G.R. No.
93867 December 18, The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.
1990
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs.  HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING
CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
  
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B.
Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989
coup d' etat attempt.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue in this case. What is
the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of the status of the
Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C,
Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where President Elpidio
Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the Commission on Elections and the Court
revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the
senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E.
Abueg, Jr.:-cralaw
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the
Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate
Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President
of the Philippines is necessary.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the
Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of
1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement,
however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by the President of the
Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of
the functions of the COMELEC.
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the operations of the
Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President of the Philippines had
not stepped in and designated an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem. In any
event, even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could) act to fill the hiatus," as
the Solicitor General maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will.
No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation of the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the
Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted
such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law library
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at will from her
permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced as
Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary
position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines
to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of
laws and not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections
themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have
been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice
and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of
motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain
her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the
Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections,
foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the
respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby
ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate Commissioners
of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so desire, or choosing another
member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142038               September 18,
2000
ROLANDO E. COLUMBRES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HILARIO DE GUZMAN,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated January 25,
2000 which affirmed the Resolution of the Second Division setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Election Case No. D- 31-98 annulling the election and proclamation of
private respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. as Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. were candidates for the
position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan during the May 11, 1998 elections. After canvassing, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent with 4,248 votes as against petitioner's 4,104
votes. Subsequently, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court docketed as Election
Case No. D-31-98. Petitioner contested 42 precincts and prayed for the revision of ballots in the said
precincts.
On December 7, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor of
San Jacinto, Pangasinan with 4,037 votes against 3,302 votes of private respondent.
Private respondent appealed the decision to the respondent COMELEC. The case was docketed as
COMELEC EAC No. A-20-98 and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.
On October 5, 1999, the Second Division promulgated its Resolution reversing and setting aside the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court and, instead, affirmed the election and proclamation of private
respondent. Private respondent was declared to have won by sixty-nine (69) votes.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the ruling of the COMELEC Second Division,
validating 120 marked ballots in favor of private respondent, despite absence of evidence, to prove that the
marks have been placed on the ballots by third persons other than the voters themselves. Petitioner likewise
moved for a reconsideration of the decision with respect to the 111 ballots found by the trial court to have
been written by two persons, but not so ruled upon by the Second Division, again in favor of private
respondent. Lastly, petitioner claimed that the Second Division erred in totally disregarding his other
objections and therefore urged the COMELEC EN BANC to review the findings of the Second Division.
On January 25, 2000, the respondent COMELEC En Banc issued its Resolution denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the Second Division.
In resolving petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the respondent COMELEC En Banc, in the herein
assailed Resolution, said:
"xxx Protestant-appellee alleges that there were 124 ballots which were written by two (2) persons, and as
such they should all be annulled. Instead, the Commission (Second Division) annulled only 13 ballots while
validating 111 ballots in favor of protestee-appellant Hilario de Guzman, Jr. Movant contends that the 13
ballots commonly invalidated by both the COMELEC (Second Division) and the trial court as having been
written by two persons were no different from the 111 ballots validated by the Commission (Second Division)
but invalidated by the trial court.
"x x x x x x x x x
"xxx The finding by the Commission (Second Division) that the 111 questioned ballots were written by the
same person is a finding of fact that may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Movant
protestant-appellee is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in this instance but the appreciation
thereof by the Commission (Second Division)." 1
"xxx Movant protestant-appellee (also) contends that there were 120 ballots erroneously validated by the
Commission (Second Division) which were admittedly marked. He argues that whenever ballots contain
markings very obvious and visible on their faces, the presumption is that the said markings on the ballots
were placed thereat by the voter themselves - thus nullifying the said ballots. Stated otherwise, protestant-
appellee argues that the purported markings on the questioned ballots are presumed to have been placed
there by the voters themselves and, unless proven otherwise, nullifies the ballots.
"We disagree. The movant is relying on an erroneous and misleading presumption. The rule is that no ballot
should be discarded as marked unless its character as such is unmistakable. The distinction should always
be between marks that were apparently, carelessly, or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot,
and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification of the ballot,
which invalidate it. (Cacho vs. Abad, 62 Phil. 564). The marks which shall be considered sufficient to
invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of
identifying it thereafter (Valenzuela vs. Carlos, 42 Phil. 428). In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a
person other than the voter himself does not invalidate the ballot as marked. (Tajanlangit vs. Cazenas, 5
SCRA 567)" 2
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises two issues:
1. Whether or not, the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially so in matters of appreciation of
ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc; and
2. Whether or not, in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent any
evidence aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by a third person, and therefore,
should not invalidate the ballot.
On the first issue, indeed, the COMELEC erred when it declared that
"xxx it is emphatic that the grounds of motion for reconsideration should consist of insufficiency of evidence
to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law. Nowhere in
the provision can finding of fact be the subject of motion for reconsideration. The finding by the Commission
(Second Division) that the 111 questioned ballots were written by the same person is a finding of fact that
may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Movant protestant-appellee is not challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence in this instance but the appreciation thereof by the Commission (Second
Division)."
3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads:
"Section 1. Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the
grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision, order
or ruling is contrary to law."
Commissioner Dy-Liaco, in her Dissenting Opinion, correctly opined, and we quote:
"I dissent in part from the majority conclusion that finding of facts on the one hundred eleven (111)
questioned ballots cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration considering that the movant
protestant/appellee 'is not challenging the sufficiency of evidence in this instance but the appreciation
thereof by the Commission (Second Division).' Protestant/Appellee in his discussion of his motion for
reconsideration (p. 205 of the records of the case/ p. 24 of the MR pleading) imploring the Commission En
Banc to review, re-examine and re-inspect the 111 ballots where the Trial Court and the Division disagreed
and make its own final findings and determination, in effect disputes the ruling of the Second Division
implying that the appreciation is contrary to law. Rule 19, Sec. 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
enumerates the grounds that may be raised in motions for reconsideration and one of which is that the
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law. Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision, order, or ruling is
not the only ground for the filing of motions for reconsideration. xxx
"When protestant/appellee argued that the appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is the implication
that such finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper subject of a motion for
reconsideration."
To determine the winning candidate, the application of election law and jurisprudence in appreciating the
contested ballots, is essential. Any question on the appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the declared winner. As the Solicitor General submits in his comment
on the petition, any question on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assailed decision, order or
ruling of a COMELEC Division is also a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
en banc.
Moreover, the opposing conclusions of the trial court and the COMELEC Second Division should have
prompted the COMELEC en banc to undertake an independent appreciation of the contested ballots to see
for itself which of the conflicting rulings is valid and should be upheld.
Be that as it may, it is our considered opinion, and we rule, that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion in declaring that the COMELEC Division's findings on the contested ballots are findings of facts
"that may not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration".
On the second issue, petitioner argues that the findings, both by the trial court as well as the COMELEC's
Second Division, are similar - that said 120 ballots (Exhs "R," "R-1" and series) indeed, had markings but the
trial court and the COMELEC Second Division differed in their conclusion. The trial court nullified the ballots
(supposedly in favor of herein private respondent) for being admittedly marked. On the other hand, the
Second Division declared the ballots valid because the marks were allegedly placed by third person/s,
purposely to invalidate the ballots. Petitioner alleges that respondent COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion in presuming that the markings found on the ballots have been made by third persons, absent
concrete evidence showing that they were placed by the voters themselves.
Petitioner is correct that there is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is that the
sanctity of the ballot has been protected and preserved. Where the ballot, however, shows distinct and
marked dissimilarities in the writing of the names of some candidates from the rest, the ballot is void for
having been written by two hands. A ballot appearing to have been written by two persons is presumed to
4 
have been cast "as is" during the voting, and this presumption can only be overcome by showing that the
ballot was tampered with after it was deposited in the ballot box.5
If the COMELEC Second Division found markings in the contested 111 ballots that were placed by persons
other than the voters themselves, then it should not have validated them. To rule the way it did, would
require a showing that the integrity of ballots has not been violated. Otherwise, the presumption that they
were placed "as is" in the ballot box stands.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General raised the following significant questions: "In the absence of showing
that the ballot boxes were violated and that somebody else had access to the ballots, how was the
COMELEC able to conclude that indeed said marks were placed by persons other than the voters?" Indeed,
the poll body is mum on how third persons were able to access the questioned ballots. Furthermore, the
COMELEC Second Division neither made a categorical finding as to whether the different markings on the
ballots were deliberately placed so as to sufficiently identify them or not. Yet, the COMELEC en banc
simplistically concluded that there was "nothing left for xxx it but to affirm the VALIDITY of the questioned
120 ballots in favor of protestee-appellant Hilario de Guzman, Jr."
In view of the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the COMELEC en banc was remiss in its duties to
properly resolve the Motion for Reconsideration before it. It should have given a close scrutiny of the
questioned ballots and determined for itself their validity, i.e., whether they were marked ballots or not. There
is truly a need to actually examine the questioned ballots in order to ascertain the real nature of the alleged
markings thereon. One has to see the writings to be able to determine whether they were written by different
persons, and whether they were intended to identify the ballot.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby remanded to the COMELEC en banc for it to physically re-examine the
contested ballots and ascertain their validity. It is further directed to resolve this case within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this decision in view of the proximity of the next elections.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139853               September 5,
2000
FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M.
SAULONG, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on August 31, 1999, in
COMELEC special relief case SPR No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed petitioner's petition to set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, dated October 1, 1998 and February 1,
1999, which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the election protest filed by private respondent against
petitioner and the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a "petition for annulment of
the proclamation/exclusion of election return". On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional
1 
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to dismiss private
respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of
action.2
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition
for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's election protest.
On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The election tribunal held that
private respondent paid the required filing fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a mere
technical defect which should not bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated
that there was no forum shopping to speak of.
Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is prohibited
except in a case involving an election offense. Since the present controversy involves no election offense,
3 
reconsideration is not possible and petitioner has no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Accordingly, petitioner properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with this
Court.
On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status quo ante  prevailing as of September
17, 1999, the date of filing of this petition.
Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction:
[I]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION
PROTEST DESPITE HIS (sic) LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME BY REASON OF THE
FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE REQUISITE FILING FEES.
[II]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT'S RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION
PROTEST DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AND ITS
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
[III]
...IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST BELOW ON
THE GROUNDS OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE
INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THEREOF. 4
In our view, notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of issues, the principal question presented for our
resolution is whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election protest.
At the outset, even if not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to resolve the question concerning
COMELEC's jurisdiction. Unless properly resolved, we cannot proceed further in this case.
Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc  or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Thus, in Sarmiento vs. COMELEC and in subsequent cases, we ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en
5  6 
banc,  does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by
the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not
referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission  en
banc.  The petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss private
respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is interlocutory because it does not end
the trial court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other. In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of
7 
election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not
on the COMELEC en banc. Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the
election protest. If the principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of
the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest
should not be referred first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution. Clearly, the COMELEC en
banc  acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first instance.
Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the petition herein is without
doubt meritorious and has to be granted. But in order to write finis  to the controversy at bar, we are
constrained to also resolve the issues raised by petitioner, seriatim.
Petitioner contends that private respondent's protest should have been dismissed outright as the latter failed
to pay the amount of P300.00 filing fee required under the COMELEC rules. Petitioner's contention is
8 
supported by Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and corresponding receipts itemized
9  10 
as follows:
P368.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 32.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;
P 46.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 4.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;
P 10.00 -- Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;
P 5.00 -- Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979
-----------
P465.00
Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his
protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752 was issued for
the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the entries in the cash book of the clerk of court. Thus, only
11 
P32.00 with OR 7022478 credited to the general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by private
respondent for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. Patently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent's election
12 
protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's protest
case.
We have in a string of cases had the occasion to rule on this matter. In Loyola vs. COMELEC, the clerk of
13 
court assessed private respondent therein the incorrect filing fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election
protest. Upon filing his counter-protest, petitioner was assessed to pay the same amount. Subsequently, the
trial court remedied the situation by directing the parties to pay the balance of P268.00. On review, we held
that the lapse was not at all attributable to private respondent and there was substantial compliance with the
filing fee requirement. The error lies in the Clerk's misapplication and confusion regarding application of
Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this Court's resolution dated September 4,
1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. An election protest falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, in which case the Rules of Court will apply, and that the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is primarily intended to govern election cases before that tribunal. But the Court declared
that this decision must not provide relief to parties in future cases involving inadequate payment of filing fees
in election cases. Our decisions in Pahilan and Gatchalian  bar any claim of good faith, excusable
negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases.
In Miranda vs. Castillo,  private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of P465.00 as filing fees.
Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P 10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for victim
compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was regarded as filing fee. The Court considered the
amount as partial payment of the P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required payment of the
deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the caveat  that in view of Pahilan,
Gatchalian, and Loyola  cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of
filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola  decision on March 27, 1997.
Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. And the dismissal
of the present case for that reason is, in our view, called for.
Besides, there is another reason to dismiss private respondent's election protest. We note that the
verification of aforesaid protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he
caused the preparation of his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations therein. Certainly,
14 
this is insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest are true and
correct of his persoral knowledge. Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be treated as an
15 
unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. 16
Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with the required certification against forum
shopping.  Private respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of
1âwphi1

election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a
petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.

It could be argued that private respondent's petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election
returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and
appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the municipal board of canvassers. But note that
such petition was filed after the proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no
longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the
winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be claimed with some reason that private
respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy, abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed. 17

Nonetheless, private respondent's belief that he no longer had a pending case before the COMELEC
because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the
pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that the COMELEC dismissed private respondent's pre-
proclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution.
Similarly, the fact that private respondent's protest was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-
proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required disclosure in the certification
against forum shopping. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to
comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The
rule applies to any complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party
filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing any initiatory pleading is required to swear
under oath that he has not and will not commit forum shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd
situation, as in this case, where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute
a violation of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might not
have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very purpose of the
rule.
18

Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuaded that respondent Regional
Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss private respondent's election
protest against petitioner. And to reiterate, respondent COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the
refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private respondent's election protest.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent

COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
September 21, 1999, is made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 42, is hereby ordered to DISMISS election protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143398               October 25, 2000
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION,
FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION) and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated June 15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division, giving notice to the parties of the promulgation of the resolution on the
1 
case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on
June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon and to prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from
promulgating the so called "Guiani ponencia." 2
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position of
Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of
3 
Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained
46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest number of votes, filed
with the Comelec, an election protest challenging the results in a total of 201 precincts. The case was
4  5 
assigned to the First Division (formerly Second), Commission on Elections. 6
On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the
case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito dissented. Commissioner Luzviminda
G. Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote but said that she would "wish to see both positions, if any, to
make her (my) final decision." 7
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service. On March 3, 2000,
the President of the Philippines appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the seat vacated by
Commissioner Guiani. Commissioner Javier assumed office on April 4, 2000.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received a purported resolution
promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner
Desamito dissenting. The result was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin
of 1,176 votes. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared that the thirteen-page resolution
8 
"is a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no promulgation
of the Resolution in the instant case." 
9
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon. However, on April 6, 2000,
10 
petitioner Ambil filed a motion to cancel promulgation challenging the validity of the purported Guiani
resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the same date, postponed the promulgation
until this matter is resolved.
11
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely, Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco
and Rufino S. Javier, sent a joint memorandum to Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, presiding
Commissioner, stating:
"Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to the Commission En Banc that
this case be submitted for a reconsultation by the members of the First Division, it is our position that we
promulgate as soon as possible the Guiani Resolution  of the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs.
Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G. R. No. 73777) and other doctrinal cases on the issue. After
all, this Commission stood pat on its policy that what is controlling is the date the ponente signed the
questioned Resolution as what we did in promulgating the case of Dumayas vs. Bernal (SPC 98-137).
"In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the subject resolution
and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en
banc or through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court. 12
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, issued an order
setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
13
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, petitioner interposed the instant
petition.
14
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the promulgation of the resolution of
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon, and prohibiting the Comelec,
First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and directing the Comelec, First Division, to
deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate the resolution reached in the case after such deliberation. 15
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Comelec from
implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the promulgation of the resolution set on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in
the afternoon. At the same time, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice.16
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment. Respondent Ramirez admitted that the proposed
17 
resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his retirement on February 15, 2000. He
submitted that Comelec, First Division, its membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest
case to the Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.19
In his comment filed on August 29, 2000, the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the petition. 20
At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." [emphasis supplied]
21  apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision
22 
or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
23  24  We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections, that "in a situation such as this where the
division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final
25  Commission on Elections in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of
resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. 26
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme
Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 27
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a
plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to
28 
abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. 29
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. Article IX-
30 
C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
"Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
18 
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a division may be raised to
the en banc via a motion for reconsideration. 31
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar. It is within the
32 
original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a
33 
reconsideration of the division’s resolution or final decision. In fact, there was really no resolution or decision
34 
to speak of  because there was yet no promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00
35 
o’clock in the afternoon. Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from an order of "promulgation of the
Resolution of this case" by the First Division of the Comelec. 36
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in
division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order
of the Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en
banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not
37 
the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the
Supreme Court. 38
39 
jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not
fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not
permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court." This is the case relied upon by the dissenting justice to support the proposition that
resort to the Supreme Court from a resolution of a Comelec Division is allowed. Unfortunately, the Kho case
40 
has no application to the case at bar. The issue therein is, may the Commission on Elections in
division admit an answer with counter-protest after the period to file the same has expired? The 41 
Comelec First Division admitted the answer with counter-protest of the respondent. The Supreme Court
declared such order void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. However, an important moiety in the Kho case was not mentioned in the dissent. It is that the
42 
Comelec, First Division, denied the prayer of petitioner for the elevation of the case to en banc because
the orders of admission were mere interlocutory orders. Hence, the aggrieved party had no choice but to
43 
seek recourse in the Supreme Court. Such important fact is not present in the case at bar.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15, 2000, which is a
mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29. We quote the order in question in
full, to wit:
"Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the Joint Memorandum
of Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier to the Presiding Commissioner of the
First Division dated 14 June 2000 paragraph 5 of which states:
‘In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the subject resolution and
let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or
through a certiorari case before the Supreme Court.’
the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday, June 20, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros, Manila.
No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be entertained.
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their Attorneys, notice of this Order
through telegram and by registered mail or personal delivery.
"SO ORDERED.
"Given this 15th day of June, 2000 in the City of Manila, Philippines.
FOR THE DIVISION:
[Sgd.] JULIO F. DESAMITO
Presiding Commissioner" 44
There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the resolution in the case, except in the mind of
suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in the order was the reference to the memorandum of the two
commissioners that was not necessary and was a superfluity, or excessus  in linguae. All the members of
the Division were incumbent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and had authority
to decide the case in the Division. What appears to be patently null and void is the so-called Guiani
resolution if it is the one to be promulgated. We cannot assume that the Comelec will promulgate a void
resolution and violate the Constitution and the law. We must assume that the members of the Commission in
Division or en banc are sworn to uphold and will obey the Constitution.
Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at bar. No one knows the contents of the
sealed envelope containing the resolution to be promulgated on June 20, 2000, simply because it has not
been promulgated!
It may be true that the parties received a copy of what purports to be the Guiani resolution, declaring
45 
respondent Jose T. Ramirez the victor in the case.  Such Guiani resolution is admitted by the parties and
considered by the Commission on Elections as void. The Solicitor General submitted an advice that the
same resolution is deemed vacated by the retirement of Commissioner Guiani on February 15, 2000. It can 46 
not be promulgated anymore for all legal intents and purposes.
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution is void for the following reasons:
First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly,
one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated
cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution
47 
or decision. The resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly
promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office, but when he
vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was
automatically invalidated. Before that resolution or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no
48 
valid resolution or decision to speak of.
49
Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First Division, Commission on Elections, denied the
release or promulgation of the Guiani resolution. He disowned the initials on the face of the first page of the
resolution showing its promulgation on February 14, 2000, and said that it was a forgery. There is no record
in the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a
"resolution on the main merits of the case was promulgated." 50
Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, disclaimed the "alleged thirteen
(13) page resolution" for being "a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties" there
being no promulgation of the resolution in the case. 51
Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her signature on the Guiani resolution. On the
date that it was purportedly promulgated, which was February 14, 2000, the Division issued an order where
Commissioner Tancangco expressed her reservations and stated that she wished to see both positions, if
any, before she made her final decision. 52
A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en banc is promulgated on a date previously
fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram. 53
It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation of a decision or resolution, the ponente
may change his mind. Moreover, in this case, before a final decision or resolution could be promulgated, the
54 
ponente retired and a new commissioner appointed. And the incoming commissioner has decided to take
part in the resolution of the case. It is presumed that he had taken the position of his predecessor because
he co-signed the request for the promulgation of the Guiani resolution. 55
If petitioner were afraid that what would be promulgated by the Division was the Guiani resolution, a copy of judicial intervention." The administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and correct the
60 

which he received by mail, which, as heretofore stated, was not promulgated and the signature thereon of errors committed in the administrative forum. Only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial
61 

the clerk of court was a forgery, petitioner could seek reconsideration of such patently void resolution and recourse be allowed. 62

thereby the case would be elevated to the Commission en banc. 56

Considering the factual circumstances, we speculated ex mero motu that the Comelec would promulgate a
void resolution.
"The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." We
must not speculate that the Comelec would still promulgate a void resolution despite knowledge that it is
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as heretofore stated, the exceptions do not
apply to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in Division.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. "Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
57 
fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on
lack of cause of action." 63

invalid or void  ab initio.

Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust
adequate administrative remedies available before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that "before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action."58
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity.
The Court orders the Commission on Elections, First Division, to resolve with all deliberate dispatch Election
Protest Case No. 98-29 and to promulgate its resolution thereon adopted by majority vote within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof.
The temporary restraining order issued on June 20, 2000, is hereby lifted and dissolved, effective
immediately.

No costs.
"This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration then is a pre-
requisite to the viability of a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can SO ORDERED.
convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question
is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application may cause great and
irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high government
official from whom relief is sought to act on the matter, and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot." 59

"This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principal of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a
legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
president bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of

G.R. No. 133486           January 28, 2000
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential
part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of
promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted
and publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems
in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
1 
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups,
its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable
Chairman to issue the same.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-
CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials particularly
for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body
2 
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized
Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed
the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported
by media without any difficulty or problem.
The Issues
Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order
enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during
the . . . May 11 elections."
3
In his Memorandum, the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1)
4 
mootness and (2) prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed
Comelec Resolution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
5 
Procedural Issues:
Mootness and Prematurity
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election
has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The
holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling
is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well
crop up again in future elections.6
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since7 
the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for
the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of
data derived therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust
available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when
8  9 
the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent
10 
and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. 11
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20)
days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under
the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift
resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition
involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari is therefore justified.
Main Issue:
Validity of Conducting Exit Polls
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters
whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey
are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the
opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had
not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass
media, committed to report balanced election-related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather
Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administrative regions."
It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting their results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding
and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's
constitutional rights.
Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely
abused its discretion. It insists that the issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory
powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve
and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might
unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of
people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which in turn may
result in "violence and anarchy."
Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve
the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the
12  13 
constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the
legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present
danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not
supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He insists that these polls
would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by
the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more
narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this
question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right
and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. . . . [T]his must be so
because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." 14
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech
15  16 
and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without
prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between
stability and change. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues
17 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. It means more than the right to approve existing political
18 
beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree
19 
with.
Limitations
The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Such freedoms could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all
circumstances. They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. While the
20  21 
liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.
In Cabansag v. Fernandez this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical test in determining the validity
22 
of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
 These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first, as
interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be
prevented. . . . 23
The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, . . . may be epitomized as follows: if the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance
be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. 24
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier
decisions in Primicias v. Fugoso and American Bible Society v. City of Manila; as well as in later ones, Vera
25  26 
v. Arca, Navarro v. Villegas, Imbong v. Ferrer, Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec and, more recently, in Iglesia
27  28  29  30 
ni Cristo v. MTRCB. In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court
31 
echoed the words of Justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character
that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only
be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be probable but
very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
33 
one's mouth or a restraint of a writing instrument. 34
Justification for a Restriction
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated
an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against
its validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech
35 
should be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been said.
36 
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. Thus:
37  opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
38
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 39
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed
is the dissemination of information meant. to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. We cannot
40 
support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech." When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or
41 
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free
elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen
and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in
the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. 42
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that
are safe and accessible. It has the duty to secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and
the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the people's freedoms of
speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may
be used to study influencing factors and trends in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be
unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election-day
projections, but also for long-term research. 43
Comelec Ban on Exit Polling
32
In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its
constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election. While admitting that
"the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] . . . an exercise of press freedom," it
argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to
the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow
confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly
unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count
made by the Comelec . . . is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of
the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls — disorder and confusion in
the voting centers — does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is
too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or
not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There
44  45 
is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.
Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election
precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose.
The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answer to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices. 1âwphi1.nêt
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was
46  purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This
to prevent the broadcasting of early returns, was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible,
and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state interest nor the least restrictive alternative.
Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to
justify speech regulation. Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason
that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is impermissible, so is regulating
speech via an exit poll restriction.47
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any
alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling. On the
other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding
or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey
groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting
center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse interviewed, and that the
interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive
clothing that would show they are not election officials. Additionally, they may be required to undertake an
48 
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the
ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The
ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus,
voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies
thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the
contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have
been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the
result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a
pollster of whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom
an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their
identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize
or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of
our people.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May
9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on
April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These
measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly
election.

For its part, petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly
selected in each province; (2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3)
only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed; (4)
the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day
after the elections. These precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be
49 

undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.

With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed
by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the
contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools
for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing,
fraud and other electoral ills.

Violation of Ballot Secrecy


G.R. No. 147066
AKBAYAN - Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA Q. PICAR,
MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE,
RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN
TABUCOL, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondents.
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147179 26 March 2001
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONER MEHOL
SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and
RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Election (COMELEC), respondents.
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 147066 and G.R. 147179.) before
us is the exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less
than by the fundamental law - the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new
voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's
Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if the Committee on
Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the
COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to
accommodate those who were not able to register before the COMELEC deadline. 1âwphi1.nêt
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant Resurreccion Z.
Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate Committee headed by Senator
Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only, excerpts of which are
hereto quoted:
"Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People's Participation presided by the
Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, new GSIS
Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request by youth
March 26, 2001 organizations to hold additional two days of registration. Thus, participating students and
civic leaders along with Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally
feasible to have a two-day additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on
February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration
under R.A. 8189 is December 27, 2000.
"To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for 'hakot system,' certain
restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as safeguard
against fraudulent applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be registering
for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and,
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records
"Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the actual
registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec filed officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters enumerator's
list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and,
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest political awareness and
interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the
 country among our youth. considering that they failed to register on December 27, 2000
deadline, they approved for special registration days.
"In viewing of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding
this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified
available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
(DEDO) for estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical side and logistical
requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED.
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and representatives,
and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of
the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of the ASD, to disapproved the request for
additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution N. 3584, the decretal portion:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters
on February 17, and 18 2001."
Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while Commissioners
Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students' request. With this impasse,
the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al.
filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. NO. 147066,
which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R.A.
8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and
others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration
petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General
Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the Philippines, likewise
filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that this Court direct the COMELEC to
provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election
code.
On March 13, 2001, this court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further required respondents to
file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001.
Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, recommended
that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at the soonest possible time "in order to
accommodate the disfranchised voters for purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections."
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-pronged
issue focusing on respondent COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2001,
which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have undermined their constitutional right to vote on the
May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement of around for four million Filipinos of
voting age who failed to register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC
Resolution dated February 8, 2001.
b. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of
mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the
hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and
framework of the Constitutions and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature,
which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from
ravishment and preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils
of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needles to say,
the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive
and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitutions provides:
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE
FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO
LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen
in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996."
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus,
contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a
mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly
and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent
and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations bear great weight in the
adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 or R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to
wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of application
of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election," (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R. A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within which to file a
sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter's list, provides:
"SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter,
representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior
to a regular election x x x."
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
"x x x. The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a
safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified
registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of
securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
"In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's registration is conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date.
If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list since we would already be well into
the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due
process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the
integrity of the voter's list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
"x x x. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom
might not even be qualified to vote, x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting
elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the
results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the
elections, regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own
results. x x x"
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers or "residual" powers
of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29, Republic Act No. 6646 (An act
introducing additional reforms in the electoral system and for other purposes) and adopted verbatim in
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election
system in the May 11, 1998 national or local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other
purposes), thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - if it should no longer
be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election
acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure
accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage."
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a)
of R. A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise meaning and coverage, thus:
"a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval
by the Election Registration Board."
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provision of Section 29 R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting each other, actually
share some common ground. True enough, both provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war
in relation to the other, are in more circumspect, perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and
reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the form of
amendments to a stature should be given effect, together with other parts of the amendment act. It is not to
be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic exercise. There
must be some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the
same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any
fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which
means that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws.
Accordingly, Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to
reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize
them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the
purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that
the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly and legally
conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section 28 of RA 8436. To this
end, the provisions of Section 28, RA 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are
susceptible of performance within the available period prior to election day. In more categorical language,
Section 28 of R.A 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain "pre-election acts"
are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and
the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC- which is the constitutional body tasked by no less that the
fundamental charter (Sec 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those involving the
right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of voters painstakingly and thoroughly
emphasized the "operational impossibility of conducting a special registration, which in its own language,
"can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission."
Hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in the
park for the COMELEC. Allow us to outline what the Commission has yet to do, and the
time to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The Projects
of Precincts indicate the total number of established precincts and the number of
registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final Project of
Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of official ballots, election
returns and other election forms and paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the
Project of Precincts, we won't know how many forms to print and so we're liable to come
up short.
21) More importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be impossible to
complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the 4th of
March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI - including the precinct where they
are assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located must be furnished by the
Election Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not later that 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration Records of
registered voters in particular precinct must be inspected, verified, and sealed beginning
March 30 until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and printed out of use on
election day; and finally
25.) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the voters Information sheet
must be completed on or before April 15.
26.) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the COMELEC will have roughly
a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen occurrences that might
delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind setting the 120-day prohibitive
period. After all , preparing for an election is no easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not- contrary to popular opinion- refer only
to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down. Registration is. In
fact a long process that takes about three weeks to complete, not even counting how long
it would take to prepare for the registration in the first place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the COMELEC, the other Commissioners,
prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the superimposition of special
registration would affect the on-going preparation for the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special registration on
April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in account the fact
that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms available, as against an
estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it would take about 14 days - if we were to
declare special registrations today - to print up the difference and to verify these
accountable forms. After printing and verification, the forms would have to be packed and
shipped - roughly taking up a further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with
registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the application for registration with the
Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is then set for
hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or municipal bulletin board for
at least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations on the 16th and the 17th, the posting
requirement would be completed by the 24th. Considering that time must be allowed for
the filling of oppositions, the earliest that the Election Registration Board can be convened
for hearing would be the May 1st and 2nd.
 32) Assuming - and this is a big assumption - that there are rift challenges to the
applicant's right to register, the Election Registration Board can immediately rule on the
applicant's registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the 7th of May. By
the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by the board will have already been
furnished to the applicants and the heads of the registered political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once against focus on the business of
getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are finalized,
they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters' List generated - at the earliest, by
May 11, after which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, if we were to follow the
letter of the law strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new CVL would be improper since
the R.A. 8189 provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and sealing
of the Book of Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May 14 election date,
and still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots, Election
Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the new
registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the various
forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different municipalities. All
told, this process would take approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
XXX XXX XXX
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the
operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these
specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can
possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The law
obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other
words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute
may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally ..., it
must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is
far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given
must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we
are of the considered view that they "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
R.A. 8436, presupposed the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of the day before the prohibitive period before the May
14, 2001 regular elections commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation
in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners
has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint
before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to
register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was
disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be
true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm
view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A.
8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They
admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and
came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their
eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights. Vigilanties sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this Court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of
discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary
manner, in issuing Resolution No, 3584 which, in respondent's own terms, resolved "to deny the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001."
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws.1âwphi1.nêt
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to hold a
special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of
R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional
task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia,
questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a
prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its
constitutionally mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide
latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than
the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on
the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs
exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC - a body accorded by no less than the fundamental
law with independence.
As to the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court cannot, in view
of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without transgressing the time-honored
principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer
where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case,
we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are
entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special
registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of
election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, we enunciated that the Court's function, as
sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely [to] check, whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutionally limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing ...[of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power...It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent
error.
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued Proclamation No. 15
calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18, 2001, to allow the conduct of Special Registration of
new voters. House Bill No., 12930 has been filed before the Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A.
8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 was
filed before the Senate, with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct
of special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative departments that a legal
obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration
before May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189868               December 15,
2009
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND V. PALATINO, ALVIN A. PETERS,
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP), MA. CRISTINA
ANGELA GUEVARRA, CHAIRPERSON OF THE STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES (SCMP), VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF KABATAAN
PARTY-LIST, VIJAE O. ALQUISOLA, PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CEGP), DIANNE KRISTEL M. ASUELO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE KABATAANG
ARTISTA PARA SA TUNAY NA KALAYAAN (KARATULA), KENNETH CARLISLE EARL EUGENIO,
ANA KATRINA V. TEJERO, VICTOR LOUIS E. CRISOSTOMO, JACQUELINE ALEXIS S. MERCED, and
JADE CHARMANE ROSE J. VALENZUELA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the threshold once again is the right of suffrage of the sovereign Filipino people – the foundation of
Philippine democracy. As the country prepares to elect its next set of leaders on May 10, 2010, the Court
upholds this primordial right.
On November 12, 2008, respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
85141 which, among other things, set December 2, 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing
voter registration using the biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 2 on February 12, 2009
adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections to October 31,
2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as previously fixed by Resolution No. 8514.
The intense public clamor for an extension of the October 31, 2009 deadline notwithstanding, the COMELEC
stood firm in its decision not to extend it, arguing mainly that it needs ample time to prepare for the
automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed on October 30,
2009,3 petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its
nullity.
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan Party-list, sues as a
member of the House of Representatives and a concerned citizen, while the rest of petitioners sue as
concerned citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential disenfranchisement of
millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first instance, claiming that based on National
Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected voting population for the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for
the age group 18-19 and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional encroachment on the
legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, reading:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that the COMELEC be
accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-
day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among other things, the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in
order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646)4 and
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA 8436) 5 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which
include voter registration; and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that the October 31, 2009
deadline of voter registration was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-
Youth v. COMELEC6 wherein the Court denied a similar prayer for an extension of the December 27, 2000
deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose
the leaders who will lead the country and participate, to the fullest extent possible, in every national and local
election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article solely therefor:
ARTICLE
SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance
of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the
Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of
the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people
empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them,7 bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.8
It is against this backdrop that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter registration in Section 8 of
RA 8189 which provides:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices
hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular election
and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary
preparations with respect to the coming elections including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is
necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and
paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of the
precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the
campaign period; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voter’s Information Sheet. Such
determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power, which this Court is bound to
respect. And the COMELEC’s rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.9
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election
acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration under RA 8189. This
V Court’s primary duty is to harmonize laws rather than consider one as repealed by the other. The
presumption is against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For Congress
is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to enact inconsistent or conflicting statutes.10
Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other
periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by law. This grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right
of suffrage – the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration
cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except
during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for
the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC. 11 In said case, the Court held that
the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an
extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. For the
therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of
voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February
17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
The Court in fact suggested in Akbayan-Youth that the therein petitioners could have, but had not, registered
during the period between the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the COMELEC and before the start of the
120-day prohibitive period prior to the election date or January 13, 2001, thus:
[T]here is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that
anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the
COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the
Office of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13,
2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for
registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27,
2000, this Court is of the firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the
continuing registration under R.A. 8189.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the Court’s pronouncement in Akbayan-Youth is that had the therein petitioners filed their
petition – and sought an extension date that was – before the 120-day prohibitive period, their prayer would
have been granted pursuant to the mandate of RA 8189. In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the
dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to
the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar
as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The
COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same
until January 9, 2010. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.