Karl Lorenzo R, Babiano JD

Activity #2 Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility

1. Define
a. Counseling- a profession that involves the use of an integrated approach to the
development of a well-functioning individual primarily by helping him/her to utilize
his/her potentials to the fullest and plan his/her future in accordance with his/her
abilities. (RA 9258)
b. Legal Counseling- means advice and assistance given by one person to another
in regard to a legal matter, proposed line of conduct, claim or contention. (Black´s
Law Dictionary)
c. Court of Justice- An organ of the government belonging to the judicial
department, whose function is the application of the laws to controversies
brought before it and the public administration of justice. (Black´s Law Dictionary)
d. Quasi-judicial Body- is an organ of government other than a court and other than
a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
or rule-making. (Honorable Monetary board v Philippine Veterans Bank, GR
189571, January 21, 2015)
e. Administrative Body or Agency- refers to any of the various units of the
government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein. (Administrative Code of 1987)
f. Arbitration- means a voluntary dispute resolution process in which one or more
arbitrators, appointed in accordance with the agreement of the parties, resolve a
dispute by rendering an award. (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004)
g. Conciliation- It is a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution that is the adjustment
and settlement of a dispute in a friendly, unantagonistic manner; used in courts
before trial with a view towards avoiding trial and in labor disputes before
arbitration. (Black´s Law Dictionary)
It is a process in which a neutral third party is called (conciliator) conveys
information between parties and attempts to improve direct communication
between them. The conciliator often prepares a report that describes the scope
of agreement and disagreement. (The Philippine Mediation Center)
h. Compromise Agreement- A compromise agreement is a contract between the
parties, which if not contrary to law, morals or public policy, is valid and
enforceable between them. (Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City v Samahang
Magsasaka, Inc., 62 SCRA 435 [1975])

2. The difference is that in counseling, it's description is broader unlike in legal counseling
wherein the advice you are giving is more particular with legal problems.

3. The difference between counseling and arbitration and conciliation is that in counseling
there are only 2 parties involved, the one who is giving advice and the other receiving such
advice while in arbitration and conciliation, there are two conflicting parties who enter into an
agreement to voluntary submit themselves before a third party who is either an arbitrator, for
arbitration, or barangay lupon, for conciliation to settle their issues.

4. It is one of the important parts of being a lawyer, for me, especially in helping those who
are in need of it and also those who are economically disadvantaged. By also helping the client
become ease with their minds and hearts, assuring the client that everything has a solution.

5. Legal Ethics is a branch of moral science, which treats of the duties which an attorney
owes to the court, to the client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public as embodied
in the constitution, Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons of
Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws. (Justice George Malcolm)

6. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is
to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. (Cayetano v
Monsod GR 100113, September 3, 1991)

7. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. (Burbe v
Magulta, AC 99-634, June 10, 2002)
8. Digest

a. Renato Cayetano v Christian Monsod, GR 100113, September 3, 1991

Doctrine:
Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.

Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Commission
on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and challenged the nomination and
the subsequent confirmation of the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years

Issue:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of
COMELEC. (YES)

Held:
The case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions."
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod also worked as
an operations officer for World Bank Group (1963-1970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he worked as
Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently rendered service to various company either
as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary
General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers.
Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years
 b. Atty, Carmen Leonor Alcantara v Atty. Eduardo de Vera, A.C. No. 5859, November
23, 2010

Doctrine:
CANON 21 — A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02 — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,
use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or
that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Facts:
The respondent (Atty. Eduardo De Vera) is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of
Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario.
Rosario demanded respondent to turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter
refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney’s
fees. An Admin case was filed against Atty. De Vera
IBP Board of Governors: Respondent is guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s
funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits
against the Mercado family except for George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the
family corporation, the corporation’s accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the
case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the
respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted
to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of
family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted
lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.

ISSUE: WON De Vera acts constitute professional malpractice and gross misconduct, thus he should be
disbarred. (YES, DISBARRED immediately from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt
of this Resolution.)

Held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him.
PURPOSE of SUSPENSION. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring
an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the
public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
 The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information as to the
structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and
figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives
were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such an act is in direct
violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

c. |(Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713 (Adm. Case No. 99-634), [June 10, 2002], 432 PHIL 840-
851)

Doctrine:
LAWYERING IS NOT A BUSINESS; IT IS A PROFESSION IN WHICH DUTY TO PUBLIC
SERVICE, NOT MONEY, IS THE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION|||

Facts:
Respondent lawyer was introduced to the complainant at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices who agreed to legally represent the latter in a money claim and a possible civil case against
certain parties for breach of contract. Upon respondent's instruction, the complainant deposited the
amount of P25,000.00 allegedly for the filing fees of the case to be filed. A week later, the complainant
was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court. In the months that
followed, the complainant did not receive any notice from the court. Complainant also frequented the
respondent's office to inquire, but the latter repeatedly told him each time to just wait. Sensing that he was
being given the run-around by respondent, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court to verify
the progress of the case and found out that there was no record at all filed by respondent on his behalf.
Feeling disgusted for the inconvenience and deception of the respondent who admitted that he had spent
the money for the filing fee for his own use, complainant filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation, dishonesty
and oppressive conduct. The Commission submitted its Report and Recommendation to the Court
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.|||
Respondent argues that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant,
because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said
documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.||

Issue:
Whether or not there was a lawyer-client relationship existed between Magulta and Dominador.
(Yes, there is Lawyer-client Relationship)

Held:
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment the complainant asked the
respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is
not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established.
The Supreme Court affirmed the recommendation of the Commission. In failing to apply to the
filing fee the amount given by complainant, respondent violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all monies of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession. The Court also stressed that after agreeing to take up the
cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for
the attorney-client relationship and lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.

d. PP v Simplicio Villanueva, GR L-19450, May 27, 1965

Doctrine:
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance of Atty. Fule in one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Further, he was
permitted by the SOJ to represent the complainant.

Facts:
Simplicio Villanueva was charged with the crime of Malicious Mischief Before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services.
The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al., vs. Blanco, et al., wherein it was ruled that "when an
attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.” Section 32, Rule 127, now
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court was also invoked which bars certain attorneys from
practicing

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rule violated Section 32, Rule 127, now Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. (NO)

Ruling:
The isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. Further, Atty. Fule had been given permission by his immediate Superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case

e. Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name ¨Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo" July 30, 1979

Doctrine:
Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name
under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be
held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus,
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics ``prohibits all agreement for the payment to the widow and
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers
and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient."
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death
of their lawyer predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding liability

Facts:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners argued that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code
explicitly sanctions the practice.
Second, The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: ". . . The continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. . . ."
Third, there is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days.
Fourth, no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a
professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the
firm.

Issue:
Whether or not the surviving partners may be allowed to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm. (NO)

Ruling:
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by
local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title. The public relations value of
the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of
the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.

f. In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar
Examinations and for Disciplinary Actions as Member of the Philippine Shari´a Bar (B.M.
No. 1154 (June 8,2004)

Doctrine:
 Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in
the practice of law.

Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition , Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City. Two of which for Grave Oral Defamation, and one for Less Serious Physical
Injuries. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of
the Bar.

Issue:
Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR
would bar to his good moral character

Ruling:
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public
in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common Honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

g. In Re: Pedro A. Amparo (1974 Bar Candidate), GR. No. 000 (July 18, 1975)

Doctrine:
Section10, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that, ¨Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms.¨

Facts:
While taking the Bar Examination in Criminal Law, examinee amparo was caught by the
headwatcher reading a piece of paper containing notes in Criminal Law, specifically on the durations of
penalties and a formula of computing them, particularly reclusion temporal. Amparo refused to surrender
the paper at first but later gave it when the headwatcher threatened him that he will be reported to the
authorities. Formal report was filed the following day and the court en bank resolved that Pedro Amparo
be disqualified from taking the Bar Examinations still to be given. Amparo requested that he be given a
chance to explain before taking final action.
 Investigation was conducted and Amparo justified his actions saying that he had the piece of
paper in his pocket and that he was supposed to take out his handkerchief as he was perspiring, out also
came the paper which contained notes that were written by his friend, and that he had forgotten about it
and he really had no intention of using.

Issue:
Whether or not Amparo is guilty of his actions (YES)

Ruling:
Amparo knowingly violated Section10, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides
that, ¨Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms.¨
He committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading the notes, His refusal
to surrender the paper containing the notes when first demanded; his eventual surrender of it only
after he was informed that he would be reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal
Law and the examination then in Criminal Law — all these override and rebut his explanation that he
merely read the notes to find out what they were as he had forgotten about them.

h. In Re: Victorio D. Lanueva, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, AM No. 1162,
August 29, 1975

Doctrine:
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, among others, provides that "every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must . . . of good moral character . . . and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.¨

Facts:
Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant, Victorio Lanuevo and a 1971 bar
candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary action against five bar examiners for acts and omission:s
committed in the 1971 bar examinations.
Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme Court checked the records of
the 1971 bar examinations. As a result thereof, the grades in five subjects of an examinee (Ramon
Galang) were found to be charged, which, however, were properly initialed and authenticated by each
of the examiner concerned. Upon investigation, the Bar Confidant admitted in his sworn statement
having brought back the five examination notebooks to the examiners for re-evaluation. In turn, the five
examiners admitted, in their individual sworn statements, having re-evaluated and re-checked the
notebooks involved (all of which had failing marks) upon the representation made to each of them
separately and individually by the Bar Confidant that examiners were authorized to do so and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his (examiner concerned) particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. On the other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the actuation's of
the Bar Confidant.
Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam
results show that he failed in 5 subjects namely in Political Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
& Remedial Law).

Issue:
Whether or not the Bar Confidant and Ramon Galang are to be disbarred (YES.)

Ruling:
The Bar Confidant is simply the custodian of bar examination notebooks for and in behalf of the
court; hence, any suggestion or request by him for re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after the notebooks are submitted by the
examiner, is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy. His position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates. His functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
Examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or
after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. Aer the corrected notebooks are submitted to
him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average.
In trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was indicted
on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the more than ninety candidates who
were more deserving of reconsideration. Furthermore, the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after
the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension
of good faith. Thus he shall be disbarred.
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the unauthorized re- evaluation of his
answers in five (5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial
Law, and Mercantile Law. Furthermore, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his pending criminal case of slight physical injuries; such is a violation of the rule that every
applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.

I. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946
to 1953; Albino Cunanan, et. al. as petitioners (March 18, 1954)

Doctrine:
In the judicial system from which ours has evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles.¨

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending and also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 972 is constitutional

Ruling:
It is Unconstitutional.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly
found by this -tribunal in the a#aforesaid examinations' the public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times become
more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 In the Judicial system from which ours has evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. the function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles, in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more indisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

J. Elpidio Javellana v Nicholas Lutero, GR No. L-23956, July 21, 1967

Doctrine:
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and
with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with diligence
and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such as the one at
bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the
petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.

Facts:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio Javellana with
the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero.
The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the
defendant to receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was
thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August 27, all at the behest of the
defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions in
Manila'' and that "he hurt his right foot toe". The last postponement was granted by the municipal court
with the warning that no further postponement would be entertained.
The defendant still failed to appear in court despite the last warning so the trial proceeds
nevertheless rendering a decision against the petitioner

Issue:
Whether or not the petition is to be granted despite the fact of repetitive absence during
scheduled hearings. (No. the petition has no merit)

Ruling:
The petitioner-appellant was not deprived of his day in court, and that the respondent municipal
judge did not err in proceeding with the trial, allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex
parte, and thereafter rendering decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not
entitled to the remedy of a petition for relief.
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette
that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more than just a
modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel.
The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the judge that
no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August 27, 1963,
which means that appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to adjust his schedule of activities as
to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27,
and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned
by illness or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from
appearing in court.
K. Virginia Villaflores v Atty. Sinamar Limos, AC No. 7504, November 23, 2007)

Doctrine:
Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client
to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left
groping in the dark; to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the
retained lawyer and in the legal profession in general.

Facts:
This is a disbarment complaint Filed by Virginia Villaflores against Atty. Sinamar Limos for gross
Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Villaflores is the defendant in a civil case wherein she received unfavorable judgment thus she
approached Atty. Limos to file her behalf the required appellants brief. The respondent agreed to handle
her appeal and she handed Limos 20k foe his acceptance fee.
An employment contract was executed between the two whereby the villaflores formally engaged
Limos´s professional services.
However, Villaflores received a copy of a resolution dated January 6, 2005 issued by the CA
dismissing her appeal for failure to file her appellant´s brief within the reglementary period.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Limos is guilty of inexcusable negligence in handling his complainant´s case
as would warrant disciplinary action

Ruling:
There is gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. An attorney is
bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability with utmost diligence. A failure to file brief for
his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed committed
a serious lapse in duty owed by him to his client as well as to the court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. Limos is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three months and ordered by the court to return the amount which he received from Villaflores.
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the
courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Certainly, a
member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion.
A lawyer's lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.