2022 HO 11 - Civil Law - Persons & Family Relations

2022 BAR REVIEW CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 11
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
PRELIMINARY TITLE
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the “principle of abuse of rights”,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also
in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.” In the context of a credit card relationship, although
there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the credit card issuer to act
on the credit card holder’s offer within a definite period of time, these principles provide the
standard by which to judge AMEX’s actions. Polo S. Pantaleon v. American Express International,
Inc., G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010
A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for
the resulting injury.
In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 (2005), [we] ruled that a person who
knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting
injury: “The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law
as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is
not negligent in doing so.” This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this case. Pantaleon
himself testified that the most basic rule when travelling in a tour group is that you must never
be a cause of any delay because the schedule is very strict. When Pantaleon made up his mind to
push through with his purchase, he must have known that the group would become annoyed and
irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his decision to make them
all wait. Polo S. Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269, August 25,
2010
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There is a material distinction between damages and injury—injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; There can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.”
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the
breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. Polo S. Pantaleon v. American
Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269, August 25, 2010
A married woman has an option but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of
the ways provided using her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status.
A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the
ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the
three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. Maria Virginia
V. Remo v. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010

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Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name.
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239.
These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden
name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Maria Virginia V. Remo v. The
Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
The RTC's use of Article 41 of the [FC] Family Code as its basis in declaring the presumptive
death [of Wilfredo] was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of
the FC.
Petitioner Estrellita was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death of (her husband) Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose . Tadeo-Matias v.
Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition
that [-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-] only seeks to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law.
Considerations why a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based on the Civil Code was
disallowed in our jurisdiction:
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that only allow a
court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain
facts.

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2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said
articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action,
there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to be remedied nor any status
to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or

Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action exclusively based thereon, would never really
become "final" as the same only confirms that existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is supposed to
be final and binding between litigants is thereby compromised.
4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is
already established by law.
Hence, the Supreme Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a person is
presumptively dead is not a requirement before the Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO)
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for their consideration . Tadeo-Matias v. Republic,
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
MARRIAGE
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.

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4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029,
April 24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code can now be applied even if it is the Filipino spouse
who initiated the foreign divorce decree against his/her alien spouse. Accordingly, a Filipino
citizen has [now] the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can [We] put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.”
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have

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ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.” Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
The foregoing notwithstanding, [We] the Court cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be
a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Also, Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."

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It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Hence, since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
**The cases of Morisono v. Morisono and Juego-Sakai v. Republic (cited below), are both based
on the ruling in Republic v. Manalo.
Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated
the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree - presumably the Filipino citizen - must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground
that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce .
Luzviminda Morisono v. Ryoji Morisono, et al., G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018
Second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if Filipino spouse gave consent
to the divorce obtained by his/her alien spouse.
The issue before [Us] the Supreme Court has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of
Republic v. Manalo (Supra.), the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein.

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In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted
the same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she
sought to have said decree recognized in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage
to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not
become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. There, the Court held that the fact that
it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted
should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. xxx The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite
the fact that Petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed
that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided
under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already
been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law .
Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 2244015, July 23, 2018
Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the
divorce decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the
pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. Stephen I. Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 2244015, July 23, 2018

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The quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.
The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a
claim must prove it. Specifically, in psychological incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who
proves the existence of psychological incapacity. Molina, [however], is silent on what quantum
of proof [that] is required in nullity cases. While there is opinion that a nullity case under Article
36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of evidence, [we] now hold that the plaintiff-
spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof
that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity of marriages. xxx As with
any presumption, it can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. Rosanna L. Tan-
Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert opinion.
[The Supreme] Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological
incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through
expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s
personality, called “personality structure”, which manifests itself through clear acts of
dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who
have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From
there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to
assume the essential marital obligations. Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R.
No. 196359, May 11, 2021
A party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence because it is an explicit
requirement of the law.
Article 36 is clear that psychological incapacity must be existing “at the time of the celebration”
of the marriage, “even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.” This
distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for causes,

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psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the marriage celebration. Rosanna L.
Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
[P]sychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the
medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly.
This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner,
and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. “[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be
a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to
demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative
to the other.” Rosanna L. Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
It is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses,
with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal separation.
That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation will not prevent [the] Court from voiding the
marriage in this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each
other without severing their marriage bond, but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the
marriage is valid. Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological
incapacity of one or both spouses, with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered
as grounds for legal separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug
abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this
should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Rosanna L.
Tan-Andal v. Mario Victor M. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of
each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable
to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,

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courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before
it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but
also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceeding. Castillo v. Republic,
G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.
In this case, as petitioner Jerrysus Tilar correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to
nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the
Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in the religious and
ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is
in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of
the church and state finds no application in this case.
Consequently, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the
RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Tilar v. Tilar and Republic, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017
LEGAL SEPARATION
Legal Separation must [not] be tried before six months have elapsed since the filing of the
petition to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action
for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off’ period. In this interim,
the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. Enrico L. Pacete, et al. v. Hon.
Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 53880, March 17, 1994

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No defaults in action for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in [formerly] Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: “SEC. 6. No defaults
in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.—If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted
is not fabricated.” Enrico L. Pacete, et al. v. Hon. Glicerio V. Carriaga, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 53880,
March 17, 1994
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Article 198 of the Family Code provides that the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory.
As the parties’ marriage was declared void on March 11, 2005, petitioner was only obliged to
support, after such date, their three children, Beatriz, Juliana and Margarita. According to the
petition, at the time the assailed Order of the RTC dated November 29, 2011 was issued, two of
their three daughters already attained the age of majority. If such is the case, respondent ceased
to have the authority to claim support in their behalf. In increasing the amount of support due
from petitioner based on the needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
Judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
[P]etitioner is not precluded from seeking the reduction of the amount of support he was obliged
to provide in the event that he can sufficiently prove that its reduction is warranted. After all,
judgment of support does not become final, and may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support. [This] Court, not being a trier of facts, must necessarily
remand the case to the trial court for the accounting, reception of evidence and evaluation
thereof for the proper determination of the ownership and share of the parties in the nine
properties mentioned above, which include the Ayala Alabang house and Rockwell
condominium, based on the guidelines set forth in this case, as well as the determination of

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arrears in support of the parties’ daughters, if any. Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo
Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
PROPERTY RELATIONS
Separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
approval.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights
of all creditors of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and other persons with pecuniary interest
pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. Virgilio Maquilan v. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409,
June 8, 2007
The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or 148 of
the Family Code.
There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent had long been
declared an absolute nullity by reason of their psychological incapacity to perform their marital
obligations to each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either
by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal
impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation
is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application
in this case even if the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express
provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Simon R. Paterno v.
Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

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For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing or other
mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they
have been obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares, shall arise.
A reading of Article 147 of the Family Code would show that the provision did not make any
distinction or make any qualification in terms of the manner the property must be acquired
before the presumption of co-ownership shall apply. As such, the term “acquired” must be taken
in its ordinary acceptation. For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on
installment, financing or other mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the
disputable presumption that they have been obtained by the parties’ joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares, shall arise. Applied in this case, since the
Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were purchased while the petitioner and the respondent
were living together, it is presumed that both parties contributed in their acquisition through
their joint efforts (which includes one’s efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household), work or industry. Thus, the properties must be divided between them equally.
Simon R. Paterno v. Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
In the event that the respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary, income,
work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and the
household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of the contributions made by the
petitioner.
It must be borne in mind that the presumption that the properties are co-owned and thus must
be shared equally is not conclusive but merely disputable. The petitioner may rebut the
presumption by presenting proof that the properties, although acquired during the period of
their cohabitation, were not obtained through their joint efforts, work and industry. In such a
case, the properties shall belong solely to the petitioner. If the respondent is able to present
proof that she contributed through her salary, income, work or industry in the acquisition of the
properties, the parties’ share shall be in proportion to their contributions. Simon R. Paterno v.
Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
There is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a
Contract of Surety.
No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband/wife entered
into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
In this case, it is not apparent from the records that respondent BDO had established the benefit
to the conjugal partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita.
Thus, petitioner Eliseo’s claim over the subject property lodged with the RTC Pasig is proper, with
the latter correctly exercising jurisdiction thereon. Borlongan v. Banco De Oro (formerly
Equitable PCI Bank), G.R. Nos. 217617 and 218540, April 5, 2017
FAMILY HOME
Family Home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases.
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family
home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final
and executory ruling. It is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a
family home, rather, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved . Felicitas Salazar v.
Remedios Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
A family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.
In this case, petitioner Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family
home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It is imperative that her claim must be
backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home,
(ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) [actually]
resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties
of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
(v) at the time of its constitution, has an actual value of not exceeding Php 300,000.00 in urban
areas, and not exceeding Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the
occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must
be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive. Felicitas Salazar v. Remedios
Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the period allowed, and supported
by the evidence required under the Family Code. A person who seeks to establish illegitimate
filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a (1) record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a (2) final judgment, or an (3) admission of legitimate filiation.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still
be established after the death of a putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concerned.
However, petitioners (Romeo Ara and William Garcia) did not present in evidence any admissions
of filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may be used
in evidence against him. The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa
and petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother. They do not
contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones
pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal Certificate,
Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that
Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa.
Josefa did not participate in making any of them. Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia v. Dra. Fely
S. Pizarro, et al., G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017

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Handout No. 11
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father.
The use of the word ‘may’ in [Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word ‘may’ is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan
Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No.
222095, August 7, 2017
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional
upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
In this case, the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in
June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and
Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should
have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan”. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live
Births of Yuhares Jan Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote
vs. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in
all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of
the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In re: Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan
Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No.
222095, August 7, 2017

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Handout No. 11
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void.
In this case, the Supreme Court declares the subject birth certificates void and order their
cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring
the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the
signature of the mother in her children’s birth certificates. In re: Petition for Cancellation of
Certificates of Live Births of Yuhares Jan Barcelota Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote
Tinitigan; Barcelote vs. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017
An illegitimate child, “conceived and born outside a valid marriage,” is entitled to support.
To claim it, however, a child should have first been acknowledged by the putative parent or must
have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative parent. When filiation
is beyond question, support shall then follow as a matter of obligation . Richelle Abella, for and
in behalf of her minor daughter, Marl Jhorylle Abella v. Policarpio Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647,
August 9, 2017
Article 201 of the Family Code states that the “amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.”
Article 202 of the Family Code adds, however, that support may be adjusted and that it “shall be
reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities
of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same”. Richelle
Abella, for and in behalf of her minor daughter, Marl Jhorylle Abella v. Policarpio Cabañero,
G.R. No. 206647, August 9, 2017

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Handout No. 11
ADOPTION
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552 (DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998)
Who may adopt?
The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen:

a. of legal age,
b. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights,
c. of good moral character,
d. has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
e. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
f. at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
i. this requirement between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptee's parent, and
g. who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the
means of the family;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided:
a. That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
b. That he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered (residency),
c. That he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country (certification), and
d. That his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter:
Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the

alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity
or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. Section 7, RA 8552
Who may be adopted?
The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). Section 8,
RA 8552
Rights of an adopted child?
The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. Section 17, RA
8552
Rescission, instances and effects.
Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years
of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article
919 of the Civil Code. Section 19, RA 8552
Effects of Rescission
If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known,
or the legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished.

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee
and restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment
of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. Section 20, RA 8552
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043 (INTER-COUNTY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995)
Inter-country adoption, defined
It refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen
permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is
undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines. Section 3(a), RA 8043
When allowed?
Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. The Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) shall ensure
that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and
that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall
set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before
the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number
that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first
five (5) years. Section 7, RA 8043
Who may adopt?
An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country
adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the
child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature
of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent;

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority
under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral
values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to
implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is
allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in
other applicable Philippine laws. (Section 9, RA 8043)
Who may be adopted?
Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child
may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board:
(a) Child study;

(b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
(c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
(d) Medical evaluation /history;
(e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
(f) Recent photo of the child.
*Legally free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Section 3(f), RA 8043
NOTE: “Child” under RA 8552 is defined as a person below eighteen (18) years of age, whereas
under RA 8043, the same is defined as a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner
emancipated by law.

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
Accordingly, mothers (such as petitioner Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of
their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the
child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their
illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care. Masbate,
et al. v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
Article 213 of the Family Code provides for the so-called “tender-age presumption”, stating that
"no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest
away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment
of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease . Masbate, et al. v. Relucio, G.R.
No. 235498, July 30, 2018

0917 – 894 53 56
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Handout No. 11
APPENDIX
Summary of relevant cases decided after the issuance of EO 227, involving the issue of the effects
of foreign divorce decree, as discussed in the dissenting opinion of J. Caguioa in Republic vs.
Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018):
Incidents of Action in
Case Incidents of Divorce Court's Resolution
the Philippines
The divorce decree is

binding on the
German spouse
pursuant to the
nationality principle.
Pilapil v. Ibay- German spouse filed Accordingly, the
Divorce obtained in
Somera (G.R. No. two (2) complaints German spouse lacks
Germany by German
80116, June 30, charging Filipino standing to file the
spouse
1989) spouse with adultery complaints as
"offended spouse",
having obtained the
divorce decree prior
to the filing of said
complaints.
The divorce
decree cannot be
recognized in the
Philippines since
Filipino husband the Filipino wife
Divorce obtained in invokes the divorce obtained the
Republic v. Iyoy (G.R. the United States by decree secured by his same while still a
No. 152577, Filipino wife prior to Filipino wife as Filipino citizen,
September 21, 2005) her naturalization as additional ground to and was, at such
an American citizen grant his petition for time, bound by
declaration of nullity Philippine laws on
family rights and
duties, pursuant
to the nationality
principle.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 25 of 27
Handout No. 11
the Philippines
The effects of the

divorce decree must
be recognized in
favor of the Filipino
Republic vs. Divorce obtained in Filipino spouse
spouse pursuant to
Orbecido (G.R. No. the United States by sought enforcement
Article 26(2) of the
154380, October 5, naturalized American of divorce in the
Family Code.
2005) spouse Philippines
Accordingly, the
Filipino spouse
should be allowed to
re-marry.

American spouse binding on the
sought enforcement American spouse,
of the Joint Custody pursuant to the
Dacasin v. Dacasin Divorce obtained in Agreement he had nationality principle.
(G.R. No. 168785, the United States by executed with his Accordingly, he
February 5, 2010) Filipino spouse former Filipino wife, cannot be allowed to
which bore terms evade the same by
contrary to those in invoking the terms of
the divorce decree the Joint Custody
Agreement.

Naturalized American binding on the
spouse sought naturalized American
Divorce obtained in annulment of her spouse, pursuant to
Bayot v. Court of
the Dominican marriage with her the nationality
Appeals (G.R. Nos.
Republic by Filipino spouse principle.
155635 and 163979,
naturalized American through a petition for Accordingly, she is
November 7, 2008)
spouse annulment filed left without any
before the Regional cause of action
Trial Court (RTC) before the RTC, as a
Petition for
Annulment

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 26 of 27
Handout No. 11
the Philippines
presupposes a
subsisting marriage.
The effect of the

divorce decree issued
pursuant to Japanese
First husband (also a law may be
Japanese national) recognized in the
sought recognition of Philippines in order
the divorce obtained to affect the status of
Divorce obtained in
Fujiki v. by his Filipina wife the first husband,
Japan by Filipina wife
Marinay (G.R. No. against her second who, pursuant to the
against her second
196049, June 26, husband through a nationality principle,
husband, who is a
2013) Petition for Judicial is governed by
Japanese national
Recognition of Japanese law. Such
Foreign Judgment (or recognition is in line
Decree of Absolute with the Philippines'
Nullity of Marriage) public policy, which
filed before the RTC characterizes
bigamous marriages
as void ab initio.
Filipina wife sought The case was

to enforce the remanded to the CA
divorce in the to allow Filipina wife
Divorce jointly Philippines through a to prove that the
Medina v. Koike
obtained in Japan by Petition for Judicial divorce obtained
(G.R. No. 215723,
Filipina wife and Recognition of abroad by her and
July 27, 2016)
Japanese husband Foreign Divorce and her Japanese
Declaration of husband is valid
Capacity to Remarry according to the
before the RTC. latter's national law.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 27 of 27

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2022 BAR REVIEW CIVIL LAW

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under Article 390 or

In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

No defaults in action for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552 (DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998)

Who may adopt?

The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen:

Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

Who may be adopted?

The following may be adopted:

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Rights of an adopted child?

Rescission, instances and effects.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043 (INTER-COUNTY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995)

Inter-country adoption, defined

Who may adopt?

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Who may be adopted?

(a) Child study;

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The divorce decree is

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The effects of the

The divorce decree is

The divorce decree is

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The effect of the

Filipina wife sought The case was

2022 HO 11 - Civil Law - Persons & Family Relations

2022 HO 11 - Civil Law - Persons & Family Relations

2022 HO 11 - Civil Law - Persons & Family Relations