unforeseen events”, The Washington Post, online, 21 October
2012 [Accessed on 12 April 2017]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/21/barack-obama-
arab-spring-cairo-speech

27
contribute to, and yet has been living its consequences - from education quality, job availability,
economic prospects, to the perception of the future40.
In addition to the West’s historical involvement and most important of the United States,
colonial legacy and power projections in the region, the legitimacy deficits of local elites have
further paved the way for the West to play a harmful role in the region, which has reduced these
elites to mere players in a western-centric state system. This has culminated in further
fragmentation of the region, a deepening of the legitimacy crises within states and further
wedges between these states and their respective societies.
From Yemen to Iraq, and Syria to Egypt, the state has become the instrument of a narrow
clique, formed by identity, ideology or particular interests. The more these elites have reduced
themselves to representatives of certain traditional or parochial identities, the more political
conceptualizations of citizenship have crumbled.
This has enabled other traditional identities: sectarian, ethnic or religious, to replace
political identities, and become the primary sources of allegiance and loyalty. Likewise, the state
equaled the regime, which equaled the ruling elite or party. This equation was in place for Syria,
Egypt, Libya and Iraq, making the state system fragile.
But this equation also shows the way forward in highlighting what needs to be avoided. If
the state embodies the interests of a party, ruling elite, a certain ideology or a family, then a
change in any of these groups will have a direct impact on the state structure itself. This part will
be further discussed as part of the ethnic and religious cleavages of the region.
While the old order may be on its deathbed, the new one is not yet in sight. This
transitional period appears likely to last for some time before the ground is laid for a new order.
In the meantime, locating and denoting the emerging features of this period will be important to
understand the nature of the regional order yet to be born.
The recent turmoil in Syria and Iraq, in large part, was fuelled by the 2003 US-led
invasion of Iraq, which propelled the formerly-exiled Shia opposition into power in Baghdad. As
such, Iraq became the first Arab state in almost a thousand years to be ruled by Shia Arabs.
However, the presence of a large US military force stationed in Iraq deeply concerned both
Tehran and Damascus, which were fearful that they would be the next target of regime change.
After all, in his State of the Union address in 2002, President Bush declared Iran to be part of an
40
Tarek Osman, “Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the Middle East”, BBC News, online article
[Accessed on 27 March 2017]. Available from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553

28
‘axis of evil’; Syria was singled out by the US ambassador to the UN in a ‘beyond the axis of
evil’ speech for its chemical weapons and ballistic missile threat41. Consequently, Tehran and
Damascus sought to undermine the US military presence in Iraq by supporting militia groups,
which were, in fact, inimical to one another. While Iran provided material support mostly to Shia
militias, Damascus hosted and provided passage to Ba’athist opposition groups and jihadists who
were intent on subverting the new political order. The Syrian leadership was firmly opposed to
the new Iraqi government and the continuing deployment of US troops in the country. As a
result, the relationship between Syria and Iraq became more antagonistic. However, hostility
between the two states was nothing new and had been rooted in the competition between the
Iraqi and Syrian Ba’ath parties.
During the reign of Saddam Hussein in the 1990’s, Syria had protected the Iraqi
opposition and even hosted one of the first major opposition conferences following the 1990
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, after 2003, Damascus hosted the new Iraqi opposition – the
Ba’athists – and other foreign Arab nationalist and resistance groups in order to undermine the
US mission in Iraq. Consequently, this meant turning a blind eye to, and facilitating, the flow of
extremists and foreign fighters who would use Syria as a transit point for their jihad in Iraq. Just
as it had before the 2003 war, Syria continued its open-door policy for the Iraqi opposition – but
this time the opposition took a very different form. During Saddam Hussein’s reign, Syria
viewed Iraq as a geopolitical competitor. It had not only supported Iran during the eight-year
Iran–Iraq war, but had hosted the Iraqi opposition. Although the political environment changed
following the US-led war against Iraq, the Syrian government nonetheless viewed the new US-
led order in Iraq with equal, if even not more concern, and hence supported the new opposition.
Believing that any Iraqi government formed under US occupation would be a threat,
Damascus refused to recognize the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council, the first interim Iraqi
government headed by Ayad Allawi, and even the first democratically-elected Iraqi government
led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Diplomatic relations were not restored until more than three years after
the war, in November 2006, ending a 26 year break42.

41
Bolton, R. J., “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction”, The Heritage
Foundation, 6 May 2002, [Online] Accessed on 8 April 2017. Available from:
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/beyond-the-axis-of-evil
42
Abboud, A, “Iraq-Syria relations strained anew”, Middle East, 4 February 2007,[Online] accessed on 9 April
2017. Available from: http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=19430

29
 Even though diplomatic relations were restored between Syria and Iraq, the US presence
on the territory of Iraq was viewed with trepidation. Syria continued to support groups whose
goals were on either hastening a US exit or to undermine the government of Iraq. For this reason,
a source of tension remained in place between the two governments. An example of such
tensions was when the Iraqi government openly accused the Syrian government of sponsoring
terrorism on its territory, in the context of a car bomb in Baghdad in 2007, which killed more
than 130 people. On discussing the matter, spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh claimed that “50% of
terrorism enters Iraq from Syria”43. Politicians from Baghdad, together with the help of the
United States managed to gather evidence that linked plans devised in Syrian training camps to
terrorist attacks carried on their territory, including confessions from arrested suspects. However,
these authorities did not produce sufficient hard evidence to prove direct Syrian government
complicity.
There was a clear pattern of behavior. The Syrian government had demonstrated its
opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by lending support to opposition groups. In the post-2003
environment, the Syrian government continued to support opposition groups in Iraq, to
undermine the US presence. In other words, the Syrian government exercised influence over its
neighbor, which it had long considered hostile to its interests, irrespective of its government, by
sponsoring opposition groups. However, the cycle was broken by the conflict in Syria, which
fundamentally changed the difficult relationship between Baghdad and Damascus. Despite
mutual mistrust, Iraq–Syria relations took a 180-degree turn towards an alliance after the Arab
Spring in 2011 and the largely peaceful protests that spread across Syria.
But something more fundamental has changed. The political mindset that underpinned
this old order has collapsed. The prevailing political psychology across the region now refuses to
accept rule by the relics of the past. This makes the foundation of these authoritarian regimes
shakier than ever before. Putting aside the first couple of decades following the end of
colonialism, during which anti-colonial movements enjoyed wide support, the Arab state system
has always suffered a severe legitimacy deficit.
This has enabled other traditional identities: sectarian, ethnic or religious, to replace
political identities, and become the primary sources of allegiance and loyalty. Likewise, the state

43
Iraqi PM vows to end bomb terror, BBC News, 4 February 2007. [Online] Accessed on 9 April 2017. Available
from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6328859.stm

30
equaled the regime, which equaled the ruling elite or party. This equation was in place for Syria,
Egypt, Libya and Iraq, making the state system fragile44.
But this equation also shows the way forward in highlighting what needs to be avoided. If
the state embodies the interests of a party, ruling elite, a certain ideology or a family, then a
change in any of these groups will have a direct impact on the state structure itself. This part will
be further discussed as part of the ethnic and religious cleavages of the region. While the old
order may be on its deathbed, the new one is not yet in sight. This transitional period appears
likely to last for some time before the ground is laid for a new order. In the meantime, locating
and denoting the emerging features of this period will be important to understand the nature of
the regional order yet to be born.
The creation of the Islamic State of Levant and Syria (ISIS) is a consequence of the US
invasion. Not a direct one, but rather one that triggered a chain of events that led to today’s
situation. Invading Iraq back in 2003 was a mistake that radicalized the Iraqi society, exacerbated
the sectarian divisions and gave birth to an unrelenting Sunni insurgency against the heavy
handed and discriminatory policies of the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government 45. The retreat of US
troops meant the expansion of insurgences, which was doubled by nationalistic uprisings.
Unfortunately, Syria created the perfect framework for the creation and flourish of
opposition groups. This is also due to the fact that Assad permitted these extremist groups to hide
and attack from Syria the U.S. troops from Iraq. The interaction between the two neighboring
populations gave rise to the conditions that allowed the ISIS to prosper, and led to the
establishment of new paramilitaries in Iraq46.
Much is said about whether Obama’s disengagement from the Middle East is merely a
reflection of his temperament and personal preferences, or a temporary reaction to the
excessiveness of the Bush administration’s military expansion. However, it seems that analysis
of the above gives us an indication of the direction of American foreign policy long-term.

44
Erwin van Veen, “A House Divided: Political Relations and coalition-building between Iraq’s Shi’a”,
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, online, February 2017 [Accessed on 25 March 2017]. Available
from: https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/a_house_divided.pdf
45
Nauman Sadiq, “Obama’s Legacy of Failure in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy Journal, online article, 20
August 2016 [Accessed on 1 June 2017]. Available from:
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/08/20/obamas-legacy-of-failure-in-the-middle-east/
46
“Syria, Iraq and the Struggles for Power”, Research Paper, Chatham House The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, online 24 November 16 [Accessed on 20 March 2017]. Available from:
https://reader.chathamhouse.org/syria-iraq-and-struggle-power-intertwined-futures#

31
 Public opinion, a large part of the political elite and opinion-makers in the United States
no longer see the Middle East as an indispensable region for political and economic interests
requiring American intervention on a large scale. None of the candidates for the American
presidency are suggesting a major overhaul of Obama’s policy; instead, they are seeking a slight
readjustment, saying they will be more resolute in the confronting the Islamic State group or
tougher on Iran and closer to Israel. Even Donald Trump is suggesting the idea of complete
disengagement from the region and banning all Muslims from coming to the United States!
These statements could be for political consumption during the campaign, but nonetheless
indicate that the gap has grown between the United States and the region.
The disengagement of the United States from the region could be considered a good thing
in terms of principle. However, until now, it has led to instability in the balance of power with
Iran, a void filled by terrorist and extremist groups. Proxy wars have also escalated between
regional powers, which have brought about a resurgence of other foreign powers, like Russia,
and the complication of international relations in the region.
The way leaders in the region deal with the constant American presence will determine
whether the 21st century will remain a century of regional, sectarian and civil wars, or become
an opportunity to build capabilities and regional stability on a foundation of respect of
sovereignty, cooperation and mutual benefit far from foreign intervention.
From two Iraqi wars to the war on terror, to waves of uprisings in Arab countries, events
have prepared the ground for the demise of the old Arab order. Putting aside external factors, the
decline was gradual until the Arab speeded up the process of decay. To be mentioned that the
structural foundations of the decline had long been present in the region. The death of the old
order does not mean that the old guard is no longer active in the region. On the contrary,
authoritarian regimes and police states of all stripes are still the dominant modes of governance
in the region.
There was a sustained effort from behalf of Obama to transform the Middle East; this was
the centerpiece of his foreign policy throughout his term. While he was eager to facilitate the
transformation of countries like Egypt in what was seen s Islamist democracies, his foreign
policy in Syria was quite different. The precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq created a vacuum
that was rapidly filled by ISIS, which now dominates parts of Iraq and Syria while sending out

32
terrorists to threaten the West and inspiring others to do the same 47. Obama stood back and
watched as the chances for a more moderate regime to replace Assad dwindled.
By March 2011, the Arab Spring started in Syria and the conflict that followed
fundamentally altered the relationship between the Syrian and Iraqi governments. What started
out as a series of protests originally aimed at addressing local grievances quickly spread across
the country, as a consequence of the regime’s brutal breakdown. Syria’s civil war led Arab
Spring protest evolved into an armed conflict following the regime’s heavy-handed security
measures. There were reports early on when the violence started that armed opposition forces
formed and carried out attacks against Syrian security forces, changing the nature of the
conflict.48
From the beginning of the Arab Spring it was a temptation to disregard the importance of
foreign powers in the uprisings. In fact, for better and worse, international actors influenced the
first phase of the Arab Spring and, in several countries, defined it. In 2010, he political scientists
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way provide extensive empirical support to what many have long
argued. They write that “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes
in domestic conditions that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the
1980s and 1990s.” Levitsky and Way find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratizing
pressure ... was often decisive.”49
Syria and Iran are the countries where the military and security establishments have
entered the zone on the side of the regime. There has been no significant foreign intervention in
support of the opposition, and the two regimes are among the most entrenched in the Middle
East. The displacement of either regime promises to be very difficult and truly game-changing
events, in the eventuality that they will ever occur.
In defining the US interests in the region I will quote president Obama in a State
Department address on 19 May 2011:

47
Jonathan Tobi, “Obama’s Arab Spring Blunders Matter”, Foreign Policy Magazine, online article, 27 January
2016 [Accessed on 25 May 2017]. Available from: https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/middle-
east/obama-arab-spring-blunders-matter/
48
Landis, J. "Western Press Misled – Who Shot the Nine Soldiers in Banyas? Not Syrian Security Forces”, Syria
Comment, [Online] 13 April 2011. Available from: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/western-press-misled-who-
shot-the-nine-soldiers-in-banyas-not-syrian-security-forces/
49
Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, “Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Problems of
International Politics)”, Cambridge University Press; 1 edition 16 August, 2010.

33
 “For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region:
countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of
commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel’s security and
pursuing Arab-Israeli peace”.50
The Arab Spring also diminished the prospects of peace. It triggered the Israeli
apprehensions that the relatively stable region of the past couple of decades has shifted against
them. The Israeli government finds itself more isolated than ever, with the Palestinians having
found new energy to make progress towards a negotiated settlement with Israel.
Unfortunately, the immediate prospects for the Middle East are continuous instability as
regional states sort out their governance and economies and recalibrate relations with their
neighbors and other countries, influence for those who possess the wealth to sustain their policies
and the continuation of a preponderant but attenuated role for the US51.
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Middle East has plunged into a state of
instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic
importance with hesitation or half-hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by
the increasingly difficult decision of defining America’s role in an apolar world while managing
the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of
delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit
American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments
of the world. Instead, Obama’s preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates- both human
and technological- that allows the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic,
operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration
surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East
that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit
considerations as well as the lack of capability has made warfare by surrogate a preferred option
in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of
control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long-term interests are not compatible

50
Obama’s State Department Address, “Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa”, The White
House Office of the Press Secretary, 19 May 2011.
51
Allen Keiswetter, “The Arab Spring: Implications for the US Policy and Interests”, The Middle East Institute, online
article, 13 January 2012 [Accessed on 23 April 2017]. Available from: http://www.mei.edu/content/arab-spring-
implications-us-policy-and-interests

34
with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the
traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East.
In Obama’s policy of keeping commerce free, the United States supports the authoritarian
Saudi kings. To keep the region secure, it backs the repressive Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain,
which gives the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet the port access that allows it to project power across the
Gulf. And to stand up for Israel, the United States gives the Egyptian military $1.3 billion per
year to protect the peace treaty and turn a blind eye while the generals protect their praetorian
privileges52. As far as championing the rights of the Arab peoples, see America’s largely hands-
off policy on Syria, which I see it just as such.
In the Middle East, the critical role of foreign powers, the US, was confirmed once again
after the Arab Spring in 2013, during Egypt’s military coup and its tragic aftermath. In this time,
the United States failed to put any significant pressure on the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces, which dominated the country at the time. America’s relative silence was no accident. To
offer a strong, coherent response to the killings would have required a strategy, which would
have required more, not less, involvement. This, however, would have been at cross-purposes
with the entire thrust of the administration’s policy. Obama was engaged in a concerted effort to
reduce its footprint in the Middle East. The phrase “leading from behind” 53 quickly became a
pejorative for Obama’s foreign-policy doctrine, but it captured a very real shift in America’s
posture.
In short, Obama showed that America is heading towards a more realistic foreign policy
of power, one which pays attention to the people of the region, which want to embrace
democracy, but a democracy of their own without foreign intervention. This new path is in
powerful opposition with the one of its predecessor, George W. Bush, which not only sustained
Arab dictatorships and the annexation of Palestinian territories by Israel, but also tried to impose
a forced democracy in Iraq, which failed lamentably. Unfortunately Obama had to exercise his
mandate and the foreign policy with the Middle East with the burden of war, dissatisfaction and
problems left by its predecessor.

52
David Miller, “The Politically Incorrect Guide to U.S. Interests in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy, online,
August 2012 [Accessed on 7 April 2017]. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/15/the-politically-
incorrect-guide-to-u-s-interests-in-the-middle-east/
53
Nina Hachigian, David Shorr, “The Responsibility Doctrine”, 2013 Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Washington Quarterly, pp.73-91.

35
 Furthermore, if it wasn’t for President George W. Bush’s trillion-dollar social science
project in Iraq and President Barack Obama’s initial tendency to create inflated expectations on
both the Israeli-Palestinian issue and what the United States could do to bring democracy to the
region, America would even be in better shape. He resisted demands to act in part because he
assumed, based on the analysis of U.S. intelligence, that Assad would fall without his help. But
as Assad clung to power, Obama’s resistance to direct intervention only grew. After several
months of deliberation, he authorized the CIA to train and fund Syrian rebels, but he also shared
the outlook of his former defense secretary, Robert Gates, who had routinely asked in meetings,
“Shouldn’t we finish up the two wars we have before we look for another?” 54 From this we can
see that Obama was more concerned with ending its wars in which U.S. was already involved
and did not consider being a good solution to start another one considering these circumstances.
The Arab Spring events have brought to the fore the conflict between interests and values in US
policy in the Middle East. Given the diversity of the nature of US relations and breadth of
interests in the Middle East, resolution of these conflicts should rightly remain a case-by-case
judgment within a broad framework

Conclusion

As I have presented above, the American objectives in the Middle East rest on the
politico-strategic, economic and cultural interests of the United States, which extend throughout
the area. Bringing peace, stability and freedom were among the primary objectives of America in
the region, to which recent times, especially after 9/11 can be added the fight against terrorism.
The Americans like to think that support for democratic practices lead to mutuality of interests
with the Middle East. Despite military evolution and situation changes, the Middle East still
occupies a vital strategic position. Even if oil deposits have been discovered elsewhere on the
globe, it still remains a vital supplier for Europe and Asia, and will probably remain so. The
54
Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, online article [Accessed on 10 June 2017]. Available
from: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/?utm_source=atl-daily-
newsletter

36
Middle East will continue to play a very serious role in Western political, economic and strategic
thinking.
In recent times, many Middle Easterners are unaware of this history, not realizing that the
United States has long enjoyed mutually beneficial relations in the region. Although its policies,
perceptions, and motives have sometimes been a bit muddled, the United States has done vastly
more good than harm in the Middle East over the course of more than two centuries, in
unexpected ways that often foreshadowed some of this century's most complex challenges. This
is due to its policies and shifting interests in the region after 9/11.
The normal outcome of the disengagement of the United States from the region should be
considered a good thing in terms of principle. However, until now, it has led to instability in the
balance of power with Iran, a void filled by terrorist and extremist groups. Proxy wars have also
escalated between regional powers, which have brought about a resurgence of other foreign
powers, like Russia, and the complication of international relations in the region. The way
leaders in the region deal with the constant American presence will determine whether the 21st
century will remain a century of regional, sectarian and civil wars, or become an opportunity to
build capabilities and regional stability on a foundation of respect of sovereignty, cooperation
and mutual benefit, far from hidden interests and direct intervention.
If we look at the chain of events, the timing of the Paris and Brussels attacks has been
critical: Islamic State overran Mosul in June 2014; the Obama Administration started bombing
Islamic State’s targets in Iraq and Syria in August 2014; and after a long time, the first such
incident of terrorism took place on Western soil at the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015,
then the November 2015 Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels bombings55.
Today’s prospect is that after the Arab Spring, a new trend will begin, probably one of
realignment. In this sense, there are some features present, like the rising regional power of the
small Arab counties like Qatar, which also have the economical power to influence, and on the
other hand the hands-off policy in recent times of the US which does not intervene with a firm
hand in the region.
Throughout my paper I have presented the diverse implications of the United States
based on their regional interests. Even if its approaches are debatable, today the fight against

55
Nauman Sadiq, “Obama’s Legacy of Failure in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy Journal, online article, 20
August 2016 [Accessed on 1 June 2017]. Available from:
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/08/20/obamas-legacy-of-failure-in-the-middle-east/

37
terrorism and facilitate stability and peace in the region remain key point of US foreign policy. In
the long term, a more democratic, prosperous and accountable Middle East offers the prospect of
a region with better governance and less abusive of human rights, and thus a net positive
outcome for U.S. interests. From interests to keep the balance of powers, war for oil, war against
terrorism, peace-keeping operations and diplomatic pressures, the United States has always been
present in the region. Even if its presence on all grounds has been inconstant, from direct war, to
diplomatic reestablishments, the US is and will remain a major pole of influence in the Middle
East due to its direct interests.

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