case studies IB GLOBAL POLITICS AT

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south china sea
syrian civil war
ukraine
north korea
rwanda
rohingya of myanmar

seiduts esac
 MOC.SSERPDROW.BIOPOLG.WWW
ANDREW THOMSON

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PEACEKEEPERS SHOW
UP IN YOUR TOWN OR
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Emergency Sex (And Other Desperate Measures): True Stories from a

War Zone 2 .p
case studies
table
of contents

04 Introduction
07 South China Sea

23 Syrian Civil War

39 Ukraine 07 23 39
51 North Korea

69 Rwanda

87 Rohingya of Myanmar

51 87

69

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 INTRODUCTION
C ase studies are vital to support the points
your make in Global Politics - in your exams, in
your IAs and in your classroom learning. This
resource provides a selection of articles for each
of the six key case studies used as part of the IB
Global Politics course here at UW Costa Rica.
It should be obvious, however, that you will
need to use the articles and sources as a starting
point only and to ensure that you carry out
research in addition to the information
provided in this booklet.
In addition to the articles and readings
contained in this booklet, you will also find
interactiove links to fiurther readings and
sources of information .
These links can be accessed by clicking on
this symbol:
 MOC.SSERPDROW.BIOPOLG.WWW
JOHN
MEARSHEIMER

"IN THE ANARCHIC

WORLD OF
INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS IT IS BETTER
TO BE GODZILLA THAN
BAMBI
 Case Study #1

SOUTH CHINA SEA

A very good case study for exploring some

of the issues arising from Unit 1: Power,
What mechanisms exist to mediate in
territorial disputes between states?
Sovereignty and International Relations, the key
How effectively do competing theories
focus here is on the competing territorial claims
of international relations such as
made by China and other nations in the South
Realism and Liberalism offer insight into
China Sea
the issue?
How do states balance their own
Some usful guiding questions to consider are:
national self interest with participation
in the global political system?
south china sea
list of readings

1.1 Why is the South China Sea Contentious?

1.2 South China Sea Tensions: A CFR Backgrounder

1.3 Why China's Rise Will Not Be Peaceful

1.4 How Beijing is winning in the South China Sea

05 08 12
1.5 China will not tolerate US military muscle-flexing off
our shores

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18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

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why is the south china reading 1.1

sea contentious?
BBC News Article
Rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea for centuries, but tension has steadily increased in recent
years.

China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.

China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols. The US says it does not take sides in territorial
disputes, but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them "freedom of navigation" operations to ensure
access to key shipping and air routes.

Both sides have accused each other of "militarising" the South China Sea.

There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

05 08 12

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What is the argument about?

It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys - two island chains claimed in
whole or in part by a number of countries.

Alongside the fully fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough
Shoal.

Why are they worth arguing over?

Although largely uninhabited, the Paracels and the Spratlys may have reserves of natural resources around them. There has
been little detailed exploration of the area, so estimates are largely extrapolated from the mineral wealth of neighbouring areas.
The sea is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region.

Who claims what?

China claims by far the largest portion of territory - an area defined by the "nine-dash line" which stretches hundreds of miles
south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.

Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral
parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims. It showed the two island groups falling entirely
within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

However, critics say China has not clarified its claims sufficiently - and that the nine-dash line that appears on Chinese maps
encompassing almost the entirety of the South China Sea includes no coordinates.

It is also not clear whether China claims only land territory within the nine-dash line, or all the territorial waters within the line as
well.

Vietnam hotly disputes China's historical account, saying China had never claimed sovereignty over the islands before the
1940s. Vietnam says it has actively ruled over both the Paracels and the Spratlys since the 17th Century - and has the documents
to prove it.

The other major claimant in the area is the Philippines, which invokes its geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands as the
main basis of its claim for part of the grouping.

Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China) - a little more than 100
miles (160km) from the Philippines and 500 miles from China.

Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to territory in the South China Sea that they say falls within their economic exclusion zones, as
defined by UNCLOS - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Brunei does not claim any of the disputed islands, but Malaysia claims a small number of islands in the Spratlys.

Recent flashpoints
The most serious trouble in recent decades has flared between Vietnam and China, and there have also been stand-offs
between the Philippines and China. Some of the incidents include:

In 1974 the Chinese seized the Paracels from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops.

In 1988 the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors.

In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the
Scarborough Shoal.

Unverified claims that the Chinese navy sabotaged two Vietnamese exploration operations in late 2012 led to large anti-China
protests on Vietnam's streets.

In January 2013, Manila said it was taking China to a UN tribunal under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea,
to challenge its claims.

In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between
Vietnamese and Chinese ships.
Have they tried to reach a resolution?

China prefers bilateral negotiations with the other parties. But many of its neighbours argue that China's relative size and clout
give it an unfair advantage.

Some countries have argued that China should negotiate with Asean (the Association of South East Asian Nations), a 10-member
regional grouping that consists of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar
and Cambodia.

However, China is opposed to this, while Asean is also divided over how to resolve the dispute.

The Philippines has sought international arbitration instead. In 2013, it announced it would take China to an arbitration tribunal
under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to challenge its claims.

In July 2016, the tribunal backed the Philippines' case, saying China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights.

China had boycotted the proceedings, and called the ruling "ill-founded". It says it will not be bound by it.
south china sea tensions: reading 1.2
a background
Council for Foreign Relations
Introduction
Territorial spats over the waters and islands of the South China Sea have roiled relations between China and countries like
Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei in recent years, and tensions continue to escalate in the wake of U.S.
President Barack Obama’s announced “pivot” of focus to the region. A handful of islands comprise the epicenter of the territorial
dispute, making up an area known as the “cow’s tongue” that spans roughly the entire South China Sea. The region is home to a
wealth of natural resources, fisheries, trade routes, and military bases, all of which are at stake in the increasingly frequent
diplomatic standoffs. China’s blanket claims to sovereignty across the region and its strong resistance to handling disputes in an
international arena have mired attempts at resolving the crises and intensified nationalist postures in all countries involved,
particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. Experts say the potential for an escalated conflict in the South China Sea—while
seemingly distant for now—presents an ongoing crisis for the region, as well as for U.S. interests in the area.

What territories are involved and disputed?

The South China Sea comprises a stretch of roughly 1.4 million square miles in the Pacific Ocean that encompasses an area from
the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, spanning west of the Philippines, north of Indonesia, and east of
05 08 12
Vietnam. The South China Sea islands number in the hundreds, although the largest and most contentious territories include the
Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal, to which all of the six major Southeast
Asian nations lay various claims. The islands are mostly uninhabited and have never had an indigenous population, making the
issue of historical sovereignty a thorny one to resolve.

The disputes aren’t limited to land, however; each country has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), prescribed by the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), over which it has special rights to marine resources and energy
exploration and production. An EEZ spans outward 200 nautical miles from the coast of the each state’s territorial sea, and may
include the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. These zones come into play during disputes over sea territory, as
displayed in China’s December 2012 spat with Vietnam over oil and fishing activity in the waters near the Paracel Islands.

What is the "nine-dash line"?

The "nine-dash line" is a controversial demarcation line used by China for its claim to territories and waters in the South China
Sea, most notably over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and Spratly Islands—the two most important disputed island
groups. The line, which is contested by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, encompasses virtually the entire
South China Sea region and caused immediate controversy when China submitted a map to the UN in 2009 that included the
demarcation. Beijing’s issuance of a new passport in late 2012 containing a map of the disputed region based on the line drew
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fresh international criticism and backlash. 23
ASEAN countries have contested this boundary, but China has insisted on the historical legitimacy of the line based on survey
expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols dating as far back as the fifteenth century, putting it at odds with the boundaries
UNCLOS has enforced for the region since 1994.

What resources are at play in the region?

The immediate source of conflict in the region is competition over resources, says David Rosenberg, professor of political
science at Middlebury College. There are roughly half a billion people who live within 100 miles of the South China Sea
coastline, and the volume of shipping through its waters has skyrocketed as China and ASEAN nations increase international
trade and oil imports. The need for resources, especially hydrocarbons and fisheries, also has intensified economic competition
in the region, particularly given the rapid coastal urbanization of China. “Behind it all, it’s essentially the industrial revolution of
Asia,” Rosenberg says. “And the South China Sea has become the hub of that.”
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According to the World Bank, the South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of at least seven billion barrels and an estimated
900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which offer tremendous economic opportunity for smaller nations like Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam, and energy security for China’s large, growing economy. In December 2012, China’s National Energy
Administration named the disputed waters as the main offshore site for natural gas production, and a major Chinese energy
company has already begun drilling in deep water off the southern coast. Competitive tensions escalated when India’s state-run
Oil and Natural Gas Corp announced it had partnered with PetroVietnam for developing oil in the disputed waters. In June 2011,
Vietnam accused a Chinese fishing boat of cutting cables from an oil exploration vessel inside its EEZ. Hostilities resurfaced in
May 2014, when Chinese vessels fired water cannons at a Vietnamese flotilla that allegedly approached a large Chinese drilling
rig near the Paracel Islands. The row affected Vietnam’s stock markets, which plunged after the incident.
Smaller-scale fishing incidents have instead become the hub of maritime confrontation as declining fish stocks have driven
fishermen farther into disputed areas to search for supply, as well as highly profitable illegal species. In the most recent clash, the
Philippines’ naval forces intercepted eight Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, finding what they
viewed as illegally fished marine life on board. The attempted arrest of the poachers led to a two-month standoff between the
two countries.

Annual fishing bans and arrests of fishermen are a convenient proxy for sovereignty claims since they can be presented as
legitimate attempts to enforce marine resources protection, according to a report by the International Crisis Group. “This is an
issue that doesn’t make big headlines, but 1.5 billion people live there and rely heavily on fisheries for food and jobs,” Rosenberg
says. “That’s where most of the conflict goes on, and most of these have been dealt with on a routine conflict management
basis.”

How does the dispute affect trade routes in the sea?

As much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea, which sees three times more tanker
traffic than the Suez Canal and more than five times that of the Panama Canal, making the waters one of the world’s busiest
international sea lanes. More than half of the world’s top ten shipping ports are also located in and around the South China Sea,
according to the International Association of Ports and Harbors. As intra-ASEAN trade has markedly increased—from 29 percent
of total ASEAN trade in 1980 to 41 percent in 2009—maintaining freedom of navigation has become of paramount importance
for the region.

“This is a very important issue, and has become the main concern of Japan, the United States and even right now the European
Union,” says Dr. Yann-Huei Song, a fellow at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. However, Yann-Huei says China is unlikely to instigate
an interruption in traffic because its business, exploration, and importation rely entirely on freedom of navigation as well. Experts
argue that the mutual benefits [PDF] from regional economic integration provide an extremely compelling incentive for
cooperation on resources, conservation, and security movements, according to a Harvard Quarterly paper.

What are the military stakes?

The region has also seen increased militarization in response to China’s burgeoning power, raising the stakes of a potential
armed conflict and making disputes more difficult to resolve. Vietnam and Malaysia have led regional military buildups and
increased arms trade with countries like Russia and India, while the Philippines doubled its defense budget in 2011 and pledged
five-year joint military exercises with the United States. The Philippines also embarked on a modernization program costing
roughly $1 billion that will rely heavily on U.S. sales of cutters and potentially fighter jets.

Ships are commonly involved in naval disputes, as exhibited in the Scarborough Shoal incident in April when the Philippines
said its largest warship—acquired from the United States—had a standoff with Chinese surveillance vessels after the ship
attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen but was blocked by the surveillance craft. The involvement of the navy made political
compromise more difficult, says the ICG.

“There’s nothing like NATO in Asia, and that’s what’s worrisome,” Rosenberg says. “Unlike the United States and EU, which are
engaged in other regions of the world, the Southeast Asian countries are compelled to spend more protecting their most
immediate interests. It’s not the Cold War by any means, but they’re still not very open with each other about military
modernization.”

What is being done to resolve the disputes?

One of the largest impasses to a resolution is China’s insistence on conducting most of its diplomacy on a bilateral basis, wrote
CFR’s Stewart Patrick. Nationalism has also fueled many of these stalemates. International tribunals, like the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are available, but nations use it selectively in light of the potential domestic political ramifications
of appearing conciliatory. China also has repeatedly rejected the mechanisms for arbitration provided by the UN.

A July 2012 ASEAN summit attempted to address ways to mitigate the conflict but ended without producing a communiqué,
which some experts say highlights the difficulties of multilateral approaches in the region. ASEAN’s six-point statement in July
made no reference to specific incidents, and only outlined an agreement to draft and implement a regional code of conduct,
respect international law, and exercise self-restraint. CFR’s Joshua Kurlantzick said in August 2012 that while ASEAN was an
appropriate venue to mediate this dispute, the organization still has not yet found its footing in transitioning to a “more forceful,
integrated organization that can provide leadership.” In a November 2012 IIGG working paper, Kurlantzick looked at how ASEAN
could strengthen its role in the region to meet challenges such as the South China Sea.

Consequently, joint management of resources has been widely proposed by experts as the best way to ease current tensions,
according to the ICG. China and Vietnam have managed to cooperate on a common fishery zone in the Tonkin Gulf, where the
two countries have delineated claims and regulated fishing. However, oil development has remained a highly contentious issue,
as both Vietnam and the Philippines have gone ahead with gas exploration projects [PDF] with foreign companies in disputed
areas.
What does this mean for the United States’ pivot to Asia?

The U.S. pivot to the area, coupled with the region’s myriad conflicts, raises concerns about the future of U.S. interests in
Southeast Asia. The Obama administration has not only worked to strengthen ties with ASEAN, but has also forged tighter
relations with individual countries like Myanmar, where it has developed a new focus and strategy of engagement. The United
States has also ramped up security cooperation with Vietnam, while Malaysia and Singapore have also signaled desire for
increased security cooperation.

A 2012 Johns Hopkins paper notes that Southeast Asia has transformed in the last two decades to an area where Chinese power
and strategic ambition confront an established U.S. military presence, and where a Chinese perception of the status of the South
China Sea is fundamentally at odds with a long-settled consensus among major maritime states.

Experts say that the United States faces a dilemma and tough balancing act in the region, as some countries in ASEAN would like
it to play a more forceful role to counter what they see as a greater Chinese assertiveness, while others want to see less U.S.
involvement. The priority on all sides should be to avoid military conflict, according to Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in this Contingency Planning Memorandum; even as China spars with its Southeast Asian neighbors, it
is becoming the largest trading partner and one of the biggest direct investors of most Southeast Asian states since an ASEAN-
China free trade area came into effect.

Click on the image (left)

to explore the CFR
InfoGuide Presentation
why china's rise will not reading 1.3

be peaceful
John Mearsheimer

The question at hand is simple and profound: can China rise peacefully?

My answer is no.

If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage
in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, to include India, Japan,
Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain China’s power.

To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act
and how the other states in the system will react to them. That theory must be logically sound and it must account for the past
behavior of rising great powers.
05 08 12
My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while
making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.

After laying out the theory, I will show its explanatory power by applying it to U.S. foreign policy since the country’s founding. I
will then discuss the implications of the theory and America’s past behavior for future relations between China and the United
States

THE THEORY

Survival is a state’s most important goal, because a state cannot pursue any other goals if it does not survive. The basic structure
of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal
of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has
three defining characteristics.

First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them.

Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they have the wherewithal to hurt each other.

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Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for
example, to know what Germany or Japan’s intentions will be towards their neighbors in 2025. In a world where other states
might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded
by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night-watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door.

Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential
rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or
Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is powerful enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle
Sam.

But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is
to be the hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system. What exactly does it mean to be a hegemon in the modern
world? It is almost impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony, because it is too hard to project and sustain power
around the globe and onto the territory of distant great powers.
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The best outcome that a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon, and thus dominate one’s own geographical area. The
United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere since the late 1800s. Although the United States is
clearly the most powerful state on the planet today, it is not a global hegemon. States that gain regional hegemony have a
further aim: they seek to prevent great powers in other geographical regions from duplicating their feat. Regional hegemons, in
other words, do not want peers. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers, so that these
states will compete with each other and be unable to focus on them. In sum, my theory says that the ideal situation for any great
power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world.
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

A brief look at the history of American foreign policy illustrates the power of this theory.

When the United States won its independence from Britain in 1783, it was a small and weak country comprised of 13 states
strung out along the Atlantic seaboard. The new country was surrounded by the British and Spanish Empires and much of the
territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River was controlled by hostile Native American tribes. It was a
dangerous threat environment for sure.

Over the course of the next 115 years, American policymakers of all stripes worked assiduously to turn the United States into a
regional hegemon. They expanded America’s boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans as part of a policy commonly
referred to as “Manifest Destiny.” The United States fought wars against Mexico and various Native American tribes and took
huge chunks of land from them. At different times, U.S. policymakers wanted to conquer Canada as well as territories in the
Caribbean. The United States was an expansionist power of the first order. Henry Cabot Lodge put the point well when he noted
that the United States had a “record of conquest, colonization, and territorial expansion unequalled by any people in the
nineteenth century.” Or I might add the twentieth century.

American policymakers in the nineteenth century were not just concerned with turning the United States into a powerful
territorial state. They were also determined to push the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere, and make it clear
to them that they were not welcome back. This policy, known as the Monroe Doctrine, was laid out for the first time in 1823 by
President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress. By 1898, the last European empire in the Americas had collapsed
and the United States had become the first regional hegemon in modern history.
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However, a great power’s work is not done once it achieves regional hegemony. It then must make sure that no other great
power follows suit and dominates its area of the world. During the twentieth century, there were four great powers that had the
capability to make a run at regional hegemony: Imperial Germany (1900-1918), Imperial Japan (1931-1945), Nazi Germany
(1933-1945), and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1945-1989). Not surprisingly, each tried to match what the United States
achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century.

How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons.

The United States entered World War I in April 1917 when Imperial Germany looked like it would win the war and rule Europe.
American troops played a critical role in tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the
early 1940s, President Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States into World War II to thwart Japan’s
ambitions in Asia and especially Germany’s ambitions in Europe. The United States came into the war in December 1941, and it
helped destroy both Axis powers. Since 1945, American policymakers have gone to considerable lengths to keep Germany and
Japan militarily weak. Finally, during the Cold War, the United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from
dominating Eurasia and then helped relegate it to the scrap heap of history in the late 1980s.

Shortly after the Cold War ended, the first Bush Administration’s famous “Defense Guidance” of 1992, which was leaked to the
press, boldly stated that the United States was now the most powerful state in the world by far and it planned to remain in that
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exalted position. In other words, the United States would not tolerate a peer competitor. 23
That same message was repeated in the famous “National Security Strategy” issued by the second Bush Administration in
October 2002. There was much criticism of that document, especially its claims about “pre-emptive war.” But hardly a word of
protest was raised about the assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position
in the global balance of power.

The bottom line is that the United States -- for sound strategic reasons -- worked hard for more than a century to gain hegemony
in the Western Hemisphere. After achieving regional dominance, it has gone to great lengths to prevent other great powers from
controlling either Asia or Europe.

What are the implications of America’s past behavior for the rise of China? Specifically, how is China likely to behave as it grows
more powerful? And how are the United States and the other states in Asia likely to react to a mighty China?

WHAT A POWERFUL CHINA WILL DO 18 25

China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek
to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is
so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it
can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will
want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear
to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China
will get Taiwan back.
An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed
the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the
Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s.

These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbors,
just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would want other
powerful states located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the last century when Japan was powerful
and China was weak. In the anarchic world of international politcs, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi.

Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating in its backyard? American policymakers, after all,
go ballistic when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. Those foreign forces are invariably seen
as a potential threat to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with U.S. forces
deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China’s security be better served by pushing
the American military out of Asia?

Why should we expect China to act any differently than the United States did? Are they more principled than we are? More
ethical? Less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is
likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

It is clear from the historical record how American policymakers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States
05 08 12
does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world’s only
regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it
to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave towards
China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

China’s neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional
hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers
like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the
end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and even China, joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Finally, given Taiwan’s strategic importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the United States, as
well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is likely to be an important player in the anti-China
balancing coalition, which is sure to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and Washington.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the picture I have painted of what is likely to happen if China continues its rise is not a pretty one. I actually find it
categorically depressing and wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the future. But the fact is that international
14 23
politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets
in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. That is the tragedy of great power politics.

18 25
how beijing is winning in reading 1.4
the South China Sea
Peter Apps / Reuters

Last month, the USS Carl Vinson became the first American aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War ended in 1975.
Coming alongside the news that a record 23 nations from Southeast Asia and beyond would be joining biennial naval exercises
in the eastern Indian Ocean, it was a potent reminder of just how eager the nations surrounding the South China Sea are to
embrace powerful allies to fend off a rising China.

But as Beijing’s regional clout continues to grow, it can be hard for weaker nations to resist it, even with these allies’ support.
Barely three weeks after the Carl Vinson’s visit, the Vietnamese government bowed to Chinese pressure and canceled a major oil
drilling project in disputed South China waters.

It was yet another sign of the region’s rapidly shifting dynamics. For the last decade, the United States and its Asian allies have
been significantly bolstering their military activities in the region with the explicit aim of pushing back against China. But Beijing’s
05 08
strength and dominance, along with its diplomatic, economic and military reach, continue to grow dramatically. 12
In recent days, Beijing has conducted major military drills, including reportedly sending its aircraft carrier through the Taiwan
Strait and flying jets between Japan’s southernmost islands (the latter of which was explicitly described by the Chinese military
as a preparation for future wars). These drills are both a response to recent U.S. military actions and a bold statement of China’s
intent to keep up the pressure.

Western military strategists worry that China will, in time, be able to block any activity in the region by the U.S. and its allies.
Already, satellite photos show China installing sophisticated weapons on a range of newly reclaimed islands where international
law says they simply should not be present. In any war, these and other new weapons that China is acquiring could make it all
but impossible for the U.S. Navy and other potential enemies of China to operate in the area at all.

A simple issue lies at the heart of the problem — Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea basin. That
assertion — first made by the exiled Republic of China government in Taiwan in 1947 and then repeated by its mainland
communist counterpart since — was flatly rejected by a United Nations tribunal in 2016. But that hasn’t stopped Beijing from
doing more and more to secure its position in the area.

China’s increasing confidence in asserting control over the South China Sea has clearly alarmed its neighbors, particularly the
14 23
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, all of whom have competing territorial claims over waters that China claims
for itself. But it also represents a major and quite deliberate challenge to the U.S., which, as an ally to all these nations, has
essentially staked its own credibility on the issue.

Over the last several years, it has become common practice for U.S. warships to sail through nearby waters, pointedly refusing to
acknowledge Chinese demands that they register with its unilaterally declared air and maritime “identification zones” (which the
U.S. and its allies do not recognize). The last such voyage — dubbed a “freedom of navigation” operation or, in naval parlance, a
“FONOP” — took place March 23, when the destroyer Mustin reportedly passed within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef in the
Spratly Islands, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.

The Mischief Reef FONOP fits a much wider pattern of increasingly assertive naval activities by Washington and its allies in the
region. Earlier in March, the U.S. announced the first deployment of its cutting-edge F-35B vertical takeoff Joint Strike Fighter —
by far the most sophisticated aircraft of its type — to an amphibious assault ship in the region.

18 25
This kind of military tit for tat appears to be escalating; China now says it plans monthly military exercises in the South China Sea,
a substantial increase. That will likely be met by intensified American and allied activity: A British warship is shortly scheduled to
conduct its own FONOP, and the U.S. has pushed Australia to join the program (although whether it will do so remains a topic of
considerable debate within the country).

None of this, however, addresses the seismic regional change produced by China’s island-building strategy. Over the last five
years, China has built ever more sophisticated military and industrial outposts on disputed atolls and reefs, in some cases
transforming scrubby patches of rock that barely broke the surface into large concrete installations.
Once a tiny fishing station on stilts, Mischief Reef is now a well-armed Chinese military base. And China’s land-reclamation efforts
continue, aided by a giant new dredging vessel that its Chinese designers have touted as a “magical island-building machine.”
Filipino officials say they believe it is only a matter of time before Beijing makes similar moves at Scarborough Shoal, within
striking distance of major Filipino population centers and military facilities.

If and when that happens, the Philippines, along with the U.S., will face a difficult decision about how best to respond. At stake
here are more than energy resources — although the estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and nearly 200 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas that the South China Sea is believed to contain are clearly a factor in the conflict.

But more broadly, China sees this confrontation as a test case for its ability to impose its will on the wider region — and so far it is
winning. (At the very least, foreign energy firms are now unlikely to bid to drill in disputed waters; Spanish oil firm Repsol is said to
have lost up to $200 million after Chinese pressure prompted Vietnam to cancel its planned exploration.)

The U.S. remains the world’s pre-eminent military superpower, and there is little doubt it could win a fight with China almost
anywhere else in the world. In its own backyard, however, Beijing is making it increasingly clear that it calls the shots. And for
now, there is little sign anyone in Washington — or anywhere else — has the appetite to seriously challenge that assumption.

05 08 12

14 23

18 25
china will not tolerate us reading 1.5
military muscle-flexing
off our shores
Liu Xiaoming, Chinese
Ambassador to UK
Amid recent hype about “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea, the US, an outspoken opponent of China’s
“militarisation” has been flexing its own military muscle by sending naval vessels and aircraft carriers to the region. Four
questions need to be answered to clarify the real situation.

First, what is freedom of navigation? According to international law, ships navigating in the territorial waters of countries other
than their own must meet the “innocent passage” requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). That means not using force or threatening the use of force, and not engaging in military exercises or intelligence
05 08 12
gathering. Although naval ships are not subject to UNCLOS provisions of innocent passage, they are required by many countries
to obtain prior permission or provide advance notice to enter foreign territorial waters. Such is the provision of China’s Law on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

So, freedom of navigation is not an absolute freedom to sail at will. The US Freedom of Navigation Program should not be
confused with freedom of navigation that is universally recognised under international law. The former is an excuse to throw
America’s weight about wherever it wants. It is a distortion and a downright abuse of international law into the “freedom to run
amok”.

Second, is there any problem with freedom of navigation in the South China Sea? The reality is that more than 100,000 merchant
ships pass through these waters every year and none has ever run into any difficulty with freedom of navigation. Despite some
disputes between China and some of its neighbours, maintaining stability in the South China Sea has been a matter of consensus
for all the countries in this region. The overall situation has been stable, thanks to the joint efforts of all the regional partners.

Last August, for example, the foreign ministers of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) countries agreed
on the framework of a code of conduct. The parties have agreed to hold at least three more rounds of consultations before the
end of this year.

The South China Sea is calm and the region is in harmony. The so-called “safeguarding freedom of navigation” issue is a bogus
14 23
argument. The reason for hyping it up could be either an excuse to get gunboats into the region to make trouble, or a
premeditated intervention in the affairs of the South China Sea, instigation of discord among the parties involved and impairment
of regional stability.

The third question concerns militarisation of the South China Sea? The US, the self-professed opponent to “militarisation”, keeps
sending destroyers, cruisers, carriers, reconnaissance flights and strategic bombers, fully loaded with advanced offensive
weapons, to this region in total disregard of others’ sovereignty and security or the peace and stability of the area. What is
“militarisation” or “troublemaking” if not this blatant show of force? Instead of getting this straight, some countries followed suit
by condescendingly accusing China of “not playing by the rules”. This is not only making a mess of the regional situation but
also assisting the troublemakers.

China is naturally vigilant and on guard against provocations and needs to increase its defensive capabilities, such as building
necessary facilities on its islands. This is the responsibility and right of a sovereign country. These facilities, while serving the
purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty and security of China, will also provide relevant navigational services to ships and
18 25
aircraft passing through this region and help ensure the openness and safety of the shipping and flight routes. China is the
biggest littoral state in the South China Sea and it is firmly committed to peaceful development, to peace and stability in the
South China Sea and to regional prosperity and growth. There is no doubt about this.

The last question is what does it take to ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea?

A calm and tranquil South China Sea matters directly to the prosperity and development of China and its neighbours, who
treasure peace and stability in this region more than anyone else. Therefore it is up to China and the Asean countries to find a
solution through negotiation and consultation among themselves.

Peace, like air and sunshine, is hardly noticed when people are benefiting from it. But no one can live without it. China respects
and supports freedom of navigation in the South China Sea according to international law. But freedom of navigation is not the
freedom to run amok. For those from outside the region who are flexing their muscles in the South China Sea, the advice is this: if
you really care about freedom of navigation, respect the efforts of China and Asean countries to safeguard peace and stability,
stop showing off your naval ships and aircraft to “militarise” the region, and let the South China Sea be a sea of peace.
south china sea tribunal reading 1.6
ruling clings to
relevance
Trọng Kiên
The Hague-based international arbitration court announced on July 12, 2016, a landmark ruling that dealt a significant legal
blow to China’s sweeping claims over most of the South China Sea (called the East Sea in Việt Nam).

At the time, expectations were high that the tribunal’s ruling, in a case initiated by the Philippines over China’s aggressive
attempts to prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing off the waters of the Scarborough Shoal since 2012, would have a great
impact and possibly lead to a permanent settlement of tensions.

The “final and without appeal” verdict of the arbitral tribunal, set up under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS 1982), states that all of the maritime features in the Trường Sa (Spratly) archipelago are not technically
islands and therefore cannot be used to make maritime territorial claims — specifically, the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic
05 08 12
Zone that extends into the waters off national coastlines. If the ruling were fully observed, it would reduce the overlapping
maritime areas claimed between the six countries in the dispute, which in turn might quicken negotiations.

In addition, many thought the ruling would thwart China’s ambitions in the contested waters and would pave the way towards a
peaceful settlement.

However, two years on, the South China Sea issue doesn’t seem to have cooled down. Instead, it has become progressively more
complicated, if not to say, deteriorated.

On the ground, reports from various watchdogs pointed to China’s renewed intensity in militarising the islands it claims in the
South China Sea – building new bases, upgrading runways and hangars, as well as deploying surveillance systems and what
amounted to electronic warfare equipment on Spratly maritime structures. Live fire drills and the deployment of missiles and
bombers by the Chinese navy have also been reported, drawing criticisms from other countries involved in the South China Sea
dispute, including Việt Nam and the Philippines, who accused China of “complicating the dispute”.

The tribunal award also “has not moved the situation as far as the dispute is concerned any nearer to a resolution, nor even is the
completion of the Code of Conduct (COC) between ASEAN and China on the South China Sea any closer,” wrote Assoc. Prof.
Herman Kraft, from the University of Philippines’ Department of Political Science, in a correspondence with Việt Nam News.
14 23
On the legal front, China has been consistently adamant in its rejection of the ruling since the day the tribunal was set up to hear
the Philippines’ case, calling both the tribunal process and the final award “null and void”.

Power Play

China’s predicted reaction “undermined not only the legal basis for good order at sea but also its credibility as a major power that
respects international law,” Emeritus Professor Carlyle Thayer from the University of New South Wales, Australia, a noted
commentator on South China Sea issue, told Việt Nam News.

“China participated in the international negotiations that led to the adoption of UNCLOS and by its actions is now in breach of its
legal obligations. This is a serious matter as UNCLOS is widely regarded as the Constitution of the world’s seas,” Thayer said,
adding that Chinese realpolitik “is not different from past imperial powers” while China has repeatedly played the card of being a
victim set upon by hostile Western powers.

He commented that aside from the militarisation of seven artificial islands, China has “pressured and coerced littoral States into
18 25
acquiescing to China’s sovereignty claims”, which eventually drove other claimant countries to increase arms purchases and
“support the naval presence of non-claimant countries such as the United States and Japan”.

As a case in point, Japan said it welcomed the tribunal ruling. In early July, Japan announced it would conduct a large helicopter
tour over the South China Sea as part of its growing involvement in the area, ostensibly aiming to maintain freedom of navigation
amidst unease about China’s territorial assertions.
A highlight in the series of high-level visits between Japanese and Vietnamese leadership in the last few years has been a
consensus on “settlement of disputes… strictly abiding by international law, especially UNCLOS 1982,” and by extension, the
2016 ruling.

The US, despite President Donald Trump’s isolationist rhetoric, remains the “principle challenger” to China’s claims and activities
in the resource-rich sea, evidenced by increased patrolling and continued “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPs)
especially around the artificial islands, Prof. Herman Kraft said, adding that the US constitutes the main roadblock in China’s
ambition to “reorder East Asia relations”.

He argued that the US, Australia or Japan’s actions were the primary way by which the arbitral decision is being enforced, as
there is no enforcement mechanism provision contained in the UNCLOS.

According to Kraft, reports of Filipino fishermen’s activities “being ‘taxed’ by the Chinese Coast Guard serves as a constant
reminder that fishing activities in the area [Scarborough Shoal] are only being conducted at the sufferance of China”.

This indicates the status quo is an unsustainable “peace”, which President Rodrigo Duterte’s Government has been working to
achieve in the interest of good economic and political relations with China at the expense of territorial claims.

It should be noted that in case any party unilaterally uses force in the South China Sea to achieve greater control of the maritime
areas, the international community – even including non-claimant States – is permitted, by international law, to respond by
appropriate means (mostly sanctions) to transgressions of erga omnes, or the universal obligation which a State owes to the
“international community as a whole”, wrote Constantinos Yiallourides for The Diplomat.

Trần Công Trục, former head of Việt Nam’s Government border committee, in a recent article, had the same conclusion that a
third-party interference was possible by international law as Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea has gone beyond self-
defence to near the realm of invasion.

The ruling’s future

Many have expressed frustration and restlessness with the Philippines’ incumbent Duterte administration’s lethargy in leveraging
this clear legal win to its advantage, resulting in Filipinos’ fears that the country’s claims to land features in the South China Sea
will be weakened irreparably. Worse still, the award might fall into irrelevance.

Prof Kraft from the Philippines conveyed a concern shared by the Filipino scholars in general that “being reticent about Chinese
actions, and lack of action on the arbitral decision, is detrimental to the South China Sea issue, as well as hinders the prospect of
any future resolution”.

However, it’s important to note that the Duterte administration has not completely renounced the tribunal ruling but only put the
implementation of the ruling on hold, in exchange for economic co-operation with China.

“It is possible that the current Philippine government or a new administration could change policy and raise the implementation
of the award with China, ASEAN and the United Nations. Such action would then provide a legal basis for the United States and
other major power to support the Philippines,” Prof Thayer said.

The award of the arbitral tribunal is now part of international case law, which means it will be used as a reference or legal ground
to settle maritime disputes, according to Thayer.

In case other claimant countries in the dispute such as Việt Nam or Malaysia want to challenge China in court, “the 2016 award
would serve as the basis for legal proceedings”.

According to Thayer’s observation, these two countries, besides the Philippines, were also the only two in the 10-country ASEAN
bloc to issue statements welcoming the tribunal award. Since then, “no ASEAN country dares to mention the Arbitral Tribunal by
name but opts instead to use the circumlocution ‘legal and diplomatic process’”.

Compliance with the tribunal ruling would likely not be included in the COC due to Chinese objections, Prof Thayer wrote,
adding that complying with the ruling would require China to relinquish its hold on Mischief and Rubi reefs and permit fishermen
from the Philippines, Việt Nam and other countries to fish in the waters around Scarborough Shoal, which is deemed “traditional
fishing grounds” by the tribunal.

“It is difficult to see how a Code of Conduct can be effective if it ratifies the status quo,” he said.

Returning to the question of compliance with international law: A country that claims to be a responsible member of the
international community cannot cherry pick the portions of international law that align with their interests, while disregarding
anything that doesn’t.

Selective defiance of international law just adds chaos and disorder to an already unpredictable and fast-changing world
 Case Study #2
SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
T he civil war in Syria which, at the time of
writing, is now in its eighth year is a case study
that relates to all four of the core topics of the IB
Global Politics course.
However, almost inevitably given the naturte of
civil war, it can be complicated to develop an
understanding of the main players and the
relationships between them.
Some questions to consider include
Who are the key actors in the conflict
and how do they relate to each other?
What justification is there for the
involvement of external states in what
some claim is an internal conflict?
What are the implications for the region
and wider world of a civil war?
How successful would external military
intervention be? What would be the
risks?
What are the prospects for - and
obstacles to - peace in Syria and the
region?
syrian civil war
list of readings

2.1 Syria's civil war explained from the beginning

2.2 The Twisted Logic of the War in Syria

2.3 Can we have an integral Syria without Bashar Al-

Assad?

2.4 05
Aleppo: The guilt, the resentment, the indifference 08 12
2.5 The 'Palestinisation' of the Syrian people

2.6 What the Spanish Civil War can reveal about Syria

2.7 Inside Bashar Al-Assad's mind

14 23

18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

WWW.GLOPOIB.WORDPRESS.COM
syria's civil war
reading 2.1
explained from the
beginning
Al-Jazeera
More than 465,000 Syrians have been killed in the fighting, over a million injured, and over 12 million - half the country's prewar
population - have been displaced.

Here is how and why the conflict started:

What caused the uprising?

While lack of freedoms and economic woes drove resentment of the Syrian government, the harsh crackdown on protesters
inflamed public anger.
05 08 12
- Arab Spring: In 2011, successful uprisings - that became known as the Arab Spring - toppled Tunisia's and Egypt's presidents.
This gave hope to Syrian pro-democracy activists.

- That March, peaceful protests erupted in Syria as well, after 15 boys were detained and tortured for writing graffiti in support of the
Arab Spring. One of the boys, a 13-year-old, was killed after having been brutally tortured.

- The Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, responded to the protests by killing hundreds of demonstrators and
imprisoning many more.

- In July 2011, defectors from the military announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army, a rebel group aiming to overthrow the
government, and Syria began to slide into civil war.

- While the protests in 2011 were mostly non-sectarian, the armed conflict surfaced starker sectarian divisions. Most Syrians are
Sunni Muslims, but Syria's security establishment has long been dominated by members of the Alawi sect, of which Assad is a
member.

- In 1982, Bashar's father ordered a military crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, killing tens of thousands of people
and flattening much of the city. 14 23
- Even global warming is said to have played a role in sparking the 2011 uprising. Severe drought plagued Syria from 2007-10,
causing as many as 1.5 million people to migrate from the countryside into cities, exacerbating poverty and social unrest.

International involvement

Foreign backing and open intervention have played a large role in Syria's civil war. Russia entered the conflict in 2015 and has
been the Assad government's main ally since then.

Regional actors: The governments of majority-Shia Iran and Iraq, and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, have supported Assad, while
Sunni-majority countries, including Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported anti-Assad rebels.

18 25
Since 2016, Turkish troops have launched several operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as
ISIS) near its borders, as well as against Kurdish groups armed by the United States.

Anti-ISIL coalition: The US has armed anti-Assad rebel groups and led an international coalition bombing ISIL targets since
2014.

Israel carried out air raids inside Syria, reportedly targeting Hezbollah and pro-government fighters and facilities.

The first time Syrian air defences shot down an Israeli warplane was in February 2018.
US and Russia

The US has repeatedly stated its opposition to the Assad government backed by Russia but has not involved itself as deeply.

- Chemical red line: Former US President Barack Obama had warned that the use of chemical weapons in Syria was a "red line" that
would prompt military intervention.

- In April 2017, the US carried its first direct military action against Assad's forces, launching 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian
air force base from which US officials believe a chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun had been launched.

- One year later, on April 14, despite Russian warnings, the US launched an attack together with France and the UK, at "chemical
weapon sites".

- CIA training: In 2013, the CIA began a covert programme to arm, fund and train rebel groups opposing Assad, but the programme
was later shut down after it was revealed that the CIA had spent $500m but only trained 60 fighters.

- Russia's campaign: In September 2015, Russia launched a bombing campaign against what it referred to as "terrorist groups" in
Syria, which included ISIL as well as anti-Assad rebel groups backed by the USA. Russia has also deployed military advisers to shore
up Assad's defences.

- At the UN Security Council, Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed Western-backed resolutions on Syria.

Peace talks

Peace negotiations have been ongoing between the Syrian government and the opposition in order to achieve a military
ceasefire and political transition in Syria, but the main sticking point has been the fate of Assad.

- Geneva: The first round of UN-facilitated talks between the Syrian government and opposition delegates took place in Geneva,
Switzerland in June 2012.

- The latest round of talks in December 2017 failed amid a tit-for-tat between the Syrian government and opposition delegates over
statements about the future role of Assad in a transitional government.
In 2014 Staffan de Mistura replaced Kofi Annan as the UN special envoy for Syria.

- Astana: In May 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey called for the setup of four de-escalation zones in Syria, over which Syrian and
Russian fighter jets were not expected to fly.

- After denouncing plans to partition Syria in March 2018, a follow-up trilateral summit was held in Turkey to discuss the way
forward.

- Sochi: In January 2018, Russia sponsored talks over the future of Syria in the Black Sea city of Sochi, but the opposition bloc
boycotted the conference, claiming it was an attempt to undercut the UN effort to broker a deal.

Rebel groups

Since the conflict began, as a Syrian rebellion against the Assad government, many new rebel groups have joined the fighting in
Syria and have frequently fought one another.

- The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a loose conglomeration of armed brigades formed in 2011 by defectors from the Syrian army and
civilians backed by the United States, Turkey, and several Gulf countries.

- In December 2016, the Syrian army scored its biggest victory against the rebels when it recaptured the strategic city of Aleppo.
Since then, the FSA has controlled limited areas in northwestern Syria.

- In 2018, Syrian opposition fighters evacuated from the last rebel stronghold near Damascus. However, backed by Turkey, the FSA
took control Afrin, near the Turkey-Syria border, from Kurdish rebel fighters seeking self-rule.

- ISIL emerged in northern and eastern Syria in 2013 after overrunning large portions of Iraq. The group quickly gained
international notoriety for its brutal executions and its energetic use of social media to recruit fighters from around the world.

- Other groups fighting in Syria include Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Iran-backed Hezbollah, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
dominated by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG).
The situation today

Fighting in Syria continues on several fronts:

Idlib: In February 2018, shelling by Russian and Syrian forces have intensified on Idlib, especially since fighters from the Hay'et
Tahrir al-Sham group shot down a Russian warplane.

In April, Russia brokered a deal to evacuate opposition fighters from Eastern Ghouta in the south to Idlib in the north, Idlib being
one of the few strongholds controlled by opposition fighters.

The province is strategically important for the Syrian government and Russia for its proximity to the Russian-operated Syrian
Khmeimim airbase.

Homs: In April, an airbase and other Syrian government facilities in Homs became again the target of Israeli and US-led air strikes in
which UK and French forces also participated.

The Syrian army recaptured the city of Homs in 2014, but fighting continues with rebels in the suburbs between Homs and Hama.

Afrin: Turkey and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) began in January 2018 a military operation against US-backed fighters in
northwestern Syria, and announced the capture of Afrin's city centre in March.

US troops are stationed in nearby Manbij, prompting fears of a US-Turkey confrontation.

Syrian refugees

Now having gone on longer than World War II, the war in
Syria is causing profound effects beyond the country's
borders, with many Syrians having left their homes to seek
safety elsewhere in Syria or beyond.

Registered: As of February 2018, the UN refugee agency

(UNHCR) had registered over 5.5 million refugees from Syria
and estimated that there are over 6.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDP) within Syria's borders.

Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan are hosting most of the Syrian

refugees, many of whom attempt to journey onwards to
Europe in search of better conditions.

The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees describes a refugee as any person who, "owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country".

Returns: In 2017, about 66,000 refugees returned to Syria,

according to reports.

According to a Turkish official, 140,000 Syrian refugees in

Turkey returned home after Turkish military operations in
2017. More refugees may return to Afrin.

AS THIS IS AN ONGOING CONFLICT IT IS IMPORTANT

TO REMEMBER THAT STATISTICS AND DATA CAN
BECOME INACCURATE VERY QUICKLY.
the twisted logic of the reading 2.2
war in syria
Kersten Knipp, Deutsche Welt

Following the logic of the various military forces in Syria reveals a twisted form of reason. Who is forming alliances with
whom and why? Nothing seems to make sense for long, and new chaos and new partnerships are constantly emerging.

Turkey's military operation in Afrin is a telling example of the cynicism in Syria. Moscow has seemingly given Ankara the green
light for its incursion into northern Syria. But why would Russia, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's protector, do that? One of the
theories is that by invading Syria, Turkey is fueling tension with its NATO partner the United States, who, in turn, backs the Syrian
Kurds. From the Russian point of view, any rift that undermines NATO unity is a welcome development, particularly with regard to
Ukraine.

Cynical power games

But Russia may be concerned about something else. Turkey could ultimately emerge weakened from its military operation in
05 08 12
Syria. And a weakened Turkey may need to turn to Russia for help — giving Moscow the upper hand in its rivalry with Ankara.

None of this has much to do with Syria itself anymore. It is about ruthless power games. NATO member Turkey is marching
callously into a foreign country. At the same time, Iran is increasingly entrenched in Syria, buying land and setting up businesses,
while threatening increased pressure on Israel from the Golan Heights. Iran, the grand master of oppression, makes a sheer
mockery of it all by accusing the Turkish government of violating human rights. What happens in Iran every day, if not that?

Europe's temptation

The war in Syria has lost its aim. And it will probably not be found, even if French President Emmanuel Macron decides to
intervene militarily, which he has threatened to do if he sees "proven evidence" of chemical weapons use on civilians. Such an
intervention would benefit Macron, who takes pride in his humanist stance, but it would not help end the war. Would Macron
dare send French fighter jets to combat the Russians?

Europe is not a military power in Syria. And France must think carefully about future military activities after the intervention in
Libya and its catastrophic consequences.

In retrospect, it was not wise to launch the military intervention against the "Islamic State" in the summer of 2014 without
14 23
international legitimacy. Things continued to go downhill after making that colossal mistake. It is hard for interventionists to
condemn other interventionists.

War has its own dark laws. If the situation does not improve, then the arbitrary slaughtering will continue, guided by the great
masters of cynicism who no longer have a goal — at least not a worthy one.

18 25
can we have an integral reading 2.3
syria without bashar al-
assad?
John Bell, director of the Middle East programme at the
Toledo International Centre for Peace in Madrid

It is safe to say that, until recently, the debate over Syria's political future came down to one thing: the fate of President Bashar al-
Assad. With his victory in Aleppo, and the firm support of Iran and Russia, it is also fairly safe to say that the Syrian president's
future is secure, for the time being. 05 08 12
What is it about Assad that has made him such a key issue? Some argued that without his rule, radical Islamists (ISIL, Jabhat
Fateh al-Sham etc) would take over Syria.

This has not only presented a threat to Syria and its minorities, but it was a problem for Europe, Russia and beyond. As Russia,
Iran and Assad have repeated: only Assad and his system can effectively keep them at bay.

The counterargument has been that it is Assad who is the very source of this terror. His rule had restricted political space and
created enough anger that young men were driven to extremes.

It was also Assad that had sent radical Islamists to fight in Iraq against the American occupation, and more recently released
them from his prisons, so they could feed the ranks of the extremists; that is to say, he is both arsonist and firefighter.

Is he really indispensable?

For some, Assad is also favoured because he is the only option that can maintain the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Syria.

14 23
His toughness and strong centralised state are sine qua non to avoid centrifugal forces. From this view, the opposition is not only
radicalised, but its moderate elements are fragmented and unrepresentative - most have no local constituency. If integrity is the
goal, then Assad is the key.

The counterargument is that Assad has already destroyed the country while trying to keep it whole. Armies of extremists could
not have done the damage that Assad and his allies have done.

Millions are displaced, wounded or dead, thousands of others languish in prison. If he had saved Syria from the worse fate of a
caliphate, his actions have still created a mentality of violence.

This is the Assad conundrum: Can you have an integral Syria without him? Can you have a healthy Syria with him?

It's difficult to believe that the future of a country would so turn on the fate of one man. There are recent reports that Russia,
Turkey and Iran are looking at a formula whereby Assad will leave after the end of his current term, possibly replaced by a less
problematic Alawite.
18 25
However, that deal is not yet done, and the contradictions between those three powers, and Assad's very role, suggest great
challenges.
 It's the deeper societal and cultural
work, not the Assad conundrum,
that's required to move Syria
slowly, but surely, towards health.
The rarest of 21st-century commodities

We may be looking in the wrong place. There may be a more subtle question that steers the gaze away from the man: How can
Syria evolve over time in a direction that is healthy and enriching for its people?

Given the need for stability and a less radical positive evolution, one can imagine the possibility of a "benevolent dictator",
05 08
someone who holds the fort, while permitting enough space for a better system to come about. 12
They address both sides of the conundrum; a modern Haroun Al Rashid or China's Deng Xiaoping come to mind, as exemplars.

However, there is little evidence that Assad or other tyrants are such figures - it would seem they are in power for their own
benefit, period. Indeed, such figures, effectively "philosopher-kings" are rare and societies risk much betting on their arrival.
Both sides of the conundrum may point to something else at the societal level itself. ISIL and Assad may be linked, not in the
conspiratorial sense, but in that they are both the tragic representatives of a culture of violence and authoritarianism. The
evolution away from that involves a change in societal habits more than just in politics.

Syrians who suffer from both these twin plagues may shudder; that they are damned to a choice between tyranny and
extremism. Many may feel ready today for a less brutal society.

However, it may well be that their politics reflect their society more than the other way around. Despite certain beliefs, their
challenge may not only be from aggravating outsiders.

If that is the case, the best way forward would be to create a culture in Syria that is less primed for tyranny, whether of the
ideological variety, such as ISIL, or the state-driven form, like Assad. In the longer run, such a culture and society will more firmly
reject both.
14 23
This work will be quickened if countries concerned with maintaining the status quo for their own benefit lessen their meddling.
Others pining for instant democracy may also need to sober up a bit.

It's the deeper societal and cultural work, not the Assad conundrum, that's required to move Syria slowly, but surely, towards
health. And doing that requires the rarest of commodities in the rapid-fire politics of the 21st century: time. Who has the patience
and outlook for such work today?

Some perspective, and a little inspiration, may be gained by knowing that the Syrian culture that produced the Umayyad
Mosque of Damascus, or the cultural plenitude of Aleppo, has little, if anything, to do with the mind that produces ISIL - or Assad
for that matter.

18 25
aleppo: the guilt, the reading 2.4
resentment, the
indifference
Riham Alkousaa
IIt seems the only way to isolate yourself from the tragedies of Aleppo is to be in Damascus.

While most of my Syrian friends abroad are posting about Aleppo on social media, my friends in Damascus are talking about late
night pizzas, posting photos of graduation ceremonies and of the wet grey asphalt after a short night rain, and celebrating
autumn. Maybe the only way to shade your eyes from this calamity is to care about your own survival.

The evening of the 14 December, while people were slaughtered in Aleppo, the Syrian Symphony Orchestra held a classical
concert lead by Missak Baghboudarian in Damascus Opera House.

05 08 12
Since I left in 2014, I stopped asking myself why the people who do care in Damascus are doing nothing to stop the tragedies in
Syria.

I know the fear, the frustration and the survival mode you get into. When I was there, I was thinking about the blackouts, about
how much the chicken will cost tomorrow and, most of all, about how to get out of there.

I was a coward from the beginning, giving myself excuses as a daughter for two parents who would lose their minds if I get hurt.
But, I was simply too afraid to act.

I am filing my final paper this semester, while reading the endless tweets and posts about Aleppo. I am sometimes too afraid to
speak with the people there.

My last contact was yesterday when Hisham Eskef, a member of a rebel group that participated in the past truce negotiations for
Aleppo, told me that 800 people were taken by the regime while they were getting evacuated from east Aleppo.

I am the hypocrite who would talk with the people in east Aleppo, hear their pleas, cry and then go back to reading Lee
Hamilton's thoughts on the "creative tension" in the American democratic system.

I am the hypocrite who would say to those trapped in Aleppo, looking death in the eye, that I am with them.
14 23
But, I am not. I am the Syrian who spends her day wondering how a horrible massacre could produce surreal images, such as
those of a woman in a wheelchair and her husband who was frantically trying to save her.

I am the Syrian who just read a long interview with Sadeq Jalal Al Azm, who died in exile on December 11, talking about the right
to revolt and at least referring to what happened as a revolution.

We never learned about him in our textbooks, we didn't read his thoughts on love and religion, many of my Syrian friends don't
recognise his name in the first place. And some would ask: "Where was the Syrian intellectual elite in this revolution?"

I am the Syrian who would see photos of an old friend reporting about the "tense sunset" in the distressed city of Aleppo. I would
see photos of a belated honeymoon taking place alongside a "victory" over an anguished city. My friend went there, with the
man she just married, to report for pro-Assad media about the greatness of a victorious army.
18 25
Among some of her photos that stuck with me were images of the long line of young men who were forced to fight with the army
in order to get to their families in east Aleppo, and an image of a mother in a black headscarf crying bitterly at the sight of her
destroyed home. Her attempt at image poetics disturbed me.

Eventually, I had to tell her that this victory is built on people's misery, that while the operation went well, the patient is dead now.
She told me that this is war and, in wars, there is always a winner and a loser.

On my news feed, I would see another pro-regime friend checked-in in Aleppo with a photo of the old partly damaged castle, a
picture of Assad crowning its top. On the same feed, a friend based in Gaziantep would post photos of the graffiti that residents
left in east Aleppo before being forced to evacuate; "Walls are the notebooks of the rebels," he captioned it.
I read the comments of all Syrians, those who are mourning the slaughter and those who are celebrating it. They both see
Aleppo as the "sacred" city, where it's always worth taking a last selfie with the rubble before departure. Aleppo is a city to be
lived, not to be described.

It is a city where resentment had all the reasons to grow into a vicious monster. Is this the type of resentment that allows one to
justify a massacre and celebrate it?

What is happening in Aleppo is truly historic, as Assad said the other day. It is the spectacular tearing apart of a once united
nation, to the point that its people can no longer agree on basic principles of humanity.

In our last politics seminar this term, we discussed nation-building. Nations need a foundational myth or a story keeping people
together, giving them a reason to live together under the roof of a "nation". While our professor was asking my colleagues about
their nations' stories, I was anxious because I didn't have one. Not before, and not any more.

Our story, I am afraid, would be that one day we were so different that we killed each other, and we celebrated this killing with
chocolates and gaudy Christmas trees. That one day we were so different that we only cared about our own survival and the
death of others did not matter.
the 'palestinisation' of reading 2.5

the syrian people

Robin Yassin-Kassab
In solidarity with Aleppo, the lights on the Eiffel Tower were extinguished. Elsewhere in Paris, and in London, Amsterdam, Oslo
and Copenhagen, people demonstrated against the slaughter. Turks rallied outside Russian and Iranian embassies and
consulates in Istanbul, Ankara and Erzurum. The people of Sarajevo, who have their own experience of genocide, staged a big
protest.

The protests are nothing like as large as they were when the United States bombed Iraq, but they are welcome nonetheless. If
this level of support had been apparent over the last six years, it would have made a real difference.

Perhaps it is making a difference even now. Public sympathy for the victims may have pressured Vladimir Putin to allow those in
the surviving liberated sliver of Aleppo to evacuate, rather than face annihilation.
05 08 12
At the time of writing, the fate of the deal is in doubt, subject to the whims of the militias on the ground. If it works out and the
tens of thousands currently trapped are allowed to leave - the best possible outcome - then we will be witnesses to an
internationally brokered forced population transfer.

This is both a war crime and a crime against humanity, and a terrible image of the precarious state of the global system. The
weight of this event, and its future ramifications, deserve more than just a few demonstrations.

The 'war on terrorism' excuse

The abandonment of Aleppo is a microcosm of the more general abandonment of Syria's democratic revolution. It exposes the
failures of the Arab and Muslim worlds, of the West, and of humanity as a whole.

Many Syrians expected the global left would be first to support their cause, but most leftist commentators and publications
retreated into conspiracy theories, Islamophobia, and inaccurate geopolitical analysis, and swallowed gobbets of Assadist
propaganda whole. Soon, they were repeating the "war on terror" tropes of the right.

The Obama administration provided a little rhetorical support and sometimes allowed its allies to send weapons to the Free
Army. Crucially, however, Obama vetoed supply of the anti-aircraft weapons the Free Army, so desperately needed to counter
14 23
Assad's scorched-earth campaign. In August 2013, when Assad killed 1,500 people with sarin gas in the Damascus suburbs,
Obama's chemical "red line" vanished, and the US more or less publicly handed Syria over to Russia and Iran.

Keeping to the "war on terror" framework, the US bombs the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and others in Syria, hitting
the symptoms rather than the cause of the crisis. Europe, meanwhile, declares a crisis over the refugees arriving on its shores. So
long as Assad remains in power, most of these refugees will not return home.

As for the Arab states, a combination of sectarianism, Iranian domination, and counter-revolutionary fervour led several to
collude in Assad's war. Others supported elements of the opposition, but in a disorganised and tepid manner.

ISIL and Assad winning

The tragedy has also exposed the weaknesses of Syrian society, vulnerabilities which Assad so cleverly manipulated. By
organising massacres (particularly in 2012, on the plain between Homs and Hama), by releasing Salafist-Jihadists from prison,
18 25
even as he tortured and killed thousands of democratic activists, then by inviting in foreign Shia militias, Assad engineered a
sectarian breakdown.

Too many Syrians fell too easily into his trap. When, for instance, Zahran Alloush - founder of Jaish al-Islam and himself a
beneficiary of Assad's prison amnesty - called for Damascus to be "cleansed of Shia influence", he played right into Assad's
hands.

Yet, the revolution exposed strengths which Syrians didn't know they possessed. Communities held elections and organised
themselves in local councils. They set up women's centres, independent trades unions and free radio and TV stations. Aleppo
was by far the largest centre of such civil society initiatives.

It's not surprising when conservative states allow a revolution to drown. It's more shocking that they stand idle as Arab
sovereignty collapses.
Assad lost the war he provoked. By September 2015, when the Russian bombing started, his depleted army held less than a fifth
of the country.

He calculated correctly, however, that powerful friends would come to his aid. When Russia arrived it employed the usual excuse
- the "war on terror", in this case on ISIL, also known as ISIS - but less than 20 percent of its bombs fell anywhere near ISIL.
Instead, its planes focused relentlessly on eviscerating the Free Syrian Army, as well as the civilian infrastructure in liberated
areas. They burned schools, hospitals and markets. They dropped cluster munitions, incendiary bombs and bunker busters -
banned in civilian areas - on residential blocks. These, too, are war crimes.

The majority of the ground forces surrounding Aleppo are not Syrian. Most are Shia jihadists from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan
and Pakistan, funded and trained by Iran. As well as these proxies, Iran has its own Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in
theatre, often commanding Syrians. In Iraq too, the sectarian Popular Mobilisation Units are under IRGC command. In Lebanon,
the Iranian-inspired and funded Hezbollah dominates.

Iranian expansionism accompanies the sectarian/political cleansing of areas of Homs and Damascus, as well as Aleppo, creating
demographic changes which won't be reversed by another consignment of missiles.

Victory for Assad is also a victory for ISIL. As Aleppo was being subjugated, ISIL retook Palmyra, capturing important weapons
stocks. At the same time, an increasing number of Syrians facing sectarian aggression - though still a minority - are buying into
the nihilist ISIL narrative.

None of this stays in Syria. So how do the Arabs respond? Hamas organised a protest in Gaza, Kuwaitis demonstrated outside the
Russian embassy, and Qatar cancelled its national day celebrations. It's not nearly enough.

With good reason, the revolutionary thinker Yassin al-Haj Saleh wrote of the "Palestinisation" of the Syrian people. Sixty-eight
years after failing to defend Palestine, Arab states have proved incapable of defending Syria from Russian, Iranian and ISIL
occupation. They have, however, taught a repeat lesson to their subjects - that sovereignty is meaningless without democratic
control. This imperative, which galvanised the 2011 revolutions, is today more relevant than ever.
what the spanish civil reading 2.6

war can reveal about

syria
Ibrahim Al-Marashi
The Spanish civil war spanned three years - why has the Syrian conflict endured so much longer?
As the battle for Aleppo continues unabated, this intense episode in the Syrian civil war harkens back to a vicious battle for
another Mediterranean city, Barcelona, during the Spanish civil war.

July 2016 marked the 80-year anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict in Spain, lasting from 1936 to 1939. In July 1936,
General Francisco Franco led a rebellion among the Spanish military and his allies, collectively referred to as the Nationalists,
05
against the recently elected left leaning Republican Government. 08 12
The Republican government rallied its military forces to its defence, in addition to anarchist and communist militia, and a civil
war ensued.

I refrain from invoking the cliched phrase, "history repeats itself". Rather, this piece, part of a series of articles comparing the
Spanish past and Syrian present, will elucidate similar dynamics in civil wars, and illustrate how they end or why they continue to
endure.

The similarities

Comparisons between these two conflicts have been made before. Two prominent political scientists, Laia Balcells and Stathis
Kalyvas write, "The Spanish Civil War became a focal conflict in Europe, the ideological and military battleground where fascist
and anti-fascist forces clashed while the entire world stared. Today, Syria has become the key battleground of Sunni and Shia
ideologues and activists."

While I disagree that the Syrian civil war can be reduced to Sunni-Shia tensions, their mention of how the "world stared" as the
Spanish civil war unfolded holds true for most of the international community and Syria since the fighting broke out in 2011.
14 23
First, in terms of similarities, both conflicts involved rival foreign powers which sponsored proxies in the Spanish civil war, akin to
the roles Saudi Arabia and Iran have played in the Syrian civil war, just to name a few.

The USSR sided with the Republicans and Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy provided its troops and military aid to the Nationalists,
tipping the balance in Franco's favour.

Franco was leading a rebellion against the government, which would seem to make his forces similar to the Nusra Front, but in
terms of military hardware, he would be comparable to Bashar al-Assad in that he utilised most of the military hardware inherited
from the state to combat his foes.

Both these parties demonstrated their dependence on airpower, even though 80 years have transpired, and aerial technology
has developed significantly.

18 25
Franco had complete control of the air, due to the participation of the air forces of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which
bombarded pro-Republican towns. As of 2015, the intervention of the Russian air force tilted the balance in Assad's favour.

Both civil wars involved fighting for two major urban centres, the capitals, Madrid and Damascus, and two rebellious urban
centres, Barcelona and Aleppo. The Republicans, like the Syrian rebels, suffered from infighting that ultimately weakened its
ranks.

In the case of the Republican side, the aid delivered by the USSR to the Spanish communist militias, defeated the anarchist
militias in Barcelona. ISIL has played a similar role in weakening Syrian rebels, particularly those forces who control Aleppo.
The differences

Despite the strength of Franco's forces, in the spring of 1938 the Spanish civil war appeared to have reached a stalemate, yet a
year later the Nationalists scored their final victory after conquering Madrid. That conflict spanned three years. Why has the
Syrian conflict endured so much longer?

There are numerous reasons why the Syrian civil war continues. Differences in terms of military, geographical, and economic
dynamics of the conflict provide some explanations.

First, the roles of the strongest military side are reversed. Assad has been ensconced in the capital, and the onus has been on the
rebels to seize it.

Franco was invading his own country from Morocco to capture Madrid. The stronger military force in Spain had to take the
capital, the ostensible seat of power, whereas in Syria the weaker power had to achieve this goal, which proved elusive.

Second, Spain is only bordered by France and Portugal, with the former providing minimal aid to the Republicans, and the latter
aiding the Nationalists.

In the case of Syria, it has many more neighbours, bordered by Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and each border serves as a
conduit for perpetuating the conflict in terms of arms flows and fighters. Those border nations, in addition to the United States,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran, all have a stake in the civil war, and all seek an end to the war that suits their national
security interests.

Third, because the conflict has lasted longer in Syria, another difference is the political economy of the civil war.
05 08 12
Since the war has lasted so long in Syria a myriad warlords, some on the government side and others on the rebel side, have
taken root during the conflict, developing their own parasitic set of micro-economies.

It is doubtful that these parties would support a negotiated political solution if their financial base were to be threatened by an
end to the hostilities.

Anarchist and communist militias in Spain had developed their own micro-economies, such as in Barcelona, but these were
dismantled after the Nationalist victory there.

Rehearsal for World War II

The Spanish civil war served as a battleground for Germany and Italy to test out their new military hardware, particularly their
bombers targeting civilian centres. This tactic was a prelude to a much larger conflict, World War II.

Observers of the Syrian civil war argue that Russia is using this conflict to try out its new military hardware, ranging from cruise
missiles to long-distance bombing raids from Iran, in order to send a message to the US and its NATO allies about its new military
prowess.
14 23
As a historian, I dislike the phrase "history repeats itself", because it is overly deterministic, and denies the agency to actors in the
present.

In this case, the US, Russia, and the Syrian parties need to ensure that the bloody, half-a-decade civil does not become the
prelude to a much larger conflict.

18 25
inside bashar al-assad's reading 2.7

mind
James Denselow
Just before the latest attempt at a ceasefire began, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad visited the newly captured Damascus
suburb of Daraya.

Several photo opportunities showed him looking relaxed and tie-less; praying and meeting soldiers. Later the president
explained that the Syrian state is "determined to retake every inch of Syria from the terrorists … and to rebuild everything that has
been destroyed in the past".

Such language is completely at odds with the various Geneva agreements made so far and the statements coming out of
Washington and Moscow, yet Assad feels confident enough to make them nevertheless.

Despite the complexity of Syria's sustained conflict, all roads seem to head to the presidential palace and the fundamental
question as to the future of the 51-year-old leader.
05 08 12
Notions of any form of transition or Assad standing down appear to be completely off the table as the regime's grinding
momentum continues to slowly accrue territory.

What does he think?

Yet, despite Assad occupying such a central position in the conflict there is an absence of more critical explorations as to his
thinking.

Too often he is pigeonholed simply as a "bloodthirsty dictator" - an evil actor who could have walked straight out of a Hollywood
script.

Yet, in a sense by simply putting Assad into a murderous dictator box, actors involved in the Syrian conflict fail to understand his
motivations, actions and shine a brighter light into the opaque world of his country's decision-making structure.

So what does Assad think?

We know from his semi-regular longform interviews that he sees himself as carrying the flame of Syrian unity against a
14
conspiracy of foreign actors looking to destroy Syria. 23
We know that he denies the existence or use of barrel bombs as he does reports of his government blocking aid to Syrian
civilians around the country.

We know that his consistent line is that he is fighting against terrorists and his future will be decided by the Syrian people and
nobody else.

Reading between the lines and connecting Assad's rhetoric to reality reveals more. The fact that he has been willing to deploy all
the repressive tools of the state against the uprising and essentially outsource the defence of the country to Hezbollah, Iranian,
Iraqi and Russian forces, while simultaneously encouraging the growth of pro-regime militias, is evidence of the lengths he is
willing to go to stay in power.

In retrospect there was only a short gap between the start of the uprising in March 2011 and Assad's decision to go "all in" to
preserve his rule. 18 25
Disconnected from reality

Syria is a conflict without any breaks and Assad is a leader who is liberated from any doubts as to his actions and the need for
justifications.

This liberation is protected by his continued insulation from events and outsourcing of action.

In 2012 we were granted a glimpse into the parallel world of the Assad inner circle when personal emails from his wife, Asma,
were leaked.
The emails showed discussions on what handmade furniture from Chelsea boutiques to invest in and what songs the
president should download on iTunes.

Assad's insulation from actions carried out in his name are increased by the notion of him being a dictator who cannot
dictate.

Back in 2011 the then British Foreign Secretary William Hague argued that Assad's ability to direct policy was seriously
limited by those who surround him and that in fact he was a hostage of powerful relatives.

In Carsten Wieland's book, Syria at Bay, an anonymous journalist described Assad as "holding the opinion of the person he
last spoke to", while his sister, Bushra, once referred to him as "stupid and nervous".

Simply calling Assad evil and leaving it at that abrogates a responsibility to better investigate what powers and influence he
does and doesn't hold and to reveal the political science that has kept his regime in power.

As "Kremlinology" looked to uncover the thinking of the Soviet leadership, there is a need for an "Assadology" to scrutinise
the nuts and bolts of the regime's operation.

This is not normalisation, nor does it signify any acceptance as a guaranteed future for Assad.

It is not enough to simply hate Assad, people must seek to understand him, however unpalatable that may seem.

83 .p
 Case Study #3

UKRAINE

I n early 2014 (March - April) Russia annexed

the Crimean peninsuala of Ukraine in a move
Some questions to consider while exploring
this case study:
widely condemned by the international
How effectively can the international
community.
community defend the sovereignty of a
state?
However, despite widespread condemnation,
What role does language / identity play
the international community has, by and large,
in constructing a sense of nationhood?
chosen not to intervene.
How are sovereignty and development
related?
This case study relates Units 1 and 4 in
particular, although links can be made across
the GloPo syllabus.
ukraine
list of readings

3.1 Ukraine in Crisis: A CFR Backgrounder

3.2 Fueling the Fire in Ukraine

3.3 Trump Can’t Recognize Russia’s Crimea Grab

3.4 four years on – but we will not forget illegally-

occupied crimea 05 08 12

3.5 Flight MH17: Netherlands and Australia say Russia

is responsible for the shooting down of passenger
plane

14 23

18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

WWW.GLOPOIB.WORDPRESS.COM
ukraine in crisis reading 3.1
Council for Foreign Relations

Introduction

Ukraine’s most prolonged and deadly crisis since its post-Soviet independence began as a protest against the government
dropping plans to forge closer trade ties with the European Union, and has since spurred escalating tensions between Russia and
Western powers. The crisis stems from more than twenty years of weak governance, a lopsided economy dominated by oligarchs,
heavy reliance on Russia, and sharp differences between Ukraine’s linguistically, religiously, and ethnically distinct eastern and
western regions.

After the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula and the port city of
Sevastopol, and deployed tens of thousands of forces near the border of eastern Ukraine, where conflict erupted between pro-
Russian separatists and the new government in Kiev. Russia’s moves, including reported military support for separatist forces,
05 08
mark a serious challenge to established principles of world order such as sovereignty and nonintervention. 12
Why is Ukraine in crisis?

The country of forty-five million people has struggled with its identity since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine has
failed to resolve its internal divisions and build strong political institutions, hampering its ability to implement economic reforms. In
the decade following independence, successive presidents allowed oligarchs to gain increasing control over the economy while
repression against political opponents intensified. By 2010, Ukraine’s fifty richest people controlled nearly half of the country’s
gross domestic product, writes Andrew Wilson in the CFR book Pathways to Freedom.

A reformist tide briefly crested in 2004 when the Orange Revolution, set off by a rigged presidential election won by Yanukovich,
brought Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency. Yet infighting among elites hampered reforms, and severe economic troubles
resurged with the global economic crisis of 2008. The revolution also masked the divide between European-oriented western and
central Ukraine and Russian-oriented southern and eastern Ukraine.

Campaigning on a platform of closer ties with Russia, Yanukovich won the 2010 presidential election. By many accounts, he then
reverted to the pattern of corruption and cronyism. His family may have embezzled as much as $8 billion to $10 billion a year over
14 23
three years, according to Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He also imprisoned his reformist
opponent in the 2010 presidential race, Yulia Tymoshenko, on charges of abuse of power.

Yanukovich continued talks with the EU on a trade association agreement, which he signaled he would sign in late 2013.
(Tymoshenko’s release was one of the conditions set by the EU for the trade association agreement.) But under pressure from
Russia, he dropped those plans in November, citing concerns about European competition. The decision provoked
demonstrations in Kiev on what became known as the Euromaidan by protesters seeking to align their future with Europe’s and
speaking out against corruption.

The Yanukovich government’s crackdown after three months of protests, in some cases spurring reprisals by radicalized
demonstrators, caused the bloodiest conflict in the country’s post-Soviet period, with scores killed. Yanukovich’s subsequent
ouster sowed new divisions between the eastern and western halves of the country, and fighting between pro-Russian separatists
and government forces broke out in April 2014. Separatists in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk established self-declared
“people’s republics.”
18 25
Elections on May 25 brought pro-Western businessman Petro Poroshenko into power, and he moved to try to reassert central
government control over restive eastern cities. By August, the fighting had killed more than 2,000 people and caused hundreds of
thousands to flee their homes, according to UN officials. Officials in Kiev and NATO states accused Russia of arming the separatists
and said rebels in eastern Ukraine using Russia-supplied ground-to-air missiles were responsible for the downing of a civilian
airliner in July 2014, in which 298 people were killed. Russia denied the charges but has continuously deployed thousands of
troops near the Ukrainian border.
What are Russia’s concerns?

Russia has strong fraternal ties with Ukraine dating back to the ninth century and the founding of Kievan Rus, the first eastern
Slavic state, whose capital was Kiev. Ukraine was part of Russia for centuries, and the two continued to be closely aligned through
the Soviet period, when Ukraine and Russia were separate republics. “The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can
never be just a foreign country,” wrote former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger in a Washington Post op-ed.

Ukraine is also a major economic partner that Russia would like to incorporate into its proposed Eurasian Union, a customs bloc
due to be formed in January 2015 whose likely members include Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia.

Ukraine plays an important role in Russia’s energy trade; its pipelines provide transit to 80 percent of the natural gas Russia sends
to European markets, and Ukraine itself is a major market for Russian gas. Militarily, Ukraine is also important to Russia as a buffer
state, and was home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, based in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol under a bilateral agreement between
the two states.

Russia considers EU efforts to expand eastward to Ukraine, even through a relatively limited association agreement, as an alarming
step that opens the door to others Western institutions. The EU’s Eastern Partnership Program is aimed at forging tighter bonds
with six former Eastern bloc countries, but Russia sees it as a stepping stone to organizations such as NATO, whose eastward
expansion is regarded by Russia’s security establishment as a threat. Ukraine belongs to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program,
but is seen as having little prospect of joining the alliance in the foreseeable future.

Russian president Vladimir Putin has portrayed his country’s role in Ukraine as safeguarding ethnic Russians worried by
lawlessness spreading east from the capital, charges that leaders in Kiev dismiss as provocations. In the case of Crimea, Putin has
stressed Moscow is not imposing its will, but rather, supporting the free choice of the local population, drawing parallels with the
05 08 12
support Western states gave to Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia. Shortly before moving to annex Crimea
on March 18, Putin told the Russian parliament that Russia would protect the rights of Russians abroad.

What is the role of the European Union?

The EU’s Eastern Partnership Program was established in 2009 to expand political and economic ties between the EU and
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, while stopping short of offering membership to partner countries.
The ill-fated association agreement negotiated by EU officials and the Yanukovich government involved a comprehensive free-
trade deal. A number of analysts fault EU officials for neglecting the broader geopolitical implications of the deal for Russia, and
declining to map out strategic aims for Europe.

After Poroshenko’s election, he pressed forward plans to sign the association agreement and Ukraine did so along with Moldova
and Georgia on June 27, 2014. Poroshenko said after signing the agreement: “Ukraine is underlining its sovereign choice in favor
of membership of the EU.”

What is the status of Crimea?

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Prior to the crisis, Crimea was an autonomous republic of Ukraine of two million people with its own parliament and laws that
permitted the use of the Russian language in everyday life. After the ouster of Yanukovich in February 2014, Crimea’s parliament
called for a referendum, in which the peninsula’s 1.5 million voters opted overwhelmingly for union with Russia. Following that
vote, Russian legislators passed a resolution nullifying Ukrainian laws in Crimea and putting in force Russian legislation. Parliament
set a deadline of January 1, 2015 for the integration of Crimea’s economic, financial, credit, and legal systems into the Russian
Federation, reported Itar-Tass. It said matters related to military service in Crimea and Sevastopol will be settled by then as well.

The peninsula only became part of Ukraine in 1954, when Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev transferred it from the Russian Soviet
Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in what was seen as a largely symbolic administrative move. The
majority-Russian residents of Crimea continued to have strong ties with Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991, the two new countries reached an agreement to permit the Russian Black Sea fleet to remain based at the Crimean port of
Sevastopol.

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Overall, Russians make up an estimated 59 percent of the population of Crimea, Ukrainians make up about 23 percent, and Muslim
Tatars about 12 percent.

Do Russian moves in Ukraine violate international law?

U.S. officials say Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are in breach of international law, including the nonintervention
provisions in the UN Charter; the 1997 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, which requires Russia
to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity; and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Signed by the United
States, UK, and Russia, that document provided security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal.

For its part, Russia has rejected charges that it is violating international law.
What are U.S. and European policy options in Ukraine?

In response to the developments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, EU and U.S. policymakers have taken a series of steps that
include:

Economic aid:
The IMF in the spring approved a loan package for Ukraine for $17 billion over two years. The EU has delivered hundreds of
millions of dollars of an announced $15 billion support package for Ukraine, with payments conditioned on Ukraine enacting
tough reforms like ending gas subsidies. Washington has promised more than $1 billion in U.S. loan guarantees and technical
assistance. In late August 2014, German chancellor Angela Merkel pledged nearly $700 million in aid to help Ukraine rebuild war-
damaged areas in the east and aid refugees.

Sanctions:
The United States, the EU, Japan, and Canada have imposed sanctions on scores of Russian and Ukrainian officials and
businesses said to be linked to the seizure of Crimea and the escalation in tensions. The measures include travel bans and the
freezing of assets. The United States and European Union announced more severe measures in late July that blocked some
Russian banks from U.S. and European capital markets, and generally target Russian finance, energy, and defense industries.
Russia was hit by a slowdown in growth and investment in the first quarter of 2014, and the scope of the new sanctions suggest a
substantial, longer-term cost to the Russian economy, says CFR’s Robert Kahn. Russia retaliated by banning imports of food stuffs
from the United States and many European states in July 2014.

Energy aid:
Some experts and U.S. lawmakers have called for accelerating the approval of U.S. natural gas proposals, which would take
advantage of booming U.S. production to help lessen the reliance of European partners and Ukraine on Russian natural gas. U.S.
05 08 12
law currently excludes the sale of natural gas to countries that are not free-trade partners, but the Energy Department can approve
sales that are deemed in the public interest. But some analysts caution that even with the lifting of export restrictions, it could take
years and cost billions of dollars to set up the necessary infrastructure.

Military aid:
The United States has bolstered NATO’s air presence over the Baltic states and deployed about six hundred soldiers in Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, as well as Poland to train with local forces as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve. NATO secretary-general
Anders Fogh Rasmussen called the crisis the greatest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War, and reasserted
alliance ties with Ukraine through the Partnership For Peace Program. The 2014 NATO summit in Wales is expected to be
dominated by the alliance’s response to the crisis in Ukraine.

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18 25
fueling the fire in ukraine reading 3.2
Steven Pifer
The crash of a Malaysian passenger jet over eastern Ukraine on July 17 that killed 298 people could sharply escalate
tensions involving Ukraine, Russia, and pro-Russian separatists. It is crucial at this stage for an international investigation
to be launched, with neutral participants, to withstand charges of bias, says Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. But the international community, particularly the United States and
Europe, should be prepared to ramp up sanctions against Russia in the event evidence linking separatists to the crash is
firmed up, he says.

Details are still murky in this incident involving the Malaysian airliner but it comes at a time of increasing clashes in
eastern Ukraine, including aircraft downed by pro-Russian separatists. Can you talk about the separatists capabilities in
this area?

The separatists over the last three weeks have had some success in bringing down Ukrainian military aircraft, usually more at
lower altitudes and the suspicion is they have used Stinger-like missiles. But by all accounts the Malaysian airliner was flying at
an altitude of about 30,000 feet. Shoulder-fired systems could not reach that altitude but there have been some reports that the
separatists do have access to the ’Buk’ missile system. It is a large missile mounted on a truck and it would have the capabilities
to reach that altitude. 05 08 12
What about Ukrainian government forces’ air capabilities?

The Ukrainians do have some air defense capabilities including against high altitude targets but as far as we have seen there has
been no use so far in this conflict in eastern Ukraine by the Ukrainian military of surface-to-air missiles because the separatists do
not have aircraft.

The crash area is on contested ground. How should authorities, both local and international, best respond in a situation
like this?

The most important thing is to have an international group with representatives of the Ukrainian government, Malaysia [and]
Boeing should be there because it’s a Boeing aircraft. It’s also important to bring in some neutral observers from places like
Finland, Austria, and Switzerland because at the end of the day you will want an investigation that is as credible as possible and
be able to withstand concerns expressed by different sides that it’s slanted one way or another. This will be the big first test: are
the separatists prepared to allow that sort of investigation to take place in an area where they appear to have some significant
forces?

14
What is the relationship between Russian authorities and these separatist rebels? 23
There have been a lot of reports over the last three or four weeks, including by the U.S. government and NATO, of weapons and
supplies flowing across the Russian border into Ukraine, including heavy weapons such as tanks. So, if it turns out that the
separatists did in fact shoot down the aircraft the question will arise: who provided the separatists in eastern Ukraine with the
capabilty to shoot down that airliner at that kind of altitude? Even yesterday there was reporting that seems to have a fair degree
of credibility of rockets being launched from inside Russia, about three miles inside Russia, into Ukraine. So there’s a lot of
evidence here that the Russians have been very supportive of the separatists.

There is a separate question, which is how much control do they have over the separatists. You have a number of locals who
were involved in the separatist groups but there is also a fair suspicion that there are Russian military or perhaps Russian
intelligence personnel involved at least in some of these operations. Particularly at the beginning [of the crisis in Ukraine] you
saw people who looked very much like professional Russian military personnel in some of the original takeover of buildings in
Donetsk and Luhansk back in April.
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This comes a day after tougher sanctions announced by the US and EU against Russia. They fell short of sectoral
sanctions. Are they having any impact yet?

The sanctions that were applied even before the sanctions announced yesterday were having an economic impact on Russia.
For example, Bloomberg reported about a month ago that in 2013 Russian companies were able to place about $43 billion in
foreign currency bonds. In January and February this year it was about $6 to $7 billion, since March it’s been zero.

What it hasn’t yet done is cause Russia to change its course on Ukraine and become part of the solution rather than part of the
problem. The sanctions announced [this week] by the United States and European Union look to be a bit more serious. You now
have the U.S. government blocking lending to some very big Russian companies and Russian financial institutions. The
Europeans are blocking all lending to Russia by the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. So the questions is will these sanctions begin to have an impact on Russian policy?
trump can’t recognize reading 3.3

russia’s crimea grab

Leonid Bershidsky
President Donald Trump has left it unclear whether he might recognize Crimea as part of Russia. But can he actually do it? That’s
not a trivial question.

Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton and his press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders have said that the U.S. doesn’t
recognize the 2014 annexation of the Black Sea peninsula that had been part of Ukrainian territory since 1954. But the president
himself would only say, “We’re going to have to see.” Coupled with a report, which Trump has never denied, that he told G-7
heads of state recently that Crimea was Russian because everybody there spoke Russian, that leaves the matter open. Or, rather,
it’s open to the extent that a U.S. president has the power to extend recognition to an act of anschluss.

Whether non-recognition of the Crimean annexation is required of United Nations members is a complex matter of international
law. On the one hand, it was a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and several UN documents
approved by member states in the 1970s say that such acts are not to be recognized.
05 08 12
On the other hand, there’s no UN Security Council resolution specifically declaring Russia’s Crimea grab an act of aggression or
a forcible annexation and thus banning its recognition. Russia has vetoed a draft resolution to that effect, and a subsequent
resolution passed by the UN General Assembly didn’t have the legal force to forbid the recognition of Crimea as Russian; it only
called on countries to refrain from it. That gives credence to the argument that non-recognition, including by the U.S., is merely a
voluntary sanction that can be ignored.

Russia holds to the latter interpretation, and so could Trump, who doesn’t think much of international organizations. U.S. law and
practice are more relevant to what he might do and what he might get away with.

U.S. administrations have asserted the right to extend diplomatic recognition to countries. In 2008, the U.S. recognized Kosovo
when President George W. Bush accepted that country’s request to establish diplomatic relations. No intervention from
Congress was necessary. But Crimea’s case is different; there’s no new entity with which the U.S. could exchange ambassadors.
The U.S. already has diplomatic relations and various treaties with both Russia and Ukraine.

The U.S. has a long history of not recognizing forcible annexations because they “may impair the treaty rights of the United
States or its citizens” in the victim states, as Secretary of State Henry Stimson wrote in a 1932 note to the Japanese government
concerning Japan’s annexation of Manchuria from China. One could argue that the recognition of Crimea, which Ukraine would
inevitably see as a threat to its statehood, would be damaging to the rights and interests of the U.S. and its citizens, for example,
14 23
under the bilateral investment treaty with Ukraine, their mutual legal assistance agreement — or indeed under the nuclear
nonproliferation treaties Ukraine signed under U.S. pressure in the 1990s.

The Stimson doctrine, however, is just a diplomatic practice, not a legal restriction, and there have been exceptions to it. The U.S.
gave the green light in 1975 for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor when it was a Portuguese colony vying for independence.
No immediate U.S.-driven repercussions for the Suharto regime in Indonesia followed, though the U.S. backed subsequent U.S.
resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops.

This could be seen as de-facto recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, but it wouldn’t be a strong precedent for
Crimea. At the time of the Suharto invasion, the U.S. didn’t have any laws in which East Timor was mentioned as part of Portugal
or a potentially independent state. By contrast, Congress has explicitly declared Crimea part of Ukraine and condemned the
annexation.

The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, passed by Congress and signed by Trump last year, has this to
18 25
say: “It is the policy of the United States … to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian
Federation or the separation of any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of military force.”

“Never” should be clear enough. If Trump extends any kind of formal recognition to the Russian takeover, such a move would
conflict with U.S. law. Congress and the courts would probably get involved.

There’s not much Trump can do on Crimea without triggering the checks and balances of the U.S. government. He can’t even
drop Crimea-related sanctions against specific companies and individuals without asking Congress first. Even if Trump wanted
to trade Crimea to Russian President Vladimir Putin when they meet in Helsinki on July 16, perhaps for some concession in the
Middle East or on arms control, he’d need to go to Congress for approval. Given the strong support the sanctions act received —
Trump only signed it because he knew his veto would be overturned — such approval would be in doubt.

Trump may act as if there are no limits to his power, and he may even win important court rulings, as in the case of his travel ban.
On Crimea and Ukraine, however, he’s hemmed in. Whatever concessions he may want from Putin, he’ll need different
bargaining chips.
four years on – but we reading 3.4

will not forget illegally-

occupied crimea
8 European Foreign Ministers
Anders Samuelsen, minister for foreign affairs of Denmark, Sven Mikser, minister of foreign
affairs of Estonia, Edgars Rinkevics, minister of foreign affairs of Latvia, Linas Linkevicius,
minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania, Jacek Czaputowicz, minister of foreign affairs of
Poland, Teodor-Viorel Melescanu, minister of foreign affairs of Romania, Margot
Wallstroem, minister for foreign affairs of Sweden, Pavlo Klimkin, minister of foreign affairs
05 08 12
of Ukraine
Four years ago, on 18 March 2014, Russia took the final step to illegally occupy Crimea, a part of Ukraine's sovereign territory that
Russia had recognised as such in several international treaties.
The Russian takeover comprised a series of equally illegal actions: from using disguised Russian elite troops to the hasty
organisation – in breach of Ukrainian and international law – of an illegitimate "referendum".

President Putin initially claimed that those troops had no association with Russia, but then admitted that he had ordered the
entire takeover in late February 2014. He later generously decorated Russian servicemen with medals for carrying out the
occupation.
The inhabitants of Crimea suddenly found themselves living under Moscow's de facto rule. They have subsequently been forced
to obtain Russian citizenship, and to serve in the Russian armed forces – both in violation of international law.

Broad repressive policies have followed, leading to widespread human rights abuses such as imprisonment on political grounds,
closure of media outlets and schools, and several cases of killings and disappearances.

The indigenous Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians, many opposed to the illegal annexation, have been particularly targeted.
14 23
Dozens have been convicted on trumped up charges, such as the appalling 20-year prison sentence for "terrorism" handed
down to Oleh Sentsov, a Ukrainian filmmaker.

Sentsov and more than 60 other political prisoners must be released immediately. The dire human rights situation in Crimea, as
reported by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine and others, must be addressed without delay.

Access must be granted to international monitoring organisations. Some brave civil society organisations have taken on the
tough task of defending human rights. They deserve our full support.

Russia claims that the "annexation" represents "new facts on the ground". Today, stating that Crimea is part of Ukraine according
to international law is regarded by Russia as an act of separatism and punishable by law.

No international recognition
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But Russia's claims on Crimea have not been acknowledged by any other international actor. Its violations of international law
and the continuous militarisation of Crimea have been widely condemned by the international community.

The UN General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions reaffirming the commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Together with many other partners, including the United States, Canada and Norway, the European Union has implemented a
policy of non-recognition and sanctions regimes, targeting people and entities that have promoted the illegal annexation.

The construction of the Kerch bridge will be considered in this context. The EU has also introduced a ban on trade and
investment and restrictions on travel and tourism.
Moreover, the EU does not recognise elections held by Russia in Crimea.

We will not allow Crimea to slip off the international agenda.

To this end the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini makes a yearly statement on Crimea on behalf of the EU. As long as
the illegal annexation continues, the restrictive measures and sanctions will be maintained.

The illegal occupation of Crimea increases the security risks in the Black Sea region, but its repercussions reach far beyond the
region.

Together with the ongoing Russian aggression in the Donbas, it also violates the European security order, a set of rules and
principles that have served as the basis for Europe's stability and security since the end of the Cold War.

What happened in Crimea is not just about Ukraine, it concerns us all. That is why we will neither forget nor abandon Crimea.
flight mh17: netherlands reading 3.5
and australia say russia
is responsible for the
shooting down of
passenger plane
Tom Barnes, The Independent
08 12
The Netherlands and Australia will hold Russia legally responsible for “its role” in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.

The Dutch government said accusing a country of being at fault for the 2014 air disaster, which left almost 300 people dead, was
“a complex legal process”.

But, its cabinet said both the Netherlands and the Australian government wanted answers after crash investigators found the
missile that shot down the plane was fired from Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade.

Dutch foreign minister Stef Blok said that following that conclusion, “the government is now taking the next step by formally
holding Russia accountable”.

Mr Blok added the Netherlands and Australia have “asked Russia to enter into talks aimed at finding a solution that would do
justice to the tremendous suffering and damage caused by the downing of MH17”.

The passenger flight was shot down over rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 passengers and crew on board,
including 28 Australians, as it flew from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur in July 2014.
14 23
Russia has routinely denied any involvement in the attack, claiming on Thursday none of its missile launchers have ever moved
onto Ukrainian soil, despite photo evidence released by prosecutors seeming to suggest otherwise.

Prosecutors stopped short of saying who actually fired the fatal shot, but Mr Blok told reporters on Friday the findings “point to
direct involvement of Russia”.

The foreign minister said attempts to hold Russia responsible for the plane’s downing under international law would be a
different, parallel process from the ongoing investigation by prosecutors seeking to establish individual criminal responsibility.

But, a Dutch cabinet statement mooted presenting the case to an international court or organisation for their judgment as a
“possible” next step, adding Australia shared its assessment of Russia’s role.

Foreign secretary Boris Johnson said the UK “fully supports” the request by the Dutch and Australian governments for Russia to
18
accept state responsibility for the disaster. 25
“The Kremlin believes it can act with impunity. The Russian government must now answer for its actions in relation to the
downing of MH17,” Mr Johnson said.

“This is an egregious example of the Kremlin’s disregard for innocent life.

“The UK will continue to offer its full support to the efforts of the joint investigation team, the Dutch and Australian authorities and
other grieving nations to deliver accountability for this terrible act and justice for all those who died.”

The father of one of the passengers has welcomed the move.

“This is great news,” said Hans de Borst, who lost his daughter Elsemiek in the crash. “I understand why the government waited,
but now the evidence is clear.”
Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop called for support from the international community for the move.

“This represents a threat to international security,” she said.

“If military weapons can be deployed and then used to bring down civilian aircraft in what was essentially a war zone, then
international security is at risk and we call on all countries to inform the Russian Federation that its conduct is unacceptable.”

The US department of state said it “strongly supported” the move by the Netherlands and Australia.

“It is time for Russia to acknowledge its role in the shooting down of MH-17 and to cease its callous disinformation campaign,”
said department spokesperson, Heather Nauert.

“As the findings of the joint investigative team made clear, the BUK missile launcher used to bring down the passenger aircraft is
owned by the Russian Federation and was assigned to the Russian 53rd anti-aircraft brigade near Kursk.

“It was brought into sovereign Ukrainian territory from Russia, was fired from territory controlled by Russia and Russia-led forces
in eastern Ukraine, and was then returned to Russian territory.”

Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, called on Russia to accept responsibility for the crash and cooperate with international
efforts to establish accountability.

“The downing of MH17 was a global tragedy, and those responsible must be held accountable,” Mr Stoltenberg said.

08 12
“Nato has repeatedly expressed its full support for the efforts undertaken by the Dutch authorities and others to shed light on
what happened on that terrible day, and to achieve justice for the 298 people who were killed and their loved ones.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected the Dutch and Australian conclusions, and said that an atmosphere of “mutual
distrust” existed between the investigation team and Russia.

“We categorically deny the allegations,” he said. “The investigation was a collective investigation … but it did not include the
Russian side. Ukraine, however, was allowed to participate.”

Mr Peskov said Ukraine held responsibility for the disaster given that it “took no measures to close air space in and around a war
zone”.

Meanwhile, the investigative group Bellingcat says it has “conclusively identified” joint investigation team person of interest
Andrey Ivanovich as former Russian defence ministry officer Oleg Ivannikov.

Also known by the covert name “Orion”, the group claim the figure it believes to be Mr Ivannikov coordinated the military
activities of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine from early 2014 until at least the following year.
14 23
Bellingcat also alleges the agent arranged the transport of arms across Russia-Ukraine border at the time MH17 was downed.

It said this was the first time it had been established a high-ranking Russian military official had been operating inside Ukraine at
the time the Malaysia Airlines flight was destroyed.

18 25
 Case Study #4
NORTH KOREA
N orth Korea is a fascinating case study that
that links neatly into all four core units,
particularly Units 1 and 2. However, given the
isolated nature of the North Korean state it is
important to carefully consider the validity and
reliability of sources related to the 'hermit
kingdom'.
Some questions to consider when exploring this
case study are:
How far does the degree of integration
into the global political system of a state
affect development?
How far does a state / international
community have a responsibility to
intervene in the internal affairs of
another state in order to protect human
rights?
Does the political structure of a state
affect its behaviour on the global stage?
north korea
list of readings

4.1 is North Korea headed for war? - What structural realism can
reveal about Pyongyang’s goals

4.2 Human Rights in North Korea

4.3 Opinion: What I Learned From Long Months Of

North Korea Talks 05 08 12
4.4 Submission to the United Nations Committee on the
Rights of the Child

4.5 North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons

14 23

18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

WWW.GLOPOIB.WORDPRESS.COM
is north korea headed for reading 4.1
war? - what structural
realism can reveal about
pyongyang’s goals
Lennart Roos

1. Since the Korean War in the 1950s the Korean peninsula has been the stage of one of the tensest and most volatile
conflicts in the world. 05 08 12
North Korea, otherwise known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is a communist state bordering China in the
North and the Republic of Korea (ROK), also known as South Korea, in the South. The country, once aligned with the communist
block in the Cold War, has continued to avoid Westernization and is arguably one of the most isolated states in the world (Alfred,
2014). North Korea’s history is pervaded by conflict with its Southern neighbor. The ROK, which has always been supported by
the United States, and the DPRK have never signed a peace treaty but only agreed to an armistice, which has lasted since the de-
facto end of the Korean War (Lavelle, 2015). Several violent incidents over the course of the past decades are emblematic of the
continued tensions between the two countries (Lavelle, 2015). These tensions have arguably increased, especially in the past
decade, due to North Korea’s nuclear program and a fear of a resulting nuclear war. This concern exists because North Korea has
consistently been ambiguous about its intentions concerning the purpose of its nuclear ambitions (Jackson, 2016). While it
officially insists the program is a means to ensure its own security, some scholars as well as foreign governments have
interpreted it as an act of aggression and have assessed that the main reason for North Korea to entertain the controversial
program is to prepare for a war based on the country’s ideology (Jackson, 2016; Withnall, 2016; Guttenfelder, 2013; AP, 2014;
UN, 2016). It is difficult and at times impossible to assess the DPRK’s true intentions, as the country favors a secretive approach
concerning its domestic and foreign policies (Sang-Hun, 2016). The important question is therefore, whether North Korea is
preparing for a war of aggression against its enemies. A single nuclear warhead deployed by the DPRK could potentially kill
millions of people in metropoles such as Tokyo or Seoul (Town & Witt, 2013). The humanitarian crisis and the retaliation that
would most likely follow such an event could potentially wipe out millions more. and destabilize the region, and according to
14 23
some scholars the global security situation at large, for decades to come (Kazianis, 2016). Experts and scholars are in
disagreement about whether North Korea is preparing for a war of aggression. The amount of information available and the
diverging analyses of the DPRK’s actions have not produced an unambiguous answer (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013; Vipin,
2015).

In this paper I will attempt to answer the question of whether the DPRK is preparing for a war of aggression by applying the
theory of structural realism to the situation. More precisely, I will use the competing approaches of defensive and offensive
realism to assess how either one can explain North Korea’s actions. S tructural realism is a suitable approach for this purpose as I
intend to focus on the role of the state and its position in in the international system. From the defensive realist perspective I will
argue that North Korea’s main objective is to stabilize its position in the international system. I will then use offensive realism to
explore possible explanations for the view that the DPRK is in fact preparing for a war of aggression. Overall, I argue that North
Korea is, according to the defensive realist perspective, not preparing for an offensive war.

The following outline will conclude Section I. Section II provides an overview of two related aspects of contemporary North
18 25
Korean politics, namely firstly its nuclear program and secondly its economy and foreign policy. Section III will then apply
defensive and offensive realism to the two elements described in Section II. By engaging with the latter I intend to point out the
logical problems inherent to its approach to the situation in North Korea, simultaneously underlining the plausibility of the
former. In section IV I will conclude that North Korea is not preparing for a war of aggression.
2, North Korea’s Nuclear Program

North Korea’s nuclear program is expanding at an ever-increasing rate and has drawn widespread criticism from allies and foes.
Its history goes as far back as the 1950s, when the Soviet Union helped the DPRK to establish a nuclear research facility. For
many decades, the program was predominantly focused on research and nuclear power (NTI, 2016). In the 1990s and 2000s,
however, the country began developing, and in 2005 obtaining, nuclear weapons. International efforts to denuclearize the
Korean peninsula had been unsuccessful (NTI, 2016; Rothwell, 2016). At the time of writing, the DPRK has conducted five
nuclear tests. Since the first test in 2006, the force of the bombs appears to have increased significantly, rising from an explosive
power of less than one kiloton of the first bomb to around 10 kilotons in 2016, as reported by seismographic institutes in Japan
and South Korea (Hu, 2016). Apart from nuclear tests the DPRK also conducts missile tests at an increasing rate. While former
supreme leader and effective head of the military Kim Jong-il conducted 26 missile tests during his 18-year-long reign, his son
and successor Kim Jong-un has already completed 49 tests, less than five years into his tenure (Fifield, 2016).

This development worries both North Korea’s allies and foes. In the past 10 years, the United Nations Security Council has
passed five resolutions, all of which imposed sanctions on North Korea and urged the country to refrain from further aggressive
behavior (Arms Control Association, 2016). South Korea and Japan have a particular interest in avoiding the continuation of the
program due to their proximity to North Korea and the DPRK’s possession of short-range missiles, which could, if not intercepted,
easily reach Tokyo or Seoul (Town & Witt, 2013). Recent intelligence reports have suggested that the DPRK’s technological
expertise may soon allow the construction of a long-range missile that could reach Alaska, which has caused concern in
Washington D.C. (Hennigan & Vartabedian, 2016). China, North Korea’s biggest diplomatic ally, has continuously expressed
discontent with Pyongyang’s disregard for its pleas to seize nuclear tests. Beijing’s concerns lie with the political instability these
tests cause. In a worst-case scenario, the United States and South Korea attack the DPRK after a perceived act of war in a
05 08 12
preemptive strike, overpower a technologically vastly inferior North Korean army, westernize the region and consequently move
dangerously close to Chinese soil (Vipin, 2015; Frank, 2013; Manyin & Nanto, pp. 7, 13, 2010).

North Korea’s Economy and Foreign Policy

The DPRK’s economy and foreign policy are deeply connected. As I will show in this section, much of North Korea’s diplomatics
is influenced by the sanctions that continue to be imposed on the country, as well as the state of its domestic economy. Although
still relatively low, North Korea’s overall trade volume, including imports and exports, has grown by a factor of almost 4 since
2000. Moreover, while the overall trade volume increases, so does the dependence on China. While less than half of all North
Korean trade was conducted with China in 2004, the number has risen to over 90% in 2014. This development is partially due to
the DPRK’s ostracization in the world community and the recent sanctions that complicated and reduced trade with Western
countries (Frank, 2015).

As North Korea’s biggest ally, China remains the DPRK’s most important partner in trade, diplomacy, and security. In recent years,
sparked by North Korea’s nuclear tests, China has taken a less supportive stance and has condemned North Korea’s violations of
international nuclear arms agreements. It has further supported each of the resolutions imposing sanctions on Pyongyang
passed by the UN security council. In the big picture, however, China can still comfortably be classified as an ally of North Korea.
It has prevented punitive action against the DPRK over the appalling human rights violations a UN report found in 2014 and has,
despite unambiguous evidence, refused to admit that North Korea attacked a South Korean naval vessel in 2010. However, to
14 23
underemphasize an overall decrease in loyalty to North Korea would be an inaccurate reflection of current Sino-North Korean
relations (Albert, 2014). Apart from China, Russia is North Korea’s second significant ally. As Russia and North Korea both move
away from internationally recognized patterns of diplomacy their respective need for allies increases. The “Year of Friendship” in
2015 brought with it a number of trade agreements, which both Russia and the DPRK depend on in order to cope with the
recently imposed sanctions from the EU and the UN (Neberai, 2015). As Neberai (2015) puts it: “[...] it seems that both nations are
sending a message to the United States and other Western governments that they have the ability to expand in other areas
should the West seek to isolate them through sanctions”. Russia has recently declared its intention to forgive $10 billion in debt
in exchange for access to North Korean mineral mines for Russian investors (Neberai, 2015). At the same time, North Korea’s
continued nuclear tests and the inevitable sanctions that follow them have affected Russian interests on the Korean peninsula.
The most recent sanctions include bans on rubel-based transactions and a ban on North Korean mineral exports, which are the
DPRK’s only way to pay back Russia for deliveries and investments (Toloraya, 2016a). It is because of these developments that
Russian-North Korean relations should be considered volatile.

The DPRK’s leadership appears to have decided to at least partially reform its economy. Since 2010 North Korean foreign
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ministers regularly attend the ASEAN Regional Forum, a summit of Southeast Asian countries that focuses on regional prosperity
and diplomatic relations. The DPRK has reportedly communicated with Vietnamese officials and several new economic policies
seem to be related to these exchanges (Govindasamy, Kyoo & Tan, 2015; Toloraya, 2016a). Vietnam’s shift from a strict top-down
economy to a now relatively free market has produced remarkable results, such as Vietnam becoming one of the fastest-growing
economies in Asia (Thanh Nien, 2016). What makes this model so appealing is especially Vietnam’s communist history. The
shared ideology has made the Vietnamese model, which is clearly outward-looking, appealing to North Korean officials who took
part in the ASEAN Regional Forums of recent years (Govindasamy et al., 2015). The first signs of this economic reform are already
visible. More factory visits by Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un than ever are inspections of factories associated with the civil
economy, rather than visits to military factories. In addition, some branches of the North Korean economy are now allowed to
keep a certain percentage of their revenues to reinvest into the sector at will (Abrahamian & See, 2011).
3. Structural realism

In order to assess the DPRK’s foreign policy and its likely intentions, I will now use structural realism as a vehicle to make sense of
the country’s unusual means to maintain security. In particular, I will firstly apply defensive, and secondly offensive realism. My
main claim is that despite its aggressive conduct, North Korea is attempting to ensure its own security by decreasing the
likelihood of a war of aggression against itself, rather than preparing for an offensive war. By interpreting the country’s action
through the respective lenses I attempt to lay out the narratives arguing for peace or war. I will respectively analyze the two
components of contemporary North Korean politics I laid out before separately.

Defensive realism

According to defensive realism, a state’s first priority is to maintain or establish security by means of securing its place in the
international system rather than attempting to expand its own influence or power (Rudloff, 2013, p. 54; Snyder, 2002, pp. 151-15;
Waltz, 1979, p. 126). I argue that from a defensive realist perspective North Korea’s nuclear program is not an attempt to prepare
for a war against its enemies as much as it is a way to assure its own security. Despite international condemnation, the DPRK
justifies the now frequently occurring nuclear tests by insisting that they are acts of self-defense and not acts of aggression
(Withnall, 2016). While these explanations have largely been dismissed as lies Pyongyang spreads to increase the legitimacy of
the tests, there is a case to be made for the validity of such claims (Al Jazeera, 2016). As discussed above, North Korea’s allies are
small in number and are growing discontent with Kim Jong-un’s aggressive leadership. The DPRK’s nuclear program could
therefore be a means to ensure continued protection.

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In “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran” (2015), Vipin Narang describes the catalytic strategy,
which small nuclear powers employ in order to assure protection by a larger, allied state. This strategy seeks to prevent attacks
from foreign states by highlighting an ensuing war not only with the attacked state but also with a powerful protector state. At the
same time, an arsenal of nuclear weapons engages said third-party state in a process of constant consideration of its protégé’s
actions (Narang, 2015, pp. 75-79). From a defensive realist perspective, the catalytic strategy makes sense for North Korea and is
likely the path the country has been following. In order to make sense of the catalytic strategy in terms of North Korea, one has to
understand the role China plays in the security situation in the region.

China’s interest in the situation on the Korean peninsula is based on at least two main considerations. Firstly, China has an
interest in securing the existence of North Korea as a state. Were it to be invaded by an alliance of South Korean and American
troops, China would likely see military troops of political adversaries right by its border, which would conceivably
cause instability and could lead to hostile encounters, potentially setting the stage for decades of tension in the region.
Secondly, such a war would also likely produce millions of refugees fleeing North Korea, most of whom would be the financial
and social burden of China (Keck, 2013). The catalytic argument, then, finds a way to reconcile these considerations with North
Korea attempting to maintain security. According to Narang (2015), North Korea effectively uses its nuclear program to scare
China into thinking that if the latter were to break off economic, diplomatic and military ties, the former would be as fragile and
rogue as the United States and its allies portray it to be and possibly recklessly initiate a war. In sum, in order to assure continued
support, North Korea’s nuclear program acts as a means to ensure Chinese support, not as a means to prepare for a war of
aggression. Defensive realism holds that in order to achieve security, states have to invest in power (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). This
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power can be established by means of political, military or economic investments (Waltz, 1979, pp. 126-127). As shown, North
Korea has established security militarily by means of the catalytic nuclear strategy. From a defensive realist perspective, North
Korea’s attempts to reform its economy as well as its efforts to grow closer to Russia also hint at an attempted increase in power.
Its approximation to the Vietnamese model can be regarded as an attempt to maintain security through progressive economic
policies and an increased integration with the rest of the world. If North Korea is interested in national security, opening up its
economy according to the model of Vietnam is to be considered a fruitful way to achieve this goal (Frank, 2015). This logic also
underlines the necessity of the renewed North Korean-Russian relations. The $10 billion debt Russia is willing to forgive in
exchange for access to North Korea’s mineral mines is emblematic of the priorities both countries appear to set. For Russia, the
amount can be seen as an investment in a mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. As both states are
affected by UN or EU sanctions, collaboration makes sense in order to remain agile and competitive even with the imposed
penalties (Neberai, 2015). As Frank (2015) argues, the economic well-being of a country is a detrimental factor for its internal
stability and thus security. By demonstrating a willingness to reform its fiscal policies and by establishing economic ties, North
Korea appears to be well aware of this connection.
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North Korea would hardly wage a costly war right after it has begun to reform its economy in this way, especially given the fact
that most scholars agree that such a war would partially be fought for ideological reasons. The ideology the DPRK would fight
for, then, would not be in line with its evident willingness to restructure the economy in accordance with foreign models (Frank,
2015).

Offensive realism

In order to confirm the validity of the above-stated defensive realist narrative of North Korea’s propensity to prepare for an
offensive war, I will now engage with an opposing narrative by applying the related theory of offensive realism to the situation
and briefly elaborating on why I find the former more plausible.
Offensive realism holds that states continuously aim to increase their power by expanding territorially and militarily and that this
strategy is the best way to ensure security (Snyder, 2002, p. 151; Mearsheimer, p. 80). From an offensive realist view, the DPRK’s
nuclear program likely follows an aggressive strategy. In order to ensure its own safety, North Korea appears to attempt to
prepare for an offensive war, which aims to eradicate the perceived threat coming from South Korea by accumulating nuclear
weapons until its arsenal is sufficient to weaken the ROK enough with one single, first strike to invade the country with its ground
troops (Shaffer, 2016). The dramatic increase in missile and nuclear tests can be seen as the DPRK’s way to ensure that once the
actual attack begins, there will be as few strategic mistakes as possible. As its military is clearly inferior to the likely American-
South Korean alliance the DPRK would face in a conventional war, nuclear warfare is the only chance North Korea has to succeed
in such a war (Fisher, 2013). This narrative is very much in line with the DPRK’s explanation of its program (Withnall, 2016). North
Korea currently emphasizes that its safety is profoundly threatened by South Korean acts of hostility, which would make this
strategy a plausible way to safeguard its perceivably threatened security (Shaffer, 2016).

Although internally logical, this narrative does not make sense in the bigger picture of North Korea’s current situation. A first strike
on South Korea or Japan, the two most probable targets, would not succeed, as the United States-led military coalition in the
region has installed continuously improving missile defense systems similar to the Iron Dome in Israel (De Luce & McLeary,
2016). In addition, it is likely that the North Korean leadership is fully aware of its military’s inadequacy for a war of such scale, due
to its striking deficits in technological development (Fisher, 2013). For this strategy to work, the DPRK would have to take a
gamble whose odds clearly favor its opponents. North Korea’s security situation would not improve but rather drastically worsen
if it initiated a war of aggression.

North Korea’s newly found willingness to reform and to reopen its foreign and domestic policies may be a sign for a certain
willingness to go to war. This argument takes into consideration the cost of war and the inevitability of the need for sufficient
05 08 12
funds, resources and material that would be necessary in such an event. The recent development in terms of diplomatic ties, can
be seen as a way to recruit new allies or to strengthen already existing ones. Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, could
potentially be swayed into improving its alliance with North Korea due to its own recent problems with the West. A renewed
alliance with former communist states could theoretically facilitate an offensive war with South Korea. To take this gamble would
be in line with the idea of opportunistic expansion, a notion within the theory of offensive realism that holds that whenever there
is a possibility for expansion, states will risk a war in order to make relative gains in power (Beavis, 2016; Schweller, 2009, pp. 227-
237). North Korea’s economic reforms, then, are a way to prepare the country for a prolonged state of war. Structural realism
holds that states are rational actors; from an offensive realist perspective, the DPRK is making rational sacrifices in terms of
ideological coherence in order to be able to achieve a bigger goal, namely being economically ready for war (Mearsheimer, p.
70).

However, both the reformation as well as the alliance argument are somewhat implausible. Russia’s economy is too strong and
stable for the country’s’ leaderships to get involved in a potential war with a volatile state such as the DPRK (Pant, 2016). It would
make no strategic sense for the country to give up its established position within the international system for ideological or
diplomatic reasons. Russia’s relative approximation to North Korea is an act of necessity, not one of ideological considerations. If
the consequences of trading with the DPRK entailed any danger for a further ostracization of Russia from the world community, it
is likely that Moscow would break off economic ties rather unreluctantly (Toloraya, 2016b). A similar argument can be made for
the country’s economic reforms. Were it really interested in preparing for a war of aggression, the country would have to speed
up domestic production significantly, certainly at a faster pace than the slow and careful reforms allow. In addition to that, the
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fact that Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un is visiting an increasing amount of factories related to the domestic economy rather than
to factories producing military equipment underlines that even though the DPRK is interested in an ever-growing economy, its
first priority does not appear to be the war-related industry. This point is further underlined by the DPRK’s relative decline in
military spending (Choi, 2016).

4. Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that the DPRK is not preparing for a war of aggression. By applying the theory of defensive realism I
have shown that due to its fundamental dependence on China, which has ample reason to avoid an escalation on the Korean
Peninsula, and its attempts to integrate with the established international community, especially by gradual reformation of its
economy, North Korea’s perceived acts of aggression are to be considered a way to ensure security in the country. By employing
the catalytic strategy, Pyongyang safeguards its continued protection by China. By increasing its power through economic
policy, the DPRK further protects its own interests by showing a willingness to adapt to a changing world community.
Additionally, I have applied the theory of offensive realism in order to explore a more aggressive narrative of North Korea’s
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conduct and contended that no logical argument can be made from this second perspective. In order to wage a war against its
foes, the DPRK needs allies who would be willing to join military forces with North Korea but no country can earnestly be
expected to join North Korea in such an endeavor. In addition, the DPRK’s economic reforms do not point to a serious
preparation for an offensive war.
human rights in north reading 4.2
korea
Human Rights Watch Briefing
Paper
North Korea is one of the world’s most repressive states. The government restricts all civil and political liberties for its citizens,
including freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion. It prohibits all organized political opposition, independent
media, civil society, and trade unions. The government routinely uses arbitrary arrest and punishment of crimes, torture in
custody, forced labor, and executions to maintain fear and control. In recent years, the government has tightened domestic
restrictions on travel and unauthorized cross-border travel with China, and punished North Koreans making contact with the
outside world.

In his seventh year in power, Kim Jong Un—the third leader of the dynastic Kim family and head of the ruling Workers’ Party of
Korea (WPK)—continues to exercise almost total political control. North Korea’s firing of 23 missiles during 16 tests and its sixth
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nuclear test in 2017 sent tensions between the United States and its allies and North Korea to their highest level in decades. In
2018, Kim Jong Un engaged in new diplomatic efforts with South Korea, the US, China, Russia, and others. Between March and
May 2018, Kim Jong Un, who had not met any world leaders since he came to power in December 2011, met twice with Chinese
President Xi Jinping, twice with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, and once with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

On human rights, the international community has continued to press the North Korean government to expand its engagement
with United Nations human rights mechanisms, including action on the findings of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on
human rights in North Korea that found the government committed crimes against humanity including extermination, murder,
enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced abortion.

On December 11, 2017, for the fourth consecutive year, the UN Security Council put North Korea’s egregious human rights
violations on its formal agenda as a threat to international peace and security. On March 23, 2018, the Human Rights Council
adopted without a vote a resolution that maintained pressure on the need for advancing accountability mechanisms for the
eventual prosecution of North Korean leaders and officials responsible for crimes against humanity.

North Korea has signed and ratified several human rights treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
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Cultural Rights, and the United Nations Charter, all of which obligate North Korea to cooperate with a variety of UN institutions
and treaty bodies.

In 2017, North Korea undertook limited re-engagement with some UN human rights mechanisms, including the CRC and
CEDAW committees, and with a short visit by the special rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, a first for a UN
thematic special rapporteur, although North Korea did not uphold its commitments to fully cooperate with her requests. The
government continues to refuse to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Seoul and the UN
special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, Tomás Ojea Quintana.

Key Vulnerable Groups

In addition to the extensive abuses noted above, North Korea discriminates against individuals and their families on political
grounds in key areas such as employment, residence, and schooling by applying songbun, a sociopolitical classification system
that from its creation grouped people into “loyal,” “wavering,” or “hostile” classes. Pervasive corruption enables some room to
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maneuver around the strictures of the songbun system, and some people who bribe government officials are able to pursue
market activities or travel domestically or abroad.

The government also fails to protect or promote the rights of numerous vulnerable groups, including women, children, people
with disabilities, and people in detention and prison.

In addition to facing violations of their rights common to the rest of the population, women suffer a range of sexual and gender-
based abuses as well. These include punishment for acts of their husbands or other relatives; torture, rape, and other sexual
violence in detention facilities; sexual exploitation or forced marriage of North Korean women in China; and sexual and gender-
based violence and discrimination. State authorities are sometimes perpetrators of abuses against women, and fail to offer
protection or justice to women and girls facing gender-based and sexual abuse
Gender-based discrimination appears to begin at childhood, where schools favor boys and men in leadership roles, and girls are
socialized to stereotyped gender roles. Women are severely underrepresented in senior positions in the ruling Workers’ Party of
Korea, which serves as the gateway to any position of power. There are no women on the all-important National Defense
Commission or the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, which determines the party’s policies. As of 2016,
according to North Korea’s report to CEDAW, women made up only 10 percent of divisional directors in government bodies,
11.9 percent of judges and lawyers, 4.9 percent of diplomats, and 16.5 percent of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Border Tightening

Kim Jong Un’s government has bolstered efforts to prevent people from leaving North Korea without permission by increasing
the number of border guards, CCTV cameras, and barbed wired fences on its border with China. Tactics include jamming
Chinese cellphone services at the border and targeting those communicating with people outside the country. China has also
increased checkpoints on roads leading from the border.

During the summer of 2017, Chinese authorities apparently intensified crackdowns on both North Koreans fleeing through
China and the networks guiding them, resulting in fewer North Koreans being able to complete the arduous overland journey to
Laos or Thailand, and from there, most often, to South Korea.

The Ministry of People’s Security classifies defection as a crime of “treachery against the nation.” Harsh punishments apply to
North Koreans forcibly returned by China, including a potential death sentence. Former North Korean security officials and
people who were forcibly returned after 2011 told Human Rights Watch that those forcibly returned face interrogation, torture,
sexual violence, humiliating treatment, and forced labor.

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The severity of punishment depends on North Korean authorities’ assessments of what returnees did while in China. North
Koreans caught working or living in China are sent to different types of forced labor camps—long-term (kyohwaso) or short-term
prisons (rodong danryeondae). Those discovered to be trying to reach South Korea are treated as enemies of the state and may
disappear into North Korea’s horrific political prison camp system (kwanliso), where prisoners face torture, sexual violence,
forced labor, and other inhuman treatment.
North Koreans fleeing into China should be protected as refugees sur place regardless of their reason for flight because of the
certainty of punishment on return. China treats them as illegal “economic migrants,” and fails to meet its obligation to protect
refugees as a state party of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. Beijing denies the staff of the UN refugee
agency, UNHCR, permission to travel to border areas where North Koreans are present.

Key International Actors

South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration has not made clear what its policy on North Korean human rights issues will be in the
context of US-North Korean nuclear negotiations and the new diplomatic opening South Korea has with North Korea. Before the
recent diplomatic flurry, key elements of its human rights policy included support for implementing the COI report
recommendations; assistance for North Korean escapees detained in China and South Korean nationals detained in North Korea;
regular publications on human rights conditions in North Korea; and the North Korean Human Rights Act that came into effect in
September 2016. However, the South Korean government has yet to establish the North Korean Human Rights Foundation
14
mandated by the act to conduct inquiries and develop policies on promoting human rights in North Korea.
23
In 2017, South Korea approved a US$8 million aid package for North Korean children and women at risk that will be distributed
at an “appropriate time,” and monitored by UNICEF and the UN World Food Programme (WFP).

Japan continues to demand the return of 12 Japanese citizens whom North Korea abducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Some
Japanese civil society groups insist the number of abductees is much higher. The Japanese government has expressed
concerns about making concessions to North Korea before the abductees issue is resolved and commitments are made on key
rights issues.

The US government has imposed many of its own bilateral sanctions on the North Korean government in response to its
weapons proliferation activities, especially since 2006. In recent years, the US imposed several new rounds of sanctions for
responsibility for human rights violations, formally determining that dozens of North Korean government entities and actors have
been implicated in such abuses. In July 2016, and in January and October 2017, the US government imposed targeted
sanctions relating to human rights abuses on ten institutions, including the Ministry of People’s Security, the Ministry of State
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Security, the Military Security Command (the military’s secret police), and the Ministry of Labor. The government also imposed
sanctions on 25 North Korean government officials, including Kim Jong Un; Choe Pu Il, a senior official in the Ministry of People’s
Security; Ri Song Chol, a senior official in the Ministry of Public Security; Kang Song Nam, a senior official in the Ministry of State
Security; and Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister and vice director of the party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.

The US sanctions regime is now mandated under US law. In 2016, the US Congress also passed the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enhancement Act, which obligates the president to investigate and list particular persons and entities involved in
weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, and cyberhacking, and mandates the president to sanction them. The act also
states that the sanctions may not be suspended unless North Korea takes major steps on ending weapons proliferation and
related activities, as well as “accounting for and repatriating” citizens of other countries who were abducted by North Korea,
“accepting and beginning to abide by internationally recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of humanitarian
aid,” and “taking verified steps to improve living conditions in its political prison camps,” among other criteria.
China is the most influential international actor in North Korea. Most of North Korea’s energy supplies come from China, and it is
the country’s largest trading partner. China has more ability to pressure North Korea economically or on human rights, but it has
never done so given its own weak policies on human rights, instead often closing the border to stop North Koreans from
escaping, or returning those who entered China. Since May 2017, the Chinese government has agreed to enforce existing
counter-proliferation sanctions more vigorously. There are also signs that China is more actively preparing contingency plans for
refugee flight from North Korea. In December 2017, according to a leaked document from China’s state-owned
telecommunications company, three villages in Changbai county and two cities in the northeastern province of Jilin bordering
North Korea had been designated to have refugee camps built in apparent preparation for a possible surge of North Koreans
escaping into China.

05 08 12

Click on the image above to watch a video from HRW giving testimonies from survivors of North Korean
prison camps

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opinion: what i learned reading 4.3
from long months of
north korea talks
Joel Wit
With Secretary of State Mike Pompeo about to embark on his third trip to Pyongyang — the first since the Singapore summit
between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un — the real work on achieving denuclearization is about to
begin.

As a State Department official in the Clinton administration, I spent countless hours formulating denuclearization plans,
negotiating directly with the North Koreans, and working with them to implement deals. That wasn't easy 20 years ago. It will be
more difficult today given the growth of Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal. But keeping in mind guidelines based on that experience
could give the Trump administration a fighting chance.

It's the political relationship, stupid

05 08 12
Don't underestimate the power of positive thinking. The Singapore summit document is thin on details but can pay important
dividends if the U.S. continues to nurture an improving political relationship with North Korea. That's one big lesson from the
1994 denuclearization deal I worked on, which included major steps forward on the political front such as the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two countries. I saw the practical impact immediately afterward when I was allowed into a
secret North Korean nuclear facility but my Foreign Ministry guides were kept out.

We shouldn't lose sight of the main reason why the North Koreans built nuclear weapons — to protect themselves from a hostile
superpower, the United States. A real security guarantee, including more summits, reaching a peace treaty to replace the
temporary armistice ending the Korean War and establishing diplomatic relations — not one written on a piece of paper without
concrete actions — is the key to unlocking the denuclearization door.

Ike was right: It's the planning, not the plans

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's dictum about preparing for battle — "Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable" — also
applies to denuclearization talks. During our negotiations that lasted on and off for 15 months starting in June 1993, our dream
scenario was always that the North Koreans would quickly make all the concessions up front and the United States would make
none. Kim Jong Un will have his own plan to present to Secretary Pompeo, formulated by North Korean bureaucrats, that takes
14
place in phases with Washington making all the concessions up front and Pyongyang none. 23
Many a U.S. negotiator has experienced talks that appear to have failed after long, overnight negotiations only to have the North
Koreans come back the next morning and concede before the Americans leave for the airport. The administration should expect
brinkmanship but also a willingness to compromise. That's what the North's "art of the deal" is all about.

Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good enough

Verification should be rigorous but can never be ironclad. Washington's fixation on making verification 100 percent certain —
requiring unfettered access anytime and anywhere — will be impossible to achieve given not just North Korean but any
country's concerns about national sovereignty. Rather, the Trump administration will have to establish a standard for a rigorous
but not perfect verification, just as the Carter and Reagan administrations did during nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union.
They settled for being able to detect any cheating before it threatened U.S. national security.

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Moreover, getting back to an earlier point, an improvement in political relations can be translated into building a stronger
verification regime. In 1998, I led a team of Americans on an inspection of a site in North Korea where we suspected Pyongyang
was cheating on the Clinton denuclearization accord. The North Koreans cooperated in large part, not just because we were
wrong — we found nothing — but because they were intent on improving relations with Washington after the downturn caused
by their long-range missile launch.
Don't underestimate the value of positive unilateral steps

The standard game plan with North Korea is pin down all the details in writing. Pyongyang will always be looking for loopholes.
But unilateral steps by both sides, even if not in writing, can create positive momentum. That's been the case in the past, whether
it was the unilateral removal by the United States of the last nuclear bombs on the Korean Peninsula in 1991 or the cessation of
the largest joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise by the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. And it certainly has
been the case this year.

We have been quick to dismiss or forget Pyongyang's suspension of its nuclear and missile tests, release of three detained
Americans, at least partial destruction of its nuclear test site and its plan to demolish a missile test facility. That's also been the
case with the suspension of the two largest U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises that the North has wanted for years. Both
sides should look for more positive unilateral steps.

Don't assume anything

It's just common sense to expect the unexpected when negotiating with Pyongyang. But successive U.S. administrations have
not learned this lesson. The most common mistake — not making sure both sides have the same interpretation of commitments
— can lead to a diplomatic train wreck. For example, Pyongyang's missile test moratorium may prove to be a land mine. The
Trump administration thinks the cessation includes not just missile tests but also space launches — a view that is enshrined in
United Nations sanctions imposed on North Korea — since both employ technologies that could be used to build
intercontinental ballistic missiles.

After The Trump-Kim Summit, U.S. And North Korea Appear As Far Apart As Ever

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In the past, however, Pyongyang has asserted that all countries have the right to conduct the peaceful exploration of space. That
difference scuttled the 2012 U.S.-North Korean "Leap Day" denuclearization deal when the North launched a satellite into space
to celebrate a national holiday against Washington's wishes. What the North thinks now is unclear. But with the 70th anniversary
of the founding of the DPRK coming up in September, Pyongyang might celebrate once again with a space launch, causing
serious problems just as denuclearization talks are getting off the ground.

Don't exclude other parties

Nuclear talks are not a case of "the more the merrier." Reaching agreements becomes harder as more countries get a seat at the
table. Negotiations limited to just the U.S and North Korea will not work either. One big reason is that a denuclearization
agreement will cost a lot of money to give the North tangible incentives, economic assistance that Washington will find
politically difficult to provide.

South Korea, on the other hand, might have fewer problems. In 1994, Seoul paid billions of dollars to help implement the deal.
But South Korea will want a seat at the table rather than outside the room waiting to hear what happened.

And others with an interest in denuclearization — Japan, China and Russia — may contribute financially and politically.
Harnessing all these countries to pull toward a common objective will require the U.S. to find effective ways to combine bilateral
and multilateral negotiations.
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Negotiations are too important to be left to bureaucrats

Just as Georges Clémenceau, France's leader during World War I, said, "war is too serious a matter to entrust to military men,"
negotiations should not be handled by just the diplomats.

After the 1994 deal, midlevel bureaucrats like myself were left to slog through the details. As a result, the agreement almost
collapsed. After the North Koreans tested a long-range missile in 1998, President Bill Clinton appointed a special envoy — former
Defense Secretary William Perry — who averted disaster. He worked with North Korean officials, as well as U.S. allies and
Congress, to save the agreement.

Pompeo has the right idea. He needs to be personally involved in talks. But negotiating detailed agreements can't be
accomplished during two-day visits to Pyongyang. That will have to be done in long negotiations, either patterned after
Secretary of State John Kerry's daily involvement, supported by professionals, in the Iran talks or negotiations conducted by
18 25
bureaucrats bolstered by regular meetings between Pompeo and senior North Koreans as well as more Trump-Kim summits.

The State Department can't steal the show

The secretary of state should lead the charge but success will require a whole of government effort to harness the enormous
expertise — particularly, the nuclear and missile experts — that resides in the Departments of Energy and Defense and in the
intelligence community.

The administration, however, faces two challenges. First, it is unclear whether it can use those resources effectively. For the
moment, while Pompeo seems to be in charge, National Security Adviser John Bolton, who is on the public record as thinking
negotiations with North Korea are a waste of time, is lurking in the background. At the slightest sign of trouble, Bolton can be
expected to gum up the works.
Second, virtually no one in the administration has had sustained face-to-face contact with the North Koreans. That lack of
experience could create serious barriers to reaching agreements. It is one thing to sit at a desk in Washington, reading reports
about the North Koreans, and another to negotiate daily with the country's authorities. We learned that in 1994, courtesy of
countless hours at the negotiating table.

Whether the Trump administration will be able to put these guidelines into practice remains an open question. The historical
narrative about the past 20 years of U.S.-North Korean relations is filled with myths and misconceptions. But having started down
the road to peace with the first-ever summit meeting between a sitting American president and the North Korean leader, the U.S.
has a historic opportunity to end the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and change the political face of Northeast Asia.

05 08 12

14 23

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submission to the united reading 4.4
nations committee on
the rights of the child
Amnesty International
INTRODUCTION

Amnesty International presents this submission in advance of the consideration, in September 2017, of the fifth periodic report of
the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
This document does not reflect the full range of concerns of the organization in terms of respect, protection and fulfilment of
children’s rights in DPRK, but it focuses in particular on the failure of the DPRK to uphold human rights of children as a result of its
heavy restrictions on citizens’ freedom to seek, receive and impart information freely regardless of national frontiers. This
05 08 12
freedom is a key component of the right to freedom of expression (Article 13 of the Convention), and the deprivation of such also
affects the enjoyment of other rights by the child.

In this context, this briefing also sets out Amnesty International’s additional concerns regarding the state party’s failure to uphold
the rights of children to maintain personal relations and direct contact with parents they are separated from (Article 9(3)),
including parents who live in a different state (Article 10(2); the right to form and express their views freely (Article 12); the right
to privacy, correspondence and family life (Article 16); the right to information (Article 17); the right to education (Article 29); and
the right to rest, leisure, play and participation in cultural and artistic life (Article 31).

The findings in this submission are based partly on Connection Denied, a report released by Amnesty International in March
2016, which gives detailed evidence of the state’s failure to ensure the right to freedom of expression (Article 19, ICCPR and
Article 19, UDHR) and the right to be protected against arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence
(Article 17, ICCPR) as a result of these restrictions.1 The DPRK exercises near total control over the information exchange
between North Koreans and the rest of the world. All telecommunications, postal and broadcasting services are state-owned,
and there is no independent media. The government’s Propaganda Department maintains control over all television, radio and
newspaper content.

Through pervasive surveillance, both technological and physical, as well as repressions and intimidation, the state also
maintains control over communications in and out of the country, including communication between North Koreans under the
14
age of 18 and family members from whom they are separated. 23
The UN General Assembly raised in a resolution in December 2016 its very serious concern regarding the all-pervasive severe
restrictions, online and offline, on the freedom of opinion and expression, the right to privacy and equal access to information,
among other human rights.2 Through this submission, Amnesty International would like to highlight the fact that these
restrictions as well as the associated surveillance also affect the rights of persons under 18 residing in or originally from the
DPRK, including in ways that may be distinct from the general population. This is especially so for children who are part of
divided families that are separated as a result of one or more members having left the country without official permission.

DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SEPARATED FAMILY MEMBERS (ARTICLES 9, 10 & 13)

The state restricts communications between family members who have left North Korea and those who remain in the country in
a way that unduly curtails the freedom to seek, receive and impart information regardless of national frontiers, which is part of the
right to freedom of expression (Article 13). The same restrictions also violates the right of children to maintain regular personal
18 25
relations and direct contact with their parents (Articles 9(3), 10(2)). The DPRK has kept the domestic and international telephone
systems separate. Landline telephones in offices and households that are used for domestic calls do not allow international
calling. Although domestic mobile phones were launched in 2008 through a joint-venture between the DPRK and an Egyptian
company and soon became popular, they also only allow calls within the country.

For most people, international landline phones in some North Korean post offices are the only way to make phone calls out of
the country legally. These public phones are not an option for children who would like to call their parents who have left the
country without official permission and/or are located in South Korea, and vice versa, because they are monitored both for
content and destination. Although speaking on the phone to individuals outside DPRK is not in itself illegal, individuals could
face serious charges if found speaking to someone in South Korea or other countries that are labelled as “enemies”. Children
over age 16 and parents trying to maintain direct contact with their children who have left their country through these phones
are at risk of being imprisoned, including being sent to political prison camps, if charged in relation to speaking with a person in
South Korea. While children below age 14 are not held criminally responsible for such offences, children between the ages of 14
and 16 can be sent for “social education” if convicted. It is not known what type of education or punishment is carried out in
these facilities
Due to restrictions on the content of communications and location of individuals telephoned, callers in the DPRK are at risk of
prosecution and detention if found making calls to people outside the country. Without a legal option, they can only turn to an
unofficial alternative. “Chinese mobile phones” smuggled into North Korea, which can connect to Chinese mobile phone
networks, are available as a result of the booming informal private “grey market” economy, and allow those located close to the
Chinese border to communicate privately with people outside the country.

Financial barriers can also impact on the child’s right of maintaining regular direct contact with their parents, as these “Chinese
mobile phones” are not affordable for every household. North Koreans who do not own one of these phones have no choice but
to go through brokers who own them in order to communicate with their families. These brokers ordinarily facilitate cash
remittances into the DPRK from family members outside the country, and as part of this transaction, they act as channels of
communication among family members. The fees charged by these brokers, however, are very expensive (typically a 30%
commission of a minimum cash remittance of USD900, or 1 million South Korean Won). These costs, together with the practical
implications of having to be close to the Chinese border physically and undetected, mean this option is not a viable means of
regular direct contact among family members.

Young North Koreans, including those under the age of 18 and who have arrived in South Korea without their parents or older
family members still in the North, find it even more difficult to afford the services of a broker, because they usually are not
employed if sent to school by the South Korean government. The restrictions on communications by mobile phones in DPRK
therefore continues to affect North Korean children even after they have left the country.

RISK OF SURVEILLANCE AND INTERFERENCE WITH PRIVACY AND FAMILY LIFE (ARTICLE 16)

Even North Koreans who own a “Chinese mobile phone,” are at risk of surveillance when making calls. Testimonies of individuals
who talked to Amnesty International confirmed findings of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic
05 08 12
People’s Republic of Korea in 2014, which reported that a special department of the State Security Department had
sophisticated equipment to pick up, monitor, as well as block the emissions of “Chinese mobile phones”.

Individuals who reported having experienced the surveillance and the jamming of signals, including persons under the age of
18, told Amnesty International that they saw these actions as a tactic to intimidate potential users of “Chinese mobile phones.”
As the authorities emit radio waves in order to block Chinese mobile signals, anyone who wishes to use these phones needs to
travel deep into the mountains close to the border to make calls. Also, to avoid being detected, those making calls must keep
phone calls as short as possible, and avoid using the real names of children or other family members during conversations.

Some young people said that households with family members who are suspected of having left the country, including their
own, are often the targets of heightened surveillance. This includes house searches, as well as monitoring at school. The state’s
surveillance system overseen by the State Security Department, penetrates all levels of daily life and officers investigating
possible cases of individuals who left the country question those individuals’ children at home or school. Children may be asked
about the whereabouts of their parents, and whether they have received money sent from outside the country.

Investigations into possible departures of family members creates fear among children about whether their parent(s) have really
left the country or not, but the suspicion about their parents also affects the future prospect of teenagers who are about to
graduate from secondary school. A number of young people reported that they were not given places in the university, nor were
they allowed to join the military, nor work in public services, very likely because the authorities suspected their family members
had gone to South Korea. 14 23
Gwang, a young North Korean man currently attending university in Seoul recalled his situation at the time when he was
finishing secondary school, “Your future will not be good if they find out that your father has escaped. This was not life and
death, but it was a constant state of fear for three years. The intensity of my fear was greater when I tried to leave [the DPRK], but
in contrast this is over in just a short period of time.” In other words, young people like Gwang can suffer from lifelong
discrimination or harassment, simply because their family members exercised their right to freedom of movement. They can be
left with few options to avoid this treatment apart from risking a dangerous, irregular exit from the DPRK.

Rules and practices interfering with privacy and correspondence are not currently determined in a specific and proportionate
manner in DPRK law, and no effective safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of power or the arbitrary or unlawful use of
surveillance on persons under 18, contrary to Article 16 of the Convention.9 Without the necessary laws and safeguards in place,
surveillance is not justifiably targeted nor conducted in a manner that is proportionate to legitimate aims, such as protecting
national security or combatting serious crime, and violate the rights of the child to be free from such interference or attacks.
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ACCESS TO OTHER FORMS OF OUTSIDE INFORMATION (ARTICLES 13 & 17)

In addition to the restrictions on communications, the DPRK has an absolute monopoly on all media and media outlets and has
been able to control to a large extent the types of information that are received by its citizens, including children. The Committee
in the past has expressed its view that a government’s total control of all sources of information, including media, and limitations
to foreign culture and media, including the internet, contravene Articles 13 and 17 of the Convention, and that the state should
ensure the right of the child to access information and material from a diversity of national and international sources.10 The
severe restrictions in the DPRK on accessing outside information through official and unofficial means violates the child’s right to
freedom of expression as stated in Article 13, as do the restrictions on mobile phone communications.
There are no independent media and all media content including television, newspapers and radio is controlled by the
Publication and Broadcasting Department, which operates within the Propaganda Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
According to the DPRK’s fifth periodic report on the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, efforts have
been made to provide TV programmes for children and youth, and include programmes from abroad in a new channel
introduced in 2012. This likely refers to a channel named Mansudae, which is only in operation for several hours per day during
the weekends, and is not independent of the state which controls all broadcasting institutions, programming choices and
content. This monopoly and strict control of content and structure makes it impossible for children to have access to a diversity
of information from a “diversity of national and international sources”, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her
social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health (Article 17).

The DPRK has a domestic, closed-off internet system and according to the state’s fifth periodic report, this “intra-network” has
been made available in schools in the capital city of Pyongyang and seats of provinces. However, this network allows access
only to domestic websites and email. Unlike other countries that censor particular web content or temporarily cut off internet
access during government-declared emergencies, North Korea denies access to the World Wide Web to the vast majority of its
citizens, including children. Access to information under Article 17 encompasses all forms of media, but particular attention
needs to be given to the digital environment; the Committee has urged states to ensure that young people have access, without
discrimination, to different forms of media and support and promote equal access to digital citizenship.

The DPRK also exercises strict control on access to outside information through unofficial means, including DVDs and USB sticks
containing foreign television dramas movies, as well as smuggled televisions and radios that can receive signals originating from
neighbouring countries, such as China, Russia and South Korea. These items are made available through the grey market
economy, but the authorities actively restrict individuals’ access to outside information through surveillance and interference
with their privacy, by the inminban neighbourhood units, as well as dedicated structures created to deal with the issue of citizens
05 08 12
accessing outside media. Further, Article 185 of the Criminal Law of DPRK provides that all individuals aged 14 or above
“listening to hostile broadcasting and collection, keeping and distribution of enemy propaganda” are subject to punishment by
“reform through labour.”

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD TO CULTURAL LIFE AND THE ARTS (ARTICLES 12, 29 & 31)

The strict restrictions on access to outside information also penetrate school settings, in which it is almost impossible for children
in DPRK to receive any genuine education about human rights values, including knowledge or information that is important for
promoting understanding, peace, tolerance, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups, but
considered unsuitable or unnecessary by the state. One woman named Soo-yae mentioned that when she was in school in the
DPRK “it was not possible to learn about ‘famous people’ overseas – for example, Abraham Lincoln – or the lives of girls in South
Korea.” Another young woman named Sung-I related that during her time at secondary school, “students were encouraged to
monitor one another and share with others ‘bad behaviour’ such as watching foreign movies.”

This censorship runs contrary to the aims of Article 29(1) which, among other things, states that education should be directed at
allowing children to reach their full potential and in preparation for responsible life in a free society. Instead it perpetuates an
environment in which state propaganda dominates all educational and other activities, and children are not allowed to form their
own views and express them freely, as guaranteed in Article 12, one of the Convention’s general principles.

14 23
By attempting to monopolize media outlets and becoming the sole supplier of all educational and cultural content, the DPRK
also seeks to impose culture “from above” and fails to serve a facilitator role, as recommended by the Committee in its General
Comment No.17 which explains state obligations to ensure a number of rights including the right to cultural life and the arts. The
document also notes that access to information and materials from a diversity of community and national and international
sources is essential for children to participate fully in cultural and artistic activity. Failure to provide the widest possible access to
such information and materials violates the right of the child to participate freely in cultural life and the arts (Article 31), and also
compromises the enjoyment of the right to education and the benefits of scientific progress. No child should be denied access
to culture, either to its creation or to its benefits, as recommended by the Committee in the same general comment. The
restrictions on access to outside information imposed by the DPRK authorities, severely limits the range of cultural and artistic
expression that can be articulated and enjoyed by children at home, school and in other settings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Amnesty International recommends that the DPRK authorities:

18 25
End the ban on North Koreans, including children accessing international mobile telephone services, including voice calls
and text messages.
Facilitate North Korean children’s access to information and materials of social and cultural benefit, including through the
World Wide Web and other international internet data and services.
Ensure that everybody in North Korea is able to communicate directly and regularly with family members and others,
including with parents or children living in other countries, without interference unless justified in line with international
human rights law and standards.
End surveillance of communications that is unnecessary, untargeted or without any legitimate aim, including between
children and their parents.
Allow the establishment of independent newspapers and other media, and end all censorship of domestic and foreign media.
Introduce internet (i.e. the World Wide Web) access in schools and other public facilities such as libraries.
Ensure the right of children to take part in cultural and artistic activity, including through ensuring that they are provided with
the widest possible access, through different media, to diverse information and materials related to their own culture and to
other cultures, civilizations, nations and peoples.
Ensure by incorporating into policies and legislation, that education is provided in a way that respects the inherent dignity of
the child, and enables the child to express his or her views freely, and to develop life skills such as critical thinking, among
other abilities which give children the tools needed to reach their potential, and pursue their options in life while also
respecting human rights values.
'north korea will not give reading 4.5
up nuclear weapons'
John Mearsheimer
There's no way North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons because they have no reason to believe the United States will
implement any denuclearization deal between them, John Mearsheimer, a professor at the University of Chicago well known for
his realist views on international politics, said Tuesday.

"North Korea is not going to give up its nuclear weapons and China will not push North Koreans to do so. The reason is that in
international politics, you could never trust anybody because you cannot be certain of what their intentions are," the professor
said in a lecture hosted by the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies in Seoul.

"There's no way North Koreans can trust the U.S. -- they give up their nuclear weapons because the U.S. might welsh on the deal,"
the professor said, referring to the U.S.' unsuccessful denuclearization deals with former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and
Iran. "If you were North Koreans, would you trust Donald Trump? Would you trust any American presidents?

"I can't think of a country that needs nuclear weapons more than North Koreans because you all know that the U.S. is into a
05 08
regime change. Donald Trump has been talking about a regime change in North Korea," Mearsheimer said. 12
"Give up their nuclear weapons? I don't think so, especially as security competition heats up in East Asia. You wanna hang on to
those weapons."

His analysis comes as the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. gear up for their respective summits with North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un in April and May to discuss the latter's denuclearization and the building of a permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula after the North's barrage of weapons tests escalated tension in the region.

The professor also said there is "virtually" no chance that the two Koreas will be unified in the foreseeable future.

"I think it's quite clear up until now the Chinese had a deep-seated interest in making sure that North Korea remains a sovereign
state, a buffer state separating China from South Korea and their American ally.

"I think as the security competition between China and the U.S. increases, the incentive for China to make sure North Korea
remains a sovereign, buffer state increases," he said.

Mearsheimer said the Korean Peninsula will likely become the single frontline for the two powers' growing security competition
14
to become the regional hegemon and a war could possibly happen on the peninsula as part of the competition. 23
"You are going to get intense security competition here in East Asia. I believe it's inevitable. I think there is a serious possibility of
a war," he said. "I don't say it's likely. I just think there is a serious possibility."

The shifting geopolitics may cause North Korea to bond closely with China again although "these days a lot of people think
China is fed up with North Koreans and there's been something of a distancing between them."

Mearsheimer noted, "I think that is probably true today, but my argument is that as security competition heats up in East Asia,
they will come closer together."

18 25
 Case Study #5
RWANDA
W hilst Rwanda can be used to make links to
btoh the development and human rights units of
the curse, the main reason for including this
case study is as a means of considering and
exploring the issue of humanitarian intervention
as the basis for violating the sovereignity of a
state.
Some questions you might consider when
exploring this case study are:
on what grounds in humanitarian
intervention justified?
what recourse do victims of human rights
violations have when let down by the
international community?
how should - can - the international
community balance the competing
demands of sovereignty and human
rights?
rwanda
list of readings

5.1 Some Lessons About Humanitarian Intervention

5.2 The Moral Obligation to Intervene in Rwanda

5.3 Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International
Community?
05
5.4 The Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention Since 08 12
Rwanda

5.5 Rwanda, 20 years on: how a country is rebuilding

itself

14 23

18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

WWW.GLOPOIB.WORDPRESS.COM
some lessons about
reading 5.1
humanitarian
intervention
James F Miskel

In a speech delivered in Kigali Rwanda in March 1998, President Clinton eloquently reminded the world of the terrible atrocities
that occurred in Rwanda four years earlier in 1994. There were, as the President made clear, many profoundly disturbing aspects
of the genocide in Rwanda. A particularly disturbing aspect of the Rwanda crisis--but one that was not emphasized by the
05 08 12
President during his grand tour of Africa in the spring of 1998--is that Hutu-Tutsi violence did not end in 1994. Indeed there
continue to be serious instances of Hutu-Tutsi violence in Rwanda, Zaire (now Congo) and Burundi. With respect to the latter
country, on January 20, 2000 the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warned that " ...in no other country is it so easy to imagine a
repetition of what we have all sworn must never be repeated: ethnic killing on a genocidal scale".

According to President Clinton and the President of Rwanda, the 1994 atrocities were not a spontaneous and thus un-
anticipatible paroxysm of mysterious tribal rivalries. Rather, the massacres were planned by Hutu extremists in the government
and in other leadership positions in Rwandan society. The extremists evidently did what Hitler and Stalin had done earlier in the
century; i.e., embitter the general public against a minority group, in this case the Tutsi, by blaming them for some or all of their
country’s economic and social woes. President Clinton and Secretary General Annan have also acknowledged that the United
States and the United Nations did not respond as quickly as they should have to the crisis in Rwanda. Initially, the claim was that
leaders in the west did not fully appreciate the genocidal nature of the violence in Rwanda until very late in the crisis and thus
were slow to intervene. This in turn, lead to recommendations that a better early warning system be established and the United
States has committed itself to working with the United Nations to build such a system.

Since then Secretary General Annan has conceded that ample warning information was actually available to western leaders,
thus implying that calls for an early warning system amounted to a polite fiction, a fig leaf for UN inaction during the first months
of the Rwandan crisis. Indeed, in September 1999 the Secretary General went so far as to say that the west's delayed response
to the genocide in Rwanda was unrelated to the issue of warning information. He stated that the UN tarried because of "the
14 23
reluctance of Member States to place their forces in harm's way where no perceived vital interests are at stake, a concern over
costs, and doubts-in the wake of Somalia-that intervention could succeed."

The Secretary General's statement is well informed with respect to both the warning information issue, the role of perceived
national interests, and doubts about the prospects for success. The embassies of the United States and other nations operated in
the Rwandan capital throughout the preliminary phases of the crisis. Moreover, North American, European, Asian and other
African countries maintained embassies in the states bordering Rwanda (i.e., Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire--now Congo)
which functioned throughout the crisis. It is frankly inconceivable that these embassies would have omitted the escalating
slaughter in Rwanda in their reports, particularly since there were concerns at the time that the violence would spread across
national borders. Indeed, if the US and European embassies in Kigali and in neighboring capitals did not apprise their respective
ministries of developments in Rwanda, this would raise very serious questions about the overall value and competence of the
embassy system and, of course, about any early warning system that would in any way depend upon the embassies for
information or analysis.

18 25
Numerous United Nations agencies and private humanitarian organizations also maintained operations in the region before,
during and after the 1994 crisis and their reports were replete with compelling information about its extent and severity. The UN
even had a military mission (UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR) in-country that reported on the early stages of the
crisis and was, perversely, reduced in size after it reported that the violence was escalating. Indeed, UNAMIR was the originator
of the infamous "genocide fax" of January 1994 which provided the UN’s Department of Peace Keeping Operations with detailed
information about the plans being made by extremists for anti-Tutsi violence. There was, as well, enough contemporary media
coverage in the United States and Europe to have encouraged policy makers and legislators to commission special inquiries into
events in Rwanda, or at the very least to consult the data available from embassies, UN agencies, and private humanitarian
organizations.
Professor Richard J. Norton and I have conducted a review of early warning information from recent humanitarian crises. Our
assumption was that due to their guilt or sensitivity to criticism for the slow response to the Rwanda crisis, leaders in the UN and
in western capitals would be unusually receptive to early warning information during the 1995-7 time frame. We hypothesized
that if ample early warning information was available during this period and if the UN and individual western nations
nevertheless failed to respond, then it might be unrealistic to expect that the UN or individual western nations would ever
respond to early warning about complex humanitarian emergencies. From this it would also follow that building early warning
systems for complex humanitarian emergencies would be a poor investment. Indeed, building an early warning system when
warning information is already available and when this warning information is consistently not acted upon, is a superfluous
activity, akin perhaps to buying a boat to launch on a dry lake.

Our study appeared to demonstrate that substantial and credible early warning information was available during the aftermath
of Rwanda for crises in Burundi and Zaire. The absence of early action in response to this warning information appeared to
confirm our hypotheses.

Indeed, the Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi humanitarian crises illustrate two paradoxes inherent in the concept of early warning
systems. One is that the states with the greatest incentive for taking early action in humanitarian emergencies are the very
nations that would benefit least from a formal, international early warning system. These are the states whose national interests
are directly affected by the emergency; i.e., neighboring states or more distant states with major investments in or security
commitments to the affected state. These states already monitor and evaluate developments like communal violence that may
jeopardize their interests or destabilize their borders. For example, as demonstrated by its participation in contemporaneous
regional conferences and commissions, Tanzania already possessed a deep understanding of the Zaire crisis and would not
have benefited significantly from information generated by a UN early warning system based in Geneva or New York. At least in
some parts of the world--notably including central Africa, neighboring states often seem to lack the physical wherewithal to act
effectively upon early warning. Angola, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, and Uganda each had obvious interests in the
05 08 12
inter-related crises in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. However, their own economies and military capabilities were too fragile to
support the kinds of action that might have been necessary to prevent the crises from worsening. Tanzania, the Central African
Republic, and Uganda are among the lowest income nations in the world with per capital annual income of $410 or less and
declining or static rates of economic growth. Often what these neighboring states do have is considerably less helpful--a history
of disputed borders, ethnic-political entanglements, and economic rivalries. Histories of this sort not only make suffering nations
reluctant to invite their neighbors to intervene, they also make it difficult for the neighboring states to cooperate with each other
in humanitarian intervention.

The second paradox is that the states that might conceivably derive informational value from an early warning system are the
states that are normally the least likely to act on early warning because they have no important security or economic interests at
stake. For example, with respect to Rwanda and Burundi some western nations might conceivably obtain useful information
from a UN early warning system. (As long as the embassies in the region continue to function and both media and relief
organizations continue to operate in the region, it would however be easy to overestimate the genuine, incremental value that
the United States and other major powers might actually derive from an early warning system.) However, because it has no
important economic or strategic interests in either Rwanda or Burundi, the United States and presumably other major western
powers will always be reluctant to act upon information from a UN early warning system until the public or legislature demands
it. Or, until national leaders have been personally affected by the moral issues at stake and have managed to convince the
legislators and/or voters that intervention is necessary. Ordinarily, by the time public and legislative support is mobilized the
early stages of humanitarian crises will have long passed. This was the case in the 1996 Zaire crisis and the 1994 Rwanda crisis.
14
One could argue that it was also the case in Bosnia during the early 1990s and in Kosovo in 1998. 23
Early Warning Actions and the Prospects for Success

In his 1998 remarks, President Clinton asserted that agitation by extremists had provoked the Hutu citizenry and that Hutu
extremists had made extensive, tangible preparations for the violence.15 It is generally agreed that extremists actually did pave
the way for the violence by: a) whipping up anti-Tutsi frenzy through inflammatory radio broadcasts and street corner agit-prop;
b) distributing hit lists of Tutsi and their moderate Hutu sympathizers; and c) providing machetes and other small arms to their
supporters. In the context of western guilt over ignoring early warning signs from Rwanda, these judgements suggest an
obvious conclusion--that a well-timed, modestly-sized military intervention could have disrupted the preparations of the
extremists and saved many thousands of lives. In effect, there could have been a surgical strike against the extremists--a series of
quick, low cost actions with minimal collateral damage. As noted above, there seem to have been doubts among UN Member
States in 1994 that quick, surgical actions would succeed in actually stopping in the Rwandan violence. Nearly a decade later,
the justification for those doubts still seems valid.
18 25
For one thing, focusing narrowly on the preparations of extremists as the cause of the tragedy in Rwanda is misguided. It is
analogous to analyzing Nazi atrocities without considering their context; e.g., anti-Semitism, German nationalism, anti-
Bolshevism, popular resentment over the World War I settlement, and the economic turmoil of the Great Depression, which
spawned fascist movements all across Europe. The context in Rwanda is that it is one of the world’s poorest, most densely
populated countries with a long history of civil wars and bitter ethnic tension, some of which--perhaps most--being the product
of the colonial powers having played the Hutu and Tutsi against each other for decades. Surely these conditions helped to
create a medium for violence and, just as surely, such conditions will be little affected by foreign intervention to confiscate
machetes, burn hit lists and shut down "hate radio" stations.

It is also surely true that by virtue of their relative lack of national interests in central Africa that the major western powers have
relatively slight incentives for acquiring a more sophisticated understanding of these conditions. It would seem, furthermore,
that a sine qua non for surgical, precise strikes of the kind envisioned by proponents of early warning actions may be the very
sophisticated and detailed information about conditions and factors in-country that the western powers have little incentive to
collect. Except, of course, when the crisis occurs in the west.
Moreover, by virtue of its small size, Rwanda may not even be an appropriate model for estimating the ability of an intervention
force to successfully disrupt extremist preparations for violence. Rwanda is only about the size of the state of Maryland. Most
other African countries where humanitarian intervention has been undertaken or considered are substantially larger. The
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) where intervention was considered in 1997 has more than eighty times Rwanda’s
square mileage. Somalia is more than twenty times as large. Even small "failing states" like Liberia and Sierra Leone are,
respectively, four times and two and a half times the size of Rwanda. Suppressing extremist movements in such expansive
territories may prove physically daunting for an early intervention force unless it is extremely large, in which case the effort of
fielding and deploying such a force from the west would certainly preclude its arriving early.

Furthermore, suppressing ethnic agit-prop (particularly "hate radio" broadcasting); confiscating weapons, and detaining
extremist leaders may prove to be difficult tasks and might only yield temporary benefits. Intervention--early or late--even against
seemingly small groups of extremists or their leaders could amount to picking sides in a nascent civil war. This often has adverse
consequences. For instance, in Somalia, the UN decided to take action against one of the warring clans that was interfering with
the distribution of humanitarian supplies. The result was the loss of 18 US soldiers and the loss of public and congressional
support for the Somalia policy. Moreover, little damage was done to the targeted clan and its leadership. The US-French-Italian
intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s had even more tragic and fruitless consequences. Because the United States forces
were perceived as siding with the minority-dominated government, the American Embassy and the Marine Corps barracks at the
Beirut airport were attacked by terrorist truck bombs.

To really be effective an early intervention would likely have to decapitate the extremist leadership; otherwise the violence might
only be postponed until the extremists have time to re-organize. Getting extremist leaders out of circulation and bringing them
to justice have often proven to be a complex and time consuming tasks. United Nations forces tried and failed to decapitate the
most troublesome Somali clan in the early 1990s. Cambodia’s Pol Pot died a free man in 1998 almost twenty years after his
involvement in some of this century’s most heinous atrocities. In Bosnia, alleged war criminals have eluded capture for years and
have continued to foment tension. 05 08 12
It is true that many Rwandan extremists have been captured and brought to trial. In fact, some have been found guilty in the
Rwandan courts and been summarily executed in public settings starting in April 1998. But it was not until January 2000, almost
six years after the crisis had ended, that the first private citizen was convicted of "genocide-related" charges by the United
Nations tribunal system. Thus, the Rwandan experience may be an exception that proves the rule about the difficulty of
decapitating extremist groups. It is, moreover, in practical terms a case of victor’s justice. The Rwandan war criminals were
captured and brought to trial only after their forces had been defeated in the civil war and even then only after the victors
assumed full control of all of the reins of government. Some of the war criminals fled to refugee camps in other countries during
the waning days of the civil war and were able to evade justice for years. Many were eventually repatriated to Rwanda under
sustained pressure from the United Nations agencies, the governments of the nations hosting the refugee camps, and non-
governmental aid organizations. (The private citizen convicted by the UN tribunal in January 2000 had escaped to Switzerland
where he was arrested in 1995.)

Roughly the same points can be made with respect to the idea of weapons confiscation. During the 1992-3 intervention in
Somalia, US and UN peacekeepers adopted a policy of weapons confiscation. Two classes of weapons were involved. The first
was relatively large weapons like rocket propelled grenade launchers which did not figure prominently in the Rwandan violence.
The second involved small arms like pistols and rifles that are analogous to the side arms and machetes used in Rwanda.
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Trying to reduce the supply of both kinds of weapons could have had the same effect as picking sides in a civil war as the
reductions could tilt the local balance of power, e.g., by reducing the advantage of the most heavily armed group, or increasing
the disadvantage of poorly armed factions. Moreover, efforts to reduce the supply of small arms in Somalia proved to be
administratively cumbersome, time consuming and ultimately futile.

As noted above, inflammatory radio broadcasts were widely judged to have contributed heavily to violence in Rwanda in 1994.
In 1995 "hate radio" broadcasts were also thought to be inflaming tensions in Burundi. The Secretary General took the matter so
seriously that UN operatives were dispatched to the region to evaluate whether the UN should establish its own broadcast
facility in or near Burundi for counter-programming purposes. As it turns out, the UN decided against getting into the
broadcasting business in Burundi for practical reasons, principally the difficulty of staffing the station with skilled translators and
the risk that the UN facility and broadcasters would be attacked. This episode points out two things. One is that derailing ethnic
agit-prop is not the kind of thing that can be accomplished in a surgical strike, or at a single stroke. The second is that
humanitarian officials and the military forces that provide them security are increasingly likely to become targeted by extremists
or criminal elements acting under the cover of ethnic strife. In the context of a civil war or civil disorder, even the subtle art of
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positive propaganda amounts to a political action that will be perceived by one group or another as a cause for retaliation.

To effectively disrupt ethnic agit-prop, considerably more is required than pulling the plugs and seizing the microphones at a
hate radio station or arresting assorted street-corner orators. Given modern technology, "pirate" radio stations can fill in for a
closed station in a matter of days, if not hours. Pirate radio stations can also change locations fairly easily, thus committed
propagandists might be difficult to actually keep off the air. For any such measures to have lasting effect, they might have to be
accompanied by extended monitoring of radio broadcasts in-country and, as the UN decided against doing in Burundi, the
establishment, operation and protection of more responsible media outlets. Here, too, experience in Bosnia may be instructive.
Even after three years of intense peacekeeping activity by NATO forces, radio and television stations in Bosnia continued to
broadcast inflammatory statements about various ethnic factions in the country and about the motives of the peacekeepers
themselves. Further complicating this issue is the fact that the offending radio stations are at least occasionally operated by the
national government itself or owned by relatives or business partners of government officials. This was the case in Rwanda. A
more recent example occurred in August 1998. According to UN sources, a Congo government station was broadcasting calls
for the Congolese people to kill Tutsis with "machete, spear, arrow, hoe, spades, rakes, nails, truncheons, irons, barbed wire,
stones and the like".
In January and February 2000, the United Nations and its leading members appear, yet again, to have indirectly acknowledged
how unlikely it is in the present order of things that early warning will be effectively acted upon. (Diplomatic efforts to peacefully
arbitrate issues or to negotiate cease-fire agreements can be and, of course, are attempted by the United Nations, by
neighboring states or by western sates with an interest in the region. When these efforts succeed, the fighting stops. My focus is
on situations where the diplomatic efforts either failed or were not undertaken.) It may also be an acknowledgement of how
dim the United Nations and its leading members think the prospects for success really are for early warning actions.

On February 8, 2000 a resolution was introduced in the Security Council to authorize a small peacekeeping force of 5,500 troops
to intervene in Congo. The resolution was introduced after many months of early warning and specified that the intervention
would take place only after the fighting had ceased. In other words, the intervention would be the opposite of early and the
peacekeeping force would be so small that it can only be thought of as a token gesture. Congo is, as previously noted, eighty
times as large as Rwanda--yet the United Nations peacekeeping force for Congo would only be slightly larger than the force that
was sent to Rwanda before the 1994 genocide to monitor a cease fire accord. The Rwanda peacekeepers (UNAMIR) numbered
2,500 troops--only 3,000 less than the number of troops that would be sent to a country eighty times as large.

The relationship between early warning and early action

The record seems clear that the major western powers and the UN decline to act during the early stages of complex
humanitarian emergencies for reasons other than ignorance about disturbing events in remote places like central Africa. In fact,
whatever ignorance exists in Washington, Paris, London or the headquarters of UN agencies about general trends in human
suffering and violence in those regions must be willful, given the information channels that exist with national embassies, UN aid
missions, non-government organizations and the media. This means that the "problem" of inaction during the early stages of
crises like those that have erupted in places like Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia will not be solved by greater investment in early
warning systems.
05 08 12
It does not necessarily follow that inaction by the UN and its leading members in the face of early warning information is
inherently immoral or even ill advised. It may be that the reluctance of the UN and its leading members to intervene forcefully in
the early stages of a complex humanitarian emergency is a function of the costs of the tools available to them. The costs
referred to here include more than the monetary price tag associated with the intervention tools. Although finances are
obviously an important consideration, all forms of intervention cost substantial amounts of money. In addition to the direct
financial costs, there are important opportunity costs and political risks to any intervention. These other costs and risks vary
considerably for different intervention tools. Thus one might assume that decision-makers in the United Nations and in the
national capitals of its leading members would be much more reluctant to approve intervention actions that entail high
opportunity costs and great political risks, than they would approve intervention actions with low cost profiles.

Based on international community's response during the early stages of recent humanitarian crises, the evidence appears to
validate the hypothesis depicted in Figure 1. This, in turn, suggests that the solution to the "problem" of inaction during the early
stages of an emerging humanitarian crisis lies in developing intervention tools with lower opportunity costs and political risks.

The following are examples of intervention tools or actions with relatively low costs:
donations of food and medical supplies to the government of the affected state;
donations of equipment or supplies to non-governmental organizations in-country;
14
financial grants to non-governmental organizations operating in-country; 23
financial contributions to UN agencies operating in country;
dispatching human rights monitors or other observer missions; and
hosting./brokering cease-fire negotiations between warring factions.

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Low cost actions such as those listed above are, of course, routinely taken during the early stages of complex humanitarian
emergencies, at least in part because the opportunity costs and political risks of these actions are relatively slight. As to
opportunity costs, food, medical supplies and money are not in such absolute short supply worldwide that donating food to
Rwanda necessarily means that food would then not be available for donation to Somalia or some other impoverished land. Or
that if funds are contributed to Burundi, then the international community would automatically forfeit the opportunity to
contribute relief funds for Kosovo.

Human rights monitors and diplomats capable of brokering negotiations are, of course, in much shorter supply, than money,
food and other commodities. However, there is no absolute shortage of either observers or diplomats and their use is presently
limited more by insufficient demand than supply. Political risks could be a more significant consideration in that a state's
prestige might conceivably suffer if the negotiations it sponsors or facilitates prove fruitless. On the other hand, whatever such
damage occurs is likely to be inconsequential over the long run. There could also political risks to the sending state if the
members of an observer mission fall victim to violence in-country. However this cost pales in comparison to the political risks
that governments incur when deployed military forces are attacked and casualties occur.

The most important high cost/risk options involve the employment of professional, national military forces to: provide security for
relief efforts, physically protect safe havens in civil war zones against attack, disarm warring factions, confiscate weapons
stockpiles, and to directly attack or arrest the perpetrators of violence. Because they are absolutely limited in size and budget,
genuine opportunity costs are entailed whenever professional, national military forces are employed. The opportunity costs
should involve missions that must be foregone and training that must be missed while forces are engaged in a humanitarian
intervention. The value of this cost varies by time and location. For example, during periods of international tension, the
opportunity cost could be considerably greater because threatened states would put a high premium on military readiness for
self-defense. Presumably the opportunity costs would also be greater for states with small military forces, military forces that are
already heavily engaged in other missions or for states with transportation and logistics capabilities that are so limited that they
05
would have difficulty re-deploying forces to meet emergent needs elsewhere. 08 12
The political risks associated with the employment of military forces are both international and domestic. On the domestic side
there is the cost that a President or Prime Minister would incur in the form of public and legislative criticism if the military force
takes casualties. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that public opinion, at least in the United States, is not
actually casualty-phobic. That is to say that there is no overwhelming, knee-jerk demand by the American public that
peacekeeping forces be withdrawn immediately after the first American soldier is killed. This does not, however, mean that the
public will not begin to question the humanitarian mission and to re-evaluate its objectives. For example, after the 18 Rangers
were killed in Somalia, even though the American public did not demand the immediate withdrawal of forces, it did apparently
began to question both the wisdom of U.S. policy towards Somalia and the judgement of the leaders responsible for that policy.
Criticism from the public and the legislature may also create risk to other policies and priorities. It may at least temporarily
reduce the President/Prime Minister's ability to garner support for other foreign or domestic initiatives. Roughly the same risk
exists internationally. Humanitarian interventions that are perceived as failures or that result in domestic criticism (e.g. due to
military casualties) create risk to future multi-national initiatives. A state like the United States or the United Kingdom that "lead
the charge" for a mission that failed may find that other states will become less willing to follow its lead again.

The high cost-high risk associated with employment of professional, national armed forces is one reason to suspect that the
responsiveness of the United Nations system may not be materially improved by increasing the readiness of military forces
designated in standby commitments to the United Nations. Even if these forces acquire rapid deployment capability as
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recommended by the Secretary General,23 the more crucial issue for responsiveness is the amount of time that Security Council
states and the states that own the forces to decide to commission a humanitarian intervention. This decision-making time frame
will be determined more by the potential opportunity costs and political risks to the sending states than by the readiness of the
forces to deploy.

The Lesson: We Need New Tools

If it is true that there is a relationship between the willingness of states to intervene and the costs/risks associated with the
intervention tools, the solution to the "problem" of inaction during the early warning period must lie in the development of new,
lower cost-lower risk tools. It is, however, important to note that the case for new tools does not depend exclusively upon early
warning. Lower cost-lower risk tools will have value in all phases of complex humanitarian emergencies. As suggested by the
1999-2000 crisis in Congo and other crises, the United Nations and its leading members seem sometimes to be as disinclined
towards intervening late as intervening early. Further, if less financially expensive tools can be developed, resources would be
freed up for expanded or improved relief programs. After all, military intervention to protect aid deliveries and aid workers and
18
keep the peace often costs far more in financial terms than the aid itself. 25
The most effective way to lower costs and decrease risk may be to develop tools that do not rely upon the professional, national
armed forces of the leading members of the United Nations. One way to accomplish this might be to rely upon regional
peacekeeping capabilities. Regional organizations are closer to the scene and could eventually be capable of intervening on a
more timely basis and without the expensive overhead and political baggage that attend NATO forces or UN units that are
composed of West European and North American forces. There are a number of regional organizations that could be
considered as potential candidates; e.g., the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), or the Organization of American States. Consideration could even be given to developing new organizations
at the regional level. As guarantors of the Rio Treaty, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have served as peacekeepers along the
disputed Ecuador-Peru border and could perhaps form the core of a new South American humanitarian response organization.
Rather than attempt to invest in and certify all potential regional organizations simultaneously, it would make more sense to
concentrate on a single organization first. The program could then be expanded if the pilot test is successful and if other regional
organizations volunteer to participate.
This would require a concerted, long-term effort by both the regional organization's members and the United Nations and its
leading members. Substantial investments may have to be made in the capabilities, infrastructure and professionalization of
regional organizations. The United Nations would have to certify the professionalism and training of the regional forces before
appointing that regional organization as the lead responder to a humanitarian crisis in-region. Provisions would also have to be
established for UN and media oversight of peacekeeping operations conducted by regional organizations. Without steps such
as these, the population of a state affected by a humanitarian crisis and the affected state itself might refuse to cooperate with
the regional peacekeepers.

Another approach would be to develop "information offensive" programs--specifically, the systematic collection of information
about complicit individuals and organizations involved in fomenting ethnic violence. The information could then be used to
organize long-term economic sanctions against complicit organizations and governments. The information could also be used
to apply international boycotts against the private organizations and government agencies that might in the future employ
complicit individuals.

Information offensives might also include an aggressive "psychological operations" program to undercut local support and
sympathy for human rights violators. The United Nations or a regional organization could, for example, broadcast information in-
country about the culpability of specific individuals. It could also broadcast information about the long term effects of violence
on the economy and the value of the economic aid that is lost when violence causes relief organizations to withdraw or when
donors decide to invest in aid to other poor, but peaceful countries.

Building new tools for humanitarian response will take time. The effort may make the international community less responsive in
the short run if resources are diverted from ongoing aid programs to building new capabilities. Admittedly, investments in new
tools will do little to mitigate the suffering in today's complex humanitarian emergencies. Some may argue, indeed, that the very
effort of developing new tools will only create another reason for decision-makers in the United Nations to decline to act
05 08 12
decisively in today's humanitarian emergencies. This may appear to be a plausible argument. However, it overlooks the fact that
the United Nations and its leading members have demonstrated that they already have all the reasons they need for not taking
effective action. In my view, these reasons are sound given the high costs and risks associated with the tools at hand today.

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the moral obligation to
reading 5.2
intervene in rwanda
Joshua Kassner
On April 6, 1994, violence erupted in the Rwandan capital of Kigali and quickly spread throughout much of the country. During
the 100 days that followed, an estimated 800,000 children, women, and men were slaughtered by their fellow citizens. The
victims were sought out and killed because they were Tutsi or Tutsi sympathizers. As Clea Koff has noted, and perhaps most
startling given the magnitude and unprecedented speed with which the killing was carried out, the death toll was not the result
of the efficiency of violence made possible by modern weaponry; rather, the implements of the Rwandan genocide were clubs
and machetes wielded by citizens and neighbors.

As knowledge of the brutality spread, the international community actively sought to avoid any responsibility it might have for
acting to prevent the killing, and did little more than make threats of future consequences for the leaders of the Hutu-led interim
government. Individual states sought refuge for their choice not to act by asserting that the killing was the result of ancient tribal
hatreds that could not be resolved. Others relied on the claim that intervention would violate Rwandan sovereignty. Despite the
05 08 12
cynicism one might feel in response to such appeals, even if one were to grant the sincerity of these excuses, they fail.

As to the former, such assertions were historically unfounded. Prior to European colonization, the Tutsi-Hutu divide was about
socioeconomic class, not ethnicity. It was the prejudices of the European colonizers that redefined the relationship between
Tutsi and Hutu less than two centuries ago. This was not an age-old hatred. The latter claim, based on the prohibitions and
protections of sovereignty, is based on a particular conception of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention. Specifically,
the orthodox account of sovereignty was thought to imply a principle of nonintervention that rendered reasons for action that
would require intervention, even moral reasons, irrelevant. As a consequence, discussions about the morality of humanitarian
military intervention have been dominated by the question of permissibility. The prevailing view has long been that, for moral
and practical reasons, humanitarian intervention is impermissible. This conception of sovereignty framed the international
community’s debate over intervention in Rwanda.

However, and despite the political rhetoric that appealed to the orthodox conception of sovereignty, not only was humanitarian
military intervention permissible in Rwanda, it was a matter of moral obligation. One line of argument in support of this claim can
be found in a variety of special relationships that were integral to the Hutu-led slaughter of countless people. Specifically, French
diplomats worked to shield the Francophone Hutu government from scrutiny. The eventual French “intervention” (“Operation
Turquoise”), intentionally or not, served to protect the fleeing genocidaires. The machetes used were smuggled from China
through Saudi Arabia to the Interahamwe, the Hutu militia responsible for orchestrating much of the killing. In each of these
cases, one might reasonably argue that the responsible countries had a special obligation to act.
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Notwithstanding the reasonableness of these potential ascriptions of special duties, just as we don’t rely solely on the thief to
respect an individual’s right to their property, we should not rely solely on such special relationships for the protection of basic
human rights. Basic human rights directly imply duties without the need for mediating moral principles, such as Pogge’s
principle of rectification which requires compensation for past wrongs. The international community bore a correlative duty to
intervene in Rwanda based, ultimately, on the moral duties correlative to basic human rights. As such, the international
community, and more specifically the individual states of which it is comprised, had no moral discretion to do otherwise. As a
consequence, the excuses offered for their choices not to intervene failed to mitigate their respective moral failures.

The moral obligation to intervene in Rwanda was not merely a prima facie moral reason for action. Rather, it was an all-things-
considered conclusive moral reason for action. The grounding for the obligation is based in the basic human right to physical
security. As Shue has noted, a right implies a tripartite set of correlative duties. First, there is the duty we each bear to refrain from
violating the right. Second, there is a duty that we collectively bear to protect the right from violation. Third, and finally, we bear a
duty to ensure that the right holder can enjoy the substance of the right. In the end, Shue captures this in his assertion that a
18
basic right implies a duty to provide “social guarantees against standard threats. 25
Despite the fact that basic rights imply universal duties borne by all, functionally, it would be unreasonable to expect individual
duty-bearers to fulfill the demands implied by the massive violation of basic human rights as occurred in Rwanda. In addition,
such uncoordinated voluntary action, even if well intentioned, would likely prove ineffective. States mediate our interactions in
the international arena and are uniquely well-positioned, both morally and practically, to effectively and efficiently fulfill the
moral demands implied by the violation of basic human rights that occurred during the Rwandan genocide. As such, states are
the derivative bearers of our duties to provide the necessary social guarantees against standard threats to the basic right to
physical security.
This grounding is, however, insufficient to establish an all-things-considered conclusive moral reason for action. For example,
there may be competing moral considerations that outweigh the moral duties implied by the violation of basic rights. In Rwanda,
there were none of these potential obligation-defeating reasons. As to the general consequentialist concern that the intervention
would likely do more harm than good, there was little factual basis in support of this proposition at the time, and with the benefit
of hindsight we are now able to state with certainty the weakness of that concern. With little effort, largely limited to supplying
Ugandan peacekeepers with logistical support and a clear mandate, timely intervention would likely have resulted in saving
hundreds of thousands of civilian lives. It is unclear what harm was avoided by the choice not to intervene.

Another more nuanced consequentialist concern about the harm that might have been caused by intervention in Rwanda is one
grounded in the sort of precedent such action might set for the future: making it easier for states to use interventionist rhetoric to
hide what may be nothing more than aggression. First, like all consequentialist arguments, this is a conjecture about the future
and for the conjecture to be validated, one would have to weigh the more certain good an intervention would have done versus
the hypothetical future harm. Second, it is at least as likely that if Rwanda were the bar for intervention, that we would see less
not more interventionist rhetoric.

Inaction on the part of the international community might have been justified if there was a high probability that intervention
would prove futile. However, those with the most intimate knowledge of the events unfolding on the ground in Rwanda were
confident that intervention would prove successful. For example, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire believed, and history has
vindicated his belief, that 5,000 well-armed troops with sufficient logistical support and a clear mandate could have put a quick
end to the violence. Futility was not a likely outcome.

One might also object on the grounds that intervention would irreparably harm a community of significant moral worth. During
the genocide, Rwanda had imploded. A necessary element of any community’s claim to being worthy of respect and/or
05 08 12
protection is that it endeavor to protect the basic human rights of all of its inhabitants. In Rwanda, there were three communities
one might consider when evaluating the strength of any claim that intervention would do irreparable damage to a community of
significant moral worth. First, there was the Rwandan state itself. The fact that the Hutu-led government was complicit in the
murder of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens is reason enough to reject the claim that the Rwandan state was a
community deserving of protection. Second, there is the majority Hutu community. Though there is much to be said on behalf of
avoiding unnecessary interference with the culture and mores of a particular community; such concerns pale in comparison with
the basic rights of others. As to both of these communities, it is far more likely that intervention to prevent a genocide or to stop it
once the killing had begun would have helped them along their post-civil war paths to reconciliation and peace.

There is at least one other community to consider. Specifically, there was an emerging pluralist community of Tutsis and
moderate Hutus. This community sought to build a modern pluralist state in the aftermath of civil war. Intervention would have
protected this community. As such, any arguments against intervention that rely on the proposition that intervention would have
irreparably harmed a community of significant moral worth are not, in fact, adopting a position of moral neutrality. Rather, the
practical effect of such an argument would be to privilege the community of the genocidaires while leaving the community of
moderates to be destroyed.

Another oft-cited objection to humanitarian military intervention is that it would undermine one of the dominant moral goals of
the international legal and political order: international peace and security. The principle of nonintervention has long been
thought to be inexorably linked to the peace between and the security of states. In Rwanda, however, this was simply untrue.
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First, the refusal to intervene eventually led Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to reopen military actions
against the Hutu-led government. In addition, the mass slaughter of civilians caused a flood of refugees to flee to neighboring
states to escape the violence. In the end, the failure to intervene not only permitted the genocide to proceed unabated, it also
reignited violence and created a massive refugee crisis. The choice not to intervene created instability and helped to fan the
flames of conflict across the region.

Though not a general concern about the moral nature of intervention, there is often expressed a more specific concern about
the possibility of perfidy In other words, a group of provocateurs – separatists, for example – might seek to create a need for
humanitarian intervention as part of their strategy to undermine the government by provoking a military retaliation by the
government against the civilian population. In Rwanda, there was very little, if any, factual or rational basis for such a concern.
Intervention would have been conducted to protect Tutsis and moderate Hutus from threats to their physical security. When the
violence erupted, a mixed Tutsi-Hutu interim government led by Paul Kagame was about to come to power under a settlement
known as the Arusha Accords. As such, there was little to be gained by provoking a violent Hutu reaction; consequently, there is
little reason, at least in the case of Rwanda, to take the argument from perfidy seriously. It should also be noted that this is not
18 25
necessarily an objection to intervention, but to how the intervention and post intervention reconstruction is pursued.

Lastly is the concern that the intervening nations and their populations would have to make unreasonable sacrifices to
effectively carry out the intervention. Again, at least with regards to Rwanda, the facts belie such an assertion. As Romeo Dallaire
noted, the genocide could have been stopped, order restored, and the Arusha Accords put back on track with a relatively small
contingent of well-armed and properly mandated UN Peacekeepers. Nor should one forget Koff’s comment regarding the nature
of the threat. This was not a highly trained military carrying out these killings. The slaughter of civilians was being carried out by
individuals carrying machetes. When confronted by a well-trained and seasoned military force, it is likely that the militias could
be stopped without significant violence. In addition, one simple and highly effective tactic to thwart the genocidal intentions of
the genocidaires would have required little more than a “violation” of Rwandan airspace. The United States could easily have
blocked the radio broadcasts of the Radio Mille Collines, which were being used to identify Tutsis in hiding and exhort the Hutu
population to go to “work” killing the Tutsi “cockroaches”. The United States refused.
In the end, the moral reasons in support of the international community’s choice not to intervene failed to outweigh the moral
obligation to intervene in Rwanda. There were, however, plenty of bad reasons permeating the political and diplomatic rhetoric
surrounding the matter at the United Nations, and even less palatable reasons being offered behind closed doors. No matter, the
massive violation of basic human rights implied a duty to intervene, and as there were no compelling countervailing reasons, the
international community did not have a moral choice in the matter. There was only one morally defensible course of action –
intervention. Sadly, we are likely to face similar events in the future, and when that happens we should not dither again over
questions of permissibility. The starting point for our discussion should be about the obligation and responsibility of the
international community to protect the basic human rights of all humanity.

05 08 12

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18 25
rwandan genocide: reading 5.3
failure of the
international
community?
Dominique Maritz
In mid-1994, over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in the Rwandan genocide (Destexhe 1994: 3-4). The
international community utterly failed to prevent and stop this atrocity. There are numerous interconnected and complex factors
that led to international inaction, such as a misguided view of African conflicts, the bureaucratic nature of the United Nations and
peacekeeping fatigue in general. However, this essay will focus on three reasons that the authors deem to be the most important
ones: First, the “shadow of Somalia” was still present and made states as well as the UN Secretariat unwilling to engage in
another Peace Operation in Africa. Second, inaction was due to national interest: the United States decided not to intervene in
05 08 12
Rwanda as there was no national interest at stake. France, which had national interests at stake, did not try to save Rwandan
lives, but actively contributed to the genocide. Third, due to the media’s failure to report on the genocide there was no internal
pressure from citizens that could have influenced policy makers. My argument develops as follows. The major actors – Belgium,
the UN Secretariat, the US and France – knew that there was genocide underway in Rwanda; therefore, they had an obligation to
prevent and stop the genocide but lacked political will. Each actor will be assessed individually. Following this analysis, I will
show that the three factors mentioned above led to inaction at the level of the Security Council, where member states focused
on the ongoing civil war rather than discussing the genocide, which would have forced them to act under the 1948 Genocide
Convention. Finally, it will be shown that this international failure had horrific consequences for the United Nations Assistance
Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR), which, with neither a robust mandate nor adequate resources, became an eyewitness to the
genocide.

Belgium, as the former colonial master of Rwanda, had a deep political connection with that country. When UNAMIR was formed
in October 1993, they contributed the largest Western contingent (UNDPI 1996: 231). There were further reasons for Belgian
involvement in the mission. After the Cold War, Belgium needed a rationale for keeping a large and well-equipped national army;
in order to preserve its status, Belgium tried to present itself as the African peacekeeping specialist (African Rights 1995: 1112).
Early on, Belgium knew of the ethnic and political killings so it began to argue for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but no other state
was interested in supporting the mission (Des Forges 1999: 176). After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed on April 7, one day
after the genocide had begun, Belgian public opinion that had been uninterested before, began to lobby for “the boys to be sent
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home” (African Rights 1995: 1113). In order to save face and not to lose its status as “African peacekeeping specialists”, Belgium
began to petition for the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, which was supported at the Security Council as no other state had an
interest in the mission (Des Forges 1999: 618; OAU 2000: 132). UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1999: 132) said that Belgium
was “afflicted with ‘the Somalia Syndrome’: pull out at the first encounter with serious trouble”. After the debacle with the dead
Belgian peacekeepers, the only time the country showed any interest in Rwanda was when Belgian, French and US soldiers
came to rescue expats between April 7 and 10 (Melvern 2000: 141). The quick and effective rescue mission of foreigners
demonstrated what would have been possible had the international community been serious about stopping the genocide (PBS
2004). Belgium knew about the nature of the killings and had the capacity to prevent and stop the genocide. However, the
“shadow of Somalia”, its concerns about losing face and satisfying voters at home stopped them from doing so.

The UN Secretariat is the United Nations’ bureaucratic arm. As such, it passes on vital information to decision-making bodies
such as the Security Council, which is responsible for “the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Charter 5(23)).
The Secretariat and the Secretary General, however, have come under considerable criticism for failing to pass on information
before and during the Rwandan genocide (Barnett 2002: 20; UNGA 2004: 34). Despite ample information about the genocide,
18 25
staff spoke in terms of a “civil war” and the need to obtain a ceasefire (Des Forges 1999: 628). UNAMIR Force Commander
Dallaire (2004: 332) remembers how his “reports [about the genocide] seemed to keep vanishing into the abyss of non-action in
New York”. As a result, non-permanent members in the Security Council, who rely on the Secretariat for information, did not
come to see the killings as genocide (OAU 2000: 128). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) only counted a few
hundred over-worked staff, who were responsible for 17 missions and over 70,000 peacekeepers (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 141;
Power 2001: 87). With large and complex missions in Bosnia and Somalia, Rwanda assumed a low status (Wheeler 2000: 215).
Moreover, US president Clinton’s blaming of the UN for the dead US rangers in Mogadishu created pressure on the Secretariat.
UN staff were determined to avoid another peacekeeping failure, due to concerns that this could mean the end of UN
peacekeeping (Des Forges 1999: 595; Independent Inquiry 1999: 41). In Barnett’s words (2002: 39), “it is virtually impossible to
exaggerate the impact of Somalia on the UN. […] What would later be dubbed ‘the shadow of Somalia’ was omnipresent, casting
a dark cloud across the headquarters, […] directing future practices.” While the UN staff were “hard-working and honourable
individuals”, their bureaucratic minds made them believe that they were acting reasonably in withholding important information
from the ground in order to save the future of peacekeeping (Barnett 2002: 21).
The United States is often blamed as being most responsible for inaction in Rwanda. This is partly because since the end of the
Cold War, “no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States” (Destexhe 1995: 49). As early as
1993, CIA studies warned of imminent massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims (Des Forges 2000: 141; Power 2003: 339).
Before the genocide began, major powers knew “that something terrible was underway in Rwanda” and that there were plans
for genocidal killings (Des Forges 2000: 141; OAU 2000: 54). Kuperman (2000: 101) states that by April 20, the US must have
known about the genocide. However, since the death of its rangers in Somalia, the US had decided to “stop placing the agenda
of the UN before the interests of the US” (Clinton in Melvern 2000: 78). President Clinton, who was worried about his poll ratings
after bringing home body bags from African missions, had decided that a range of factors must be met in order for the US to
approve future UN peacekeeping missions (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 107-108): The Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-
25), although not published until May 1994, strongly influenced US decision-making in April 1994 (Scheffer 2004: 129).
Unfortunately for the people of Rwanda, their country did not “qualify” for a US-sponsored peacekeeping operation under PDD-
25 (Power 2003: 332).

In addition to the memories of Somalia, the United States had never had “national interest” in Rwanda, one of PDD-25’s many
requirements (Power 2003: 330; The White House 1994: 2). Power (2003: 335) contends that Washington simply “remember[ed]
Somalia and hear[ed] no American demands for intervention”. Citizens have a powerful voice in lobbying their government to
place topics on the policy agenda. However, there was no such pressure in 1994, owing largely to the absence of international
media in Rwanda (Power 2003: 375-361). Reports about the conflict also demonstrate Western misunderstandings of African
conflicts: Instead of seeing the killings as extraordinary, there was the belief that “these people do this from time to time” (Power
2003: 351). Government officials realised that they would look ridiculous calling the killings in Rwanda genocide and then do
nothing (PBS 2004). Apart from moral obligations, there are also legal requirements. Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, the
international community is obliged to act if genocide occurs anywhere in the world (Genocide Convention 1948). This led to a
“dance to avoid the g-word” in the US (Power 2003: 359). The US’ response to the Rwandan genocide demonstrates all three
major reasons for inaction: the “shadow of Somalia” as well as inaction because of a lack of national interest and internal
pressure. 05 08 12
So far in this essay, I have considered the roles of Belgium, the UN Secretariat and the US, which failed to prevent and stop the
Rwandan genocide due to deliberate inactions (Uvin 2001: 87). I now will turn to the role of France, the country with the longest
and deepest political and military involvement in Rwanda and whose actions directly contributed to the genocide. Although
France knew that there were ethnic massacres going on in Rwanda, it continued to give military and political support to the
interim government (Melvern 2000: 24; Wallis 2006: 103). In October 1993, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked
Rwanda from Uganda, France sent troops and weapons in order to support their francophone ally against an “Anglo-Saxon
invasion” (Prunier 1997: 101; Wallis 2006: 104). France, worried about its “prestige and international stature”, sees Anglo-Saxon
countries as a threat to its position (African Rights 1995: 1104). This led to quick and deep intervention in Rwanda (Prunier 1997:
105). Janvier Afrika, a former Rwandan Hutu supporter, remembers French involvement in 1992 in Rwanda (in Wallis 2006: 57):

We had two French military officers who helped train the

Interahamwe. […] The French military taught us how to catch
people and tie them.
14 […] I saw the French show Interahamwe 23
how to throw knives and how to assemble and disassemble
guns.
A few days after the genocide had begun, the French embassy was abandoned and the only thing left behind was a heap of
shredded documents and at least seventy French soldiers (Melvern 2000: 48; Wallis 2006: 70). These soldiers continued to hand
out firearms, train the militia and even control check-points and demand to see identity cards, arresting Tutsi and handing them
over to the Rwandan army (Melvern 2000: 49; Wallis 2006: 57-61). In France, between April and May, like elsewhere, there was
virtually no media coverage about the genocide (Prunier 1997: 277). Therefore, French citizens did not call for an intervention;
however, as soon as there was sufficient NGO and media pressure, starting in early June, official French intervention was again
contemplated (Prunier 1997: 277). 1995 was an election year in France and every government official wanted to be seen as a
‘humanitarian’ (African Rights 1995: 1139). On June 22, the Security Council authorised a “multinational operation for
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humanitarian purposes” with a Chapter VII mandate and on 9 July, France began to deploy its troops (UNDPI 1996: 121; 308).
However, the real reasons for French intervention were to keep Rwanda francophone by stopping the RPF advance and to send
a signal of commitment to other French speaking African countries (African Rights 1995: 1105-1107). While France did have
national interest in Rwanda, this did not lead to Rwandan lives being saved. As the only Western country willing to send a force,
it could have supported UNAMIR. Rather, France’s role in the genocide was that of a “silent accomplice” (Wallis 2006).
As explored above, the information flow from the UN Secretariat to the Security Council was insufficient. While France and the
US were well informed about the genocide, non-permanent members who rely on the Secretariat for their information never
heard the truth about the killings in Rwanda; instead of speaking about genocide, the UN Secretariat repeatedly reported about
the breakdown of the ceasefire, which legitimised the great powers’ decision not to intervene (Wheeler 2000: 220-1). According
to the Czech ambassador at the time, about 80% of the Council’s time was devoted to questions of how to withdraw the
peacekeepers, 20% of how to reach a ceasefire and no time at all to discuss the genocide (Power 2003: 361). Security Council
states were extremely reluctant to use the word genocide, as this would have bound them to act under the Genocide
Convention (Melvern 2000: 177). Additionally, Rwanda held a seat on the Council, where its representative could “openly
express his racist philosophy” (Destexhe 1995: 50). At the same time, he passed on information to the Rwandan government
about Western apathy, which gave it the impression of moral and legal impunity (Melvern 2000: 112). France, meanwhile, was
pressuring its “client francophone African states” on the Council to back all its decisions (Wallis 2006: 107). These Security
Council decisions had horrific consequences for Rwandans. On 21 April, two weeks after the death of the Belgian peacekeepers
and Belgium’s request for complete UNAMIR withdrawal, the Security Council voted in favour of Resolution 912 (UNPDI 1996:
268), which was to reduce UNAMIR’s troop strength by 90% to 270 troops (PBS 2004). Although the Council established
UNAMIR II with a Chapter VII mandate and authorised 5,500 troops in Resolution 918 a few weeks later on 17 May (UNDPI 1996:
282), Western countries were still unwilling to physically or monetarily contribute so that UNAMIR II could not be deployed until
the genocide was over (Melvern 2000: 198; UNDPI 1996: 122). This allowed France to deploy its own mission. Authors of the
Independent Inquiry (1999: 37) conclude that “[t]he Security Council bears a responsibility for its lack of political will to do more
to stop the killing”.

In the field, UNAMIR was ill equipped to stop the killings due to “constant pressure by the Security Council on UNAMIR to save
money” (Independent Inquiry 1999: 41). First, it did not have a sufficient mandate. UN Security Council Resolution 872, which
authorised UNAMIR on 5 October 1993, restricted UNAMIR to simply “monitor”, “assist” and “investigate” under a Chapter VI
05 08 12
mandate (UNDPI 1996: 232). The only time Dallaire was allowed to use force other than in self-defence was when he was
requested to help with the evacuation of foreign nationals between 7 and 10 April (Power 2003: 352). This shows that Western
states simply put the lives of white people above that of Africans. Second, UNAMIR did not have sufficient resources, especially
after the Belgian peacekeepers were withdrawn: “UNAMIR does not have heavy weapons systems, ammunition, let alone secure
transport. […] Troops […] were very tired and sickly because of the lack of proper food and medicine” (Dallaire 2003: 319). The
result was that UNAMIR had to “watch helplessly as people were being slaughtered right before their eyes” (Prunier 1997: 275).
This is even more tragic when one considers that a modest force of 5,000 troops, UNAMIR could have stopped the worst killings
(Carnegie Corporation 1997: 68).

In this essay, it was demonstrated that the “shadow of Somalia”, national interest and lack of internal pressure, or short “lack of
political will”, were the main factors that led to the international community’s failure to prevent and stop the Rwandan genocide.
The main actors Belgium, the US and France had sufficient information on what was going on and the quick and effective
evacuation of foreign nationals as well as France’s intervention in July show that they also had the capacity to intervene.
Furthermore, the Genocide Convention of 1948 not only carries moral but also legal responsibilities. Lack of political will led to
the failure of the Security Council, which has responsibility for international peace and security. Its malfunction meant that
UNAMIR was never able to protect or save Rwandan lives and became a bystander to genocide. Recognition of international
failure to prevent and stop the Rwandan genocide should be the first step in ensuring that it will never again fail another state in
the face of genocide.
14 23

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the challenge of reading 5.4
humanitarian
intervention since
rwanda
Fred Aja Agwu, Council for
Foreign Relations
Humanitarian intervention is intervention forced upon a sovereign state. It is either arbitrarily undertaken by one state or
05 08 12
collectively by a group of states (at times under the platform of an international organization like the United Nations) with the
express purpose of protecting civilians from human rights abuses, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, among
other humanitarian imperatives.

Before the emergence of the United Nations, any nation could arbitrarily embark on "intervention" into another state (though
most interventions were justified in terms of the intervening state's obligation through a formal alliance or national security,
rather than humanitarian reasons). But since the foundation of the UN Charter in 1945, humanitarian intervention has become
the exclusive and statutory prerogative of the "international community," primarily through the authority of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). However, this is if and only if the precipitating circumstances pass the "shock-the-conscience" test; that
is, if the circumstances involve the existence of an immediate and extensive violation of humanitarian principles, in the form of
mass atrocities.

Thus, humanitarian intervention is undertaken to prevent horrendous crimes, such as widespread slaughter, and other serious
violence that puts citizens of a given state at risk. Such forcible intervention, authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and undertaken by the UN or even a regional organization, trumps the sovereignty of the state that has either committed
or failed to prevent atrocities against its citizens.

Limits and accountability in humanitarian intervention

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Although humanitarian intervention is the statutory preserve of the United Nations or any other regional organization acting at
the behest or under authorization of the UNSC, there are limits to be strictly observed. Furthermore, some accountability should
be rendered during and after the intervention. This includes: the obligation to use proportionate force that does not destroy
more human lives than the intervention was undertaken to protect; prompt discontinuation of the intervention once atrocities
are halted and relevant structures are put into place to ensure they do not recur; and the obligation to render accounts to the
authorizing body (the Security Council) with respect to the actions taken.

In addition, interventions should, where possible, attempt to stop the government from committing atrocities but should
simultaneously minimize destabilizing effects on the country's fundamental political structures. This is in accordance with Article
2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Despite this limitation
on humanitarian intervention, the UN became involved in electoral disputes in the Ivory Coast and was part of regime change in
Libya under the auspices of humanitarian intervention. Unfortunately, by overstepping the bounds of a humanitarian operation
and engaging in politics that look more like regime change, the UN has undermined its credibility for conducting authentic
humanitarian interventions in the future. The point must be made here that the only exception to Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN
18 25
Charter is in an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. But here, the exception must be with an express mandate or
authorization of the Security Council. Unfortunately, in Sierra Leone and Libya, this UN Security Council mandate was never
given, which is why the UN can be said to have overstepped its bounds in those countries.

The Rwandan Genocide

From its inception the United Nations has undertaken several humanitarian interventions—ranging from its operation in the
Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Korean War of the 1950s (1950 to 1953), to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) crisis, the
eviction of Iraq from Kuwait, and the Balkan crisis. But the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a case that genuinely required a
humanitarian intervention and did not receive one, irrespective of the fact that around eight-hundred thousand people (mainly
the Tutsis and moderate Hutu population) were slaughtered in cold blood by Hutu extremists, the Interahamwe.
The inability to intervene in Rwanda truly scorched the conscience of the United Nations and its member states. In the aftermath
of the Rwandan genocide, the international community ruefully made the historical declaration, "never again, not on our watch,"
and Kofi Annan, then secretary-general of the United Nations, asked the members of the UN General Assembly how the world
should respond "to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"
Answering the challenge, the Canadian government and a number of renowned global foundations, established the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which developed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
doctrine.

Even though R2P was a mere semantic shift vis-à-vis the traditional practice of humanitarian intervention, it nonetheless
introduced a civilian component into humanitarian intervention. The United Nations and civil society organizations are now
charged with the task of sensitizing policymakers in fragile or failing states that are vulnerable to human rights violations; the
goal is to train them in proactive good governance in order to prevent or forestall situations that may lead to the political and
societal ruptures that precipitate humanitarian interventions.

Humanitarian intervention after Rwanda

Irrespective of the remorse over Rwanda, dire human rights violations that call for humanitarian intervention continue to occur
around the world, with little or no response from the international community. The situations that readily come to mind include
the crises in the Darfur region of Sudan, Syria, South Sudan (the Bentiu massacre), Central African Republic, the ever festering
DRC, and, to some extent, Ukraine. The humanitarian situations in these conflict zones mandate intervention by the United
Nations, but the organization, though in sight, is not doing much.

The United Nations' continued failure to live up to expectations after Rwanda is due, in part to the divergent interests of the
permanent members of the Security Council, which can paralyze the decision-making body. Because of this paralysis, the
05 08 12
Security Council does not act robustly; it deploys peace-keeping forces into crisis zones instead of mounting well-resourced and
adequately mandated forced interventions.

But the persistence of mass atrocities also reflects that good governance is still not taken seriously in many fragile and failing
developing nations around the world, and civil society has often become all but nonexistent. Efforts to address the underlying
causes of mass atrocities and humanitarian crises have made little headway. The development of the institutions necessary to
implement good governance is essential for preventing the outbreak or recurrence of such calamities. Advancing this goal will
require more attention by the United Nations—and particularly its wealthier member states—to help vulnerable countries
improve their capacities to prevent mass atrocities, as called for in the so-called "second pillar" of the R2P doctrine. Alternatively,
the UNSC should help to promote the growth of institutions, and civil society organizations that can help build the necessary
bases for good governance, particularly those in line with the principle of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP).

What should be done?

At the global level, a number of steps could be taken to surmount the challenges to humanitarian intervention. One of the most
important would be for the Security Council's permanent members to transcend their narrow national interests and, in fact, do
away with the obsession with state sovereignty. Unfortunately, there is a very slim chance of this happening, particularly because
UN Security Council permanent members like China and Russia have continued to exhibit obdurate behavior in addressing
14 23
conflict zones like Syria and the Iranian nuclear program crisis. Any nation that fails in its obligation to uphold international law,
particularly the protection of human lives, loses its right to sovereignty, political independence, and territorial inviolability. Thus,
state sovereignty should be discarded in favor of human rights and humanitarian principles.

To that end, the Security Council should make the threshold for humanitarian intervention more explicit. State sovereignty
should no longer be a barrier to humanitarian intervention because any claim to sovereignty that is not consistent with the
protection of fundamental humanitarian principles should be null and void. As such, the Security Council should mandate an
unambiguous enforcement action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. As laid out in Article 45 and Article 43, this
would require the Security Council to make a special agreement on such issues as "armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage." The members of the Security Council should therefore seek to design an agreement that lays out
the elements of this enforcement action with an explicit threshold for humanitarian intervention, and limits to prevent this
humanitarian intervention from becoming regime change.

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rwanda, 20 years on: reading 5.5
how a country is
rebuilding itself
Emma Howard, The Guardian
On 6 April 1994, with the world's media focused on the election of Nelson Mandela, a plane was shot down in Kigali, the capital
of Rwanda. It had been carrying Rwanda's president, Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of
Burundi. The double assassination triggered the state-sponsored genocide of approximately 800,000 of Rwanda's minority Tutsi
population and moderate Hutus. The mass slaughter was carried out in 100 days by government-backed perpetrators in the
army, police, militias and by thousands of Hutu civilians across the country.

It is obvious that the challenge of rebuilding a country in the aftermath would be phenomenal. Here are just some of the
remarkable ways Rwanda has faced up to this challenge and continues to do so today.

Justice 05 08 12
In a case concerning 150,000 perpetrators, it would seem that the continuing challenge is to bring about justice and
reconciliation to a population in which it is estimated up to one fifth were killed during the genocide.

The vast majority of perpetrators were not dealt with by the criminal justice system. In the past 20 years, only 71 people –
generally the most severe offenders – have been convicted by the UN's international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. The majority
(who were mostly living in rural areas, among those they killed) confessed and pleaded their case at special village courts called
gacacas. With strong encouragement from the government, survivors across the country then accepted the perpetrators back
into their communities.

Youth

With two-thirds of Rwanda’s population under 25 and life expectancy just 55, many have placed their hopes in the country’s
youth. As a result, stringent efforts have been made to improve access to education; the country can boast that 97% of its
children attend primary school – the highest rate in Africa. Unesco noted this by naming it as one of the top three countries
globally for improving access to education.

Born in the years since the genocide, children are educated in schools that are strongly encouraged to desist from using
14 23
potentially divisive labels. Pupils are discouraged from identifying themselves as Hutu or Tutsi and are instead asked to focus on
building the future of a common Rwanda. To this end, in 2001, the government unveiled a new flag and national anthem.

Yet with the youth unemployment rate persisting above 40%, there is clearly much to be done to support the people who will
drive the country's economic growth – there is, in particular, a skills gap to tackle.

Women

Although women complain of cultural barriers, Rwanda has a great track record for female emancipation in the political sphere.
In the parliamentary elections last September, women won a majority of 51 out of 80 seats, beating its own world record from the
previous parliament for the highest proportion of women in government. This is arguably down to the law, which imposes a
mandate on national and local government to ensure a minimum of 30% of seats are held by women.

The figures do not seem to be superficial, however. Laws have been introduced that have given women a host of rights: they are
18 25
now free to own their own property, keep an equal inheritance upon divorce and easily access contraception.

Economy

Rwanda's drive to rebuild its economy since the genocide has been driven by three main sources: the export of tea and coffee;
foreign aid, which constituted 20% of gross annual income in 2011; and the tourism trade. Most of this plays out in the
rainforests, which are home to a 1,000-strong population of mountain gorillas, some of the last surviving on the planet.

Although 7 million people, close to two-thirds of the country's population, live below the poverty line, more than 1 million have
crossed this threshold in recent years. With economic growth hitting an average eight per cent since 2001, the World Bank
chose to name the country as its top reformer for business in 2010.
Government

Since the genocide, Rwanda's government has been led by Paul Kagame. A Tutsi growing up as a refugee in neighbouring
Uganda, Kagame led the Rwandan Patriotic army in its resistance against the Hutu militias wreaking carnage on the country.
After the genocide ended in July 1994, he became vice-president and in 2000 was elected president.

Although he remains very popular within Rwanda and has received acclaim for his economic record, Kagame's method of
government, state-sponsored media and human rights record has provoked criticism from outsiders. Kagame's consistent retort
has been that he will not be lectured by Western countries that comprehensively failed to intervene during the genocide.

The role of the west

In the years since the genocide, western leaders, including Bill Clinton and Kofi Annan, have apologised to the Rwandan people
and government for the international community's failure to act during the genocide. Over the 100 days of the tragedy, the UN
and US persistently failed to recognise it as genocide, avoiding an admission that would have obligated them to intervene.

Since 2000, the cost per head in foreign aid to Rwanda has almost trebled to £68 a person annually. In 2012, its government
launched a fund to attract investments from the international disapora; they called it Agaciro, which means "dignity" in
Kinyarwanda, the official language of Rwanda.

05 08 12

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 Case Study #6

THE ROHINGYA

P ersecution of the Rohingya has been

ongoing, to one degree or another since the
1970s, leading the Rohingya to be described by
some commentators as the most persecuted
minority on the planet.
What rrole does identity play in nation
building?
To what extent has inaction by the
international community contributed to
the persecution of the Rohingya?

Some questions to consider when exploring this

case study:
the rohingya
list of readings

6.1 The Rohingya Crisis: A CFR Backgrounder

Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military

6.2 Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in
Rakhine State

05
6.3 The United Nations has betrayed the Rohingya — 08 12
once again
6.4 Enough talk. Let’s have action on Rohingya
massacres

Births, marriages and deaths: Rohingya lives

6.5 playing out as refugees

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18 25

global politics at uwc costa rica

WWW.GLOPOIB.WORDPRESS.COM
the rohingya crisis reading 6.1
CFR Backgrounder
Introduction

Discriminatory policies of Myanmar’s government since the late 1970s have compelled hundreds of thousands of Muslim
Rohingya to flee their homes in the predominantly Buddhist country. Most have crossed by land into Bangladesh, while others
have taken to the sea to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Renewed violence, including reported rape, murder, and arson in 2017, triggered a massive exodus of Rohingya amid charges of
ethnic cleansing against Myanmar’s security forces. Those forces claimed they carried out a campaign to reinstate stability in the
western region of Myanmar.

Who are the Rohingya?

The Rohingya are an ethnic Muslim minority who practice a Sufi-inflected variation of Sunni Islam. There are an estimated 3.5
million Rohingya dispersed worldwide. Before August 2017, the majority of the estimated one million Rohingya in Myanmar
resided in Rakhine State, where they accounted for nearly a third of the population. They differ from Myanmar’s dominant
Buddhist groups ethnically, linguistically, and religiously.
05 08 12
The Rohingya trace their origins in the region to the fifteenth century, when thousands of Muslims came to the former Arakan
Kingdom. Many others arrived during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Rakhine was governed by colonial rule
as part of British India. Since independence in 1948, successive governments in Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989, have refuted
the Rohingya’s historical claims and denied the group recognition as one of the country’s 135 ethnic groups. The Rohingya are
largely considered illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, even though many trace their roots in Myanmar back centuries.

Neither the central government nor Rakhine’s dominant ethnic Buddhist group, known as the Rakhine, recognize the label
“Rohingya,” a self-identifying term that surfaced in the 1950s, which experts say provides the group with a collective political
identity. Though the etymological root of the word is disputed, the most widely accepted theory is that Rohang derives from the
word “Arakan” in the Rohingya dialect and ga or gya means “from.” By identifying as Rohingya, the ethnic Muslim group asserts
its ties to land that was once under the control of the Arakan Kingdom, according to Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, a
Thailand-based advocacy group.

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18 25
What is the legal status of the Rohingya?

The government refuses to grant the Rohingya citizenship, and as a result the vast majority of the group’s members have no
legal documentation, effectively making them stateless. Myanmar’s 1948 citizenship law was already exclusionary, and the
military junta, which seized power in 1962, introduced a law twenty years later stripping the Rohingya of access to full
citizenship. Until recently, the Rohingya had been able to register as temporary residents with identification cards, known as
white cards, that the junta began issuing to many Muslims, both Rohingya and non-Rohingya, in the 1990s. The white cards
conferred limited rights but were not recognized as proof of citizenship. Still, Lewa says that they did provide some recognition
of temporary stay for the Rohingya in Myanmar.

In 2014 the government held a UN-backed national census, its first in thirty years. The Muslim minority group was initially
permitted to identify as Rohingya, but after Buddhist nationalists threatened to boycott the census, the government decided
Rohingya could only register if they identified as Bengali instead.

Similarly, under pressure from Buddhist nationalists protesting the Rohingya’s right to vote in a 2015 constitutional referendum,
then-President Thein Sein canceled the temporary identity cards in February 2015, effectively revoking their newly gained right
to vote. (White card holders were allowed to vote in Myanmar’s 2008 constitutional referendum and 2010 general elections.) In
the 2015 elections, which were widely touted by international monitors as free and fair, no parliamentary candidate was of the
Muslim faith. “Country-wide anti-Muslim sentiment makes it politically difficult for the government to take steps seen as
supportive of Muslim rights,” writes the International Crisis Group.

Muslim minorities continue to “consolidate under one Rohingya identity,” says Lewa, despite documentation by rights groups
05 08
and researchers of systematic disenfranchisement, violence, and instances of anti-Muslim campaigns. 12
Why are the Rohingya fleeing Myanmar?

The Myanmar government has effectively institutionalized discrimination against the ethnic group through restrictions on
marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice, and freedom of movement. For example, Rohingya couples
in the northern towns of Maungdaw and Buthidaung are only allowed to have two children. Rohingya must also seek permission
to marry, which may require them to bribe authorities and provide photographs of the bride without a headscarf and the groom
with a clean-shaven face, practices that conflict with Muslim customs. To move to a new home or travel outside their townships,
Rohingya must gain government approval.

Moreover, Rakhine State is Myanmar’s least developed state, with a poverty rate of 78 percent, compared to the 37.5 percent
national average, according to World Bank estimates. Widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and a lack of employment
opportunities in Rakhine have exacerbated the cleavage between Buddhists and Muslim Rohingya. This tension is deepened by
religious differences that have at times erupted into conflict.

What’s caused the recent exodus?

Clashes in Rakhine broke out in August 2017, after a militant group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)
14 23
claimed responsibility for attacks on police and army posts. The government declared ARSA a terrorist organization and the
military mounted a brutal campaign that destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages and forced nearly seven hundred thousand
Rohingya to leave Myanmar. At least 6,700 Rohingya were killed in the first month of attacks, between August 25 and September
24, according to the international medical charity Doctors Without Borders. Myanmar’s security forces also allegedly opened fire
on fleeing civilians and planted land mines near border crossings used by Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.

Since the start of 2018, Myanmar authorities have reportedly cleared abandoned Rohingya villages [PDF] and farmlands to build
homes, security bases, and infrastructure. The government says this development is in preparation for the repatriation of
refugees, but rights activists have expressed concern these moves could be intended to accommodate other populations in
Rakhine State.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has described the violence as ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian situation as
catastrophic. Rights groups and other UN leaders suspect acts of genocide have taken place. At an emergency UN Security
Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said Myanmar authorities have carried out a “brutal,
18 25
sustained campaign to cleanse the country of an ethnic minority,” and she called on members to suspend weapons provisions
to the military. Other Security Council members, including Russia and China, have resisted increasing pressure on Myanmar’s
government because they say it is trying to restore stability.

Sectarian violence is not new to Rakhine State. Security campaigns in the past five years, notably in 2012 and 2016, also resulted
in the flight of tens of thousands of Rohingya from their homes.
Where are the Rohingya migrating?

Bangladesh: Most Rohingya have sought refuge in nearby Bangladesh, which has limited resources and land to host
refugees. More than 950,000 people are refugees in the country, many unregistered, according to estimates from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees. The World Health Organization projects the birth of sixty thousand babies in Bangladesh’s
crowded camps in 2018. Meanwhile, the risk of disease outbreak in camps is high, with health organizations warning of
possible outbreaks of measles, tetanus, diphtheria, and acute jaundice syndrome. Moreover, more than 60 percent of the
available water supply in refugee camps is contaminated, increasing the risk of spread of communicable and water-borne
diseases. Vulnerable refugees have turned to smugglers, paying for transport out of Bangladesh and Myanmar and risking
exploitation, including sexual enslavement. In November 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a deal for the possible
repatriation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, though details remain vague; on the rights that would be granted to the
Rohingya, locations for resettlement, and assurances that pogroms would not recur. The repatriation of Rohingya, first slated
for January 2018, has been delayed.
Malaysia: As of November 2017, 150,000 Rohingya were in Malaysia, according to the United Nations, though tens of
thousands of others are in the country unregistered. Rohingya who arrive safely in Malaysia have no legal status and are
unable to work, leaving their families cut off from access to education and health care.
Thailand: Thailand is a hub for regional human smuggling and serves as a common transit point for Rohingya. Migrants often
arrive there by boat from Bangladesh or Myanmar before continuing on foot to Malaysia or by boat to Indonesia or Malaysia.
The military-led Thai government has cracked down on smuggling rings after the discovery of mass graves in alleged camps
where gangs held hostages. But some experts say that while punishing traffickers disrupts the networks, it does not dismantle
them.
Indonesia: The Rohingya have also sought refuge in Indonesia, although the number of refugees from Myanmar there
remains relatively small because they are treated as illegal immigrants. Indonesia has rescued migrant boats off its shores and
dispatched humanitarian aid and supplies to Bangladesh’s camps. Indonesian President Joko Widodo pledged more help
05
during a visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh in January 2018.
08 12
Has civilian leadership changed the Myanmar government’s policies?

In 2016, Myanmar’s first democratically elected government in a generation came to power, but critics say it has been reluctant
to advocate for Rohingya and other Muslims for fear of alienating Buddhist nationalists and threatening the power-sharing
agreement the civilian government maintains with the military.

Some observers saw the establishment in August 2016 of an advisory commission on ethnic strife led by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan as a positive development. However subsequent outbreaks of violence have curbed this optimism.

Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto leader, has denied that ethnic cleansing is taking place and dismissed international
criticism of her handling of the crisis, accusing critics of fueling resentment between Buddhists and Muslims in the country. In
September 2017, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate said her government had “already started defending all the people in Rakhine
in the best way possible.” In December, the Myanmar government denied access to the UN special rapporteur on human rights
in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, and suspended cooperation for the remainder of her term.

How is the region responding?

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Protesters have at times gathered in cities in Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, and Bangladesh to condemn the killing and
persecution of Rohingya. Bangladesh’s foreign minister condemned the violence in Rakhine as “genocide” in September 2017
and Indonesia and Malaysia called on the Myanmar authorities to halt their campaign and bring an end to the violence. Yet
governments in Southeast Asia lack established legal frameworks to protect refugees’ rights, and the ten members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have not coordinated a response to the deepening crisis.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand—all ASEAN members—have yet to ratify the UN Refugee Convention or its
protocol. ASEAN itself has been mostly silent on the plight of the Rohingya and on the growing numbers of asylum seekers in
member countries, largely because of its members’ commitment to the principle of noninterference in each other’s internal
affairs. “They aren’t going to take collective action on Myanmar, with Myanmar as one of its members,” says CFR’s Joshua
Kurlantzick.

How have others responded?

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In December 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama lifted sanctions against Myanmar, saying it had made strides in improving
human rights. The move came amid a crackdown on Rohingya and was criticized by some as premature. A year later, new U.S.
sanctions were imposed against a Myanmar general for his alleged role in the military’s attacks in Rakhine. Meanwhile, countries
including the United States, Canada, Norway, and South Korea, as well as international donors, have upped their humanitarian
assistance as the flow of Rohingya to Bangladesh has grown, and in early 2018 a team of UK medics led an emergency response
to help stem the spread of disease in camps. The United Nations has requested $951 million in immediate relief funds [PDF] for
2018.

Advocacy groups including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Arakan Project, and Fortify Rights continue to
appeal for international pressure on Myanmar’s government. In April 2018, the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor
sought jurisdiction over alleged war crimes that forced the exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh.

Still, resentment of the minority group has run deep for generations. Without overhauling “a culture of pervasive prejudice” and
ensuring that Rohingya are treated as human beings, the situation in Rakhine State is unlikely to improve, says journalist and
author Francis Wade.
extensive report reading 6.2
suggests myanmar
military thoroughly
planned crimes against
humanity in rakhine
state
08 12
Joshua Kurlantzick
Last week, the research and advocacy group Fortify Rights, which has amassed considerable expertise on the situation in
Rakhine State and the abuses perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces, released probably its most comprehensive report yet.
The report , based on interviews with more than two hundred survivors of the killings in Rakhine State and some two years of
research, strongly suggests that the Myanmar military carefully laid the plans for massive crimes against Rohingya in Rakhine
State in late 2017. In fact, some of the evidence collected in the report makes the situation in Myanmar seem reminiscent of the
type of planning that occurred in Rwanda, prior to the genocide against Tutsis there in 1994. The Myanmar military has denied
any and all allegations that it planned atrocities in Rakhine State. As the Guardian notes, “A military inquiry into the conduct of
soldiers released its findings in November 2017, exonerating the army.”

As the Fortify Rights report shows, however, the killings of Rohingya in late 2017 were not just an outpouring of violence or some
kind of inter-ethnic bloodletting that happened in the heat of Rakhine State political tensions. Its evidence shows that, well
before an attack by a shadowy Rohingya insurgent group on police posts in western Myanmar in August 2017 which the
05
Myanmar government claims supposedly triggered the violence, the Myanmar military had apparently launched a concerted
effort to prepare for the killings of Rohingya that came after August. Fortify Rights reveals that, nearly a year before, the military
had begun stripping Rohingya areas of possible defenses against violence, including confiscating makeshift weapons and
14 23
removing Rohingya’s fences. The report also shows that the army trained Rakhine Buddhist vigilante groups, and armed them as
well, and that in 2016 and 2017 the military moved new detachments of troops into northern Rakhine State, which would be the
epicenter of the violence. All this , it shows, was in preparation for 2017, and these preparations allowed Rakhine Buddhists, and
security forces, to go on a rampage in late 2017 against Rohingya, with the Rohingya fully unable to defend themselves.

Perhaps more than any other piece of evidence yet unveiled about the situation in Rakhine State, the report demonstrates the
need for international actors to take action against senior leaders of the Myanmar military responsible for the atrocities. There is
no hope that the most senior army leaders will face any reckoning within Myanmar, given the army’s continuing dominance of
many facets of Myanmar politics, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s weakness, as well as the weaknesses of the civilian government. The
Myanmar government has not even allowed the top UN human rights official focused on Myanmar into the country to
investigate the situation in Rakhine State.

But the international community should take stronger action against the top levels of the Myanmar military—even if doing so, as
some analysts predict, would alienate the majority of Myanmar citizens (at least Buddhist Burmans), who have rallied around the
18 25
armed forces in the past two years. Top Myanmar leaders could, for instance, be referred to the International Criminal Court, or
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could create a framework for investigating alleged crimes in Myanmar; the
Security Council will not do so, since any proposal would be blocked by China and Russia, so a UNGA framework would be a
possibility.

Without some kind of accountability for the Myanmar armed forces’ top leadership, the prospect of the army committing similar
abuses in the future is high. And future crimes, in Rakhine, or in other ethnic minority areas, could not only bring more suffering
but also further set back Myanmar’s peace process, and further undermine the country’s already-shaky political stability.

You can read the full report by Fortify Rights here

the united nations has reading 6.3
betrayed the rohingya —
once again
Azeem Ibrahim
On June 6, the United Nations agencies in Burma — namely, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.N.
Development Program — signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of the country concerning the
repatriation of some 700,000 Rohingya refugees from Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The members of this Muslim minority group
had been forcibly displaced from their homeland in Burma’s Rakhine state entirely between August and December last year,
when the Burmese armed forces used the excuse of a minor ethnic insurgency in the area — a rebellion not unlike the others
going on in the country’s border regions in recent months — to force almost the entirety of an ethnic group from the land of their
birth and across the border to Bangladesh.

The U.N. has been treating this agreement as a welcome step forward. Yet this neglects several fundamental problems. The
05 08 12
terms of the agreement have not been made public, no representatives of the Rohingya themselves have been consulted on the
matter, and the U.N. agencies do not appear to have obligated the government of Burma to ensure the security of Rohingya
returning to the country. Nor is there any sign of movement toward accountability for those who have previously orchestrated
and carried out the attacks on the minority community.

If past experience is anything to go by, the majority of those returning will not be going back to their villages and their homes.
Instead the Burmese government will send them to internal refugee camps, as has been the case in past instances when the U.N.
“facilitated the return” of Rohingya refugees who had fled abuses in Burma.

As things stand now, we know for a fact that many of those villages have already been burned to the ground, and many of the
lands have already been redistributed to Rakhine Buddhists. Where would the returnees go, if not to Burma’s already notorious
“concentration camps”?

There are already more than 120,000 Rohingya held in such camps from previous refugee crises. These are places where
international relief organizations are not allowed to go, and where the interned are just rotting away with no prospects of
employment or education, little or no access to health care, and no expectation of ever being released.

If repatriation is forced upon the 700,000 Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, according to the terms of this agreement, the best-case
14 23
scenario is that they will flee again in a few months or years. This refugee ping-pong has occurred before, and it has done
nothing to alleviate the human suffering of those displaced. Quite the opposite: It has served only to amplify their problems.

Conversely, there is every reason to believe that next time around, many more Rohingya will be killed by the Burmese armed
forces or by civilian extremists before they can get back over the border to Bangladesh.

The Rohingya crisis in Rakhine state is already understood at the global level to be a de facto genocide. We cannot and must not
drive these people back into the hands of those who wish nothing more than to kill them. No Rohingya should be enticed, let
alone compelled, to return to Burma before the country’s regime is purged of its genocidal elements and before all those who
have previously committed crimes against humanity are held to account in international human rights courts.

If the U.N. is serious about tackling the plight of the Rohingya people in the region, it should start with those 120,000 in internal
camps of Burma itself. At the very least, they should be released from their effective prisons and allowed to return to their lands,
under the supervision of international observers.
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Next, the government must grant adequate legal protections to these people and to the areas they inhabit, and must begin to
prosecute those who have instigated and carried out attacks against the group in the past. And then, it must begin the process
of normalizing the legal status of the Rohingya and establish the legal processes by which they will be granted citizenship in the
country of their birth, as per international law. Only then can there be any question of returning any more Rohingya from other
refugee camps in the region.

Whatever else we may want to say about the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and other places, the Rohingya there are safe.
International relief organizations have access to them, can see to their well-being and can help with at least some human
services. Returning any of these people to Burma under the current conditions, as envisioned by the memorandum of
understanding, would make their lives materially worse.

These people have suffered enough. The obligation on the international community now is to make their lives safer and better —
not to throw them back into harm’s way.
enough talk. let’s have reading 6.4
action on rohingya
massacres
Jan Figel and Benedict Rogers
After the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the words “never again” were uttered like a mantra by many in the international
community. Yet a year ago in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, “never again” happened all over again.

On 25 August 2017, the army unleashed a military offensive that forced more than 700,000 Rohingya to flee their villages into
neighbouring Bangladesh. It is believed that thousands were killed. Human rights organisations have reported mass rape and
eyewitness accounts describe babies and children snatched from their parents’ arms and thrown into burning homes or
drowned in rivers. Families were burned alive in their homes, villagers lined up and shot and civilians targeted indiscriminately.
Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein, the outgoing United Nations high commissioner for human rights, described what happened as “a
textbook example of ethnic cleansing”, and the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, said she saw
“the hallmarks of genocide”. 05 08 12
Within the next few weeks, two significant reports will be published. The United States is expected to release the results of its
investigation, which may conclude that what has occurred is genocide. The UN fact-finding mission, established before the
offensive began last year, will present its report and may well recommend mechanisms for accountability. The evidence and
recommendations of these reports must receive serious attention – it is essential that the international community summons the
political will to act. This coming week, the UN security council will discuss the situation again, as it has done on several
occasions already. Such discussions are vital, but they must move from talk to action.

And yet of course the crisis did not begin a year ago. The plight of the Rohingya has been severe for decades. This
predominantly Muslim population has been subjected to dehumanisation and marginalisation, stripped of citizenship rights,
rendered stateless and facing restrictions on movement, marriage, access to education and healthcare and freedom of religion
or belief.

In 2012, violence broke out between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, leaving thousands displaced and parts of the
state smouldering. Rohingya were held in dire conditions in camps that observers compare to internment centres. A new
campaign by the Myanmar military broke out in October 2016, a prelude to last year’s dramatic escalation.

What, then, should be done? The European Union, the US and Canada have imposed visa bans on a few military and security
14 23
personnel, which is a welcome step, and Washington has recently strengthened some sanctions against some individuals,
although not yet the man ultimately responsible, the commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing. But there is no global arms
embargo, no targeted sanctions against military-owned enterprises and no action to end impunity by referring the perpetrators
of crimes against humanity to the international criminal court. These are steps that the UN and its member states should now
adopt.

Ending impunity is essential because history shows that if those who perpetrate crimes against humanity get away with it, they
or others will take it as a signal that they can repeat the same crimes. We warned of this 18 months ago.

But we must also consider what else can be done in addition to justice and accountability. Myanmar has been torn apart by
decades of ethnic conflict, fuelled in recent years by religious intolerance and hatred. Constructive steps towards long-term
peace-building and reconciliation are needed, to counter the voices of intolerance and promote the principle of freedom of
religion or belief, based on respect for human dignity, for every person of every race in Myanmar. Narratives need to be
challenged, hate speech countered, the citizenship rights of the Rohingya respected, voices of peace within all religions
18
strengthened and a genuine peace process and political dialogue enhanced. 25
Perhaps there is a role for trusted international mediators whose only agenda is the basic dignity of all. Pope Francis visited the
country last year and delivered this message – perhaps his good offices could play a role in bringing the different peoples of
Myanmar, of different races and religions, including the Rohingya, together in dialogue. For one thing is absolutely certain: if
hatred, deeply entrenched in society but manipulated by Myanmar’s still powerful military, is not addressed, we will be
lamenting “again and again” our failure to live up to our responsibility to protect.
births, marriages and reading 6.5
deaths: rohingya lives
playing out as refugees
Japan Times
A newborn yet-to-be-named squirms in a mother’s arms; a marriage party lights up a fetid lane; a dead man’s face makes a soft
impression on the blanket covering him — with no route home Rohingya lives are playing out in the refugee camps of
Bangladesh.

Chased from Myanmar in waves reaching back to the late 1970s, a million of the stateless Rohingya are cornered in one of the
most densely populated areas on Earth.

Most are unable to work legally, move freely or access full education — existences pared back to the basics of survival.

The camps of Cox’s Bazar district buzz with children, typically curious and mischievous, but many also underfed, with few
05
clothes, less schooling and nothing but homemade toys for entertainment. 08 12
Expectations of marrying early, having a family and dying a refugee are realities, with faith and tradition providing rare constants
for a minority without a state.

Births

“One day I want my daughter to see Myanmar,” says 20-year-old Setara of a tiny eight-day-old child born in a bamboo shack in
the Thangkhali refugee camp where the family arrived last year.

“But I won’t go back unless everyone else does.”

Throughout her pregnancy, Setara did not seek help from the NGO-run health centers.

Instead like most Rohingya women, she relied on a traditional midwife — known to Rohingya as “diama” — for the delivery.

Five thousand babies will be born over the next few months across the new refugee camps, according to the United Nations
Population Fund, which delivers 300 babies each month in its facilities alone.
14
The birth rate has kept the diama busy.
23
“Sometimes I have gloves, but if there are none available I will do the delivery with my bare hands,” says 60-year-old Majuna
Begum.

She has delivered 22 babies in nine months at the camp without charge.

Pregnant women are expected to provide the diama with a basic delivery kit — fresh cloths, scissors, a needle and a tub with
clean water. But there is no pain relief or antibiotics.

She insists that she will not assist with births “if there are complications.”

But plenty of others do, say health workers.

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Ten percent of births involve complications and without full medical care the risks of infection and injury to the mother or
asphyxiation of the newborn are high.

The birth rate among the new refugee community is potentially dangerous for women and unsustainable for the camps, given
the extreme resource squeeze on an already poor wedge of Bangladesh.

But contraception remains taboo among Rohingya men.

“They really don’t want to use it as it’s a cultural and a religious issue,” says family planning expert Shapta Aktar.

But Rohingya women are increasingly taking charge of their bodies.

Contraceptive injections — discreet and short-term — have surged from five a month to 250, Aktar adds.
Marriage

“WELL COME TO HAPPY MARRIAGE DAY 10.08.2018” reads the pink banner inside a rattan-walled shack, the decorations of
bright tissue paper incongruent with the mud and sewage that glistens outside.

The nuptials are for groom Wahidur Rahman, a 21-year-old born in the camp, and his bride Nur Kaida.

Her husband insists his wife is 18. Neighbors say she is younger, yet hesitate to give an age.

Rohingya marry young and concerns are mounting that a rising number of adolescent girls are being married off to men they
barely know.

Women and girls in bright sequined saris, make-up and henna tattoos lead the party, while music blares from two tuk-tuk
motorized rickshaws crammed into a narrow alleyway.

Nur’s face is covered throughout as per custom, while relatives of her husband’s family try to draw her out from her home in a
ritual that descends into a water fight.

“I’m happy,” says Wahidur as he sneaks a cigarette away from his family.

“The marriage was arranged by our parents. … The last time I saw her (Nur) she was young, she has been inside since,” he says of
a tradition that sees unmarried young Rohingya women kept housebound.

Refugees like Wahidur who were born in the camps fear they have been relegated in the eyes of the aid community by the
05
massive needs of the 700,000 Rohingya who arrived last year. 08 12
“I don’t know what will happen,” the newlywed Wahidur says. “It depends on the will of Allah.”

Death

Najmul Islam died in a roadside shack aged 72 after months suffering from tuberculosis and jaundice.

A Buddhist — and a former Myanmar soldier — he converted to Islam in his mid-fifties and married Mabia Khatun, a Rohingya
who was 15 at the time.

It was a rare union in Rakhine, a region cut deep by ethnic and religious enmity.

“He was a good man,” Mabia says, mopping tears with the corner of her headscarf as her husband’s body lies under a gray
blanket below, his lips and nose pressing through the cloth.

The family fled last year from Tula Toli, the site of an alleged massacre of Rohingya villagers by Myanmar security forces.
14
Before he joined them in Bangladesh, Najmul was held for a month by soldiers.
23
“They kept asking ‘why did you convert and live with these people (Rohingya)?,’ ” his wife says.

He left behind four young children in a Rohingya refugee camp and five Burmese offspring from a previous marriage.

An elder with a beard and a prayer cap carefully measures the body with a bamboo stick. The burial will be on a neat hillside
cemetery nearby, where in death, the order that was missing from the chaotic last year of Najmul’s life is once again re-
established.

“I took him home from hospital. I wanted him to breathe his last breath here,” says Mabia.

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