NAVAL STRATEGY

COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH THE

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
ON LAND
LECTu:au »&LlVa.a~:» .AT u. s. NAvAL 'vA.a CoLLao~:, NJ:Wl'O.aT,
R. I., BJ:TWII:D TBJ: TE.UlB 1887 .AND ltll

BY

CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

8lnitr~ $taus 'Na~
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TO TBJ1 W~ Oll' 1812"

BOSTON
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1915
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BT A. T. l\l.ur..ur.

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 222 NAVAL STRATEGY

nine, and in like manner the main body. The smaller, being
for the moment unavoidably separate, must take its chance.
The case is abJolutely on all-fours with the proposition to
divide our fteet between the Atlantic and Pacific, and with
the Russian blunder of that character in the late war.
So long as the troops are aftoat, the dispositions of the
convoying fteet center around their protection, are tactical
in character, and governed by the rules applicable to every-
force on the march when liable to meet the enemy; but
when the objective is reached and won, the troops take care
of themselves, the tactical dispositions of the fleet for them
disappear, and there arises immediately the strategic ques-
tion of the communications of the army, of the command
of the sea, and of the disposition of the fleet so as best to
insure these objectB. An intermediate hostile port, like
Malta, flanking the communications, may then draw upon
itBelf the full, or at least the proportioned, effort of the fleet.
The treatment of our present theme thus far has been
by statement of general principles, with only incidental
illustration. There will now be cited at some length two
historical examples of expeditions such as those under dis-
ouBBion. Separated as the two are by an interval of two
thousand years, the leBBons which they afford in common
illustrate strikingly the permanence of the great general
principles of strstegy.
. Sir Edward Creasy, in his" Fifteen Decisive Battles of
theWorld," ranks among these the defeat of the Athenians
before Syracuse, B. c. 415.1 Whether the particular claim
be good or not, this event certainly has a high value to
doubting students of military- history-, by showing that,
under all conditions of · material or mechanical develop-
ment, strategic problems remain the same, though affected
by tactical difficulties peculiar to each age.
At the time in question, two centuries before the great
1 See map facing page 230.

Orgltl?ed by Goog Ie
 FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 223

strife between Rome and Carthage known as the Punic

Wars, Athens had a sea power which was to the world of
that day tremendous and overwhelming. It extended over
and wielded the resources of the islands of the £gean Sea,
and was strongly based on the coasts of the Dardanelles and
the mainland of what we now call Turkey in Europe,
whence the trade of Athens WBS pushed to the Black Sea
and to the Crimea, then as to-day the center of a wheat
country. During nearly twenty years Athens had been
engaged in war with the combined states of the Pelopon-
nesus, now the Morea, at the head of which stood Sparta.
Lacking the insular position which has been at once the
strength and safety of Great Britain, she had seen her
petty land territory in Attica wasted up to the city walls
by the far superior armies of the enemy; but she still held
out proudly, based upon her great navy and her commer-
cial wealth,- in other words, upon her sea power. By it
she mastered and held two distant advanced posts upon the
h06tile coasts; one at Cape Pylus, now the ·Ba.y of Na-
va.rino, where the conjoined British, French, and Russian
fleets, under Sir Edward Codrington, destroyed the Turk-
ish navy in 1821, the other at Naupactus, at the entrance
of the Gulf of Corinth. Both were valuable strategic
points for making raids into the enemy's territory, and for
intercepting the com trade from Sicily, which island was
peopled by Greeks of a. race kindred to Sparta. Besides
these, the island of Corcyra, now Corfu, was in strict alli-
ance with Athens ; and as in those early days the course of
galleys bound from Greece to Sicily was to coast to Corfu,
then across to the Iapygian Promontory, now Cape Santa
Maria di Leuoa, and thence to follow the Italian coast, the
strategic worth of the island to th06e who controlled it is
easily seen. It therefore WBS chosen as the point of assam·
bly for the transports; but the great bond knitting to-
gether all the elements of strength was the Athenian navy.

Dtgtltzed b y Goog Ie
224 NAVAL STRATEGY

This was the situation when, tow&rds the yea.r B. o. 418,

Athens determined upon the conquest of Syracuse, the
chief city of Sicily, as a prelude to the subjuga.tion of the
whole island. Of the many motives leading to this serious
step, involving a reach over sea muuh exceeding any
previous attempt, we are here concerned only with the
military; and but incidentally with them, as our attention
is called mainly to the expedition proper and not to the
whole war.
The military reasons for attacking Sicily were, first, the
fear that its Greek cities, being mainly colonies of a race
antagonistic to Athens, would join with their fleets in the
war then raging. If this fear was well founded, sound mil-
itary policy justified, nay, demanded, an attack in force
upon them before they were ready; for, if a junction were
effected, they would seriously imperil the control of the
sea, upon which the safety of Athens depended. The condi-
tion much resembled that of 1807, when the British Govern-
ment seized the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, it having be-
come known that Napoleon, in understanding with the Czar,
proposed to compel the cooperation of the Danish navy in
his general naval policy. The second reason was that
Sicily, as fruitful then as in all ages, supplied the enemy
with wheat, even as Athens drew her grain supplies from
the Black Sea. The two together justified the undertaking
from a military standpoint, if there was strength enough to
succeed in it and to hold the chief seaports; and after
weighing the blunders of the Athenian commander-in-chief
as well as I can with an unavoidable lack of experience of
the sea difficulties of that day, I am persuaded the sea.
power of Athens was equal to the task.
So much for the general military policy. Let us now
examine the conditions of the particular field in which this
expedition was to act.
Athens was on the side of Greece farthest from Sicily.
 FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 225
The Peloponnesus, the territory of her opponents, lay be-
tween it and her. She held the islands Cythem (Cerigo)
off the south of the peninsula and Corcyra on the west,
while by her sea power she controlled the other Ionian
Islands and occupied the seaports Naupactus and Pylus.
Along the south coast of Italy, which fleets would usually
follow, every city was hostile or unfriendly, until on the
Straits of Messina Rhegium was reached; but Tarentum
and Locri, at the two ends of this line, - the one at the
heel, the other at the toe of the boot of Italy, -were stren-
uously inimical. Messene, on the Straits of Messina, had
passed from one party to the other, but was now held
against Athens. Then came, on the east coast of Sicily,
three friendly cities, beyond which Syracuse, the first
objective, was reached. The misfortunes of the expedition
never allowed a thought of a farther step.
The choice of Symcuse as the objective was accurate.
It was the front and center, the foundation and keystone,
of the. whole system of danger to Athens from the west-
ern colonies. To strike at it direct was right, if the sea
strength of Athens was as great as the event showed. In
so doing, the expedition paased by the hostile stmtegic
points capable of sheltering an enemy's fleet; but the leader
had reason to think that, if unaided, they would not dare
to act against him. He was right; their jealousy of Athens
refused help, beyond water and permiBBion to anchor, but
no seacoast city dared to lift a hand against the power of the
sea. The Athenians thus cut loose from their base, having
force amply sufficient to crush Syracuse before help could
come, depending, with reason, upon their control of the
sea daunting the enemy cities near their communications.
In fact, these hostile porta, except Tarentum, finally allowed
the besiegers of Symcuse to be supplied from their mar-
kets, and thus became to them new bases of support, of
resources.
226 NAVAL STRATEGY

This was what did happen. What might have happened

-with the respectable though inferior fleet possessed by
Syracuse, and under the straregic conditioDB, added to the
tactical embarrassments inseparable from an expedition
composed of ships of war and transports -is admirably
set forth in a speech made by a SyracUB&n before the pop-
ular assembly of the city. This man, named Hennocrates,
proposed to make RCtive use of the strategic position of
Tarentum, flanking the Athenian line of operations, by
sending thither a fleet which would either derer the enemy
by threatening his communications, or, if he persisted,
would act offensively against them and the fleet as oppor-
tunity arose,-Nelson's opportunity, too tempting to be
resisted. The speech of Hermocrates was as follows :
"There is one point more which, in my opinion, is more
critical and important than all the rest; and although,
inured as you are to domestic indolence, it may perhaps
not gain your ready approbation, I shall, however, boldly
recommend it. If all of us in general who are inhabitants of
Sicily, or at least if only we Syracusans, with what other
people we can get to assist us, would put out instantly to
sea with all the ships we have in readiness; and, victualled
but for the space of two months, if we would then give
these Athenians the meeting either at Tarentum or at Cape
Iapygia, and there convince them that before they enter the
lists of war for the conquest of Sicily they must fight for
their passage across the Ionian Sea, we would strike them
with the utmost terror. We would infinitely perplex them
with the thought that from a friendly port we sally forth
to guard our outworks, for Tarentum will readily receive
us; while they have a long tract of sea to pass with their
cumbersome train, and must find it hard, through so long
a voyage, to be always steering in the regular order. As
their course must thus be slow, and must advance only in
exact conformity to order, we shall have a thousand opportu-
 FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 227
nities to attack them. If, again, they clear their ships for
action and in a. body bear down expeditiously upon us, they
must ply hard a.t their oars, and, when spent with toil, we
-can fa.ll upon them; 1 or, in case fighting be not advisable,
we have it always in our power to retire into the harbor of
Tarentum.
" Thus, if the Athenians, in constant expectation of being
fought with a.t sea, make their passage with but. a. sma.ll
portion of their stores, they will be reduced to a. great
distress upon coasts which will a.iford them no supply.
Should they choose to continue in their station," that is,
to remain in Corfu, " they must be infallibly blocked up
in it; should they venture a. passage, they must unavoid-
ably leave their tenders and storeships behind," because
of the tactical embarrassment in the day of battle, "and as
they have no a.ssurance of a hearty reception from the
cities of the coasts, must be terribly dismayed," for their
communications. " It is my firm opinion that, amidst the
great perplexity of thought which must result from these
obstructions, they will never- presume to set sail from
Corcyra; or, a.t least. while they are agitating the forms of
procedure and sending lookout vessels to discover our
numbers and positions, the season of the year will be pro-
tracted to winter."

1 lu the tacticaleyetem of the Atbeni&Da, "'ho were the moet ezpert of

eeamen, dependence "'u placed upon their euperior eldll enabling them ~
charge the lidel of an enemy'• ehip "'lth the bow of their o,.,n, -the etrongeet
par1 of a Teeeel to the "'eakeet. For thi1 maneuTering the rowere needed to be
in fullatrengtb,- freeh. The Syracuaana reinforced the bow• of their plley1
abnonnally, to meet bo"' to bo"' ,like two egga teating atrength. Their Inferior
akill could not lnaure tbia p&rt.icular collialon if the Athenian rowere, "'lth
their lighter handling Yeuela, were frKh. The Roma111 would not be af.
fee ted by the fatigue of ro"'ere, if they could reach the enemy ; for then they
made fut, and the fighting men, who "'ere freab, fell on. All tbeae partie·
ulare are tactical ; there ia ln each of them juat u real tactical resource "'
in the American nuy replacing eighteen pounden by tweuty-foun in 1800-
1812.
228 NAVAL STRATEGY

A further detail, affecting naval operations in the field

of strategy as well as of tactics, is evidently deducible from
this speech; namely, if the ancient fleets proposed to them-
selves to keep the sea for some time, as in this instance to
make a stmight course from Corcyra. to Syracuse, they were
forced to carry such a weight of provisions and water as
brought them down in the water and rendered them slow
and difficult in maneuvering. In other words, the stra-
tegic consideration of the route to be followed, whether as
shorter or with reference to the friendly disposition of the
coast ski~ involved also the tactical question of the
efficiency of their fleets in the all-important point of speed
a.nd turning power. The same thought applies to over-
loading with coal when within tactical reach of the enemy,
as Rozhestvensky did. It is also worth remarking that the
excessive labor of the oar necessitated for the oarsruen an
ample supply of nourishment, a.nd especially of fluid in
warm weather.
The salient a.nd decisive features, however, in the plan
of Hermocrates were : (1) The recognition of the strategic
value of Tarentum, flanking the route the enemy must
take, as do Jamaica, Gibraltar, Malta; and (2) the use to
which he proposed to put this, by rapidly mobilizing the
Syra.cusa.n or Sicilian fleets, and massing them on the flank
of the Athenian line of advance in a position secured from
attack. Here was, first, a threat the enemy could scarely
venture to disregard ; and, secondly, the preparation of the
inferior navy for offensive action at a moment's notice,
and upon the weakest yet most vital link in the enemy's
scheme of operations.
In the proposition of Hermocrates, then, we have a true
and fruitful strategic thought, with the modification due to
tactical conditions, put forth two thousand years ago by a
man who never heard the words " strategy " or "tactics "
technically used. nor tried to formulate their laws. If,
 FOUND.! TJO.VS AND PRINCIPLES 229

however, any one is disposed to infer, from the accurate in-

sight of this untaught genius, the welessness of studying
war .as an art, he may be quickly set right by the coldness
and insult with which the speech was received, and the
vainglorious appeal to national self-sufficiency made by the
opposition orator; a Grecian anticipation of "buncombe,"
which can be read in Thucydides. The advice was rejected
with contumely, the result being the unopposed progres~ of
the Athenians, and the consequent siege, suffering, and nar-
row escape of Syracuse, with the change of attitude before
mentioned in her friends, the Italian-Greek cities. How-
ever many and mixed the motives of the Syracusan assem-
bly, a knowledge of the principles of war might have given
the true policy a chance ; averting the ruin which nearly
overtook the city, and would have overwhelmed it but for
the imbecility of the .Athenian general.
It should be added, however, that although the scheme of
Hermocrates was not only sound, but the very best fitted
to the conditions, it would not assure the certainty of
Syracuae's safety, because she was much the inferior
power. It was the most skilful thing to do; it secured
the most numerous chances; but if the Athenian skill had
been equal, the stronger must in the end prevail. Indeed,
the transfer of the Syracusan tleet to Tarentum, as con-
ceived by Hermocrates, illnstrates aptly both the power and
the limitations of a " tleet in being," of which we have
beard and still hear so much. Tarentum would have fixed
upon itself the Athenian attack, just because the hostile
navy was there; as Port Arthur fixed the attention of the
Japanese, and Santiago that of the United States in 1898.
Syracuse would have bee.n saved by the tleet, at least until
Tarentum fell. The momentary safety of Syracuse would
illustrate the intluence of a "tleet in being"; its subjuga-
tion after the fall of Tarentum would show the limitations
of such a tleet, which, by definition, is inferior. !

o'9'''ZEO b·· Goog Ie

~0 N.A VAL STRATEGY

This episode in the Peloponnesian War, for in resnlt it

proved to be no more, gives us all the conditions of a distant
maritime expedition in any age. We have the home base,
Athens; the advanced intermediate bases at Corcyra and
other points, which played for Athens the part that Gi~
raltar, Malta, and foreign coaling stations have done and
still do for Great Britain ; the objective, Syracuse; the
neutral, doubtful, or hostil~ country to be passed, acl'088
the Ionian Sea or along the coasts of Italy; the enemy's
advanced post in Tarentum and sister cities ; the greater
naval power in Athens ; the smaller but still respectable
fleet of Syracuse; the difficulty of communications ; the
tactical embarrassment of a train of supply ships ; the
tactical difficulty of ships deeply laden for a long voyage,
which exists in a degree to-day ; the tactical difficulty of
the fatigue of rowers, which has disappeared; the wisdom
of meeting the enemy half way and harassing his progress ;
the danger of awaiting him at home on the defensive; the
perception of a navy's true sphere, the offensive. All
these broad outlines, with many lesser details, are to be
found in this Athenian expedition, and most of them in-
volve principles of present application. In fact, put this
early galley expedition under a microecope and there is
seen realized the essential leading features of every mari-
time invssion.
The attempt of the Athenians, though overwhelmingly
disastrous in this issue, was justified, because they were by
far the superior naval power, and therefore had the prol,
ability of operating over a controlled sea.
The same cannot be said for Bonaparte's Egyptian expe-
dition of 1798.1 Without attempting to analyze the mingled
motives which detennined the action of the French general,
it is probable that he was swayed largely by his disposition
to trust to the chances of war, 88 he so often did both before
t See m.p f•cing ~ge 260.

o,g,t11ed by Coogle
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ATHENIAN EXPEDITION
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