High-Rise Buildings

High-Rise Buildings
01 Cover page: MANHATTAN, NEW YORK

High-rise buildings in the course of history Technology of high-rise buildings Risk potential Insurance

M M Münchener Rück
Munich Re Group
Contents
Page Page

1 Introduction 4 4.2.4.4 Fire fighting 110

4.2.4.5 Organizational measures 111
4.2.4.6 Atriums 111
2 High-rise buildings in the course of his-
4.3 Windstorm 111
tory, technology and the environment 8
4.4 Earthquakes 115
2.1 Historical development 9 4.5 Foundations, settlement and
2.2 Architectural aspects and urban subsidence 119
development today 12 4.5.1 Foundations 119
2.3 Financing models 14 4.5.2 Settlement and subsidence 121
2.4 Infrastructural aspects 17 4.6 Water 122
2.5 Economic aspects 21 4.7 Special structural measures 122
2.6 Social and ecological aspects 21 4.7.1 Conversions 122
4.7.2 Rehabilitation 122
4.7.3 Demolition 123
3 Technology of high-rise construction 24
4.7.4 Disposal 126
3.1 Planning 25 4.8 Other risks 126
3.1.1 Planners 25 4.8.1 Terrorism 126
3.1.2 Regulations and directives 25 4.8.2 Impact 127
3.1.3 Technical analyses and special 4.8.3 Collapse 132
questions 26 4.8.4 Wear 132
3.1.4 Construction licensing procedure 26 4.9 Loss of profit 132
3.1.5 Other constraints 29
3.2 Execution 31
5 Insurance 138
3.2.1 Foundations 31
3.2.2 Supporting structure 35 5.1 Property insurance 139
3.2.2.1 Load-bearing parts 35 5.1.1 Contractors’ and erection all risks
3.2.2.2 Special construction methods 42 insurance 139
3.2.2.3 Facade 45 5.1.2 Advance loss of profit insurance 141
3.2.2.4 Roof 46 5.1.3 Insurance of contractors’ plant
3.2.3 Interior finishing 46 and machinery 142
3.2.4 Service systems 48 5.1.4 Decennial liability insurance 144
3.2.4.1 Installations 48 5.1.5 Insurance of buildings, fire insurance 144
3.2.4.2 Deliveries, vehicles 49 5.1.6 Loss of profit insurance 145
3.2.4.3 Passenger transport, vertical 5.1.6.1 Loss of rent 145
development 49 5.1.6.2 Additional costs 145
3.2.4.4 Waste disposal 50 5.1.6.3 Contingency planning 145
3.3 Occupancy 51 5.1.6.4 Prevention of access 145
3.3.1 Maintenance, administration 51 5.2 Third-party liability insurance 147
3.3.2 Conversions 53 5.2.1 Insurance of the designer’s risk 147
3.3.3 Rehabilitation 53 5.2.2 Insurance of the construction risk 147
3.4 High-rise construction in the future 54 5.2.3 Insurance of the operational risk 148
5.3 Problem of maximum loss 149
5.3.1 Construction phase 149
4 Risk potential 84
5.3.2 Decennial liability insurance 149
4.1 Design errors 85 5.3.3 Operating phase 149
4.2 Fire 86 5.3.4 Accumulation control 152
4.2.1 Examples of losses during the 5.4 Underwriting considerations 153
construction phase 86 5.4.1 Contractors’ and erection all risks
4.2.2 Fire protection on construction sites 89 insurance 153
4.2.3 Examples of losses during the 5.4.2 Contractors’ plant and machinery 153
occupancy phase 99 5.4.3 Decennial liability insurance 153
4.2.4 Fire-protection regulations, loss 5.4.4 Insurance of buildings, fire insurance 153
prevention 107 5.5 Reinsurance 155
4.2.4.1 Regulations 107
4.2.4.2 Structural fire protection 107
4.2.4.3 Active loss-prevention measures 108 6 Summary and outlook 156
1 Introduction

1
Page 5
High-rise buildings have always triggered major
debates and aroused emotion. That is hardly
surprising, considering that this type of building
radiates more symbolic power than almost any other.
1 Introduction
From their beginning in the middle of the last century
and right up to the present day, high-rise buildings have
always been a dominant landmark in the townscape,
visible from far and wide, like the towers of Antiquity and
the Middle Ages. At the same time, this sky-scraping con-
struction method has always been an ideal means of dis-
playing power and influence in the community. In the light
of this goal, reasonable economic considerations often
recede into the background during the erection and sub-
sequent use of these high-rise buildings.
A prestige object for the builder, these edifices not only
have an effect on their immediate neighbours, but also
influence many areas of urban life in very different ways.
These aspects will also be taken up in this publication.
In the early years, the builders’ urge to rise to dizzying
heights was limited by unsolved technical problems. In
recent years, however, a real competition has developed
among the builders of skyscrapers to be world champion
at least for a few months before being outdone by a rival
with an even higher building. Even seemingly Utopian
projects now stand a good chance of becoming reality.
This rapid development has only become possible be-
cause the technical conditions and methods used in con-
structing high-rise buildings have improved decisively
and in some cases changed fundamentally in the last few
years.
1 Introduction
Up until the end of the last century, high-rise buildings
were still made of solid brick masonry, which ultimately
required foundation walls up to 1.8 m thick. When steel
frames adapted from steel bridge construction were intro-
duced, with their increased strength and lower weight,
builders and architects were able to soar to greater
heights. With this steel skeleton, the net weight of the
structure was considerably lower than that of a solid
masonry building; it thus not only cut the costs of con-
struction, but also gave wings to the architects’ imagin-
ation. By the turn of the century, they were designing build-
ings that also looked light and delicate as even at that
time the skeleton structure permitted a large proportion
of windows on the outer facade.
Since then, the construction of high-rise buildings has
continued to change with the requirements imposed by
air-conditioning and particularly office communications.
The high-rise office buildings of the nineties have
little in common with their predecessors. Instead of
compact walls and ceilings, we now have a high-tech
structure made up of largely prefabricated elements which
are welded and bonded together on site. The building
comprises a skeleton of steel or reinforced concrete which
is rounded off by suspended ceilings and false floors
creating the space required for installations. The originally
1 Introduction
02 SAN GIMIGNANO
load-bearing outer wall has been replaced by a pre-
fabricated facade.
However, this complex method of construction promotes
the spread of fire and fumes, and therefore, in conjunction
with the considerable concentration of values involved,
represents an extremely sensitive risk both during con-
struction and throughout the service life of the building.
The major fires which broke out in a number of high-rise
office buildings shortly before their completion in the early
nineties show how correct the appraisal of the fire risk in
high-rise buildings is. The losses incurred through these
fires are several times higher than the amounts of indem-
nity known to date.
This is consequently one of the main reasons why high-
rise buildings constitute a new dimension of risk for the
insurance industry, one which has made it necessary to
draw up new concepts for underwriting, loss assessment
and PML determination throughout every phase of con-
struction and subsequent use.
We therefore believe that this publication on high-rise
buildings is an appropriate addition to our comprehensive
series of special publications, particularly those on under-
ground railways and bridges.
We are fully aware of the fact that many of the aspects
considered with regard to the construction, use and insur-
ance of high-rise buildings naturally apply in the case of
lower buildings too. Nevertheless, we do not wish to limit
ourselves to aspects which only apply specifically to high-
rise buildings. After a brief historical overview, we will
therefore consider in detail all the risks and problems
Page 6
associated with high-rise buildings and the techniques that
are applied in order to illuminate possible solutions from
the point of view of both construction technology and
insurance.
Moreover, the more broadly based general information
available will make it easier not only to assess the risk of
high-rise building projects but also to arrive at a price
for insuring such projects.
The definition of a high-rise building differs from one
country to the next. For our purposes, we will proceed
on the basis of a minimum height of 30 m and will restrict
ourselves to buildings used for residential or office pur-
poses.
Despite the various critical voices raised, the construction
of high-rise buildings has by no means reached its zenith.
The problem of high-rise buildings is one which we – as
insurers and reinsurers – will also have to consider in the
future.
This special publication is also intended, last but not least,
as a means of passing on to others our experience from
the major losses that have occurred in the recent past.
03 MONADNOCK BUILDING
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment

2
2.1 Historical development
2.2 Architectural aspects
2.3 Financing models
2.4 Infrastructural aspects
2.5 Economic aspects
2.6 Social and ecological aspects
Page 9
04 THE TOWER OF BABEL
According to the Bible, the Tower of Babel was to
“reach unto heaven” (Genesis 11).
But when the Lord saw what the people had done, He confused their language and scattered them abroad over the face
of all the earth so that they left off building the city.
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
2.1 Historical development
What could be a more appropriate point to begin our con-
sideration of high-rise buildings than with the Tower of
Babel and then to trace their historical development over
the centuries. However, a distinction must be made
between “high buildings” and “high-rise buildings”: “high
buildings” have only a few floors and not uncommonly
only one, albeit very high floor. They are crowned by a
high roof and turrets (in the manner typical of medieval
and Gothic cathedrals). “High-rise buildings”, on the other
hand, have many, usually identical floors of normal height
one above the other. Seen in this light, high-rise buildings
have their origins in the towers of San Gimignano rather
than in the Tower of Babel or ecclesiastical structures.
The first high-rise office building according to this defin-
ition was built in Chicago in 1885: the Home Insurance
Building. It still stands on the corner of La Salle and
Adams Street, a witness of its times. It has twelve floors –
there were originally ten, but two were subsequently
added – and was built in roughly eighteen months. The
architect W. L. B. Jenney used an uncommon new method
for the construction of his building: the weight of the walls
was borne by a framework of cast-iron columns and rolled
I-sections which were bolted together via L-bars and the
entire “skeleton” embedded in the masonry.
The early Equitable Life Building in New York, which was
completed in 1872, also contributed towards the develop-
ment of high-rise buildings, for it was the first tall building
to have an elevator. Although it only had six floors, the
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
edge of the roof was no less than 130 feet (roughly 38 m)
above the road surface. Due to its elevator, the upper
floors were in greater demand than the lower floors. Fol-
lowing completion of the “Equitable” building, it was the
done thing to reside on one of the “top” floors.
Burnham and Roof’s Monadnock building, which was
completed in Chicago in 1891, must also be mentioned as
one of the last witnesses of a whole generation of solid
masonry high-rise buildings. Sixteen floors of robust brick
masonry rise skywards in stern, clear lines: an astonishing
sight to eyes accustomed to the frills and fancies of the
late 19th century. Standing on an oblong base measuring
59 m  20 m, the building is reminiscent of a thin slice
and not only recalls the industrial brick buildings of the
late 19th century, but also anticipates the formal simplifi-
cation of the later 1920s.
The buildings rose higher and higher with the spread of
pioneering construction methods – such as the steel
skeleton or reliable deep foundation methods – as well
as the invention and development of the elevator. The
highly spectacular skylines of North American cities,
particularly Chicago and New York, originated in the early
years of the 20th century.
Glancing over Manhattan’s stony profile, the silhouettes
dotting the first 12 km of the 22-km-long island bear
vociferous testimony to this dynamic development:
– the World Trade Center, currently the tallest building in
New York, 417 m high,
– the legendary Empire State Building, built in 1931,
381 m,
 2 High-rise buildings in the course of history,
technology and the environment

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I4@@0Y

Top left: 05 EQUITABLE LIFE BUILDING

Bottom left: 06 HOME INSURANCE BUILDING

Right: 07 NEW YORK PANORAMA

2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
08 HONGKONGBANK 09 MESSETURM, FRANKFURT AM MAIN
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, HONG KONG
– the United Nations building erected in 1953, 215 m,
– the Chrysler Building dated 1930, 320 m,
– the former Pan Am Building completed in 1963, 246 m,
– the Rockefeller Center (1931–1940), a complex of
19 buildings,
– the Citicorp Center built in 1978, 279 m, and
– the AT&T Building opened in 1984, a pioneering
building by the post-modern architect Philip Johnson,
with an overall height of 197 m.
It is only recently that attention has also turned to interest-
ing high-rise buildings outside North America: Norman
Foster’s Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Ieoh Ming Pei’s
Bank of China in Hong Kong and the twin tops of the
Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur, currently the tallest
building in the world at 452 m.
High-rise buildings in Germany are a modern develop-
ment and are concentrated particularly in Frankfurt am
Main: today, Frankfurt is the only German city with a
skyline dominated by skyscrapers. One of the tallest build-
ings in the city is the Messeturm built in 1991 with a
height of 259 m, which is not much more than half the
height of the Sears Tower in Chicago, currently the tallest
office and business tower in North America with a total
height of 443 m.
It was the rapid growth in population that originally pro-
moted the construction of high-rise buildings. New York
once again provides a striking example: land became
scarce well over a hundred years ago as more and more
European immigrants streamed into the city. From roughly
half a million in 1850, the city’s population grew to
1.4 million by 1899.
More and more skyscrapers rose higher and higher on
the solid ground in Manhattan, as buildings could only be
erected with great difficulty on the boggy land to the
right and left of the Hudson River and East River. In this
way, New York demonstrated what was meant by “urban
densification” despite the considerable doubts originally
voiced by experts in conjunction with this development.
The first area development code to come into force in
New York was the so-called “zoning law” of 1916, accord-
Page 12
ing to which the height of a building must not exceed two-
and-a-half times the width of the road running alongside
the building. The building mass was further limited by the
requirement that the floor space index must not exceed
twelve times the area of the site. Among other things, the
zoning law stipulated that only the first twelve floors of a
building were allowed to occupy the full area of the site
and that all subsequent floors must then recede in zoned
terraces – a requirement of major aesthetic significance,
for this terraced form still dominates the silhouette of
American skyscrapers today.
All doubts as to the profitability of high-rise buildings
were set aside with completion of the Empire State Build-
ing, the Chrysler Building and other skyscrapers in the
1930s, for they would never have been built if they could
not have turned a profit. Although rentals proceeded slow-
ly at first when the Empire State Building was completed
in the heart of the recession in the 1930s and it was there-
fore known as the “Empty State Building” for many years,
it subsequently generated satisfactory revenues once all
the premises had been let.
Cities in Europe and Asia grew horizontally and it was
only when production and services acquired greater eco-
nomic significance throughout the world and the price of
land rose higher and higher in economic centres after the
Second World War that they also began to grow vertically.
Modern Hong Kong is a striking case in point: it encom-
passes an area of 1,037 km2 (Victoria, Kowloon and the
New Territories), of which only one-quarter has been de-
veloped, but with maximum density and impressive effi-
ciency. Almost all the new buildings, office towers and
particularly residential towers in the New Territories have
more than thirty floors.
2.2 Architectural aspects and urban development today
As the historical development of high-rise buildings has
already shown, the construction of edifices reaching higher
10 PETRONAS TOWERS
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
and higher into the sky was – and to a certain extent
still is – an expression of power and strength. This is
equally true of both ecclesiastical and secular buildings:
the power, strength and influence of entire families – i.e.
their standing in society – is mirrored in the erection of
ever taller buildings culminating in a battle to build. The
towers of San Gimignano are one of the best preserved
examples of this development. In many North African cit-
ies, too, this attitude has moulded the townscape for
many centuries and will no doubt continue to do so in
the future.
The names of the builders and architects have only been
known since the high Middle Ages around 1000 AD. They
created new stylistic elements and added their “signature”
to entire periods. Looking back, this makes it difficult for
us today to decide whether these master craftsmen
shaped the various stylistic developments or whether a
number of master builders only became so well known
because their work reflected the contemporary fashion
trends most accurately. That still holds true today, the only
difference being that tastes change very much more rapid-
ly and “degenerate” into short-lived fashions. A building
that reflects the spirit of the times when it is finished can
appear “old” within only a few years. The brevity of the
various stylistic trends is one of the reasons for the in-
homogeneous appearance of modern towns and cities.
Since architects must expect that later buildings will have
their own, completely different formal identity, they do not
see any reason why they should base their own designs
on existing standards, particularly as this would merely
cause them to be considered “unimaginative”.
Three points become clear if we take a closer look at mod-
ern trends in high-rise construction:
– The dictate of tastes mentioned above is expressive of
the egotism prevalent in modern society with its desire
for status symbols and designer brands. Unfortunately,
the public not uncommonly bows to this dictate, as
when town councillors set aside major urban develop-
ment considerations and with seeming generosity set
up public areas in the form of lobbies and plazas in
high-rise buildings.
– The sheer magnitude of the projects forces all planners
to adopt a scale totally out of proportion to all natural
dimensions and particularly to the people concerned
when planning their buildings. In the past, urban devel-
opment plans were easily drawn up on a scale of 1:100
or at most 1:200, a scale which could still be directly
related to the size of a human being. With today’s high-
rise buildings, however, a scale of at least 1:1000 is
required simply in order to depict the building on paper.
This is illustrated by the example of the Sears Tower
in Chicago: completed in 1974, the Tower measures
443 m in height. Drawn to a scale of 1:2000, a human
being is represented by a minute dot measuring barely
0.9 mm.
– In the past, it was the master builder and architect who
defined the construction and consequently the appear-
ance of a building; today, on the other hand, technical
developments determine what can and cannot be done;
Page 14
the appropriate and basically essential symbiosis
between engineering designer and artist has been aban-
doned.
This critical discourse on the architectural, urban develop-
ment and economic background is not basically to cast
doubt on high-rise buildings as such, but it does illuminate
some of the facets that are central to considering the risk
potential inherent in high-rise buildings.
This almost inevitably raises the question why high-rise
buildings should have to be built in today’s dimensions.
– One reason is indisputably the need for a “landmark”. In
other words, to express economic and corporate power
and domination in impressive visual terms. Nothing has
changed in this respect since the very first high-rise
buildings were erected.
– The steadily rising price of land in prime locations and
an increasingly scarce supply have made it essential to
make optimum use of the air space. Prices in excess of
DM 50,000 per square metre are not uncommon for land
in conurbations and economic centres. Despite their
height, however, high-rise buildings still occupy areas of
truly gigantic proportions: the ratio of height-to-base
width of the cubes in the 417-m-high World Trade Cen-
ter, for example, is 6:1.
– Connections to the infrastructure are improved by con-
centrating so many people in such a small area. The
World Trade Center alone provides jobs for over 50,000
people – that is the equivalent of a medium-sized town.
All institutions of public life are united under a single
roof and the distances between them have been min-
imized.
However, high-rise buildings do little to prevent land being
sealed on a large scale. The suburbs of modern American
cities are a prime example: as far as the eye can see, the
landscape is covered with single-family homes, swimming
pools and artificially designed gardens simply to provide
sufficient private residential land for all the people work-
ing in a high-rise building occupying only a few thousand
square metres.
– Many of the techniques and materials which are also
used for “normal” buildings today would never have
been invented and would never have become estab-
lished if high-rise construction had not presented a
challenge in terms of technical feasibility. Rationalized,
automated sequences are beneficial to high-rise build-
ings; at no time in the past were such huge buildings
erected in such a short space of time. Short construction
periods also mean shorter financing periods and conse-
quently profits which partly compensate for the add-
itional costs incurred in the construction and finishing of
the building.
2.3 Financing models
The construction costs for high-rise buildings often run
into hundreds of millions of dollars. The owner of the
building will rarely be willing or able to bear these costs
11 HIGH DENSITY: HONG KONG SKYLINE
12 FLATIRON BUILDING, NEW YORK
Page 17
without outside assistance. On the other hand, however,
debt service and exhausted credit lines will then constrict
his operative freedom. Alternative financing models are
therefore frequently sought; the best known models are
briefly outlined below.
LEASING
Leasing of buildings, particularly high-rise buildings, can
to a large extent be compared with rentals. This alternative
is commonly chosen when a company finds itself in finan-
cial straits and needs cash. Selling the building – often a
prestige object in a prime location – to a leasing company
is of two-fold advantage to the company: firstly, it acquires
the urgently needed capital, and secondly, it can continue
to use the building in return for a monthly leasing fee
which, however, amounts to no more than a fraction of the
purchase price received.
The composition of corporate assets is changed by such a
transaction. This can be a disadvantage when new loans
are needed, for the building is then no longer shown on
the assets side as a property secured by entry in the land
register.
BOT
BOT stands for “build, operate and transfer” (there are
other variations but these will not be discussed in further
detail here). In the case of this financing model, the owner
of the land places his land at the disposal of a contractor
who then erects a building on it, such as an office tower.
The owner of the land can exert a certain influence on the
planning and intended use, but does not share in the con-
struction costs. The contractor must organize the project’s
financing himself, be it with own funds or with the aid of
loans (“build”).
In return, the owner of the land waives all or some of the
income from occupancy of the building for a certain
period of time, usually 25 years. During this time, the
builder must obtain rents that are calculated to cover his
debt service and draw a profit from the invested capital
(“operate”). The builder’s risk with regard to rents and
debt interest is often considerable. At the end of the
agreed occupancy period, both the land and the office
tower become the property of the landowner (“transfer”).
There are differences between these financing models: al-
though the BOT model grants the landowner the right to
ownership, he is for a long time excluded from occupancy
of the property. With the leasing model, the high capital
investment required is transferred to the lessor and the
financing costs are replaced by monthly payments akin
to rent by the lessee.
DEVELOPER
The developer is a new profession born out of the explo-
sive rise in construction costs which has been intensified
by increasingly large buildings and structures. This was
triggered by urban renewal programmes and changes in
tax regulations for large construction projects for which
new financing models were developed in the USA in the
sixties and seventies.
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
The developer usually draws up what is known as a mas-
ter plan for complete districts and then retains (usually
prominent) architects to design the various components of
the master plan independently of one another. The devel-
oper then seeks to find tenants or lessees for the building
which at this stage only exists on paper. Construction
work begins when tenants or lessees have been found.
La Défense in the Paris Basin is a typical example of such
a development.
This suburb was created on the drawing board in the
1950s. A dilapidated district was demolished and com-
pletely redesigned. The traffic systems, such as Metro,
urban railway, motorway and access roads were moved
below ground level and covered by a concrete slab 1.2 km
long.
Mostly office towers were erected on this slab with open
squares and green areas in between. The ensemble is
rounded off by the Grande Arche de la Défense designed
by the Danish architect Johann Otto von Spreckelsen and
completed in 1989. The Grande Arche is a huge cube
which is open on two sides with 37 office floors and a
height of 110 m equal to its ground lengths. All the capital
invested on the site came from private sources and was
controlled by a public-law community of interests.
In times of sluggish investment activity, however, it is not
uncommon to find that only certain parts of the master
plan are actually realized. Originally planned as a homoge-
neous townscape, the result is then nothing more than an
unrelated fragment and areas that should have been filled
with life appear to be deserted and uninhabited instead. In
the mid-nineties London’s Docklands provided a dramatic
example of such a development: the transformation of the
West India Docks built between 1802 and 1806 resulted in
what was for a while the highest mountain of debt in the
world with the high-rise obelisk on Canary Wharf. After
having consumed roughly US$ 3bn, the half-finished pro-
ject was temporarily abandoned before finally being com-
pleted and let following a variety of financial transactions.
2.4 Infrastructural aspects
The different fates of La Défense and Canary Wharf are
not (only) due to the extremely different planning periods
of 30 years (La Défense) and 8 years (Canary Wharf), but
above all to the manner in which the necessary infrastruc-
ture for the two projects was tackled.
In the case of La Défense, the entire necessary infrastruc-
ture was completed before the construction work actually
started: underground railway lines and roads, service
systems were all planned and built beforehand. As a re-
sult, a fully functional and above all adequately dimen-
sioned infrastructure was consequently available when the
buildings were taken into service. This made La Défense
attractive to investors and tenants alike; the new district
soon pulsated with life as an economically sound basis for
the entire project.
13 LA GRANDE ARCHE
14 CANARY WHARF
15 TRADITIONAL AND MODERN BUILDINGS IN PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE
Page 21
A jungle of political, economic and investment difficulties
must be overcome for such prospective planning because
the owner of the high-rise complex bears no direct respon-
sibility for the large majority of these far-reaching infra-
structural measures. The project’s progress is consequent-
ly controlled by the municipal authorities, as well as by
supply and operating companies and not by the owner of
the complex.
The situation of Canary Wharf in London’s Docklands
is exactly the opposite and proves that the La Défense
type of planning is the economically more appropriate
approach, despite the associated delay in starting con-
struction work and the longer preliminary financing
required.
A second City of London was to be created in the heart of
the Docklands within the shortest possible space of time,
with thousands of square metres of tailor-made office
space, hotels, shops and apartments for high-income ten-
ants. A rail-bound fully automatic cabin railway known as
the Docklands Light Railway was to ensure the necessary
access.
However, this transport system fell far short of meeting
the requirements, as its capacity was far too low and it
lacked the essential connection to the London Under-
ground. The road connections for private traffic and public
buses were similarly inadequate. This made the Docklands
unattractive to both commercial and private tenants. An
Underground link was finally built after extensive planning
and at the enormous cost of roughly US$ 1.7bn; the road
connections were likewise improved at the cost of almost
US$ 1bn. Only then did the precarious economic situation
of Canary Wharf improve.
As these examples show, almost every high-rise construc-
tion project is doomed to at least economic failure if the
infrastructure is not considered, planned and actually in-
stalled down to the very last detail.
2.5 Economic aspects
Hundreds of companies and thousands of people depend
on the smooth operation of a high-rise building, from the
one-man business of a newspaper vendor or shoeshiner
and corporations with thousands of employees, such as
banks, brokers or global players with a daily turnover in
the order of several billions to radio, television and tele-
communications companies which use the roofs and tops
of high-rise buildings for the transmission and receiving
installations. In addition, there are innumerable other busi-
nesses and workers with their families whose economic
situation is directly or indirectly linked with the high-rise
building. These range from transport companies and
catering firms to tradesmen under long-term contract in
the building.
Nor should it be overlooked that even the municipal au-
thorities and the service companies are also affected by
the “failure” of a high-rise building and that its effects can
be felt nationwide or even worldwide in the worst case.
This scenario not only applies to such total failure as a
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment
major fire or collapse of the building. Despite (or precisely
because of) its size, a high-rise building is an incredibly
sensitive and vulnerable system. Even a brief power fail-
ure can result in operational and economic chaos. The
same applies to outside disturbances in the form of strikes
by public transport corporations or a malfunction in the
underground or urban railway system.
2.6 Social and ecological aspects
Criticism today focuses particularly on the social and eco-
logical effects of high-rise buildings.
The most commonly voiced reservations with regard to
high-rise apartment blocks concern the social aspect. It is
claimed – and there are probably a number of studies to
prove – that cohabitation in high-rise buildings does not
work as smoothly as in homogeneous, historically grown
districts with numerous small, manageable dwellings. The
anonymity suffered by the people in these “residential fac-
tories” is criticized in particular – above all on account of
the total isolation from other residents in order to avoid
the stress of permanent contact.
Organic, homogeneous population structures with their
positive effects on social conduct are rarely found and the
charge that high-rise apartment blocks are hostile to fam-
ilies and children is consequently not entirely unfounded.
Two diametrically opposed ghetto situations can easily
arise in high-rise apartment blocks: since the costs for con-
struction and maintenance of these buildings are dispro-
portionately high, correspondingly high rents must be
charged, with the result that these blocks are more or less
reserved for the well-off, while the socially weaker classes
are excluded. Conversely, however, high-rise apartment
blocks can rapidly cease to be attractive if compromises
are made with regard to the building quality, maintenance
or infrastructure on account of the high investment costs
entailed. A building in disrepair will soon drive away the
“good” tenants and become a slum.
The ghetto situation is intensified when high-rise apart-
ment blocks are built in newly developed fringe areas – far
away from cultural and social centres – on account of the
high cost of land in inner city areas. It is not without good
cause that these areas are commonly referred to as “dor-
mitory towns”.
Studies have also proved beyond all doubt that criminal
activity is promoted by huge apartment blocks and particu-
larly high-rise buildings. According to these studies, this
phenomenon is attributable to the anonymity of the resi-
dents, as well as to the “pro-crime” environment with ele-
vators, poorly lit corridors devoid of human beings, refuse
collection rooms and bicycle garages, laundries and above
all underground parking lots. It is a proven fact that con-
siderably more murders, burglaries, muggings, rapes and
other crimes are committed in such buildings than in resi-
dential areas with smaller rented or private homes.
Not only high-rise apartment blocks have a usually nega-
tive effect on people’s social environment: office towers
are equally disadvantageous. The vertical structure of the
2 High-rise buildings in the course of history, technology and the environment Page 22

buildings simultaneously underlines the vertical hierarchy: the possibility of falling objects. That fear is surely not en-
the location of the office space becomes an indicator of a tirely unfounded, for there have been cases in which parts
company’s “importance” and, if the company occupies of buildings, such as glass panes, have been torn out of
several or all the floors in a high-rise building, it may also their anchorage by strong winds and injured or even killed
be indicative of the employee’s standing in the company. people on the street below.
The company’s top executives reside on the uppermost Our love-hate relationship with high-rise buildings is final-
floors with the best views; the floors below provide a ly also revealed in such recent box-office hits from Holly-
shield and every employee can positively see the distance wood as “Deep Impact”, “Godzilla” or “Independence
between himself and “them up there“. It is therefore not Day”. It seems that their directors simply cannot avoid the
wrong to question whether high-rise office towers are temptation of reducing one of New York’s most beautiful
really appropriate to modern organizational structures buildings – the Chrysler Building – to a smouldering heap
with their emphasis on team work and interdisciplinary of rubble with the help of floods, monsters or meteorites.
cooperation. As a result, these skyscrapers more or less become the
real stars of the film on account of their magic attraction
Excessive energy consumption is a major shortcoming of and immediate recognizability.
high-rise buildings and one which could possibly lead to
their demise one day. High-rise buildings are the farthest
removed from the ideal form as regards energy efficiency
– namely the sphere, or the cube in the case of houses.
That applies to both heating and cooling: some skyscraper
facades have to be cooled by day and heated by night in
order to avoid undue stresses and the resultant damage.
The World Trade Center, for example, consumes some
680,000 kWh/day electricity for air-conditioning during
periods of strong solar irradiation; the Messeturm in
Frankfurt burns up energy worth DM 40 per square metre
of useful floor space for heating and cooling every month.
A well insulated low-energy house, by comparison, uses
energy worth less than DM 1 per square metre. The “energy
balance” of high-rise buildings is also poor in other
respects such as the water supply, which usually only
operates with the aid of booster pumps, as well as in terms
of the disposal systems and operation of the elevators, etc.
From the point of construction economy in general, high-
rise buildings will probably always be the poorest conceiv-
able solution, from the particularly energy-intensive and
therefore expensive construction as such to the dispropor-
tionately high demolition costs. Moreover, high-rise build-
ings are made almost exclusively of materials which a
construction biologist would take great pains to avoid,
namely concrete, steel, light metal, plastics and a wide
variety of chemicals.
Although subjectively unaware of the fact, the residents
are frequently exposed to constant stresses in the form of
pollutant emissions and electrosmog. High-rise buildings
are sometimes described as microcosms; that is no doubt
meant in a positive sense, but the reality is different. The
people in a high-rise building are totally cut off from the
world around them, from wind and weather, from tem-
perature, from smells, sounds and moods. They live in an
artificial world.
At the same time, however, the high-rise buildings also
have a negative effect on the world around them, for they
not uncommonly generate air turbulence and downdrafts
in their immediate vicinity; they can be a source of un-
pleasant reflections and some adjacent areas remain per-
manently in the shade. Illuminated facades and large glass
fronts are a death trap for many birds.
The people outside the high-rise buildings also often have
the feeling that they are being observed or threatened by
16 CHRYSLER BUILDING, NEW YORK
3 Technology of high-rise construction

3
3.1 Planning 3.2 Execution 3.3 Occupancy 3.4 High-rise construction in the future
Page 25
Skyscrapers are gigantic projects demanding incred-
ible logistics, management and strong nerves among
all concerned in their planning and construction.
As long ago as 1928, the American Colonel William
A. Starrett wrote that no peacetime activity bore
greater resemblance to a military strategy than the
construction of a skyscraper.
3 Technology of high-rise construction
3.1 Planning
3.1.1 Planners
The complexity of the trades to be coordinated has be-
come several times greater since then. Take, for example,
the new block built for Südwest-Landesbank in Stuttgart:
many disciplines and different experts were involved sole-
ly in the project planning:
– Architects
– Planning engineers for the supporting structures (engi-
neering design and structural analyses)
– Construction and site management (resident engineer)
– Planning of the technical building services (particularly
heating, ventilation, sanitation, cooling and air-
conditioning)
– Interior designers
– Construction physics and construction biology
– Planning and site management for data networks
– Planning of the lighting and materials handling
– Planning of the electrical and electronic systems
– Planning of the facades
– Surveying engineers
– Geotechnology, hydrogeology and environmental
protection
– Design of outdoor facilities and vegetation
– Surveying of the actual situation in surrounding build-
ings
If we were to include all the contractors and specialists in-
volved in the project as well, the list would probably be
ten times longer. And if we then consider that bankers,
construction authorities, legal advisers and even advertis-
ing agencies or brokers must also be coordinated in the
3 Technology of high-rise construction
course of the entire planning and construction of a sky-
scraper project, it soon becomes clear that highly profes-
sional management is essential for such a project. Project
management companies have come to play an increasing-
ly important role in recent years as they take over the en-
tire organization, structurization and coordination of con-
struction projects. They act as professional representatives
for the client and embody the frequently voiced desire for
the entire project to be coordinated by a single partner.
3.1.2 Regulations and directives
The various laws, regulations, directives and standards in
force must be taken into account when planning and erect-
ing a building. The planning engineers are also obliged to
observe what are known in Germany, for instance, as the
“generally accepted technical rules for construction“; in
other words, generally applicable technical and trade rules
must be taken into account and observed in addition to
the standards and regulations.
Although each country has its own regulations and dir-
ectives governing the construction of high-rise buildings,
they are all basically similar in content with a few differ-
ences depending on the local circumstances. It is standard
practice in some countries to base the bidding and plan-
ning phase for projects on foreign standards (particularly
on the American ANSI Codes and UL Standards, British
Standards or the German DIN standards) or to include var-
ious elements of these foreign standards in the national
system of standards.
As a rule, these regulations are primarily designed to en-
sure personal safety and then to protect the building
against damage and defects. In addition to the require-
ments imposed by public authorities, there are also re-
3 Technology of high-rise construction
quirements imposed by insurance companies with the aim
of ensuring greater protection for property. These require-
ments can be classified in four groups:
FIRE PROTECTION AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY
Many of the construction regulations concern fire protec-
tion. There can be many thousands of people in a high-
rise building at any one time. If a fire breaks out, they
must all be able to leave the building in the shortest
possible space of time and without risk of injury. This is
why regulations concerning the number and execution
of escape routes and fire escapes, fire compartments
and the choice of materials must be observed (see
Section 4.2.5).
Operational security encompasses regulations governing
the safety of elevators and escalators, the execution of
stairs, railings and parapets or the installation of emer-
gency lighting. Some regulations also include CO2 alarm
systems for underground parking lots; indeed, there are
even regulations governing the non-slip nature of floor
coverings in traffic areas, sanitary rooms and kitchens.
STABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION PHYSICS
The regulations governing the stability of a building are
usually met by the requisite structural analyses. In add-
ition to demonstrating the internal structural strength of
the construction and safe transfer of loads to the subsoil,
the stability calculations must also include possible de-
formation due to thermal expansion, wind loads and live
loads or dead weight, for example. This is closely related
with demonstrating the safety of the construction, for in-
stance by taking steps to limit the (unavoidable) cracks in
concrete elements.
PROTECTION AGAINST NATURAL HAZARDS
The regulations and directives governing protection
against natural hazards are usually closely associated with
the demonstration of stability. Windstorms and earth-
quakes are the most serious natural hazards for high-rise
buildings. As a rule, the assumed loads and design rules
for the “load cases” of earthquake and windstorm will be
specified by the regulations in order to ensure that the
building will withstand windstorms or earthquakes up to
certain load limits. At the same time, this will serve to rule
out the risk of bodily injury due to falling parts of the
building, especially parts of the facade.
SOCIAL ASPECTS AND PROTECTION OF THE SURROUNDINGS
The regulations governing social aspects and protection of
the area surrounding high-rise buildings are designed
above all to prevent any indirect risk or threat to people.
Such regulations may concern planning aspects, such as
the minimum distance between a high-rise building and
neighbouring buildings, or they may take the form of rules
defining the maximum permissible influence that a build-
ing can have on the microcosm surrounding it.
Depending on the location of the high-rise building, cor-
responding statutory instruments may also govern the
effects on air traffic safety or the building’s influence of
radio communications.
Page 26
This exceedingly concise outline of applicable regulations
illuminates only some of the rules to be observed when
building a skyscraper. If all the regulations governing high-
rise construction were to be stacked one on top of the
other in printed form, they would themselves be as high
as a multi-storey building.
3.1.3 Technical analyses and special questions
Planning a high-rise building would be inconceivable
today without the help of experts and technical consult-
ants. Extensive soil analyses are required to determine the
strength of the subsoil before deciding on the location for
a high-rise building. In the majority of cases, cores are
drilled into the load-bearing subsoil to obtain soil samples.
The drilling profile of the geological strata making up the
subsoil and laboratory analyses of the soil samples pro-
vide the basic data for the soil report which is in turn used
as the basis for planning the supporting structures and
choosing a suitable foundation structure with due regard
for the loads exerted by the high-rise building.
The forces acting on the high-rise structure in the event of
an earthquake must be taken into account when erecting
high-rise buildings in areas prone to seismic activity. The
same applies to wind loads and particularly to the dynamic
effects of windstorm or earthquake loads. The additional
vibration loads can result in overall loads of the same
order of magnitude as the load exerted by the dead
weight of the structure. The situation is particularly critical
if the vibrations reach the resonant frequency of the build-
ing: in such a case, the vibrations can intensify until the
entire building collapses. The collapse of the Tacoma
Bridge in Washington State, USA, was probably the most
spectacular case of destruction due to resonant vibration
in a man-made structure.
In many cases, these effects cannot be determined by or-
dinary computation. Even computer simulation cannot al-
ways help. Sometimes a decisive element may be lacking
to obtain a mathematical approximation; in other cases,
the computer may be too slow or the storage capacity in-
adequate.
This frequently makes it necessary to carry out model
experiments in a scientific laboratory. Models of the high-
rise buildings are exposed to artificial earthquakes on a vi-
bratory table or subjected to a simulated hurricane in the
wind tunnel. A detailed knowledge of mathematics and
physics is necessary to ensure that the same physical
properties and serviceable results are obtained despite the
reduction in scale. For this reason, these studies can only
be carried out by highly specialized test institutes.
3.1.4 Construction licensing procedure
The construction licensing procedure is normally specified
in the construction laws of the country concerned. As a
rule, the principal will file an application with all the requis-
ite documents (description, plans, analyses, etc.) to the
relevant construction supervisory authority. The involve-
ment of specialists is obligatory in the case of larger and
more complicated projects, such as those involving high-
17 DETAILS FROM PLANNING DOCUMENTS
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3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 28

Page 29 3 Technology of high-rise construction

rise buildings. Such specialists include experts from the

municipal fire brigade, water authorities, trade supervisory
offices, environment protection agencies or similar offices
in other specific fields.
These specialists review the applications for a construction
licence and specify any additional requirements to be met.
The licence is then sent to the principal together with the
requirements specified by the specialists; responsibility for
complying with these requirements rests with the principal
or owner of the building.

3.1.5 Other constraints

Even in our high-tech era, the planning and construction

19 OPENING IN AN APARTMENT COMPLEX ALLOWING NEGATIVE VIBES TO PASS
THROUGH
of a high-rise building are not dictated only by naked fac-
tual constraints. Tradition, religion and even the belief in
spirits and demons still play a not insignificant part in
many countries.
Take, for example, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
building in Hong Kong: during the planning phase, a geo-
mancer or expert on “fung shui” (i.e. “wind and water“)
repositioned the escalators and moved executive offices
and conference rooms to the other side of the building on
the basis of astrological investigations and measurements
in order to guarantee an optimum sense of well-being for
clients and employees. However, it must be said that such
intervention is limited by technical and structural require-
ments.
In western countries, too, the owners are guided by
similar considerations when the 13th floor is omitted
from the planning or the technical installations are deliber-
ately located on this floor in order to avoid the unlucky
number 13.
Page 31
3.2 Execution
3.2.1 Foundations
Although the foundations are out of sight once the build-
ing is completed, they are of immense importance for en-
suring that the dead weight and live loads of the building
are safely transmitted to the native subsoil.
These loads are not inconsiderable. The dead weight of a
high-rise building can amount to several hundred thou-
sand tonnes. This value may be exceeded several times
over by the live loads which are taken as the basis for de-
signing the building and include the loads from equipment
and furnishings, people or moving objects, as well as wind
or earthquake loads. Moreover, these loads often exert dif-
ferent pressures on the subsoil, thus resulting in uneven
settlement of the building. In order to avoid such develop-
ments where possible, these buildings must be erected on
subsoil of high load-bearing capacity, such as solid rock.
Yet even if a strong native subsoil is found near the sur-
face, shallow foundations will frequently be disregarded in
favour a system that transfers the load to deeper layers on
account of the high bending moments to be absorbed
from horizontal forces.
This can be done in several ways. One is to produce round
or rectangular caissons which are lowered to the required
depth and bear the foundation structure. Pile foundations
are probably the most widely used method, however. The
piles can either be prefabricated and then inserted in the
native soil or they can be produced on site in the form of
concrete drilling piles. Which method is chosen will ultim-
ately depend on both the structural concept and the soil
20 LARGE-BORE PILE FOUNDATION PROCESS
Bottom: VARIOUS STAGES IN THE DIAPHRAGM WALL PROCESS
21 Following page: DIAPHRAGM WALL ROTARY CUTTER
3 Technology of high-rise construction
conditions prevailing on site. Drilling piles in a whole var-
iety of forms can be used when working with large pile
diameters and very long piles. Modern equipment can
easily ram piles measuring up to 2 m in diameter to
depths of well over 50 m. The piles are then combined
into appropriate pile groups in accordance with the loads
to be transmitted by the building.
Although the load-bearing capacity can be roughly calcu-
lated on the basis of soil characteristics, the maximum
permissible pile load is determined by applying test loads
to the finished piles with the aid of hydraulic presses and
comparing the resultant settlement with the permissible
settlement.
Diaphragm walls are another means of producing deep
foundations. These walls are produced directly in the
ground and are between 60 and 100 cm thick. They are
produced in sections with the aid of special equipment
and a stabilizing bentonite slurry. The result is a continu-
ous wall in the ground. This method is used in particular
when subsoil of high load-bearing capacity is only found
at considerable depth.
Diaphragm walls and piles are also used to safeguard the
foundation pit required for construction of the under-
ground part of the building. The effort entailed can be con-
siderable, particularly if the neighbouring buildings are
very close. Rotating drills are mostly used today to minim-
ize vibrations when installing the retaining wall. Founda-
tion pits can easily be produced to depths of 30 m or more
using this method.
3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 34

22 RETAINING WALL TO PROTECT NEIGHBOURING BUILDINGS

23 VIEW OF A BUILDING PIT WITH COMPLETED RETAINING WALL

Page 35
3.2.2 Supporting structure
3.2.2.1 Load-bearing parts
The steel skeleton permitted hitherto inconceivable flexi-
bility in construction and layout planning. It also permitted
series construction up to great heights, since the vertical
dead weight was considerably lower than when using
solid masonry and did not make it necessary to grade the
sectional steel profiles in these areas. The tradition of steel
skeleton structures predates the first high-rise building to
have been erected by this method, namely the Home In-
surance Building in Chicago (1885): mills and granaries, as
well as engineering structures (bridges, silos) had already
been built in England with an iron framework towards the
end of the 18th century.
The first frame structures used for the steel skeleton
were flexurally rigid frames corresponding in height to
one floor. New York’s Empire State Building, which was
completed in 1932, is one example which clearly shows
the advantage of this new method, namely the short
time required for the construction work. Moreover, the
complete separation of outside wall and supporting
structure permitted absolute freedom of design for the
facade. Instead of requiring around 300 kg of steel per
square metre of base area as in the past, modern support-
ing structures only require roughly 125 kg of steel on
average.
As the buildings became taller and taller, however, the
main problem was no longer the vertical loads but such
horizontal loads as wind and earthquake forces, as well as
their transmission.
This led to the development of what was known as the
core method. The individual floors with their secondary
supporting structure, namely the columns, are suspended
from a central core as the primary supporting element,
normally in the form of a reinforced concrete or steel
structure with reinforcing shear walls. The columns merely
transmit vertical loads, while the core transmits both verti-
cal and horizontal loads. Its primary function is to rein-
force the building in horizontal direction. The cores and
their surrounding walls normally accommodate vertical
service installations, such as elevators, stairs, primary ser-
vice shafts for electric power and HLS (heating, lighting,
sanitation). A similar supporting effect is obtained with the
aid of horizontal reinforcing elements in the form of shear
walls, which may be considered as an “open core“. How-
ever, such supporting structures are rarely found in taller
buildings.
Since the middle of the 20th century, a number of im-
provements in the supporting structures for skyscrapers
have been introduced by the architects Skidmore, Owings
& Merrill (SOM) in Chicago. One such development by
SOM is the “outrigger truss”: a rigid superstructure known
as the outrigger is mounted at the top of a reinforcing core
with movably connected floors and columns. The outrig-
ger connects the columns to the core. They are suspended
from the outrigger and are therefore under tension, thus
eliminating the risk of buckling that is associated with
pressure elements. A supporting system in the form of
3 Technology of high-rise construction
such an outrigger truss yields further advantages over a
simple core construction when it comes to transmission of
the horizontal loads. The bending stress applied to the
core area in the lower floors is considerably reduced when
using an outrigger truss. The outrigger itself usually ac-
commodates such technical floors as the heating and ven-
tilation systems.
The Fort Wisconsin Center built in Milwaukee in 1962 is
one example of an outrigger truss structure. The produc-
tion of such suspended structures gave rise to a number
of innovations, such as the lift-slab process for concrete
structures. The load-bearing cores are first of all erected
with the outrigger on top; the individual floors are then
concreted on the ground, one above the other (separated
by a release spray). Finally, they are raised to their installa-
tion position by means of hydraulic jacks and then con-
nected to the core (see Section 3.2.2.2).
Supporting steel structures in the form of tubes are often
used for extremely tall buildings. In this case, the support-
ing structure is located in the outer facade, which is conse-
quently designed in the form of a load-bearing facade with
small openings. The result is an enclosed, intrinsically
rigid tube without any unnecessary space-filling columns
inside. The World Trade Center in New York is an example
of such a structure. The outer walls are studded with verti-
cal steel columns roughly one metre apart. A generously
dimensioned development area was obtained on the
ground floor by “collecting” the descending columns.
America’s tallest skyscraper, the Sears Tower in Chicago
(443 m high), is a further development of the conventional
tube: it is a “bundled” tube. The layout of the building is
subdivided into a number of tubes to relieve the columns
in the corners of the building when subjected to horizontal
loads; this results in more uniform distribution of the load
over the facade columns. In this case, however, the inter-
ior can no longer be designed with the same flexibility as
when using a single tube.
The “truss tubes” perfected by Fazlar Khan (SOM) in the
John Hancock Center in Chicago are another further devel-
opment of the basic tube. These tubes are additionally re-
inforced by diagonal struts in the facade plane and are a
structural feature that has almost become a hallmark of
SOM buildings.
It was only in the mid-1970s that concrete began to be
more widely used in constructing skyscrapers. Until then,
the length of time required for concrete construction and
the associated financing problems were the main reasons
for the predominant use of steel structures in the construc-
tion of high-rise buildings. New developments in shutter-
ing, however, resulted in dramatically shorter construction
times. The octagonal concrete core of the Messeturm in
Frankfurt, for example, was erected with the aid of a slip-
form which was hydraulically raised one metre every day.
The latest developments in supporting structures for high-
rise buildings include composite structures of steel and
concrete, for instance in the form of steel sections embed-
ded in concrete.
24 EXAMPLES OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS WITH STEEL SKELETONS
25 DEFORMATION AND BENDING MOMENTUM DUE
TO WIND WITH THE CORE CONSTRUCTION METHOD

26 Background: COMMERZBANK BUILDING

A B C D E F G

27 DEFORMATION AND BENDING MOMENTUM DUE TO WIND WITH THE

OUTRIGGER TRUSS METHOD
Below: 28 EXAMPLES OF CORE CONSTRUCTION METHODS (A-E) AND
BUNDLED TUBES (F-G)
 3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 40

↑ Wind

29 VARYING LOAD DISTRIBUTION WITH TUBES AND BUNDLED TUBES

Page 41 3 Technology of high-rise construction

Top: 30 EXAMPLE OF THE ARRANGEMENT

OF BUNDLED TUBES

Right: 31 STEEL SKELETON

3 Technology of high-rise construction
3.2.2.2 Special construction methods
BMW HEADQUARTERS, MUNICH
The headquarters of BMW A.G. differs from conventional
buildings to create an impressive corporate symbol in the
form of a 100-m-high four-cylinder structure. The require-
ments for appropriate office organization yielded a basic
outline in the shape of a clover leaf. Stairways, elevators
and sanitary areas are accommodated in the central core.
In this way, all the offices can be reached by the shortest
possible route. Trendsetting methods were also used for
the construction work.
A reinforced concrete version was chosen as the most
economical solution. According to the design concept, the
entire building with 18 office floors and a technical floor
was to be suspended from a girder cross at the top of the
roughly 100-m-high core via four central king posts. This is
a modification of the outrigger truss (Section 3.2.2.1). The
entire load of the building is transmitted to the founda-
tions via the core as the central element; it also absorbs
all wind forces. A mighty girder cross with a projection of
16 m is mounted at the top of the core.
The four king posts are secured to this central girder
cross, each king post comprising 105 threaded steel bars
with a load-bearing capacity equal to a suspended weight
of 4,600 Mp. Small outer columns are additionally located
between the floors. These outer columns are designed as
compression columns above the technical floor (12th
floor) and as king posts below.
Time and costs were the decisive reasons for choosing
this innovative construction method. All 19 floors were
successively produced at the foot of the shell and core; the
first floors were even produced complete with facade and
Page 42
glazing during construction of the supporting cross. The
finished floors were then connected to the supporting
cross via the king posts and raised one floor at a time
every week with the aid of hoisting gear so that another
floor could be produced in the space vacated at the foot of
the core and then connected to the floor above (lift-slab
method). Completion of the facade, glazing, installation
and interior finishing proceeded on the suspended floors,
unimpeded by the structural works and lifting operations.
In addition to reducing the construction time required, this
method also eliminated the need for expensive tooling
and assembly work.
LA GRANDE ARCHE, PARIS
This building, which has already been mentioned in Sec-
tion 2, takes the form of a giant cube open on two sides
with edge lengths of 110 m. It was completed at the end of
1989 on the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution
and took 5 years to build (see photo on page 18).
The building has a weight of more than 300,000 Mp and is
mounted on neoprene bearings, the loads being transmit-
ted 30 m into the subsoil via twelve concrete pillars.
The cube’s main support is in the form of four prestressed
upright reinforced concrete frames 21 m apart. They are
complemented by horizontal members measuring roughly
70 m at ground and roof level. Each of these members is
9 m high, the equivalent of a 3-storey building. Since the
two vertical sides of the cube would be without roof-level
transverse bracing during construction, the required stabil-
ity for that phase of the work was produced by means of
horizontal steel truss reinforcements.
A total of 37 office floors are accommodated in the
two 18-m-wide wings of the cube (each with an area of
42,000 m2).
Top: VIEW FROM THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
Bottom: 32 HEADQUARTERS OF BMW A.G. IN MUNICH
Page 45
3.2.2.3 Facade
The skeleton construction which has increasingly been
used since the turn of the century has inevitably given rise
to new possibilities for the facade. The size, shape and
number of windows were no longer limited by structural
requirements following the introduction of curtain facades,
since the loads were now primarily transmitted by posts
and columns.
PLANNING
Most facade designs today are still based on empirical
know-how and are not tested until the design has been
established in detail. The tests are carried out on true-to-
scale models of individual facade elements in order to
test adequate resistance to air and water, load-bearing
capacity and the possibility of excessive deformation
or glass breakage when subjected to corresponding loads,
e.g. with the aid of firmly anchored aircraft engines.
DESIGN
Today’s modern facades are characterized by external wall
elements equal to one floor in height and inserted
between the respective structural floors. Non-supporting
metal facades suspended in front of the building have in-
creasingly become established for economic reasons, par-
ticularly in high-rise construction.
The scope for design is enlarged by coloured or mirrored
window panels and linings of natural stone, ceramic
tiles or brick. Almost any desired appearance can be pro-
duced.
TECHNICAL PROPERTIES
Modern facades must meet complex requirements as re-
gards construction technology, engineering design and
construction physics. Thanks to its lightness and almost
unlimited possibilities for profile design, aluminium has
largely become the material of choice for the outer frame-
work. The panes are made of high-grade glass filled with
noble gases or with a surface coating that reflects infrared
light. On the inside, modern facades are highly imperme-
able to water and water vapour in order to prevent dam-
age due to moisture.
Despite the large areas of glass, protection against the sun
is more important than heat loss today due to good ther-
mal insulation of modern facades. Even where sound-
proofing and fire protection are concerned, glass and
33 FACADE ASSEMBLY
3 Technology of high-rise construction
metal facades are at least the equal of conventional con-
structions.
Modern facades also require a sophisticated ventilation
and cooling system. The air-conditioned or twin facade is
a case in point. Here an additional facade of laminated
glass is arranged in front of the conventional facade, thus
creating a space through which air can circulate. More
complex ventilation concepts for routing air into and out
of the building may be realized by including additional
vertical and horizontal bulkheads. Individually controlled
ventilation flaps are capable of providing a more natural
and far less complex exchange of air.
PRODUCTION AND ASSEMBLY
Due to the extensive know-how required with regard to
material properties and construction physics and on ac-
count of the great manufacturing depth, modern facades
are only produced by specialized companies based on the
architect’s design and in accordance with functional, as
well as structural aspects before subsequently being as-
sembled.
The degree of prefabrication in modern facades is consid-
erable. The frames, glazing, parapet lining, sunshades and
anti-glare finish, as well as thermal insulation and sealing
are all assembled into single-storey facade elements in the
manufacturer’s plant. In many cases, such technical equip-
ment parts as radiators, air outlets and the ducting for
electrical and electronic equipment are also already inte-
grated at this stage.
In the meantime, fixing elements can be mounted on the
shell of the high-rise building. These elements can usually
be displaced in three planes to compensate the dimen-
sional tolerances occurring in the shell. The facade elem-
ents as such are fitted without the help of scaffolding,
thus greatly reducing the time required for this work. The
frame profiles are assembled with labyrinthine indenta-
tions to compensate the deformation arising in the build-
ing as a result of wind and live loads, as well as tempera-
ture differences. Permanently elastic rubber profiles en-
sure that the facade remains impermeable to air and
water.
3 Technology of high-rise construction
3.2.2.4 Roof
There are no fixed rules governing the roofs of high-rise
buildings. The roof design depends only on the architect’s
draft and on the purposes and functions to be fulfilled by
the roof.
Most roofs are flat. The electromechanical drive system
for the elevators is usually installed on the roof; in some
cases, there is also a rail around the perimeter of the
building to accommodate the equipment required for
cleaning the facade, as well as the pertinent connections
and facilities.
A heliport or parking space can also be set up on the flat
roof of large high-rise buildings. It is sometimes even used
in Japan for golfing practice.
Air-intake towers for air-conditioning systems, on the
other hand, have become less common on modern high-
rise buildings. Due to the great height of buildings, air-
conditioning and heating systems are now decentralized
and spread over several individual floors. Moreover, every
installation and every superstructure on the roof means
another opening in the intact roof skin and this can give
rise to leakage problems, particularly on flat roofs. It is
therefore advantageous to transfer such systems to lower
floors.
Overhead glazing is another type of roof commonly found
in high-rise buildings. Such roofs keep out the elements
while at the same time creating spacious assembly areas,
usually in the centre of the building. Atriums and conven-
tion halls are two pertinent examples.
High-rise buildings with a sloping roof are usually round-
ed off by an antenna system with appropriate lightning
protection.
3.2.3 Interior finishing
Walls, ceilings and floors in high-rise buildings are no dif-
ferent to those in other buildings. The choice of materials
and structures depends on the intended use of the build-
ing rather than on its form (high-rise, low-level or cubic).
Since particular importance is attached to flexible use of
high-rise buildings, the partition walls, floor structures and
(usually suspended) ceilings will be of corresponding de-
sign.
When considering the interior finishing, a distinction must
basically be made between load-bearing or supporting ele-
ments which are required for structural reasons and those
which merely partition off the rooms and installations.
Load-bearing elements are almost exclusively made of
concrete or steel today, as well as of combinations of
these materials.
Page 46
Due to the relatively small area available per floor, fire-
resistant elements (fire walls) are usually only to be found
in the core areas incorporating the elevators, stairwells,
service and installation shafts, sanitary and ancillary
rooms. A vertical breakdown into fire compartments is
mostly obtained with the aid of fire-resistant floor con-
structions (for further details see Section 4.2.4).
The installations for air-conditioning, ventilation, lighting
and fire alarms are usually located between the load-bear-
ing ceiling and a suspended false ceiling into which the
lamps are normally integrated. Small-scale electrical in-
stallations are contained in trunking in the screed flooring;
elevated false floors are installed if numerous connections
are required, such as in computer centres. Cables can then
be routed as desired in the space below the floor; the
equipment is connected to sockets in so-called floor tanks.
False floors are to be found almost everywhere in modern
office towers, since cables can be rerouted without diffi-
culty, as is increasingly required on account of the rapid
pace of change in office and communications technology.
Moreover, the space below the floor can also be used for
ventilation and air-conditioning installations, particularly in
computer centres. Particular attention must be paid to the
question of fire protection in such false floor construc-
tions.
Connection of the flexible partition walls to both the sus-
pended ceiling and the elevated false floor can pose prob-
lems. From the point of view of soundproofing and ther-
mal insulation, it would be better to install the partition
walls between the load-bearing floors. However, since the
suspended ceilings and false floors normally extend over
the entire area and are not confined to any single room on
account of the technical installations, the partition walls
must also be fitted between the suspended ceiling and
false floor. This consequently makes it necessary to use
soundproofing and thermally insulating floor coverings,
as well as ceiling materials.
Facade elements into which technical components have
already been incorporated by the manufacturer (see
Section 3.2.3) are conveniently linked to the remaining net-
work by means of screw-in and plug-in connections. How-
ever, it is becoming increasingly rare for such technical
service connections to be installed in the external walls,
as they do not permit as flexible use of the room as floor
tanks.
34 CEILING INSTALLATION
35 DOUBLE FLOORING
3 Technology of high-rise construction
3.2.4 Service systems
3.2.4.1 Installations
ENERGY AND WATER SUPPLY
Unlike the case with normal multi-storey buildings, the
technical service components in high-rise buildings must
meet special requirements – if only on account of the
height – since the required supply of energy, water and air
and the effluent volume are incomparably larger. The twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York, for in-
stance, with around 50,000 employees and 80,000 visitors
every day, requires more than 25,000 kWh of electricity
every hour. These utilities must also be transported to the
very last floor in sufficient quantities, under adequate
pressure and at sometimes totally different temperatures.
The planning effort required on the part of the service en-
gineers responsible for the supply and disposal services in
high-rise buildings is therefore very much greater than
in the case of smaller and medium-sized projects. The
costs for electrical and electronic systems in the recently
completed Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur, currently the
tallest building in the world, amount to more than US$ 90
per square metre – and that does not include any other
services.
The pressure load on the individual components is re-
duced through subdivision into several pressure stages
with technical service centres in the basement or on the
ground floor, on intermediate floors and on the roof.
VENTILATION AND AIR-CONDITIONING
The systems should be designed in such a way as to en-
sure flexible division of the areas (large rooms, individual
rooms) so that their use can subsequently be changed
without extensive conversions.
A variety of ventilation and air-conditioning systems can
be installed, depending on the purpose for which the
building is used. The high-rise headquarters of the Deut-
sche Bank in Frankfurt am Main, for instance, is supplied by
a two-channel high-pressure system in which the air is in-
jected from above and discharged through corresponding
exhaust air windows. A second, independent two-channel
high-pressure system additionally blows air into the
rooms from the false floors.
The concept used in the Messeturm in Frankfurt am Main
is completely different: in this case the required air is sup-
plied via what is known as a one-channel continuous-flow
system in combination with a “fan-coil four-conductor
system” in the outer facade.
In principle, all air-conditioning and ventilation systems
must meet the same basic requirements:
– The air in the room must be continuously renewed (a
three to sixfold exchange of air is normally required per
hour).
– The outside air flow must be guaranteed with a min-
imum fresh air flow of 30 to 60 m3/h per person.
– The risk of drafts must be minimized and any nuisance
due to the transmission of sound eliminated.
Page 48
– It must be possible to shut off individual plant segments
when the corresponding parts of the building are not in
use.
SUPPLY OF HEAT AND COOLING
Unlike the case with the majority of normal multi-storey
buildings in which the installed heating capacity is several
times the required cooling capacity, the ratio is normally
reversed completely in most high-rise buildings, due
above all to the larger ratio of window area to total ex-
terior area.
The energy required for this purpose, such as heating,
steam, refrigeration and electricity, must be supplied with
due regard to cost-efficiency and the minimum possible
environmental impact due to emissions. A number of
alternative solutions are drawn up during the planning
phase and compared in order to determine the most cost-
efficient source of energy on the basis of the investment
costs and expected annual costs for operation and main-
tenance of the equipment.
The essential difference between high-rise buildings and
other buildings in terms of designing the components
(particularly fittings, pumps, gaskets) lies in the higher
pressure stage. A water column in a 300-m-tall building,
for instance, exerts a stagnation pressure of 30 bar. The
fittings on the lower floors must therefore be dimensioned
for the maximum stagnation pressure (possibly with the
aid of pressure reducers). This makes for a major differ-
ence in costs.
SANITATION
Pressure stages are also required for the sanitation, thus
permitting the use of smaller pumps. Sanitary dispensing
points must additionally be isolated from the building as
such for soundproofing reasons.
The internal heat loads (e.g. hot exhaust air, exhaust heat
from refrigeration systems) accumulated in high-rise
buildings are commonly used to heat water with the aid of
heat pumps or heat recovery systems.
Studies undertaken in the USA have shown that the height
does not have any effect on the flow rate and rate of fall,
since faecal matter and effluent do not simply drop to the
ground under the force of gravity, but more or less wind
their way downwards along the pipe walls.
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Today’s complex, ultra-modern control systems are pri-
marily based on intelligent digital controllers. This tech-
nology permits a direct link between DDC (direct digital
control) substations and the centralized instrumentation
and control which also takes over energy management
functions, such as:
– optimization of the overnight and weekend temperature
reduction,
– linking the heating of service water with re-cooling of
the refrigeration system,
– operation of the external blinds.
Page 49
3.2.4.2 Deliveries, vehicles
Although most high-rise buildings are centrally located
and within a convenient distance to public transport
systems, a sufficient number of parking spaces must still
be provided for employees, suppliers and visitors. The
number of parking spaces required is usually stipulated in
the construction regulations in relation to the number of
jobs or useful office space; similar ratios also apply to
other business premises, shops, restaurants and meeting
halls. The ratio may be more than 5:1 – i.e. one parking
space for more than five jobs – if the building is well sup-
plied by public transport, such as direct connection to the
underground railway. Even in such cases, however, sev-
eral hundred or a few thousand parking spaces may still
be required for large high-rise buildings. The recently com-
pleted Petronas Towers in Malaysia, for instance, is set to
accommodate around 70,000 workers. In extreme cases, if
adequate public transport is not available, it may be ne-
cessary to provide one parking space for every job.
For financial reasons, the size of a high-rise building is
often also dictated by the number of parking spaces re-
quired. Depending on the nature, location and execution
of the garages and on the building’s structural system (na-
ture of the subsoil), the manufacturing costs for one park-
ing space can easily amount to around DM 50,000. This
means that the cost of building 2,000 parking spaces can
reach as much as DM 100m with complex engineering and
location on several levels, including the required ramps
and traffic areas.
Traffic links must be created not only for the parking
spaces, but also for delivery traffic to the building, as
well as for refuse-collection vehicles. High-rise buildings
are commonly said to represent a “town under one
roof“. That, however, also means that the traffic to,
around and from the building is equal to that of a small
town, the only difference being that the entire traffic is
concentrated on a handful of access roads and adjacent
traffic areas which must be able to handle this volume
of traffic at peak periods.
3.2.4.3 Passenger transport, vertical development
In addition to escalators and automatic walkways, which
usually only serve to connect a few floors conveniently
and without delays, passengers and goods are normally
carried up and down by elevators in high-rise buildings.
The comparison made above between a high-rise building
and a small town also applies with regard to the number
of people inside the building: in the course of a few hours
every morning, tens of thousands of people stream into a
megabuilding to start work and leave again within a very
short space of time at the end of the day. They are supple-
mented by visitors, guests and customers, with the result
that the elevators often have to transport well over
100,000 people every day.
3 Technology of high-rise construction
It is therefore not unfair to assert that the American invent-
or of our modern “safety elevator”, Elisha Graves Otis,
was also one of the pioneers who paved the way in 1852
for high-rise construction. Asked what they feared most in
a high-rise building, the respondents claimed that their
greatest horror scenario was not a fire, but a malfunction
in the elevator system. Such catastrophes may be exceed-
ingly rare, but they cannot be excluded entirely. A fully oc-
cupied elevator plummeted when a B25 bomber crashed
into the Empire State Building in 1945 (see Section 4.8.2).
In the beginning, when the high-rise buildings had no
more than about 20 floors, every elevator led from the en-
trance level (not necessarily the ground floor) to every
other floor in the building. The simple control technology
was offset by a number of disadvantages: numerous ele-
vators and elevator shafts were needed. The numerous
stops and, above all, the low speed (with frequent braking
and restarting) meant that it took a long time for the eleva-
tor to reach its destination. It was soon found that eleva-
tors – like every mass transit system – needed a sophisti-
cated operating concept. The two operating systems com-
monly used today – namely group and changeover opera-
tion – only became possible with the development of
powerful drive systems and controllers, as well as highly
effective braking systems with multiple braking for safety
reasons.
In group operation, for which a separate shaft is (still) re-
quired for each elevator, the elevators or groups of eleva-
tors only serve certain floors: one group of elevators
serves the first ten floors, for example, while a second
group serves floors 10 to 20 from the entrance level, the
next group then serves floors 20 to 30, etc. The groups
must overlap on at least one floor so that people can
transfer from the 17th to the 23rd floor, for example, al-
though they must change elevators in the process. The
advantage of this system is that the number of elevator
shafts decreases towards the top of the building, thus
counteracting the lower floor space frequently found on
the top floors.
In changeover operation, large and very fast express ele-
vators serve a small number of central floors which are
often also highlighted architecturally. In New York’s Em-
pire State Building, these elevators take no more than a
minute to travel from the ground floor to the 80th floor.
“Local elevators” serve the floors between the “change-
over floors“. Here too, the elevators may serve groups of
floors in exceptionally large high-rise buildings. If the
equipment rooms are located alongside the elevator shaft,
a number of local elevators can be operated one above
the other in the same shaft; in this way, the number of
shafts can be reduced while maintaining the transport
capacity. Up to three elevators are contained one above
the other in each of 36 open shafts in New York’s World
Trade Center. The volume of traffic is analysed by micro-
processors, thus avoiding long delays. The floor area has
been increased by 25% as a result of these sophisticated
systems.
3 Technology of high-rise construction
At least one goods elevator with high load-bearing cap-
acity and therefore lower speed is usually required to
transport goods and to serve the building.
Depending on the size of the high-rise building, there
must also be a sufficient number of elevator cabins large
enough to accommodate stretchers.
Elevators should never be used to evacuate people follow-
ing a catastrophe. It is therefore a statutory requirement in
most countries that a warning be affixed to all elevators
prohibiting use of the elevator in the event of a fire. Eleva-
tors are often directed automatically to the ground floor
following a fire alarm and remain there with their doors
open. So-called firemen’s lifts are additionally installed in
high-rise buildings for use in the event of a fire (see Sec-
tion 4.2.4).
Apart from the statics, there is no other structural part or
equipment in a building subject to so many regulations
and technical controls as the elevator – and with good
reason, too. Constant care and regular maintenance com-
bined with stringent inspections by an independent test
institution, such as the Technical Inspection Agencies (TÜV)
in Germany, are an absolute must for the safe operation of
high-rise buildings.
36 ELEVATOR IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, NEW YORK
Page 50
3.2.4.4 Waste disposal
In the days when waste was collected without preliminary
sorting on site, waste chutes were frequently installed in
residential and administrative buildings, as well as in high-
rise buildings with up to 20 floors. Such waste chutes are
not advisable in taller buildings – due to the associated
greater height of fall – for paper or plastic bags tear open
as they fall and considerable noise is generated by the
waste as it falls and collides with the walls and bottom of
the chute. The fire hazard is also enormous.
Standard practice today is to collect the waste separately
on each floor: paper, recyclable secondary materials, com-
postable organic waste and residual household waste
which is collected in large containers and then transferred
via the goods elevator (or service elevator) to a central col-
lecting point (in the basement) alongside the delivery area
or to the underground parking deck. The waste is com-
pressed to a fraction of its original volume in special con-
tainers at the central collecting point. Mobile waste collect-
ing bins are ready and waiting in the goods elevators in
the World Trade Center in New York, for instance. In add-
ition, there are five filling hoppers which can comminute
all manner of objects, including desks.
Page 51
Too little attention is frequently paid to the problem of
waste disposal when planning a building. The following
rough estimate illustrates just how much waste can accu-
mulate in a high-rise building: if each of the 5,000 as-
sumed employees in a high-rise building “produces” only
2 kg of waste per day, that makes a total of no less then
10 tonnes to be disposed of every day. In addition, there is
the waste from shops, kitchens and restaurants, as well as
special waste from service facilities and filling stations for
motor vehicles. A sophisticated logistical system is conse-
quently needed simply to dispose of the waste.
3.3 Occupancy
3.3.1 Maintenance, administration
When the high-rise building is completed, it is taken into
service and occupied by the owner or tenants. Costs are
continuously incurred during this time for maintenance
and care of the building; these costs can have a significant
effect on the financial result of the building’s operator. He
must decide whether to employ his own staff to deal with
the problems (e.g. cleaning, maintenance, security, admin-
istration) or whether to assign intrinsic functions to exter-
37 ELEVATOR DEMONSTRATION BY OTIS
3 Technology of high-rise construction
nal service-providers (“outsourcing“). Both alternatives re-
quire an efficient building management capable of taking
over the following responsibilities, particularly in the case
of high-rise buildings:
a) Technical building management
– Energy supply
– Disposal
– Equipment operation
– System communication
b) Commercial building management
– Cost accounting
– Property accounting
– Rentals
– Contract management
c) Infrastructural building management
– Cleaning services
– Caretaker services
– Security services
– Secretarial and postal services
A new market segment known as “facility management”
has developed in recent years and caters to the needs of
users in larger properties in particular. It differs from clas-
sic building management in that it is not limited solely to
the occupancy phase, but is already in action during the
planning phase and therefore covers the entire life cycle of
the building right up to its demolition.
38 MAINTENANCE
3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 52

Top: 39 RENOVATION OF A HIGH-RISE BUILDING

Bottom: 40 PILE-DRIVING MACHINERY FOR WORKING IN

BASEMENT FLOORS
Page 53
Cost-efficient optimization of all processes during the
occupancy phase of a high-rise building requires an effi-
cient and powerful computer system including CAD
(computer-aided design) applications. The latter is
particularly important for internal planning changes, con-
versions, rehabilitation and changes in occupancy, as well
as for permitting documentation of important information
(e.g. layout drawings, general drawings of the building,
security information, furniture inventories, telephone con-
nections).
New requirements are often imposed on the performance
of technical equipment in a high-rise building in the
course of its occupancy phase. Different times of day and
seasons, as well as changing tenants require rapid adapta-
tion of the heat, cooling, electric power and lighting. In
office buildings, manufacturing premises and high-rise
buildings, this adjustment is handled by freely program-
mable DDC systems which record all the data of the con-
nected technical equipment, such as fans, burners, pumps,
valves and external blinds, analyse these data and then
optimize the corresponding process sequence. Unneces-
sary energy consumption is avoided, consumers are
switched off when their offices are not in use and
switched on again shortly before occupancy recom-
mences. The recorded data are forwarded to either the
centralized instrumentation and control in the building or
via the public telephone network to an external control
centre. Expensive call-outs on site can be reduced
through remote programming by the maintenance com-
pany if faults arise or limit values change. If more com-
plex maintenance work is required, the technician on duty
can immediately see which spare parts are required
to remedy the fault.
3.3.2 Conversions
In the planning a high-rise building, care is normally taken
to ensure that the building can subsequently be used in a
relatively flexible manner. Internal conversions due to
changes of use following a change of tenant or the chang-
ing needs of the present user should not be a problem. In
this way, the operator of the building can also respond
more effectively to changes in the property market.
To ensure such flexibility, the service systems are centrally
located in the building. The partition walls separating the
individual rooms are non-supporting and can be relocated
to permit subsequent changes in room size. As a rule, the
building’s supporting structure is totally isolated from the
system of partition walls inside the building. Where pos-
sible, reinforcing walls are located outside the useful floor
area, such as in the core area. The columns are conse-
quently the only remaining load-bearing elements causing
a “nuisance” in the useful area. A column spacing of 6 to
7 m is widely used as a standard grid, meeting both archi-
tectural and structural requirements.
If the conversion nevertheless affects the load-bearing
structure of the high-rise building, it is essential to draw
up a structural analysis for all building states during the
conversion work in order to avoid damage. If other parts
of the building remain in use during the conversion work,
3 Technology of high-rise construction
special precautions must be taken and the work efficiently
coordinated to ensure that the conversion proceeds with-
out a hitch.
The only possibility for expansion in densely populated
cities is normally upwards – i.e. by adding floors – if add-
itional space is required at a later date. In such cases, par-
ticular care must be taken to ensure that the additional
loads can be absorbed by both the existing building and
the existing foundation structure. It may even prove ne-
cessary to extend the foundations in such a case. This can
be achieved by a technically complex method using add-
itional piles which must be produced with the aid of spe-
cial drilling equipment in the underground parking levels
on account of the low working height.
Demolishing old skyscrapers in inner city areas is an ex-
ceedingly complicated business. Such buildings are nor-
mally demolished by blasting after months of preparation
and a great deal of expert knowledge so that the explosive
charges are positioned at precisely the right points to en-
sure that the building collapses like a stack of cards with-
out a single piece of rubble leaving the site.
3.3.3 Rehabilitation
There are many reasons why a high-rise building should
have to be rehabilitated. The criteria to be met here are
basically the same as for conversions, i.e. the safety of
the building and its residents or users must be assured
completely and at all times during the rehabilitation work.
Particularly high safety standards must be maintained in
conjunction with asbestos abatement – i.e. when removing
the asbestos installed as insulation or for fire-protection
purposes and replacing it with physiologically safer
materials. Asbestos fibres are considered to be highly
carcinogenic and are released in particular during
demolition work.
The technical equipment in the building, such as heating,
sanitation or elevators, must also be rehabilitated after a
certain period of time. In many cases, however, such re-
newal or modernization work is undertaken without shut-
ting down the entire building. It is often sufficient to shut
down only part of the building, and sometimes the work
can even be carried out without interrupting operation of
the building at all.
3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 54

3.4 High-rise construction in the future

In view of the anticipated population explosion and

the concentration of dwellers in the conurbations,
the need for high-rise buildings will continue to grow,
especially with building land becoming increasingly
scarce and property prices soaring as a consequence.
The Australian Embassy in Tokyo sold 500 m2 of its
garden in return for DM 1.25m – per square metre!
Such astronomical prices can be more easily
understood if we consider that there are currently
5,400 people per square kilometre in Tokyo and
that the population in this conurbation is forecast
to increase from 18.5 million at present to almost
30 million in the coming decades. In some regions,
it will only be possible to settle new residents or busi-
nesses if they can be accommodated in high-rise
buildings.

It is already certain that today’s (1999) world record for the
tallest building – the twin Petronas Towers in Kuala Lum-
pur (452 m) – will not be held for long. A new record-
breaking edifice, the Chongqing Tower, is already under
construction in Shanghai. Specific plans have already
been drawn up for an 800-m-high building in Tokyo (Mil-
lennium Tower), and totally inconceivable, gigantic pro-
jects involving heights of several kilometres are also under
discussion. One of the most unusual is the Japanese pro-
ject TRY 2004, a pyramid rising 2004 m into the sky. It is
to be made up of 204 octahedral elements which can be
mutually sealed off from one another if a fire breaks out.
In this way, living space is to be created for one million
people over an area of 8 km2.
Economic considerations could impose limits on these gi-
gantic plans, for the costs for construction and operation
of a high-rise building increase exponentially with its
height. It does not take a prophet to forecast that the
future of high-rise buildings – these “architectural dino-
saurs”, as one critic recently wrote – is highly uncertain in
their traditional form. The disproportionately large manu-
facturing effort, the high operating costs due above all to
the excessive consumption of energy, and reservations as
regards health and safety will result in a new kind of high-
rise building totally different from today’s.
Since technological progress is advancing steadily, how-
ever, and the attitudes of both owners and architects will
also be of decisive importance, one would almost require
the skills of a clairvoyant to predict with any accuracy the
specific changes which are impending. Nevertheless, we
shall at least venture a rough prediction of possible future
developments.

41 PETRONAS TOWER
3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 56

MESSETURM LANDMARK TOWER CENTRAL PLAZA EMPIRE STATE BUILDING JIN MAO BUILDING
259 m 296 m 310 m 381 m 381 m

42 TREND TOWARDS EVER-TALLER

MODERN HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS
Page 57 3 Technology of high-rise construction

ASIA PLAZA SEARS TOWER PETRONAS TOWERS CHONGQING TOWER MILLENNIUM TOWER
431 m 443 m 452 m 457 m (under construc- 800 m (planned)
tion)
800m
(2624 feet)

43 THE MILLENNIUM TOWER – a vision for the 3rd millennium

452
2
(1482 feet)
 44 PETRONAS TOWERS, KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

2m
45 SEARS TOWER, CHICAGO

443m
(1453 feet)
46 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK

381m
(1250 feet)
47 MESSETURM IN FRANKFURT AM MAIN

259m
(850 feet)
3 Technology of high-rise construction
ENERGY SAVINGS
Consistent use of the savings potential already available
today will indisputably be the most important “source” of
energy in the future. Numerous studies have proved that
energy savings of up to 80% can be realized in both the
private and the commercial sector without any loss of
comfort or convenience. “Intelligent energy consumption”
is a term that is increasingly being used in this context. As
a result, the foundations for a building’s future consump-
tion of energy are already set in the planning stage: the
topographical surroundings are of importance here, as is
consideration of the prevailing wind strengths and direc-
tions, and any shadows cast. An energy-efficient building
will be positioned with its “broadside” away from the sun
in warmer climates, while every effort will be made to
ensure that as much of the facade as possible faces the
sun in colder climates. Windows facing the sun should be
as large as possible, those facing way from the sun as
small as possible (the keyword is: passive solar architec-
ture). A rotary building is another conceivable possibility
and could be turned towards or away from the sun as re-
quired. Particular attention must be paid to thermal insula-
tion of the facade. Northern European construction stand-
ards are a positive example here, as they specify a thick-
ness of several decimetres for the insulating layers. Trans-
parent thermal insulation will probably become estab-
lished in future, as it not only reduces the heat loss, but
can also attract additional heat by allowing the radiated
heat to reach the facade without obstruction. Thermopane
glazing with a k-value of less than 1 already represents the
state of the art today, as does solar glazing with almost
100% reflection of the radiated heat.
Considerable savings can also be achieved inside the
building, for instance by using a combined heat and
power generating unit instead of conventional heat and
power generation, or by using variable-speed forced-circu-
lation pumps in the sanitation, heating and air-condition-
ing sectors, or by using energy-efficient fluorescent tubes
which require up to 80% less electricity than conventional
filament lamps, or by controlling the lights via movement
detectors and naturally by ensuring the energy efficiency
of every single appliance used in flats or offices, from
well insulated fridges to personal computers with low
power consumption. Reusing the off-heat from air and
water will be a matter of greater importance in the future.
Ideally, our future energy requirements should all be met
by regenerative sources.
Page 68
POWER GENERATION
High-rise buildings are positively ideal for generating
power: the huge facades are usually exposed to the sun
from dawn to dusk and the prevailing winds on the roof
are considerably stronger and more persistent than those
on the ground. And these are also the main sources of en-
ergy to be used in the future: wind-operated plants to gen-
erate electricity on the roof or particularly exposed edges
of the facade, collectors to heat air or water and photovol-
taic systems to generate electricity on the facades and
possibly also for producing hydrogen at a later stage.
Generation of heat via the deep-pile foundations asso-
ciated with virtually every high-rise building is a less ob-
vious possibility. When the building is complete, water
can be circulated through heat exchanger tubes integrated
into the pile reinforcements. Due to the feed and return
flow of the water, the different energy potential between
footing and building can be exploited and the subsoil
used as a seasonal or temporary store of energy. One
of the first projects of this type has already been realized
in the rebuilding of the Commerzbank headquarters
in Frankfurt am Main.
CONSTRUCTION BIOLOGY
The more we know and learn about the harmful effects of
modern materials and installations on health, the less
probable it becomes that future generations will voluntar-
ily accept this hazard. Research and industry must there-
fore find acceptable alternatives, such as emission-free
materials, installations, insulating and isolating materials,
adhesives and coatings, as well as avoiding the use of
chemicals which give off toxic gases in the event of a fire.
48 ADDITIONAL HEAT RECOVERY VIA PILING FOUNDATIONS
IN THE COMMERZBANK HIGH-RISE BUILDING
3 Technology of high-rise construction Page 70

CONSTRUCTION PRACTICE
The construction of high-rise buildings will be dominated by four factors in future, namely: time savings, personnel
savings and financial savings, in addition to the energy savings already mentioned above.
As examples in Japan show, it is already possible to erect buildings with the help of assembly robots. The required ele-
ments are designed and drawn with the aid of computers (CAD = computer-aided design). The computer automatically
retrieves all the required (dimensional and design) data from the saved architectural and engineering drafts, as well as
from detailed libraries. The parts are then manufactured by fully automatic machines on the basis of these production
data (CAM = computer-aided manufacture) and transported to the site “just in time“. Assembly robots pick out the right
part in the right sequence, transport it to the assembly point and install the finished element in the right place.

Thanks to the efficiency of the computers and robots,

buildings erected in this way bear little resemblance
to the conventional edifices erected with prefabricated
parts: the precision and arithmetic accuracy of these
machines permits a hitherto inconceivable variety of
forms and even the most complex structural analyses
are mastered with the help of computers.
If the engineers who developed and built these robot-controlled “construction machines” are to be believed, then this
method can not only considerably cut the time required for construction work, but can also reduce the construction costs
by up to 40% and reduce the workforce required for conventional construction projects by up to one-third (roughly one-
half of these would then find work in the component manufacturing plants). Above all, the dangerous and physically
strenuous work would be eliminated.
In this way, something that was considered Utopian only a few years ago has already begun to become an everyday real-
ity: huge edifices and even complete towns are erected by robots as if guided by a ghostly hand. In spite of this, how-
ever – or perhaps for precisely this reason – highly qualified experts will be needed to develop, operate and control the
necessary computer programs, techniques and technologies.

49 FULLY AUTOMATED BUILDING SITE

50 JIN MAO BUILDING
51 SHANGHAI PUDONG
 52 NEW YORK
53 CHINA, GUANGZHOU
 Page 78

54 NEW YORK
Page 79
55 NEW YORK: VIEW FROM THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
56 NEW YORK
4 Risk potential

4
4.1 Design errors
4.2 Fire
4.3 Windstorm 4.5 Foundations, settlement 4.7 Special structural measures 4.9 Loss of profit
4.4 Earthquakes 4.6 Water 4.8 Other risks
Page 85
The following sections consider all of the hazards
constituting the greatest risk potential during the
construction and occupancy of a high-rise building.
The commentaries will be illustrated by examples of
losses and rounded off by proposals which need to
be implemented to minimize such risk potential and
prevent losses.
4 Risk potential
4.1 Design errors
Fortunately, no-one really knows just how many rumoured
design errors by architects are actually true. They are said
to have forgotten not only the toilets, but even complete
stairwells in multi-storey buildings. And today’s construc-
tion practice makes such design errors more probable than
ever: since the supporting structure, shell and core, and
interior finishing are totally isolated from one another not
only during the design phase, but also during the subse-
quent construction phase, errors may possibly not be dis-
covered until the work has reached a fairly advanced stage.
This leads to time-consuming and costly changes and cor-
rections, usually at the expense of the professional indem-
nity insurance prescribed for architects in many countries.
The most commonly occurring design errors can be sub-
divided into two groups: failure to observe building and
planning codes on the one hand, and errors in the choice
of materials and wrong or inadequate construction details
on the other.
FAILURE TO OBSERVE BUILDING AND PLANNING CODES
It may be assumed that, in the majority of countries, when
a building exceeds a certain size – and this will certainly
apply to high-rise buildings – corresponding plans must
be submitted to the construction licensing and supervisory
authorities for inspection. The inspection and approval
procedure not only encompasses aspects under the build-
ing code, such as compliance with specified distances and
the specified height and size of a building or its type of
use, but also the safety of the people inside the building.
4 Risk potential
Such aspects include compliance with fire protection re-
quirements in the building, the position and number of
escape routes and the number, location and execution of
stairwells and traffic areas. Even such seemingly less im-
portant aspects as compliance with accident prevention
regulations are reviewed, for instance as regards the
height of railings or the distance between bars in railings
and grids.
In many cases, however, the design is changed at short
notice during the construction phase, with the result that
the plans submitted for inspection no longer reflect the
actual situation. If errors are made by the designer at this
stage in violation of building and planning codes, they will
only be discovered (if at all) during final inspection of the
building by the construction supervisory authority as
specified in many countries.
Such changes frequently cannot be undone, and this
forces both sides to accept compromises possibly at the
expense of the building’s safety. Despite the numerous
statutory instruments and court rulings in test cases, the
complex legal relationship between principal and architect
makes it necessary for the courts to decide who is to bear
the costs incurred as a result of such errors. In most cases,
both the architect’s legal protection insurer and his profes-
sional indemnity insurer will be involved.
If the errors are not discovered and the building is taken
into service, however, this may not only increase the prob-
ability of a loss occurring, but also pose an acute risk to
life and limb for its users. Particularly grave defects only
become evident when the loss actually occurs, for in-
stance when a fire occurs. Fire insurers, personal accident,
4 Risk potential
health and life insurers, occupational disability insurers
and once again the liability insurers may all be called
upon to bear the costs once the courts have settled the
question of blame. If a guilty party can be identified, that
party can face considerable penalties for any shortcom-
ings ascertained. It is irrelevant in this context whether
this party was actually aware of these shortcomings or
merely must have been aware of them.
For this reason, all insurers – and particularly fire insurers
– are well advised to ascertain whether all of the safety re-
quirements have been met before they conclude a policy
for buildings entailing high risk potential.
MATERIALS AND CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
Not only the legal relationship between principal and
architect is exceedingly complex; just as complicated is
that between architect and (sub)contractors and particular-
ly among the (sub)contractors themselves.
Although the architect or specialist engineer specifies
which materials are to be used or installed, the (sub)con-
tractor must check whether these materials are indeed
suitable for such use. Modern and unconventional con-
struction practices frequently make it difficult or even im-
possible for (sub)contractors to determine whether the
specified materials or the execution intended by the
designer are indeed suitable and correct.
Unsuitable materials and connections in sanitary installa-
tions, for instance, can rapidly result in water damage due
to burst pipes.
Unsuitable insulating materials can give off toxic gases or
acids in the event of a fire; incorrectly dimensioned fix-
tures for suspended ceilings or facade elements can cause
bodily injury or property damage if they fall down.
In extremely simplified terms, it could be said that most of
the damage incurred in or on a building is ultimately at-
tributable to design errors.
4.2 Fire
Fire is one of the greatest risks for every building and par-
ticularly for high-rise buildings. Due to the spectacular
photographs and film sequences shown in the media,
major fires have always made – and will continue to
make – headline news not only during the construction
phase, but above all during the occupancy phase. They
are a major headache to all insurers and reinsurers due
in particular to the exorbitant rise in repair and restoration
costs, as well as the loss of human life.
A few examples of major fires during the construction and
occupancy phases are provided below.
4.2.1 Examples of losses during the construction phase
GENERAL
It is not always easy for an insurer to determine which
risks may be associated with technical improvements, new
techniques, new materials or combinations of different
materials. It is only when the loss occurs that the insurer
Page 86
can be sure of having underwritten a completely new risk.
As already mentioned in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, the con-
struction of modern office towers has little in common
with the construction methods employed in the past. In-
stead of solid ceilings and walls, we now have a skeleton
structure – usually made of steel – with endless kilometres
of wiring for telecommunications, switching, control and
air-conditioning running vertically and horizontally
through the entire structure. During both the construction
and the operating phases, this combination consequently
poses an enormous risk for the spread of fire and smoke,
as well as for the harmful effects of heat, fumes and water.
BROADGATE
This new 12-storey office tower is one of fourteen build-
ings erected over the railway tracks of a station in the City
of London. Due to the extremely confined conditions, the
containers accommodating the construction workers were
installed on the first floor of the shell.
During the evening of 22nd June 1990, an electrical appli-
ance or short-circuit caused a smouldering fire in one of
these containers. Undiscovered for several hours, this
smouldering fire charred the interior furnishings until it
reached the polystyrene foam inside the steel walls of the
container. This resulted in major generation of smoke until
the container literally burst apart around midnight and
caused a major fire.
The fire was only discovered by a security patrol roughly
30 minutes later after a smoke detector was tripped. When
the fire brigade arrived another seven minutes later, the
temperature around the container was apparently already
in excess of 1,100 °C. Twenty fire-fighting teams with over
100 firemen fought for almost five hours to bring this diffi-
cult fire under control.
The extreme heat ultimately caused the steel skeleton and
a number of ceilings to fail. A large area in the middle part
of the roughly 40-m-high building subsequently dropped
by between 0.6 and 1.2 m. The fire also destroyed material
which was stored on the first and second floors. This led
to even more intense smoke emission, which in turn
caused extensive damage to the aluminium facade and
valuable interior fittings.
The considerable property damage worth around £36m
was the highest fire loss to have been incurred in a high-
rise building in the United Kingdom up to that time and
was due to the absence of an early-warning system, the
widespread propagation of fumes due to the chimney ef-
fect of the atrium and the presence of numerous openings
in walls and ceilings. Moreover, neither the fire-alarm
system nor the risers and sprinkler system had been acti-
vated in this stage of the building’s construction.
LONDON UNDERWRITING CENTRE
A fire broke out during the interior finishing work in this
over 55-m-high office tower in London’s banking and in-
surance centre in August 1991. The cost of repairing the
damage consumed £110m or around 75% of the insured
value of the building and was far higher than the cost of
repairing the damage following the Broadgate fire in the
previous year. First estimates indicated that the loss would
57 FIRE IN THE BROADGATE BUILDING, LONDON: sunken roof support beams

Following page: 58 FIRE-PROTECTION INFORMATION

Page 89
be no more than a fraction of the final cost, and to the
man on the street the building appeared to have survived
largely unscathed, at least from the outside, and merely
had to be cleaned.
The fire broke out on the ground floor at the beginning of
the morning shift, near the atrium where it was extensive-
ly nourished by the considerable material and packaging
scrap which had been stored there. Although the fire bri-
gade arrived within minutes despite the early morning
rush-hour and narrow streets, it proved extremely difficult
to bring the fire under control. Thanks to the atrium, the
flames had already reached the roof and were reaching
out towards the unsealed floors leading off to the sides.
The atrium itself was difficult to reach since it was com-
pletely encased in scaffolding for installation of 16 large
escalators. The stairwells were almost impassable on ac-
count of the immense heat and smoke. It was only when
the roof above the atrium broke and the smoke was dis-
pelled that the firemen were able to make progress in
bringing the fire under control.
The considerable increases in the cost of repairing the
building during the ensuing months were due almost ex-
clusively to the extreme spread of harmful fumes. These
fumes (including chloride-laden fumes from burning PVC
cable installations) had spread through openings in walls
and ceilings, as well as the false floors, to all floors above
and below ground and had settled on most of the installa-
tions and facade elements. Further damage was caused by
contaminated fire-fighting water in the false floors and
basement floors. The supporting structure, on the other
hand, suffered very little damage.
In addition to requiring extensive decontamination, such
fires also raise questions with regard to warranties. Sup-
pliers may have guaranteed the serviceability and appear-
ance of their parts and installations over a period of sev-
eral years, but no-one can judge how the frequently com-
plex switchgear, for example, will respond over the years
to the extreme heat and corrosive fumes produced by the
fire. In addition, the commonly used PVC sheathing also
produces highly corrosive substances.
MERIDIEN PRESIDENT TOWER
This 36-storey hotel and shopping centre in Bangkok was
almost complete and about to be inaugurated when a fire
broke out following an explosion during installation of
parts of the air-conditioning. The fire very rapidly spread
through the air-conditioning shafts and soon reached the
10th floor, as well as lower floors.
When the fire broke out, more than 150 construction work-
ers were adding the finishing touches to the inside of the
building. Since the workers on the upper floors were un-
able to make their way downwards, roughly 40 fled onto
the roof while others used ropes to lower themselves onto
a veranda on the 5th floor so that they could escape from
the flames.
Despite the intense smoke, seven helicopters succeeded in
rescuing the men on the roof, as well as another 50 from
lower floors with the aid of ladders and straps. One of the
helicopters was even forced to make an emergency land-
ing after its tail rotor touched the building in the dense
4 Risk potential
smoke. Three men died in the fire or as a result of jump-
ing out of a window.
Altogether, 40 fire brigades with over 2,000 firemen fought
for roughly six hours to bring the fire under control. Their
work was impeded from the very beginning by the narrow
access roads. The water pressure from their nozzles only
reached up to the 10th floor.
Subsequent investigations revealed that although all the
fire-prevention requirements, such as smoke detectors,
fire walls, firemen’s lifts and sprinkler systems, had been
met, these systems had not been activated during the con-
struction phase. It is assumed that the fire was most prob-
ably caused by a bucket of thinners igniting on contact
with sparks from welding work being done on parts of the
air-conditioning system.
Despite the extensive damage, the hotel – which is located
on the 17th to 36th floors of the building – was opened
without undue delay. In the department store, around
3,000 m2 out of more than 130,000 m2 was seriously
damaged by the fire, but the supporting structures re-
mained unscathed. Completion of the store is expected to
be delayed by several months. The total loss is estimated
to be in the region of DM 25m.
4.2.2 Fire protection on construction sites
Numerous similar major fires in the recent past have clear-
ly shown that too little attention is still being paid to fire
prevention on construction sites for buildings in general
and for high-rise buildings in particular. This has led to
devastating fires and immense costs for the insurance in-
dustry.
These fires are more likely to be caused by human negli-
gence than by technical defects, for example workers care-
lessly throwing away glowing cigarette ends and the im-
proper use of cooking appliances in the workers’ quarters,
which are frequently located in the shell of the building.
Moreover, as the fires in the Broadgate Building (1990)
and the London Underwriting Centre (1991) clearly
showed, an atrium in the building can have extremely
negative effects in the event of a fire, as its considerable
area positively invites misuse as a place for storing large
quantities of material, particularly during the construction
work. These materials are easily combustible on account
of their packaging, which is usually not removed before-
hand and therefore constitutes an increased fire risk. In
addition, the chimney effect (i.e. vertical draft) due to the
atrium helps the fire to spread rapidly to the roof and
other floors leading off from the atrium.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that, even if
the risk potential is acknowledged, safety features are the
first to be sacrificed under the rising pressure of time and
costs. The growing use of combustible materials, the high-
er fire load and its distribution over all floors are therefore
the main reasons for catastrophic major fires.
This trend has become unacceptable in the United King-
dom. In an unrivalled campaign, fire brigades, insurance
companies and the construction industry have drawn up a
“Joint Code of Practice” for fire protection on construction
sites. Compliance with the regulations and requirements
59 ESCALATOR DESTROYED BY FIRE
60 FIRE IN THE MERIDIEN PRESIDENT TOWER, BANGKOK
4 Risk potential Page 94

61 MERIDIEN PRESIDENT TOWER, INCREASED RISK OF FIRE DURING THE FINAL FIT-OUT PHASE
Page 95 4 Risk potential
62 DIFFICULT FIRE-FIGHTING CONDITIONS IN THE MERIDIEN PRESIDENT TOWER
Page 99
contained in this Code has now become an indispensable
element in the terms of insurance for the construction of
major high-rise projects. This Code specifies in detail how
fire protection is to be effectively organized and imple-
mented in all the various areas and phases of construc-
tion.
Adequate protection against fires can only be guaranteed
by clear instructions and standards which are implement-
ed from the very beginning of the construction work and
which are regularly monitored and supported with corres-
ponding investments in time, money and material.
Particularly in the case of high-rise construction, prevent-
ive fire protection must be included from the planning
phase onwards so that the various construction phases
can be taken into account accordingly. One of the essential
conditions for effective fire protection is the appointment
of a safety officer responsible for risk management on site.
A whole team of safety officers may be appointed for a
high-rise construction site; in such cases, they are often re-
sponsible for personal and occupational safety, as well as
for fire protection. In addition to drawing up, implement-
ing and verifying the fire-protection concept, it is import-
ant to train the site personnel in fire-fighting techniques
and to familiarize the fire brigade with the site.
Since the situation on site is subject to constant change in
line with the progress made during the various construc-
tion phases, the site drawings must be regularly updated
with regard to access roads for the fire brigade, fire com-
partments, water supply lines and fire loads in particularly
high concentrations. Such risks as combustible liquids,
gas depots, cable ducts and temporary openings in walls
and ceilings must be highlighted in the same way as the
available fire-fighting equipment.
Above all, particular attention must be paid to preventive
fire protection. The primary objective must be to reduce
the fire load. Waste materials must be removed regularly
and combustible waste collected from the individual floors
every day. The value of material stored for construction
and assembly work should be limited, the material spread
over several storage units and protected by special meas-
ures, such as fire walls or sufficient distance, in order to
reduce what is frequently a very high fire load.
Specific control of all work constituting a fire hazard is an-
other essential precaution. A special approval procedure is
being introduced to ensure safer practices with grinding,
cutting or welding work, for example, as well as work with
soldering lamps, application of hot asphalt or other work
with radiant heat. At least one person trained in fire-fight-
ing techniques and equipped with a fire extinguisher must
always be present during such work. Even when the work
is complete, however, the area must be inspected again to
ensure that a fire cannot break out subsequently (e.g. as a
result of glowing welding slag).
The site should be fenced off and access controlled in
order to minimize the risk of fires due to third parties.
63 COMBUSTIBLE WASTE INCREASES RISK OF FIRE
4 Risk potential
4.2.3 Examples of losses during the occupancy phase
GARLEY BUILDING IN HONG KONG
“Elevator to hell”, “Trapped in a burning skyscraper”,
“Towering inferno” – these are just a few of the headlines
in world press reports on one of the most devastating fires
in Hong Kong in almost 40 years.
During welding work in an elevator shaft in the 16-storey
Garley Building in Hong Kong’s Kowloon district on 21st
November 1996, a fire broke out which killed 39 people
and seriously injured around 80 others. More than 90
people were rescued, some of them in daring scenes in
which a helicopter pilot risked his own life.
Maintenance and repair work was in progress in the office
and business tower when highly flammable material
caught fire during welding work in the basement. The fire
made its way up through the elevator shafts and spread
like lightning through the top three floors of the building.
The immense heat and smoke made these floors a death
trap for the people working there: the windows could not
be opened to let the heat and smoke out, and escape
routes were filled with smoke or impassable on account of
the fire. As a result, 22 charred bodies were subsequently
found in a single office on the 15th floor.
The fire brigade was called shortly after the fire broke out
and arrived on the scene shortly afterwards, so that many
of the people in the building were fortunately saved. Al-
though hundreds of firemen were at the scene of the fire,
it took over 20 hours to bring the fire under control.
What were the reasons for the fire being able to spread so
rapidly, for the magnitude of the loss and the numerous
fatalities? The primary cause lay in the totally inadequate
fire-protection installations in the 21-year-old Garley Build-
ing. There was neither an automatic fire alarm nor a
sprinkler system. From the speed at which the fire spread
through the elevator shaft to the upper office floors, it may
be assumed that the structural fire protection was also in-
adequate. It is claimed that plywood had been used as
provisional elevator doors.
The Hong Kong Fire Prevention Act stipulates that all high-
rise buildings licensed after 1973 must be equipped with a
sprinkler system, among other things, but this did not
apply to the Garley Building. In view of the large number
of older buildings in a similar condition to that of the Gar-
ley Building, the headline in one Hong Kong newspaper –
“700 office buildings could become death traps” – is not
so far-fetched.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK BUILDING IN LOS ANGELES, USA
Once the tallest building in California, the 261-m-high,
62-storey office tower fell prey to what is considered to
have been one of the most destructive skyscraper fires in
the USA in recent years when, for reasons unknown, a fire
broke out on the 12th floor on the evening of 4th May
1988. From the fire-fighting point of view, it represented
one of the biggest challenges for the Los Angeles City Fire
Department. With 383 firemen, almost one-half of the en-
tire shift on duty in the city was called out to fight this fire.
The fire was brought under control after 31/2 hours. The
12th to 16th floors were gutted. The floors above suffered
64 LIMITED EVACUATION ROUTES THROUGH SMOKE-FILLED STAIRWAYS
65 HONG KONG, FIRE IN THE GARLEY BUILDING
66 TOWERING INFERNO
67 DIFFICULT FIRE-FIGHTING CONDITIONS
4 Risk potential
considerable damage due to smoke and those below were
extensively damaged by fire-fighting water.
One maintenance technician died when he took the eleva-
tor to the floor in which the fire had broken out because
an open fire door had evidently jammed between the
burning office area and the lobby in front of the elevator.
Around 50 people were injured, including several firemen.
The loss totalled more than US$ 50m, plus losses amount-
ing to tens of millions for business interruption.
The building had been completed in 1973 before the
sprinkler regulation for high-rise buildings in Los Angeles
came into force. This regulation stipulates that sprinklers
must be installed throughout the building. At the time of
the fire, work was under way to install a sprinkler system
in the rest of the building to ensure better fire protection
for the roughly 4,000 employees and tenants in the build-
ing and to supplement the sprinkler system which was
originally only installed on the lower level of the under-
ground car park. Work on the new sprinkler system was al-
ready 90% completed at the time of the fire, even in the
floors affected by it, but the system had not yet been taken
into service. Parts of the riser had also been drained and
fire pumps switched off in the building.
The fire brigade was alerted by a neighbour, as there was
a delay before the alarm warned security personnel des-
pite the fact that the automatic fire-detection system was
functioning correctly; this delay was due to human error
and incorrect regulations. As a result, the security person-
nel disregarded a fire alarm triggered manually by the in-
stallation workers in response to minor smoke emissions,
as well as other alarms by smoke detectors on the 12th
floor.
By the time the fire brigade arrived, most of the 12th floor
was already in flames. Since use of the elevators was pro-
hibited by regulations, the firemen had to carry their
heavy equipment up the stairs to the scene of the fire.
As a result, roughly half an hour passed before they were
actually able to start fighting the fire with water from the
risers in the four stairwells.
Fighting the fire proved to be a difficult matter. Once
again, the excessively low water pressure had to be boost-
ed with the aid of fire pumps and additional water sup-
plied via the risers. Since the fire doors leading to the
stairs had been opened, smoke and fumes soon spread
upwards.
In the meantime, the fire had spread to floors above the
12th floor with flames up to 10 m high leaping from
broken windows on the outer facade. Fire and smoke also
penetrated through incompletely sealed cable openings
and air-conditioning ducts, as well as through the 31 ele-
vator shafts.
In addition to the intense heat and smoke in the stairwells,
the firemen’s work was further impeded by failure of the
power supply and of the emergency lighting in the stair-
wells. The vital radio link was similarly impeded by the
shielding effect of the building’s steel skeleton and the
large number of firemen on the scene.
Helicopters were called in to drop firemen onto the roof of
the building to allow them to head down towards the seat
of the fire via the stairwells. However, this attempt had to
Page 104
be abandoned on account of the major smoke in the stair-
wells with their chimney effect.
Broken glass panes on the facade posed another problem
as they fell down onto firemen and fire engines feeding
water into the fire connections at the foot of the building.
Cut hoses had to be replaced more than once. The glass
panes also came down in large units, as they were bonded
together by the reflecting plastic coating; even the coating
was burning in some cases.
As a precautionary measure, the newly installed sprinkler
groups on floors 17 to 19 above the burning floors were
also activated so that they would have provided effective
assistance had the fire spread above the 16th floor, but
this proved unnecessary.
The defects and negative factors will be discussed in more
detail in the next section. The positive factors in this diffi-
cult fight against a fire are summarized here:
– Concentrated and well organized deployment of
firemen.
– Resistant supporting steel framework thanks to the fire-
resistant spray-coating.
– Sophisticated emergency plans by the bank made it
possible to continue bank operation without a hitch in
an emergency centre on the morning following the fire
and throughout the months of cleaning and repair work
in the building.
– As a result of this fire, a regulation was issued specify-
ing that sprinkler systems had to be retrofitted in all
450 high-rise buildings without such sprinkler protection
in Los Angeles within a transition period of three years.
ONE MERIDIAN PLAZA IN PHILADELPHIA, USA
On the evening of 23rd February 1991, a fire broke out on
the 21st floor of this office tower with 38 floors above
ground and three underground floors. Three firemen were
killed in action and 24 others injured.
There were only a few people in the building when an
automatic fire-detection system on the 21st floor triggered
an alarm on the central control panel on the ground floor
at 20.23 hours. The fire brigade was called by neighbours
before an alarm could be sent from there to the fire bri-
gade.
The first firemen arrived on the scene after seven minutes
and took the elevator up to the 10th floor. From there, they
took the stairs up to the burning floor. Since the power
supply, including the emergency power supply, failed in
the entire building shortly afterwards, the firemen had to
carry all their equipment up the stairs, thus considerably
delaying the commencement of their fire-fighting efforts.
Licensed in 1969 and completed in 1972, the building was
only equipped with sprinklers in a few areas of the under-
ground floors. In 1988, the building’s owner decided suc-
cessively to install sprinklers throughout the whole build-
ing. Only a few floors from the 29th upwards had been
equipped with sprinklers when the fire broke out.
Originally dry risers had been converted into wet risers to
supply the sprinklers during the installation work. Two
sprinkler pumps were similarly installed, as were pressure-
reducing valves on the connections for the wall hydrants
installed on all floors. Following the fire, it was found that
Page 105
these valves had been wrongly set so that the water pres-
sure from the wall hydrants was too low.
This also explains why the firemen’s efforts proved unsuc-
cessful – the fire on the 21st floor had turned into a conflag-
ration in the meantime. Due to the excessively low water
pressure, both the volume of fire-fighting water and the
range were inadequate. After four hours, the sprinkler in-
staller succeeded in adjusting the pressure-reducing
valves with the aid of special tools so that the required
water supply could be guaranteed.
In the meantime, the fire had spread to three other floors
and the stairwells were filled with smoke. The fire spread
particularly along the outer facade. Three firemen died as
they tried to clear the smoke in one of the stairwells by
smashing windows.
After roughly 11 hours fighting the fire, the firemen had to
retreat from the burning floors because the ceilings threat-
ened to collapse. It was therefore decided to fight the fire
via the sprinkler system already installed on the 29th floor.
The required water pressure was to be obtained by feed-
ing water into the risers. Ten sprinkler heads were acti-
vated by the heat of the fire and it was finally brought
under control around 15.00 hours on 24th February.
Altogether 19 hours were needed to put the fire out com-
pletely. It is assumed that the fire was caused by spon-
taneous ignition of oil-soaked rags. In addition to total
destruction of the entire furnishings on the floors affected
by the fire, the building’s structure and outer facade also
suffered considerable damage.
The owner of the building demanded over US$ 250m in-
demnification from the insurers for the repair costs and
other losses. In his view, the steel structure of the upper
floors from the 19th floor upwards had been so severely
damaged by the heat that the only alternative was to de-
molish and subsequently rebuild the tower. An expert ap-
pointed by the courts, however, agreed with the insurers
that the building could be repaired without demolishing it.
After protracted negotiations, the claim was settled six
years after the fire. The building had neither been repaired
nor was it partly occupied at that time. Barely a year later
it was demolished, probably on account of the significant
deterioration in its condition and on account of its contam-
ination with asbestos and PCB (polychlorinated biphenyls).
The robust roof and facade construction considerably im-
peded the demolition work. The building’s location in the
city centre and adjacent buildings, as well as underground
rapid-transit railways under the building, prohibited the
use of explosives. The demolition costs were estimated at
US$ 25m over a period of two years.
4 Risk potential
CONCLUSIONS
These fire catastrophes have once again shown that the
threat posed by fires in high-rise buildings still exists.
Although in some cases exceedingly more stringent regu-
lations and fire-protection requirements were introduced
for high-rise buildings in many countries throughout the
world in the 1960s and 70s after a series of devastating
fires in various countries with in some cases numerous
fatalities (Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Korea and others),
there are still a large number of older high-rise buildings
which do not come under the more stringent regulations
or at least not fully – as the fire in Hong Kong proves –
since separate statutory rules and regulations are required
to retrofit structural changes and fire-protection equip-
ment in existing buildings.
The following list of negative features can be drawn up on
the basis of these fires during the occupancy phase, more
or less representative of numerous similar occurrences in
high-rise buildings:
– absence of fire compartments on large open-floor areas;
– vertical spread of fire and smoke through stairwells and
air-conditioning ducts not sealed by fire dampers (chim-
ney effect);
– lack of sealing on cable ducts in stairwell walls;
– inadequate evacuation of people due to smoke-filled
stairwells;
– impeded access to the actual seat of the fire;
– absence of a suitably protected firemen’s lift with separ-
ate power supply in high-rise buildings with more than
30 floors;
– threat of ceilings collapsing on account of inadequate
resistance to fire;
– failure of the emergency power supply since it was not
isolated from the shaft of the main power supply;
– no continuous, automatic fire-detection system to give
early warning of a fire, to signal a fire and to permit
rapid location of the fire;
– inadequate instruction and training of security person-
nel regarding the action to be taken in the event of an
alarm and fire;
– lack of standardized procedures between the alarm
regulations and the guidelines published by the fire
brigade;
– inadequate supply of fire-fighting water due to exces-
sively low pressure in the risers, often on account of a
partly closed shutoff valve or incorrectly set pressure-
reducing valves;
– external attempts to boost the water pressure thwarted
by inappropriate marking of the fire connections;
– no automatic fire-fighting systems, such as sprinklers;
– failure of the sprinkler systems installed to function
properly.
68 SPECIAL COATING ON THE STEEL SKELETON GUARANTEEING ADEQUATE FIRE RESISTANCE

69 FIRE-DETECTION SYSTEM IN THE MESSETURM IN FRANKFURT

Page 107
4.2.4 Fire-protection regulations, loss prevention
The facts and shortcomings outlined in the preceding sec-
tion have significantly increased the magnitude of the fire
losses described.
For this reason, efforts are being made to limit the fire risk
with the aid of corresponding fire-protection regulations
and loss-prevention measures.
A high-rise building does not constitute any extra risk with
regard to occurrence of the fire, but it certainly does with
regard to the spread of fire, smoke and fumes. This is due
to the vertical nature of the building, which greatly pro-
motes the spread of fire in the main propagation direction,
namely from the bottom upwards.
Compared with buildings below the limit for a high-rise
building – regardless of definition – a high-rise building
will always have significant disadvantages when it comes
to rescuing people and fighting fires. People cannot be
rescued from outside the building if they are trapped on
floors out of range of the fire ladders; they can only be lo-
cated and rescued via the stairwells. The same applies to
fighting the fire, since outside intervention is impossible.
The firemen must concentrate on tackling the fire from in-
side the building and must make their way to the scene of
the fire with their equipment through stairwells filled with
smoke and heat.
4.2.4.1 Regulations
Due to these difficulties, the standards and regulations in
force in the majority of countries include special provi-
sions for high-rise buildings, with corresponding require-
ments to be met in respect of fire prevention and protec-
tion. In this way, they take account of the higher risk po-
tential.
In Germany, for instance, these requirements are laid out
in the 1978 “directives”. Besides, compliance with all the
provisions of the Construction Codes in force in each fed-
eral state is compulsory.
4.2.4.2 Structural fire protection
Most of these directives relate to the requirements for
structural fire protection, including the rescue routes.
The examples described in the preceding section clearly
show, both in a positive and negative sense, how import-
ant it is to meet these requirements.
FIRE-RESISTANT MATERIALS
To ensure the stability of a high-rise building in the event
of a fire, the supporting structure and ceilings must be re-
sistant to fire. The characteristic “fire resistant” must be
defined in the applicable standards. However, this means
that the requirements to be met by fire-resistant parts can
easily differ from one country to the next, depending on
the standards applied. The same holds true for the inspec-
tion procedures specified for verification.
4 Risk potential
The German directives specify a fire-resistance period of
90 minutes for the supporting structure in high-rise build-
ings and 120 minutes for buildings with a height of more
than 60 m. In both cases, only non-combustible materials
may be used for the supporting elements.
Since high-rise buildings are largely constructed with steel
skeletons, unprotected steel cannot be used on account of
its inadequate resistance to fire. Composite structures of
concrete and steel or fire-resistant coatings or fire-proof
panelling must be used instead.
So that the building itself cannot contribute towards the
spread of fire, non-combustible materials are largely stipu-
lated for the structural parts and elements. Combustible,
normally or barely flammable materials are only permitted
if structural measures ensure that they cannot contribute
towards a fire.
FIRE COMPARTMENTS
As already mentioned, fire can also spread via the outer
facade if windows have been shattered by the heat. It has
been found in such cases that the flashover distance of at
least 1 m between two floors as required by the directives
is frequently too short. The alternative possibility of parts
projecting from the facade is similarly not always effect-
ive, and it is therefore perfectly appropriate to use fire-
resistant glazing.
In the cases described above, it was sometimes found that
the fire had spread over the entire floor and also over sev-
eral floors inside the building. Fire compartments with
vertical and horizontal structural seals must be created to
prevent fire spreading in this way:
– The ceilings must be fire resistant and made of non-
combustible materials.
– Partition walls must be made of non-combustible ma-
terials and must also be fire resistant for certain uses.
– Doorways should at least be sealed with tightly closing,
fire-retardant doors; any other openings required in the
walls must be sealed in an equivalent manner.
– Partition walls in corridors should reach right up to the
structural ceiling.
STAIRWELLS
Stairwells are areas of particular importance, since they
must usually permit safe evacuation of the building in the
event of a fire. Their number depends on the area, height
and shape of the building. Several stairwells are normally
required.
Stairwells must have fire-resistant walls of non-combust-
ible materials. Internal stairwells may only be reached via
lobbies sealed by smoke-tight self-closing and at least fire-
retardant doors.
Smoke vents must be installed at the top of all stairwells;
internal stairwells must be equipped with a mechanical,
automatically activated ventilation system connected to an
emergency power supply. If a fire breaks out, excess pres-
sure must be generated in the stairwells to prevent the in-
gress of smoke.
4 Risk potential
VENTILATION AND AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEMS
Ventilation and air-conditioning systems must be installed
in such a way that fire or smoke cannot be transmitted to
stairwells and other floors or fire compartments. The
cases outlined above clearly show how difficult it is to
meet this requirement. Stairwells, lobbies, safety locks and
elevator lobbies must be equipped with ventilation
systems which are isolated from other systems.
As a rule, several floors are normally combined into one
area for the ventilation and air-conditioning systems. To
prevent fire and smoke being transmitted via the ventila-
tion ducts, fire dampers must be installed in the fresh air
and exhaust air ducts on each floor; these fire dampers
must be activated automatically by smoke detectors as
well as manually.
More stringent requirements must be imposed on the
stairwells in taller buildings (safety stairwells). In particu-
lar, the safety locks outside the stairwells must be
equipped with mechanical ventilation systems.
SHAFTS AND ELEVATORS
To prevent fire and smoke spreading vertically inside a
building, the continuous installation shafts for ventilation,
electric power, telecommunications, sanitation and docu-
ment conveyors must be of the same fire-resistant design
as the stairwells. Cable ducts should be sealed with fire-
resistant elements on every floor. Openings must be
sealed with fire-resistant doors or flaps. Automatically ac-
tivated smoke and heat vents must be installed here too.
Waste-disposal chutes must be protected in the same way.
Elevator shafts must also be enclosed by fire-resistant
walls; access to the elevators must be restricted to the cor-
ridors or enclosed lobbies. Elevators should be connected
to the standby power supply so that they can automatical-
ly be lowered to the ground floor following a power failure
or fire alarm.
Firemen’s lifts must be installed so that the firemen can
arrive at the scene of a fire without delay; this is already
specified by public authorities in certain standards and
directives. The time lost in fighting a fire due to the ab-
sence of such firemen’s lifts has already been shown by
the cases described above.
According to the German directives governing high-rise
construction, a firemen’s lift is required for all buildings
over 30 m high. Additional firemen’s lifts may be specified
for buildings over 100 m high.
Every firemen’s lift must be located in a separate fire-
resistant elevator shaft. The associated equipment rooms
must likewise be of fire-resistant design and sealed by fire-
resistant elements. In many cases, these lifts are addition-
ally equipped with rescue materials and radio equipment.
Lobbies with fire-resistant walls and at least fire-retardant
doors must be provided at the stopping points for the
firemen’s lifts. A mechanical ventilation system must also
be provided. The required electrical switchgear and supply
lines must be physically separated from other systems
and lines. It is also important to ensure that the firemen’s
lifts are connected to the standby power supply specified
for the building or that they can be operated via perman-
ently charged batteries.
Page 108
4.2.4.3 Active loss-prevention measures
STANDBY POWER SUPPLY
Standby or emergency power supplies must be installed
in high-rise buildings from a specified height onwards.
These power supplies operate independently of the public
grid; following a power failure in the public grid, they auto-
matically switch on to supply electric power to all safety
equipment:
– fire-detection and gas-alert systems;
– fire pumps and their control systems;
– firemen’s lifts and passenger elevators;
– ventilation systems, as well as smoke and heat vents;
– fire-resistant sealings of openings;
– emergency lighting for rescue routes;
– electroacoustic alarm systems and/or paging systems.
The equipment providing the standby power supply must
be isolated from the general power supply and protected
by fire-resistant materials.
FIRE DETECTORS
The importance of rapid and reliable detection and report-
ing of fires has already been highlighted in the preceding
section. In larger high-rise buildings, it is therefore essen-
tial to install an area-wide automatic fire-detection system
which triggers a fire alert on the building’s central control
panel. This central control panel should preferably be lo-
cated on the ground floor or in a permanently manned se-
curity centre. Automatic or manual signalling of an alarm
to the local fire brigade – preferably via a direct line – de-
pends on the conditions prevailing on site. The security
and maintenance personnel must have clear and precise
rules of conduct; they must also be fully familiar with
these rules so that human error can largely be excluded.
Automatic fire-detection systems should be installed in ad-
dition to the existing sprinkler systems, since the latter’s
fire-detection sensors are only tripped much later – by the
heat of a fire – and trigger an alarm when the sprinkler
nozzles open.
The type of smoke or heat detector to be used must be
determined according to suitability in each individual in-
stance. Manual detectors – e.g. push-button fire detectors
– must be installed in addition to automatic detectors so
that fires can also be signalled by the people present.
These detectors should preferably be located in a prom-
inent position in the corridors and rescue routes, as well
as in the lobbies to stairwells.
The installation of automatic fire or smoke detectors is
problematical due to the presence of ventilation and air-
conditioning systems in high-rise buildings and the asso-
ciated air streams. Appropriate specialist companies are
consequently considering the use of highly sensitive
smoke detectors (HSSD) and very early smoke detection
apparatus (VESDA). With such apparatus, detection of the
smoke at a very early stage in the fire could be used to
activate the fire dampers and then to switch off the air-
conditioning.
70 ATRIUM IN A BANK BUILDING
4 Risk potential
4.2.4.4 Fire fighting
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Hand-operated fire extinguishers must be installed at
clearly marked and generally accessible points in high-rise
buildings in order to fight incipient fires. These extinguish-
ers are intended for use by the building’s residents. How-
ever, teams should be present on every floor made up of
the people who work and live there; they must then be in-
structed on what to do if a fire breaks out and also be fa-
miliarized with the use of these hand-operated fire extin-
guishers.
FIRE-FIGHTING WATER
The cases outlined above have shown how important it is
to have an effective supply of fire-fighting water when
combatting a fire in a high-rise building. So that the fire-
men can start to fight the fire as soon as they arrive on the
scene, wet risers must be installed in every stairwell or in
their vicinity and a wall hydrant with hose line connected
to these risers on every floor. The hoses must be suffi-
ciently long to direct fire-fighting water to every point on
that floor. An adequately dimensioned water line and ade-
quate water pressure must be ensured when planning and
designing the building. In very high buildings, booster
systems must be installed in the wet risers to increase the
water pressure.
Whether the water for fire fighting can be taken from the
public mains or from separate water reservoirs or tanks
must be decided in each individual instance in accordance
with local conditions and regulations.
For greater safety, it may be useful to install not only wet
risers, but also dry risers into which the fire brigade can
feed water at the required pressure from the ground floor.
SPRINKLERS
An automatic sprinkler system is the most effective pro-
tective measure for fighting and controlling a fire in a high-
rise building. Care must be taken to ensure that the com-
plete building is protected by such sprinklers. In the cases
outlined above, there were either no sprinklers at all or no
activated sprinklers on the burning floors. In the case of
“One Meridian Plaza”, the fire was subsequently brought
under control with the aid of the sprinkler system and an
additional supply of fire-fighting water.
Based on past experience, the installation of sprinkler
systems is in many countries prescribed by law for high-
rise buildings from a certain height onwards – as from
60 m in Germany, for example. In some cases, the statu-
tory regulations even stipulate that sprinklers have to be
installed retroactively in high-rise buildings erected be-
fore the regulations came into force.
Automatic sprinkler systems throughout the building are
important since they must fight a fire as early as possible
and must either extinguish the fire directly or keep it
under control until the fire brigade arrives to finish off the
job. However, a sprinkler system will normally be unable
Page 110
to control a fire in full flame, for instance if it leaps from a
floor with no sprinklers to one with sprinklers. Sprinkler
systems are simply not dimensioned to cope with such
developments.
Sprinkler systems must meet the following requirements:
– they must rapidly control a fire in the fire compartment
in which it breaks out;
– they must limit the emission and spread of flames, hot
fumes and smoke;
– they must trigger an alarm in the building, preferably
also indicating to the central control panel where the
seat of the fire is located;
– the alert must be forwarded to the fire brigade or other
auxiliary forces.
The ability of the system to indicate to the central control
panel where the seat of the fire is located presupposes
that a separate sprinkler system with an alarm valve is
assigned to each floor and to each fire compartment. As
already mentioned in connection with fire-detection
systems, the installation of an automatic fire-detection
system in addition to the sprinkler system is advisable so
that fires can be discovered and signalled more quickly.
Sprinkler systems must be installed in accordance with the
applicable directives or standards, the best known of
which include NFPA, CEA, FOC and VdS. All the compon-
ents used for installation must comply with the relevant
standards.
The various directives and standards permit a variety of
solutions with regard to the water supply:
– water supply from the public mains – possibly via an
intermediate tank on the ground – via booster pumps on
the ground to supply several groups of floors with dif-
ferent pressure levels
– intermediate tanks on various upper floors, under either
normal pressure or excess pressure, to supply the
sprinkler groups above or below
– deep tanks and pressurized tanks on the roof, as well as
intermediate tanks in the middle of the building, to sup-
ply the sprinklers below with static or high pressure
Tanks on upper floors can be replenished via low-capacity
pumps. Depending on the type of supply selected, it may
be necessary to install pressure-reducing valves on the in-
dividual floors.
For a sprinkler system to operate smoothly, it must not
only be correctly installed and set, but also be regularly
inspected and serviced by specialist personnel.
OTHER FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT
Other automatic fire-fighting equipment may be appropri-
ate for certain systems in a high-rise building, such as
transformers, electrical switchgear and control rooms,
computer centres and telephone switchboards. Depending
on the systems concerned, CO2 or – if still permitted by
law – halon fire extinguishers are two possibilities worth
mentioning here, as well as extinguishing systems based
on inert gases.
Page 111
4.2.4.5 Organizational measures
As already mentioned, emergency and alarm plans must
be drawn up in consultation with the relevant authorities
and auxiliary forces, especially the local fire brigade. So
that all fire-protection facilities are fully functional when
required, they must be regularly inspected and serviced.
The test and maintenance intervals applicable to the differ-
ent facilities and systems must be scrupulously observed.
It is also important to ensure that the maintenance and
security personnel know what procedures to adopt in the
event of an alarm or fire, reinforced by recurrent staff fire
and safety training at regular intervals. The catastrophic
consequences due to taking the wrong action have already
been outlined in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.4.6 Atriums
The situation described in Section 4.2.2 with regard to at-
riums also poses an additional risk for people during the
building’s occupancy as a hotel or department store, for
example. Atriums in particular have a magnetic effect and
a concentration of visitors and customers is consequently
to be found in these areas.
A number of special requirements must be met in order to
ensure personal protection.
The required rescue routes must not be directly linked to
the atrium. Instead, they must lead away from the atrium,
towards the outside walls of the building. This conse-
quently means that the stairwells should be located along
the outside walls to keep them clear of smoke and to per-
mit more effective illumination in the event of a power
failure.
Flashover from one floor to the next must be prevented in
the atrium area. This can be achieved, for example, by in-
stalling fire-resistant glazing. The supporting elements
must also be at least fire-retardant to prevent the top of
the atrium crashing down onto the inner area.
Care must also be taken to ensure that smoke is adequate-
ly discharged in the event of a fire. This is particularly diffi-
cult on account of the large volume and resultant dilution
and mixing of the smoke. Frequently, discharging the
smoke via a smoke and heat vent will suffice; in critical
cases, however, an additional mechanical means of dis-
charging the smoke must also be installed.
4.3 Windstorm
Each of the two twin towers of New York’s World Trade
Center, which will be discussed in more detail in the fol-
lowing sections, has a base area of roughly 4,200 m2. That
is roughly equal to a square base measuring 65 m  65 m.
The towers are 417 m and 415 m high, respectively.
Using the highly simplified wind load permitted by Ger-
man standards, this yields a total static load of roughly
4,500 tonnes per tower from dynamic pressure and wind
suction.
These values do not, however, include the conditions
prevailing locally which must be taken into account when
designing a high-rise building. The building’s surround-
4 Risk potential
ings, for example, have an immensely important effect on
the active wind and flow conditions. The location of the
building – on open ground or surrounded by other high-
rise buildings – has a massive influence on the wind pro-
file. The effect of wind separating off the edges of neigh-
bouring buildings, reduced wind velocities due to obs-
tacles at ground level and effects similar to friction or de-
flection of the wind loads due to neighbouring buildings
cannot be taken into account in the standard loads.
Local wind effects have repeatedly been observed in the
canyons formed by skyscrapers in large cities. One such
effect is known as the “spinning effect”, a tornado-like
effect near ground level which affects pedestrians. In by-
gone days, the strong upwinds encountered on the Flat-
iron Building in New York used to cause not a few ladies
considerable problems as they strolled past. It is also
known as the Marilyn Monroe effect in construction aero-
dynamics.
The shape of the building is another factor influencing the
wind forces actually at work. When wind meets an obs-
tacle, it normally generates compressive forces on the
windward side of the building and suction forces on the
leeward side. In addition, air streaming around the build-
ing produces suction forces on the sides parallel to the
wind direction. The shape of the corners and edges of the
building is particularly important. Separation effects can
cause suction and compressive forces several times great-
er than the original dynamic pressure. The magnitude of
these edge and corner forces depends primarily on the
geometry of the building round which the air flows. Basic-
ally, it may be said that the more sharp-edged and irregu-
lar the building is, the more irregularly the wind forces
will be distributed.
Suction forces cause major problems around the roof in
particular. If the roof structure has not been adequately an-
chored, parts of the roof may be lifted off and catapulted
away unhindered. In addition to the roof, such elements as
light-metal facades, antennas, promotional signs and
water tanks are some of the parts most seriously threat-
ened by wind on high-rise buildings. The risk of parts
being blown away and flying around is greatest during the
construction phase. Such parts can cause considerable
property damage to their surroundings, and harbour
potential for bodily injury which cannot be neglected.
During the autumn gales in 1972, for example, several
hundred glass elements worked themselves loose from
the outer facade of the John Hancock Tower in Boston and
crashed down onto the pavement. An area of 50,000 m2
had be reglazed. Facades and roofs are also exposed to
driving rain and hail. “Updraughts”, which cause the rain
to move upwards instead of down as a result of different
inner and outer pressures, can cause moisture to penetrate
inside the building. No fewer than 5,000 panes had to be
replaced for this reason on the UN Secretariat Building in
New York in 1952.
A purely structural consideration of the wind will not suf-
fice in the case of larger building structures. Wind is a
phenomenon which varies strongly in strength and direc-
tion and can produce dynamic effects in combination with
vortices separating off from the buildings around which
71 DYNAMIC-PRESSURE APPROACHES:
effects from friction impact wind speed

Wind load
W (kN/m)
Height h (m)

Horizontal load H = W x H

Bending moment M = W x h2
2

72 TYPHOON TRACKS FOR JAPAN AND CALIFORNIA

 Core to stiffen
Wind the building

Foundation

Ground-bearing pressure
from vertical load

Ground-bearing pressure
from wind

Total
(Ground-bearing pressure
from vertical load and wind)

73 REPRESENTATION OF WIND IMPACT ON A

BUILDING’S GROUND-BEARING PRESSURE
4 Risk potential
the air flows. Particularly in the case of slim buildings cap-
able of vibration, such as towers, smokestacks and sky-
scrapers, this can lead to stresses which must not be
neglected. These vibrations are particularly critical when
the wind excites the building to vibrate at its resonant fre-
quency, thus producing the resonant effects already men-
tioned in Section 3.1.3. In response to these fluctuations in
the wind, the building begins to vibrate and can continue
to do so until the vibrations reach an amplitude threaten-
ing the building with collapse.
There are also other, less spectacular problems to be
solved by the planners. Depending on their frequency and
amplitude, vibrations will be perceived by the building’s
users. These vibrations can become unpleasant or even in-
tolerable when they reach a certain limit which, however,
is normally still far away from threatening the stability of
the building. In the 1970s, for instance, this resulted in one
of the greatest “building losses” anywhere in the world:
due to wind vibration, almost all the tenants moved out of
a high-rise building as if in panic, resulting in a loss of
roughly US$ 75m in lost rent.
Such dynamic effects can be counteracted by changing
the rigidity of the building or by installing active or pas-
sive damper systems. Passive dampers include baffle
plates, for example, to reduce vortex formation. Active
systems can be made up of water tanks, movable weights
or rotating unbalanced flywheels.
Shortly after completion of the John Hancock Tower in
Boston in the early seventies, it was found that gales
caused enormous vibrations in the tip of the tower. A
damping system comprising a 600-tonne counterweight
which can be moved around as required in accordance
with the wind direction had to be installed on the 58th
floor. It was discovered that the building could have top-
pled over at any time. To everyone’s surprise, however, it
would have fallen onto its narrow side, rather like a book
falling onto its spine.
Damping systems are always based on a similar principle.
A large mass is moved by hydraulic computer-controlled
equipment or pendulum constructions in the direction op-
posite to the actual direction of vibration by the building.
The vibration energy of the wind is absorbed in this way.
The amplitudes and horizontal acceleration forces are re-
duced considerably, thus also largely eliminating the effect
of dynamic forces.
It can be extremely complicated to take wind loads into ac-
count in calculations, and it is therefore almost standard
practice today to test the response of a high-rise building
in the wind tunnel first. As already mentioned in Section
3.1.3, even computer simulations cannot always provide a
satisfactory answer to the problem. Over the years, this
has given rise to a separate engineering discipline – model
analysis – to solve the structural and dynamic problems of
a building on the basis of miniaturized models.
The widespread belief that it is sufficient to divide all the
parameters of the original by the same factor in order to
obtain an adequate model is unfortunately not correct.
Complex mathematical problems are frequently encoun-
tered when drawing up models and it has taken a long
time for model-making to become a precise science.
Page 114
The main problem for the planning engineers are not the
horizontal loads but the much more complicated question
of transmitting the bending moment due to these loads. In
the case of a uniformly applied area load, for example, the
horizontal load acting inside the building will represent a
linear function over the height of the building, while the
bending moment increases quadratically in proportion to
the building height. This means that the bending moment
increases much more strongly than the horizontal load
with every additional metre in height. More and more so-
phisticated solutions must be found for these loads to be
controlled by the supporting structure of a skyscraper.
Supporting structures of the type developed in particular
by the architects Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), such
as the “tube” (e.g. World Trade Center, New York), the
“bundled tube” (e.g. Sears Tower, Chicago) or the “truss
tube” (e.g. John Hancock Center, Chicago), have been pro-
duced as a result of the problem that conventional sup-
porting structures are no longer in a position to transmit
the wind loads safely (see Section 3.2.2.1).
In the subsoil, the bending moments caused by wind must
be absorbed by soil pressures which can lead to consider-
able pressure on the leeward side of the foundations.
So far, we have only considered “normal windstorm
loads“. If we consider, however, that many of the metro-
politan centres with skylines dotted with skyscrapers are
located in areas exposed to severe windstorms – Hong
Kong and Tokyo, for instance, are located in the track of
typhoons and even New York can suffer a hurricane, while
Chicago is exposed to tornadoes – then it becomes clear
that the planning engineers must also consider this prob-
lem. The high wind speeds associated with typhoons, hur-
ricanes and tornadoes are not the only problem: a tor-
nado, for instance, can cause a sudden pressure drop of
up to 10% of the atmospheric pressure within only a few
seconds, with the result that the outer skin of “airtight”
buildings literally bursts – and that applies particularly to
the windows.
Compared with the simplified wind load assumed in ac-
cordance with German standards, this would lead to an
actual assumed wind load of around 10,000 to 13,000
tonnes for New York’s World Trade Center if we were to
take into account all the effects mentioned in this section.
PRECAUTIONS DURING CONSTRUCTION
The loss potential during construction is an aspect which
cannot be neglected.
Although the stability of the building during the various
construction phases is documented by corresponding
structural analyses, such equipment items as facade
elements or temporary structures are usually not taken
into account, or only inadequately.
Additional precautions must therefore be taken during the
construction work, particularly if the contractor is given
sufficient advance warning of an impending windstorm.
A loss of more than DM 5m was incurred during construc-
tion of a 90-storey high-rise building in the Far East. Sub-
contractors had temporarily stored such electrical installa-
tion material as control cabinets and relays on the upper
floors of the building shell, but delivery bottlenecks led to
Page 115
a delay in assembly of the facade elements on these
floors. A considerable proportion of the electrical material
stored on these floors was soaked by Typhoon Herb as it
passed over in 1996 and consequently exposed to the risk
of corrosion. Since the damage was foreseeable and pre-
cautionary measures were not taken, the insurer was only
obliged to indemnify part of the loss under the policy.
4.4 Earthquakes
The Richter scale is a logarithmic scale for determining the
energy dissipated in an earthquake. This means that an
earthquake measuring 7 on the Richter scale dissipates
32 times the energy of a size-6 quake, while one measur-
ing 8 dissipates roughly 1,000 times as much energy.
The energy dissipated by these earthquakes is expressed
in horizontal and vertical acceleration forces acting on the
skyscrapers. The immense forces transmitted from under-
ground must be absorbed by the supporting structures of
the buildings. These dynamic loads are replaced by struc-
tural equivalent loads in horizontal and vertical direction
when a structural analysis of the building is performed.
The highest acceleration forces measured to date in an
earthquake were recorded during the Northridge earth-
quake in Los Angeles (17th January 1994) and amounted
to 2.3 times the acceleration due to gravity “g” (g =
9.81 m/s2) in horizontal direction and 1.7 times the accel-
eration due to gravity in vertical direction. In simplified
terms, this means that the planning engineers would add-
itionally have to apply roughly 2.3 times the dead weight
in horizontal direction and roughly 1.7 times the dead
weight in vertical direction to the building when dimen-
sioning the supporting structure so that these earthquake
forces can safely be absorbed. Such values are fortunately
exceptional. Moreover, they only act on the supporting
structure very briefly and are subject to rapid changes
of direction. The values assumed in the majority of stand-
ards correspond to between 5% and 10% of the acceler-
ation due to gravity. Assumed loads of up to 0.4 g are re-
quired in extreme cases and US standards already include
more recent earthquake zones in which even higher values
must be assumed in certain frequency ranges. In spite of
this, however, experts still doubt the adequacy of these
assumed loads under certain conditions.
HOW DO SEISMIC LOADS ACT ON A BUILDING?
The horizontal and vertical acceleration of the subsoil due
to an earthquake causes the building to vibrate.
In simplified form, these loads can be represented by hori-
zontal and vertical equivalent loads acting on the mass
centre of gravity of the building. The magnitude of these
equivalent loads depends directly on the mass of the
building. This leads to the conclusion that as the height of
the building increases, the mass centre of gravity normally
wanders upwards and the flexural effect on the building is
intensified by the longer lever arm.
The potential earthquake damage suffered by high-rise
4 Risk potential
buildings varies. The damage depends more on the rate of
motion and magnitude of the displacement than on the
acceleration. The most important and most serious effects
are outlined below, together with the possible protective
measures.
SUBSOIL
Natural rock is the best subsoil from the point of view of
its earthquake properties. Sandy soils saturated with water
and artificially backfilled land are considered to be particu-
larly critical. The widely-feared liquefaction effects (plasti-
cization of the soil) can occur if an earthquake coincides
with high groundwater levels. The building may subse-
quently remain at a slant or both the building and the sur-
rounding terrain may subside. The importance of the sub-
soil was revealed in particular by the earthquake in Mexico
in 1985. The epicentre of the earthquake was located near
the Pacific coast, at Lázaro Cárdenas. The intensity of the
earthquake decreased rapidly as the distance from the epi-
centre increased, but then rose strongly (up to 3 points on
the modified Mercalli scale) in Mexico City, some 350 km
from the epicentre. The main reason for this increase lay
in the fact that Mexico City is built on the soft sediment of
a dried-up lake, a subsoil that massively reinforces the
effect of the incoming seismic waves through resonant
vibration.
FOUNDATIONS
Deep foundations generally display better seismic resis-
tance than shallow foundations. Floating foundations can
prove advantageous on soft ground, since they may be
better able to attenuate resonance action. The risk of sub-
sidence is considerably greater with floating foundations
than with deep foundations.
“Base isolation” is an anti-seismic construction technique
that uses the principle of attenuation to reduce vibrations.
The building is isolated from the solid subsoil by damping
elements arranged on a foundation ring or foundation
plate. Another version was employed for the Court of Ap-
peals in San Francisco: the building was retroactively
more or less mounted on ball bearings which are intended
to gently damp down the impact of a future earthquake.
The requirements to be met by all the various anti-seismic
bearings are set out, for example, in the Uniform Building
Code (Division III, 1991).
When using these methods, it is important to ensure that
the damping system is correctly attuned to the applied
frequency spectrum and to the resonant frequency of the
building. Resonance action can be avoided in this way.
As in the case of wind loads, earthquakes can also give
rise to resonant vibration. These are described in more
detail in Section 4.3. The resonant frequency and conse-
quently also the resonance effects can be influenced with
the aid of damping systems. In addition to the isolation
systems for foundations mentioned above, vibrations can
also be damped by using heavy moving counterweights.
“Soft” skeleton structures have a period of fundamental
natural oscillations equal to roughly one-tenth of the num-
ber of floors in seconds. The period of a 15-storey building
consequently equals roughly 1.5 seconds. Higher edifices
74 IMPACT OF EARTHQUAKE LOADS ON THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY

HIGH-RISE BUILDING
Static equivalent system

V = ay x g

H = aH x g
Mass centre of gravity

H = horizontal equivalent load

Horizontal (aH)
+ which acts on the mass centre
Vertical (aV)
of gravity
acceleration

V = vertical equivalent load

which acts on the mass centre
of gravity

h = building’s own weight

75 50 T AND/OR 90 T HEAVY DAMPERS TO BE INSTALLED IN TWO JAPANESE HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS

TO REDUCE RESONANCE VIBRATIONS CAUSED BY EARTHQUAKES
76 EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENT OF DAMPERS IN HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS
4 Risk potential
require a certain time before they oscillate at maximum
amplitude. This excitation period lies between 20 and
30 seconds. Enduring earthquakes, such as that in Mexico
City in 1985 (around 3 minutes), consequently represent a
particularly high risk. A so-called whiplash effect was ob-
served in the high-rise buildings in Mexico City, for ex-
ample, as the buildings abruptly moved back from their
maximum deflection. Extremely high acceleration forces
and consequently high horizontal forces were involved
here and resulted in damage to the upper floors, including
such superstructures as tanks and antennas.
HEIGHT OF THE BUILDING
Tall buildings are more susceptible to damage from strong
remote earthquakes than from weak earthquakes close at
hand. They normally have a lower resonant frequency and
a lower attenuation than low buildings. Short-wave oscilla-
tion components in earthquakes are rapidly damped, while
the long-wave components (frequency f < 1 Hz) can still
make themselves felt at a distance of several hundred kilo-
metres, particularly in the form of surface waves.
SUPPORTING STRUCTURE
A distinction can generally be made between rigid and
elastic supporting systems. Rigid systems, such as solid
wall and ceiling elements, are difficult to deform and
transmit the seismic loads through their rigidity. Due to
the stiffness and lack of ductility in the supporting struc-
ture, however, shear cracks can develop in the building.
The problem is that more and more energy must be ab-
sorbed through the high rigidity and that more and more
material is required for this purpose.
Elastic supporting structures, such as reinforced concrete
or steel frames, are highly deformable and absorb the ap-
plied seismic energy in this way. The nodes connecting
the horizontal and vertical elements of the supporting
structure are highly stressed, however, and peak loads
occur both here and on the reinforcing elements (bonds)
which must be taken into account when producing these
connections. However, integrated non-supporting partition
walls may suffer excessive stresses and break out on ac-
count of the major deformation of the frame structure.
Skyscrapers with steel frames were hitherto considered to
be particularly resistant to earthquakes, but the Northridge
earthquake in January 1994 brought new insights. In an
unexpectedly large part of the flexurally rigid steel frame
structures, cracks were found in the welds in the corners of
the frames. Comprehensive studies were undertaken to de-
termine the causes and lay down rehabilitation measures.
This strong earthquake also showed that steel supporting
structures do not immediately come crashing down when
overstressed and that plastic supporting reserves are acti-
vated first. The ductility and load-bearing capacity of rein-
forced concrete frames, however, can be improved by in-
creasing the percentage of reinforcement. When over-
stressed, the concrete will usually fail at the risk of a total
collapse.
A number of systems based on the principle of flexibility
and energy absorption are currently being developed to
protect buildings against seismic activity.
Page 118
The system of active variable stiffness (AVS) is one such
system. With this system, the rigidity of the building is
specifically varied by securing the bonds to the members
of the frame structure by means of a variable connection
which is essentially made up of hydraulic cylinders con-
trolled via valves. An operating power of 20 W is sufficient
for this purpose.
The incoming seismic vibrations are detected by sensors
which transmit the information to a central computer. The
computer determines the required rigidity and opens the
valves at the individual points to increase the building’s
flexibility in these areas. This ensures that the vibrations
are optimally damped and overstressing is avoided.
SYMMETRY
Symmetric layouts, rigidity and mass distribution lead
to a considerably better seismic response than asymmetric
layouts, rigidity and mass distribution. This is because
asymmetric buildings are subjected to stronger torsion
(twisting) around the vertical axis by horizontal seismic
loads.
SHAPE OF THE BUILDING
When parts of different height are permanently connected
to one another as, for example, is often found in high-rise
buildings with atriums, then the various structures in
the building can be subjected to considerable torsional
stresses by the seismic loads. Buildings of different
heights can also be subjected to a whole series of effects
in an earthquake, such as the jackscrew effect observed
in Mexico City in 1985: higher buildings were literally
jammed in between lower buildings, thus extensively
damaging the floors at the clamping point. In some cases,
the buildings simply buckled over at the edge of the lower
adjacent buildings. Resonance effects can also cause
buildings to oscillate so strongly that they hammer against
one another. Another effect observed in high-rise build-
ings is the soft-storey effect: due to lobbies, atriums or
glazed shopping passages, some floors – usually near the
ground floor – are distinctly “softer” than those above
them. These “soft” floors then collapse in an earthquake.
A further source of loss potential relates to the standards
applied. Many countries do not have their own earthquake
standards and simply adopt the corresponding regulations
from others, such as the Uniform Building Codes from the
USA. This means, however, that common local seismic ef-
fects are not covered. Moreover, application of the stand-
ards is not mandatory in many countries and their super-
vision not sufficiently stringent. One of the main problems
that is repeatedly found in conjunction with earthquake
damage lies in the quality of the work. Poor-quality mater-
ials, poor training from the engineers to the workers, cor-
ruption and the pressure of time must be mentioned in
this context.
“Only fools, liars and charlatans predict earthquakes”, ac-
cording to C. F. Richter, the man who gave his name to the
Richter scale.
New and potentially promising methods are being devel-
oped in the meantime, but the question remains whether
these methods can ever be properly applied in practice.
Page 119
Such predictions are naturally of subsidiary importance
where physical losses are concerned, such as a cata-
strophic loss estimated at up to US$ 3bn in the metro-
politan district of Tokyo. Where personal protection is con-
cerned – and up to 600,000 fatalities are assumed for the
aforementioned scenario – such precise earthquake fore-
casts would be of inestimable value.
4.5 Foundations, settlement and subsidence
4.5.1 Foundations
Particular attention must be paid to additional foundation
measures (see Section 3.2.1) when erecting a high-rise
building and above all if it is to be built on poor or dam-
aged subsoil.
Foundation structures up to 100 m deep and known as
“barrettes”, each comprising four diaphragm wall elem-
ents, were required to transmit the loads safely into nat-
ural foundation soil under the Petronas Towers in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, which we have already mentioned
above. Load tests should really be performed on such
foundation structures before starting the high-rise con-
struction work, but they are economically unacceptable
4 Risk potential
and technically almost impossible on account of the high
vertical loads to be applied.
Instead, the load-bearing capacity of the deep foundation
is determined in addition to routine investigation of the
drilling explorations (assessment of the soil strata encoun-
tered). The integrity of the respective pile and diaphragm
walls can be continuously monitored with the aid of such
special methods as ultrasound; special pipelines are inte-
grated into the foundation structures to permit a certain
degree of rework if defects arise, for instance by means of
subsequent injection.
Although such complex foundation work can only be
undertaken by highly specialized and experienced civil
engineering contractors, mishaps occur all the time. When
producing the trenches for the diaphragm walls, for in-
stance, or when drilling holes, particularly at great depth,
opened fissures or existing but undetected channels result
in loss of the bentonite supporting slurry, thus jeopardiz-
ing the stability of the trench or hole or even causing it to
collapse.
The long cages of reinforcing steel can become wedged
against the wall of the deep trench or drill hole, making it
impossible to lower them to the required depth. It is not
uncommon for the freshly positioned reinforcing cage to
be pulled upwards a short distance when the casing string
77 EARTHQUAKE IN KOBE, JAPAN
78 CORRODED SUPPLY LINES
79 TENSION CRACK IN A CROSSLINKED POLYETHYLENE PIPE
Page 121
is raised after completing the pile. This can impair the in-
tended load-bearing capacity or even make it necessary to
abandon the pile in question.
The required load-bearing capacity may likewise not be
achieved if deviations from the vertical axis exceeding the
theoretically permissible limit occur as a result of encoun-
tering obstacles or due to carelessness while drilling
(sinking). This is not uncommon, particularly in the case
of long piles.
Simple repairs or reworking are rarely possible in such
cases. Extensive supplementary measures, such as re-
placement piles, pile bents or injections, will usually be
required on account of the simultaneous disturbance pro-
duced in the subsoil. These supplementary measures may
prove considerably more expensive than the original foun-
dation.
In many cases, this will also give rise to the question
whether a mere defect is involved or whether it is a phys-
ical loss with corresponding consequences for indemnifica-
tion under the policy. In the latter case, the indemnification
for such supplementary costs should be suitably limited
by correspondingly worded clauses, limits or other restric-
tions when concluding the policy before construction
starts.
4.5.2 Settlement and subsidence
Settlement and subsidence are another risk. It must be
pointed out, however, that a certain degree of settlement
will be unavoidable in all these projects. The equilibrium
of forces originally present in the ground is disturbed by
excavation of the soil for the underground floors and by
application of the structural loads. Depending on the type
of building, the soil conditions and the foundation select-
ed, settlement will occur immediately or at a later date.
Depending on the method selected (diaphragm wall, bore
diaphragms), the retaining wall can also cause the ground
to settle and result in damage to third-party property. For
this reason, it is advisable to record prior damage on
neighbouring buildings as evidence before starting the
work.
The planning engineer is responsible for ensuring that
such settlement is determined correctly and for ordering
appropriate structural precautions so that the settlement
remains within tolerable limits. This can be achieved by a
corresponding arrangement of joints in the building and
4 Risk potential
other structural measures, such as the use of hydraulic
jacks.
Problems only arise, however, if defective work, undetect-
ed disturbances, subsequent changes in the subsoil or an
incorrect appraisal of the load-bearing capacity lead to
abrupt and extensive subsidence which may threaten the
stability of the entire building.
Such subsidence can occur during the construction phase,
when the building has already reached a certain height
and consequently also a certain weight. It may also occur
after several years and may not only cause the building to
collapse, thus resulting in a total loss, but can also result
in devastating casualties.
The spectacular collapse of a high-rise building will in
many cases be due to a combination of causes, such as a
combination of design errors, inadequate workmanship
and problematical soil conditions.
Attention must be devoted to the horizontal forces in par-
ticular when designing the foundations for high-rise build-
ings on sloping ground.
In one case, reject railway tracks were used as the founda-
tion element for a high-rise building instead of the usual
steel or reinforced concrete piles. Although the tracks
were welded together to give them the requisite load-
bearing capacity, they still did not conform to the ap-
plicable regulations. When heavy rainfall subsequently
caused a landslide on a nearby slope, these piles were
neither structurally nor theoretically in a position to ab-
sorb the additional active horizontal earth pressure. The
piles buckled and some sheared off, with the result that
the high-rise apartment block literally tipped over and
then collapsed.
It is very difficult to repair a high-rise building when its
stability has been jeopardized by such severe subsidence.
The defective foundations can be reinforced with the aid
of injections, supplementary piles or root piles if neces-
sary on account of the limited height available on the
underground floors. However, such measures are almost
impossible in a completed high-rise building, due to its
immense overall weight, and the only alternative is usual-
ly to demolish the building.
Even when high-rise buildings are still under construction,
i.e. in a phase where repairs would still be possible on
account of the lower dead weight, demolition of the shell
will usually prove to be the more economical, time-saving
and generally better alternative for the principal.
4 Risk potential
4.6 Water
GENERAL
Like other buildings, high-rise buildings can also suffer
damage due to water. As a rule, this damage will be due
to soaking, soiling, discoloration, corrosion, shrinkage or
expansion and mould.
DEVELOPMENT OF LOSSES
The damage is due to the interplay between the nature of
the media concerned (e.g. drinking water, heating water,
effluent), the quality of the installation materials, design
and execution of the plants and the prevailing operating
conditions.
In the case of high-rise buildings, the risk is further aggra-
vated by the fact that leaking water rapidly finds its way to
floors below the actual leakage point, with the result that
several floors may be affected, depending on the duration
of the leak and the amount of water involved.
The considerably larger size of the installations in compari-
son to “normal” buildings is another risk factor: booster
systems and pumps, pressure reducers, etc., are all need-
ed in order to distribute or discharge the drinking water,
heating water and effluent horizontally and vertically, thus
increasing the number of possible leaks.
4.7 Special structural measures
Considerations on the conversion, rehabilitation and final-
ly demolition of high-rise buildings have been subsumed
under this heading.
4.7.1 Conversions
Conversions are constantly being made to any high-rise
building with thousands of square metres of useful floor
space. Redecoration and modernization are the common-
est conversions, in addition to those necessitated by
changes in operational procedures and use of the build-
ing.
More stringent or additional requirements in respect of
fire protection, installations or computer systems can also
make conversions necessary.
On the one hand, conversions and changes of use are fa-
cilitated by the separation of shell (= supporting structure),
installations and interior finishing commonly applied in
the construction of modern high-rise buildings; at the
same time, however, it is precisely this separation that im-
poses limits on what is economically acceptable. Even if
technically feasible, conversions involving changes to the
existing structural system, i.e. to the supporting structures,
will usually be rendered impossible on account of the
costs involved. For this reason, conversions will almost al-
ways only affect the interior finishing and the installations.
The range of possible conversions extends from simply
relocating interior wall elements or fitting complete new
false ceilings or laying new floor coverings to “gutting”
the building completely. In such a case, all or part of the
Page 122
building is restored to the condition of a shell and then
refinished with corresponding installations and interior
finishing in line with its new use.
However, if these conversions result in considerably
higher loads for the building, these loads will have to be
discharged via extended foundations in extreme cases.
Particular attention will have to be paid to settlement in
this context. The problem can be minimized by providing
additional piles, for example. From a technical point of
view, however, this will prove fairly difficult as the working
height of the drills is usually limited by the height of the
various levels in the underground car parking.
The fact that conversions are often undertaken while oper-
ation continues without interruption in those parts of the
building and on those floors not affected by the work not
only makes the work more difficult, but also increases the
risk for the insurer. The nuisance due to noise and un-
pleasant odours or temporary failure of the sanitary instal-
lations, heating or ventilation are relatively harmless phe-
nomena. The dust inevitably generated by such conver-
sions, on the other hand, can have serious consequences
if high standards of purity and hygiene must be met by
those areas still in operation, such as computer systems or
doctors’ offices.
As in the case of “normal” building work, the use of such
flammable substances as adhesive and bituminous mater-
ials or naked lights, for instance for soldering and welding,
will be unavoidable when carrying out conversions. Ex-
tremely stringent requirements must therefore be imposed
on the fire-protection measures due to the incomparably
greater risk potential. In particular cases, the fire brigade
will have to be ready on site to take immediate action if an
emergency arises.
Another problem associated with conversions is that the
normally strict controls with regard to access and author-
ization are often suspended for the conversions: workers,
suppliers and the vehicles transporting materials and
equipment need “open doors”. This naturally also in-
creases the risk of unauthorized persons exploiting the
situation and simply marching into the building.
Conclusion: all conversions, no matter how slight, must be
thoroughly planned in advance and organized in detail
with due consideration given to all eventualities.
4.7.2 Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is an extreme form of conversion. The two
commonest reasons making rehabilitation measures ne-
cessary are
– physiologically harmful materials, such as materials
containing asbestos or materials with excessive formal-
dehyde concentrations, or
– potentially dangerous structures.
All the aspects already mentioned in the previous section
also apply here in particular. In addition, there is the prob-
lem of disposing of the physiologically harmful materials.
Correct disposal of contaminated materials and sub-
stances not only poses a technical challenge, but is also
one of the most difficult jobs for third-party liability insur-
Page 123 4 Risk potential

ers on account of the possible environmental impact and

health hazard.
In the majority of cases, it will be impossible to continue
normal operation of the building while the rehabilitation
work is in progress. For this reason, such rehabilitation
will usually also be associated with conversion and a
completely new interior finish.
An alternative method was employed when Winterton
House in London was rehabilitated in the 1960s. All false
ceilings and facade linings were removed first. The new
brick facade was then built up on its own foundations
around the steel supporting structure. The facade was
secured to the supporting structure by means of steel
brackets for reinforcement. An active construction was
required to compensate the differences in thermal expan-
sion of the facade and supporting structure. In this case,
the roof structure links the inner skeleton with the outer
wall via hydraulic presses. These presses are in continu-
ous duty and maintain a constant compressive strain on
the upper edge of the masonry. The building’s outer and
inner columns were reanchored in the roof structure, thus
reducing the load in the columns. Ceilings in line with
today’s state of the art were then installed.

4.7.3 Demolition

Demolition remains the method of last resort when even

changes in use, conversion and rehabilitation can no long-
er meet the more stringent requirements imposed on a
building.
It is no longer standard practice today and in many coun-
tries even illegal simply to demolish a building – often
with the help of unskilled labourers. Experienced special-
ists are needed not only in order to meet environmental
regulations requiring that all materials and parts accumu-
lated in the course of the demolition work be carefully
sorted, but also to judge how the complex supporting
structures will react during the demolition. Within only a
few years, the demolition of a building has ceased to be
a low-tech job and become a highly specialized technical
task.
Specialists often take over when the building has finally
been gutted, i.e. when all interior finishings and installa-
tions have been removed and duly disposed of (recycling)
and when there are no further physiologically harmful
materials in the remaining supporting structure. Either the
building is then dismantled carefully and with as little
noise and dust as possible, the reinforced concrete literally
being “nibbled away” by special machines, or – if the cir-
cumstances permit – explosives experts apply their pre-
cisely primed charges to the predetermined points after
analysing the drawings and inspecting the remaining
building. As spectacular explosions of high-rise buildings
have proved, experienced experts can make a building
collapse in such a way that the surrounding structures
remain undamaged. Less carefully planned explosions,
on the other hand, have caused serious damage to the
surrounding areas.
80 BLASTING OF A HIGH-RISE OFFICE BUILDING
4 Risk potential
In addition to taking into account the existing supporting
structure, it is also important to investigate the effect of
conversions, rehabilitation and demolition work on the ex-
isting supporting structure, neighbouring buildings and
the site environment.
The most appropriate methods are then selected on the
basis of such influencing factors as
– vibrations,
– noise,
– dust,
– site traffic,
– contamination.
The work is preceded by detailed analyses of the existing
structures.
4.7.4 Disposal
As already mentioned in the preceding section, particular
attention must be paid to disposal of the materials accu-
mulated in conjunction with conversions, rehabilitation
measures and demolition jobs. Specific reuse of the ma-
terials will be unavoidable as contaminated materials must
be dumped on special landfills in some regions and land-
fill space for construction rubble becomes scarcer and in-
creasingly more expensive.
The materials must be analysed before starting the work
and classified according to their contamination, suitability
for disposal and reusability.
The primary objective is to reduce the volume of contam-
inated rubble so that it can be decontaminated (if possible),
for instance by washing the soil. If this is not possible, the
material must be dumped on special landfills.
The degree to which the materials can ultimately be sorted
depends on the local regulations and on the landfill capa-
bilities and costs. Separating and sorting the contaminated
materials often entails a great deal of work.
Such reusable materials as concrete, steel and PVC are
sorted, delivered to recycling plants and reprocessed. In
the case of concrete or masonry, this can also be done on
site using mobile plants. The resultant materials (crushed
stone, etc.) can then be used in the construction of a new
high-rise building, thus also reducing the volume of traffic
on site.
Page 126
4.8 Other risks
For the sake of completeness, mention must also be made
of a few other risks which, although closely associated
with high-rise buildings, either occur very rarely, such as
terrorism, are unavoidable, such as wear, or are often un-
derestimated, such as the consequential costs due to phys-
ical damage.
4.8.1 Terrorism
High-rise buildings with their characteristic silhouette in a
city’s skyline not only represent a magnet for tenants,
customers and guests, but unfortunately also become a
popular, sometimes inadvertent, target for terrorist attacks,
as the 1998 bombing attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
show.
A skyscraper’s famous name is enough to assure the ter-
rorists of the desired media attention following an attack.
In many cases, however, the dominant presence of a high-
rise building will suffice to obstruct the devastating shock
waves of an explosion somewhere else.
OFFICE TOWER OF COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE IN
LONDON
Precisely that was the fate of the office tower of Commer-
cial Union in London when a bomb exploded on the even-
ing of Friday, 10th April 1992, in the immediate vicinity of
this newly renovated tower with its completely new facade.
The physical damage sustained by the building amounted
to more than £40m, plus the loss of rental income during
the tower’s restoration. Although there is no effective pro-
tection against such indirect effects of terrorist attacks, the
crisis management set up by CU for such events passed
its first test with flying colours and saved the company
from potentially ruinous loss of business.
After corresponding reports in the national press and
thanks to availability of the complete data in Croydon, the
company was able to resume its business at 9 a.m. on the
following Monday. The problem of such business inter-
ruptions will be discussed in the next section.
WORLD TRADE CENTER IN NEW YORK
The consequences of a car-bomb explosion in the under-
ground car park of New York’s famous World Trade Center
on 26th February 1993 were even more devastating.
Six people were killed in the explosion and more than
1,000 were injured; the explosion caused immense physi-
cal damage estimated at around US$ 500m. The bomb
fortunately exploded around lunchtime when many of the
offices were empty. Around 50,000 people normally work
in the skyscraper and over 80,000 visitors are additionally
recorded every day.
Contrary to the recommendations of experts, there were
no special precautions against such terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center with its 417-m and 415-m-tall twin
towers and the 22-storey Vista Hotel between them. The
emergency power generators and central water supply
were located on the uppermost of the six underground
floors immediately above the parking decks and therefore
Page 127
highly vulnerable, as this underground car park was open
to all users. Three underground railway lines also have
their own stations on two of these parking decks.
When the bomb concealed in a delivery van detonated, it
blasted a hole in the concrete floors of the decks above
and below and left a crater roughly 30 m deep. Numerous
fires broke out on the three levels affected. Caustic smoke
rapidly spread through service and elevator shafts in the
two towers and in the hotel.
FEDERAL BUILDING IN OKLAHOMA
The world was even more deeply shocked by the explosi-
on of a car bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, USA, on the morning of
19th April 1995.
The nine-storey office building accommodated not only
several federal authorities, but also a daycare centre for
young children. The blast killed 168 people and injured
475. The bomb with almost two tonnes of explosive had
been concealed in a small closed pick-up truck parked near
the main entrance to the building. The building was posi-
tively “lifted” by the shock wave from the detonation and
the supporting structure so severely damaged that almost
one-half of every floor collapsed and the glass facade was
sheared off. The people inside the building were buried
under the rubble. Several nearby buildings also suffered
considerable damage and numerous cars caught fire. Win-
dows shattered even at a distance of several kilometres.
Altogether 43 fire brigades and auxiliary organizations,
many of them from other federal states, took part in the
rescue operation which commenced immediately. Many
people were recovered alive from the rubble. The complete
loss was estimated at more than US$ 300m, but the dam-
aged building itself was not insured. It had to be complete-
ly demolished on account of the major damage suffered.
What insights and conclusions can be drawn from these
occurrences? There is naturally no such thing as complete
protection against the inventiveness and fanatical destruc-
tive urge of terrorist attackers. Nevertheless, appropriate
security and fire-protection measures should make it more
difficult for them to achieve their objectives.
One such measure would be total control of all incoming
and outgoing people and vehicles. Thanks to the attentive-
ness of the security personnel, for example, it was pos-
sible to defuse the bomb placed by a terrorist organization
in a delivery van outside the new office tower on London’s
Canary Wharf. If such an attack cannot be prevented, how-
ever, it is extremely important that the emergency plans
and fire-fighting measures already discussed in the pre-
ceding sections be applied and function smoothly.
4.8.2 Impact
The risk of an “impact or crash of a manned flying object
or parts thereof or its cargo” which is normally included in
the insurance cover for buildings, is considered a neces-
sary but rarely claimed insurance element. The number of
losses of this type reported to date is admittedly small, al-
though the media frequently feature such “near misses”.
When an accident of this type does occur, however, it is al-
4 Risk potential
most always a genuine catastrophe, possibly with numer-
ous fatalities and enormous losses.
Two of the most spectacular cases in which an aircraft col-
lided with a high-rise building occurred in New York and
near Amsterdam.
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK CITY
A light fog lay over the city on the morning of Saturday,
28th July 1945. Visibility was no more than 2 miles,
the cloud ceiling had dropped to roughly 500 m. Shortly
before 10 a.m. a B25 bomber of the US Air Force with a
crew of three approached Newark airport, New Jersey, just
a few miles from the centre of Manhattan. The 12-ton
aircraft was scheduled to land at Newark a few minutes
later. At a cruising speed of roughly 320 km/h, the bomber
crossed the East River and Manhattan above 42nd Street.
Witnesses saw the aircraft heading directly towards a
high-rise building on Park Avenue at a height of roughly
2,000 ft. Pedestrians and shoppers saw how the aircraft
just managed to evade this building at roughly the level of
the 22nd floor and then avoided colliding with another
skyscraper on Fifth Avenue. Most of the witnesses
subsequently said that it seemed as if the pilot was
having technical problems. Whether that was indeed the
case is still unknown today.
What is known is that, for whatever reason, the aircraft
could not be pulled up in good time and drilled its way
into the 78th and 79th floors of the Empire State Building
at precisely 9.52 a.m. Fire broke out immediately in the
building. The bomber’s wings broke off first. The fuselage
ripped a 6-m hole into the facade and penetrated more
than 25 m into the building. One engine continued right
through the 79th floor and emerged through the outer
wall on the southern side of the building, from where it
dropped onto the roof of a 12-storey building which also
caught fire. The 800 gallons of kerosene in the tanks ex-
ploded and totally destroyed the western half of the two
floors concerned.
The other engine made its way through an elevator shaft
and ultimately came to rest in a stairwell, blocking this
escape route. The suspensions on several elevators were
destroyed and two cabins crashed 300 m to the bottom
basement floor. By a miracle, two people in the lifts
survived the crash with serious injuries, while 14 people
were killed in the offices directly affected by the explosion
on the 79th floor. The 78th floor was fortunately only used
as a store and there were no further fatalities there.
All in all, the catastrophe could have been even worse.
Hundreds of people would probably have been killed in
the offices and on the surrounding streets on a normal
working day. The physical loss totalled around US$ 1m –
an immense sum in those days and the equivalent of 4%
of the contract price – and it took over a year to repair the
building.
81 INTERIOR OF A HIGH-RISE BUILDING FOLLOWING A BOMB ATTACK
Page 131 4 Risk potential

82 Left: WOODEN PANELS ON A GLASS FACADE DESTROYED BY A CAR-BOMB ATTACK

Top: INTERIOR VIEW OF ONE FLOOR
4 Risk potential
BIJLMERMEER NEAR AMSTERDAM
A Boeing 747-200 F operated by the Israeli airline El Al
with a crew of four and 320 tonnes of freight on board
was on its way from New York to Tel Aviv via Amsterdam
on 4th October 1992. Ten minutes after taking off from
Schipol Airport, the fully laden aircraft had evidently not
gained sufficient height and crashed into the two high-rise
buildings “Groenevenen” and “Kruitberg” in a modern
satellite town near Amsterdam. Both buildings caught fire
within seconds of the crash as a result of the full tanks.
According to official figures, 43 people were killed in add-
ition to the crew; 233 flats were destroyed. Insiders as-
sume, however, that many more people were actually
killed, since these flats were inhabited by numerous immi-
grants and asylum seekers, and not all residents may have
been officially registered.
Not long before the accident, experts at Schipol airport
had considered the risk of an aircraft crashing into this
residential area to be “negligible” – a disastrously false
assessment, as it turned out.
Despite adequate lighting, inclusion in flight maps and
designation of air corridors with sufficient distance, high-
rise buildings will always constitute a certain impact risk if
only on account of their height.
4.8.3 Collapse
The collapse of a building could be considered the “worst
case” for everyone involved in its planning and realization.
The financial consequences for its owner and the expos-
ure risk for the people inside the building and in its vicinity
when it collapses are devastating.
The possible causes are often complex and difficult to as-
certain retrospectively, but risk potential can be identified
and corresponding precautions taken.
The following risks are a potential source of errors during
the planning and construction phases:
– Flawed analysis of the subsoil
– Flawed structural analyses
– Lack of coordination between the parties involved in the
planning and realization (changes which are not taken
into account, etc.)
– Defective work (stripping times, wrong quality of mater-
ials, etc.)
– Incorrect use of the building during the construction
phase (e.g. concentrated storage of materials on floors
not structurally dimensioned for this purpose)
During the occupancy phase, a building may collapse for
the following reasons:
– Structural changes which have not been taken into ac-
count in the structural analysis of the building (e.g. by
adding floors or removing supporting structures)
– Poor maintenance
Evacuation of the people in the building depends very
strongly on the manner in which it collapses. No precau-
tions can be taken against a sudden failure of the support-
ing structure. Cracks in the tension zone of the concrete or
plastic deformation of the steel structure could be detect-
ed if the building is properly serviced. It would then have
to be closed due to the risk of collapsing.
Page 132
The leaning tower of Pisa, on the other hand, shows just
how long it can take for an impending collapse actually to
take place. Due to poor soil conditions, the tower has
leaned over further and further over the centuries, but it
has still not collapsed.
4.8.4 Wear
A high-rise building is exposed to time-dependent influ-
ences during its occupancy period. Ageing processes on
such building parts as windows, joints and seals are influ-
enced in particular by temperature, wind, UV radiation,
moisture, dust and gaseous emissions. They play an im-
portant part in conjunction with plastics and rubber ma-
terials and differ from the corrosion processes primarily
affecting metallic materials. In the majority of cases, cor-
rosion of metallic materials on facades and roofs does
not constitute any form of wear – assuming that mistakes
have not been made in the planning, execution and choice
of materials – but is instead a desired process covering the
metals with a protective layer.
Inside the building itself there are numerous installations,
machines and units, such as pumps, fans, compressors,
elevators and garage doors, the moving parts of which are
subject to wear in accordance with their operating condi-
tions.
Maintenance schedules (for maintenance, inspection and
repair) must be drawn up and observed in order to minim-
ize the probability of losses occurring due to component
wear. Unfortunately, such intentions do not always func-
tion as smoothly as with motor vehicles.
4.9 Loss of profit
The risk potential and examples of losses discussed in the
preceding sections have focused above all on the physical
damage to the building as such, while the considerable
consequential losses following such an occurrence have
only been mentioned in passing. This problem will now be
discussed in more detail here.
CONSTRUCTION PHASE
As already mentioned, the realization of high-rise con-
struction projects requires considerable financial resources
and investments, for which interest and repayment instal-
ments are often already due during the planning phase or
at the latest when the land is purchased. The owner’s pri-
mary aim will be to ensure that the high-rise building is
completed as quickly as possible, not only on account of
the considerable borrowed capital and higher resultant
interest burden, but also in order to make a profit. Every
major loss during the construction phase will consequent-
ly thwart his efforts to achieve this aim and can even
jeopardize his financial survival.
Particularly in the case of high-rise buildings, the investor
will also seek to conclude a large number of contracts with
future tenants or lessees during the construction phase.
Such contracts usually not only govern the tenancy as
such, but also the approval for often expensive interior fin-
ishings tailored specifically to the tenant’s requirements.
83 AIRCRAFT DEBRIS AFTER A PLANE PLOUGHED INTO THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
84 AIRCRAFT CRASH ONTO A
BLOCK OF FLATS IN AMSTERDAM
85 BOMB ATTACK ON A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUILDING IN OKLAHOMA, USA
4 Risk potential
Delayed completion of the building can therefore also
have negative effects on the contracts already concluded,
as well as on the dates agreed between the tenant on the
one hand and tradesmen, suppliers or service-providers
on the other. Innumerable other consequential costs are
also possible, the least of which will be media advertise-
ments publicizing the forthcoming opening of new prem-
ises.
Since these are consequential losses, the best precaution
is to avoid the physical losses leading to such delays in
completion of the construction work. These statements
thus merely serve to underline the measures already out-
lined in the preceding sections with regard to loss preven-
tion.
The possibility of covering some of these consequential
losses through corresponding insurance products will be
discussed later.
OPERATING PHASE
The main financing aspects concerning the construction
phase also apply equally to the operating phase. Regard-
less of whether own or borrowed capital has been invest-
ed, the investor will expect a guaranteed return on his
investment. Even as the property is being let, the owner
will therefore seek to attract solvent tenants guaranteeing
a profit in line with his cost calculations within the frame-
work of a long-term lease. This is particularly true if the
owner has during the construction phase already provided
advance financing for complex interior finishing meeting
the tenant’s wishes.
The owner of a high-rise building will therefore wish to
know what impact a maximum foreseeable physical loss
due to the aforementioned risk potential could have on his
calculated revenues and expenditures:
– How long will it take for the property (offices and busi-
ness premises) to be restored and when can they be
relet?
– Can the property be relet immediately and generate the
calculated revenues or must rents be expected to de-
cline due to the growing supply in the neighbourhood
of the property?
– What is the term of the individually concluded leases?
– What revenues are guaranteed by these leases over
their entire term? Under what conditions could a tenant
rescind the contract completely or insist on a pro rata
reduction in rent due, for example, to a physical loss of
the aforementioned type?
– What is the maximum term to be foreseen by the owner
of a high-rise building, i.e. from occurrence of the phys-
ical loss until the calculated rent revenues are obtained
again; and what losses will he in all probability have to
include in his calculations during this period?
Page 136
Investors and owners are not the only people, however,
whose fate largely depends on the profitability of a high-
rise building and who must precisely identify, appraise
and control their associated risks before considering a
well-conceived insurance.
The following risk potential and other aspects must also
be weighed up by the tenants renting offices and business
space in what is no doubt an attractively located high-rise
building from a strategic business point of view:
– If the tenants have obtained very favourable long-term
leases in the past which, however, can be terminated
prematurely on account of material physical damage to
the building or to the rented furnishings, these tenants
must expect to pay considerably more when renting
comparable business premises if rents have risen sub-
stantially in the meantime.
– Quite apart from the additional rent to be paid for tem-
porary or definitive removal to alternative premises, the
tenants concerned will possibly also have to reckon with
considerable additional costs for all the special meas-
ures required in order (preferably within the scope of
contingency plans) to avoid or at least minimize any
negative effects on the company’s operating and earn-
ings situation. In spite of this, however, it will probably
be impossible to prevent all loss of gross profit between
occurrence of the physical loss and restoration of normal
operating conditions.
The economic environment of the high-rise construction
project must also be taken into account – depending on
the order of magnitude in each instance. It was mentioned
in Section 3.4.2.4 that high-rise buildings could be com-
pared to a “town under one roof”. The World Trade Center
(WTC) in New York (see Section 4.8.1) is an example of
this economic aspect underlining the loss-of-profit risk.
The WTC is made up of seven buildings accommodating
some 1,200 businesses on an area of 7 hectares. The two
office towers are 415 and 417 m high, respectively, and are
linked by a 22-storey hotel complex. With 110 floors, they
provide roughly one million m2 of useful floor space for
various offices, such as investment companies, brokers,
raw commodity markets, customs authorities and televi-
sion companies. A 100-m television mast with various
antennas is mounted atop one of the towers. The second
tower additionally accommodates a switchboard for New
York’s telephone system with, among other things, the
telecommunications for air traffic control at New York’s
three largest airports. Underneath the extensive open-air
plaza are the largest covered shopping promenade in
Manhattan, six department stores and shops, 2,000 park-
ing spaces, two vehicle tunnels and the stations for three
underground railway lines carrying the roughly 50,000
people working in the two towers and the roughly 80,000
visitors recorded every day. Numerous businesses, organ-
izations and a complex infrastructure are consequently
dependent on the smooth functioning of the two towers.
Page 137 4 Risk potential

The magnitude of the direct losses caused by the car

bomb on 23rd February 1993 has already been described
in detail. Both office towers were closed by official order
until further notice.
Due to the surplus of offices available in New York City in
1993, the towers’ owner – the Port Authority Risk Manage-
ment – was naturally anxious to do everything possible as
quickly as possible in order not to lose tenants. Perfect
contingency plans meant that 220 floors were cleaned up
within only 21 days and the towers reopened for use as
offices on 19th and 26th March, respectively.
During this one-month break, the tenants in the towers
had to find alternative premises at considerable expense
and had to finance the temporary furnishings. This was
not always an easy matter in view of the special technical
equipment required in various cases. One Japanese insti-
tute quoted lost revenues in the order of US$ 12m per day,
while another cited a figure of US$ 20m daily.
The absence of the people working in the office towers in-
evitably also led to loss of profit for the other businesses
and organizations in the area and surrounding districts,
particularly the transport corporations and the toll bridges
and tunnels over and under the Hudson River, which sep-
arates New York from New Jersey. In this way, an eco-
nomic loss of roughly US$ 1bn was incurred in a one-
month period.
Particularly when assessing the loss of profit risk, it is im-
portant always to remember that “if anything can go
wrong, it will – at the worst conceivable moment – and
everything always takes longer than expected“.
5 Insurance

5
5.1 Property insurance
5.2 Third-party liability insurance
5.3 Problem of maximum loss
5.4 Underwriting considerations
5.5 Reinsurance
Page 139
Compared with normal building construction, there
are a number of additional risks associated with
the construction and subsequent occupancy of high-
rise buildings which can only be appraised by an
experienced insurer. The project documents provide
an initial overview of these risks.
5 Insurance
GENERAL
The project documents usually only provide information
on the finished building and how it is integrated into the
townscape. Since different methods are often employed
for the construction work, the respective risk potential dur-
ing the construction phase must also be weighed up and
valued by the insurer.
Almost every blueprint of a high-rise building also in-
cludes a series of tailor-made elements, such as facades
or special foundations, with divergent risks which
consequently can be considered a kind of prototype,
at least in part. The effects of such semi-prototypes for
contractors’ all risks insurance must be investigated
separately.
At the end of the planning phase, if not before, the princi-
pal must decide how the risks during the construction
work are to be spread between himself and the contract-
ors. This must already be specified in the tenders. Such
early and precise demarcation of risk between the princi-
pal and the contractors is of great importance, not only for
determination of the premium, but also for subsequent
loss events.
5.1 Property insurance
A distinction must first be made between construction of a
high-rise building (construction or erection) and the sub-
sequent occupancy phase. The first phase will be covered
5 Insurance
by contractors’ all risks insurance, possibly including cover
for construction and erection equipment. The second
phase, however, requires a series of policies covering such
risks as fire, complete or partial collapse (decennial liabil-
ity) and various additional perils (natural hazards, water
damage, glass breakage, etc.).
5.1.1 Contractors’ and erection all risks insurance
Construction work on a high-rise building is normally
covered by contractors’ all risks (CAR) insurance. If cover-
age in accordance with an erection all risks (EAR) policy
is required in certain cases for the interior finishing, in-
cluding installations for air-conditioning, electric and
telecommunications systems, this can be included
in the CAR policy through corresponding extensions of
cover without making it necessary to issue two separate
policies.
A separate EAR policy is only meaningful if a strict distinc-
tion is to be made between the structural works and the
interior finishing on account of different insurance inter-
ests (principal/tenant). Since, however, it is impossible
both physically and chronologically to separate the struc-
tural works from the interior finishing, care must be taken
in this specific case to ensure that the scope of cover is
precisely defined in relation to the concurrent CAR policy.
GENERAL
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the following com-
ments apply equally to the cover granted under a CAR and
5 Insurance
an EAR policy. Both policies cover the construction or
erection work specified in the Schedule against unfore-
seen and sudden physical losses of every kind.
POLICYHOLDER
The interests of all parties involved in the construction
work are normally insured by the principal. The group of
insured persons or companies is therefore very large; both
the principal and the general contractor are policyholders
in a CAR/EAR policy, although all subcontractors are also
covered. These are often specialists, particularly in high-
rise construction. This explains why the general contractor
is not the only party of interest to the insurer, for the spe-
cial jobs undertaken by subcontractors can frequently rep-
resent a greater risk. Here, too, the general contractor is
liable as contractor to the principal. It is therefore essential
to obtain full information on the work of these specialized
companies as well, in order to appraise the physical and
moral hazard.
If – in deviation of the norm – only the contractor takes
out CAR/EAR insurance to safeguard his own interests,
then the contractual agreements reached between
principal and contractor must be reviewed in order to as-
sess the risk to be borne by the insurer. The risk for losses
due to force majeure will normally pass partly or entirely
to the principal. This reduces the risk to the contractor’s
insurer.
FORM OF COVER
It concerns all-risks coverage, i.e. every cause of loss is
covered unless explicitly excluded. This naturally means
that the insurer must take account, in particular, of the
risks from ground and soil and the exposure due to nat-
ural hazards, especially windstorm and flooding. The terms
of insurance must be clear. In very rare cases, it may be
necessary to introduce a limit of indemnity for losses due
to natural hazards, such as earthquakes. This may be ne-
cessitated by inadequate capacities or uncertainties when
estimating the possible maximum loss.
SUM INSURED
Particular expertise is required of the insurer when deter-
mining the sum insured. As a rule, the approximate con-
tract value at the beginning of the insurance term can
serve as a provisional sum insured and is used as the
basis for calculation of the premium. However, the con-
tract value must be regularly reviewed by the insured to
take account of inflationary price rises or higher sums
due to supplementary contracts during the construction
period, and this sum insured must then be adjusted cor-
respondingly in the policy. The sum insured can also be
increased by a safety margin in order to avoid the danger
of underinsurance. If this margin exceeds the actual sum
insured upon completion of the construction work, the
insured is granted a corresponding premium refund. In
all cases, however, the total sum insured is equal to the
maximum indemnification for all claims payments. On the
other hand, it is not advisable to wait until the end of the
construction phase before adjusting the sum insured, as
experience has shown that the policyholder’s interest in
Page 140
exact documentation of the final sum insured declines
after conclusion of the construction work.
PERIOD OF COVER
Insurance cover is provided until the policy expires or until
the construction work is finally accepted by the principal
or until the building is taken into service or used, if this
occurs before expiry of the policy. However, there are ex-
ceptions, particularly in this context and especially if com-
pleted floors are let earlier in order to earn income from
rentals or sales proceeds as soon as possible. In such
cases, a clear distinction must be made between the cover
defined for the CAR policy and that of the subsequent
insurance for the building. In spite of all efforts to boost
efficiency, construction work usually continues over sev-
eral years, with the result that during risk assessment the
construction schedule should be consulted in order to in-
clude seasonal hazards, such as monsoon rains or autumn
gales.
Extensive preparatory work (routing of supply lines, erec-
tion of the retaining walls, excavation and water manage-
ment) is necessary before work on the high-rise building
actually starts. Insurance cover is also required for this
preparatory work, since losses can arise even in this phase
of construction.
A so-called maintenance agreement is often concluded
between the principal and the contractor for the period
after completion of the construction work. Under these
agreements, the contractor is obliged to remedy any
defects occurring in the building during the term of the
maintenance agreement (usually 12 months). Two types of
insurance cover can be granted for property losses in this
period:
– Insurance of physical losses following maintenance
work (Clause 003: Maintenance visits), or
– In addition to the aforementioned cover, insurance of
physical losses occurring during the maintenance period
but caused by an event originating in the construction
phase (Clause 004: Extended maintenance).
LOSS ADJUSTMENT
In cases of physical damage to the insured contract works,
the insurer will indemnify the necessary costs incurred for
restoring or replacing the damaged contract works. The
repair costs will sometimes be higher than the original
expenditure up to occurrence of the loss. However, if the
cost types are the same as those included in the sum in-
sured, they will be indemnified in full. This is not the case
with costs which are first incurred during repairs (e.g. re-
moving damaged parts in order to carry out repairs). The
policies recommended by Munich Re include such costs
only if this has been specifically agreed and a first-loss
sum provided for this purpose.
This procedure should be applied above all to cleanup
costs (removal of debris) and loss-locating costs. In both
cases, the duty to indemnify depends on whether or not
expenditure was incurred in conjunction with an indemni-
fiable loss. We believe that this procedure allows insurers
to assess their liabilities more accurately. And it is also in
the interests of the policyholder, who can then decide on
Page 141
the amount of cover required in view of the potentially
very high “additional loss costs”. The same also applies to
indemnification of additional planning costs which may be
incurred due to repairs if the original planning costs were
not included in the stipulated sum insured or if new plans
are required on account of the circumstances surrounding
the loss. Only those costs will be indemnified which are
necessarily incurred in order to restore the building to the
same technical condition as immediately before occurrence
of the loss. However, if the original condition is improved
or changed as a result of the repair, this also means that
any costs associated with such improvement or change
will not be indemnifiable. The same applies if other, more
complex methods are used for the repairs; they, too, are
only indemnifiable to the extent that they were included
in the original sum insured. The agreed deductible must
in all cases be taken into consideration in the calculated
amount of indemnity.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Assessment of the physical hazard by insurers should be
based on the same considerations as those underlying the
choice of a certain construction method. In addition, how-
ever, they must also consider, for example, whether a cer-
tain method or material was perhaps only selected in
order to save time or money. The insurers must then
determine whether, in the light of known risk factors, a
higher risk of physical damage was knowingly accepted by
the principal or contractor as a result of this choice.
Assessment of the moral hazard always begins with the
planning process. The manner in which the planning has
been organized must be reviewed; for instance, to deter-
mine whether principals assign the planning and super-
vision of the construction work to their own office or
whether they retain various engineering offices for this
purpose. The question whether planning and execution
were done under time pressure and whether the schedule
allowed for adequate time buffers can also be of decisive
importance. Last but not least, the contractors’ experience
on similar high-rise construction projects, and particularly
the quality of the contractors’ construction or erection per-
sonnel, can also be of great importance when assessing
the moral hazard.
EXTENDED COVERS
The CAR policy can be suitably extended with the aid
of various other standard clauses, including those applic-
able to EAR insurance, in order to provide sufficiently
comprehensive cover for the erection work concerned.
The following most commonly used clauses provide
extended cover for political risks (Clause 001), cross
liability (002), extended maintenance (004), overtime (006),
airfreight (007), fire-fighting facilities (112) and designer’s
risk (115).
5 Insurance
5.1.2 Advance loss of profit insurance
The large proportion of borrowed capital required to fi-
nance high-rise construction projects has made principals
increasingly aware that conventional property policies will
only cover a limited part of the overall loss, but not the
loss of operating profit or standing charges due to delayed
commissioning or occupancy following a loss.
Even such additional agreements as contractual penalties
or liquidated damages provide only inadequate relief here.
For this reason, the existing CAR (EAR) policy can be ex-
tended by means of an ALOP cover. The purpose of this
extension of cover is to insure the principal’s financial
losses due to delayed commissioning or occupancy fol-
lowing an indemnifiable CAR loss during the construction
phase.
FORM OF COVER
ALOP risks are written in line with Section III in the
Schedule to the standard policy for property cover. If the
property policy provides for a very large scope of cover,
this may have to be reduced to take account of the ALOP
cover. This applies particularly to the exclusion of losses
following delayed completion of the construction work as
a result of earthquakes.
Stand-alone ALOP covers without property insurance
should as a rule be declined because, when it comes to
adjusting property losses, the necessary information is
lacking and there is no way to influence the adjustment
process.
POLICYHOLDER
Since ALOP covers exclusively protect interests of the
principal, the latter should be the sole beneficiary. In order
to ensure that they are able to exert their full influence in
the event of a loss, however, both the principal and the
contractor should be named as policyholders in the basic
policy cover.
Contractors on the other hand cannot obtain ALOP cover
to insure their consequential losses – above and beyond
the property losses covered by Section I of the CAR policy
– such as penalties, interest due on withheld warranty
sums and other “soft costs”.
Banks should also be excluded as policyholders, since
their interests should be regulated in the financing agree-
ments concluded with the principal, independent of the
terms and conditions of insurance.
A special situation only arises in conjunction with the in-
creasingly widespread “build-operate-transfer” (BOT)
projects where principal and contractor act together and
therefore are joint usufructuaries of the building following
its completion. In such a case, they are both named policy-
holders under the ALOP cover, but with due regard to the
possibility of a higher moral hazard.
5 Insurance
SUM INSURED
The sum insured is normally equal to the gross annual
profit, i.e. projected fixed costs and operating profit for the
high-rise building. This gross profit is determined by de-
ducting the variable costs from the sales or profit. Insur-
ance is not required for these variable costs (e.g. cost of
electricity, water, personnel), since they are not yet in-
curred when the delay occurs.
However, the principal’s possible losses are not limited
solely to the lost profit from letting or leasing the
high-rise building. The following can therefore also be
insured:
– “Ongoing rent costs” if the policyholder must pay rent
for continued occupancy of other business premises
when completion of the new high-rise building is
delayed, since he or his tenants cannot move into the
new premises on schedule.
– “Ongoing interest charges” incurred by the principal if
he cannot sell the building at the planned time and
must repay the loans taken out to finance construction
of the building or if the interest due cannot be paid at
the planned time out of income from rental or leasing.
– “Additional costs” if the loss of profit can be avoided
or reduced in this way, for instance by purchasing
outside electricity, renting flats, office or computer
capacities.
Loss-minimization expenditure will also be indemnified up
to the value of the indemnifiable loss of profit which has
been avoided in this way.
If the agreed period of indemnity exceeds one year, the
projected sum insured for the entire indemnity period
must also be specified in addition to the one-year sum
insured.
PERIOD OF INDEMNITY
The maximum period of indemnity to be specified in the
policy should be sufficient to allow damaged or destroyed
parts of the building to be repaired or replaced. Due to the
difficulties often encountered in removing rubble and in
obtaining new licences, this can easily result in indemnity
periods considerably longer than the originally planned
construction period.
EXCESS
Time excess is always preferable to monetary excess with
this form of cover and should be equal to at least four
weeks per twelve months of construction time. In view of
the long time required for the construction of high-rise
buildings, this results in a highly desirable time excess of
several months.
Page 142
The policy recommended by Munich Re for this cover pro-
vides for a one-off application of the time excess, since
numerous cases of physical damage during the construc-
tion period will ultimately delay commissioning of the
high-rise building, thus resulting in only one ALOP loss
during the agreed indemnity period.
CLAIMS HANDLING
The handling of claims, i.e. determination of the indemnifi-
able period of delay in completing the building and the
resultant loss of profit is normally complex and time-con-
suming. For this reason, progress should be verified at
regular intervals during the construction phase, so that
loss-related delays can be distinguished from those un-
related to losses and so that their impact on the original
completion date can be traced.
So-called one-off costs cannot be insured, i.e. sums which
are due for payment or which are lost in full on a fixed
date, such as tax benefits, seasonal business, lost orders
and licences.
5.1.3 Insurance of contractors’ plant and machinery
Construction plant and machinery can be insured under
the CAR policy, through Clause 202 in the EAR policy or in
a completely separate contractors’ plant and machinery in-
surance. The scope of cover is the same in all three cases.
Basically, this concerns machinery insurance for contract-
ors and is limited to external causes of loss. In other
words, the insurance does not cover losses due to internal
mechanical or electrical problems.
In high-rise construction, such machinery and plant is re-
quired above all for the retaining walls, foundation struc-
tures and excavation. Cranes are used for construction of
the high-rise building as such. However, care should be
taken to ensure that all the plant and machinery is insured
and not just such highly exposed plant as cranes and scaf-
folding. The sum insured should correspond to the re-
placement value of the insured machinery and plant, since
this is the only value that can be objectively determined;
in the case of partial losses – which make up the bulk of
all losses – the repair costs can then be indemnified new-
for-old without deduction. It is only with the much less
common total losses that the amount of indemnity is
limited to the current value.
Experience has shown that numerous individual losses
must be expected in particular when insuring contractors’
plant and machinery. Appropriate deductibles can there-
fore reduce not only the claims burden, but also claims-
handling costs, while at the same time creating an incen-
tive for the policyholder to prevent losses and ensure the
orderly organization of construction work.
86 HEAVY PLANT IN USE DURING FOUNDATION WORK
5 Insurance
5.1.4 Decennial liability insurance
This special form of cover for buildings originated in
France. In accordance with the Napoleonic Code, all build-
ings are insured against total or partial collapse for a
period of ten years (hence the term “decennial”) following
their completion, provided that the loss is attributable to a
defect or fault in the performance of one of the parties
involved in construction during the construction phase.
This form of long-term cover has only become established
in a few markets and is normally limited to buildings,
including high-rise buildings. The scope of cover varies.
The commonest extended cover includes leaks in under-
ground levels, facades and the roof, which can prove
problematical due to the frequently unknown long-term
performance of seals and the highly complex, cost-inten-
sive repairs.
A distinction is made between countries, such as France,
in which this cover is obligatory and markets which only
offer this form of cover in isolated cases.
Technical inspection of the construction work by an inde-
pendent inspection agency or engineering office is nor-
mally essential before decennial liability cover can be
granted. The availability of such cover is dependent on
this agency or office having submitted a satisfactory final
report stating that it has no reservations as regards the
stability of the high-rise building.
The principal is the insured party and also beneficiary in
the event of a loss. However, the insurer can also seek
recourse from contractors, subcontractors and suppliers
if they can be held liable for the loss.
Due to the long period of liability, insurers must make ade-
quate provisions with regard to administration and when
carrying forward reserves.
5.1.5 Insurance of buildings, fire insurance
For property insurers, insurance of high-rise buildings
is nothing unusual in terms of designing the policy. As in
the case of “normal” buildings, the policy is designed
along the lines of industrial or commercial insurance for
buildings and sometimes also of insurance for residential
buildings.
A distinction is merely made between two essential forms
of cover:
NAMED-PERILS COVER
The model of named-perils cover is derived from the basic
perils of fire, lightning strikes, explosions and crashes by
manned flying objects or parts thereof or of their cargo.
This form of cover allows the insurer a very good over-
view of the perils to be covered and ensures the trans-
parency necessary for fixing prices.
Page 144
This basic cover is normally extended accordingly with
additional inclusions in line with individual requirements,
such as
– natural hazards: earthquakes, floods, windstorm, land-
slides, hail, volcanic activity, snow pressure, avalanches;
– political risks: strikes, riots and civil commotion, sabo-
tage, possibly terrorism;
– other perils: impact of vehicles, water damage, sprinkler
leaks, glass breakage, malicious damage, graffiti.
ALL-RISKS POLICIES
Policyholders in a number of markets are increasingly de-
manding all-risks policies for high-rise buildings as well.
This form of cover includes all of the risks under one pol-
icy which are not explicitly excluded.
Although these policies offer the policyholder extensive
insurance cover, they must be examined with particular
care by the underwriter. Calculation of the premiums is no
longer transparent in these cases, since the extensive
scope of cover may tend to “veil” the insured perils.
A distinction must also be made from one country to the
next with regard to the scope of liability. Such political
risks as terrorism and sabotage, for instance, may be in-
cluded in an all-risks policy without additional premium in
some countries, but excluded from the standard cover in
others on account of local claims experience.
Inclusions from non-property classes, such as third-party
liability and machinery breakdown insurance, are also in-
creasingly to be found in all-risks covers.
The owner of a high-rise building and its users or tenants
are frequently separate and distinct legal entities with dif-
ferent policyholders, i.e. the owner for the building as
such and the tenant for its contents and furnishings. For
the insurer, this may result in exposure to accumulation,
which must be taken into account accordingly. Depending
on the purpose for which the building is used by its ten-
ants, e.g. offices, computer centre, flats, hotels, possibly
also commercial businesses (multi-occupancy building),
the loss exposure can be quite substantial.
In conclusion, from the insurer’s point of view high-rise
buildings are exposed to the same risks as other residen-
tial and/or office buildings as far as the scope of cover is
concerned; for this reason, they are not different from
other risk groups with regard to insurability. Only the spe-
cial characteristics of certain risk situations have a limited
influence on pricing (see PML, loss prevention). The pos-
sibility of accumulation must be taken into account, how-
ever, when the building and its contents are insured separ-
ately.
The policyholder’s primary interest is to obtain the most
extensive insurance cover possible in return for a premium
commensurate with the risk.
Page 145
5.1.6 Loss of profit insurance
Standard covers or customized insurance (on request)
are offered for the loss of profit risks mentioned in
Section 4.9.
5.1.6.1 Loss of rent
The high-rise building owner’s interest in steady income
from rent is normally protected through loss-of-rent insur-
ance. In accordance with the applicable General Terms
and Conditions of Insurance (ABM 89), insurers in Ger-
many will indemnify the insured loss of rent for the build-
ing specified in the insurance contract, as well as for other
parts of the property which have been destroyed or dam-
aged by specified perils. Where rented property has been
destroyed or damaged, tenants are entitled by law or
under the lease to refuse payment of part or all of the rent.
The value insured is normally equal to the value of one
year’s rent and the sum of ongoing ancillary costs for a
period of one year.
The loss of rent will be indemnified, at most, until the
premises are reusable, regardless of official restrictions on
restoration. If the tenancy ends on account of the damage
and if the premises cannot be relet when restored even if
due care and diligence have been exercised, then the loss
of rent will be indemnified after this time until the prem-
ises have been relet, but at most for three months. Unless
otherwise agreed, loss of rent is indemnified for a max-
imum of twelve months as from occurrence of the insured
event.
On Anglo-Saxon markets loss of rent can generally be
covered as a supplementary item under insurance of
buildings. However, coverage ends when the rooms are
finally restored, i.e. reusable, regardless of any further
loss of rent until a new tenant can be found.
In such cases, the owners of high-rise buildings of the
type described here are advised to take out loss of profit
insurance corresponding precisely with the terms of the
lease. This applies in particular to the period of indemnity
until the entire establishment has been economically re-
habilitated; agreements with terms of up to ten years are
therefore entirely possible. Another advantage of loss of
profit insurance is that it covers all additional costs, inso-
far as they actually reduce the threatened loss of rent.
Such costs include, for example, additional expenditure
for short-term emergency repairs, overtime for contract-
ors’ employees and other trades, as well as special ad-
vertising measures taken to find new tenants.
5 Insurance
5.1.6.2 Additional costs
On the other hand, it is also perfectly possible that if a
business is favourably and strategically located in the
high-rise building, the tenants may have decided on a
long-term investment by concluding a lease over several
years in order to protect their interests. The following
circumstances may have to be taken into account:
– The rental value of the premises at the time of the loss,
and probably throughout the remaining term of the
lease, is appreciably higher than the rent actually paid,
with the result that the tenant must expect to pay more
in order to rent comparable premises elsewhere.
– Advance payments of the rent which have not yet been
amortized and which, under the terms of the lease, need
not be refunded in the event of a loss.
– Improvements in the value of permanent fixtures and
fittings which have been financed by the tenant, but
which have not yet been amortized and which, accord-
ing to statutory regulations, he cannot remove when
vacating the premises following a loss.
– Under the terms of the lease, the tenant is obliged to
continue payment of all or part of the rent although the
premises cannot be used on account of the loss.
American insurers offer “leasehold interest coverage” to
cover such eventualities. European insurers offering loss
of profit insurance will indemnify the additional costs in-
curred to minimize the impending insured loss.
5.1.6.3 Contingency planning
The more exposed a skyscraper’s position as a regional
attraction and the more special the fixtures and fittings in
the rented premises, the greater the business-interruption
risk, for it will probably be very difficult and exceedingly
expensive to relocate business operations to suitable alter-
native premises.
The survival of a company may often depend on detailed
and regular reviews to assess the feasibility of such con-
tingency plans which would be triggered by a potentially
catastrophic loss.
Although loss of profit insurance can indemnify financial
expenditure for a calculated period of time, it cannot
compensate for the loss of contact with key customers,
a situation which could easily be averted by adequate
contingency planning. The results of such perfect planning
were demonstrated following the bomb attacks on the
Commercial Union building in London on 10th April 1992
and the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993.
5.1.6.4 Prevention of access
Loss of profit insurance (business interruption, additional
costs, etc.) can be extended to cover other risks, including
the risk of a company being dependent on external oper-
ations, institutions and special circumstances.
Physical damage on the underground levels (garages) or
approach roads to a high-rise building due to fire, explo-
sion, earthquake or flooding can lead to at least temporary
closure of the entire building complex. Although the
Page 147
offices, shops, etc., have not suffered any property loss
as such, they can expect profits to be affected in different
ways – unless they have appropriate insurance (preven-
tion-of-access insurance). American standard policies
permit claims for damages for up to two weeks in such
cases.
5.2 Third-party liability insurance
As can be seen from what has been said so far, third-party
liability risks are also to be expected during the construc-
tion of high-rise buildings.
A distinction must be made between liability risks during
planning and construction and those during occupancy of
the high-rise building. The product liability risk of the
manufacturers of the individual construction elements will
not be discussed further here.
The high technical requirements to which engineers and
contractors are subject in the construction of a high-rise
building naturally also pose a special challenge for the
liability insurer in terms of recording, assessing and
underwriting such risks.
5.2.1 Insurance of the designer’s risk
A planning engineer or office can obtain professional in-
demnity insurance to cover the liability risks associated
with planning and site management.
In the case of larger projects, a customized property policy
is advisable with correspondingly higher limits of indem-
nity which should also be available separately, instead of
an annual policy for twelve consecutive months.
SCOPE OF COVER
The scope of cover under professional indemnity insur-
ance for civil engineers basically corresponds to the
generally applicable professional indemnity insurance for
architects and construction engineers.
Insurance cover is provided for all statutory claims for
damages from errors and omissions by the insured in the
discharge of his precisely defined responsibilities.
The geological conditions on site play an important part
on account of the considerable load concentrations. If soil
analyses are performed by the designing engineer himself
or if he is contractually responsible for selecting, employ-
ing and possibly supervising a geologist, then he may be
liable for the consequences of inadequate soil analyses as
well as for incorrect soil analyses during the planning
phase.
The most important scope of cover relates to the so-called
object loss, i.e. loss or damage to the high-rise building as
such, insofar as such loss or damage is attributable to an
error for which the planner is responsible. However, object
87 DANGEROUS WORKPLACE
5 Insurance
losses should only be included if the designer and site
manager have no interests in the widest possible sense in
the delivery, erection and execution of the work. Such in-
dependence is only feasible with freelance engineering of-
fices which have no financial or personnel links to the con-
tracting companies and suppliers. Only then is it possible
to distinguish between a claim for damages based on fault
on the one hand and a claim for performance and war-
ranty, which is not covered by the liability policy, on the
other. This condition is not met, for example, by engineer-
ing offices which act as general contractor. In such cases,
the liability policy should be limited to the second essen-
tial scope of cover, namely third-party losses (bodily injury
and physical losses). The term of the object policy general-
ly covers the planning and construction phase up to final
acceptance of the construction work with a period of sec-
ondary liability of between two and five years as agreed.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Every high-rise building could be considered a prototype
on account of such different parameters as location,
height, intended use, choice of materials and natural haz-
ards. Particularly high standards are therefore imposed
with regard to the skill and experience of the planning en-
gineer. Technical know-how is also required of the liability
insurer so that these difficult planning risks can be as-
sessed and rated. The following criteria in particular must
be taken into account when assessing the risk:
– Qualifications and experience of the policyholder
– Number of partners and number of engineers involved
in the project
– Total fees
– Contract price
– Responsibilities and liabilities accepted
– Construction method applied (Does it reflect the latest
scientific and technical findings? Have any comparable
projects already been completed?)
– Particular geological conditions, groundwater conditions
and natural hazards to be taken into account in the plan-
ning (earthquakes, wind, possibly floods)
– Surrounding area (e.g. closely built-up city centres, pub-
lic roads: damage due to falling parts)
– Planning period
– Particular circumstances aggravating the risk (e.g. use of
new materials, facade elements)
– Effect of construction work on the neighbourhood
(shadows, poor television reception, noise)
5.2.2 Insurance of the construction risk
The specific liability risk of the contractor responsible for
construction of a high-rise building lies firstly in the risk of
injury to his own employees (employers’ liability). This
particular risk of bodily injury is due to the fact that the
workers often have to work at dizzying heights and if a fire
breaks out in the high-rise building, the number of casual-
ties and fatalities is likely to be very high.
5 Insurance
Secondly, the risks depend on the location of the high-rise
building, as it will normally be located in a city centre,
with dense traffic and narrow streets. Falling parts or
crashing scaffolding and cranes can cause physical dam-
age to nearby main traffic arteries (urban motorway,
tramways, railway lines) or to adjacent buildings, as well
as bodily injury to road/rail users and local residents.
Interruptions to traffic can lead to consequential finan-
cial losses. This highlights the particular risk of a major
loss during the construction phase of a high-rise build-
ing.
Moreover, the extensive foundation work and construction
of the underground levels make it necessary to excavate
deep pits, which often reach below the groundwater table.
Depending on the type of retaining wall used, it may also
be necessary to lower the groundwater table. The risk of
subsidence, ground motion and even shear failures result-
ing from such work must be assessed with particular care
due to the risk of major losses.
SCOPE OF COVER
The normal limits of indemnity are usually insufficient for
such major projects or particularly exposed risks. Two al-
ternatives can be chosen in such cases: either the limit of
indemnity in the annual policy is increased for the particu-
lar object in return for a correspondingly higher premium
or separate liability insurance is concluded, tailored to the
individual project in question. For the insured, the latter al-
ternative has the advantage that this limit of indemnity is
available exclusively for this one project, thus eliminating
the risk of limits in the annual policy being exhausted by
losses on other projects.
However, there is also another possible variation: high-rise
construction involves not only the general contractor, but
also numerous other contractors (main and ancillary con-
struction trades). In order to obtain uniform and adequate
insurance cover for all contractors, large or small, it is
standard practice for all companies to agree on a single
policy with a uniform limit of indemnity.
The policyholder is frequently the principal who takes out
the policy on behalf of the contractors (third-party ac-
count); the latter are then deemed to be insured persons.
From the insurance point of view, they are treated as if
they each had their own policy. However, it is also stand-
ard practice to agree that the individual companies must
take out their own liability insurance with certain minimum
limits and that this liability insurance takes precedence
over the joint project policy. The project policy thus takes
the form of a surplus cover.
The principal’s risk can also be included from the outset.
Cover is occasionally also extended to include the risk of
independent planners (property loss and third-party liabil-
ity), albeit usually with considerably lower indemnity
limits and, analogous to the procedure outlined above
for the contracting companies, only subsidiary to higher-
ranking basic covers.
Page 148
What are the problems associated with an insurance
solution employing a common project policy for all con-
tractors involved in the construction work? Since the prin-
cipal is the policyholder and some of the principal’s claims
against contractors/designers are also included in the
insurance, this means that there is – at least formally –
a certain degree of cover for first-party losses. In practice,
however, the problem is mitigated by the surplus function
in that claims for damages are first examined and, where
justified, also settled by the insurers of the mutually inde-
pendent basic covers. Indemnity under the project policy
would only kick in thereafter.
CAR or EAR policies include the possibility of insuring
the third-party liability risk of all contractors involved in
the construction work under Section II. In both policies,
however, the indemnity limits of the third-party liability in-
surance section are subject to certain limitations. An add-
itional third-party liability policy known as the contractors’
excess liability (CEL) policy can be concluded if higher in-
demnity limits are desired, as may be assumed for high-
rise construction, for instance on account of the particular-
ly exposed nature of the risk.
RISK ASSESSMENT
When assessing the risk, it is important to appraise the
potential degree of bodily injury losses within the frame-
work of employers’ liability and particularly the possible
third-party losses to the direct surrounding area as a
result of falling parts, tools or even partial collapse of the
high-rise building. Damage to adjacent buildings as a re-
sult of lowering the groundwater table or damage due to
ground motion as a result of piledriving, underpinning
and driving underpasses can often prove more expensive.
The following aspects must be taken into account in par-
ticular:
– Contract price
– Number of site employees and total payroll
– Responsibilities and liability accepted
– Construction methods and schedule
– Location, surrounding area, neighbourhood
– Particular geological conditions
– Lowering of the groundwater table, blasting, underpin-
ning, driving underpasses
– Contractor’s experience
– Construction period, maintenance period, period of
secondary liability
5.2.3 Insurance of the operational risk
When the construction work is complete and the high-rise
building has finally been taken into service, it is taken over
by the operator or principal, who is consequently respon-
sible for all losses suffered by third parties through the
operation of the high-rise building. This operational risk
would be covered by the usual insurance for homeowners
and property owners: it protects the owner in his capacity
as owner and lessor of the high-rise building.
Page 149
The main risk lies inside the building, particularly if it is
open to the public. The most commonly occurring losses
will be personal accidents on improperly serviced stairs or
elevators and bodily injury due to falling objects. However,
the owner is only liable for causes within his sphere of re-
sponsibility. These include regular servicing and mainten-
ance of elevators, safety and control facilities, as well as
compliance with statutory regulations or official require-
ments (e.g. fire protection). For this reason, the relevant
maintenance, safety and fire-protection schedules, as well
as fire procedures should be inspected by the insurer
when underwriting a third-party liability policy for the
owner and lessor of a high-rise building.
The premium is normally calculated on the basis of the
gross annual rent value, i.e. the total income from rent.
5.3 Problem of maximum loss
Due to the high concentration of values, the probable
maximum loss (PML) must be estimated separately for
each of the risk phases, also in the case of a high-rise
building.
5.3.1 Construction phase
As is usual for all major projects, the PML estimate should
be based on a separate assessment of the risk. In the case
of high-rise buildings, fire will normally be considered a
peril relevant to the risk and therefore form the basis for
the PML estimate.
The measures required for active and passive fire protec-
tion should not lead to any reduction in the PML, since
some of these measures only become fully effective when
the building is finished.
This explains why fixed percentages are not specified
here; at best, a deduction for the often extensive and ex-
pensive foundation measures can be justified when as-
sessing the parts at risk, since these foundation measures
are not exposed to fire.
Depending on local conditions, exposure to windstorm,
earthquakes and natural hazards may also be of relevance
for the PML estimate during the construction phase.
5.3.2 Decennial liability insurance
The same considerations basically also apply to decennial
liability insurance, except that here fire is replaced by the
fairly rare risk of collapse. With major projects, it may
also be advisable in view of the limited capacity available
worldwide to introduce a limit of indemnity in order to
facilitate placement of the risk.
5 Insurance
5.3.3 Operating phase
From an underwriting point of view, the fire PML is the
most important element during operation of a high-rise
building. The PML for a given risk refers to the probable
maximum loss which must be expected if the event oc-
curs, with due regard to the conditions surrounding the
risk and based on conservative estimates.
When estimating the PML of “normal” risks, we base our
assessments on complexes, but this is not possible in the
case of high-rise buildings, as they usually comprise only
one complex. What is important, however, is that we –
unlike many other companies – do not take account of the
existing fire-protection facilities and precautions in our
PML estimate. The following are disregarded in particular:
– Manual and automatic fire detection systems
– Fire-extinguishing equipment, such as wall hydrants,
sprinkler systems, CO2 or inert-gas fire-extinguishing
equipment
– Efficiency of the fire brigade
These points are not considered to be factors which re-
duce the PML because they occasionally fail when the in-
sured event occurs. Structural fire-protection measures,
such as fire-resistant construction practice, fire-resistant
sealing and fire compartments (see Section 4.2.4.2),
on the other hand, can be considered as PML-reducing
factors.
Experience has shown that the total loss of a high-rise
building is highly improbable, so that an assumed PML of
100% should remain the exception. Although fires result-
ing in total demolition of the high-rise building are known
to have occurred (see Section 4.2.3), this was essentially
due to other reasons and not primarily to the impossibility
of repair. Moreover, the total sum insured was not paid as
indemnification in these cases.
On the other hand, we do not believe that it is right to
specify flat-rate percentages of the sum insured as the
PML for high-rise buildings, nor to define a certain number
of floors as determining the PML, as is sometimes done.
We believe that an individual approach is required which
takes into account the following criteria:
– Form of the building
– Construction practice
– Internal layout
– Facade design
High-rise buildings are frequently erected on a podium
with one or more levels. When estimating the PML, it is
important to establish whether a fire breaking out in the
podium can spread to the rest of building or whether this
is prevented by protected fire-resistant separations. Three
forms of building must be taken into account here:
– small dot-like layout/towering building,
– flat slice-like building (length of the building equals at
least three times its width),
– large sprawling layout (base area in square metres
equals at least 50 times the height of the building in
metres).
88 WORLD TRADE CENTER, NEW YORK
5 Insurance
The probability that entire floors will be gutted by fire is
highest in the case of the first group of buildings.
With the second group, subdivision into fire compart-
ments is more likely, if only on account of statutory re-
quirements with regard to the length of rescue routes. If
the partition walls have been correctly designed and di-
mensioned, a lower percentage loss may therefore be
assumed per floor.
An even larger number of fire compartments is to be ex-
pected with the third group of buildings, and this should
reduce the loss per floor still further. Going purely by the
form of the building, the percentage PML must be highest
in the first and lowest in the third group.
Regardless of the form of the building, the combustibility
of the materials used and the fire-resistance period of the
parts must also be considered. The characteristics of the
supporting structure and of floors as well as the fire-resist-
ant elements protecting the openings to stairwells and ele-
vator or service shafts are important in this respect. The
facade design is a very important factor for vertical propa-
gation of the fire and consequently for the PML. A fire
must be expected to spread from one floor to the next if
the window glazing is not fire-resistant and if the flashover
distance between the windows on consecutive floors is
too short.
The risk of fire spreading is even more serious if the build-
ing includes an atrium, since the resultant chimney effect
also has to be considered.
When estimating the PML, it is useful to consider the
building’s supporting structure and its finishings separate-
ly. The finishing work must be taken to include all non-
bearing inner and outer walls including panelling, all
building service installations and elevators, all doors, win-
dows, floor coverings and ceilings.
In the past, it was common to do a 50:50 split on support-
ing structure and finishings, but this ratio has now
changed to 30:70 on account of the more complex build-
ing services and more extensive wiring in modern build-
ings. Experience has shown that considerably less than
50% of the supporting structure of a high-rise building will
be damaged by fire, depending on its type, particularly
as regards its fire resistance. In the case of the finishings,
on the other hand, the loss must be expected to be in the
region of 40–100% due, among other things, to damage
caused by smoke and fire-fighting water.
The highest percentage losses are suffered by the support-
ing structure and finishings in the first group of buildings
and the lowest by those of the third group. What has been
said above must be considered one possible approach for
estimating the PML and not as an algorithm, since numer-
ous different criteria must be taken into account separately
in each case.
In addition, such covered items as cleanup and demolition
costs, increased costs of working due to conditions im-
posed by the authorities and price rises during the restor-
ation period, must be added to the PML. These are normal-
ly first-loss risk items which should be included 100%.
Page 152
So far, we have only considered the building as such. Its
contents are normally insured separately, the policyhold-
ers usually being the building’s users or tenants. If the
building is insured together with its contents, the PML for
the contents must be taken as a cumulative figure when
estimating the PML. Contents require similar consideration
to interior finishings. Once again, special attention must
be paid to “multi-occupancy buildings” (see Section 5.1.5).
How appropriate is it to specify a terrorism PML for high-
rise buildings? In our point of view, there is little point in
specifying such a PML, as we would not like to consider
terrorism a “probable” event. Moreover, it is impossible to
give any precise estimate of a loss due to terrorism and
the PML would always have to be set at 100%.
A bomb attack is the most effective terrorist attack. It is
perfectly conceivable that trained experts, such as special-
ists in the use of explosives, could be used for the “most
effective” result. After surveying the building, such spe-
cialists can easily position their bomb or bombs in such a
way that it will cause the entire building to collapse.
What is more likely, however, is that a car bomb contain-
ing a large charge of explosives will be detonated in an
underground car park or in the immediate vicinity of the
high-rise building. The extent of the destruction is conse-
quently a matter of chance and therefore hard to estimate.
It is necessary to adopt a country-specific approach to this
issue, also taking account of the building’s location and
occupancy. An office block in an industrial complex will
undoubtedly be a less likely target for terrorists than a
city-centre office tower. There have been sufficient ex-
amples of such cases in the recent past.
If cover for terrorism cannot be excluded for reasons of
market policy in a country with high exposure to terror-
ism, then it is perfectly appropriate to assess the PML at
100% of the sum insured.
Earthquake exposure must also be taken into account for
the PML during the operational phase. The major earth-
quakes experienced in recent years caused such extensive
damage to high-rise buildings as to make repair impos-
sible (Mexico City, Kobe). Older buildings and particularly
buildings with “soft storeys” (see Section 4.4) were worst
affected.
When estimating the earthquake PML in regions exposed
to this risk, it is therefore important to establish whether
modern anti-seismic construction codes exist and whether
they were also applied to the high-rise building under con-
sideration. If these construction codes are known to have
been violated or if there are any doubts in respect of com-
pliance, then a PML of 100% should also be assumed for
earthquakes.
The same applies to windstorm, volcanic activity and
other natural hazards in regions exposed to these particu-
lar risks.
5.3.4 Accumulation control
This problem must be considered above all in conjunction
with the perils windstorm, earthquake and fire primarily in
respect of buildings covered by CAR, EAR or fire policies.
Page 153
This naturally only applies to areas or cities with a corres-
ponding concentration of values in the property insurers’
portfolios.
Munich Re has already stated its views on this subject in a
number of publications; it has also drawn attention to the
need for accumulation control and issued corresponding
explanations.
As far as the natural hazards windstorm, earthquake and
flooding are concerned, the values currently at risk in the
respective exposure zones or specific catastrophe scen-
arios are determined using computer-aided data analyses.
The respective loss accumulation zones and correspond-
ing loss potential are then determined for these catas-
trophes.
We will gladly answer any queries from our clients on
such issues.
5.4 Underwriting considerations
Different construction methods, different finishings and
the exposure to external influences demand careful analy-
sis of the resultant risks. For this reason, only approximate
rates can be specified for insuring the construction and
operational phases of high-rise buildings, despite the
availability of statistical analyses extending over many
years.
5.4.1 Contractors’ and erection all risks insurance
When determining the premium rate, different degrees of
exposure during construction of the high-rise building
(foundations, structural works, finishing) must be taken
into account in the same way as the proportion of tem-
porary auxiliary structures (e.g. retaining walls) and their
exposure during use. The following documentation
should normally be available:
– General drawing and layout plan of the site with an
overview of the immediate surroundings
– Technical details concerning the construction method,
progress made and materials used
– Breakdown of the contract price according to the most
important parts (foundations, structural works at under-
ground levels/floors above ground, finishing)
– Schedule of construction work, particularly in conjunc-
tion with regularly recurring natural phenomena (e.g.
monsoon)
– Expert report on soil conditions
– Description of the foundation method, retaining wall,
possible lowering of the groundwater table
– Layouts, longitudinal and transverse sections of the
building in different planes, details of the most import-
ant structural parts (e.g. facade connections).
The premium rates required for underwriting are deter-
mined on the basis of an assessment of these documents
and of the structural analyses. Premium rates are not
5 Insurance
specified here on account of the considerable scope for
variation and additional, highly commercial influences pre-
vailing in the various markets.
Where the deductible is concerned, difficult soil conditions
and the exposure to windstorm due to structural reasons
or progress in construction must also be taken into ac-
count in addition to the long time frequently required for
the construction work.
If necessary, it must be possible to calculate the risk by
including suitable special terms, limits of indemnity or
exclusions. This applies particularly to high-rise buildings
over 500 m, as their exposure to windstorm has not yet
been sufficiently investigated, and when using inadequately
tested materials and construction methods.
5.4.2 Contractors’ plant and machinery
When determining the premium rate, the number and
period in use of the highly exposed cranes must be taken
into account in addition to the scope of cover. Elevators
for transporting materials to great heights are less ex-
posed to loss, since they are firmly connected to the shell
on the outside or are located inside the high-rise building.
5.4.3 Decennial liability insurance
The level of premium rates for this cover is also largely
dependent on the specific market, the market situation
and scope of cover. For this reason, the premium rate can
range between 5‰ and 15‰ for the ten-year period. In
addition to the premium, the principal must also bear the
costs of technical inspections; these costs vary in line with
the size and complexity of the project.
The waiver of a deductible is prescribed by law in some
markets; as a rule, however, the long term of this cover
should be taken into account when determining the
amount of excess.
5.4.4 Insurance of buildings, fire insurance
As with all risks, the terms, quality of the risk and price are
components which must be taken into account when
underwriting high-rise buildings.
Where the terms are concerned and particularly in con-
junction with the scope of cover, the statements made in
Section 5.1.5 apply, with “named perils” and “all risks” as
the two main forms of cover.
All the criteria listed in Section 4.2.4 must be considered in
order to determine the quality of the risk. Under no circum-
stances should the underwriter assume that all statutory
measures have been taken or that the quality of the risk
is satisfactory simply because of compliance with the
regulations. As the cases outlined in Section 4.2.3 have
shown, the standard of protection applying when the high-
rise building was erected may well be far below the stand-
ards required today. It therefore follows that the con-
struction practice and standard of protection must be con-
sidered individually. Particular attention must be paid to
Page 155
structural fire protection, as well as sprinkler protection
commensurate with the risk.
Although quantitative statements cannot be made, the
probability and frequency of a loss occurring and the
amount of loss to be expected will be lower if the quality
of the risk is “good” than in the case of inadequately pro-
tected buildings. Higher shares can therefore be written in
the case of “good” risks.
In the case of extended basic cover, the risks due to sup-
plementary perils, e.g. earthquake, windstorm, hail, flood-
ing, water damage and glass breakage, must naturally
also be taken into account in the underwriting. The same
also applies to all-risks covers, special attention being de-
voted to the exclusions (see Section 5.1.5).
General statements cannot be made here with regard to
the price, i.e. premium rate. Claims experience and local
exposure play a vital role in pricing, as do commercial
considerations. Above all, the premium calculation also
has to take into account supplementary perils such as
natural hazards and political risks on the basis of individ-
ual loss exposure.
The quality of the risk is naturally also reflected in the
price; in other words, appropriate protective measures or
generally “good” quality of the risk will result in a corres-
pondingly lower premium rate.
5.5 Reinsurance
In the majority of cases, there should be no particular
problems in reinsuring individual high-rise buildings, pro-
vided that the necessary conditions have been met for the
individual classes (contractors’ all risks, erection all risks,
insurance of the building, fire insurance, decennial liability
insurance, third-party liability insurance). On account of
the different forms of cover, the main thing is to ensure
that the policies in question are allocated to the appropri-
ate classes, e.g. engineering insurance, third-party liability
insurance and fire insurance (as described in detail in the
preceding sections) and that the risk is properly assessed
in line with the respective policy.
Special need for reinsurance may arise, however, in the
case of individual major high-rise-building risks and exten-
sive accumulation risks resulting from the concentration of
numerous high-rise buildings within a small area. This is
indeed the case with skyscrapers of record-breaking
heights and sums insured due to the high fire PML or the
risk of earthquakes or windstorm in areas particularly
prone to such hazards. The need to insure these risks will
normally exceed the capacity of the local insurance mar-
ket. The same also applies with regard to decennial cover
for such risks.
However, even reinsurers with the soundest financial back-
ing cannot accept unlimited liability. In some cases, it will
therefore be necessary to introduce a limit of liability
which makes the risk more manageable and easier to cal-
culate; this will also ensure that the available underwriting
capacity can be fully utilized. The type of limits to be speci-
89 EXTERIOR HOIST
5 Insurance
fied in the classes concerned should be decided in accor-
dance with individual requirements.
In addition, limits of liability also facilitate matters for in-
surers and reinsurers; liability accumulations can be deter-
mined and updated more easily and precisely. This is par-
ticularly important in countries or regions which are con-
stantly exposed to natural hazards, such as Japan or Cali-
fornia, where comprehensive insurance cover is provided
for a large number of high-rise buildings in an area of in-
tense seismic activity and where there is consequently a
substantial accumulation risk.
Even in these extreme cases, however, the demand for ad-
equate insurance cover is and was satisfied by insurers
and reinsurers working together as partners. This is par-
ticularly true of insurance markets marked by high invest-
ment and growth. The benchmark has been raised in
terms of what insurers require and expect of reinsurers,
especially with regard to know-how, professional compe-
tence, market experience, innovativeness and ultimately
also adequate capacity combined with long-term financial
strength.
Munich Re is optimally positioned to meet these chal-
lenges.
The lead it has built up globally over the decades in terms
of experience and information is based on extensive data-
bases. With the help of modern computer-based tools, the
latest data can be rapidly made available to the insurers.
Comprehensive geo-scientific and underwriting analyses
of these data by experts at Munich Re’s head office and in
the engineering offices around the world ensure that nat-
ural hazards and loss potential can be reliably assessed.
Experienced underwriters are available to our clients at
more than 45 business units and subsidiaries in our inter-
national organization, all of which are linked online to the
head office. This enables us to advise prospective clients
on assessing risk, defining the terms of insurance, and
determining and providing the required reinsurance
capacity.
During the period of cover, our specialists can actively
participate in inspections, loss prevention or settlement
of complex losses.
Extensive know-how and the courage to take innovative
steps make it possible for our specialists to provide
our clients with professional support in developing new
concepts for cover or new insurance products.
We will gladly answer any queries by our clients, provide
further information or outline possible solutions in con-
nection with reinsurance and our range of services.
6 Summary and outlook

6
Page 157 6 Summary and outlook

The historical and technical development of high-rise

buildings as seen from the point of view of insurers
and reinsurers has been outlined in the individual
sections of this publication. Needless to say, develop-
ment does not stand still, and therefore by the time
this publication appears in print some of the technical
details described here may already have been super-
seded by research, progress and the pressure of costs.

Most of the statements made here, however, will continue

to apply to future high-rise buildings. Despite certain reser-
vations and all economic bottlenecks, the quest to reach
for the sky and erect higher and higher buildings goes on,
particularly in Asia.

For this reason, we as insurers and reinsurers will con-

tinue to devote our attention to these projects in the new
millennium. We are also confident that, thanks to our
worldwide know-how and long-standing experience, we
will be able to offer our clients solutions in line with the
specific risks involved.

1
Die Bezeichnung höchstes Bauwerk der Welt bean-
sprucht zur Zeit der Fernsehturm von Toronto, der neben
dem Ontariosee 553 m in den Himmel ragt. Das zweit-
größte Bauwerk ist der Fernsehturm von Moskau mit
537 m.

2
Eine Geschoßflächenzahl von 12 bedeutet, daß die
Gesamtfläche aller Geschosse über Straßenniveau maxi-
mal das Zwölffache der Grundstücksfläche betragen
darf.
.
3
Bentonit ist ein spezielles Tonmineral, das das Mehr-
fache seines Gewichts an Wasser absorbieren kann und
dabei auf das 8–15fache seines Volumens anschwillt.
Es bildet an den Wänden des Schlitzes eine Schicht,
wodurch dieser gegen Materialeinbruch stabilisiert wird,
ohne den Aushubvorgang zu beeinträchtigen.

4
Weitere Details sind in unserer Brandschutztafel nach-
zulesen.

5
Advance loss of profit.
Picture credits Page 158

Page Picture No. Title Picture credits

Cover 01 Manhattan, New York Image Bank, A. Becker, Anzenberger, Loccisano

6 02 San Gimignano Picture Press, Riedmüller
7 03 Monadnock Building Library of Congress
9 04 The Tower of Babel AKG, Berlin
10 05 Equitable Life Building Museum City of New York
10 06 Home Insurance Building Philipp Holzmann, Frankfurt a. M.
10/11 07 New York panorama Image Bank, A. Becker
12 08 HongkongBank Headquarters Building, Hong Kong HongkongBank
12 09 Messeturm, Frankfurt am Main Werkfoto HOCHTIEF, Essen
13 10 Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur Munich Re
15 11 Hong Kong skyline Pacific Century, Hong Kong
16 12 Flatiron Building, New York Photonica, B. Hubert
18 13 La Grande Arche, Paris Munich Re
19 14 Canary Wharf, London Munich Re
20 15 Traditional and modern buildings in peaceful co-existence Laif, Arthur Selbach
23 16 Chrysler Building, New York Image Bank, B. Frommer
27 17 Details from planning documents Munich Re
28 18 Extract from a technical report Munich Re
29 19 Opening in an apartment complex Munich Re, J. Eber
30 20 Large-bore pile foundation process Bilfinger & Berger
30 Various stages in the diaphragm wall process Bauer Spezialtiefbau, Schrobenhausen
32/33 21 Diaphragm wall rotary cutter Bauer Spezialtiefbau, Schrobenhausen
34 22 Retaining wall to protect neighbouring buildings Munich Re
34 23 View of a building pit with completed retaining wall Bauer Spezialtiefbau, Schrobenhausen
36/37 24 Examples of high-rise buildings with steel skeletons Munich Re, A. Kleiner
38 25 Deformation and bending momentum due to wind with the core construction method Munich Re
38 26 Background: Commerzbank Building Minimax
39 27 Deformation and bending momentum due to wind with the outrigger truss method Munich Re
39 28 Examples of core construction methods and bundled tubes Munich Re
40 29 Varying load distribution with tubes and bundled tubes Munich Re
41 30 Example of the arrangement of bundled tubes Munich Re
41 31 Steel skeleton Büro X
43 32 View from the headquarters building/Headquarters of BMW A. G. in Munich Pressestelle BMW A. G., Munich
44 33 Facade assembly Munich Re
47 34 Ceiling installation Top: Munich Re
47 35 Double flooring Bottom: Fa. Mero, Würzburg
50 36 Elevator in the World Trade Center, New York Visum, Michael Wolf
51 37 Elevator demonstration by Otis Left: Otis
51 38 Maintenance Right: Laif, REA/P. Bressard
52 39 Renovation of a high-rise building Top: Werkfoto BASF
52 40 Pile-driving machinery for working in basement floors Bottom: Bauer Spezialtiefbau
55 41 Petronas Tower Munich Re
56/57 42 Trend towards ever-taller modern high-rise buildings Büro X
58/59 43 The Millennium Tower – a vision for the 3rd millennium Forster and Partners, London
60/61 44 Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Munich Re
62/63 45 Sears Tower, Chicago Anzenberger, G. Sioen
64/65 46 Empire State Building, New York Visum, J. Röttger
66/67 47 Messeturm in Frankfurt am Main Laif, C. Emmler, P. Langrock
69 48 Additional heat recovery via piling foundations in the Commerzbank high-rise building Minimax
71 49 Fully automated building site Obayashi Corporation, Japan
72/73 50 Jin Mao Building Shanghai Educational Publishing House
74/75 51 Shanghai Pudong Airphoto International Ltd./Pacific Century Publishers Ltd.
76/77 52 New York Visum, M. Wolf
76/77 53 China, Guangzhou action press, SABA-Laif, REA/Sinopix
78/79 54 New York Image Bank, A. Becker
80/81 55 New York: view from the World Trade Center Visum, M. Wolf
82/83 56 New York Munich Re, J. Eber
87 57 Fire in the Broadgate Building, London: sunken roof support beams Munich Re
88 58 Fire-protection information Munich Re
90/91 59 Escalator destroyed by fire Munich Re
92/93 60 Fire in the Meridien President Tower, Bangkok Munich Re
94/95 61 Meridien President Tower, increased risk of fire during the final fit-out phase Munich Re
96/97 62 Difficult fire-fighting conditions in the Meridien President Tower Bangkok Post
98 63 Combustible waste increases risk of fire Munich Re
100 64 Limited evacuation routes through smoke-filled stairways Bangkok Post
101 65 Hong Kong, fire in the Garley Building South China Morning Post
102 66 Towering inferno Munich Re
Page 159 Picture credits
Wooden panels on a glass facade destroyed by a car-bomb attack/Interior view of one floor

103 67 Difficult fire-fighting conditions Munich Re

106 68 Special coating on the steel skeleton guaranteeing adequate fire resistance Top: HongkongBank, Minimax, Eissing-Kister
106 69 Fire-detection system in the Messeturm in Frankfurt Bottom: HOCHTIEF/Landis & Gyr
109 70 Atrium in a bank building HongkongBank
112 71 Dynamic-pressure approaches: effects from friction impact wind speed Top: Munich Re, A. Kleiner
112 72 Typhoon tracks for Japan and California Bottom: Munich Re
113 73 Representation of wind impact on a building’s ground-bearing pressure Munich Re, A. Kleiner
116 74 Impact of earthquake loads on the centre of gravity Top: Munich Re, A. Kleiner
116 75 50 t and/or 90 t heavy dampers Bottom: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
117 76 Effective arrangement of dampers in high-rise buildings Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
119 77 Earthquake in Kobe, Japan Munich Re
120 78 Corroded supply lines Munich Re, W. Schromm
120 79 Tension crack in a crosslinked polyethylene pipe Munich Re, W. Schromm
124/125 80 Blasting of a high-rise office building Iduna Versicherung
128/129 81 Interior of a high-rise building following a bomb attack Munich Re, J. Eber
130/131 82 Wooden panels on a glass facade destroyed by a car-bomb attack/Interior view of one floor Commercial Union, G. Evans
133 83 Aircraft debris after a plane ploughed into the Empire State Building Associated Press
134 84 Aircraft crash onto a block of flats in Amsterdam action press, F. Bründel
135 85 Bomb attack on a federal government building in Oklahoma, USA action press, SABA
143 86 Heavy plant in use during foundation work Bauer Spezialtiefbau, Schrobenhausen
146 87 Dangerous workplace Laif, REA/Sinopix
150/151 88 World Trade Center, New York Laif, P. Gebhard
154 89 Exterior hoist Munich Re

References
Title Author Publisher
Architektur des 20. Jahrhunderts Gossel/Leuthäuser
Architektur und Städtebau des 20. Jahrhunderts Lampugnani
Das Hochhaus in Gegenwart und Geschichte Goldberger (1984) DVA Stuttgart
DIN 1055, Part 4 Issue 8/86, 5/89
Elevators and Escalators Strakosch John Wiley & Sons, New York
Erdbebenprognose Geo 3/96
Facility Management 1/95 Bertelsmann Verlag
Fassadengestaltung Dr. Gartner
Fire Letter No. 24 Munich Re
Hongkong, Architekturmuseum Frankfurt a. M. Exhibition catalogue (1993–94) Prestelverlag
La Grande Arche Tête Défense (1990)
Marvels of Engineering National Geographic
Massivbau Vertiefungsvorlesungen J. Schlaich Universität Stuttgart
Messeturm Frankfurt a. M. Kolodziejczyk Technik am Bau (Periodical)
Messeturm Frankfurt a. M. J. Murphy Schriften zur Architektur der Gegenwart
MR Handbook “Water Damage Insurance” Munich Re
Preliminary Report on the Northridge Earthquake WSSI
Schadenspiegel 1/84 Munich Re
Schadenspiegel 1/95 Munich Re
Schadenspiegel, Special issue 1994 Munich Re
Skyscrapers Starrett Charles Scribner's Sons, New York
Special publication “Earthquakes of the Caribbean Plate” Munich Re (1976)
Special publication “Earthquake Mexico ’85” Munich Re (1985)
Special publication “Windstorm” Munich Re (1990)
The Empire State Building Theodore James, Jr. Harper & Row, New York
The Skyscraper Book Giblin T. Y. Crowell, New York
Tuned Active Dampers Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Wie man Wolken kratzt P. v. Seidlein
Wolkenkratzer – Ästhetik und Konstruktion J. Schmidt Dumont Verlag

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 High-Rise Buildings
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High-rise buildings in the course of history Technology of high-rise buildings Risk potential Insurance

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