Arrest Search and Seizure Criminal Procedure

EVIDENCE AT YOUR FINGERTIPS
“Truth is what we determine it to be…

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And it lies, not in the facts, but in the telling.”
EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The exclusionary rules under the Constitution are found in:
1. Article III, Section 2 (Right against unreasonable search and

seizure)
2. Article III, Section 3 (Right to privacy and inviolability of
communication)
3. Article III, Section 12 (Rights of persons under custodial
investigation, otherwise referred to as the Miranda Rights)
4. Article III, Section 17 (Right against self-incrimination)
Common principles:
1. Under the foregoing exclusionary rules, any evidence obtained in

violation of the rights under Sections 2, 3, 12 and 17 of Article III
of the Constitution is inadmissible. Thus, even if such evidence
is relevant – having logical connection to the fact in issue - it is
nevertheless inadmissible for being incompetent as it is
specifically excluded by the Constitution.
2. The exclusionary rules under the Constitution are relevant only if

invoked against the State or its agents. If the acts or omissions
complained of are committed by private individuals or entities,
Sections 2, 3, 12, and 17 of Article III do not operate as exclusionary
rules. Consequently, any evidence obtained thereby is admissible,
without prejudice to the liability – criminal, civil or administrative
– that may be imposed upon the private individual or entity
responsible therefor.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI

(G.R. NO. 81561, 18 JANUARY 1991)
FACTS:
Andre Marti (“Marti”) engaged the services of Manila Packing

and Export Forwarders, a private forwarding company, for
By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa
Professor – Evidence
For the exclusive use of Gullas Law School – University of the Visayas
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shipment of four (4) wrapped packages to Zurich, Switzerland.

Without Marti’s knowledge and consent, and as standard
operating procedure, the proprietor of the forwarding company
Job Reyes (“Reyes”) opened the packages which yielded some
dried leaves. Reyes then reported the matter to the NBI, who
conducted investigation and confirmed the contents of the
wrapped packages to be dried marijuana leaves. A criminal case
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Marti.
Invoking the exclusionary rules under Sections 2 and 3, Article
III of the Constitution, Marti argued that the seized marijuana
leaves are inadmissible in evidence as they were obtained in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure and privacy of communication.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized dried marijuana leaves are admissible in

evidence.
RULING:
1. It was Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency,

who made the search/inspection of the packages. Said
inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Reyes as a precautionary measure
before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or
the Bureau of Posts.
2. After Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he

took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned
the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened
the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much
less an illegal one.
3. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not

meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights

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answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of

fundamental liberties is the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder.
4. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches

and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
5. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a

warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
6. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an

individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-
governmental as it is, of Marti’s constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.

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2. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION AND EMMA CO VS.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(G.R. NO. 113271 OCTOBER 16, 1997)
FACTS:
This is a labor complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal

dismissal, and illegal suspension filed by Antonia Melodia
Catolico (“Catolico”) against her employer Waterous Drug
Corporation (“Waterous Drug”). Catolico was dismissed from
her employment when she was found guilty of receiving
“kickbacks” from Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“YSP”), a
company which supplied pharmaceutical products to Waterous
Drug.
The evidence against Catolico consisted of a check drawn by YSP

in favor of Catolico in an amount representing alleged “refund
of overprice” for some medicines purchased by Waterous Drug
from YSP. The check was discovered by Saldana, one of
Catolico’s co-employees, when Saldana opened the envelope
containing the check, which Catolico decried as an invasion of
her privacy. The NLRC declared that the check was inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 (1) and (2) of Article III
of the Constitution.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the check is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the

NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary,
and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.

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3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASHER

BONGCARAWAN
(G.R.NO.143944, JULY 11, 2002)
FACTS:
An interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from

Manila to Iligan City. When the vessel was about to dock at the
port of Iligan City, its security officer, Mark Diesmo (“Diesmo”),
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy (“Canoy”)
about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-
passengers as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of
the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section and who
would later be identified as Basher Bongcarawan
(“Bongcawaran”). Bongcarawan was informed of the complaint
and with his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was
found. Upon request of the security personnel, Bongcarawan
opened his suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic
packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the
substance to be "shabu," the security personnel called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance, who then took custody of
Bongcarawan and seized the Samsonite suitcase, the brown bag
and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.
When asked about the contraband articles, Bongcarawan

explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex"
Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan
City. The packs of white crystalline substance were confirmed to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
"shabu." When prosecuted for violation of the dangerous drugs
law, Bongcarawan contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was
forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against
him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not applicable in
this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to
perform the duties of a policeman.

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RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the eight (8) packs of shabu are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. Evidence acquired in violation of the right against

unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking
the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by this
Court in the case of People v. Marti, "in the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
2. In the case before us, the baggage of Bongcarawan was

searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after
they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government intervention,
and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
3. There is no merit in the contention of Bongcarawan that the

search and seizure performed by the vessel security
personnel should be considered as one conducted by the
police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed
and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel
security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast,
police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically

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and until now, it is against them and other agents of the

state that the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be invoked.
4. MARIETA DE CASTRO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. NO. 171672 , FEBRUARY 2, 2015)
FACTS:
Marieta De Castro (“De Castro’), a bank teller of the BPI Family

Savings Bank, was prosecuted for the crime of four (4) counts of
estafa through falsification of a commercial document, by
forging the signatures of bank depositors in withdrawal slips,
thereby enabling herself to withdraw some amounts from the
savings accounts of the affected depositors. When confronted
about the anomaly, De Castro confessed in writing to her guilt.
Since then, she executed three (3) more statements in response
to the investigation conducted by the bank's internal auditors.
De Castro was then dismissed from employment and prosecuted
for the crime of estafa through falsification of documents. On
appeal, De Castro urges the Supreme Court to set aside her
conviction, insisting that her conviction was invalid because her
constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to due process
and to counsel were denied.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether De Castro’s rights against self-incrimination and to

counsel have been violated and her written confessions
admissible in evidence
RULING:
1. The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel

guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during
the custodial interrogation of a suspect. De Castro was not
subjected to any investigation by the police or other law
enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an
administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI
Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by
her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against
herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke
down when bank depositors confronted her about her

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crimes. We hold, however, that in the particular setting in

which she was investigated, the revered constitutional
rights of an accused to counsel and against self-
incrimination are not apposite.
2. The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are

peculiarly rights in the context of an official proceeding for
the investigation and prosecution for crime. The right
against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial,
is contained in this terse injunction - no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words,
he may not be required to take the witness stand. He can
sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel
is expressed in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means
inversely that the criminal prosecution cannot proceed
without having a counsel by his side. These are the
traditional rights of the accused in a criminal case. They
exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal
indictment and trial for a criminal offense. But since
Miranda vs. Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to
recognize that an accused needs the same protections even
before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very
inception of the criminal process - when a person is taken
into custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a
person says or does during custodial investigation will
eventually be used as evidence against him at the trial and,
more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual
conviction. His trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy
from the start the right against self-incrimination and to
counsel. This is the logic behind what we now call as the
Miranda doctrine.
3. The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise

words the occasion for the exercise of the new right and the
protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an
individual is subjected to police interrogation while in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom
in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is
underway that the certain procedural safeguards takes
over - the person must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the

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right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot

afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning.
4. The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source

of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, a
provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. As we can
see, they speak of the companion rights of a person under
investigation to remain silent and to counsel, to ensure
that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had also to be
institutionalized by declaring that any confession or
admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain
silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for the
commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by
rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much
later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175
incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into the above-
cited provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to
remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the
context in which the Miranda doctrine applies - when the
official proceeding is conducted under the coercive
atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases
extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the
Supreme Court said very clearly that the rights are
invocable only when the accused is under custodial
investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit
examination is not under custodial investigation and,
hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law
enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not

be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not
even being investigated by any police or law enforcement
officer. She was under administrative investigation by her
superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any
manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence
that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an

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act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental

and moral catharsis that religion and psychology
recognize to have salutary effects on the soul. In this
setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to
counsel is simply irrelevant.
EXCEPTION:
1. CECILIA ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND

ALFREDO MARTIN
(G.R. NO. 107383, FEBRUARY 20, 1996)
FACTS:
Cecilia Zulueta (“Cecilia”) is the wife of Alredo Martin

(“Alfredo”). Cecilia went to Alfredo’s office and without the
latter’s knowledge, opened Alfredo’s office cabinets, read and
seized letters, photographs, diaries and correspondence between
Alfredo and his alleged mistress. Cecilia used these documents
as evidence in a civil action for legal separation and in the
administrative complaint for disqualification from practice of
medicine which she filed against Alfredo.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the documents which Cecilia seized without Alfredo’s

knowledge and consent are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in

evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable admits only of two exceptions – if there is a
lawful order from the court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise. Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
2. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify

any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,

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does not shed his integrity or his right to privacy as an

individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
NOTE:
Zulueta is an isolated case and a deviation from Marti and other

kindred cases. It is humbly submitted that the controlling
jurisprudential trend is People v. Marti, which held that the Bill of
Rights can only be invoked against the State and its agents, not
against private individuals.
Exclusionary Rules under the Constitution Explained
1. Section 2, Article III
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
2. Section 3, Article III
“The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
General rule:
Any search or seizure without judicial warrant is illegal, unless it falls

under any of the recognized valid warrantless search and seizure. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this rule is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceedings when offered against the person whose
right has been violated. Any such evidence, however, is admissible

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when offered against the person responsible for the violation.
Where to file application for search warrant
General rule:
An application for a search warrant shall be filed with any court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was committed (Section 2 (a),
Rule 126)
Rule on venue in the application for search warrant mandatory
As a general rule, venue in the application for search warrant is

mandatory. Non-compliance with the rule on venue renders the
issuance of the search warrant defective.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND

PETRON CORPORATION VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
GASES CORPORATION
(G.R. NO. 189669, FEBRUARY 16, 2015)
FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (“Shell”) and Petron

Corporation (“Petron”) sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in connection with the report that
Romars Gases International (“Romars”) has been engaged in
counterfeiting Shell’s and Petron’s Liquified Petroleum Gas
(LPG) products. Acting on the request, the NBI applied for
search warrant before the RTC of Naga City, Bicol, in connection
with a crime allegedly committed in Iriga City. The search
yielded positive results and, thus, Romars was criminally
charged in court. Romars filed a motion to quash the search
warrant, on the ground that it was issued without probable
cause. The RTC of Iriga City denied Romars’ motion to quash
search warrant. Subsequently, however, a new counsel for
Romars filed a Formal Entry of Appearance with motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to quash search

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warrant. In the said motion for reconsideration, Romars raised

for the first time the issue on the propriety of filing the
application for search warrant with the RTC of Naga City when
the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court in Iriga City.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
1. Whether the rule on venue in relation to application for,

and issuance of, a search warrant is mandatory in nature.
2. Whether Romars is precluded from raising the ground of
improper venue under the Omnibus Motion Rule.
3. Whether venue in the application for search warrant is
jurisdictional.
RULING:
1. “Section 2. Court where applications for search warrant

shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be
filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime

was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any

court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the

application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.”
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b)

thereof, the application for search warrant in this case
should have stated compelling reasons why the same was
being filed with the RTC-Naga City instead of the RTC-
Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged
crime was committed and also the place where the search
warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of
a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling

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reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not

have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission
of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants
constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
construed strictly against state authorities who would be
enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then,
petitioner's application for a search warrant was indeed
insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to
state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file
the application in a court that did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed.
2. Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling

reasons in the application, the more pressing question that
would determine the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-
Naga City act properly in taking into consideration the
issue of said defect in resolving Romars’ motion for
reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very
first time? The record bears out that, indeed, Romars failed
to include said issue at the first instance in its motion to
quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to
quash search warrants? The omnibus motion rule
embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included
in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be
deemed waived, except for some recognized exceptions. In
accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the
trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was
not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not
available or existent when they filed the motion to quash
the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Obviously, the issue of
the defect in the application was available and existent at
the time of filing of the motion to quash.
3. What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised

issue of the defect in the application is an issue of
jurisdiction. A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search

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warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing

issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the
court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity. Clearly then, an application
for a search warrant is not a criminal action. The rule that
venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently,
the issue of whether the application should have been filed
in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving
jurisdiction because the power to issue a special criminal
process is inherent in all courts.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. For “compelling reason” stated in the application, an

application for search warrant may be filed with any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed, if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF A “COMPELLING

REASON”:
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROBERT CHIU

(G.R. NOS. 142915-16, FEBRUARY 27, 2004)
FACTS:
The accused Robert Chiu (“Chiu”) was charged under two

(2) separate Informations with violation of the provisions
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. These charges were the off
shoot of a search warrant issued against Chiu. While the
subject of the search warrant and the object to be seized
and the placed to be searched were located in Quezon City,
the application for the search warrant was filed in Pasay
City because of the possibility that the shabu would be
removed therefrom by Chiu.

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Moreover, there was a need for confidentiality, in that if

the policemen filed their application in the RTC of Quezon
City, there was a possibility that the information would
reach Chiu and his cohorts. The search conducted on the
strength of the warrant issued by the Pasay City court
yielded positive results. In his appeal before the Supreme
Court, Chiu asserts that there was no compelling reason
for the police to apply for and secure a search warrant from
the Executive Judge of the Pasay City RTC. He further
asserts that confidentiality is not a compelling
consideration for urgency and that the application for a
search warrant should have been filed in the RTC of
Quezon City which had primary jurisdiction over the
matter. Chiu urges the Supreme Court to declare the search
warrant defective and exclude the shabu seized
thereunder inadmissible in evidence.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant is defective and the shabu

seized on the strength thereof inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. "Urgent" means pressing; calling for immediate

attention. The court must take into account and
consider not only the "subject" but the time and place
of the enforcement of the search warrant as well. The
determination of the existence of compelling
considerations of urgency, and the subject, time and
place necessitating and justifying the filing of an
application for a search warrant with a court other
than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the
place to be searched and things to be seized or where
the materials are found is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court where the application is
filed, subject to review by the appellate court in case
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.
2. In this case, the application for a search warrant was

filed with the Pasay City RTC instead of the Quezon

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City RTC because of the possibility that the shabu

would be removed by Chiu from No. 29 North Road,
Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City.
Indeed, as shown by the evidence, Chiu had a
residence other than No. 29 North Road where he
sold shabu.
There was also the pervading concern of the police

officers that if they filed the application in Quezon
City where Chiu plied his illicit activities, it may
somehow come to the knowledge Chiu and his
cohorts, thus, rendering the enforcement of any
search warrant issued by the court to be a useless
effort. We find and so hold that the RTC-Pasay City
did not err in taking cognizance of and granting the
questioned application for a search warrant.
3. Additionally, Chiu did not raise, at the trial court, the

issues of the validity of the search warrant, the
propriety of its enforcement in Quezon City, as well
as the admissibility of the shabu against him on the
ground that it had been illegally seized. Chiu’s
objection to the admissibility of the search warrant
was grounded merely on the "lack of veracity (sic)"
thereof. Such omission constituted a waiver by Chiu
of the protection under Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution.
2. If the criminal action has already been filed, the application for
search warrant shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. (Section 2(b), 2nd paragraph)
3. Section 2, Rule 3 of A.M. No. 21-06-08-SC dated 29 June 2021,

otherwise known as “Rules on the Use of Body-Worn Cameras
in the Execution of Warrants”, which provides:
“Section 2. Search warrants in Special Criminal Cases by

Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts. – Except for the
jurisdiction of the Special Commercial Courts to issue
search warrants involving intellectual property rights
violations, the Executive Judges and, whenever they are on

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official leave of absence or are not physically present in the

station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the Regional Trial
Courts shall have authority to act on applications for
search warrants to be implemented within their judicial
regions, filed by the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Philippine National Police, the Anti-Crime Task Force, the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bureau of
Customs, for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001, the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act,
and other relevant laws that may later be enacted by
Congress and included in these Rules by the Supreme
Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads

of such agencies and shall particularly describe the places
to be searched and/or the properties or things to be seized
as prescribed in the Rules of court. They shall also state the
compelling reasons for filing the application with these
courts. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may
be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction, but
within the judicial regions of these courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep

a special docket book listing the names of Judges to whom
the applications are assigned, the details of the
applications, and the results of the searches and seizures
made pursuant to the warrants issued.
This shall be an exception to Section 2, Rule 126 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
4. Under Section 2.2 of A.M. No.17-11-03-SC dated 3 July 2018,

otherwise known as the “Rule on Cybercrime Warrants”, an
application for cybercrime warrant concerning a violation of
Section 4 (cybercrime offenses) and/or Section (other offenses),
Chapter II of R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)
shall be filed by the law enforcement authorities before any of
the designated cybercrime courts of the province or city:

19
(a) where the offense or any of its elements has been

committed, is being committed, or is about to be
committed; or
(b) where any part of the computer system is situated; or
(c) where any of the damage caused to a natural or juridical

person took place.
However, the cybercrime courts in Quezon City, the City of

Manila, Makati City, Pasig City, Iloilo City, Davao City and
Cagayan De Oro City shall have the special authority to act on
applications and issue warrants which shall be enforceable
nationwide and outside the Philippines.
On the other hand, an application for a warrant under the Rule

on Cybercrime Warrant for violation of Section 6, Chapter II of
R.A. No.10175 (all crimes defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code and other special laws, if committed by, through,
and with the use of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) shall be filed by the law enforcement
authorities with the regular court or other specialized regional
trial courts, as the case may be, within its territorial jurisdiction
in the places above-described.
CRIMES/OFFENSES COVERED
BY THE CYBERCRIME WARRANT:
1. Cybercrime Offenses enumerated under Section 4, as follows:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability

of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a

computer system without right.
(2) Illegal Interception. – The interception made by technical

means without right of any non-public transmission of
20
computer data to, from, or within a computer system

including electromagnetic emissions from a computer
system carrying such computer data.
(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration,

damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without
right, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses.
(4) System Interference. — The intentional alteration or

reckless hindering or interference with the functioning of
a computer or computer network by inputting,
transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or
suppressing computer data or program, electronic
document, or electronic data message, without right or
authority, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses.
(5) Misuse of Devices.
(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation,

distribution, or otherwise making available, without
right, of:
(aa) A device, including a computer program,

designed or adapted primarily for the purpose
of committing any of the offenses under this
Act; or
(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar

data by which the whole or any part of a
computer system is capable of being accessed
with intent that it be used for the purpose of
committing any of the offenses under this Act.
(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs

5(i) (aa) or (bb) above with intent to use said devices
for the purpose of committing any of the offenses
under this section.
(6) (a) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name

over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy

21
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same,

if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an

existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name
registration:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a
person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property
interests in it.
(b) Computer-related Offenses:
(1) Computer-related Forgery. —
(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer

data without right resulting in inauthentic data with
the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal
purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether
or not the data is directly readable and intelligible; or
(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is

the product of computer-related forgery as defined
herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent
or dishonest design.
(2) Computer-related Fraud. — The unauthorized input,

alteration, or deletion of computer data or program or
interference in the functioning of a computer system,
causing damage thereby with fraudulent intent.
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional

acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or
deletion of identifying information belonging to another,
whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided, That
if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable
shall be one (1) degree lower.

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(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance,

control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity,
with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts

defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided
for in Republic Act No. 9775.
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The

transmission of commercial electronic communication
with the use of computer system which seek to advertise,
sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited
unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient;

or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for

service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or
customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication

contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for
the recipient to reject. receipt of further
commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from
the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication
does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication

23
does not purposely include misleading

information in any part of the message in order
to induce the recipients to read the message.
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined

in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other
similar means which may be devised in the future.
2. Other Offenses enumerated under Section 5, as follows:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any

person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of
the offenses enumerated in the Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who

willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in
the Act shall be held liable.
3. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the
use of information and communications technologies (ICT) shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of the Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws,
as the case may be (Section 6).
Exceptions to the requirement of judicial warrant

(valid warrantless search):
1. Seizure of evidence in plain view

2. Consented search or where the right against unreasonable search
and seizure is waived by the person entitled to such right
3. Search incident to a lawful arrest
4. Stop and frisk or “Terry” search
5. Search on moving vehicle
6. Search in checkpoints
7. Customs search
8. Search in emergency or exigent circumstances

24
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES EXPLAINED
1. SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW
Statement of the rule:
A police officer - when he has the right to be in the place where he is -

may validly search and seize item which is in plain view and where its
incriminating nature is immediately apparent.
Reason:
Practical consideration as when the police is staring directly at the

instruments of a crime, it would be pointless to first obtain a search
warrant.
Requisites:
(a) Prior valid justification for intrusion
The presence of the police officer in the place must be legitimate,

as when the police officer is in the place while implementing a
valid warrant of arrest, or engaging in hot pursuit, search
incident to a lawful arrest, or implementing a search warrant for
another object, or some other legitimate reasons for being
present unconnected with the search directed against the
accused.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO SALANGUIT

(G.R. NO. 133254-55, APRIL 19, 2001)
FACTS:
The police, armed with search warrant, went to the house

of Roberto Salanguit (“Salanguit”) to seize undetermined
quantity of shabu and other drug paraphernalia. In the
course of the search, they recovered shabu and drug

25
paraphernalia. Afer the discovery of the shabu and drug

paraphernalia, the police conducted further search which
led to the discovery of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
a newspaper, which are otherwise not included in the list
of items to be seized under the subject search warrant.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a

newspaper are admissible under the “evidence in plain
view” doctrine.
RULING:
(a) The Supreme Court held that when the purpose of

the search warrant is accomplished, any further
search cannot be justified under the “plain view”
doctrine.
(b) The discovery of the dried marijuana leaves cannot

be considered valid under the plain view doctrine
because the police has no prior and valid justification
for the further intrusion. It can validly be presumed
that the shabu and drug paraphernalia were first
discovered because the police had knowledge of
their location being the applicants for the subject
search warrant.
(b) Inadvertent discovery of evidence
The incriminating object must not be purposely and specifically

sought for by the seizing officer, but merely inadvertently
discovered.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE VS. MARI MUSA

(G.R. NO. 96177, JANUARY 27, 1993)
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police against

26
Mari Musa (‘Musa”) outside the latter’s house. When the

police handed the marked money to Musa, the latter went
inside his house to get the drugs. Upon Musa’s return and
after the exchange, the members of the team swooped
down and arrested Musa. But when the arresting officers
body searched Musa, the marked money could not be
found in Musa’s possession. Upon inquiry, Musa told the
police that he gave the marked money to his wife. The
police then rushed inside the house where they found a
plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen which,
when opened, turned out to contain dried marijuana
leaves.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized dried marijuana leaves are admissible

under the “plain view” doctrine.
RULING:
1. The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used

to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search
made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.
2. What the "plain view" cases have in common is that

the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure.
Of course, the extension of the original justification

is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent

27
to the police that they have evidence before them; the

"plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
3. In the instant case, Musa was arrested and his person

searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the
NARCOM agents searched the whole house and
found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag
was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when
they arrested Musa as to justify its seizure.
The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion

of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police
officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the
marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went
from room to room with the obvious intention of
fishing for more evidence.
(c) The incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately

apparent to the seizing officer.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE VS. MARI MUSA

(G.R. NO. 96177, JANUARY 27, 1993)
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police against

Mari Musa (‘Musa”) outside the latter’s house. When the
police handed the marked money to Musa, the latter went
inside his house to get the drugs. After the exchange, the
members of the team swooped down and arrested Musa.
But when the arresting officers body searched Musa, the
marked money could not be found in Musa’s possession.
Upon inquiry, Musa told the police that he gave the

28
marked money to his wife. The police then rushed inside

the house where they found a plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen which, when opened, turned out to
contain illegal drugs.
RELEVANT ISSUE:

under the “plain view” doctrine.
RULING:
1. Even if an object is observed in "plain view," the

"plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object. Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
2. In this case, the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag

hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
clue as to its contents. They had to ask Musa what
the bag contained. When Musa refused to respond,
they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker
v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the
police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case
could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened
it.
3. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents

inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it
was within their "plain view," what may be said to
be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature
of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an

29
observer. We, therefore, hold that under the

circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine
does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section
3 (2) of the Constitution.
2. PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO SALANGUIT

(G.R. NO. 133254-55, APRIL 19, 2001)
FACTS:
The police, armed with search warrant, went to the house

of Roberto Salanguit (“Salanguit”) to seize undetermined
quantity of shabu and other drug paraphernalia. In the
course of the search, they recovered shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Afer the discovery of the shabu and drug
paraphernalia, the police conducted further search which
led to the discovery of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
a newspaper, which are otherwise not included in the list
of items to be seized under the subject search warrant.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized marijuana leaves wrapped in a

newspaper are admissible in evidence under the “plain
view” doctrine.
RULING:
1. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint.

There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa in
which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said
drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents.
2. No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an

officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In this case, the marijuana allegedly

30
found in the possession of Salanguit was in the form

of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in
newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly,
for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure
of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted
in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we
hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence
against the accused.
When incriminating nature of evidence deemed immediately

apparent
1. In seizure of evidence in plain view, the law enforcement officer

must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and its discovery inadvertent.
2. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly

exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a
closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then
the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words,
if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
3. Thus, when the object is contained in a container, the search

cannot be valid under “plain view” doctrine, except when the
container betrays its incriminating contents because of:
(a) The container’s transparency

(b) Distinctive physical configuration of the object, like an

31
armalite rifle placed inside a sack
2. CONSENTED SEARCH
The concept of “consented search” as an exception to the requirement

of a judicial warrant is premised on the principle of “waiver.” The right
to object to the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the
right against unreasonable search and seizure – just as several other
rights – may be waived. Thus, if one consents to the search of his/her
place and seizure of his/her personal effects without a warrant, such
a warrantless search and seizure is valid and evidence obtained
thereby admissible.
Requisites:
The waiver is to be strictly construed against the state. To have a valid

waiver, the following requisites must be established:
1. The right exists;
2. The person had knowledge of the existence of such right;
3. The consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary,

specific, and intelligently given; and
4. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
NOTE: Mere passive refusal to object should not be interpreted as

a waiver or consent. It is an oft-repeated ruling of the
Supreme Court that mere passive consent is more
consistent with one’s respect for authority and should not
be taken to mean that the person involved willingly and
intelligently waives the right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
Waiver is a personal right
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable search and seizure,

being personal, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his

32
or her behalf. The right to object necessarily includes the reciprocal

right not to object. If the right to object to a search and seizure is
personal to the person concerned so is the right to consent to such
search and seizure. A third party can neither invoke nor waive the
right against unreasonable search and seizure belonging to another.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE VS. BASILIO DAMASO

(G.R. NO. 93516, AUGUST 12, 1992)
FACTS:
Some members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) were sent to

verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the
group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba,
Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated,
the persons apprehended revealed that there was an
underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. The group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village
and found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45
firearm and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded to
Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba
whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados (“Morados”), a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba.
Morados stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza otherwise
known as Basilio Damaso (“Damaso”). Morados guided the
group to the house rented by Damaso. When they reached the
house, the group found that it had already been vacated by the
occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give Damaso’s new
address, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place
and requested him to point out the new house rented by
Damaso. When the group reached the house, they saw Luz
Tanciangco (“Tanciangco”) outside. Tanciangco requested the
group to go inside the house.
Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay

Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who
were companions of Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa,

33
Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda

Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow
them to look around. When Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-
14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial
beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d)
Laguna and other items. Damaso was then charged with alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with, the crime of subversion.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the search on the house rented by Damaso is valid and

the evidence obtained thereby admissible under the “consented
search” principle.
RULING:
1. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is

enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The
purpose of the law is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of
the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. However, such right is
not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless
search and seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search
incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view. None of these
exceptions is present in this case.
2. The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the

group of Lt. Quijardo entered Damaso’s house upon
invitation of Tanciangco, helper of Damaso; that when
Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw a copier
machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions,
radio set and more subversive items; that technically
speaking, there was no search as the group was voluntarily
shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a
search may be validly conducted without search warrant
with the consent of the person searched in this case,
Damaso’s helper Tanciangco allowed them to enter and to
look around the house; and that since the evidence seized

34
was in plain view of the authorities, the same may be

seized without a warrant.
3. We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from

unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose
rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the records
show that Damaso was not in his house at that time
Tanciangco, Damaso’s alleged helper, allowed the
authorities to enter it. The prosecution failed to show if
Tanciangco was authorized by Damaso to allow the search
of his rented house. Without this evidence, the authorities'
intrusion into Damao’s dwelling cannot be given any color
of legality.
3. SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
This applies when a person is validly arrested and, as an incident to

such valid arrest, a search may be effected on his/her person and
his/her immediate surrounding. The arrest must precede the search.
The arrest is valid because it is effected:
(a) pursuant to a validly issued warrant of arrest; or

(b) the arrest is made under a valid warrantless arrest.
The purpose of the incidental search is to:
(a) Find out if the person arrested has in his possession some
deadly weapon which he/she may use against the
arresting officer;
(b) Prevent the person arrested from destroying any evidence
pertaining to the commission of the crime.
Extent of the search incident to a valid arrest
The search is not only limited to the body of the person arrested; but it
extends to the immediate surroundings under the control of the
person arrested.
The obvious purpose is to prevent the suspect from possibly using a

35
deadly weapon in assaulting the police officer effecting the arrest.
NOTE:
It is humbly submitted that the search incident to a lawful arrest

warrants the search of the immediate surroundings only, and not of
the individuals who may happen to be present in the place of the
arrest. These other individuals have their individual rights to privacy
and are not under the control of the person arrested, having
independent minds of their own. Thus, unless the search on these
other persons is justified under any of the recognized warrantless
search, they cannot be subjected to a warrantless search as an incident
to another person’s lawful arrest.
Instances of valid warrantless arrest
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person

may be lawfully arrested without warrant under any of the following
instances:
(a) In flagrante delicto arrest

(b) Hot pursuit arrest
(c) Arrest of a fugitive from justice
VALID WARRANTLESS ARRESTS EXPLAINED
(A) IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
Under this principle, a warrantless arrest may be validly justified

when in the presence of the arresting officer or citizen, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
Requisites:
1. The person to be arrested must execute or perform an overt act

indicating that he has just committed, or is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and

36
2. Personal knowledge of the arresting peace officer or private

person of such overt act being performed or committed in the
presence or within the view of the arresting peace officer or
private person.
Requisites of in flagrante delicto arrest explained
1. Overt acts on the part of the person to be arrested
Not all overt acts performed by a person will warrant an in

flagrante delicto arrest. The overt acts must be indicative of a
crime, which means that the outward manifestations or acts
performed are such that would indicate that the person to be
arrested has committed, is not committing, or is about to commit
a crime. If the overt act performed is constitutive of any crime,
an in flagrante delicto arrest cannot be justified.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE VS. IDEL AMINNUDIN

(G.R.NO. 74869, JULY 6, 1988)
FACTS:
Two (2) days before the date of the arrest, the police
already received confidential report that Idel Aminnudin
(“Aminnudin”) would be arriving at the port of Iloilo City,
on board M/V Wilcon, transporting drugs. The
information of the police included the identity and
physical description of Aminnudin, the particulars of the
vessel, and the time of the arrival. Acting on the
confidential report, the police positioned themselves at the
port waiting for the vessel to arrive. True enough, when
the confidential informant identified Aminuddin, the
police arrested him without warrant and, as an incident
thereto, a warrantless search was effected on his body and
his bag, which yielded the presence of dried marijuana
leaves.

37
RELEVANT ISSUE:

in evidence under the search incident to a lawful arrest
principle.
RULING:
The warrantless search was not an incident to a lawful

arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under any of the
exceptions provided for under the law. For in flagrante
arrest to apply, it is necessary that the person arrested
should be performing an overt act indicative of a crime.
Here, the arrest did not fall under in flagrante delicto
because the accused was not committing a crime when
arrested, nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. He was merely walking in a
gangplank with no outward indication calling for his
arrest.
2. PEOPLE VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE

(G.R. NO. 87059, JUNE 22, 1992)
FACTS:
The police received an anonymous call reporting that three

(3) persons were observed acting suspiciously along a
certain alley. Responding to the call, the police dispatched
some of its operatives to the reported place. When the
police arrived, they saw Rogelio Mengote (“Mengote”)
standing in an alley, looking from side-to-side, holding his
abdomen. Suspecting that Mengote was engaged in a
criminal enterprise, the police swooped down on Mengote
and arrested him without warrant. The police conducted a
warrantless search as an incident to the warrantless arrest,
and found unlicensed firearms in Mengote’s possession.
The State theorized that the warrantless search was an
incident to a lawful arrest.

38
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized unlicensed firearm is admissible in

evidence under the principle of search incident to a lawful
arrest.
RULING:
There was nothing to support the arresting officers'

suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand
on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or was
attempted to be committed in their presence. In short, no
overt acts indicative of commission of a crime. Hence, in
flagrante delicto principle cannot apply.
3. PEOPLE VS. BINAD SY CHUA

(G.R. NOS. 136066-67, FEBRUARY 4, 2003)
FACTS:
The police received an information from a confidential

informant that Binad Sy Chua (“Chua”) would deliver
illegal drugs to a certain hotel in Baguio City. Acting on the
tip-off information, the police waited for Chua outside the
hotel and when they saw Chua arrive and alight from his
car carrying a Zest-O juice box, they arrested Chua and
searched him. The search yielded the presence of
unlicensed firearms and illegal drugs inside the box. The
State tried to justify the warrantless search as an incident
to a lawful arrest.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized unlicensed firearms and illegal drugs

are admissible in evidence under the search incident to a
lawful arrest principle
RULING:

39
In in flagrante delicto arrest, the person to be arrested must

execute an overt act indicating that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
Here, there were no overt acts on the part of Chua
indicative of a crime calling for his arrest. He was merely
alighting from his car carrying a Zest-O juice box. The
warrantless arrest was illegal and the evidence seized
inadmissible.
2. Personal knowledge on the part of the arresting peace officer

or private person
The overt act/s must be committed in the presence or within the

view of the arresting peace officer or private person as would
afford the latter personal knowledge of the crime. Even if the
person to be arrested has performed overt acts indicative of a
crime, the in flagrante delicto arrest does not apply if the arresting
peace officer or private person has no personal knowledge of the
overt acts indicating that a crime has just been committed, or is
being committed, or about to be committed.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE

(G.R. NO. 87059, JUNE 22, 1992)
FACTS:
The police received an anonymous call that three (3)

persons were seen acting suspiciously along a certain alley.
Responding to the call, the police dispatched some of its
operatives to the reported place. When the police arrived,
they saw Rogelio Mengote (“Mengote”) standing in an
alley, looking from side-to-side, and holding his abdomen.
Suspecting that Mengote was engaged in a criminal
enterprise, the police swooped down on Mengote and
arrested him without warrant. Thereupon, the police
conducted a warrantless search as an incident to the
warrantless arrest, and found unlicensed firearm in
Mengote’s possession. The State theorized that the
warrantless search was an incident to a lawful arrest.

40
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized unlicensed firearm is admissible under

the search incident to a lawful arrest principle.
RULING:
1. The truth is that the police did not know then what
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of
Mengote. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they
learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal
possession of the firearm found on Mengote's
person, the policemen discovered this only after he
had been searched and the investigation conducted
later revealed that he was not its owner nor was he
licensed to possess it. Before these events, the Peace
officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity,
let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was
unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was
involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
2. It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be

summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because
of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act
or is actually committing or attempting it. This
simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a
police state where order is exalted over liberty or,
worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting
officer may be justified in the name of security.
NOTE:
The requirement of “personal knowledge” does not only contemplate

of a situation where the arresting peace officer or private person

41
personally observed through his/her sense of sight the commission of

an overt act indicative of a crime. It also extends to situation where the
personal knowledge was obtained by the arresting officer through
his/her senses other than his/her sense of sight.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANITA CLAUDIO

(G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 1988)
FACTS:
Police Officer Daniel Obiña (“Obiña”) boarded a bus in going

back to Olongapo City. He was seated on the second seat at the
back. Anita Claudio (“Claudio”) boarded the same bus and took
the seat in front of Obiña after putting a bag which she was
carrying at the back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by
Claudio behind Obiña’s seat was a woven buri bag made of
plastic containing some vegetables. The act of Claudio in putting
her bag behind Obiña's seat aroused Obiña’s suspicion and made
him feel nervous. With the feeling that there was something
unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it
was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to
the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at
the bottom of the woven buri bag and smelt marijuana. The
plastic woven buri bag appearing to contain camote tops on the
top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. Obiña
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned
at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not,
however, do anything after he discovered that there was
marijuana inside the plastic bag of Claudio until they reached
Olongapo City and Claudio alighted from the bus. Right after
Claudio alighted from the bus, Obiña intercepted her and
showed her his ID identifying himself as a policeman and told
her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was
carrying marijuana inside said bag. He then handcuffed Claudio
and brought her to the police headquarters. At the police
headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched and a
big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one
kilo was found. Claudio contends her arrest and the warrantless
search and seizure of her woven buri bag containing marijuana
leaves were unlawful.

42
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the marijuana leaves found inside the woven buri bag
are admissible in evidence under the search incident to a lawful
arrest principle.
RULING:
1. The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the
said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,

arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (12a)
2. Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Police

Officer Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as
the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless
search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1
kilos of marijuana.
NOTE:
The requirement of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting

peace officer or private person applies only in situations where the
arrest precedes the search (in flagrante arrest resulting in incidental
search). But if the situation is the reverse in that the search precedes
the arrest, personal knowledge is not required. Instead, probable cause
will suffice to justify warrantless search, in which case probable cause
may be based on a “reliable tipped-off information” which matched
with what the arresting person actually observed at the time of the

43
search.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE VS. ZENAIDA QUEBRAL, ET. AL.

(G.R. NO. 185379, NOVEMBER 27, 2009)
FACTS:
The police held a briefing regarding a police informer’s report

that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a
specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug,
on the following day at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas to
Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list. After a
short briefing, PO3 Cecilio Galvez (“Galvez”) and six other
police officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas
Exit at Burol 2nd, watching out for the owner type jeep
mentioned. Since the informer did not give the exact time of the
delivery of shabu, the police officers staked out the expressway
exit until late afternoon. At around 4:00 p.m., such a jeep, bearing
the reported plate number and with two men and a woman on
board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two
men as accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove the jeep, and
Fernando Lopez and the woman as Zenaida Quebral. The police
trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the town proper of Balagtas
and entered a Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.
After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which Michael
Salvador alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked to
Quebral, who then handed a white envelope to him. On seeing
this, Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters in a tinted
car, signaled his back-up team to move. The police officers
alighted from their vehicles and surrounded the jeep. Galvez
took the envelope from Salvador, opened it, and saw five plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance which he believed
was shabu.
The accused invoked the rule that a person may be arrested even
without a warrant only a) if he is caught in the act of committing
a crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the arresting
officer pursued him, or c) if he escaped from a legal confinement.
But in the first two instances, the officer must have personal
knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target person’s

44
observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident

from those acts, no valid arrest can be made. An informant
whispering to the police officer’s ear that the person walking or
standing on the street has committed or is committing a crime
will not do. The arresting officer must himself perceive the
manifestations of a crime. In this case, the police officers cannot
say that what they saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two
men and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas station. A
third man approached the jeep, spoke to the woman and she
handed him a folded white envelope that appeared to contain
something. These acts do not constitute a crime per se.
Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal. The
subsequent search of their persons, not being based on a valid
arrest, was itself illegal.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized sachets of shabu are admissible in evidence

under the search incident to a lawful arrest principle.
RULING:
1. But, actually, it was more of a search preceding an arrest.

The police officers had information that two men and a
woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in
Balagtas and hand over a consignment of shabu at a gas
station in town to a known drug dealer whose name was
on the police watch list. When these things unfolded before
their eyes as they watched from a distance, the police came
down on those persons and searched them, resulting in the
discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their
possession. In such a case, the search is a valid search
justifying the arrest that came after it.
2. It would have been impractical for the police to apply with

the appropriate court for a search warrant since their
suspicion found factual support only at the moment
accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida
Quebral rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the
Petron gas station for the hand over of the drugs. An
immediate search was warranted since they would have
gone away by the time the police could apply for a search
warrant. The drugs could be easily transported and

45
concealed with impunity.
3. The case of People v. Aminnudin cannot apply to this case.

In Aminnudin, the informant gave the police the name and
description of the person who would be coming down
from a ship the following day carrying a shipment of
drugs. In such a case, the Court held that the police had
ample time to seek a search warrant against the named
person so they could validly search his luggage. In the
present case, all the information the police had about the
persons in possession of the prohibited drugs was that
they were two men and a woman on board an owner type
jeep. A search warrant issued against such persons could
be used by the police to harass practically anyone.
(B) HOT PURSUIT ARREST
When an offense has just been committed and the arresting peace
officer or private person has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it (Section 5 (2), Rule 113, Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
Requisites:
(1) An offense has just been committed (immediacy); and

(2) The person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed the offense.
NOTE:
Hot pursuit arrest should not be confused with in flagrante arrest.

While hot pursuit arrest also requires personal knowledge on the part
of the arresting person, the personal knowledge in hot pursuit is
different from the personal knowledge required under an in flagrante
arrest. Hot pursuit arrest does not require the arresting person to
personally witness the commission of the offense or that the crime be
committed in the presence or within the view of the arresting person.
Instead, the personal knowledge required in hot pursuit arrest refers
to “the facts and circumstances indicating that the crime may have

46
been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it.”
Requisites for hot pursuit arrest explained
1. Immediacy of the arrest
The arrest should be immediately effected. The requirement of

immediacy must be reckoned from the time of the commission
of the offense in relation to the time of arrest, and not from
knowledge of the commission of the crime.
Immediacy how determined
There is no hard and fast rule to determine how immediate is

“immediate.” The prevailing guiding principle is the presence of
“unbroken chain of events” from commission of the crime to the
actual arrest, which means that there must be no appreciable
interval of time. Immediacy of arrest is not a straitjacketed
concept but is to be determined on the basis of the attending
circumstances in each case. The Supreme Court in a number of
jurisprudence interpreted “immediacy” in a variety of ways
without, however, defining it by a fixed mathematical formula.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
(a) Where arrest was deemed “not immediate”
1. People vs. Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson

(G.R. No. 102140, April 22, 1994)
- the arrest was effected 19 hours from the
commission of Murder
2. People of the Philippines vs. Joselito del Rosario

(G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999)
– arrest was effected one (1) day from the
commission of Robbery and Homicide
3. People vs. Rafael Olivares and Danilo Arellano

(G.R. No. 77865 December 4, 1998)
– arrest was effected two (2) days from

47
commission of the crime of Robbery and

Homicide
4. People vs. Jose Monda and Nestor Balbalosa

(G.R. Nos. 105000-01 November 22, 1993)
– arrest was effected three (3) days from the
ambush
5. Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.

(G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992)
- arrest was effected six (6) days from
commission of Murder.
(b) Where arrest was deemed “immediate”
1. Robin Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997)
– arrest was effected less than an hour from the
hit and run incident
2. People vs. Gabriel Gerente

(G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993)
– arrest was effected three (3) hours from the
killing
3. People vs. Albert Abriol, et. al.

(G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001)
– arrest was effected few minutes after the
killing.
2. Personal knowledge on the part of the arresting person
The requirement that “the arresting person must have personal

knowledge” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean
that ‘the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that a crime may
have been committed and the person to be arrested has
committed it.’

48
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE VS. ALBERT ABRIOL, ET. AL.

(G.R. NO. 123137, OCTOBER 17, 2001)
FACTS:
PO3 Alexander Rustela (“Rustela”) was at a vulcanizing

shop near the intersection of Bacalso Avenue and Leon
Kilat Street, Cebu City when he heard gunshots coming
from the north. He ran towards where the gunshots came
from and saw people scampering. All of a sudden, a "Jiffy"
with three persons on board sped past him and made an
abrupt left turn at Leon Kilat Street. Rustela immediately
radioed for assistance and broadcasted an alarm to police
headquarters and other mobile patrol cars. On nearby
Colon Street, SPO1 Eleazar Abrigana (“Abrigana”) and
PO2 Romeo Abellana (“Abellana”) heard a radio message
that the suspects in the shooting incident were aboard a
"Jiffy." As they turned left at Leon Kilat Street, they saw the
"Jiffy" heading towards Carbon Market. They pursued the
"Jiffy" which stopped when another police car, with PO
Eugenio Badrinas (“Badrinas”) and PO2 Gerald Cue
(“Cue”) aboard, blocked the "Jiffy's" path. Cue fired a
warning shot and three persons alighted. The driver was
accused Astellero, whom Cue had recognized and seen
before. Abrigana and Cue approached the trio who stood
a meter away from the "Jiffy." Abrigana frisked Abriol and
seized from his waist a .38 caliber revolver with six (6)
empty shells in its cylinder. Under Abriol's seat, the police
also found two (2) .45 caliber pistols with live
ammunitions. On their conviction for illegal possession of
firearms, the accused contend that the handguns and
ammunition allegedly taken from them by the police
officers were illegally seized without warrant, such that
these illegally seized firearms were inadmissible as
evidence.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized firearms and ammunitions are

49
admissible in evidence under the search incident to a

lawful arrest principle.
RULING:
1. The warrantless search and seizure of the subject

handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons.
It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was
made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a fast-
moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police
officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the
part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects
aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal
activity. The urgent need of the police to take
immediate action in the light of the foregoing
exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for
warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court.
2. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with

firearms and ammunition which they were not
authorized to carry, the accused were actually
violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid
arrest under the Rules.
2. JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III VS. P/SUPT. GERMAN B.

DORIA AND SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ
(G.R. NO. 170672, AUGUST 14, 2009)
FACTS:
P/Supt. Doria (“Doria”) received a telephone call about a

shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3
Ramirez (“Ramirez”) to investigate the incident. Ramirez
later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while Judge Felimon Abelita (“Judge Abelita”), who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of
the incident. Doria then looked for Judge Isabelita and
when he found him, he informed Judge Isabelita of the
incident and requested the latter to go with him to the
police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in
the incident. Judge Isabelita agreed but suddenly sped up
his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. Doria and his

50
companions chased Judge Isabelita. Upon reaching Judge

Isabelita’s residence, the police caught up with Judge
Isabelita as he was about to run towards his house. The
police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle
beside the driver’s seat as Judge Isabelita opened the door.
They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat.
The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested
Judge Isabelita and was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and frustrated murder. By way of getting back at
the police officers who arrested him, Judge Isabelita filed a
civil action for damages against Doria and Ramirez. He
claimed that his arrest and the search were unlawful, in
that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting
officer must have personal knowledge of facts that the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Since
the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the
arresting officers, then they have no personal knowledge
of facts as required by the Rules.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and

seizure were illegal.
RULING:
1. For the warrantless arrest under hot pursuit, two

requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just
committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
2. Personal knowledge of facts must be based on

probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the

51
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion,

therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
Section 5 (2), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense
with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria
received a report about the alleged shooting incident.
SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned
from witnesses that Judge Isabelita was involved in
the incident. They were able to track down Judge
Isabelita, but when invited to the police headquarters
to shed light on the incident, he initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities
to give chase. Judge Isabelita’s act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to
the existence of probable cause.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GABRIEL GERENTE

(G.R. NO. 95847-48. MARCH 10, 1993)
FACTS:
The police station received a report about a mauling

incident. Acting on the report, the police went to the crime
scene to investigate, where they saw the dead body of the
victim and the murder weapon. A witness told them that
Gabriel Gerente (“Gerente”) was the one who killed the
victim. They then proceeded to the house of Gerente and
arrested him without a warrant. The arrest took place three
hours after the murder.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest of Gerente was valid.
RULING:

52
1. While Gerente’s arrest cannot be justified under in

flagrante because the crime was not committed in the
presence or within the view of the arresting police
officers, the arresting police officers had personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances indicating
that a crime has been committed and that Gerente
has committed it.
2. The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)

hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon
him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the
killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
4. ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997)
FACTS:
Enrique Manarang (“Manarang”) and his compadre

Danny Perez (“Perez”) were inside the Manukan sa
Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City. While
inside the restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a
Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway
prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into
an accident considering the inclement weather. True
enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle

53
running very fast followed by a sickening sound of the

vehicle hitting something. Manarang and his companion
went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a
slight tilt to its side. Manarang, being a member of both the
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster
Coordinating Council, decided to radio the Philippine
National Police of Angeles City and reported the incident.
By the time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had
started to leave the place of the accident taking the general
direction to the north. Manarang went to the location of the
accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody.
He then rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle.
During the chase he was able to make out the plate number
of the vehicle. He again radioed the police and reported the
vehicle’s plate number which was then heading to the
north. SP02 Ruby Buan (“Buan”), upon receipt of the
second radio call, flashed the message to all units of PNP
Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle.
Upon receipt of the flash message, SPO2 Juan C. Borja III
(“Borja”) and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda (“Miranda”)
immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle and
positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan
bridge since it was the only passable way going to the
north. Another police officers who responded to the flash
message of Buan were SPO Ruben Mercado (“Mercado”)
and SPO3 Tan (“Tan”) and SPO2 Odejar (“Odejar”). When
the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from the
abacan bridge, Borja and Miranda boarded their Mobile
car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe
light and drove out to intercept the vehicle. They cut into
the path of the vehicle forcing it to stop. Borja and Miranda
alighted from the patrol car and Miranda went to the
vehicle and instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled
down the window and put his head out while raising both
his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla
(“Padilla”). Miranda told Padilla to alight from the vehicle
which Padilla obliged. Padilla was wearing a short leather
jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands
raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was
revealed, its butt protruding. After disarming Padilla,
Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was
angrily denied by Padilla. While Borja and Padilla were

54
arguing, Mercado, Tan and Odejar arrived. As the most

senior police officer in the group, Mercado took over the
matter and informed Padilla that he was being arrested for
the hit and run incident. He pointed out to Padilla the fact
that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the
railing and the hood were dented. Padilla, however,
arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with
the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and
pointing to Borja with his right hand. Because Padilla’s
jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of
an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket . Mercado
saw this and so when Padilla turned around as he was
talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated
the magazine from Padilla. Suspecting that Padilla could
also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a
magazine, Mercado prevented Padilla from going back to
his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padilla’s vehicle,
where he saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at
the front by the driver 's seat. The police then arrested
Padilla without warrant.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized firearms and ammunitions are

admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. The policemen's warrantless arrest of Padilla could

likewise be justified under Section 5, paragraph (b)
of Rule 113 as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run
and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw
for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of Padilla,
its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by
Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
thereof. These formed part of the arresting police
officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that Padilla’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved
in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting

55
police officers acted upon verified personal

knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
information.
5. ROLITO GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 101837 FEBRUARY 11, 1992)
FACTS:
Eldon Maguan (“Maguan”) was driving his car when he

nearly bumped the car of Rolito Go (“Go”) who entered a
one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. Go alighted from his car, walked over
and shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to take down Go’s car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and
there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the
Land Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the

shooting to find out where the suspect had come from.
They were informed that Go had dined at a nearby bake
shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by Go from
the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake
shop was shown a picture of Go and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
The police launched a manhunt for Go. Six (6) days after
the shooting, Go presented himself before the police
station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by
the police. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station
at that time, positively identified Go as the gunman.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the arrest of Go six (6) days after the killing of

Maguan was illegal.

56
RULING:
1. The warrantless "arrest" or detention of Go does not

fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Go’s "arrest" took
place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning
of Section 5(b).
2. Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any

"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was
the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information
upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting — one stated that Go was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered
in Go’s wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus
clear that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
Go within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
NOTE:
1. In a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the

preceding arrest must be clearly established. An arrest is
the taking of a person into custody in order that he/she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
There must be an intention on the part of the person
effecting the arrest to place the suspect in custody resulting
in the suspect being restrained of his/her liberty or
otherwise deprived of his/her freedom of action. A mere
act of accosting a person without intention of placing
him/her under restriction does not amount to an arrest in
contemplation of the rules. Consequently, any warrantless
search conducted as an incident thereto cannot be justified
under the principle of “search incident to a lawful arrest”

57
and any evidence seized thereby is inadmissible.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. RODEL LUZ VS. PEOPLE

(G.R. NO. 197788, FEBRUARY 29, 2012)
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza (“Alteza’), who was then

assigned as a traffic enforcer, flagged down Rodel Luz
(“Luz”), for driving a motorcycle without a helmet, in
violation of a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving. Alteza
then invited Luz to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down Luz was almost in front of
the said sub-station. While Alteza was issuing a citation
ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, Alteza noticed
that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from
his jacket. Alteza was alerted and so, he told Luz to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it. Luz obliged and slowly put out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches
in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors
and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container,
Alteza asked Luz to open it and Alteza noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it. Upon Alteza’s instruction,
Luz spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2)
of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu. Luz was then arrested.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized sachets of shabu are admissible in

evidence.
RULING:
1. Luz was flagged down and apprehended by Alteza

for violation of a City Ordinance requiring the use of

58
crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders

thereon. Luz himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged
down albeit he had a helmet in his possession.
Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of Alteza
to flag down and arrest Luz because the latter was
actually committing a crime in their presence, that is,
a violation of a City Ordinance. Being caught in
flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by
the apprehending officers.
2. However, Luz was not arrested. When he was

flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest,
is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
3. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and

Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with
a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
“SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. — Law

enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver
for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt
prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period

59
not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of

issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall
not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days
from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations

Manual provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
“SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting

Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The
mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a
Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicle’s occupants;
At the time Luz was waiting for Alteza to write his citation
ticket, Luz could not be said to have been "under arrest."
There was no intention on the part of Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior
to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which Luz
was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that Luz had
been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence,
it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take Luz into
custody. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
2. ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR VS. PEOPLE

(G.R. NO. 182534 SEPTEMBER 2, 2015)
FACTS:
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) and civilian agent Ronald Tangcoy

60
(Tangcoy) saw Ongcoma Hadji Homar (“Homar”)

crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard.
They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at
the pedestrian crossing area. Homar picked up something
from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy
conducted a thorough search on Homar’s body and found
and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he
suspected as shabu. Homar was then charged with and
prosecuted for the offense of illegal possession of shabu.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized sachets of shabu is admissible in

evidence.
RULING:
1. To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in

evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or
not the search which yielded the alleged contraband
was lawful. There must be a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, which must precede the search. For this
purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed.
2. In the present case, Homar’s warrantless arrest was

due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante
delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy. To
constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence of or within the view of the arresting
officer. The prosecution, however, did not proffer
any other proof to establish that the requirements for
a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied
with. Particularly, the prosecution failed to prove
that Homar was committing a crime. The police
failed to specifically identify the area where Homar

61
allegedly crossed. Homar was also not charged of

jaywalking.
These are pieces of evidence that could have

supported the conclusion that indeed Homar was
committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was
valid.
3. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order

that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest,
is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
In this case, no arrest preceded the search on the

person of Homar. When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly
saw Homar jaywalking, they did not arrest him but
accosted him and pointed to him the right place for
crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and
Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to
cross [at] the designated area." Tan and Tangcoy did
not intend to bring Homar under custody or to
restrain his liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him
was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal
charge that was filed against Homar for crossing a
"no jaywalking" area.
From Tan’s testimony, the intent to arrest Homar

only came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu
from Homar, for which they informed him of his
constitutional rights and brought him to the police
station.

62
(C) ARREST OF AN ESCAPEE OR FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
Applies when the person to be arrested is:
(a) A prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place

where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending; or
(b) Has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to

another.
3. STOP AND FRISK OR “TERRY” SEARCH
The “Terry” doctrine is of two parts: The “stop” and the “frisk.” This
is allowed if the officer has a reasonable belief based on a genuine
reason and in the light of the officer’s experience and the surrounding
circumstances, that a crime has either taken place or is about to take
place and the person to be stopped is armed and dangerous.
Requisites:
1. Valid stop – requires that the peace officer has a reasonable and
articulable belief that criminal activity has happened or is afoot
or is about to happen.
2. Frisk – must be done because of a reasonable belief that the

person stopped is in possession of a weapon that will pose a
danger to the peace officer and others. It must be a mere pat
down outside the person’s outer garment.
3. The peace officer must identify himself as a policeman, and then

ask reasonable inquiry.
Justification for the rule:
Practical consideration demands that the officer is entitled to protect

himself and others in the same area from possible danger that may be

63
posed by the person stopped who may be armed with a dangerous

weapon that he might use against the accosting officer or any person
within the same vicinity.
In the “stop” and “frisk” or “Terry” search, the warrantless search

precedes the arrest. Thus, this is to be distinguished from “search
incident to a lawful arrest”, where a lawful arrest precedes the search.
Moreover, in “Terry” search, the search is limited only to the outer
clothing of the person being stopped and frisked. The "sole
justification" for a stop-and-frisk was the "protection of the police
officer and others nearby" while the scope of the search conducted in
the case was limited to patting down the outer clothing of the person
being stopped and frisked and his companions, without placing his
hands in their pockets nor under the outer surface of their garments
until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and
removed the weapon. It must not constitute a general exploratory
search; while in search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the search is
more intrusive and generally exploratory.
Condition sine qua non for a valid “Terry” search
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it

nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. A "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.

64
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. JOHN TERRY V. STATE OF OHIO

(392 U.S. 1, 88 S. CT. 1868, 20 L. ED. 2D 889 [1968])
FACTS:
Two men repeatedly walked past a store window and returned

to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This
aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced
officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they were sizing
up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer
approached the men, he spun them around and frisked them and
concealed weapons were discovered.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized weapons are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
The seized weapons are admissible in evidence. Where a police

officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.
2. ROMEO POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 89139 AUGUST 2, 1990)
FACTS:
While some police operatives were conducting surveillance at a

certain area reportedly frequented by criminals, they saw Romeo

65
Posadas (“Posada”) walking, carrying a buri bag and acting

suspiciously. The police approached Posadas and identified
themselves as police officers, but Posadas tried to flee. The
police officers gave chase and caught up with Posados. They
then searched the buri bag which was then in possession of
Posadas which turned out to contain some unlicensed firearms.
Posadas was arrested and the firearms seized.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search was valid and the seized

unlicensed firearms and ammunitions admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can

be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without
a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by
this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, as follows:
“Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that

he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the

curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a
light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is

susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of

66
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,

discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
2. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure

conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require
the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
3. ALAIN MANALILI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 113447 OCTOBER 9, 1997)
FACTS:
The police officers, while conducting a surveillance in the

vicinity of the Caloocan City cemetery, saw Alain Manalili
(“Manalili”) walking wobbly and with reddish eyes. Acting on
this unusual conduct, the police approached Manalili and body
searched him which yielded marijuana leaves.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the seized marijuana leaves are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the

landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was
defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,

67
and pat him for weapons.
2. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another

exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure
could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case,
members of the Integrated National Police of Davao
stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-
cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live
ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In
upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they
had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such
a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur.
3. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his

companions observed during their surveillance that
Manalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along
the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police
information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From
his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop Manalili
to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During
such investigation, they found marijuana in Manalili’s
possession.
NOTE:
The “stop” and “frisk” as conceived in Terry vs. Ohio

contemplated a limited search by “patting down” the outer
clothing of the person being stopped and frisked. However, a
more intrusive search was involved in both Posadas and Manalili,

68
but the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the warrantless

search under the “Terry Search” doctrine. It, thus, appears that
in our jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopted a rather
expanded concept of “stop” and “frisk” as to include even an
extensive or intrusive search.
5. SAMMY MALACAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 123595 DECEMBER 12, 1997)
FACTS:
Police Officer Rodolfo Yu (“Yu”), in response to bomb threats

reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol with three other
police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with
each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite
sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug
Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . .
moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for
about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one
group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat (“Malacat”). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found
a fragmentation grenade tucked inside his "front waist line."
Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan (“Casan”) from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station. The trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop
and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from Malacat [as an
appropriate incident to his arrest,"
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search was valid under “stop-and-

frisk” principle and the seized fragmentation grenade
admissible.
RULING:
1. The trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk"

69
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two

types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental
to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and
the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as
evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
2. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or

hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. Having thus
shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case,
plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have
been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
3. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable

scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry.
There are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk"
was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat

was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated
by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness,
this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine
reason existed so as to arrest and search Malacat. If only to

70
further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary

to his claim that Malacat and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest
expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5)
other police officers, Malacat and his companions were
"immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s behavior or

conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast"
— an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise,

to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that
Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu. When the policemen approached Malacat
and his companions, they were not yet aware that a
handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not
see any bulging object in [sic] his person. What is
unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of
Malacat’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and
12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
4. SEARCH IN CHECKPOINTS
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid as long as they are

warranted by the exigencies of public peace and order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search (Ricardo Valmonte vs. General Renato
De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989)

71
EXCEPTION:
Where there is “probable cause” to believe that the motorist is a law

offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense, an extensive search of the vehicle and the persons on
board may be extensively conducted without warrant.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
1. PEOPLE VS. VICTOR VINECARIO, ARNOLD ROBLE, AND

GERLYN WATES
(G.R. NO. 141137, JANUARY 20, 2004)
FACTS:
Pursuant to Comelec resolution imposing gun ban, the Davao

City police put up a checkpoint at a certain highway. A
motorcycle with three men on board sped past them. One of the
police blew his whistle and ordered them to return to the
checkpoint. When asked why they sped past the checkpoint, one
of them said he was a member of the army, but failed to produce
any ID. All three were acting suspiciously and the police noticed
a military backpack slung over the shoulder of one of the
passengers. The three passengers then took turns at passing the
backpack to each other. Suspecting that the backpack contained
a bomb, one of the police officers opened the bag, which yielded
marijuana. The three passengers where then arrested.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search was valid and the seized

marijuana admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. The arrest, search and seizure were valid. Although the

general rule is that motorists and their vehicles passing
through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine
inspection, vehicles may be extensively searched when
there is probable cause to believe that the motorist is a law

72
offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been

instruments of some offense.
2. In light then of the suspects speeding away after noticing

the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down
by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures
when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which
they passed to one another, and the representation by one
of them that he was a member of the Philippine Army,
apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from
proceeding with their inspection – there existed probable
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that they were offenders of the law or that the
contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.
5. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES
Justification for the exception:
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in

recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such

would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. In this particular type of search, the search
must not be discriminatory and the vehicle is the target, not a specific
passenger.

73
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RENANTE COMPRADO

(G.R. NO. 213225, APRIL 4, 2018)
FACTS:
A confidential informant sent a text message to the police of

Cagayan de Oro City that an alleged courier of marijuana
together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan,
Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack
containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to
Cagayan de Oro City. Thereafter, the confidential informant
informed the police that the alleged drug courier had boarded a
bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound
for Cagayan de Oro City. The confidential informant further
reported that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and
violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Acting on the
report, the police put up a checkpoint. At the checkpoint, the
policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body and plate
numbers. The police manning the checkpoint boarded the bus
and saw a man matching the description given to them by the
confidential informant. The man was seated at the back of the
bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After the police asked the
man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent
cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves. The State justified
the warrantless search under search of moving vehicle.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the dried marijuana leaves are admissible in evidence

under search of moving vehicle principle.
RULING:
1. The appellate court, in convicting Comprado, reasoned

that the search and seizure is valid because it could be
considered as search of a moving vehicle. Warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant
under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the

74
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases,

however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
[an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure
and destruction.
2. The search in this case, however, could not be classified as

a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of
search, the vehicle is the target and not a· specific person.
Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was
intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It
is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police
officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was
carrying marijuana such that when the police officers
boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not
the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case,
it just so happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus
passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches
on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to
unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by
the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride
a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of
that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when it
arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target
person.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAIME SISON,

LEONARDO YANSON, AND ROSALIE BAUTISTA
(G.R. NO. 238453, 31 JULY 2019)
FACTS:
The Police Station of M’lang, North Cotabato received a radio

message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate number
61911 and carrying three (3) people—that was transporting
marijuana from Pikit. The police then set up a checkpoint and

75
stopped the reported vehicle. The team leader asked the driver
about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an
officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of
marijuana were discovered beside the engine. The vehicle, its
driver, and its passengers were brought to the local police
station. The driver and the two (2) passengers were later
identified as Jaime Sison, Rosalie Bautista, and Leonardo
Yanson, respectively. They were then arrested and detained and
charged with violation of the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. The trial court convicted the three (3) accused; but only
Yanson appealed his conviction. He contended that the two (2)
sacks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, Bautista, and
Sison are inadmissible in evidence since the police officers did
not have probable cause to conduct a search on their vehicle. He
noted that the radio message supposedly received by the police
officers was "[t]he sole basis for their belief of the alleged
transportation of marijuana[.] He further claimed that "searches
at checkpoints, in the absence of probable cause, should be
limited only to a visual search. Thus, the further instruction for
Sison to open the hood of their pickup amounted to an
unreasonable intrusion and violation of privacy. He also argued
that Sison could never have freely consented to an extensive
search considering how, when they were flagged down and
asked about opening the hood, he was surrounded by police
officers and could not feel secure in declining.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search was valid under search of

moving vehicle principle and the seized sacks of marijuana
leaves admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. A search of a moving vehicle is one (1) of the few

permissible exceptions where warrantless searches can be
made. This exception is easy to understand. A search
warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made
in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But
it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other
motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.

76
However, for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to

be valid, probable cause remains imperative. Law
enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct
searches. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however,
does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made
within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
2. In determining the existence of probable cause, bare

suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not
demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify
conviction, it requires the existence of "a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged. In warrantless searches, law
enforcers "must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance." What is required is the "presence of more
than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity." Indeed, it is unlikely that a law enforcer's
suspicion is reasonably roused at the sight of a single
activity, which may very well be innocent. It is far more
likely that there first be several, continuous, peculiar acts
of a suspect before any law enforcer's suspicion is roused.
At every peculiar act done, a law enforcer's suspicion is
successively confirmed and strengthened.
3. There have been a number of cases where this Court

considered warrantless searches made in moving vehicles
to be valid. In these cases, probable cause was founded on
more than just a solitary suspicious circumstance.
In People v. Malmstedt, Narcotics Command officers set

up a temporary checkpoint in response to "persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
These included information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. At the
checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it,

77
starting from the front, going towards the rear. The bus
turned out to be the vehicle boarded by the accused. Upon
reaching the accused, an officer noticed a bulge on his
waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's
passport and identification papers, which the accused
failed to provide. The accused was then made to reveal
what was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be hashish,
a derivative of marijuana.
In Malmstedt, this Court ruled that the warrantless search

was valid because there was probable cause--premised on
circumstances other than the original tip concerning a
Caucasian person for the arresting officers to search the
accused. It was only when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only
managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused
was trying to hide his identity.
Thus, here, the arresting officers' search and subsequent

seizure are invalid. As such, the two (2) sacks of marijuana
supposedly being transported in the pickup cannot be
admitted in evidence.
3. MARCELO G. SALUDAY vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. No. 215305, APRIL 3, 2018)
FACTS:
A bus was flagged down by military personel at a checkpoint in

Davao City. One of the military personnel manning the
checkpoint requested all male passengers to disembark from the
vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside.
He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the
entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and
suspicious individuals. He also checked all the baggage and
personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack
bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He
lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. He then
looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a

78
man in a white shirt (later identified as Marcelo Saluday) kept

peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Afterwards, the military personnel asked who the owner of the
bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that Saluday and
his brother were the ones seated at the back. The military
personnel then requested Saluday to board the bus and open the
bag. Saluday obliged and the bag revealed the following
contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial
number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions;
(3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting
knife. Saluday was then asked to produce proof of his authority
to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, Saluday
was immediately arrested and informed of his rights.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search of the bus was legal and the
seized firearms and ammunitions admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure

ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence,
only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of
privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth
Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does
not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of
privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State
intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. A survey of Philippine case law
would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To
illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court declared airport
searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure
clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that
society will regard as reasonable:
“Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure

clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come

79
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers

attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what
the objects are. There is little question that such searches
are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures.
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Court described

seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground that
the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right
to privacy:
“Routine baggage inspections conducted by port

authorities, although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure
the safety of the traveling public.”
xxxx
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the

color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case.
Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures
are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to
routine security procedures in airports.
xxxx

80
Port authorities were acting within their duties and

functions when [they] used x-ray scanning machines for
inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-
ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the
port authorities had probable cause to conduct search of
petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.
In People v. Breis, the Court also justified a bus search

owing to the reduced expectation of privacy of the riding
public.
2. Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a

shopping mall are all private property whose owners have
every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same
time, however, because these private premises are
accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can
impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those
going in. The only difference in the imposition of security
measures by an owner and the State is, the former
emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article
429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the
exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety.
Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises
that are accessible to the public.
3. Thus, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao

at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public
transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, the military personnel
merely lifted Saluday’s bag. This visual and minimally
intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray
and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport
terminals where passengers may further be required to
open their bags and luggages. Considering the
reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding
the necessity for a warrant.

81
4. PEOPLE VS. JERRY SAPLA

(G.R. NO.244045, 16 JUNE 2020)
FACTS:
The pólice received a phone call from a concerned citizen that a

certain male individual would be transporting marijuana from
Kalinga to Isabela. This was followed by a text message that the
man who would be transporting marijuana was wearing a
collared white short with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying
a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with specified plate
number bound for Isabela. Acting on the tipped-information,
the police put up a joint checkpoint at a strategic area where the
passenger jeepney was reported to be passing by. When the
reported passenger jeepney reached the checkpoint, the police
flagged it down and told the driver to park the vehicle by the
roadside. The police approached the jeepney and saw Jerry Sapla
(“Sapla”) seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police then
asked Sapla if he was the owner of the blue sack in front of him.
When Sapla answered in the affirmative, the police asked him to
open the blue sack. After the blue sack was opened, the police
saw four (4) bricks of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a
newspaper and an old calendar. The police then arrested Sapla
and seized the four (4) bricks of suspected marijuana leaves.
Sapla was prosecuted for violation of the provisions of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of
a moving vehicle.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search was valid under search of

moving vehicle principle and the seized marijuana leaves
admissible in evidence.
RULING:
1. Citing Comprado which held that ‘in search of a moving

vehicle, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person,’
the Supreme Court ruled that the target of the search
conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by
Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the vehicle. The target

82
of the search was the person who matched the description

given by the informant, i.e., the person wearing a collared
short with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue
sack. Therefore, the search conducted cannot be
characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.
2. Even if the search conducted can be characterized as a

search of a moving vehicle, the operation undertaken by
the police cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of
a moving vehicle. In People vs. Gerrjan Manago (G.R.
No.212340, 17 August 2016), the Supreme Court explained
that a variant of searching moving vehicle without a
warrant may entail the setting up of military or police
checkpoints. The setting up of such checkpoints is not
illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the
exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists. However, in order for a search of
vehicles in checkpoints to be non-violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable search and seizure,
the search must be limited to the following:
(a) Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of

a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;
(b) Where the officer simply looks into the vehicle;
(c) Where the officer flashes a light therein without
opending the car doors;
(d) Where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
or body search;
(e) Where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and the routine
check is conducted in a fixed area.
3. Routine inspection do not give the authorities carte

blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless
searches in the absence of probable cause. When the
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as
opposed to a mere routine inspection, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched. A more extensive or intrusive

83
search that goes beyond a mere visual search necessitates

probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.
4. The singular circumstance that engendered probable cause

on the part of the police officers was the information they
received via text from an anonymous person. The mere
reception of a text message from an anonymous person
does not suffice to create probable cause to justify the
conduct of an extensive or intrusive search without a
warrant. Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no
matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion. The police officer
should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.
The police officer, with his or personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act,
and not merely rely on the information passed to him or
her by another. There should be presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants
goes against the very nature of probable cause. A single
hint hardly amounts to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the object sought in connection with the offense are in
the place to be searched.
COMPARISON BETWEEN SALUDAY AND SAPLA:
1. In Saluday, a bus inspection conducted at a military checkpoint

was considered as valid. However, in that case, the authorities
merely conducted a “visual and minimally intrusive inspection”
of the accused’s bag – by simply lifting the bag that noticeably
appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to
the Sapla case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing
of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by Sapla.
2. Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied

on sheer information relayed by an informant, unlike in Sapla. In
Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in

84
determining probable cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag

revealing that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the
very suspicion looks being given by Saluday.
3. Further, in Saluday, the Supreme Court laid down the following

conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in
transit:
(a) The manner of the search must be least intrusive;

(b) The search must not be discriminatory;
(c) As to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to
ensuring public safety; and
(d) The courts must be convinced that precautionary measures
where in place to ensure that no evidence was planted
against the accused.
None of these conditions exists in Sapla.
First, unlike in Saluday where the search conducted was merely

visual and minimally intrusive, the search undertaken on Sapla
was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that
he allegedly possessed.
Second, the search was directed exclusively towards Sapla was

discriminatory. Unlike in Saluday where the bags of other
passengers were also inspected, the search conducted in Sapla
focused exclusively on him.
Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with

the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the search was
conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an
anonymous informant, was transporting illegal drugs.
Lastly, the court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary

measures were undertaken by the police to ensure that no
evidence was planted against Sapla, considering that the
inventory, photographing, and marking of the evidence were not
immediately conducted after the apprehension of Sapla at the
scene of the incident.


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EVIDENCE AT YOUR FINGERTIPS

“Truth is what we determine it to be…

EXCLUSIONARY RULES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

The exclusionary rules under the Constitution are found in:

1. Article III, Section 2 (Right against unreasonable search and

1. Under the foregoing exclusionary rules, any evidence obtained in

2. The exclusionary rules under the Constitution are relevant only if

1. PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI

Andre Marti (“Marti”) engaged the services of Manila Packing

shipment of four (4) wrapped packages to Zurich, Switzerland.

Whether the seized dried marijuana leaves are admissible in

1. It was Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency,

2. After Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he

3. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of

4. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches

5. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a

6. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

2. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION AND EMMA CO VS.

This is a labor complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal

The evidence against Catolico consisted of a check drawn by YSP

Whether the check is admissible in evidence.

1. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASHER

An interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from

When asked about the contraband articles, Bongcarawan

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

Whether the eight (8) packs of shabu are admissible in evidence.

1. Evidence acquired in violation of the right against

2. In the case before us, the baggage of Bongcarawan was

3. There is no merit in the contention of Bongcarawan that the

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

and until now, it is against them and other agents of the

4. MARIETA DE CASTRO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Marieta De Castro (“De Castro’), a bank teller of the BPI Family

Whether De Castro’s rights against self-incrimination and to

1. The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

crimes. We hold, however, that in the particular setting in

2. The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are

3. The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot

4. The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source

By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

act of conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental

1. CECILIA ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND

Cecilia Zulueta (“Cecilia”) is the wife of Alredo Martin

Whether the documents which Cecilia seized without Alfredo’s

1. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in

2. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify

By: Atty. Joseph Randi C. Torregosa

does not shed his integrity or his right to privacy as an

Zulueta is an isolated case and a deviation from Marti and other

Exclusionary Rules under the Constitution Explained

1. Section 2, Article III

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,