G.R. No. 204544 Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your mother.

"  Just as he was about to leave,

13

Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now."  Bacerra then left.  Alfredo's son,
14 15

MARLON BACERRA y TABONES, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his room. 16

DECISION Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down beside the window.  At around
17

4:00a.m.,  he heard dogs barking outside.  Alfredo looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking towards
18 19

their nipa hut,  which was located around 10 meters from their house.
20 21

LEONEN, J.:
Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it.  Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning.
22 23

The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on the strength of circumstantial
evidence.
Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire.  Edgar contacted the authorities for assistance  but
24 25

it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents were completely destroyed.  The local authorities conducted an
26

This resolves the Petition for Review  assailing the Decision  dated August 30, 2012 and the Resolution  dated
1 2 3
investigation on the incident. 27

October 22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32923, which upheld the conviction of Marlon
Bacerra y Tabones (Bacerra) for the crime of simple arson punished underSection 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1613. 4 The defense presented Bacerra, Alex Dacanay (Dacanay), and Jocelyn Fernandez (Fernandez) as witnesses.
Their collective testimonies yielded the defense's version of the incident:
In the Information dated January 12, 2006, Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613: At around 11:00 p.m. of November 14, 2005, Bacerra was at the house of his friend, Ronald Valencia. The
two (2) engaged in a drinking session with Dacanay and a certain Reyson until 1:00 a.m. of November 15,
2005.28

That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 15, 2005, at Brgy. San Pedro Ili, Alcala, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to cause damage to
another, did then and theres [sic], willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the rest house of Alfredo Bacerra asked Dacanay to take him to his grandmother's house. Dacanay conceded but they found the gate
Melegrito y Galamay, to his damage and prejudice in the amount of Php70,000.00, more or less. closed.  Embarrassed to disturb his grandmother,  Bacerra asked Dacanay to bring him to Fernandez's house
29 30

instead.  However, Dacanay was already sleepy at that time.  Hence, Bacerra requested his brother-in-law,
31 32

Francisco Sadora (Sadora), to acconwany him to Fernandez's house, which was located one (1) kilometer
Contrary to Sec. 1, 1st par. Of P.D. 1613. 5
away.33

Bacerra pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6

Bacerra and Sadora arrived at Fernandez's house at around 1:30 a.m. Fernandez told Bacerra to sleep in the
living room. She checked on Bacerra every hour.  At around 7:00 a.m., police officers who were looking for
34

During trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Alfredo Melegrito (Alfredo), Edgar Melegrito Bacerra arrived at Fernandez's house.  Knowing that he did not do anything wrong,  Bacerra voluntarily went
35 36

(Edgar), Toni Rose dela Cruz, and P03 Marcos Bautista, Jr. to testify on the alleged incident.  Their collective
7 to the police station with the authorities.
37

testimonies produced the following facts for the prosecution:

In the Decision dated October 6, 2009, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in Villasis, Pangasinan  found 38

Alfredo and his family  were sound asleep in their home on

8
Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson:

November 15, 2005.  At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from sleep by the
9 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Marlon Bacerra y Tabones GUILTY  beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Arson defined and penalized in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living room  and
10
1613 and, there being no modifying circumstance, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, together with all
the accessory penalties provided by law.
peered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his neighbor and co-
worker,  Bacerra.
11 12

The accused is likewise ordered to pay the private complainant ₱50,000.00  as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

39
Bacerra appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.  He argued that none of the prosecution's
40
Lastly, respondent argues that temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 was properly awarded because
witnesses had positively identjfied him as the person who burned the nipa hut. 41
the burning of private complainant's nipa hut brought some pecuniary loss. 66

In the Decision  dated August 30, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated October 6, 2009 of
42
This case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:
the Regional Trial Court in toto. 43

First, whether petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the circumstantial evidence
Bacerra moved for reconsideration  but the Motion was denied in the Resolution  dated October 22, 2012.
44 45
adduced during trial;67

On January 15, 2013, Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Decision dated August
46
30, 2012 and Resolution dated October 22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals.
Second, whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender may properly be
appreciated in this case to reduce the imposable penalty;  and
68

In the Resolution dated January 30, 2013, this Court required the People of the Philippines to comment on the Finally, whether the award of temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 was proper. 69

petition for review. 47

This Court affirms petitioner's conviction for the crime of simple arson.
On June 18, 2013, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment
on the Petition  to which petitioner filed a Reply  on January 27, 2014.
48 49
I

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction based on circumstantial Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal consequences.
evidence, which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.  No direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to private complainant's nipa
50

hut.  Moreover, there were two (2) incidents that occurred, which should be taken and analyzed separately.
51 52 The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact
inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the
evidence.
Petitioner adds that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses.  Petitioner also points out that private complainant acted contrary to normal human behavior,
53

placing great doubt on his credibility.  Persons whose properties are being destroyed should immediately
54 Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.  Circumstantial evidence, on the
70

confront the perpetrator.  Private complainant and his family, however, merely stayed inside their house
55 other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
throughout the entire incident. 56 circumstantial evidence." 71

Petitioner argues in the alternative that the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial
should have been appreciated by the lower tribunals in computing the imposable penalty.  Petitioner was 57 evidence.  The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of
72

drunk at the time of the alleged incident.  In addition, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities despite the
58 circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred."  The same quantum of evidence is still
73

absence of an arrest warrant.  Lastly, petitioner asserts that temperate damages should not have been
59 required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 74

awarded because private complainant could have proven actual damages during trial. 60

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred,
In its Comment, respondent asserts that direct evidence is not the only means to establish criminal beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.  There is
75

liability.  An accused may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of
61 no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.  After all, evidence is always a matter
76

circumstances leads to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 62 of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical
and beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's decision. For intoxication to be
considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that it is not habitual.  The state of drunkenness of
63 Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to
the accused must be of such nature as to affect his or her mental faculties.  Voluntary surrender cannot
64 sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
likewise be considered as a mitigating circumstance because there is no showing of spontaneity on the part of
the accused. 65
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.  - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance; of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire.  Private
101

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and complainant's son likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 77
before it was burned. 102

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator,  and the finding of guilt may all be established by
78
The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed separately. Instead, they must be
circumstantial evidence.  The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken
79
viewed and considered as a whole.  Circumstantial evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands which
1âwphi1

chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime. 80
create a pattern when interwoven."  Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it
103

only forms part of the entire picture.  The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be
104

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative disregarded. Petitioner's threat to bum occurred when he stoned private complainant's house.
test not a quantitative one.  The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with
81

the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is Also, there is no other reasonable version of the events which can be held with reasonable certainty.
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt." 82

Private complainant could have actually seen petitioner bum the nipa hut by stepping outside of his house.
The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial evidence in People v. Abayon.  None of 83
However, behavioral responses of individuals confronted with strange, startling, or frightful experiences
the prosecution's witnesses actually saw the accused start the fire.  Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence
84
vary.  Where there is a perceived threat or danger to survival, some may fight, others might escape.  Private
105 106

adduced by the prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt. 85
complainant's act of remaining inside his house during the incident is not contrary to human behavior. It
cannot affect his credibility as a witness.
In People v. Acosta,  there was also no direct evidence linking the accused to the burning of the
86

house.  However, the circumstantial evidence was substantial enough to convict the accused.  The accused
87 88
Furthermore, "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function ... of the trial courts."  It is a factual
107

had motive and previously attempted to set a portion of the victim's house on fire.  Moreover, he was present
89
matter that generally cannot be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition.  Petitioner failed to prove, much less allege,
108

at the scene of the crime before and after the incident. 90

any of the exceptions to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  Hence, this Court will not disturb the trial court's findings on the
109

Similarly, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has matter.
established multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson. II

First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private complainant's house and For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused must neither
threatened to bum him.  Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner throwing stones at his house and
91
be "habitual [n]or subsequent to the plan to commit [a] felony." 110

heard petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!"  (Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum
92

you now.)  Petitioner's threats were also heard by private complainant's son  and grandchildren.
93 94 95
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a
way that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts.  The 111

Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a few hours later and made bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is insufficient.  There must be
112

his way to private complainant's nipa hut.  Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m.,  he saw petitioner
96 97
proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of intoxication on the accused. 113

pass by their house and walk towards their nipa hut.  This was corroborated by private complainant's son who
98

testified that he saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it was burned.
Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. 100
99
There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the
commission of the crime. A considerable amount of time had lapsed from petitioner's drinking spree up to the
burning of the nipa hut within which he could have regained control of his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot
be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in this case.

Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in front
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity. The accused's act of
surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his [or her] search and capture."
114

Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's act of submitting his person to the
authorities was motivated by an acknowledgement of his guilt.

Considering that no mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,  as maximum,
imposed by the trial court, stands.

III

Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be awarded when there is a finding that "some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount [cannot], from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty." The amount of temperate damages to be awarded in each case is discretionary upon the
courts  as long as it is "reasonable under the circumstances."
115 116

Private complainant clearly suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of the burning of his nipa hut. However,
private complainant failed to substantiate the actual damages that he suffered. Nevertheless, he is entitled to
be indemnified for his loss. The award of temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 is proper and
reasonable under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 and the Resolution
dated October 22, 2012 of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32923, finding petitioner Marlon Bacerra y
Tabones guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of arson is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS ERIC VARGAS Y JAGUARIN AND GINA BAGACINA,
ACCUSED, ERIC VARGAS Y JAGUARIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the 15 November 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07331,
which affirmed with modification the Judgment2 dated 5 February 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iriga City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-9351, finding appellant Eric Vargas y Jaguarin (Vargas) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
On 2 August 2010, Vargas and a certain "Jane Doe" were charged as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of July 2010 at around 8:30 in the evening, in Zone 3, Barangay San Jose
Pangaraon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery,
evident premeditation employing means to insure or afford impunity, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot Miguel Belen y Abala, with the use of unlicensed Caliber 45, hitting him on
the different parts of his body, thus, inflicting mortal wounds, which was the proximate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be proven in Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On 12 August 2010, an Amended Information was filed to substitute "Jane Doe" with Gina Bagacina
(Bagacina). A warrant of arrest was issued against Bagacina on 13 August 2010, but to this date, she remains
at large. Upon arraignment, Vargas entered a plea of not guilty.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On or about 8:30 in the evening of 9 July 2010, Miguel A. Belen (Belen), a volunteer field reporter of Radio
Station DWEB was riding home aboard his motorcycle along the barangay road in Zone 3, Barangay San
Jose Pangaraon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, when he was shot by a woman who was riding a black motorcycle
driven by a man.
At around 8:55 of the same evening, the Nabua Municipal Police Station received a phone call from a
concerned citizen informing them that a shooting incident happened. Police officers were immediately
dispatched and upon cursory investigation of the scene, it was found that at around 8:30 in the evening, Belen
was riding his red motorcycle when he was shot several times by an unidentified gunman. Belen was rushed
to the Doña Josefa Hospital in Iriga City for treatment.
On 10 July 2010, SPO2 Romeo Benito Apolinar B. Hugo (SPO2 Hugo), Chief Investigator of. the Nabua
Municipal Police Station, was directed to conduct an investigation at the Dona Josefa Hospital where Belen
was confined. However, SPO2 Hugo found Belen to be physically indisposed for verbal communication, given
that he was then being treated with his mortal wounds and was intubated due to damage to his lungs.
On 13 July 2010, SPO2 Hugo returned to the hospital with SPO3 Henry Dino (SPO3 Dino), who brought two
volumes of the rogue gallery of Iriga City for possible identification of the victim's assailants. On this day,
Belen appeared to be aware and in full possession of his mental faculties but remained unable to engage in
verbal communication due to his injuries. As Belen's wife and daughter were communicating with Belen
through writing, SPO2 Hugo explained to his wife that he would be propounding questions to Belen and then
he would annotate his response based on the hand or head gestures made by Belen. Congressman Salvio
Fortuno, who belonged to the same political party as the victim, was also there to aid with the questioning.
SPO2 Hugo asked several questions and the victim's actual method of response - through nodding or shaking
his head or other hand gestures - was annotated in the sworn statement that was later on prepared to reflect
his testimony. Belen was able to identify Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle after being shown the second
volume of the rogue gallery brought by SPO3 Dino. While SPO3 Dino was flipping the pages, Belen gestured
and pointed to Vargas, and motioned that Vargas was the driver of the motorcycle in the shooting incident. As
for the actual shooter, Belen confirmed that his assailant was a woman - nodding his head yes when asked if
the shooter was a woman - and Belen was able to describe her general description by checking the
characteristics written down by SPO2 Hugo in a piece of paper. Belen also wrote the woman's height as 5'2"
in the same piece of paper after much visible effort.
The transcription of the interview was confirmed by Belen, to whom it was read before he affixed his
thumbmark thereto. It was also witnessed by his wife, who confirmed that Belen was giving his assent thereto,
and later on signified that she witnessed the same by affixing her signature on the same document. Belen's
affidavit was certified by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio V. Ramos, after personally confirming with
the victim the veracity of the contents of the same. This Sworn Statement was later offered as evidence during
the trial.
From the confinement until 21 July 2010, Dr. Godofredo Belmonte, Belen's attending physician, noted that
Belen's condition was improving. However, on 21 July 2010, Belen suffered considerable physical
deterioration, requiring further surgery to be conducted. On 29 July 2010, Belen succumbed to his injuries and
passed away.
Dr. James Belgira (Dr. Belgira), the medico-legal officer of the PNP, examined Belen post-mortem and in his
medico-legal report, found that Belen suffered from significant gunshot wounds, some of which were found to
have entry points at his back, probably shot while Belen was lying on the ground, and were sustained through
intermittent - rather than successive -gunshots.   Dr. Belgira opined that, given the location of the shots and
the position of the victim as he was being shot, there was manifest intent to kill and that treachery attended
the shooting.
For his defense, Vargas denied the charge against him and interposed alibi as his defense. He alleged that it
was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime as he has never been to Nabua, Camarines Sur in all
his life and that at the time of the incident, he was having a drinking session with his uncle Arnulfo Abinal in
San Nicolas, Iriga City, not far from the game fowl farm where he works. They were later joined by Jeffrey
Manaog and Sheila Castanares. Vargas further alleged that he woke up at about 5:00 a.m. the following day
and reported for work at the chicken farm.
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Judgment dated 5 February 2015, the RTC found Vargas guilty of the crime of Murder, penalized under
Article 248 of the RPC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Eric J. Vargas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Death of the victim having occurred due to the crime, Maryjane A. Belen, the widow of the victim is entitled to
moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP 100,000.00 in exemplary damages.
There being no receipts presented as to the actual expenses incurred by the family of the victim, no actual or
compensatory damages can be awarded. However, jurisprudence allows the award of temperate damages
considering that, as records show, the victim underwent medical treatment before his demise. For this, the
court awards the widow of the victim the amount of PhP75,000.00 as temperate damages.
All monetary awards shall earn an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until
fully paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.4
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to clearly establish that Belen was shot several times, and
despite the medical attention received, he nonetheless died. The RTC also found that the killing of Belen was
attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and thus the crime
committed was murder. Moreover, the RTC found that Belen, through his sworn statement, positively
identified Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle of the shooting incident, and that Belen's statement against
his assailant, while not a dying declaration, was credible and spontaneous, and was admissible as part of res
gestae.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision dated 15 November 2016, the CA affirmed, with modification, the Decision of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The [Judgment] dated February 5, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 6, finding accused-appellant Eric Vargas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION. ACCORDINGLY, appellant
is hereby ordered to indemnify the family of the victim Miguel Belen the following damages which shall bear
interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum until fully paid, namely:   
1. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Moral Damages;
2. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Civil Indemnity;
3. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as Exemplary Damages; and
4. Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as Temperate Damages.
In all other respects, the herein appealed [Judgment] of the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 60, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA found that the sworn statement of Belen, identifying Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle of the
shooting incident, is admissible as part of res gestae, even if the statement was made in a question-and-
answer format, three (3) days after the shooting incident. The CA held that the statement was still made under
the influence of a startling event, given that Belen had to undergo extensive surgery immediately after the
incident. The CA held that the RTC correctly admitted the Sworn Statement of Belen, and as the admissibility
of specific statements is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, such determination of
admissibility is conclusive upon appeal, especially if there is no clear abuse of discretion.
The CA also found that the killing of Belen was attended by treachery and evident premeditation, qualifying
the crime as murder. Conspiracy between Vargas and Bagacina was also duly proven by the prosecution, as
they were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of killing Belen. The
conspiracy was manifest as Vargas was the driver of the motorcycle which Bagacina, the shooter, rode at the
time of the commission of the crime. The motorcycle driven by Vargas was also the means by which he and
Bagacina fled the scene.
The CA modified the amount of damages awarded to the family of Belen, but affirmed the decision of the RTC
finding that the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Vargas.
The Issue
The issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in finding Vargas guilty of the crime of
Murder under the RPC.
The Ruling of the Court
We find the appeal to be without merit.
For a successful prosecution of Murder under Article 248 of the RPC, the following elements must be proven:
(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.6 In this case, we
find that the prosecution sufficiently proved each element beyond reasonable doubt.
The first and fourth elements are not contested by Vargas. The death of Belen has been established by the
Medico-Legal Certificate dated 14 July 2010, Belen's Certificate of Death, and the testimony of Dr. Belgira.
Moreover, there is no allegation that Vargas and Belen are related. Thus, the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide. Vargas only questions the finding of the lower courts as to the second and third elements -
whether Vargas was positively identified, by admissible and credible evidence, as the person in conspiracy
with the woman who shot Belen, and whether the killing of Belen was qualified by the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
In particular, Vargas argues that the statements of Belen in his Sworn Statement cannot be admitted as part
of res gestae because the statement was given three (3) days after the shooting incident.
We disagree.
In this case, we find that the Sworn Statement of Belen was correctly admitted by the lower courts as part
of res gestae to positively identify Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle where the female who shot Belen
was riding.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules." However, there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, one of which is res gestae, found
in Section 42 of Rule 130, which provides:
SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites are present: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.7
In this case, we find that all the requisites are present. The shooting incident is a startling occurrence, and the
statements of Belen, which concern the shooting incident as he was identifying his assailants, were given
before he had time to contrive or devise a false statement. The mere fact that it took Belen three (3) days
before he was able to give his statement does not remove such statement as part of res gestae.
There are two tests in applying the res gestae rule to determine whether or not statements should be
admissible as part of res gestae: (1) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself; and (2) the evidence clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.8  To
ascertain whether the evidence negates fabrication, spontaneity of the statements must be determined.
Res gestae comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a
spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such
circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.9 As long
as the statements were made voluntarily and spontaneously so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the occurrence, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, such must be admissible as
part of res gestae, if the statements were made under circumstances which exclude the idea of design or
deliberation.10 While there is no hard and fast rule, this Court has considered a number of factors to
determine spontaneity. In People v. Estibal, the Court held:
By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime,
immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement
become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. x x x.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of
factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is
made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of
intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself, xxx.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the test mentioned, we find that the Sworn Statement of Belen is admissible in evidence as part
of res gestae, as the statements made by Belen, the victim of the startling occurrence, refer to the
circumstances of the shooting incident - particularly the actual perpetrators of the crime. We find that these
statements were made spontaneously considering the circumstances under which they were made.
Immediately after the shooting incident, Belen had to undergo extensive surgery for the gunshot wounds he
sustained.  He was unable to talk and had difficulty in breathing, but he managed to convey his answers to
ℒαwρhi ৷
the questions propounded to him through writing and moving his head and hands. During the three (3) days
that intervened the shooting incident and when the statements were made, Belen had no time to deliberately
fabricate a story. He was in the hospital, receiving treatment for his numerous wounds, fighting for his life. He
could not even speak or communicate verbally because of the intubation in his lungs. Given this situation, it is
clear that he had no time to contrive a false statement against Vargas or Bagacina.
Belen positively identified Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle of the shooting incident. SPO2 Hugo
corroborated this statement, and testified as to how Belen identified Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle in
the shooting incident. SPO2 Hugo testified that when Belen was shown the rogue gallery, he saw Belen shake
his head to signify that he did not recognize the pictures in the particular page shown to him. After going
through the first volume, SPO2 Hugo testified that SPO3 Dino also clarified with Belen that he did not
recognize anyone from the first volume of the rogue gallery. SPO2 Hugo continued his testimony by stating
that while looking at the second volume, he saw Belen wave his hand to SPO3 Dino who was flipping the
pages, signaling him to go back to the previous page. SPO2 Hugo then saw Belen point to one of the pictures
in that particular page. When SPO2 Hugo, while pointing to one of the pictures, asked him "Amo adi?" (Is this
the one?), Belen nodded. Belen pointed to the person in the photograph and made a motion of wiping his
face, and then acted by his hands of a motion of driving a motorcycle. When SPO2 Hugo asked if the person
he was pointing to was the driver of the motorcycle of the shooting incident, Belen nodded, still making the
gesture of driving a motorcycle. When a copy of a picture was shown during trial, SPO2 Hugo testified that it
was the very same picture referred to by Belen in his Sworn Statement, which was the photograph of Vargas.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that despite not being able to communicate verbally, Belen had positively
identified Vargas as the driver of the motorcycle which his female assailant was riding.
Moreover, we find that the lower courts did not err in giving weight to these statements, especially given
Vargas' weak defenses of denial and alibi. Vargas' claim that he was having a drinking session when the
incident happened cannot prevail over the positive identification presented by the prosecution.
To be able to validly use the defense of alibi, two requirements must be met: (1) that the accused was not
present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and (2) that it was physically impossible for
him to be there at the time.12 Therefore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that he was
so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.13 In this case, Vargas' statement is self-serving and
unreliable, especially as it remains unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. It is well-settled that alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter.14
Vargas further argues that the courts gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy between him and the
female assailant in the shooting incident.
We disagree.
Based on the records, the lower courts were correct in finding that Vargas was in conspiracy with the female
assailant of Belen. Conspiracy is present when there is unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a
crime — it does not require a previous plan or agreement to commit assault as it is sufficient that at the time of
such aggression, all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack.15 Given that
Belen's shooter was riding the motorcycle driven by Vargas, which was the same motorcycle used to flee the
scene of the shooting incident, it is clear that Vargas and the female assailant had a common purpose against
Belen. Their acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts indicate a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.16 By
driving the motorcycle which carried the person who shot Belen, there was clearly a conspiracy, a common
intent and purpose, to kill Belen.
Finally, we address the argument of Vargas that the lower courts erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
As to the finding of treachery, we find that the lower courts did not err in finding that the killing of Belen was
attended by treachery. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the
killing itself.17 Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, two conditions must necessarily occur before
treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (1) the employment of means, methods, or
manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of
means, methods, or manner of execution.18
In this case, the lower courts were correct in finding that both requisites were present - Belen was
unsuspecting and unaware of the threat to his life, when he was shot several times, inflicting upon him mortal
wounds. The suddenness of the attack shows that Belen, who was unarmed, had no opportunity to defend
himself. Moreover, the wounds sustained by Belen show that treachery attended his killing. The following
findings of the trial court support the finding of treachery: (1) the gun was fired not in succession but
intermittently, meaning that there was sufficient time for the assailant to have observed the condition of Belen
after each and every fire; (2) the quantity of bullets indicates the intent of the assailant to kill the victim; and (3)
the locations of the wounds - with two coming from the back - show that it is possible that Belen was already
lying down when the shots were fired.19 The combination of the six (6) gunshot wounds was found to be fatal
and life-threatening, according to Dr. Belgira, who examined Belen post mortem. Dr. Belgira opined that given
the locations of the gunshot wounds and the position of the victim as he was being shot, treachery attended
the shooting.
However, as to the finding of evident premeditation, we find that the prosecution failed to prove the elements
of evident premeditation. Similar to treachery, evident premeditation must be clearly proven, established
beyond reasonable doubt and based on external acts that are evident, not merely suspected, and which
indicate deliberate planning.20 The prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, each element of
evident premeditation as follows: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.21 Absent any proof as
to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.22
In this case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence as to when the plan to kill Belen was determined
by Vargas and the female assailant. The essence of the circumstance of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.23 To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the
moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or
persistent attempt.24 In this case, there was no showing as to whether or not sufficient time had passed from
the determination to carry out their criminal plan until the execution of such plan. Thus, evident premeditation
cannot qualify the killing of Belen.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the lower courts were correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua based on Article 248 of the RPC. However, there is a need to modify the amount of indemnity
awarded as the circumstance of evident premeditation should no longer be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. The CA awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;  and P75,000.00  as temperate damages. However,  as  evident
premeditation was not attendant in the killing of Belen, this will no longer be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance which would have meted the penalty of death, which in turn would have justified the
amounts awarded by the CA. In light of People v. Jugueta,25 we award P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. As no evidence was presented as to
the medical treatment, burial and funeral expenses, we also award P50,000.00 as temperate damages, in
accordance with People v. Jugueta.26 All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 15 November 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 07331 affirming the Judgment dated 5 February 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. IR-9351 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages is reduced to P75,000.00 each. The award of temperate
damages is also reduced to P50,000.00. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204289
FERNANDO MANCOL, JR., Petitioner vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  is the Decision  dated February 22, 2012 and
1 2
Resolution  dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
3
03030, affirming the Orders dated June 13, 2008,  November 4, 2008  and April 17, 2009  of the Regional Trial
4 5 6
Court (RTC) of Calbayog City, Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 923.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), scheduled an Invitation to Bid for Negotiated Sale
on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, over a residential lot with a two-storey building (subject property)
covered by TCT No. 2041 located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City, and with Tax Declaration (TD) Nos.
990100600931  and 990100600479  with a purchase price of ₱l,326,000.
7 8 9
In line with this, Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner) executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)  appointing his
10
father, Fernando Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), to represent and negotiate, on his behalf, the sale of the subject
property. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase  and Negotiated Sale
11
Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis.  DBP then issued an Official
12
Receipt (O.R.) No. 3440018  dated October 13, 2004, in the name of Fernando R. Mancol, Jr., paid by
13
Fernando M. Mancol, Sr., in the amount of ₱265,200, as initial payment for the purchase price of the subject
property. During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and effect the
transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT); and (2) to get
rid of the occupants of the subject property.14
Petitioner paid the balance in the amount of ₱1,060,800, as evidenced by O.R. No. 3440451  dated 15
December 10, 2004. Thereafter, DBP, through its Branch Manager Jorge B. Albarillo, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale,  in petitioner's favor.
16
On December 21, 2004, petitioner made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary
stamp tax (DST) in the amount of ₱99,450. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued O.R. No. 3440537. 17
Sometime in 2006, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement. DBP returned to the
petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager's Check (MC) No. 0000956475  in the18
amount of ₱99,450. 19
In a Letter  dated February 21, 2006, petitioner through its counsel demanded from DBP to comply with its
20
verbal undertaking. He returned the MC and all pertinent documents affecting the sale of the subject property
to DBP.
DBP, through its Letter  dated April 22, 2006, disregarded the subsequent oral agreement and reminded
21
petitioner that DBP has no obligation to eject the occupants and to cause the transfer of title of the lot in
petitioner's name.
Meanwhile, Mancol, Sr. wrote a Letter  dated May 15, 2006 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
22
requesting for a detailed computation of the CGT and DST with penalties and surcharges thereof affecting the
sale of the subject property. The BIR, through its Letter  dated May 24, 2006 came out with a detailed
23
computation in the total of ₱160,700.88.
In a Letter  dated June 2, 2006, petitioner proposed to DBP that he will facilitate the payment of the CGT and
24
DST but DBP should shoulder the penalties and surcharges. The proposal, however, was turned down. As of
March 7, 2007, the total amount to be paid which is necessary for the transfer of the title in petitioner's name
ballooned to ₱183,553.61 and counting. 25
On August 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint  for damages for breach of contract against DBP before the
26
RTC of Calbayog City, Branch 31. He prayed that DBP be found to have breached its obligation with
petitioner; that DBP be held liable to pay the aggregate amount of ₱160,700.88 and surcharges which may be
imposed by the BIR at the time of payment; that DBP be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees; and
that DBP be ordered to return the MC dated February 8, 2006 for ₱99,450.
In its Answer with Counter-Claim,  DBP alleged that the terms of the
27
Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to eject the
occupants thereon.  Assuming that DBP's officials made such a promise, DBP alleged that the same would
28
not be possible since the petitioner did not give any money to DBP for other expenses in going to and from
Calbayog City. DBP likewise alleged that it is not the bank's policy to work for the registration of the instrument
of sale of properties.  DBP further claimed that petitioner's unilateral act in issuing a check to DBP does not
29
constitute as evidence to prove that DBP assumed the responsibility of registering the instrument of sale. By
way of counterclaim, DBP averred that petitioner grossly violated the terms and conditions of the agreement of
sale.  Petitioner failed to pay, reimburse or assume the financial obligation consequent to the initiation and
30
filing of the writ of possession by DBP against the occupants. Petitioner's failure was contrary to his promise
and assurance that he will pay. Petitioner did not comply with the clear and express provisions of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and of the rules and procedures of sale on negotiation. DBP, thus, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that petitioner be ordered to assume the burden of initiating the ejectment DBP sought reconsideration  of the RTC Order dated November 4, 2008, which however, was denied by the
46

suit and to pay DBP damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit amounting to ₱200,000. RTC in its Order  dated April 17, 2009. The RTC ruled that DBP has waived its right to question the return of
47

₱99,450 to the petitioner since DBP failed to refute such an issue in the RTC Decision dated April 14, 2008.
On February 20, 2007, the RTC issued an Order  declaring DBP in default by reason of its counsel's failure to
31

appear during the pre-trial and to file its pre-trial brief. Both petitioner  and DBP  appealed the RTC Order dated June 13, 2008 and November 4, 2008, respectively,
48 49

with the CA.

Trial ensued.
On February 22, 2012, the CA in its Decision,  denied both appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads,
50

During the trial, Rodel Villanueva testified  that he was the one commissioned or ordered by a certain Atty.
32 thus:
Mar De Asis (Atty. De Asis) of DBP, to go to BIR-Catbalogan, and to bring the following documents: a check
worth PhP99,450.00, the amount for the CGT, the title, the TD, and the deed of sale. 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeals filed in this case are hereby DENIED. The
assailed Orders dated June 13, 2008, November 4, 2008 and April 17, 2009 of the [RTC], Branch 31 of
Mancol, Sr. testified  that he signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated Sale Rules and
34 Calbayog City in Civil Case No. 923 are AFFIRMED. Costs to be shouldered equally by both parties.
Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis on behalf of his son, by virtue of the
SPA.  He stated that after the execution and delivery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to
35
SO ORDERED. 51

facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to cause the vacation of the occupants of the
house and lot. Although he admitted that the verbal agreement contradicted the negotiated rules and Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,  while DBP filed a Motion for
52

agreement.  He stated that DBP undertook to get rid of the occupants, when its lawyer filed an Ex-
36
Reconsideration,  seeking the reversal of the CA Decision dated February 22, 2012. Both motions, however,
53

Parte Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession  dated January 11, 2005, which is pending in the RTC.
37 38
were denied in the CA Resolution  dated September 27, 2012.
54

On April 14, 2008, the R TC Decision  ruled in favor of the petitioner, and ordered DBP to return to petitioner
39
Henceforth, only the petitioner filed the instant appeal anchored on the following arguments:
the amount of ₱99,450 deposited to it for payment of the CGT and DST; to pay the surcharges and/or
interests on the CGT and DST as may be determined by the BIR from June 12, 2005 up to the date of
payment; and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of ₱l5,000. The RTC likewise dismissed I. THE TESTIMONIES OF [PETITIONER'S] WITNESSES, [VILLANUEVA] AND [MANCOL, SR.] ARE BASED
DBP's counterclaim. 40 ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NOT HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AND THAT THEY SUFFICIENTI.JY
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF A SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
[PETITIONER] AND DBP TO (1) ARRANGE AND EFFECT THE TRANSFER OF THE TORRENS TITLE IN
Thereafter, DBP moved for the reconsideration  of the RTC's Decision. DBP alleged, among others, that the
41
THE NAME OF [PETITIONER], INCLUDING PAYMENT OF [CGT] AND [DSTs], AND (2) TO GET RID OF
testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr. were hearsay because their statements were based on facts THE OCCUPANTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY[;]
relayed to them by other people and not based on their personal knowledge.
II. UNDISPUTED RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE
On June 13, 2008, the RTC Order  granted DBP's motion and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
42
AND VALIDITY OF THE SUBSEQUENT ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANCOL, JR. AND DBP, AND
THAT TO IGNORE THEM IS TO SANCTION VIOLATION OF MANCOL. JR.'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS[;
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration  of the June 13, 2008 Order. For the first time, petitioner alleged that
43
AND]
through his father, Mancol, Sr., he entered into a contemporaneous verbal agreement with DBP. He argued
that since his father was his attorney-in-fact, then his father had personal knowledge of all transactions III. [PETITIONER] IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF' MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
involving the sale of the subject property. The motion, however, was denied in the RTC Order  dated 44
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT. 55

November 4, 2008. The RTC affirmed with modification its June 13, 2008 Order, to read thus:
WHEREFORE, this court finds no reason to disturb its order dated June 13, 2008, subject only to a
modification that [DBP] is directed to return to the [petitioner], the total amount of ₱99,450.00 deposited to it
for the payment of the [CGT] and [DST], with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from December 21, 2004
until its return to the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED. 45
The petition/ails.
The above assignment of errors make it evident that the only issue involved in this appeal is one of fact:
whether or not the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr., should be given probative
value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract, i.e., that DBP bound
itself to arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name; and, get rid of the occupants of
the subject property.
We answer in the negative.
"The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract."
56
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the
exceptions in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9  of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a party may
57
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement. "Moreover, as with all possible
objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol
evidence may then be entertained. 58
In the case of Maunlad Savings & Loan Assoc., Inc. v. CA,  the Court held that:
59
The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably
apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is
asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such
answer, otherwise the objection is waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and complete evidence and all parties are thus amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects
resulting from the evidence.  (Citations omitted)
60
Here, in order to prove the verbal agreement allegedly made by DBP, petitioner invoked the fourth exception
under the parol evidence rule, i.e., the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-
interest after the execution of the written agreement, by offering the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.
The bank, however, failed to make a timely objection against the said testimonies during the trial since DBP
was declared in default. Thus, DBP waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.
This notwithstanding, We stress that the admissibility of the testimonial evidence as an exception to the parol
evidence rule does not necessarily mean that it has weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
confounded with its probative value.
"The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade."  The admissibility of a
61
particular item of evidence has to do with whether it meets various tests by which its reliability is to be
determined, so as to be considered with other evidence admitted in the case in arriving at a decision as to the
truth.  The weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
62
testifying to a given fact, but depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the judge trying
the case.  "Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at
63
all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue."  "Thus, a
64
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence." 65
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal
knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception.  A witness may not testify on what he
66
merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard.  Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of
67
what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or
statements but likewise applies to written statements.68
The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact.  A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be
69
called upon for that purpose because his testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to him as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of his
information.70
Guided by these precepts, Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary to
petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement between
petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted by the petitioner, the alleged
verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and Mancol, Sr., by virtue of the SP A. Villanueva has no
personal knowledge of such fact. His testimony related only to the fact that Atty. De Asis ordered him to go to
BIR-Catbalogan, and bring the following documents: a check worth ₱99,450, the amount for the CGT, title,
TD, and the deed of sale. None of Villanueva's acts would suggest, even remotely, that he personally knew
about the verbal agreement.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
[Villanueva] did not personally witness the perfection of the alleged contemporaneous agreement between
Mancol, Jr. and DBP. Furthermore, he had no personal knowledge of its existence. His testimony merely
touched on the alleged denial by the Revenue Office of the payment of the [CGT] on the subject property and
the subsequent execution of a new deed of conveyance by the DBP. It is clear then that his testimony did not
bolster [petitioner's] allegation to any degree.
71
The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s testimony. Although the records show that by virtue of
an SP A executed by the petitioner, Mancol, Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase, including the
Negotiated Sale Rules and Procedures/Disposition of Assets on a First-Come First Served Basis, and that he
made the initial payment for the sale, there is dearth of evidence to prove that indeed, he personally entered
into a verbal agreement with DBP. Upon being asked what transpired after the delivery of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Mancol, Sr. simply answered that DBP agreed to undertake the transfer of title of the lot, and to
oust the occupants. There was no mention as to who actually and personally appeared before DBP or any of
its officials in order to forge the alleged verbal agreement. Thus:
(DIRECT EXAMINATION by Atty. Elino Chin, counsel for
Witness: [Mancol, Sr.])
xxxx
ATTY. CHIN
Q After the delivery of this Exh. "H'', what transpired? 1. To represent and negotiate before the DBP Catarman Branch regarding the INVITATION TO BID FOR
NEGOTIATED SALE scheduled on October 13, 2004 at the Mezzanine Floor, the subject Residential Lot with
A The bank agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title and the payment of the [CGT] to get rid of the present two storey building (TCT No. 2041) located at Navarro Street, Calbayog City; and
occupants of the house and lot.
2. To sign, or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for the above purpose.
Q You said that the bank agreed, is that in writing?
x x x x. 74

A Only verbal.
There is nothing in the language of the SP A from which We could deduce the intention of petitioner to
Q That does not contradict the negotiated rules and agreement? authorize Mancol, Sr. to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP. Indeed, it has been held that "[w]here
powers and duties are specified and defined in an instrument, all such powers and duties are limited and are
confined to those which are specified and defined, and all other powers and duties are excluded."  Clearly, the
75

A Yes, but there was a verbal undertaking for them to do what was agreed upon. power to enter into a verbal agreement with DBP is conspicuously inexistent in the SPA.

x x x x. 72
To adopt the intent theory advanced by petitioner, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to that
effect, would run afoul of the express tenor of the SPA. It would likewise be contrary to "the rule that a power
Additionally, the RTC aptly observed that: of attorney must be strictly construed and pursued. The instrument will be held to grant only those powers
which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the power of attorney." 76

[N]owhere in the records would also reveal that the agreement to arrange and effect the transfer of title over
the subject lot was entered into between [DBP] and [Mancol, Sr.], for and on behalf of the [petitioner]. It is axiomatic that this Court will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the CA, especially
where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since this Court is not a trier of facts.
x x x The [SPA] authorizes [Mancol, Sr.] to represent the [petitioner] and negotiate before the DBP, Catarman
Branch on the invitation to bid on he sale of the lot covered by TCT No. 2041 scheduled on October 13, 2004, All told, therefore, the Court finds no reason or basis to grant the petition.
as well as to sign or execute and receive any paper or document necessary for said purposes. This explains
why it was Mancol, Sr. who signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and the Negotiated Sale Rules and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 22, 2012 and Resolution dated
Procedure, and who paid to DBP the initial payment of the purchase price on October 13, 2004 in [petitioner's] September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 03030 are AFFIRMED.
behalf. It was not established however whether the subsequent payments and other transactions, including
the act of entering into an oral agreement with [DBP] that it will effect the transfer of the subject title, were also
carried out by Fernando Mancol, Sr. in behalf of [petitioner]. SO ORDERED.

The [petitioner] fails [sic] to show with whom the [DBP] agreed to arrange and effect the transfer of the title in
his name.  Thus, as there is no showing that it was [Mancol, Sr.] who entered into such agreement with [DBP]
1âwphi1

or that he was personally present during the perfection of the agreement and witnessed the same, any
statement from the latter as to the circumstances relative to the perfection of such oral agreement would
indeed be hearsay. 73

Assuming for argument's sake that Mancol, Sr., on behalf of petitioner, entered into a verbal agreement with
DBP, such agreement would remain unenforceable. Despite petitioner's insistence, the act of entering into a
verbal agreement was not stipulated in the SPA. The authority given to Mancol, Sr. was limited to representing
and negotiating, on petitioner's behalf, the invitation to bid on the sale of the subject lot, which is specifically
worded as follows:

I, FERNANDO R. MANCOL, JR., xxx by these presents do hereby name, constitute and appoint my father
Fernando M. Manco, Sr., as true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for me, in my name, place and to do and perform
the following:

G.R. No. 199451, August 15, 2018
IRIS RODRIGUEZ,Petitioner, vs YOUR OWN HOME DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (YOHDC),
Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Petition for Review1 assails the July 18, 2011 Decision2 and November 23, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90297. The assailed Decision overturned the Regional Trial Court August 13,
2007 Decision,4 which ordered Your Own Home Development Corporation (YOHDC) to pay Iris Rodriguez
(Iris) P424,000.00. The assailed Resolution denied Iris' motion for reconsideration. Iris prays that this Court
affirm the Regional Trial Court's Decision.
This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental Mindoro, which YOHDC entered into with
its partner, Archangel Corporation. Iris' husband, Tarcisius Rodriguez (Tarcisius), was hired as the project
coordinator/manager.5
Tasked to find land suited for the project, Tarcisius found a property owned by Rosa Rosillas (Rosillas) and
proceeded to negotiate with her. According to YOHDC, Rosillas agreed to sell the land for P1,200,000.00.
However, Tarcisius misrepresented to the partner corporations that Rosillas had asked for P4,000,000.00
instead.6
Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2) installments on April 8, 1993 and May 14, 1993. Despite this,
Tarcisius still requested for two (2) more checks in Rosillas' name, each for P500,000.00, insisting that the
land was acquired for P4,000,000.00. Thus, YOHDC issued Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank) Check Nos. 1181043810 and 1181043843 (Rosillas' Checks).7
Aside from this, Tarcisius also requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor of Rosillas' property,
Engineer Senen Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), in the amount of P254,400.00 each. 8 For this, YOHDC issued
Metrobank Check Nos. 1181043813 and 1181043841 (Delos Reyes' Checks).9
Tarcisius received all four (4) checks. However, instead of delivering them to Rosillas and Delos Reyes,
Tarcisius and his wife, Iris, (collectively, the Rodriguez Spouses), deposited two (2) checks—one of Rosillas'
Checks and one of Delos Reyes' Checks—totaling P754,400.00 in their personal Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Account No. 3293-0730-06. The other two (2) checks were deposited in the Rodriguez Spouses'
other personal bank account, BPI Account No. 0065-0506-25.10
YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' checks after it received reports
of project anomalies, such as padding of expenses and overpricing. Upon investigation, it was found that the
endorsement signatures on the checks of the intended payees, Rosillas and Delos Reyes, were different from
those on file.11 Moreover, while the checks were for two (2) different people—for Rosillas who lived in Bulacan
and for Delos Reyes who was from Mindoro—they were deposited in the same BPI accounts.12 It must be
noted that during this time, Iris worked as a bank teller at BPI. This prompted YOHDC to contact Rosillas and
Delos Reyes regarding the checks. Both confirmed that they never received, endorsed, encashed, or
deposited any of the four (4) checks.13
Hence, YOHDC demanded from Tarcisius the amount of the checks which he failed to return. Tarcisius then
requested to settle YOHDC's claim by way of transferring properties. However, no settlement was reached
with Tarcisius, so YOHDC pursued its claim against the banks.14
YOHDC first sought reimbursement from Metrobank, which advised it to direct its claim against BPI. BPI
suggested that YOHDC course its documents through Metrobank. Pursuant to Metrobank's instructions,
YOHDC submitted Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which, in turn, forwarded
them to BPI.15
BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so
that it could respond to YOHDC's complaint.16
The Rodriguez Spouses complied and deposited the amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI Account No. 3293-
0994-39.17 However, they requested BPI to suspend its action on YOHDC's claim and instructed it not to
deduct the amount until they have clarified the matter. 18 BPI denied this request and sent Metrobank Special
Clearing Receipt No. 065273 to reimburse the amounts of the four (4) checks totaling P1,508,000.00.
Thereafter, Metrobank credited the amount to YOHDC.19
These events prompted the Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for Damages against YOHDC, BPI,
Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos Reyes, among others.20 The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas'
Checks were received by Rosillas' agent, Godofredo Syquioco (Syquioco).21 As for Delos Reyes' Checks, the
Rodriguez Spouses asserted that Delos Reyes received P424,000.00 from the proceeds of Metrobank Check
Nos. 181043813 and 181043841. They claimed that all four (4) checks were encashed through BPI with the
assistance of Iris.22
On August 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Rosillas, Delos Reyes, Metrobank,
and BPI.23 However, it noted that in Delos Reyes' Answer dated July 9, 1995,24 he admitted receiving portions
of the proceeds of his Checks in the amount of P424,000.00. 25 Thus, based on the principle against unjust
enrichment, it ordered YOHDC to reimburse the Rodriguez Spouses P424,000.00, representing the amount
that Delos Reyes had received.26 The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court August 13, 2007 Decision
read:
WHEREFORE premises considered judgment is hereby rendered as follows[:]
1. The case as against defendants ROSA ROSILLAS, SENEN DELOS REYES, METROBANK
and BPI are hereby ordered DISMISSED;
2. Defendant YOUR OWN HOME DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiffs the amount of Php 424,000.00 representing the amount already paid by plaintiffs to
defendant Senen delos Reyes; and
3. Defendant YOUR OWN HOME DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs the
amount of Php 50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
4. Costs against the defendant YOUR OWN HOME DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
SO ORDERED.27
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified in its July 18, 2011 Decision the Regional Trial Court August 13,
2007 Decision.28
It found that the principle against unjust enrichment did not apply. It did not lend credence to Delos Reyes'
admission in his Answer regarding an Acknowledgement dated June 9, 1995, which he allegedly signed
(Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement). It found that the document is a private document, the execution and
authenticity of which were not proven as required by the rules of evidence.29
Instead, the Court of Appeals lent credence to the evidence presented by YOHDC, consisting of payment
receipts to Delos Reyes, and Delos Reyes' duly notarized Affidavit dated March 14, 1995 (Delos Reyes'
Affidavit),30 which stated that he never received, encashed, or deposited the checks.31
The Court of Appeals further noted that assuming that P424,000.00 was given to Delos Reyes, it could not
have been from Delos Reyes' Checks because the total value of Delos Reyes' Checks was P508,800.00. 32 It
was not swayed by Tarcisius' explanation that the difference between the two (2) amounts was used for extra-
legal expenses for the title's issuance. It concluded that if the amount was for that purpose, it should not have
been added to the checks to be paid to Delos Reyes.33
It also noted that the numbers of the checks claimed to have been encashed by the Rodriguez Spouses for
Delos Reyes and Rosillas were different from Delos Reyes' and Rosillas' Checks.34 The Rodriguez Spouses
claimed that the checks for Rosillas were Metrobank Check Nos. 081043810 and 08143843, instead of
1181043810 and 1181043843, and that the checks for Delos Reyes were Metrobank Check Nos. 181043813
and 181043841, instead of 1181043813 and 1181043841.35
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that YOHDC was not liable to the Rodriguez Spouses for P424,000.00 as
well as attorney's fees:36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of the
City of Parañaque, Branch 259, in Civil Case No. 95-0131, is MODIFIED. Your Own Home Development
Corporation is not liable to the Spouses Tarcisius and Iris Rodriguez in the amount of PhP 424,000.00 and it is
not also liable to the latter for attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 37
Meanwhile, Iris alleged that Tarcisius passed away during the course of the proceedings.38
Iris filed a Motion for Reconsideration39 of the Court of Appeals July 18, 2011 Decision.
However, her motion was denied in the Court of Appeals November 23, 2011 Resolution.40
Hence, she filed the instant Petition before this Court on January 25, 2012.41
She argues that in Delos Reyes' Answer filed with the Regional Trial Court, he admitted the existence of his
Acknowledgment and receipt of the amount of P424,000.00. She also points out that there is no substantial
disparity between the numbers of Delos Reyes' Checks and the numbers of the checks stated in Delos Reyes'
Acknowledgment.42
She claims that the subsequent execution of his July 9, 1995 Answer and of his June 9, 1995
Acknowledgment constitutes an abandonment of his March 14, 1995 Affidavit, where he denied the receipt or
encashment of his Checks.43
She raises unjust enrichment, arguing that the payment to Delos Reyes of P424,000.00 was at her expense,
since she had no obligation to pay him, and it was YOHDC who was bound to pay him for his services.44
In its Comment,45 YOHDC asserts that in arguing that Delos Reyes was paid P424,000.00, Iris raised a
question of fact, which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.46
Furthermore, YODHC claims that it is undisputed that the four (4) checks were not endorsed, encashed,
deposited, or transacted by Rosillas or Delos Reyes to BPI. BPI even admitted that it was Iris who deposited
or negotiated the checks to it as a second endorsement, without authority from the bank.47
YOHDC also contends that Delos Reyes never appeared in court to confirm or prove the allegations in his
Answer. It asserts that Delos Reyes' Answer is of doubtful source because it is not signed by counsel, and
seems to be part of Tarcisius' grand scheme to cover up his misappropriation.48
Assuming it was filed by Delos Reyes, his Answer did not expressly admit the allegations in his
Acknowledgment49 or the truth of its contents.50 He only admitted the existence of his Acknowledgment.51
In any case, the Answer is not binding on YOHDC because "[a]n admission by a co-defendant is not an
admission by the other defendant."52
YOHDC also contends that Iris' complaint did not attach a copy of Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' Checks. Thus,
Delos Reyes could not have admitted the real and correct checks because he had nothing to admit.53
It further avers that the checks mentioned by Delos Reyes in his Acknowledgment are different from his
Checks. Hence, assuming there were payments made by the Rodriguez Spouses to Delos Reyes, they did
not come from Delos Reyes' Checks. In any case, YOHDC posits that it should be Delos Reyes who should
explain the disparity. However, the evidence was offered without explanation from Delos Reyes or Iris during
trial. The belated explanations are, therefore, without factual basis.54
YOHDC also suggests that it was Tarcisius who prepared Delos Reyes' Acknowledgment or, at the very least,
supplied the check numbers. It submits that the check numbers in Delos Reyes' Acknowledgment are the
same check numbers in the Rodriguez Spouses' complaint. It also points out that the "typing" in Delos Reyes'
Acknowledgment is the same typing in Syquioco's Affidavit, 55 where Rosillas' Checks were also typed as
Check Nos. 081043810 and 081043843, instead of 1181043810 and 1181043843. It stresses that this is how
the Rodriguez Spouses also typed the check numbers of Rosillas.56
It maintains that the figures are not mere typographical errors, but are deliberately done by Tarcisius. It argues
that it is unlikely that the mistakes in the Rodriguez Spouses' complaint were also committed by Delos Reyes
and Syquioco. Thus, it is tainted with fraud and manipulation, and its integrity cannot be relied upon. 57 YOHDC
avers that the Rodriguez Spouses created the confusion so that if it is established that Delos Reyes did not
receive the proceeds of the subject checks, they still cannot be charged with falsification or perjury.58
It likewise insists that Delos Reyes would not have been able to determine for sure that any amount he
received from Tarcisius are proceeds of his Checks because he was not the one who encashed or deposited
them.59 It was Iris who deposited Delos Reyes' Checks in her BPI account in Parañaque City. Delos Reyes
lived in Occidental Mindoro and there is no showing that he was in Parañaque when the checks were
deposited in Iris' BPI Account.60
YOHDC reiterates the Court of Appeals' ruling that if P424,000.00 was really the amount intended for Delos
Reyes, his Checks would have been issued in that amount, not in the amount of P508,000.00. Moreover,
Delos Reyes' Checks would have been given directly to Delos Reyes himself, instead of being deposited in
Iris' account.61
It also points out that in Delos Reyes' Affidavit, he categorically stated that he did not receive, deposit, encash,
or endorse his Checks, or receive their proceeds.62
YOHDC maintains that it has clearly shown that it was the party that directly paid for Delos Reyes' services. It
suggests that assuming Tarcisius paid for Delos Reyes' services, it is likely that Tarcisius took it from the
numerous unliquidated advances he obtained from YOHDC's joint venture with Archangel Corporation. All
other expenses were paid by YOHDC.63
YOHDC denied that it has been unjustly enriched. It argues that reimbursement is proper considering that it
was proven that the Rodriguez Spouses did not give the checks to the payees, but instead forged the latter's
signatures, deposited the checks in their own accounts, and withdrew the amounts for their personal use. It
argues that if there is overpayment to Delos Reyes, Iris should have pursued her claim with him.64
Iris filed her Reply where she maintains that she is not disputing the facts, but merely questioning the
conclusion drawn from it. She argues that it is clear from the undisputed facts and admitted evidence that
Delos Reyes received P424,000.00, as he expressly admitted in his Answer. She maintains that the
differences in the check numbers are mere typographical errors. She reiterates that Delos Reyes' March 14,
1995 Affidavit was executed before his July 9, 1995 Answer, which, being more recent, is controlling. Hence,
Delos Reyes' allegations in his March 14, 1995 Affidavit must be deemed abandoned. Moreover, the Answer
was neither controverted by YOHDC nor shown to be a falsity. Thus, the admissions in it must be lent
credence. YOHDC being spared from paying P424,000.00 at the expense of Iris amounts to unjust
enrichment.65
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not Your Own Home Development Corporation is liable
to Iris Rodriguez for P424,000.00 based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
This Court denies the Petition.
I
In the first place, Iris raised a factual issue which is not proper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It only entertains questions of law—those
which ask to resolve which law applies on a given set of facts. 66 It does not rule on questions which determine
"the truth or falsehood of alleged facts."67
In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.:68
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts.69 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The question of whether Delos Reyes has been paid the amount of P424,000.00 is a question of fact. It does
not simply ask to resolve which law properly applies given the set of facts in this case. It requires a review of
the evidence and the determination of the truth or falsity of the parties' allegations. Clearly, Iris is raising a
question of fact which is not proper in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
II
In any case, the Court of Appeals rightfully lent more credence to Delos Reyes' Affidavit, which stated:
AFFIDAVIT
I, SENEN DE LOS REYES, of legal age, Filipino, married/single and a resident of San Jose, Occ. Mindoro,
after having been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I am the Geodetic Engineer who was contracted to do the land survey for the Joint Venture Project of Your
Own Home Development Corporation (YOHDC) and Archangel Development Corporation (ADC) in San Jose,
Occidental, Mindoro;
2. Sometime during the first week of March 1995, I was confronted by the President of YOHDC. Mr. Yadollah
N. Sichani, about its two (2) Metrobank (Pasong Tamo Branch) Checks with Nos. 1181043813 and
1181043841 which they issued in my favor to pay for my services;
3. After examining the said checks, I realized that these checks were already encashed through a deposit at
BPI-Paranaque Branch;
4. However, I deny having received these checks and further deny having encashed or deposited these
checks with the BPI-Paranaque Branch, as I do not maintain any account from the said bank, and neither
have I deposited or encashed the same checks with the Metrobank, in any manner whatsoever, more so, I
could not have signed the indorsements thereon, and the signatures appearing at the back thereof as
indorsements are not my signature[s.]70 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Delos Reyes' Answer stated:
1. That herein defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint from paragraphs 1.0 to 9.6 inclusive, hence, he specifically denies the same
except to the allegations in the last sentence of paragraph 2.3 in so far as the existence of ANNEX "D-1"
referring to the acknowledgement receipt and the last paragraph of paragraph 2.5 as far as the receipt of the
amount of P424,000.00[.]71 (Emphasis supplied)
The last sentence of paragraph 2.3 of the Rodriguez Spouses' Complaint stated:
[Rosillas] acknowledged receipt of P1,200,000.00 and P2,400,000.00 through her authorized agent Mr. Fred
Syquioco to pay all expenses attendant to the sale transaction including taxes, disturbance compensation and
related tenancy problems, commissions and other extra-legal expenses. (Attached and marked Annex "D &
D-1" are the acknowledgement receipts of Rosa Rosillas and Senen de los Reyes).72 (Emphasis supplied)
Annex "D-1" refers to Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement, which stated:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I, SENEN M. DELOS REYES, of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and the Geodetic Engineer engaged to do the
subdivision survey and titling of Bahayang San Jose Project, San Jose, Occ. Mindoro, hereby state that I have
received the Total amount of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FOUR THOUSAND (P424,000.00) PESOS a
portion of the proceeds of [Metrobank] cheques 181043813 and 181043841 from Mr. Titus R. Rodriguez
representing partial payment for services for the said project.73
Paragraph 2.5(2) of the Rodriguez Spouses' Complaint stated:
Defendant Senen de los Reyes received the sum of P424,000 as represented by Metrobank Check No.
181043813 and Metrobank Check No. 181043841.74
The Regional Trial Court found that Delos Reyes had been paid P424,000.00. Thus, YOHDC must reimburse
Iris this amount.75 However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Iris was not entitled to the reimbursement.76
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more credence to Delos Reyes' Affidavit, which
is a public document.
A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary weight with respect to its
due execution.77 As such, it need not be proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it is
entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and effect.78
A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.79 (Citations omitted)
To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects, there must be a strong, complete, and
conclusive proof of its falsity. The required quantum of proof is a clear, strong, and convincing evidence:
Thus, a notarial document must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not
present strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects.
Absent evidence of falsity so clear, strong and convincing, and not merely preponderant, the presumption of
regularity must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial
document lies on the party contesting the same.80 (Citations omitted)
In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,81 this Court ruled that to contradict statements in a notarial document,
there must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence against it. A subsequent
notarial document retracting the previous statement is not even sufficient:
No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant. It bears stressing, however, that
Alusitain's Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document, hence, prima facie evidence of the
facts expressed therein.
Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the facts stated
therein, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two documents in
order to obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by sworn statement, corroborates his
explanation. His position does not persuade.
In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to
merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated
in a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence. The subsequent notarial documents executed by
respondent and his daughter fall short of this standard.
The case of Reyes v. Zaballero is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December 1, 1944 a
notarial document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor had already paid his
debt. On even date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without the debtor's knowledge stating
that he had accepted the payment under protest and "obligado por las circunstancias actuales." This Court
held that the creditor's statement in his affidavit that he received the money "obligado por las circunstancias
actuales" is self-serving evidence.82 (Emphasis in the original and supplied, citations omitted)
The rationale for this rule is to maintain public confidence in the integrity of notarized documents.83
In contrast, private documents must first be authenticated before they could be admitted in evidence. To
establish their authenticity, the best proof available must be presented. In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp.,84
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
....
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine
and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake
or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the
corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no
fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document,
the best proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the
testimony of a representative of [Sta. Mesa Market Corp.]'s external auditor who prepared the audited financial
statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements were never
authenticated.85 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, authentication may not be necessary where the document's genuineness and due execution were
admitted by the adverse party.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals:86
Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before the court, as
follows: firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court;
secondly, the document should be identified and marked for identification; and thirdly, it should be formally
offered in evidence to the court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have an opportunity to
object thereon.
The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they can be
received in evidence. This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact.
When there is no proof as to the authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in a private document, such
private document may be excluded. On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. There is also no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may be
found in the pleadings of the parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from the failure
of the adverse party to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the document in his
pleading.
After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever proper, the marking for
identification and the formal offer of such documents as evidence to the court follow.87 (Citations omitted)
However, this rule presents a caveat m that the admission of the document's authenticity must be categorical:
Nevertheless, petitioner insists on the application of an exception to this rule: authentication is not necessary
where the adverse party has admitted the genuineness and due execution of a document. The fact, however,
was that nowhere in his testimony did Amado Domingo categorically admit the authenticity of the copies of the
audited financial statements. He only testified that [Sta. Mesa Market Corp.] regularly submitted its audited
financial statements to the BIR and SEC. There was never any admission that the documents presented by
petitioner were true or faithful copies of those submitted to the BIR and the SEC.88 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is a private document. Thus, for Iris to rely on it, she must
have first proven its genuineness and authenticity by presenting the best proof available. As such, she should
have presented Delos Reyes to testify on its genuineness and due execution. However, Iris merely relied on
Delos Reyes' Answer and Acknowledgement on their faces. Delos Reyes neither appeared in court to attest to
the allegations of his Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as Iris' witness.89
Assuming that the statements in Delos Reyes' Answer are binding admissions, these admissions only pertain
to the existence of his Acknowledgment. He neither categorically stated its genuineness and authenticity, nor
admitted its allegations. Moreover, while he admitted the receipt of P424,000.00, he excluded from his
admission that it was from the Metrobank checks stated in the Rodriguez Spouses' Complaint. Thus, the
amount he received cannot be assumed to have been from the proceeds of his Checks or that it was payment
made to him on behalf of YOHDC as these claims must still be proven.
Moreover, this Court notes that Delos Reyes never denied his notarized Affidavit's allegations even though his
Acknowledgement's allegations are inconsistent with them.
Hence, this Court assumes that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of a retraction. This Court has
consistently held that retractions are looked upon with disfavor because of its unreliable nature and the likely
probability that it may again be repudiated.
Again, in Rufina Patis Factory:90
Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitain's subsequent sworn statement is in the nature of a retraction of his May
22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate the affidavit. For retractions are
generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts as they can easily be
fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction, it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding it
and possible motives for reversing the previous declaration, as these motives may not necessarily be in
consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them hook, line and sinker would allow unscrupulous
individuals to throw wide open the doors to fraud.
In the case at bar, Alusitain's retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and
the sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any
scintilla of evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took
effect. He did not produce any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification
card, or any other independent evidence to substantiate his claim.
While the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the
adjudication of cases, this should not be construed as a license to disregard fundamental rules on evidence in
proving one's allegations.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) The rationale for this ruling stems from
retractions being easily obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration.
In People v. Deauna:92
The Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in Alonte v. Savellano explains the rationale for
rejecting recantations in these words:
"Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court. . . . The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there
is always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there would never be an end to criminal
litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds for one reason or
another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses."
To be sure, recantations made by witnesses must be viewed with utmost caution and circumspection,
because the motivations behind them may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. Moreover, to
automatically uphold them in any form would allow unscrupulous witnesses to trifle with the legal processes
and make a mockery of established judicial proceedings, to the detriment of the entire justice
system.93 (Citation omitted)
Thus, retractions must not be believed right away. It is important to consider a witness' surrounding
circumstances and motives for changing his or her stance. In Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio:94
We concur with the NLRC's appreciation of the affidavits of retraction. We have often repeated that "[j]ust
because one has executed an affidavit of retraction does not imply that what has been previously said is false
or that the latter is true." The reliability of an affidavit of retraction is determined in the same manner that the
reliability of any other documentary evidence is ascertained. In particular, it is necessary to examine the
circumstances surrounding it. In the case of Villar's affidavit of retraction, we note that this has never been
identified and authenticated. Thus, its weight as evidence is highly suspect. As to Rebollo's alleged affidavit of
retraction, a reading of its contents, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, reveals that Rebollo in fact affirmed
Gregorio's participation in the lending activities within PNB Sucat when she said in this affidavit that Gregorio
introduced her to a certain Realina Ty who became her borrower.95 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
There must be a comparison of the two (2) testimonies and the general rules of evidence must still be applied:
2. Where a witness testifies for the prosecution and retracts his or her testimony and subsequently testifies for
the defense, the test in determining which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence, as enunciated in People v. Ubina, where the Court said:
The testimony of Ruben Francisco for the prosecution is claimed to be unworthy of credit because later on he
testified for the defense, declaring that all he had stated against the defendants is not true ...
The theory of the defense that Francisco's previous testimony is false, as he subsequently declared it to be
so, is as illogical as it is dangerous. Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and
that what he now says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No
such reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by
a previous contradictory statement (Rule 123, section 91); not that a previous testimony is presumed to be
false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has
always been otherwise, i.e. that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the
previous testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained. We have also held that if a previous
confession of an accused were to be rejected simply because the latter subsequently makes another
confession, all that an accused would do to acquit himself would be to make another confession out of
harmony with the previous one. Similarly, it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies
solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change
their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. If Francisco says that when he testified for the
prosecution he was paid P700, what can prevent the court from presuming that subsequently he testified for
the defense because the defendants also paid him to testify for them? The rule should be that a testimony
solemnly given in court should not be lightly set aside and that before this can be done, both the previous
testimony and the subsequent one be carefully compared, the circumstances under which each given
carefully scrutinized, the reasons or motives for the change carefully scrutinized — in other words, all the
expedients devised by man to determine the credibility of witnesses should be utilized to determine which of
the contradictory testimonies represents the truth.96 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bar, considering the evidence presented by the parties, this Court hesitates to accord Delos
Reyes' retraction any weight or credibility.
This Court is not bound by Delos Reyes' alleged admission in his Answer. In Atillo III v. Court of Appeals:97
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer,
We hold that such admission is not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case
of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in open court to override admissions he
made in his answer. Thus:
"The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and in his declarations in
open court differed will not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent
court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are
binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the
party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had
repudiated the defenses he had raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is
deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and
we find no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon."
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with
more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the trial court on the basis of the
evidence presented....98 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
In L.C. Ordonez Construction v. Nicdao,99 this Court lent credence to respondent Imelda Nicdao's notarized
affidavit although it contained allegations inconsistent with those in her complaint and position paper.
To support their argument, petitioners point out that Nicdao's claim as to the date of her employment should
not be believed as she has lost her credibility when she made inconsistent statements regarding the date of
her employment as stated in her Affidavit dated January 21, 1994 stating that she was employed in August
1991, as opposed to the date of employment stated as June 1985 in her complaint and position paper.
On this point, the Court rules in favor of petitioner. Indeed, even if petitioners were not able to present any
employment records, respondent Nicdao's Affidavit dated January 21, 1994 submitted to the Labor Arbiter in
support of her complaint for illegal dismissal militates against her for it stated that "I am a regular employee of
respondent Ordonez, having been employed on [sic] August 1991, ..."
....
The burden of proof rests upon respondent Nicdao since she is the party claiming entitlement to separation
pay and other employee benefits computed from 1985. However, Nicdao herself made an admission against
her own interest by stating in her affidavit that she was employed only in August 1991. Nicdao did not even
present any explanation for the variance between the date of employment stated in her affidavit as against the
date stated in her complaint and position paper. Nor has she presented any other evidence to overturn the
statement in her own affidavit that she was employed only in August 1991. Having made such an admission
against her interest, Nicdao's statement in her affidavit freed petitioners from the burden of presenting
evidence, i.e., the employment records, to prove their assertion in their position paper that they only employed
Nicdao in May 1989.100 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In the case at bar, assuming Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is genuine, he provided no satisfactory
explanation for his contradictory statements in his Affidavit. He did not appear in court to clarify the matter or
elucidate any circumstance that could explain what happened between the executions of these two (2)
documents.
The only logical explanation that could reconcile the two (2) documents is if this Court assumes that the
Rodriguez Spouses paid Delos Reyes the amount of P424,000.00 sometime after he executed his Affidavit.
However, if this is the case, that payment on behalf of YOHDC is not authorized since the Rodriguez Spouses
did not represent YOHDC in any manner. Moreover, it can be assumed that Tarcisius' authority to represent
YOHDC had been impliedly revoked considering the incidents on Delos Reyes' and Rosillas' Checks.
Thus, if Delos Reyes was paid by the Rodriguez Spouses on behalf of YOHDC, this payment is unauthorized.
Iris' cause of action is with Delos Reyes, and not with YOHDC.
III
It cannot be said that YOHDC was unjustly enriched to make it liable to petitioner.
Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
This provision addresses unjust enrichment. It is the State's public policy to prevent a person from unjustly
retaining a benefit, money, or property, at the expense of another, or against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity, and good conscience. 101
Unjust enrichment has two (2) elements: a person benefited without a real or valid basis or justification, and
the benefit was at another person's expense or damage. In Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.:102
In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at
the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of
the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is part
of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social
order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human
conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice."103 (Citation omitted)
In the case at bar, it is argued that YOHDC unjustly retained benefit at the expense of the Rodriguez Spouses
when the amounts of Delos Reyes' Checks were reimbursed to it.104
This Court finds that it did not.
First, Metrobank rightfully returned to YOHDC the amounts in Delos Reyes' and Rosillas' Checks.
Considering that Metrobank is the drawee bank, it is obligated to return the full amounts of the checks upon
discovering that they were not paid to the correct payees. In Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals:105
Where the instrument is payable to order at the time of the forgery, such as the checks in this case, the
signature of its rightful holder (here, the payee hospital) is essential to transfer title to the same instrument.
When the holder's indorsement is forged, all parties prior to the forgery may raise the real defense of forgery
against all parties subsequent thereto.
An indorser of an order instrument warrants "that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports
to be; that he has a good title to it; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the instrument is at
the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting." He cannot interpose the defense that signatures prior to him
are forged.
A collecting bank where a check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the
drawee bank, is such an indorser. So even if the indorsement on the check deposited by the banks' client is
forged, the collecting bank is bound by his warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the defense of forgery
as against the drawee bank.
The bank on which a check is drawn, known as the drawee bank, is under strict liability to pay the check to
the order of the payee. The drawer's instructions are reflected on the face and by the terms of the
check. Payment under a forged indorsement is not to the drawer's order. When the drawee bank pays a
person other than the payee, it does not comply with the terms of the check and violates its duty to charge its
customer's (the drawer) account only for properly payable items. Since the drawee bank did not pay a holder
or other person entitled to receive payment, it has no right to reimbursement from the drawer. The general
rule then is that the drawee bank may not debit the drawer's account and is not entitled to indemnification
from the drawer. The risk of loss must perforce fall on the drawee bank.
....
In cases involving checks with forged indorsements, such as the present petition, the chain of liability does not
end with the drawee bank. The drawee bank may not debit the account of the drawer but may generally pass
liability back through the collection chain to the party who took from the forger and, of course, to the forger
himself, if available. In other words, the drawee bank can seek reimbursement or a return of the amount it
paid from the presentor bank or person. Theoretically, the latter can demand reimbursement from the person
who indorsed the check to it and so on. The loss falls on the party who took the check from the forger, or on
the forger himself .106 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, the return of the amounts to YOHDC was rightful and justified.
Likewise, it cannot be said that the amounts returned were at the expense of Iris, considering that the
amounts were not meant for the Rodriguez Spouses but for Delos Reyes and Rosillas.
Furthermore, Iris has not proven that Delos Reyes released YOHDC from the payment of its obligation to him.
Hence, this Court cannot assume that YOHDC is no longer obligated to pay Delos Reyes for his services on
the premise that the Rodriguez Spouses paid him a particular amount.
For Iris to claim any right to the amounts returned to YOHDC, she must prove her claim with the required
quantum of evidence. As established, considering there was a previous duly notarized affidavit stating that
Delos Reyes did not receive any proceeds from his Checks, it was incumbent upon Iris to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed had been paid and that he had released YOHDC from paying him its
obligation. However, Iris failed in this respect; thus, she cannot claim any reimbursement for the returned
amount.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals July 18, 2011 Decision
and November 23, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90297 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 227878, August 09, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALDO SANTILLAN Y VILLANUEVA AND
EUGENE BORROMEO Y NATIVIDAD, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
This is an appeal from the May 8, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals  (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05026, which affirmed the April 6, 2011 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128, Caloocan
City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. C-70393, finding accused-appellants Geraldo Santillan y
Villanueva (Geraldo) and Eugene Borromeo (Eugene) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The Antecedents
In an Information, dated March 30, 2004, Geraldo and four (4) John Does were charged with the crime of
murder. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of March 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually aiding with one another,
without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with a bladed weapon
one ERNESTO GARCIA Y MARIANG, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting
upon him serious physical injuries, which caused his instantaneous death.
Contrary to Law.3
On April 28, 2004, Geraldo was arraigned where he pleaded "not guilty." Upon motion by the Public
Prosecutor, an Amended Information was admitted by the RTC on June 24, 2004. The Amended Information
named the four (4) John Does as Eugene, Ramil Santillan y Villanueva (Ramil), Julious Esmena (Julious), and
Andres Cartnueva (Andres).
On January 24, 2007, Eugene was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Ramil, Julious
and Andres, however, remained at large.
The prosecution presented Julie Ann Garcia  (Julie Ann), Michael Garcia (Michael), Police Chief Inspector
Felimon Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula, Jr.), PO1 Joselito Bagting, and Mary Ann Parinas as its witnesses.
On the other hand, the defense consisted of the testimonies of Clarita Amen  (Clarita), Teresita
Arias  (Teresita), Geraldo and Eugene.
Version of the Prosecution
On March 23, 2004, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Andres invited the victim Ernesto Garcia (Ernesto),
who was then watching television in his living room, to go out. Ernesto agreed and they went to the end
portion of an alley.
Minutes later, Michael, Ernesto's son, was tending their store when he saw his father running towards their
gate while being chased by Ramil and Geraldo, also known in their place as Dodong Santillan. 4 Thereupon,
Ramil stabbed Ernesto at the back. Geraldo, who was also armed, tried to stab Ernesto but missed.
Ernesto ran towards their gate and embraced Michael. Michael then called out his sister, Julie Ann, who came
to help her father while Michael sought assistance from their uncle, Domingo Trinidad. Julie Ann asked
Ernesto who his assailants were. Ernesto answered Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." Ernesto
vomited blood and fell to the ground. Michael returned on board a tricycle and they tried to bring Ernesto to
the hospital, but their father was already dead.
Version of the Defense
Geraldo testified that on March 28, 2004, at about 7:45 o'clock in the evening, he was already asleep in their
house but was awakened when he felt something cold was pointed at his side. He was surprised to see that it
was a gun and policemen were inside his house. The policemen immediately handcuffed him and informed
him that he was responsible for Ernesto's death.
Geraldo further attested that Ernesto filed a complaint against him for allegedly throwing stones at his
(Ernesto's) house. The barangay investigation, however, showed that he was not responsible for the
complained act. He and Ernesto shook hands and the latter's children even asked for an apology. On March
14, 2004, Ernesto hacked him on the head. He filed a case for frustrated murder before the police precinct,
but the case did not reach the prosecutor's office because Ernesto died.5 Also, sometime in November 2003,
he and his wife Lorna Santillan filed a complaint against Ernesto before the barangay.6 He never thought of
retaliating as they were advised to file a case against Ernesto.
Teresita, sister of Julious, corroborated the testimony of Geraldo. She testified that on March 28, 2004,
between 6:00 to 6:30 o'clock in the evening, she was at Geraldo's house and she saw him sleeping because
the house had no door and there was illumination from a candle; that while on her way home from the market,
she noticed a commotion; that she heard that Ernesto was stabbed; that she hurriedly went to Geraldo's
house to fetch her son and saw that Geraldo was still sleeping; that she was cooking at about 8:00 to 8:30
o'clock in the evening when policemen suddenly arrived; and that she saw from their window that Geraldo,
who had just awakened, was being arrested.
For his part, Eugene deposed that on March 28, 2004 at about 7:45 o'clock in the evening, he was in Camarin,
Zapote, Caloocan City. He arrived in the said place at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon because his mother
instructed him to collect payment from her kumadre. He ate there and was able to collect the payment. He left
Zapote at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening but did not go home and instead played video carrera for more
than thirty 30 minutes. Afterwards, he went home and was surprised to see a lot of people in their place. He
then learned of Ernesto's death. He alleged that he never had a misunderstanding with Ernesto; and that he
was present during the time that Ernesto attacked Geraldo with a bolo. On November 23, 2005, he discovered
that a case for murder was filed against him when he secured a clearance from the OCC-MeTC.7 He stated
that he never left their house in Bagong Silang; and that he did not go into hiding.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 6, 2011 decision, the RTC found Geraldo and Eugene guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accessory penalties
attached thereto.
The RTC treated the ante mortem statement of Ernesto as a dying declaration. It found that Ernesto's
declaration, which was relayed to Julie Ann, concerned the circumstances surrounding his death; that it was
offered in a criminal case in which he was the victim; and that it was made under the consciousness of
impending death, taking into consideration the gravity of his wounds and the immediacy by which death took
place. It also admitted Ernesto's declaration as part of the res gestae.
The trial court was convinced that the dying declaration, coupled with the testimony of Michael, had
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of both Geraldo and Eugene. It opined that the defenses
proffered centered on alibi, an inherently weak defense that is reduced to self-serving evidence when
unsubstantiated and is undeserving of weight in law.
Moreover, the RTC ruled that the testimonies of defense witnesses Clarita and Teresita did not provide
corroboration because both witnesses were not present during the stabbing incident. It observed that Teresita
was at the market and saw Geraldo before and after the stabbing incident but not during its occurrence. In the
same manner, the RTC noted that while Clarita saw Geraldo asleep before and after the stabbing incident,
she nevertheless did not see him at the time of its commission for she was inside the house of Geraldo's
mother having a massage session.
Finally, the RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In so ruling, it stressed
that Ernesto was unarmed and was trying to flee from his attackers. The RTC took into account the fact that
there were four assailants, two of whom were seen chasing Ernesto with a bolo on hand. Hence, it concluded
that the crime committed was murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. The  fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Geraldo Santillan and Eugene Borromeo Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for Murder, the court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accessory
penalties attached thereto. Accused Geraldo Santillan and Eugene Borromeo are likewise directed to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Ernesto Garcia as follows:
1) Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, as civil indemnity;
2) Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages;
3) Seventy Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as, exemplary damages; and
4) Twenty Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Five (P27,845.00) Pesos, as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, the accused-appellants elevated an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its May 8, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the conviction of Geraldo and Eugene. It held
that all the requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration were present in this case. In the same
manner, the CA ruled that Ernesto's declaration could also be admitted as part of the  res gestae because
when Ernesto gave the identities of those who stabbed him to Julie Ann, he was referring to a startling
occurrence. It added that Ernesto was wounded and blood was oozing from his chest, thus, he had no time to
contrive the identification of his assailants. The CA opined that Ernesto's utterance that Dodong, Eugene,
Ramil, and a certain "Palaka" stabbed him was spontaneously made and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence.
The appellate court explained that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength must be
appreciated because the assailants enjoyed superiority in number and were armed with weapons, while
Ernesto had no means with which to defend himself. It declared that the medico-legal report supported the
inequality of forces between the victim and the assailants in terms of number and weapons. The CA noted Dr.
Porciuncula, Jr.'s testimony that Ernesto sustained multiple incise wounds on different parts of his body; that
the weapon used was a single bladed sharp instrument and it was possible that more than one was used; and
that it was likely that there could have been more than one assailant that inflicted the stab wounds. 9 The CA
disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128
in Criminal Case No. C-70393, finding accused-appellants Geraldo Santillan y Villanueva and Eugene
Borromeo y  Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are ordered
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Ernesto Garcia the amounts of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages and Twenty-Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-
Five Pesos (P27,845.00) as actual damages. Accused-appellants shall also pay interest on all these damages
assessed at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
I.
WHETHER IT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT GERALDO AND EUGENE WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ERNESTO
II.
WHETHER ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
In a Resolution,11 dated January 16, 2017, the Court required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desired. In their Manifestation (in lieu of Supplemental
Brief),12 dated March 3, 2017, accused-appellants manifested that they were adopting the Appellant's Brief
filed before the CA as their supplemental brief, for the same had adequately discussed all the matters
pertinent to their defense. In its Manifestation (Re: Supplemental Brief), 13 dated March 15, 2017, the Office of
the Solicitor General  (OSG) stated that all matters and issues raised by the accused-appellants had already
been adequately discussed in its Brief before the CA and manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief.
In their appellant's brief, accused-appellants sought a reversal of their conviction contending that Ernesto's
statement, as relayed to Julie Ann, was inadmissible as a dying declaration or part of  res gestae. They
posited that Ernesto was incompetent to testify had he survived. Accused-appellants advanced the proposition
that because the stabbing incident happened at night, darkness made it improbable for Ernesto to identify his
assailants. Considering that no moral certainty could be had as to their participation, their accountability for
Ernesto's death was reduced to a mere possibility which was insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Further, accused-appellants argued that the prosecution failed to prove that they took advantage of their
physical strength to ensure commission of the crime for even if it was true that Michael saw Ramil and
Geraldo chasing Ernesto, such circumstance did not prove that they took advantage of their physical strength
by simultaneously attacking the victim.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Ernesto's dying declaration stands; likewise, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.14
All of the above requisites are present in this case. The Court quotes with approval the CA's disquisition on
the matter:
Ernesto communicated his ante-mortem statement to Julie Ann, identifying accused-appellants and the other
two accused as the persons who stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Ernesto was conscious of his
impending death, having sustained multiple incise and stab wounds, one of which being fatal, piercing deeply
into the middle lobe of his right lung, trachea and esophagus. Ernesto even vomited blood, collapsed, and
eventually died.
xxx
Ernesto would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the
dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Ernesto was the victim.15
The postulate that darkness of the night prevented Ernesto from identifying his assailants must be rejected for
being entirely conjectural. Basic is the rule that mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not
equivalent to proof.16
To be sure, Geraldo and Eugene's proposition crumbles in light of the testimony of Dr. Porciuncula, Jr., whose
competence as an expert witness was admitted by the defense. Dr. Porciuncula, Jr. testified that with respect
to the injuries in front, the assailant could have been in the front right side of the victim if the assailant was
right-handed; whereas, if the assailant was left-handed, then he was facing the victim in front. 17 He likewise
stated that the incise wounds on the hands could be considered as defense wounds and it was possible that
the victim was able to fight back his assailant.18
The presence of defense wounds is a positive indication of resistance on the part Ernesto. Gauging from
the situs of the defense wounds, it is discernible that the victim utilized his hands to ward off the slew of
attacks from his assailants. Logically, the defense wounds resulted from attacks that were hurled within
Ernesto's line of sight, for the simple reason that his hands could only parry those attacks coming from the
direction he was facing. This leads to the unmistakable conclusion that at one point in time, Ernesto came
face to face with his assailants. Contrary to Geraldo and Eugene's assertion, the evidence on record reveals
that Ernesto was in a position to glance upon and recognize the face of his aggressors. Moreover, such
conclusion is buttressed by the uncontroverted findings that Ernesto sustained frontal injuries; and that the
attacker could have been in front or facing the victim.
Ernesto's statement may also be considered part of the res gestae. A declaration or an utterance is deemed
as part of the res gestae  and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19
Ernesto's statement referred to a startling occurrence, that is, him being stabbed by Dodong, Eugene, Ramil,
and a certain "Palaka." At the time he relayed his statement to Julie Ann, he was wounded and blood oozed
from his chest. Given his condition, it is clear that he had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified the authors of the crime.20
The Qualifying Circumstance of Abuse of Superior Strength was improperly appreciated; Geraldo and
Eugene could only be convicted of the crime of homicide
Although the Court entertains no doubt that Geraldo and Eugene are responsible for Ernesto's death, the
lower tribunals erred when it appreciated abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder. The
courts a quo commonly concluded that the assailants' number and weapons gave them significant advantage
in ensuring the death of Ernesto. Such reasoning, however, is incorrect and fails to muster the standards set
by jurisprudence on the proper appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
In People v. Beduya (Beduya)21 the Court explained the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
as follows:
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons
who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion
to the means of defense available to the person attacked.22
As pointed out in the appellant's brief, only the fact that there were two (2) persons chasing Ernesto, Ramil
and Geraldo, can be ascertained from Michael's testimony. In line with Beduya, the sole fact that there were
two (2) persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength. Moreover, as can be gleaned from Michael's testimony, the respective attacks thrown by
Ramil and Geraldo occurred alternately, one after the other. It is settled that when the attack was made on the
victim alternately, there is no abuse of superior strength.23 Besides, the Court notes that Eugene was not even
a participant in the chase Michael witnessed.
Neither will Ernesto's dying declaration suffice to establish abuse of superior strength. The  ante
mortem statement, as relayed to Julie Ann, revolved solely on the identification of the assailants Dodong,
Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." There was no account on how the assault transpired or a narration to
the effect that the aggressors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their combined strength to
perpetrate the crime with impunity.24 Aside from naming his assailants, Ernesto's ante mortem statement is
bereft of any indicia that will convince the Court that the perpetrators espoused a deliberate design to utilize
the advantage of number and weapons. Thus, the dearth in the prosecution's evidence impels a downgrading
of the nature of the offense committed from murder to homicide.
Proper penalty and award of damages
Having established Geraldo and Eugene's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide, they must
suffer the appropriate penalty imposed by law. The crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.
Considering that there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they should be sentenced to an indeterminate
term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,  i.e., prision mayor, and the
maximum of which is that properly imposable under the RPC, i.e., reclusion temporal  in its medium period.25
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,26 the Court reduces the awards of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Likewise,
the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the April 6, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128, Caloocan City, in Criminal
Case No. C-70393, isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Court finds accused-appellants Geraldo
Santillan y Villanueva and Eugene Borromeo  y Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide and hereby sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to pay the heirs of Ernesto Garcia the amounts of P27,845.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%)  per annum from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.