Four that >say last nof sof This mal Chaim Perelman cal theory are sure to featu vey may dominate an account of rhetorical dominate Wilbur We will jions to contemporary rhetoric in chapter seven: jose of Perelman. examine Burke's the focus here will bea ee errr errno nnn IO nese 102 Chapter Five Chaim Perelman was born in Warsaw, Poland, on May 20, 1912; his family moved to Belgium in 1925. Perelman was exposed to the study of rhetoric in secondary school. He was introduced to Richard Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric (1828), among other works, and he studied such di- verse topics as the syllogism and figures of style— topics that later seemed to Perelman to be conspicuously unrelated to one another: “Since then I have often wondered what link a professor of rhetoric could possibly discover between the syllogism and the figures of style with their exotic names that are so difficult to remember."”” Perelman completed his education at the Free University of Brussels, where he earned a doctorate in law in 1934 and ‘a doctorate in philosophy in 1938. Perelman was a man of action as well as a man of ideas. During the second World War, he was a leader of the resistance movement in Belgium ‘and, at the conclusion of the war, he was offered a number of medals for heroism. He refused them, saying, ‘My heart was on fire. 1 simply picked Lup a pail of water to douse the lames. I want no medals.”” After the war, he returned to the Free University as a professor of logic, ethics, and meta- physies. Later, he served as director of the Center for the Philosophy of Law and the National Center for Logical Research. Since then, he received honorary degrees from the University of Florence and the Hebrew Univer sity of Jerusalem. Because of his interest in law, Perelman studied the nature of justice early in his professional career; these studies led him to develop a concept he calls justice." He defines formal justice as “a principle of action in accordance with which beings of one and the sume essential category must that application of f values ‘be treated in the samme way." Perelman soon discovered this principle to particular cases led immediately to questions of How do we reason about values?” 1 found the answers provided by about values and reason to be highly unsatisfactory. He himself could think Of no way to resolve questions of value on rational grounds: ‘Indeed, as T ely accepted the that one cannot draw an ‘ought’ from an > a judgment of value from a judgment of fact —I was led inevitably (0 weNew Rh Idee of Justice and the Problem of Argument, ira John Pettis Chaim Perelman value udgrents, rest ; ston any rational foundation.” the stan flaw andro fund quinine oe yo logically compares ne value to another o be ones tha could Similar to Kant’ If Home is ight na sm cannot provide a basis for either science or morals eine ras, must we not hen look to other empirical methods to justify them?"’ Perelman then set out to dis secre those methods might be. sscover what Perelman and his colleague, Lucie Of ue, Lisi Olbrechts-Tytea, decided to the method used by German logician Ge suo suded xaos of reasoning used by mathem: and Olbrechts-Tytec simitany decided d cided to investigate the ways authors in diverse elds use argument to reason about values These methods ined ea fic examples of argumentation texts concerning questions of Value; they aso. studied specific examples of pollie! di 19 juny their deistons fons about mates of value Mme. L. Olbrechts-Tyteca and I cor a Perelman explained: ducted such an “For almost ten year inquiry and analysi Tanored and despised, I 2 dstngihed from % anayks which Tops ard On Sophie Refute We called new, or revived, branch of ne thats ofinormal reasoning henew one? ss ee oe Their study was rest Ketones A Treas on Argument in 199, According tothe editors of The Grea! Ideas Todo, “more than any singe tem, this work aroused rencwed interea nthe nea fo ion of The New Rhetoric was published, but before ° ir of the Department of Philosoph of the Department of Speech. "1 was very pe oF 1 knew nothing of “spec 1 chose asnnn sn” |r CL, 104 Chapter Five prepare my lessons, because I did not know what the preoccupations of the mer ‘the Department of Speech were."”” Priors hsv To Ameria, Perelman sumed tha chore and are “4 ry exis f a univer Perelman concluded, he knew nothing ‘‘of the very existence ot rofession in the United States devoted to the study and teaching of rhetoric {Speech Communication). Later, he explained his eater conclusion as the speech communication field since that time. His, the profession was marked by his attendance at the sensi oo Ass 'ion in Louisville annual convention of the Speech Communic: in 1982. ; 5 . ‘On December 5, 1983, a law was passed in Belgium making Perelman Baron in recognition of his work in philosophy and of the renown he had brought to his native land, Following a dinner to celebrate the honor with some of his close friends, on January 22, 1984, Perelman died of a heart attack in his home. Need for a New Rhetoric Pete fl that a new approach to thr was nesded because thetoric stressed matters of style at the expense of matters of rationality, ‘The contemporary state of disrepute of rhetoric is due to this problem, Perelman beleves, a problem he traces to Grose: the aces thet nique for use bythe common man clusions \out first of all taking the trouble of a Ths, because rhetoric seemed to be i with matter of rationality, the concerned more with matters of ssl thn with mat subject has not been one that hisorially has commanded respet pati. tary among philosophers, Perlman traces the connection of thetorc oye (and thus ots current leadg analysis. of the epideltc or Argumenttion, ‘of Notre Dame (Chaim Perelman ic ceremonial form of oratory." Aristotle divided rhetoric of oratory. Forensic oratory or judi laws it is concerned with matters of the past such as whether or not a ee act has or has not occurred. Deliberative oratory, ot speaking in a legisla, tive assembly, is concerned ters of the Future, such as what courses of action are advisable. Epideictic oratory, or ceremonial speaking, such se a fourth-of-July address, concerns speaking about matters of praise and blame. The audiences of both forensic and deliberative oratory were expected to judge the speech on the merits ofits content. “Was it or was it not true that & certain person had committed an act of murder?” was a question that ‘might concern the forensic speaker. not advisable for the state to enact this policy or that policy?” might be the question a deliberative speaker must answer. In ic oratory, however, the audience was ex- ected to judge on the basis of the orator’s skill: “Such set speeches were often delivered before large assemblies, as at the Olympic Games, where competition between orators provided a welcome complement to the athletic contests. On such occasions, the only decision that the audience was called upon to make concerned the talent of the orator, by awarding the crown to the victor.”” While deliberative and forensic speaking were con, cerned with matters of policy and fact, epideictic oratory was concerned with matters of value. Since it was concerned with values, no standards for judging the content of the speech supposedly existed; thus, audiences had to be instructed to judge on matters of skill This clasical treatment of rhetoric seemed to indicate that audiences, al- though capable of judging matters of fact and policy on their merits, were incapable of judging matters of value in the same way. Because epideicti¢ oratory, the form of speaking most closely associated with values, was judged on style instead of content, Perelman felt the need for a theory of argument in s could be assessed rationally —in the same way as facts and policies. He believes that questions of value are especi tant to rhetoric: “The epid from an educational point of (00 has an effective and distine- of bringing about a consensus in the minds of the audience regarding the values that are celebrated in the speech." How 4 speaker achieves assent with an audience became of particular interest to Perelman, and the topic was one he felt best could be dealt —rather than law or philosophy. by rhetoric "ada 's analysis of epideitic, del and foresie oratory is dscused in Perelman and Olbrechs-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 47-1; and Perna, "The New Rhee Pp. 277-75,ES” LAA AAA AAA ae Chapter Five Argumentation and Logic sccan’s theory of rhetoric sa theory of argumentation. Arguments tion is separate and di stinct from demonstration or formal logic. ‘Demon- A rr ego Perdana ealclaon made accordance ee ess aid down beforehand,” whe “arguments iin ayo he are eis a “nd nee he mrs airenatcal language such as that contained fn the mathematical ila cd whe angueation snes the nua mbes 1eguseuf hanns Sach dononatan allows Yo nede «cn ere om reman wehe aruen "sig er Glsion by reasoning om Ducato aempis fo produce adhetence 10 CHS primary difference between argumentation and demonstration, accor 10 Pecan, ta danommteeton inerona, whi Suncor peno, Demos oy al Bs bcd Scoring tt ht ae ted 0 peopl, bu ran tion is a person-centered _activit calculation —the deduction of formally valid conclusions by conforming to par of argumentation is not calculation, bout seeking. adherence 10 a thesis, which presupposes @ “mesting of minds.""* The conclusion of demonstration is assumed to be certain while the conclusion of an argument js a probable one. Demonstration begin with axioms that are assumed to be true regardless of an audience's agre mn, on the other hand, is personal because it Jes see Perelman the ditferences between demonstration and fort xa, The New Rhetoric, pp. 1:17; Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, IRL ‘concent of audience include: John W. Kay, “Pere ral of Speech, 64 (December 1978), 361-75; ental State Speech Journal Chaim Perelman 107 tion must be planned in relation to an audience: ‘a speech must be heard, as 4 book must be read."""” Sometimes, groups such as scientists pretend they do not address an audience and that they merely report the facts. Such an ide is contrary to Perelman's perspective on rhetoric since it “rests on iusion, widespread in tific circles, that speak for themselves.”"* The perspective on thetoric presented by Perelman insists that facts do not “'speak."" “Facts” only become facts when an audience consents to call them facts. A central notion in Perelman’s perspective on rhetoric is the idea that in order for argumentation to occur, a contact of the minds or, in Perelman's words, a “formulation of an effective community of minds” must exis This meeting of the minds is an intellectual contact that requires people engaged in argumentation to share some frame of reference. In some cases, of course, contact of minds can be inadequate, Perelman uses the example of Alice in Alice in Wonderland to show how failure to have this contact of ‘minds results in ineffective or non-existent argumentation, Alice was unable to communicate effectively with the characters in Wonderland because the rules of conversation there were so different from those in Alice's natural environment; a shared frame of reference between speaker and audience did not exist." How is “‘audience" to be defined? Is it to be limited (0 the audience to whom the speaker physically is speaking? Perelman does not impose this ing that “‘a member of Parliament in England must address himself to the Speaker, but he may try to persuade those throughout the country.” At the same time, however, si ations exist where the speaker may choose to ignore certain persons to ‘whom argumentat actually addressed because they are beyond appeal. speech. Perelman divides the audience into two types— particular and universal ‘pp. 9.20; and Perelman, “The New Rhetoric,” pp. 14s, "Perelman and Olbrechs-Teca, The New Rhetoric . 19.Fe eee erent ee eect ee eee eo Chapter Five sae(universal dudience is composed of all reasonable and competent pecple particular audience is any group of people whether or not they are Feasonable or competent. His notion ofthe particular audience may range Trem people who. are physically present and who are addresed at a particular time to a specifie group of persons whom the speaker is tempting to influence. The particular audience for a politician, for example, may include all of the voters ofthe precinct, although the speech is presented only 10 an assembly of the League of Women Voters. For a Goctor, a particular audience may be the patient, although the entice Family ispresent. In contrast tothe particular audience, the universal audience “may be all of humanity, or atleast all those who are competent and reasonabl which may isalf be made up of an infinite variety of particular audienc ‘The universal audience is x mental concept that the speaker construc thus, every culture and pethaps every speaker has afferent universal audience. The universal audience generally s not an elite audience or even fan audience of experts ina subject area, Those who wish to appeal to elite audiences well may consider ete audiences to be above common peop “the elite audience embodies the universal audience ony for those who knowiedge this role of vanguard and model, For the fst it will be no more than a particular audience. The status ofan audience varies with the con- cepts one has of it" An elite audience may or may not conceptualize the universal audience, depending on the atitude ofthe speaker. "The universal audience doesnot have to be composed of many peopl can be one person or one’s own sof. Argumentation before a single hi “does not depend upon the number of persons who hear the speaker but ‘upon the speaker’ mn: does he want the adherence of some or of every reasonable The speaker may envisi speech is delivered—even in an inst erelman, The Reo of Rhetoric, p18, ‘Chaim Perelman 109 Speaker. First, it serves as an aid in the choice of argument as a “metaphor which functions as an inventional too egins ora tees or speaker dudience and Irom that concer the types of appeals that seem most appre ‘appeals and argument, the ually ising the alent, nivel parte, werd whoa he argumentation is dred. The conception of the aience th speaker in selectic ‘appeals anc is isa Seatoe tie spat in selection of prea and hss ol lin he nnn a he 'N second purpose ofthe universal audience isha it serves asa standard for differes 8 “good arguments’ pad argumen This purpose seems to be more relevant to ore relevant to philosophical argument tha everyday argument. For philosophical arguments, the univer seine brovides a sense of rationality since the universal audience gheswseecn fod arguments and witholdy it from those cr doesnot consider rath and va must provide for vat Dhilsophic lain to rationality with plurality of philosophic spsems, we mus recognize that he apped to feason mus eerie es 8% an appeal oa single uth but instead as an appeal Tor adherence oak various aces varios menus af the uence use, varying concepions of what must be provide assent will be given. ee ‘The concep ofthe universal audience imp men depends on the thatthe quay o lity of the audience that a neti ce Of the universal audience theory. T that would convince trol is unwise The Starting Points of Argumentation ‘The purpose of argumentation is to move an audience from agreement n. Thus, the process of purpose 0 a conclusion. Innn nN tt 110 Chapter Five he aim of argumentation is not, like demonstration, to n from premises, but to transfer to the con- Pereiman's words, prove the truth of the cone! lusion the adherence accorded to the premises. h the con ‘gent, and unacceptable to an audience, the argument with premises the audience accepts. For example, a speaker may seek assent for a controversial thesis such as the value of a nuclear freeze by appealing to agreed-upon premises concerning the value of peace. Once the speaker hhas identified premises that the audience accepts, the next step is to cause ‘members of the audience to adhere to the speaker's co same way that they agree with the premises. This is accomplished by “the establishment of a bond between the premises and the theses whase accept ance the speaker wants to achieve." ‘A variety of points of agreement are avi ‘ment.”* Perelman distinguishes between starting points that deal with reality (facts, truths, and presumptions) and those that concern the preferable (values, hierarchies, and the foci of the preferable). Facts, truths, and pre- starting points of argumentation that deal with hs are “characterized by objects that already are agreed to by the universal audience."" Since something's status as a fact depends on agreement by the universal audience, no way exists “to define “fact” in such a manner that would allow us, at any time, to classify this oF that concrete datum as a fact.”” A fact is a fact due to the agreement accorded it by the universal audier actual” correspondence to he structures of reality is not the issue, universal agreement is achieved when persons perceive data to be ro hose structures of reality. “From the standpoint of argumentation,” Perelman asserts, “*we are con- if we ean post sontroverted, universal agree sumptions are among reality. Facts and tr hey are not subject 10 are justification, and an audience leged status in argumentation ed for, the datum loses its status sat to cause that expects no rei that easily as a fact are dives in: Karl R, Wallace, "Tope" and the Speech, $8 (December 1972), 387-96: id OlbrehisTytca, The Neve 247-89 ci jim Perelman aa fact unless the speaker shows ‘that the person who opposes him is mis- 0 0, Ie there is no reason to take fe latter's opinion the status of a To summarize, a Tat Toss its privileged status 38 fact wl conclusion rather than the stating point of argument, While arpuoneny conclusions are uncertain and cont the starting points of argumenta- arse than, agement is rebel the ein ta defines a nthe das pir to Christopher Columb, for sample waka Bra aa eee the: garth was flat. This idea was granted the ' enduring truth, but Because ofthe agree pets at stl to fay Boame bth enjoy univer agree lina ss he erm at retr pata dat and he en ter to Sme broader prince coneting ats (0 oe anther diferent in that rats involve "more complex systems eating to ree facts. They may be scientific theories or piosonta ous conceptions.” Perelman takes no. poston resasding i Primacy of facts and truths in his argumentative schema, Beak one Starting points of argument that are concerned withthe nature of reality, A third starting point of argument bearing on the nature of rr one's view ofthe way things ae ia presumption, Presumption and truths, enjoy universal agreements "We ha tions with what happens and with what ean reasonably be cote gee Unik fac and tits, however, the audiences adherence 10 pee tons fas short of ting maximum: thi, presumption can be ean 9 argumentation. Speakers engage in preliminary arburne npresump example, audiences expect good people to com: cxample, 00d people to commi supposed to accept the presumption of innoc of innocence on the part ofthe defen: di Of course, a presumption such as this does not last forever ind ough jury members are othe The Nev Rhetoric. p69. 24,mm Chapter Five also are informed that it can be overturned by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Presumptions, then, are overturned when they are shown to be con- trary to facts. In summary, the starting points of argument concerned with re: involve facts, truths, and presumptions, which enjoy agreement by the ut versal audience. Facts and truths are accorded a higher status, however, because, unlike presumptions, they do not require reinforcement in the minds of the audience. While facts, truths, and presumptions are starting points of argument dealing with reality, the next group of starting points—values, hierarchies, and /oci of the preferable—bear on the preferable.”* The statement that “Denver is a large city,” for example, would be classified as a fact Perelman’s schema, In contrast, the statement that “large cities are unde- sirable places’” would be classified as a value. Both sets of ideas are starting points for argumentation; the primary difference between them facts, truths, and presumptions deal with matters of reality, while values, hierarchies, and /oci deal with matters of preference. Although facts, truths, and presumptions hold the adherence of the universal audience, values, hierarchies, and foci hold only the adherence of particular audiences. Some values, such as truth or beauty, seem to be ones ‘might secure the adherence of the universal audience. But Perelman that these values are not made spe- sular case, the adherence of ices is all that one reasonably can expect. He maintains that their *‘claim to universal agreement ...seems to us to be due solely to their generality. They can be regarded as valid for a universal audience only on condition that their content not be specified; as soon as we try to go into y. for example, may be 3k expect someone to tell Perelman divides values into two types—the abstract and the concrete. Values are called abstract when they are not attached to a particular person and the “American way” are examples ion, or object. For example, in general, becomes conerete when we attach it to a part person ina claim that “Superman is a good person because he fights for “ruth, ‘and the “American wa) People who argue for the status quo, according to Perelman, are more y to begin their arguments with concrete values because concrete values Wales, hicrarchies, and foc! of the preferable ate discussed in Perelman and Olbrechs: Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 74-99; and Perelman, The Realm af Rhetoric, pp. 26-32. “Perelman and Olbrecis-Tylca, The New R 1%. ‘Chaim Perelman 1 13 rengcore Persuasive when “‘one wishes to preserve than when one wishes to id, those who argue for change are m: BE are more likel with abstract values: “Abstract values can ed for criticism, because they are no respectors of per seem to provide criteria for one wishing to change te esbished itistarchies are even more important to argumentation than are sales Herarchies— also starting points dealing with the preferable refer to ng way values are arranged in terms of importance, asin the “supertory et over animals, of gods over men" or in the importance of a ait Sree reedom of the press. Selecting values that audiences accep usual simple matter; determining how that audience com, ple ma : compares one value another much more difficult: “Most values are indeed shared bya great umber of audiences, and a particular audience is characterzea men values i accep than by the way rade thea Ween ee ted by many different audi mut the mite by many the degree of their acceptance Value hierarchies help to clarify the and concrete values because an abstract hierarchy among concrete values. The ab. a dualism is related to two @ concrete manner. As in the case of values, hierarchies a concrete hierarchy speci objects. The superiority ofthe oo useful isan example ofan absirat hierarchy Becae thse ene applied to particular objects. mai so are cased by Perlman as homoge lomoreneous an hte mogencous hierarchy is one that compares sit ° for example, the danger of amid ines compurcde gence th walt af diferent ony in dg, tee herr ae lsermine. More of # good thing susp Gene thing is preferred. : Peter ‘A heterogeneous hierarchy is more d are diferent and often may come truth may come into con, Tor ex friend whos wearing «postvely sgh of my drew?” The answer Value hierarchy re just as since the values conflict. The values of honesty and imple, when you are approached by a ly dress; she asks, ‘What do you think this question illustrates your h values of honesty and kindness. The need fe ichies, particularly heterogeneous ones, is iman and Olbrechis-Tyteca, The New Rh 1. The New Rhetoric p79. "relman and Olbrechis Tyteca, The New Rhetorn btna Chapter Five ument related to the preferable that he calls “loci.” Loci, also cal "ha important pin about oi hs within nr ae argument tha ate incompatible ih one another, ssh a refresh Te lasting and a preference for that which is brief and fleeting. ee one someone might vale alone Sse aig 2 eetingreltonship for incompatible ‘The is used by the person who argues for the greatest mber. The general loci of quality, in contrast, is ‘general foci of q good for ive matter; most people prefer to hav The value of certain co to deal with, ‘der as a as what strong or weak an ight leave them indi Perelman's sider the res any audience properly, a speaker SHOU <0 Shes. hirarehes and ol ofthe preferable that are acepable 0 that nudlence iman, The Realm of Rhetoric. pp. 290. Rhetoric," p 288. Perelman 1s Choice, Presence, and Communion Because Perelman’s perspective includes a variety of starting points and a Focus on the audience, choice is an important factor in his conception of argumentation. Unlike the mathematician or the computer engaging in ana- ical reasoning, the speaker engaging in argumentation must choose from among the premises available as potential starting points. concept of choice leads Perelman to a discussion of another impor- tant element in his perspective on thetoric—the concept of presence. When a speaker has a variety of elements of argumentation from which to ‘choose, “‘the orator must select certain elements on which he focuses atten. tion by endowing them, as it were, with a ‘presence.’ Certain elements in our perception, depending upon the situation, can seem more important or special than other elements. The elements that are present in our mind are the most important, of course, while those that are absent are less impor. tant. Presence, then, is “the displaying of certain elements on which the Speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the fore: ‘round of the hearer’s consciousness."""" One way to explain the notion of presence is by using the metaphor of figure and ground. A person standing on a mountain top looking intova valley may see trees, a lake, a stream, along with other objects, When that Person focuses on, for instance, a tree, the tree becomes the figure and the Fest of the objects become the ground, Perelman might say tha, in this case, the tree has achieved "presence" in that person's perception. of argumentation is to create prese trate this concept, Perelman tells of a Chinese story in which a “king sees.an ox on its way (0 sacrifice. He is moved to pity for it and orders that sheep be used in (0 establish pr the speaker is acting on the senses of the audience in order to move that audient Establishing the presence of Philosophy and Rhetortc, (5 Rhetoric, pp. 115-82; and Perelman and Olbvech-Tyteca, The New of Rhetoric, pp. 33-40, p28 ‘Perelman and Olorechis-Tyteca, The New Re “Pesehman, The Realm of Rheorie p34 R An, "The New Rhetor oni, BS 1a, Iman and Olbrechs-tyteca, The New 2p. 28,a rf Chapter Five elements of argumentation that are physi present are more important to argument since they are the most persuasive, but Perelman warns us a his belief. Often, he claims, the most per- suasive ideas are more abstract and are not represented by physical n these cases, the techniques of presentation aimed a speaker who establishes such communion is more likely to be persuasive than a speaker who does not. For example, a speaker might establish com- ‘munion with a group of members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars by ducing a speech by referring to his own experiences in World War notion of communion reasserts Perelman’s notion that the starting point of igreement. introduces various techniques of presentation—or st presence and communion. argument Perel. aspects of argi The present problems of language. Choice of terms to express the speaker's thought is, rarely without significance in the argumentation.”” He claims that the argu- mentative intent of a speaker often is conveyed by the choice of one word. over another. For example, when a person is described as “having a tendency to mislead,” the meaning communicated is different than when man and Olbreshte-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. erelman and Olbrechi-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. Chaim Perelman 47 that same person is described as a For the speaker, argum: exists because the language of logic mm, many choices exist because human ind thus inherently ambiguous. The study of argu- lust take into account the study of human language and . In Perelman’s words, The speaker's presentational techniques and the choices, of course, are interrelated. A speaker's pres may be aimed at securing a pa in techniques to establish the pr The speaker creates presence for a par the foreground of consciousness. formed of this play of innumerable jos and ofthe sragle fo mpase some of them ange oF sumentation may succeed or fail depending on whether 1€ Sf ris su i aoe the speaker i suc in choosing techniques that achive pesee ot Techniques of Argumentation ion in the form of a isference to the conclusion of the adherence ac- le argumentation in the form of dissociation 's which language or a recognized tradition havene (Chapter Five ‘Techniques of Lisison The technique of liaison seeks to establish a bond between the starting points of argument and the speaker's thesis. For example, the speaker might take as a starting point the presumed value of human life and attempt to ereate a liaison or bond between human life and the act of abortion in order to convince an audience that abortion is immoral, Perelman claims that three techniques of argumentation are used to create liaison: quas ‘arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and arguments that attempt to establish the structure of reality. they differ from formal ogi Structure and because they seek audience adherence rather tion. Perel ct suasive force from thei ical forms. Since people are inclined to accept claims based on “logic,” this type of argument seems particularly Persuasive. Perelman provides a variety of examples of this type of argument, one of which is the argument of reciprocity. Using such an argument, a person might claim that capi ment for a murderer because the pu Quasi-togical arguments best express the difference between logic and argument. In formal logic, a contradiction consists of two statements that inconsistent with one anol argumentation is, similar to contradiction in formal occur when we find ourselves faced with a posi one. A child, for instance, is faced wi Id can tell a vough instructed by his teacher never to do so by rationalizing, for example, that this is only a “tittle white lie."” One cannot escape contradic- 0 Arguments Based on the Structure of Reality. After quasi-logical argu ‘ments, Perelman considers arguments based on the structure of reality. Two kinds of these arguments include associations of succession and associa. tions of coexistence. Perelman claims that these are two different ways of in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthut Advances in Argumentation Theory (Carbondale; Southern Iliois Press, 1982), pp. 78:94, Chaim Perelman 119 ‘example of an association of succession is the “ Which exemplifies argumentation relevant to consequences. Suclean argu- docneeresumes that the value of an act can be determined by its exon, tment pea rotuce a good reason for an action using the pragmatic arg, For Saasmaker would argue thatthe action will ead to good consequences, For example, a speaker might argue that ce because itis successful asa deterrent to crime. ‘The second type of asso volves associa phenomena on di * Perelman calls the argur act the “prototype case of such a i developed by claiming is accepted by might claim was s0. Aecording in the absence of argum better types of arg Arauments that Establish the Structure of Reality. Associations of suc- ased on the structure of reality; the nts that attempt to establish the structure of into two broad types: (1) argumentation by ‘and (2) argumentation by analogy. _\rgumentation by example consists of using examples to create a gener It presumes the e: among cases, and by pres- incing an audience of those the argument that professors are absent minded cw Rhetoric,” p. 293, The Realm of Rhetoric. $0.7 Chapter Five ‘can be developed by showing an audien« cons loses his keys, Professor Riley constantly misplaces her briefcase, and Professor Hollihan never can find a pen when he needs one. Aside from ‘moving from a particular case (o a general statement, ar from ‘example can be used to move from particular cases to other par cases. For example, a speaker would argue in this way when asserting that since capital punishment did not reduce the incidence of murder in Texas, it could not be expected to do so in Colorado. by example serves to establish a prediction or a cases in which a rule need to be generally accepted, the others, once the .ccepted, will in turn be supported ‘Argumentation by model aims at present for example, you make the argument that the qualities of a id in Professor Davis, you are not establish- teachers are like Professor Da\ sive the audience a model of a teacher that it profitably cou! ‘Another example of argumentation by model concerns the ideal of legal that previous court opinions are worth imi can be used; such an argument co ted but to be avoided. snts designed to establish the yn by analogy and metaphor. An gain adherence about the relation- ing a generalization that “*phoros” of the analogy). A met ‘a condensed analogy in which the theme and phoros are fused. phrase, ‘the lion charget understand metaphorical ‘metaphor is made expl tion to other people is as a lion in relation to other ‘metaphorical expressions become so commonplace that we actually forget wwe are dealing with metaphors. The ‘*foot™ of a mountain or the “‘arm”” of ‘are metaphors that are so commonly used that we tend to Chaim Perelman 124 such an instance, “life in general mi "fein general” maybe dined oinclde alo growth ranging from an amoeba to plant ofan ane vite “human life" is defined ar con b in general destroys life when picking a head of cabbage in the same way one joving an appendix from consists ofthe es the form of Ferm acini nthe above crample, Corresponds ote land was dsoiated fom “huey hu, term Il derstood only in comparion to tere 1 ingrid of the incompatibiltes 5 different aspects of term 1.""" e that may appear between is more impersonal. Argut audience, and the aim of argument cases, the audience is a particula audience. The universal audience, to argumentat tes the highe ker sar with points of rath, and presumptions ‘nature of the real, while other st: : ar evant tthe : aring points such a lus, hierarchies, and foe ofthe preferred oncern the wate of he “*Perciman, The Revi of Rhetori, p 127.Chapter Five preferable, A thetor, then, attempts to transfer the agreement accorded these starting points to a thesis that may be contingent or controversial. ‘This is accomplished by attempting to influence the audience's choice of particular interpretations, establish presence, and secure communion with the audience. Perelman then discusses a variety of techniques aimed at accomplishing. these argumentative aims. Three techniques of argumentat logical arguments, arguments based on the structure of rei ‘arguments establishing the structure of reality—it ‘on between the starting points of argument and the speaker's thesis, The technique of dissociation involves dividing concepts that wise would produce a conclusion incompatible with the speaker's thesis. Responses to Perelman While many scholars find the work of Perelman useful for extending our ideas about rhetoric, others have found some of his ideas in need of improvement. The sms of Perelman's perspective have been ‘aimed at his notion of the universal audience. Some have found this notion to be so ambiguous as to render it all but useless.”" Johnstone has argued that Perelman’s theory would be no worse if the notion of the uni audience (in fact, the entire notion of audience) were ignored completely: s and perplexities in the concept of the universal audience make me wonder whether the concept is after all really necessary to the project that the authors of The New Rhetoric have undertaken. What Ray argues that the imperative... The concept of the universal audience is open to ms teveled against the general will and the cat fay notes that the “Categorical Imperative" and the ‘General Wi providing standards for ethical theory; is excessively formal and abstract—too formal and abstract to provide a standard for rhetorical theory. Press of Man & World, Rays 361 Ray. p37 ‘Chaim Perelman Perelman published an essay in th designed to respond to some of his notion of the universal audience agai claiming that Ray and others have misint noted that a formalist poi Ie, he defended his criticisms such as those of Ray, ave misinterpreted his position. Perelman Of view to which he was opposed described in The New Rhetoric in such a sufficiently convincing manner ag tolead certain hetorical readers to consider it as expresing my own das claims that Ray's criticisms “would certainly be justified if they were ta sul of ale interpretation” of The New Rhea. spite these criticisms, the work of Perelman has be eth er an has been particular to scholarsntresedn retrial thought. May have been ale cork in ways that are consistent with the way that Perelman saw hor, “Tam happy ose tha certain hetoriians have bee tle uilize and extend my works, I think ofthe texts that | ii lexts that I know of Karl A. Wallace, of Louise A. Karon, and of J. Robert Con, which have cen enriched the theory of rhetorie. I am convinced that there sre works ny which [am unaware, but, above all, that there is a great deal more to do in this field.