O-ALL METALS INDUSTRIESvs. SECURITY BANKG.R. No.

176339January 10,
2011PONENTE:AbadPETITIONERS: Do-All Metals IndustriesInc., Sps. Domingo Lim and Lely Kung
LimRESPONDENTS:Security Bank Corp.,Titolaido E. Payongayong,Evylene C. Sison, Phil.Industrial
SecurityAgency Corp., and Gil Silos
DOCTRINE:Asupplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a
complaint need to be paid upon itsfiling

FACTS:This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the
plaintiff’s supplemental complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.From
1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc., owned by petitioner spouses Lim took out loans from
respondent Security Bank Corporation totaling P92.4 million.Unable to pay the loans on time, the
Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the same, including a buildingand
the lot on which it stands, located at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.In 1998,the Bank offered to
lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily
for business although the Lims were to use part of the property as their residence.DMI and the
Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the
Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease.The contract also provided that, should the
Bank decide to sell the property, DMI shall have the right of first refusal.In1999, beforethe lease was
up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on December 31,
1999.Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the
terms of its purchasebut the Bank, wanting a higher amount, declined its offers.While the
negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their
business.But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial
Security Agency (PISA).The Lims also claimed that on several occasionsthey were harassed by the
guards and that they were unable to enter the premises as the bank representatives had the property
padlocked. TheLimsalsoalleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and
personal items left at the property.The Lims eventually filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and officers. They won in the RTC and
the Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTC’s
authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint.The RTC denied the motion, but on appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed, and the
complaintas well as the counterclaimswere dismissed. DMI and the Lims filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the same, hence this petition.

ISSUE & HELD:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s
supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the
amounts of damages they claim in it

YES. What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental
Complaint.The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their
original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees due on the same.The plaintiffs’
non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of
the jurisdiction it already had over the case.2.Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the Lims
for the machineries, equipment, and other properties they allegedly lost after they were barred from
the property in their supplemental complaint.NO the bank is not liable.The supplemental
complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the
Bankbut the plaintiffpaid no filing fees on the same.And, while petitionersclaim that they were willing
to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same.They
merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.But a
supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint
need to be paid upon its filing.The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases
of supplemental complaints.
u v. Lu Ym Sr., G.R. No. 153690, August 26, 2008; Resolution dated August 4, 2009; Resolution En Banc
datedFebruary 15, 2011Prayer of petitioners:InG.R. No. 153690, David Lu (David) prays that this
Court annul and set aside the CA Decision dismissing theinitial complaint filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) or non-compliance with the rules on non-forumshopping. InG.R. No. 157381, Paterno
Lu Ym, Sr. (Paterno Sr.), Paterno Lu Ym, Jr. (Paterno Jr.), John Lu Ym (John), Kelly LuYm (Kelly)
(collectively referred to as the Lu Ym father and sons), and Ludo and Luym Development Corp.
(LLDC)assail the CA Decision5dated February 27, 2003 ordering the RTC to desist from
conducting any proceedingrelating to the receivership over LLDC.InG.R. No. 170889, John and
LLDC question the CA Resolutions dated September 6, 20046denying theirapplication for a
writ of preliminary injunction; and dated December 8, 20057denying their motion
forreconsideration and further deferring the resolution of the issue on docket fees.

FACTS:LLDC is a family corporation founded by Paterno Sr. and his brothers primarily to hold real
estate for thefamily.8LLDC’s Board of Directors authorized the issuance of its 600,000 unsubscribed
and unissued shares at parvalue ofP100.00 per share. The Lu Ym father and sons subscribed to and
paid most of such shares. David, et al.,however, claimed that the 600,000 LLDC stocks were issued in
favor of the Lu Ym father and sons for less thantheir real values. Hence, the complaint9filed
forDeclaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership andDissolution, before the RTC. They
asked for the dissolution of the corporation as their ultimate remedy to obtainredress for their
grievances.11To protect the interest of the corporation during the pendency of the case, Davidet al.
asked that a receiver for the corporation be appointed.12Lu ym filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of non-compliance with the certificate of non-forum shopping andno compromise was
executed. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ordered for the appointment
ofreceivers.Lu Ym father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals assailing the court’s
resolutions denying theirmotion to dismiss and their motion for reconsideration; and placing the
corporation under receivership andappointing two persons as receivers.The appellate court initially
dismissed19the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTCwhen it denied
the Lu Ym father and sons’ motion to dismiss and because of the prematurity of the petition onthe
issue of receivership (since there was still a motion for reconsideration pending before the
RTC)December 20, 2001, the CA granted22the Lu Ym father and sons’ petition and, thus, dismissed
the complaintfiled by David Lu, et al. for the parties’ (except David Lu) failure to sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping.On October 8, 2002, the Lu Ym father and sons fileda Manifestation and Motion
praying for the immediatelifting of the receivership order over LLDC. It turned out later that
David instituted a special civil action forCertiorari and Prohibition with the CA, with Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writof Preliminary Injunction, on the sole
issue of whether or not the RTC should proceed to hear the Lu Ym fatherand sons’ motion to lift the
receivership.
On December 4, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution temporarily restraining the RTC from
conducting anyproceeding in SRC Case No. 021-CEB.29On February 27, 2003, the appellate court
finally resolved to grant thepetition and ordered the RTC to desist from conducting any proceeding
relating to the receivership over LLDC.The court concluded that the proceedings on receivership could
not proceed without the parties complying firstwith the earlier court order which required the parties
to amend their pleadings.On March 31, 2003, David filed a Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to
the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, which the court admitted on July 18,
2003.On March 1, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision33on the merits of the case, annulling the
issuance of LLDC’s600,000 shares of stocks thereby divesting the Lu Ym father and sons of their shares
and canceling theircertificates of stocks. The court further ordered the dissolution of LLDC and the
liquidation of its assets.Aggrieved, the Lu Ym father and sons seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal to CA
raising the question of jurisdictionof RTC to hear the case since David did not pay the prescribed
docket fees.RULING:In G.R. No. 170889, John Lu Ym and LLDC explain that while it may be possible to
raise the issue of docket fees intheir appellants’ brief as suggested by the CA, it would already be too
late because the issue would be renderedmoot and academic by the dissolution of the corporation.
They further question the propriety of the creation ofthe management committee, arguing that there
was non-observance of substantive and procedural rules. As tothe issue of estoppel, they claim that
they first raised the issue of docket fees only in their motion forreconsideration before the CA
because they had yet to await the OCA’s response to their inquiry on the correctdocket fees. Lastly,
they argue that David et al. are now precluded from paying the correct docket fees by thelapse of the
prescriptive period. Neither can a lien be created on the judgment in lieu of dismissal.63In short, John
and LLDC seek the dismissal of the initial complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdictionoccasioned
by the insufficient payment of docket fees.In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal
prayed for because of the following reasons:First,the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the correct docket fees werepaid.Second, John and LLDC are
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because of theiractive participation in the
proceedings below, and because the issue of payment of insufficient docket fees hadbeen belatedly
raised before the Court of Appeals,i.e., only in their motion for reconsideration.Lastly, assumingthat
the docket fees paid were truly inadequate, the mistake was committed by the Clerk of Court who
assessedthe same and not imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any, the same may instead
be considered a lienon the judgment that may thereafter be rendered.The Court had, in the past, laid
down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an action isincapable of pecuniary
estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If theaction is
primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation.However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, the money claimbeing only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable ofpecuniary estimation.65In the current controversy, the main purpose
of the complaint filed before the RTC was the annulment of theissuance of the 600,000 LLDC shares of
stocks because they had been allegedly issued for less than their parvalue.Thus, David sought the
dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/managementcommittee.66To be
sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment
ofreceivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of
money. If, in the
end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of
such principalaction. Therefore, the case before the RTC wasincapable of pecuniary
estimation.Accordingly, John’s and LLDC’scontention cannot be sustained. And since David paid the
docket fees for an action the subject of which wasincapable of

BELTRANG.R. No. 85879September 29, 1989NG SOON, vs. HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

FACTS:Applying the Manchester ruling, the respondent Judge ordered that petitioner's Complaint for
reconstitution of a savings account, and payment of damages and attorney's fees, be expunged; and
that the case be dismissed.The savings account was maintained with the China Banking Corporation
(CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are respondents. Petitioner claims to be the latter's widow.The
respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint." on the
ground that the amount of the alleged damages were not stated and that the statement “the amount
equivalent to twelve percent payable to her” is indefinite, and the statement “not less than
P50,000.00 merely fixes the minimum amount. The judge granted the defendant’s Motion to expunge
complaint.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:WON the doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent
Judge

RULING:Yes. The Court states that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify
the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any
pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall,
otherwise, be expunged from the record.While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint
below was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the
prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and
not less than P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled
the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees payable.