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A review of hydro-hegemony and transboundary water governance

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© 2022 The Authors Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1723 doi: 10.2166/wp.2022.256

A review of hydro-hegemony and transboundary water governance

Shakeel Hayat a,b,c, *, Joyeeta Gupta b,c, Courtney Vegelin b and Hameed Jamalia,c
a
Department of Development Studies, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan
b
Department of Human Geography, Planning & International Development Studies, Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, University
of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
c
Integrated Water Systems & Governance Department, IHE Delft Institute for Water Education, Delft, The Netherlands
*Corresponding author. E-mail: shakeel.hayat@imsciences.edu.pk

SH, 0000-0001-6405-2596; JG, 0000-0003-1424-2660; CV, 0000-0001-9787-1627

ABSTRACT

This review paper is an attempt to analyze the existing literature on hydro-hegemony (HH) theory, which has emerged to explain
transboundary water interactions. The literature highlights that the conventional water interaction literature inadequately deals
with three important factors: (i) asymmetric power relations, (ii) varying intensities of conflict, and (iii) the importance of the
geographical location of riparian states. Since its emergence, it has evolved both in theory development and in application
to transboundary basins. Although an attempt has been made earlier for reviewing, organizing and evaluating the overall litera-
ture on HH, the review itself is somehow silent on the hegemonic approaches to assess its contribution to the transboundary
water governance literature and to identify the existing and future research gaps. This paper, however, not just addresses these
omissions to (i) review the scholarly literature on HH; (ii) explore the challenges associated with power, cooperation, and con-
flict; and (iii) identify and explore potential trends in HH theory, but it also gives special attention to the hegemonic approaches
within states’ boundaries and the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH.

Key words: Conflict, Cooperation, Counter hydro-hegemony, Hydro-hegemony, Transboundary water governance

HIGHLIGHTS

• The conventional water interaction literature inadequately deals with three important factors (asymmetric power relations,
varying intensities of conflict, and the importance of the geographical location of riparian states).
• This paper addresses to review the scholarly literature on HH; explore the challenges associated with power, cooperation,
and conflict; identify and explore potential trends in HH theory, and reviews the HH within states’ boundaries.

1. INTRODUCTION
Transboundary rivers are recognized as a global public good, as a common concern/heritage of humankind, and
as a resource. However, in a neo-liberal world (as well as in the common heritage wording of the European Water
Framework Directive1), it can be treated as a commodity. When conceptualizing water as a resource, guarantee-
ing healthy flows in rivers to protect biodiversity and contribute to the livelihoods of basin inhabitants becomes
the focus. Moreover, the challenges associated with transboundary rivers, mostly when basins extend into the

1
The Water Framework Directive is a European Union directive, which commits European Union member states to achieve good qualitative and
quantitative status of all water bodies by 2015.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY 4.0), which permits copying,
adaptation and redistribution, provided the original work is properly cited (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1724

territory of multiple sovereign states which contend to control the flow of water resources, become the subject of
inquiry. Various bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements have been drafted over the course of the 20th
century (Beach et al., 2000) to mitigate potential conflict but there still remain many challenges.
Interpretations of these challenges range from the neo-Malthusian narrative of ‘water wars’, a prominent dis-
course in water-scarce regions, providing a stark picture of the future of hydro-relations among and within
states (Ward, 2002; Warner, 2008). Alternatively, a liberal interpretation (Wolf, 1998, 2007) has emphasized
the unlikelihood that water wars will emerge, arguing that riparian states can and will successfully realize
their self-interest by cooperating over shared resources. Additionally, embracing more complexity, hegemonic
approaches to water issues have emerged in transboundary water law (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008) and politi-
cal geography (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008; Cascão & Zeitoun, 2010) literature, with a focus on the national level
(Warner, 2008).
This development in the literature has led to the emergence of the concept of hydro-hegemony (HH; section 2).
As theoretical approaches to HH have been previously explored (e.g. in Warner, 1992 and Williams, 2002), they
have yet to be thoroughly conceptualized or theorized in the water conflict literature (Cascão, 2008: p. 436).
Although, an attempt has been made earlier by Warner et al. (2017) to review, organize, and evaluate the overall
literature on HH, the review itself is somehow silent on the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries and
to explore the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH. Hence, this paper not only system-
atically reviews and analyses (i) the conceptualization and theorization of HH in the dominant water-related
journals (such as Water Policy, Water Alternatives, Water International, Political Geography and International
Environmental Agreements) (section 2); (ii) highlights the various elements and pillars of HH (i.e. power, exploi-
tation potential, and riparian position) (section 3); (iii) enriches the debate on water-related political questions of
who gets how much water, how, when, and why; and (iv) assesses the overall contribution of HH theory (section 4)
but also gives special attention to (1) the hegemonic approaches within states’ boundaries (see section 4.1) and (2)
also explore the ingredients to enrich the theory and research agenda of HH (see section 4.4). The last section
concludes with reflections on power relations and suggestions for future research (section 5).
Through this review of how hegemony is constructed around transboundary river basins, two features have
emerged. The first is an implicit acknowledgment of water scarcity. While much scholarly work has moved on
from this notion since Homer-Dixon (1991), the literature is nonetheless situated in a context of the Anthropo-
cene (Gupta et al., 2015), and the anticipated future demands on the water system with the likelihood that
issues of scarcity will become more central. This might exacerbate power struggles over water as opposed to
more cooperative approaches. Second, the literature is largely based on relations between states where states
claim sovereignty over their territory and resources, as is allowed by international law (Vick, 2008; Rahaman,
2009). While state boundaries can rightfully be questioned (Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1993), this does not change
the reality of the difficulties in sharing water, in water-scarce river basins, during the flooding or drought situation
(Hussain et al., 2021), and the durability of the structure of the state.

2. THEORY OF HH
2.1. Evolution of the HH theory
Drawing on the conceptualization of hegemony in relation to water (Warner, 1992; Williams, 2002), the term HH
was coined and developed into a theory by the London Water Research Group in May 2005 at King’s College
London. The workshop was the first in a series organized by the London Water Research Group (LWRG)
which discussed and refined the theory (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Cascão, 2008; Mirumachi, 2015). Against
this background, a range of theoretical approaches to HH have since emerged, alongside broader literature on
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1725

transboundary issues. Furthermore, Special Issues on HH in Water Policy, Water International, and International
Environmental Agreements have demonstrated that riparian hegemons flourish in the near-anarchic international
system and find ways to benefit from the absence of applicable and legally binding rules of international water
treaties (e.g. the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997 and the UNECE Water Convention of 1992), which
have been slow to develop and remain unratified by many states.
Since coining the term, scholars based in King’s College London, the School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS) London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science have further developed HH theory
by focusing on power asymmetries, the varying intensities of conflict, and the importance of the geographical pos-
ition of the riparian states. Among the most important developments of the last decade include multi-layered HH;
the role of international water law in negotiations; the multidimensional concept of power (including coercive,
economic, political, cultural, and discursive); the concept of counter HH; the role of non-state actors in shaping
water governance outcomes; and the concept of virtual HH. In the 20th century, international law dealt with
groundwater aquifers only in relation to surface water (Stephan, 2007) and stresses the growing need for its inte-
gration in bilateral and multilateral water treaties in relation to sovereign rights to address multiple issues specific
to it. Salamé et al. (2021) discuss in the chapter that water discourses reflect on the unfolding of new water rea-
lities in the wake of new challenges like climate change, in addition to the limitations of international law in
addressing potential transboundary water management issues. Similarly, Varady et al. (2021) conceptualize the
discourse associated with the term Water Security in understating transboundary water management.
Understanding cooperation and contestation among riparian states also shows a range of approaches. These
include theorizing under what conditions hydro-hegemonic relations and with what results (e.g. Warner, 2008;
Wegerich, 2008); identifying different types of hydro-hegemonic relations (Zeitoun & Allan, 2008); using HH
concepts to analyze water laws and treaties (Daoudy, 2008; Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008); conceptualizing coun-
ter hydro-hegemonic measures (Cascão, 2008; Saleh, 2008); distinguishing different types of power in riparian
interactions (Zeitoun et al., 2011); examining the power of civil society in water-based interactions (Zawahri
& Hensengerth, 2012); and analyzing the links between domestic and international dynamics in shaping the
nature and forms of HH in each river basin (Warner, 2012). In short, these approaches show a range of ways
in which the concept of HH engages with the politicization and depoliticization of transboundary water relations.
The evolution of the HH concept is summarized in Table 1.

2.2. Concepts and definitions of the HH theory

Approaches in HH theories draw from realist accounts of power (e.g. Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001) and hege-
mony in international relation theories (Lustick, 2002; Gilpin, 2005); institutionalist theories of regimes
(e.g. Keohane, 1982), knowledge and discourse (e.g. Hajer, 1997), water conflict (e.g. Wolf, 2004), and water con-
flict intensity (e.g. Yoffe et al., 2003) and have roots in the principles of sovereignty as found in international law
(Yannis, 2002). In these varying contexts, HH scholars (Zeitoun, Warner, Allan, Woodhouse, Mirumachi, etc.)
have demonstrated that various forms of power consistently used in water-based interactions include incentives
(e.g. treaties), coercion (e.g. pressure), manipulation (e.g. threat of military operations), and perception change
control (e.g. through knowledge construction). Grandi (2020) inquiries into the subjectivity and heterogeneity sur-
rounding the concept of hydropolitics employed with varying meanings across time and space and the lack of
interest in academia to develop a standard definition. These forms of power, used in various combinations,
allow one riparian state to influence another state and thus control the flow of transboundary rivers.
These forms reproduce a variety of perceptions about hegemonic power that runs from a direct threat (hard
power) to a condition where power and consent are only implied (soft power), to institutionalized norms not
requiring enforcement (Lukes, 2005). Within this range, theoretical approaches of HH suggest that there are
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1726

Table 1 | Evolution of theoretical approaches to HH.

Year Context Objectives Contribution to the theory

2004–2006 Conceptualization and Employing the IR approach in Analyzing power, location, and
theorization of HH transboundary water governance exploitation potential in
transboundary river basins
2007 HH and sustainably developing Ensuring equitable and efficient use Promoting political stability and
water resources of water resources socio-economic growth; counter-
hegemony strategies
2008 HH and International Water Law Linking to international law Adopting international legal
(IWL) principles in negotiation theory
and process
2009 Transboundary water governance The role of the relative distribution Assessing how institutions contribute
institutions of power in resolving water to conflict management
disputes
2010 HH and critical hydropolitics Effective implementation of Water science and stakeholder
transboundary water participation and negotiations
management
2011 The use of soft power in Evaluating the impacts of soft Soft power influences choices and
transboundary rivers power treaties to manage, delay, or
perpetuate conflict
2012 Bilateral management to common Initiating discussions concerning Ensuring equity, human rights, and
basin governance peace and development social justice
2013 Transboundary water interactions Transboundary level rules and Management and governance
and the UN Watercourses conventions for improved water through political processes
Convention resource management
2014 HH theory to inform virtual Exposing relationships between Virtual water shaped by material,
water trade access to water, global trade, and bargaining, and ideational powers
power
2015 Power shift and HH Political and economic changes Donor’s investment leads to power
challenge the regional balance of changes and new kinds of
power relationships
2016- & Counter HH and transboundary Institutional analysis of Inclusive development and
beyond? water governance transboundary rivers ecosystem approaches to deal with
power issues in shared waters

various forms of power intrinsically linked to water resources specifically in a shared river basin and explain con-
trol strategies to assess how and why a powerful riparian in a transboundary river basin can influence its co-
riparians (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). They also focus on two important under-developed theoretical concepts,
i.e., power asymmetry between riparian states and the varying intensities of conflicts (Carles, 2006), and pay atten-
tion to the specific features of different geographical locations of the riparian states (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008).
Daoudy (2009) goes beyond traditional elements of power in relation to hydropolitics and analyses many facets of
soft power, such as time and issue linkages, influencing bargaining power between downstream/upstream ripar-
ian, characterized by power asymmetries, in reaching bilateral, if not basin-wide agreements. Similarly, Conker &
Hussein (2020), while analyzing the Lebanon–Syria and Syria–Turkey hydropolitical relations, discuss the
manner in which Syria has maintained its hydro-hegemonic position on the Orontes River Basin over Lebanon
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1727

and Turkey and how changing regional political environment and Lebanon’s use of issue linkages impacted
power asymmetry in the region to Divest Syria of its HH in the region.
Power asymmetries lead to exploring security issues. The Constructivist Copenhagen School (e.g. Buzan et al.,
1998) informs some HH scholarship in this regard, questioning the object of security in the context of riparian
state competition. Traditional realist approaches privilege the state as the primary subject of what is to be secured.
However, in the context of a transboundary river basin and of changing threats to people’s lives, the referent of
security could be the river basin itself and this re-orients the discussion on how security can be guaranteed. None-
theless, Copenhagen scholars admittedly fall back to the state as its main referent, claiming that its social
construction remains durable over time (Baker, 2013). Reflecting this, HH also privileges the state as the guaran-
tor and referent of security, in terms of securing its interest relative to other states of the river basin.

2.3. Forms of HH
Theoretical approaches of HH essentially claim that powerful riparian states can gain maximum benefits from
transboundary rivers. However, if the powerful riparian intends to control the flow or persuade co-riparians to
take decisions in line with its own preferences, there may be different water outcomes (Zeitoun & Warner,
2006). The forms that HH may take include (i) benign outcomes (e.g. when states agree to cooperate in situation
of water stress); (ii) neutral restrictive outcomes (e.g. when human rights are not fulfilled); (iii) obstructive oppres-
sive outcomes (e.g. when states intervene to allocate water according to their own preferences); and (iv) contested
control outcomes (when changing water-related circumstances may ignite a conflict due to no agreement)
(Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008).
As such, HH may be beneficial (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Warner, 2008), or it may be ‘negative and domina-
tive’ (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Under conditions of positive HH, a powerful riparian state can take a leading
position to provide benefits to all riparian states and share the water resources more equitably (Turton &
Funke, 2008). Negative relations are cases in which the hegemon desires to maintain power asymmetries and
structural inequalities, drawing on its own resources or colonial legacies (Warner, 2004; Sanchez & Gupta,
2011). The favoring of Egypt and Sudan by Great Britain over the upper riparians in treaties of the early 20th
century is an example of this (Waterbury, 2002), where treaties were biased in favor of the more powerful
states (Takele, 2004; Cascão, 2005).

3. PILLARS OF HH THEORY
This section explains and discusses the various features of power, which are important to water conflict analysis
in shared river basins. In scarce water situations, the type of intervention and the nature of competition over
shared water resources show each riparian’s strengths and weaknesses. Apart from geographical and climatolo-
gical circumstances and ‘luck’, the powerful riparian can more easily gain maximum advantages and maintain
control over the shared water resources.

3.1. Power
State power can be linked to its population size and physical territory, its abundance of natural resources, and its
military and economic capabilities (Nye, 2004; Armitage & Nye, 2007). How such resources of power are wielded
is more complex (Armitage & Nye, 2007). In focusing on the hydropolitics of international river basins, Nye
(2004) argues that power is about achieving the desired outcome by persuading others. In line with Nye, Dahl
defines power as the potential capability of one actor to influence another in such a way that the latter does some-
thing which he/she would otherwise not do (Dahl, 1965 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1728

3.1.1. Types of power

With respect to water resources, Daoudy (2005) and Turton (2005) refer to two important types of power known
as ‘puissance and pouvoir’. Puissance is hidden or prospective power (i.e. the ability to explode a bomb); pouvoir
is visible or tangible power (e.g. the real power to stop a bomb from exploding). Real or ‘pouvoir’ power has three
dimensions identified by Lukes (2005[1974]) and Strange (1994), and each dimension varies in intensity and
applicability. First is the mobilization of capabilities (i.e. stronger economy and military) (Strange, 1987:
p. 132) achieved through domestic political support and a geographically advantageous position. Second is the
constraining power of the stronger riparian to force weaker riparians to comply with the hegemon’s preferred
order (Lukes, 2005[1974]: p. 11). Strange (1994: p. 176) identified a third dimension of power in which powerful
actors impose their ideas over the weak in such a way that it is acceptable to the weaker, in line with Lustick’s
‘ideological hegemony’ (Lustick 2002). These three dimensions of power allow hegemons to maintain and change
the terms by which they maintain their power (O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1999: p. 82). As an example, Dellapenna
(2003: p. 289) argues that a hegemonic state can extract water from a shared river by imposing its own interpret-
ation of international water law and customary law to prove its legal right to do so.

3.1.2. Impacts of power on hydro-relations

Countries use their power to negotiate international and transboundary water treaties. Reflecting its state bias,
HH theory explains how hydro-institutions and interactions among states are influenced by power. It suggests
that power, rather than general and specific principles of international law, geographical position, or even the
accessibility of water resources, explains the outputs and outcomes of these interactions (Zeitoun & Warner,
2006; Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008; Tawfik, 2015). This may be because powerful
states have access to multiple sources and dimensions of power as well as strategies to exercise power and
ensure desired outcomes (Cascão, 2008; Daoudy, 2008). Water resource control strategies under hydro-hegemo-
nic conditions can thus lead to a cooperative regime if a HH intends to establish a beneficial hegemonic
relationship by sharing water equally among riparian states in a transboundary river basin.
Similarly, a HH can act negatively if it uses its control over the water to dominate the region, leading to a pro-
tracted conflict (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 452–453). Various regional hegemons (e.g. Egypt and Turkey, as
well as Israel [although not a hegemon in the definitional sense]) in the Middle East have imposed negative
hydro-hegemonic relations in transboundary river basins (such as the Jordan, Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile) despite
being geographically disadvantaged by their downstream position (Daoudy, 2004 in Zeitoun & Warner, 2006:
p. 452). States like Israel and Egypt arguably compensate for this disadvantaged position by drawing on its
other power resources to maintain dominance (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). For example, Israel uses 90% of the
shared water resources, even though the Palestinian Liberation Organziation’s (now Palestine) water rights are
clearly recognized by Israel in the 1995 agreement which shaped the Oslo II accords (B’tselem, 1998;
Frederiksen, 2003). Resource capture and containment strategies, coercion- pressure, and display of military
and economic strength have helped Israel to establish a dominant form of HH (Selby, 2003b, 2005).

3.1.3. Uses of power and control strategies of HHs

Under hydro-hegemonic conditions, a hegemon may use resource capture strategies to affect the quality or quan-
tity of water by developing hydro-projects or dumping waste in shared water resources; this is similar to ‘active
unilateralism’ (Waterbury, 1997: p. 279). Examples of active unilateralism include Egypt’s High Aswan Dam,
which biases the allocation of waters between Egypt and Sudan despite the mechanisms to prevent it in the
1959 Agreement (Takele, 2004). Second, Turkey’s south-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) allowed Turkey, as an
upstream country, to build on the Tigris and the Euphrates (Warner, 2004: p. 16). Third, Israel’s largest water
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1729

project, the National Water Carrier, was set up to transfer water from the Sea of Galilee in the north of the
country to the highly populated center and arid south to enable the efficient use of water and to regulate the
water supply (Feitelson, 2000; Allan, 2001). Alternatively, a hegemon can employ a containment strategy to
force the weaker riparian state to accommodate its preferences, such as signing an agreement in the hegemon’s
favor. Examples of this include Israel and Jordan’s treaty in 1994 (Dombrowski, 1998: p. 99) and the treaty
between Israel and Palestine in 1995 (Selby, 2003a).
Drawing from the literature on hegemonic strategies employed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region, various compliance-producing mechanisms are shown in Table 2. Based on the earlier work of Amitai
Etzioni (1986) and Held (1991), Lustick (2002) recognizes four types of mechanisms, i.e., coercive (direct
threat of force), utilitarian (bribes and mutual trades), normative (reinforcing the legitimacy of the hegemon),
and ideological hegemony inspired by Gramsci (Lustick, 2002).

3.2. Varying intensities of hydro-interactions

The water conflict literature suggests that interactions over transboundary waters range from cooperation to con-
flict with various intensities in between (Furlong, 2006; Zeitoun & Warner, 2006; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008:
p. 77). Intensities range from the weak riparian protecting the river to the powerful riparian controlling the
resources (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008: p. 114). NATO (1999) classifies these interactions as follows: (i)
durable peace (i.e. unification into one nation voluntarily), (ii) stable peace (i.e. verbal support for shared
values, goals, and regime), (iii) unstable peace (i.e. situations of tension that avoid violence by mutual deter-
rence), (iv) crisis (i.e. hostile diplomatic, economic, political, and military actions), and (v) war (i.e. formal
declaration of war).
The Water Event Intensity Scale (WEIS) proposed by Yoffe et al. (2003) shows that the intensity of water-based
interactions has different effects on inter-state relations and that the same conflict can occur again with different
intensities (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Moreover, the Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS) pro-
posed by Mirumachi (2007) recognizes five levels of interactions over transboundary rivers, which are (i)
argumentative situations over an issue (i.e. when the problem is identified but there are no joint actions or
shared goals); (ii) unplanned or informal interaction (i.e. joint action but no shared goals); (iii) technical
cooperation (i.e. shared goals but no joint action); (iv) risk-aversion (i.e. joint action and shared goals); and (v)
risk-taking cooperation (i.e. a type of cooperation where it is not obvious that states will assume costs without
a clear response).

3.3. Riparian position

An upstream state’s riparian position on a shared river can lead to hegemonic tactics such as diversion, damming,
overuse, contamination, flooding, and flow delay (Frey & Naff, 1985: p. 78). In transboundary water interactions,
coercion is enhanced by the geographical positioning of the riparian states (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 450) to
manipulate the flow of water (Rees, 2010: pp. 9–10). Cascão & Zeitoun (2010) suggest making each of the three
dimensions of power (e.g. material power, bargaining power, and ideational power in Table 1) its own pillar, with
‘geography’ as the fourth. The original pillar of ‘riparian position’ is part of ‘geography’; the infrastructure forming
‘exploitation potential’ is part of ‘material power’ (Farnum, 2014: p. 10). The physical geography of a river basin
has significant impacts on the flow and quality of water and the nature of interaction among riparian states. In
sheer geographical terms, the upper riparian is the most powerful (Amery & Wolf, 2000: p. 6).
The geographical location of a riparian state in a shared river basin plays a crucial role in shaping foreign policy
and negotiating processes (Waterbury, 1994: pp. 36–64; Dolatyar & Gray, 2004: p. 7). Drawing on Putnam’s two-
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1730

Table 2 | Water control strategies of HH.

Compliance producing
strategies/mechanisms
Source: Adopted and modified from Lustick (2002).
Coercive Use of military e.g. Israel attacked hydropower projects of Syria in the
force upper Jordan River (Trottier, 1999; Wolf, 2000; Medzini,
2001).
Covert action e.g. Egypt supported Somalian irredentism and the Eritrean
Liberation Front to influence the construction of the
GAP project (Takele, 2004).
Coercion- e.g. Egypt used pressure tactics against Ethiopia to
pressure maintain its status quo from 1960 to 2000? (Waterbury,
2002).
Utilitarian Incentives e.g. Egypt and Uganda’s joint electricity grid project
(Waterbury, 2002) and common irrigation between
South Africa and along the Orange River Basin (Heyns,
2005).
Normative Treaties Weaker countries sign hoping for benefits, e.g. the 1906
treaty between Egypt and Ethiopia (Waterbury, 2002);
and the 1959 Aswan High Dam treaty between Egypt
and Sudan (GCI, 2000).
Ideological Securitization e.g. in 2002, Israel threatened the Wazzani Springs Project
hegemony of Lebanon to divert the attention of Israeli citizens from
other water-related concerns (Newman, 2002; Zisser,
2002; Zeitoun, 2005).
Knowledge Egypt has successfully reduced external pressure and
construction created more space for national and international
negotiations on water politics by providing diverse
viewpoints (Cascão, 2005).
Sanctioned e.g. The official Israeli discourse to promote JWC and the
discourse Egyptian discourse about the benefits of NBI are
regularly communicated in comparison to the Ethiopian
and Palestinian viewpoints that are heard less frequently
(Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).
Coercive a. International political support
resources e.g. In 1929, Britain supported Egypt over Sudan in the
Nile Basin agreement, which still influences current
perceived political and legal rights (Sanchez & Gupta,
2011).
b. Financial mobilization
e.g. Egypt, with the UK support, has been developing
infrastructure on the Nile since 1995 (Collins, 2003), and
China (along with Italy and Norway) is investing in
Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

level game approach (1988: p. 437), a better riparian position of states has the potential to define the size of
win-sets (i.e. the set of all possible international agreements that would be acceptable at the domestic level). In
transboundary basins, upstream states have very small win-sets as compared to downstream states unless and
until the social, political, and economic conditions of upstream states support their geographical position (Zei-
toun & Warner, 2006; Lopes, 2012). In navigable rivers, downstream countries have power over upstream
countries (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1731

4. ASSESSMENT OF HH THEORY
4.1. The multi-layered perspectives of HH theory
The literature shows that theoretical approaches of HH mostly focus on the basin level and state boundaries for
understanding international hydropolitics; however, some have shown how hegemonic struggles take place at
multiple geographic levels (Selby, 2007; Warner, 2008; Conker, 2014) and show how power relationships and
discursive strategies are inherent to ecological interactions (Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Perreault, 2014). In addition
to the ‘layered-hegemony’ approach, Conker (2014) also highlights the role of state and non-state actors and the
role of power in terms of material and discursive capabilities (e.g. scalar dynamics and the role of values and
norms in terms of hydropolitical relations). Furlong’s analysis (Furlong 2006) reveals that state actors may interact
with each other at one scale, ignoring the interests of sub-national actors (Warner & Zeitoun, 2008) in order to
meet domestic needs and maximize outcomes at the international level (Warner & Zawahri, 2012). Table 3
explains the different geographic levels of HH.

4.2. Strengths of HH theory

The theoretical approaches of HH explain the hegemonic relationships among states in a reasonably simple and
comprehensive way. While emphasizing different features and discussing the various options for riparian states in
the interplay of water and power (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: p. 455), HH theory has offered useful ways for under-
standing hegemonic relationships. Examples of this include the Tigris and Euphrates (Warner, 2008), Orange
(Turton & Funke, 2008), Nile (Link et al., 2011), Upper Jordan Waterscape (Zeitoun et al., 2013), Amu Darya
Basin (Wegerich, 2008), and Brahmaputra (Sinha, 2012) basins. Three key strengths of HH literature stand out:
(1) HH theory helps analyze past and present hydropolitics and explain the role of power in the management and
allocation of transboundary water resources (Cascão, 2008: p. 14). It also contributes to international law by
highlighting injustices due to asymmetric power relations among states (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008:
pp. 110, 118–119) and draws attention to discrepancies between equality on paper and in practice (Zeitoun
et al., 2014: p. 178).
(2) HH theory explains hydropolitical interactions by reference to power (e.g., see, Frey & Naff, 1985; Lowi,
1993) and illustrates how this power is exercised (Zeitoun et al., 2014: pp. 4–12; Tawfik, 2015: pp. 3–5).
HH theory reveals that conditions of HH exist in malign and benign forms (Woodhouse & Zeitoun, 2008:
p. 111).

Table 3 | The layered-hegemony approach.

Level of hegemony Explanation

At home (national or sub- State’s legitimate rights over water resources to provide water on a regular basis to some
national level) farmers while denying it to others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
Basin level Developing infrastructure intentionally by upstream states on shared rivers may divert and
pollute the flow of water or may increase the risk of flooding to downstream countries
(see Meijerink, 2008; Wegerich, 2008).
Regional level Achieving regional hegemony has a direct impact on neighboring countries (Warner,
(2008)) as state power may lead to regional stability.
Global level Global hegemons are champions of free trade, while military and economic superiority
secures a competitive advantage in politics and rule-making (Warner, 2008).
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1732

(3) HH theory shows how states behave in the absence of institutionalized cooperation, highlighting the role of
bilateral and multilateral agreements in conflict management and in promoting cooperation (Rieu-Clarke,
2010: p. 828). It explores the connections between the local and the global in blue water issues and the
global ramifications of river basin politics (Sojamo et al., 2012: p. 172).
d. HH theory illuminates how prioritizing water in trade policy impacts virtual water trade and power over water
resources (Farnum, 2013). The virtual HH concept also explains the implications of increasing competition
over the sources of global food supply chains (Sojamo et al., 2012).

4.3. Weaknesses of HH theory

HH theory has also shown some weaknesses. With a state-centric conception of hegemony, HH theory can be
accused of ignoring the social and transnational characteristics of hegemony (Selby, 2007). However, by present-
ing multilevel HH (i.e. global hegemony, regional hegemony, river basin hegemony, and state–society relations),
Warner (2008) took a step toward more complex conceptualizations by arguing that interactions at various levels
influence each other (in line with Putnam, 1988). However, the social dimension remains under-explored.
The literature has also developed an understanding of regional hegemony. This level and the different strands
were addressed by HH scholars in a Special Issue of Water Policy (2008: Vol. 20: Supplement 2), though their
analyses were mostly limited to the inter-state level. To challenge this, HH scholars can build on the work of
Selby (2007) by following the example of critical IR (international relations) scholarship. This strand has also
drawn on Gramscian’s (1971) accounts of hegemonic control at the national level, defined by social and cultural
dynamics of coercion and consent, and are explored at the international and civil society levels (e.g. van der Pijl,
1997; Cox, 2006).
This literature also explores the need for apt-scale development for hydropolitics leading to HH, since the rami-
fications of this scale are quite widespread affecting the regional hydropolitical dynamics. It is endorsed by
analyzing the scales produced by some riparian countries and stakeholders for La Plata River Basin (LPRB)
and Guarani Aquifer System (GAS) at different points of times in the 20th century for shaping regional hydro-
politics. This concept of scale construction and evaluation was established in the article: Production of scale
in regional hydropolitics: An analysis of La Plata River Basin and the Guarani Aquifer System in South America
(da Silva & Hussein, 2019). It also provided a comprehensive framework stemming from hydropolitics and
human geography in the region. The understanding of the importance of scale in human geography and ecology
is developed, the effect of these key components on how river basins are habituated to composing transboundary
water governance, structuring distinct river basin trajectories (Molle & Wester, 2009).
Within this frame, some of the critical weaknesses of HH theory include:
(1) HH theories are rooted in the realism of international relation theories, allowing them to explain conflict with
the view that inter-state interactions are zero-sum power games, and playing down the possibility of structural
positive-sum interactions (Lopes, 2012). They have only partially engaged with explaining the difference
between interaction and genuine cooperation, and rarely explain how cooperation emerges through, for
instance, regime theory (Selby, 2013), or legal institutional approaches which show how sovereignty is limited
by rules on cooperation, human rights, and other principles of international law (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011).
It also established how hydropolitical analysis can serve as a baseline for explaining the circumstantially
guided cooperation over transboundary groundwater resources (Hussein, 2018).
(2) HH theory is rooted in the notion of state power as a resource and has inadequately dealt with multiple levels
at which power plays a role (Warner, 2008). It has not problematized the concept of power, nor drawn on
critical water scholars (such as Kistin, 2007; Keller, 2012; Mirumachi, 2015) to expand the meaning of
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1733

power. In global water governance, agriculture plays a vital role in the dependency of nations on each other,
and agribusiness is administered through virtual water control which is with a few conglomerates in the world
creating power disparities in global agro-food supply. Water being the key element, hydropolitics also chal-
lenges the economic power relationships of the world (Sojamo et al., 2012).
(3) It has been unable to incorporate liberal accounts of international relations (Moravcsik, 1993), which account
for actors beyond the state, such as NGOs (Conca, 2005; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2012), transnational net-
works (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), professional associations (Gutiérrez, 2006), or companies (Shiva, 2002),
which influence the dynamics not only at the state level but also at levels under and above state relations
(Warner, 2012; Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012). It has yet to encompass the role of hydropolitics in relation
to the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) and now the more globally emphasized SDGs (Sustainable
Development Goals), where SDG 6 stresses the availability of water and sanitation to all, to be ensured
through the means of implementation 6.5 under SDG 6, which promotes integrated water resources manage-
ment at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate (Hussein et al., 2018).
(4) It has not yet engaged with the ongoing ‘politics of scale’ debate that gives closer attention to the inter-
relationships between power and social networks in studies of water governance, with particular reference
to both institutional dynamics and scalar constructions (Norman et al., 2012). Schmeier et al. (2013) suggest
that transboundary river basins risk potential flashpoint for riparian states and delve into the role of River
Basin Organizations (RBOs) in the institutionalization of International Water Treaties as a result of effective
governance to contain emerging hydro-hegemonies in the context of increasing water scarcity around the
world.
(5) It has not drawn sufficiently from the water discourse literature which argues that water scarcity (Dinar, 2016)
and water surplus (Warner & Zawahri, 2012) can create interdependence (Furlong, 2006: pp. 444; Le Billon,
2001: p. 564).
(6) HH theory focuses primarily on blue surface water and has rarely paid attention to different kinds of fresh-
water and the broad range of ecological services that these waters provide (Hayat & Gupta, 2016).
(7) HH theory assumes state sovereignty as an uncontested attribute in international relations (Zeitoun &
Warner, 2006: p. 453) and does not engage enough with literature that allows for a reassessment of power
by challenging the notion of state boundaries (Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1993).
(8) HH theory fails to give a due share of thought to the increasingly attractive desalination concept, which is
now considered by a notable number of developed countries facing water scarcity, including oil-rich Arab
Gulf States and water-scarce islands (Feitelson & Rosenthal, 2012).

4.4. Enriching the theory and research agenda of HH

The theoretical approaches of HH build upon previous approaches to hegemony in the water-politics literature
(see Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and set the directions for future research for hydro-scholars to investigate trans-
boundary water resources with more complexity. They have problematized the role of the hegemon and of
how states use their capabilities to impose their will on other states, shed light on the role of institutions, and
on norms in constraining behavior of hegemonic and subordinate states (Bakker, 1999). Furthermore, HH
theory indirectly challenges the tendency to de-politicize environmental issues (Lousley, 1999; Swyngedouw,
2011) when they are viewed as scientific problems requiring only technical solutions (Bond et al., 2002 in
Furlong, 2006).
While certain approaches of international relation theories can tackle equity issues and the social construction
of ideas about security, none are proficient in theorizing the construction and production of ecological conditions
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1734

(Furlong, 2008: p. 813). In a dialogue between water governance scholars (such as Zeitoun & Warner, 2006) and
international relation scholars (such as Selby, 2005, 2007; Furlong, 2006, 2008; Cohen & Davidson, 2011), it also
becomes clear how HH calls for inter-disciplinarily by first recognizing how international relation scholars have
largely ignored transboundary issues and related water politics and by suggesting that international relations can
contribute to water knowledge. Furthermore, gaps in knowledge about how different actors relate to and contest
water issues, and the terms of engagement of conflict, can be addressed through ethnographic approaches of
anthropology and analyses of inequality through sociology (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). In short, water issues
should not be limited to water scholars only. With this in mind, a future research agenda for HH scholars
could include:
(1) Research on the consequences of asymmetric power relations to mediate situations of low conflict and low to
medium cooperation, along with the identification of the drivers of interaction (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008:
p. 312; Zeitoun et al., 2011: p. 174).
(2) Research on the large volumes of virtual water flows between states (Farnum, 2014: pp. 29–32) and possibly
within the states.
(3) Research on the techniques to securitize and de-securitize water-related issues (Fischhendler, 2015). The lack
of agreements and silence over water-related problems among riparian states and tactics related to the effect
of time in resolving water conflicts also need to be explored (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: pp. 455–456).
(4) Research on the impact of multilateral institutions on regulating behavior and galvanizing cooperation
between riparian states.
(5) Research on enlarging the scope of HH theory to take into account all kinds of water as every kind of water is
linked to distinct ecological services.

5. CONCLUSION
This paper reviews HH literature and draws conclusions arising from the reproduction of power asymmetry,
exploitation potential, and geographic positioning. It has shown that there is still a long way to go to develop
a multilevel, multiactor HH theory in a way that gives attention to the layered nature of hegemonic struggles
among states (Davidson-Harden et al., 2007) and the context for transboundary water management in the context
of anthropogenic pressures and the resulting climate change affects stressing resources in the Water–Energy–
Food (WEF) nexus framework (Keskinen et al., 2016). It has also found that transboundary water issues must
be addressed by multi-disciplinary scholars (both social and natural scientists), with emphasis on the contribution
of international relation scholarship. In summary, HH theory can explain where power plays a role but (a) does
not sufficiently address institutionalist theories which explain why cooperation develops in cases of asymmetrical
hydropower relations, nor epistemic theories which show how knowledge leads to converging state policies;
(b) does not deal with social practice models that show how common norms shape actor behavior (cf. Young,
2001); (c) ignores the role of law as balancing the power; (d) focuses primarily on blue water and does not yet
deal with the various kinds of water and its ecosystem services (Hayat & Gupta, 2016); and (e) does not look
at the layered impacts of power on water-related issues such as climate change and nexus approach (WEF).
Thus, insights from HH need to be enriched through combinations with theories on hydro-solidarity, hydro-iden-
tity, institutionalism, and cognitive theories, and applied at multiple levels of governance.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

All relevant data are included in the paper or its Supplementary Information.
 Water Policy Vol 24 No 11, 1735

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare there is no conflict.

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First received 13 November 2021; accepted in revised form 25 September 2022. Available online 13 October 2022

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