Political Law

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)

POLITICAL LAW

HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to
the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable
sovereignty also in the field of international relations."

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is
vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created
two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City.

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
"sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states. In a
community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but
for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City
has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic
Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its
mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as
to make it in a sense an "international state".

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014

We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then Ministry of Public Works
and Highways, now DPWH, was created under Executive Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710).
EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public Highways and
transferred their functions to the newly-created Ministry of Public Works of Highways.

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT
in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. However,
a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian  and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity
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therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice
and Robling.

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation
and national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A
petition was filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the
constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII § 2)
required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for
people's initiatives and such lack could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also
could not delegate its legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate
rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so under law.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via people’s initiative. However, his
petition did not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative
did not meet the requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and
would render the initiative void, since there should be both direct proposal and authorship by the
person affixing their signature to the petition.

TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic political creed of the
nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,  the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993

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Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme
Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing,
held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II § 16 of the
Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of
Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It
concerns nothing less than self- preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from
the inception of mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing.

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003

Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to adopt the
historical background, nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the
major Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining the
nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny of these cases would also
reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation - separation and benevolent neutrality - the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence
on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation.

IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand,
and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly,
a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If
he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative
of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No.
197291, April 3, 2013

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and
to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly
established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has
exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to compel respondent
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the
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manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal
of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM
Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as
Representative, was not able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take
office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve as
provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official actually serves. The Constitution
protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his
tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his
post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by law,
but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of the officer.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was
assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but
that it involves the division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is
simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, section 5(4).

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list
seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties
participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum
possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In
such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one
seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the
1987 Constitution. In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote
requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the
2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of
the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be
given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House
of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill
up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in
the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent
upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number
of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first
round of seat allocation. 
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ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized
and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing
in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice
in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R.
No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests.

JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI § 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
(sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary session),
statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress. It
also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of Congressional premises while in
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the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not
connected with the discharge of their office.

Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, being appointed to
other government posts, does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is
not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in
view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13,
Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before
they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with
forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly  provided  by law that a
person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate
the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v
Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his
election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65
NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR
941)." Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the
prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so
that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. — State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d
258, 283 Ala 445).

AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding
Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does
not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could
have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there
would be no doubt about Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the
same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained

OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
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States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in
any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power
to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The criteria for valid delegation are that:(1)
Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No. 170338, December

23, 2008

It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of.
It consists of “publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines” (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication.
Publication via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state that the rules
must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According to RA 8792, an electronic document
serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does
not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. The rules must also be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a continuing body
independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every Senate.

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991

Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure
and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator
Enrile’s privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the legislature,
such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and inquire into the
same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into
the exclusive domain of the court.

SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is

compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a greater imperative to
enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department heads can only exempt themselves by a
valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on whom the executive power is
vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a collegial
body as co-equal branches of government. For § 1, the requirement for Presidential consent is
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limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in aid of
legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by “executive privilege”, there can be
no implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries
in aid of legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive
privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on
the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative
power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious
acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions
per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government.

ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to

present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute
heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in language sufficient to
notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title. Complying with the second
directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to read a bill’s entire text
during deliberations.
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BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v. PRESIDENT AQUINO III,
G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251, November 19, 2013

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual
items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill
and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget”
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN, et al. vs.

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015

If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and
court decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it stated that savings as a
concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial
determination.
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Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39. Authority to Use
Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General
Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be
allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law:
Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or
project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts
appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the
total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or
agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39
violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the
President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings
in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a
valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP
which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the
requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were present, namely:
1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a
candidate, listening to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly
transfer of power, declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency,
etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution.
Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal
prosecution, then he would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized
Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers
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to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal
penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states
that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification
were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A preamble is really not an integral
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon
was intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon
itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular clause
cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended.

NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President.
It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among
others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the
process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of
the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses
the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public
interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.

AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.

MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison,
and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commission,
and Calderon vs. Carale; under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
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Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who
are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 

MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and

can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.

PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of

them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No.
191644, February 19, 2013

The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by
one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE

III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No.
191672, November 25, 2014

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions
to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated
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with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment
status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the concerned
GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-
related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and
exercised by the respective Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits
as a member of the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and
functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such being the case,
the designation of Duque was unconstitutional.

MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015

The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then President Estrada of the
grant of additional allowances and benefits. MIA failed to prove its existence. The alleged
approval of the President was contained in a mere photocopy of the memorandum... The original
was not presented during the proceedings. A copy of the document is not in the Malacañang
Records Office.

Further, “the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double compensation proscribed by
Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.”

DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May,
letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular
presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest
possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in
which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill
up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could
not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither
discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section
15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because
they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any
of the lower courts.

GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015

Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those appointments to

offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are
made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country
indirectly after the end of his term.

IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

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Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the President’s wisdom but the
matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.

SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required for calling out the
armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it springs from
powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not
the same as a declaration of martial law.

DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a   state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no     power to take over privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.  Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation,  the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.   In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. 

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino.
She invoked her rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the
President’s residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting
people's general welfare, preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace,
attending to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging the
President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power. Residual powers are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare.

YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari,  as the law or rules
of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999

Political Law

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the
constitution were 1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to
which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of
government.

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular
measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or
constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and
sanctioned by law for said breach of right.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as
to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the Framers were not keen on
adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
exercise of its primary function – to legislate. In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress,
whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to
represent the entire Congress.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. , G.R. No. 213181, August
19, 2014

a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:

SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged.  - In every case where
the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or
challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the
favorable consideration of his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put,
when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a
judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority vote” required in the preceding
section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term “integrity” as an essential qualification for
appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that “integrity”
as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions
only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the
“unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It
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finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral

uprightness.

ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.

FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE

BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction
extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower
than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.

BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yorac’s appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2)
of 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." The SC agreed. The appointment was
unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence of ConCom from the
executive department.

DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment
in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They
withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.
Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the
original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement
on the ground that the LDP’s reorganization was not permanent and stable.

The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the Philippine
President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a
democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid
down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its
representation in the CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary
Political Law

alliances or factional divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may

transpire in the political alignments of its members.

AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of police
power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited,
regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking,
hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property
condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of
collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of
public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious
to the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into residential and
industrial areas).

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms
to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept
of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power
has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police
power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s
legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974

The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property with
a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession
did not also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only
in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession with a
permanent character when the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php 10.00
however was quite high taking in consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range
of Php 2.50 – 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper
price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
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2. For more than a momentary period

3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012

Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just compensation, the law on
stock distribution option acknowledges that landowners can require payment for the shares of
stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital
stock of the corporation.

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY,
REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF,
AND BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS,
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due process, the petitioners
filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA. In order to be
proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or
separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges
against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the
point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. In the case at bar, the
investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was
then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options
and the entire process that the case would undergo. Thus, the petitioners could not argue that
Cadet Cudia was not afforded due process.

ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character.

PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 
Political Law

BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the PTC’s
investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal protection. The
Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear presumption
of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to overcome that
presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a preliminary step to selective
prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose.
However, petitioner has sorely failed in discharging that burden.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING

MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and
worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization —
becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that
capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and
therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 

BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on
freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-
based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.
Political Law

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND
THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral which
aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC
twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a
size limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELEC’s breach of the petitioners’
fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election. Thus, the COMELEC had no legal
basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political party and
the candidates therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the petitioner’s
advocacy against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit to free speech of candidates
during elections but do not limit the rights of broadcasters to comment on the candidates do not
apply to the petitioners, as the petitioners are private individuals who have lost their right to give
commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin removed. Second, the
tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the tarpaulins is fundamentally part of protected
speech, as it is important to convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the
electorate. More importantly, every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party
or party-list group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it lacks the
requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the tarpaulins and their messages
are not religious speech, as they do not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. With
all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH
Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995

Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts
and individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar — than which, upon its facts,
there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the limits of press freedom as it
relates to public comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order.

SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001

SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of
national candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to
publish surveys covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their
right to free speech and expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the
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governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression
of freedom of expression.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST. THERESA’S
COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

The concept of privacy  has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of
the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational
privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a business office. In
this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence
and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997

Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of
prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which
commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in
Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of
public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The
Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of
printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines.
The government’s goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The proceeds
of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not to any church.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation

distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to
comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay
municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid
in protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court
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dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayor’s permit.
Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because such license fee
constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other restraints of
freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive
evil, which the State has the right to prevent.

EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who
were expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by
their parents. As Jehovah’s Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their
religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship
which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department
Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should
participate in the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the
petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to
religious profession and worship and their right to free education.

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)

The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” The Board of
Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for
public viewing as it offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC
is protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave
danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an
attack against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid
ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCB’s power to
regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the
Director of Post’s power to check as to whether or not publications are of a libelous character.

RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.

CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable  cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly  describe the things to be seized.
Political Law

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS “NOY”, G.R. No.
207950, September 22, 2014

The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused during custodial
investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its definition to “include the practice of
issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of
law.” This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be
apprised of their Miranda rights.  For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario.  Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station.  As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied
him to the police station.

MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015

The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which
the Miranda doctrine applies – when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive
setting.  The rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit
examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair
analogy, Marieta may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being
investigated by any police or law enforcement officer.  She was under administrative investigation
by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her
freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go.  There was no evidence that she was forced or
pressured to say anything.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach." It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from
being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014
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A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for
any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article
II of the law. Hence, a drug test can only be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested
for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. To make the provision applicable to all persons
arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase “a person
apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. Moreover, “a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.”

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA

G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk”.  “Stop and frisk”
searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed  in flagrante delicto, and
the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure
that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in.  This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer.  Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.  Clearly, a basic criterion would
be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person.  The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person.  This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to
security of one’s person and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be
shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and
that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.

MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006

The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 

GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
Political Law

After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February
18, 2014

Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel; likewise with
RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime
Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA
9775.

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction
“deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time
when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease
Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become
citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is
qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” It provides that those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002

A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after
enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S.
citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. The person may only be
said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he repatriates or by an act of Congress,
but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the residency requirement for
elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant
visa and has waived his status as a non-resident.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7,
2013

A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization
under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare
or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based
on requirements required under CA 473.

ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928

Political Law

Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After
completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his
cancellation of voter’s registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the
mails on time. In ruling in Abano’s favor, the Court explained that the registration of a voter does
not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26,

2013

A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y

CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and foreign
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being
barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from
the beginning.

Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply.

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136, December 2,
2014

The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The Court emphasized
that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in
character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go
into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is
thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. The determination of whether a
candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties
must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus, in simply relying on the
Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s
substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court
finds that the COMELEC once more gravely abused its discretion.

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify the
Political Law

cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to
“Qualifications for elective office” (residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications
necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the Local Government Code) coupled with
a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate.

GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, contrary to
the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing "Section
78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in
the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates (retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections
explains that "the ‘procedure hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed
to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification
cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance
candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing "sec. 78"
petitions under the oec is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of COCs. The
clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a
subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action.
Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not
be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is
noteworthy that Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions, was
decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the
unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy."

SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY

MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a

disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due
course, the candidate cannot be validly substituted.

RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013

When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should
be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY"
S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The COMELEC
First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the disqualification petition. In the said petition, San
Luis alleges that Ejercito was distributing an “Orange Card” with the intent to entice voters to vote
for him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable amount for campaign funds. Ejercito alleges that
a preliminary investigation should have been conducted prior to the decision of the COMELEC. In
Political Law

this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be
inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of
have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the
COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved
before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the
said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.

PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009

Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the
campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only
liable for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period, when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R.
No. 207900, April 22, 2014

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of
procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters
pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil
action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as
their rightful leader.

ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA

G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014

It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of
the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical
fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second
District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by
district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is
the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is disqualified to
serve another term a Sangguniang Member.
Political Law

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine
the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the
renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented,
albeit by another eligible person.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due process for being
considered a nuisance candidate even before a clarificatory was even conducted. The SC ruled
that nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate
that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate." To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates
of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation
may be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an
opportunity to be heard.” Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance candidate
without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had
already declared petitioner a nuisance candidate even before the clarificatory hearing. This was
an ineffective opportunity to be heard.

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to
enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations – or reasonable basis. It
could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do,
in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that
must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply
change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular
manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with
sufficient basis. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal mandate when it
provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement.

FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998

It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or

tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is elementary that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and
mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said body, court or
tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication
on the merits.

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002
Political Law

The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation,
thus, they did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in
accordance with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the
operative act that gives rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the
ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National
Library, and other public officers or agencies specified by Congress. Publication in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required before laws can take effect.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was
no need to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Center’s
guidelines, “interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public” need not be filed with the center.

PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No. 170599, SEPTEMBER 22,
2010

the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this
issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for
another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB assumed the powers and functions
of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this
does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of
responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.

OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308
involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First,
the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement
making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their
own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings,
Political Law

greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does
not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)

Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order to
compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature
delegated to the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law
to delegate to Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will be just and
reasonable.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a
petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing
appeals from the orders of the DARAB.

Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on
the land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court
within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans’ petition in the RTC was filed
beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case.

HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661, December 10,
2014

Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It amounts to
dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the
service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The act of
falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on
government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an
official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act, as
in this case. The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of
public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a
public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency.
Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society has consciously
embedded them in our laws so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles, and
the Court is mandated to apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned
for our public service.

SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007

Political Law

All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and such
publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government
units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority
after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this case, the
publication of vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant.

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES’ UNION (CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE, et al.,
G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014

Apropos then is the Court’s ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v.
Barin, to wit: however, abolition of an office and its related positions is different from removal of
an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal
standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no
tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does
not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its
related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Based
on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence of any bad faith, we rule
that the ATO employees’ right to security of tenure was not violated.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending
authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari
in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The
defense of respondent Cortes that her appointment was made by the Commission En Banc and
that his father, a member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his appointment did not cure
the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the
prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V
created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the
Commission En Banc.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a highly
urbanized citys should be participated by the qualified registered voters of the entire province of
Nueva Ecija not of Cabanatuan City only. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component
city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial
Political Law

alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical

configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its
political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political
subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And
as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional
provision.

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R.

ANTONINO-CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014

Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational structure and staffing
pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local governments
will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and efficient governmental
services especially at the local government level require rational and deliberate changes planned
and executed in good faith from time to time. However, the assailed decision by respondent
Commission on Audit was anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
4968, which proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for government employees.

NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area
requirement – when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands – is
expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for
the creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local
Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of the exemption
in the case of provinces was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the
true legislative intent. This will also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local
government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity
and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units in order to achieve
the desired results.

MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

The MMDA’s power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in

Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with
legislative power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can
only lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011

The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed that
Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate
during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a
class of their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of
Political Law

their respective provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of
convergence of transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).

AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province.
Records of the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not the sole determinant
of the creation of a legislative district.

SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated
the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution
but only Congress may create provinces and cities.

ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the
autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term “region” used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766
(Organic Act of the CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an
autonomous region; otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the
Ifugao Local Government Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will
be exercising executive and legislative powers over the same area.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994

The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto
municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of
governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality) that point to the state’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality
of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, which states
that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office” at the time of the
effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the status of
a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the legality of EO 353 only thirty years after
its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision
should be timely raised.

SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009

The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is a
mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to
effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units,
free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this automatic realease
of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or
Political Law

suspending its release to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in court
as to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012

There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations
Act, even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services
involved in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National Government,
which it may designate to implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of local
autonomy does imply the establishment of local government units into mini-states, as what is
involved in local autonomy is decentralization of administration and not of power.

GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011

Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the
Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings.
Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police
power, but the methods and means used in exercising such power to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance in question is
valid as the city’s primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since
these arcardes were intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for
pedestrians.

SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” 116 subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed
by another ordinance.

The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the
absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that
Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006

The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its basis
only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or hospital, and
not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations
and gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there was no due
process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance (Parayno’s gasoline filling
station) without proper judicial proceedings.

CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919
Political Law

Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of
expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does
not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a
particular property is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on
expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is private but
the second condition (public purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the
street was necessary and its extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as
other lots have been offered to the city free of charge.

JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005

The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local
government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,
to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property; b) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare,
or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no offer because the letter Pasig sent
the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineer’s office only proved its intent to acquire the
property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.

ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009

The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the
municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as
mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances
levying taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.

QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006

Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and exclusively
used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by
the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies
the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as
Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec.
232 of the Local Government Code which provides that “a province or city or municipality within
the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property...not
hereinafter specifically exempted,” the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt
certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same
phrase “exclusive of this franchise” in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayante’s
exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power all of the franchisee’s properties actually,
directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

Political Law

MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate tax
because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality
refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation imposed
by Congress on the local government’s exercise of the power to tax. Furthermore, the power of
local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed strictly against local
governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be clear language in
the law imposing the tax.

QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008

While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise
create sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of
municipal corporations. In this case, the “in lieu of other taxes” provision does not expressly
provide in clear and unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as
a claim of tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN
is liable for Quezon City’s franchise tax.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16, 2008

Smart is liable to pay Davao’s franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly
provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The “in lieu of all taxes” clause in Smart’s
legislative franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both
local and national taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal
revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.

SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988

The Mayor’s act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for public
use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local
executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.

CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968

The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to
“defective streets”, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter
is not decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from negligence in general,
regardless of the object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in
particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street where
Teotico was injured was a national highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
Political Law

municipality on which responsibility is placed. It is enough that the said province, city or
municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978

The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the
state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to
provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service.

KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003

Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving municipalities
or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of
the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since one party is an independent
component city. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power
to hear and resolve the dispute in the case at bar.

SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall election as
any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on serving
for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008

Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be disqualified from running
because of the three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and he must have fully served three consecutive terms. In this
case, there was an interruption in Potencioso’s second term as municipal councilor as he
succeeded the retired Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by
operation of law and does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the
succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of office (which does not interrupt the
continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully served his second term and as
such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.
Political Law

MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003

The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective
official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once
Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume
office and exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to stop
him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of
execution pending appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTC’s decision proclaiming
Fermo as winner of the election was stayed and the status quo – or when Laxina was occupying the
office of Barangay Captain – was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality,
because through the stay of the MTC’s decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued
and he was not ousted from office.

VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term ‘dual citizenship’
as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the certificate of candidacy,
one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a
declaration, under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case,
Lopez should not be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also,
the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her Filipino citizenship since a
renunciation must be express to result in the loss of citizenship.

MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Manzano should not be disqualified because the “dual citizenship” meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the
Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to “dual allegiance”. Dual
citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual
allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship. Manzano‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his election of
Philippine citizenship.

MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955

Political Law

The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over
municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before
the Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances
contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be
considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may formally
charge and suspend the petitioner, there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.

TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012

Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void.
The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race, one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a
candidate) or to a petition to deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded
on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which
is the cancellation or denial of due course of the person’s certificate, with the said person not
treated as a candidate at all – as if she never filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled
does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore cannot be substituted by another person.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief
in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the
reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a
legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international
law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

 As a general principle – and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has
lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given
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ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan,
from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide
on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that
are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of
these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R. No. 173034, October 9,

2007

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."
Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect
to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." 

Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)

Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread terror
among the civilian population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court
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convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are expected to result, the attack should not
be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)

This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging Pena-
Irala, then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage
Paraguayan. The Court held that deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated
customary international law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.