Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule: an overview

Author(s): Abdol Rauh Yaccob

Source: Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, Vol. 42, Papers from the forty-
fifth meeting of the Seminar for Arabian Studies held at the British Museum, London, 28
to 30 July 2011 (2012), pp. 411-419
Published by: Archaeopress Publishing Ltd.
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Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 42 (2012): 41 1-420

Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule: an overview

Abdol Rauh Yaccob

Summary
Most of the history of the Ottomans in Yemen is marked by a series of uprisings of Yemenis against the Ottoman presence. This
paper attempts to trace the general pattern of opposition to Ottoman rule in Yemen before the conclusion of the Treaty of Dacãn in
1911. Relations between Yemenis and Ottomans were hostile for a number of reasons, notably the malpractices of Ottoman officials.
This was further stimulated by the ZaydT political concept which encouraged them to rise up against any unjust ruler in the name of
religious duty. Their imãm thus gained support and approval from ZaydT tribesmen and notables. The paper will also examine the
content of the Treaty of Dacän; the aim of the uprising was finally achieved through this treaty, which not only benefited the imãm
and the Zaydls but also the Ottomans.

Keywords: Zaydis, Ottomans, Yemen, Treaty of Dacan, Aden

Introduction century they reviewed their policy on Yemen as a result of

As a result of the Ottoman policy of expansion into the
Middle East, Yemen was incorporated into the Ottoman
Empire. Following their conquest of the Mamlüks in
Egypt in 1517, in 1538 the Ottomans seized Yemen,
which had previously been held by the Mamlüks. The
upper Yemen highlands, the area north of Sancã3 including
Sacdah, Shahãrah, and Hajjah, however, remained in the
hands of the ZaydT imãms. This enabled the Zaydls to
challenge the Ottomans and a century later, in the 1630s,
the Ottomans were defeated - notably by Imãm Qãsim
and his son, Imam Muhammad (Baldry 1963: 158).
Following the defeat of the Ottomans in the 1630s, the
Zaydls extended their authority to most of greater Yemen,
from cAsIr in the north to Haçlramawt in the south, but
less than a century later the ZaydT imamate rapidly fell
the expansion of the Wahhãbiyyah movement, which had
taken control of the greater part of Arabia including the
holy places of Mecca and Medina. The Ottomans reacted
by requesting the governor of Egypt, Muhammad CA1T,
to subdue the movement and consequently the whole of
Arabia came under his rule, including towns in Yemen
such as Hudaydah, ZabTd, Mukhä, and Shaykh SacTd (aka
Ghurayrah). Fearing that Muhammad CA1T might pose
a serious threat to their interest and position in India,
in January 1839 the British seized Aden (Kour 1976:
28). With the cooperation of several European powers,
including Russia, Austria, and Italy, the British put
pressure on Muhammad CA1T to withdraw his forces from
Arabia and in April 1840 Arabia, including Yemen, was
evacuated (Baldry 1963: 161).
After the withdrawal of Muhammad CA1T the Ottomans

into disarray. From 1728 Tihämah and lower Yemen were
declared independent under local authorities such as the
Sultanate of Lahej (AnTs 1963: 225-226); meanwhile
from 1730, cAsTr and Tihãmah were ruled by Sharif
Ahmad, the imäm's governor of Abü cArïsh (Baldry
1985: 46).
Although the ZaydTs lost their dominance in most of
greater Yemen, the Ottomans did not immediately attempt
returned to Yemen in part to pursue their claim to
sovereignty, which was based on their previous conquest
of the country in the sixteenth century. In April 1849 they
took Hudaydah and other parts of the Tihãmah from SharTf
Husayn of Abü cArïsh who had succeeded Muhammad
cAlT (AnTs 1963: 225-226). On 24 July 1849 the
Ottomans proceeded to the highlands and entered Sancã3
at the invitation of Imãm al-Mutawakkil Muhammad b.

to reassert their authority in Yemen. In the early nineteenth Yahyã (al-cAmrï 1984: 333-334). The imãm was asked

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 412 Abdol Rauh Yaccob
to conclude an agreement whereby he would agree to
the establishment of a small Ottoman garrison in Sancã3,
but the highlands would continue to be under his rule.
He became a vassal of the Porte and the revenues from
the highlands were to be divided between him and the
Ottomans (Naval Intelligence Division 1964: 272-273).
In return, he was to be awarded a monthly salary of 4000
riyals. Before long a revolt took place in the capital.
The imäm was denounced as treacherous by the rebels,
notably for his consent to the presence of Ottoman forces
in SancäD, and a new imãm, CA1I b. Muhammad b. cAbd
Alläh, was appointed. On 18 August 1848 the Ottomans
were expelled from the capital and forced to retire to the
Tihãmah (al-cAmñ 1984: 333-334). The atmosphere in
the highlands was far from quiet. Imam CA1T was soon
removed, and the country was again divided among
rivalling imãms until the opening of the Suez Canal in
1869. This eventually encouraged the Ottomans, who
had retained their foothold in the Tihãmah, to secure their
position in the Yemen highlands. Following an invitation
from the notables of Sancä3, who were irritated by the
alleged incompetence of the imãms, the Ottomans were
able to re-establish themselves in the highlands in 1872
(Arab Bureau 1917: 40). The return of the Ottomans
was marked by revolts by Yemenis, including the ZaydTs
and the Shãfi^s. It is not surprising that a number of
studies on the history of the Ottomans in the Yemen have
emphasized the theme of the Ottoman- Yemeni conflict.
This paper pursues this theme by reviewing the history of
the Yemeni - and particularly the ZaydT - opposition to
Ottoman rule.
ZaydT imãms and the Yemeni revolts
In 1891 the first of a series of Yemeni uprisings occurred
and threatened the survival of the Ottomans in Yemen.
According to the ZaydTs the ostensible justification for
the uprisings led by the ZaydT imãm was apparently due
to the malpractice of Ottoman officials coupled with their
irreligious modes of conduct. In a reply to the mufti of
Hamãh, Muhammad Effendi al-Напп, Imãm Muhammad
clarified his justification for revolt when he stated that:
But our object was in no wise worldly supremacy, no
ultimate bodily comfort and luxury ... but we have
seen that the officials were not giving Allãh His due
nor respecting His Laws, nor those of the Prophets
of Alläh, but they had rather set up to themselves a
religion that was offensive to the sight of Alläh and
antagonistic to His Laws, committing every kind of
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transgression, and leading to the participation therein
[of] all those of our people who came in contact with
them, violating Alläh by the drinking of wine, obscene
relations with males, and every kind of fornication;
they have oppressed the weak, insulted and degraded
the noble, until posterity was corrupted and the word
of Jews and Christians rose high and the Kurds and
Ethiopians ruled the people. They have discarded
every regard for the faithful, and lost every feeling of
benevolence and pity towards the Muslims. Therefore,
seeing that the will of Alläh was unavoidable, we have
invoked His help, and putting our trust in Him, we
began earnestly the fight, acting thus in accordance
with the command of Alläh the Most High. And fight
them so that there should be no more conflict, and the
faith remains for Alläh alone... and if the great Sultan
were to know the reality of things he would hasten
to our assistance now and always and withdraw all
his servants from the Yemen Province to order them
rather to fight the infidel nations (R/20/ A/1256, imãm
to mufti of Hamãh, 20/10/1905)
Malpractice in the administration of the province ofYemen
continued to be the main justification for the new imãm to
revolt against Ottoman authority. When Imäm Yahyä was
elected as new imäm in June 1904, he continued in his
father's footsteps by evoking the maladministration of the
country under Ottoman officials, mainly in the northern
part of Yemen (home of the ZaydTs), as his justification
for an uprising.
The revolts carried out by the ZaydTs must have been
primarily inspired by ZaydT doctrine, which went back
to Zayd b. CA1T b. Husayn, who rebelled openly against
the Umayyads after the event of Karbalã3, calling for the
observance of the Book of Alläh and the Sunnah or the
practice of His Prophet. This position was not unique to
the ZaydTs and was shared by other groups, particularly the
followers of Sayyid Idrïsï who also fought the Ottomans.
Furthermore, the ZaydT imãms could no longer tolerate
the loss of their position as temporal and spiritual leaders
of the ZaydTs, as a result of the Ottomans' administration.
After the occupation of Sancä3 in 1872, the temporal role
of the ZaydT imãms was considerably reduced, especially
when the power to appoint officials and judges was taken
away from them, and the imãms were further restricted
from ruling over the tribesmen. They were also prevented
from collecting zakãt which further reduced their
religious authority and naturally diminished their position
as spiritual leaders. Instead, the imãms and their families
were dependent on monthly salaries of 3000 riyals. The
 Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule : an overview 413
authority of the imam was downgraded to that of a local
religious leader, in contrast to their traditionally elevated
position as ZaydT imams. All these factors encouraged
them to rise up against the Ottomans as part of their role
as religious leaders.
In addition to the religious doctrine of the Zaydls
and the accountability of ZaydT imãms, Imãm Yahyã
made a claim to the territory of their ancestors in Yemen.
This claim not only led him to oppose the authority of
Ottomans in Yemen, but also that of the IdrTsT in cAsTr
and the British protégés of the Aden Protectorate,
which the imãm regarded as part of their territory
of greater Yemen. It should be noted that this claim,
together with the appearance of Imãm Yahyã in the
Aden Protectorate had been carefully observed by the
Aden Residency, notably when it was reported in June
1906 that the imãm had addressed some chiefs in the
Aden Protectorate (R/20/A/1102, Resident to Bombay,
1/7/1906). Nevertheless, Imãm Yahyã was reported to
have approached the British Government for an alliance,
but the British Resident had declined the invitation on
the grounds that 'the recent revolt of Imãm Yahyã has
been regarded by the British Government in the light
of a rebellion against a friendly power' (R/20/A/1268,
Resident's note, 5/11/1906).
On a number of occasions, however, the imãm was
under pressure from his followers, notably the ZaydT
tribesmen, the principal shaykhs, and his advisers, either
to lead an uprising against the Ottomans or to decide
matters concerning the future of the ZaydTs in Yemen.
The imãm had to act in accordance with the wishes of
the community that had selected him as imãm. Any
slight inclination on his part to depart from the mandate
specified by the community would lead to his fall and
disgrace and the election of another imãm.
In April 1905, with the support of ZaydT tribesmen,
Imãm Yahyã began his uprisings against the Ottomans
when he moved towards Sancä3 and succeeded in
subduing the Ottomans. Accordingly, the Ottoman
authorities were forced to sign a capitulation, which
resulted in the surrender of the capital to the imãm. All
troops and Ottoman officials, including the Ottoman wall
(or governor) and commander-in-chief, were permitted to
leave for Hudaydah, under a guarantee for their safety
from the imãm. An armistice was proclaimed for a period
of one year (FO 195/2198, Richardson to G.P. Devey,
Jiddah, 16/5/1905).
The imãm made a further move by proposing to
administer all mountainous districts of Yemen where the
ZaydT element was predominant and, in return, to pay
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an annual levy to the sultan and to maintain at his own
expense a garrison of 5000 Ottoman troops at Sancã3.
It was also suggested that the sultan should receive a
deputation from Yemen for the purpose of presenting
grievances against the misconduct of Ottoman officials
(FO 195/2198, Richardson to G.P. Devey, Jiddah,
16/5/1905).
As a result of the ZaydT uprising and the loss of Sancã3,
in June 1905 the Ottomans initially made an attempt to
negotiate with the imãm by sending Mahmüd Nadim
to Sanca3 in order to reach an amicable understanding.
Mahmüd Nadim did not, however, see the imãm personally
but was met outside Sanca3 by his representative. Written
communications passed between them for nearly a
week. The imãm was personally in favour of a peaceful
settlement, but he could not carry his advisers and
principal shaykhs with him. In his last proposal, the imãm
offered to return Sancã3 to the sultan and to desist from
further rebellion, on condition that the towns of Dhamãr,
Yarïm, Hajjah, TawTlah, Kawkabän, and cAmrãn should
be given to him (FO 195/2198, Richardson to G.P. Devey,
Jiddah, 15/7/1905). The Ottomans, however, were not
prepared to abandon those mountainous areas to him.
At the failure of the peace negotiation, the Ottomans
immediately adopted military tactics and issued orders
for a general mobilization against the insurgents. On 16
July 1905 Ahmad Fay di Pasha, who was in charge of the
relief of Sancã3, made a first advance in the direction of
Sanca3 with six battalions of Albanian troops and on 29
August 1905, only four months after the surrender of
Sancã3 to the rebels, the Ottomans succeeded in retaking
the capital. After his successful campaign in recapturing
Sancã3, in the middle of November of that year, in an
attempt to crush the imãm, Ahmad Fay di Pasha led an
army of 10,000 towards Shahãrah where the majority of
the artillery, rifles, and ammunition captured from Sancã3
had been kept. Ahmad Fay di Pasha, however, decided to
abandon the campaign due to the rugged inaccessibility
of Shahãrah and constant attacks from the imãm.
In a letter to the cAbdalT sultan in July 1905, the imãm
had expressed his resentment towards the Ottomans
caused by their violation of the truce:
We ousted them [the Ottomans] from Sancã3. ... we
fixed a truce for one year during which there should
be no fighting and both parties should have peace
without any defiance or violation of the terms. When
they, however, reached the place to which they had
agreed to retire, they reverted to their former deeds
admixed with truth and falsehood. They commenced
 414 Abdol Rauh Yaccob
to violate the terms they have concluded and the
undertakings they had agreed to, and to commit evil.
(R/20/A/1268, imãm to cAbdalI, 16/7/1905)
The commencement of the military operation against the
imam in August 1905 undoubtedly affected his attitude
towards the Ottomans. In September 1906, the imãm
wrote to the cAbdalT sultan to justify his action, claiming
that Ottoman officials were responsible for renewing a
state of war in Yemen. On the other hand, he spoke about
the good treatment accorded by him to Ottoman officials
during his successful campaign at Sancã' He stated:
When they reached their destination however, they
violated the terms concluded with us and had no
respect for the firm connection they had undertaken.
But this was not all for they stretched their necks
towards our country. They collected their shattered
forces and advanced with a large army, the time of
whose discomfiture was near at hand. They approached
Shahara and re-kindled the fire of war which God had
extinguished. What took place was unparalleled in the
annals of the past.... They retreated when they saw
that their concentrated forces would be annihilated. ...
When we gained power over the officials and regulars
we treated all of them with kindness for the sake of
the Sultan of Islam. We accepted peace from them in
the best manner, secured them safely and dispatched
them, their families and their baggage with honour
and respect. We personally rose when we heard
that something approaching a breach of faith was
committed by some Arabs [against the Ottomans]
and we inflicted on the offenders condign punishment
ordained by the Glorious God. (R/20/A/1268, imãm
to cAbdalT, 16/9/1906)
At the failure of their military measures to subdue the
uprising, the Ottomans initiated a new move to come to
an agreement with the imãm by proposing a number of
negotiations. In July 1906, the Grand Sharif of Mecca
deputed a commission to Yemen, consisting of Shanf
Hamzah, former Grand Sharif of Mecca, his son Sharif
cÃ3id, and cAbd al-Rahmãn Ilyãs, one of the most
distinguished culamã° of Medina, to persuade Imãm
Yahyã to come to an agreement and save Muslim blood
in the name of Islamic unity (FO 195/2224, 8/9/1906).
The mission was apparently undertaken at the request
of the Grand Sharif, but it was no doubt executed at
the express command of the sultan. In August that year,
the delegation arrived at Hudaydah with this message.
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The imãm was reported to have replied by stating his
wish not to continue hostilities against the Ottomans
and expressing his eagerness to put an end to all the
bloodshed. He also stated that in such matters he was not
able to make the decision of his own free will, as he had
to be guided by the wishes of the community who had
selected him as imãm, and he further declined the offer
of a position in Yemen under the Ottoman government,
which would have allowed him residence at Sancã3 similar
to that held at Mecca by the Grand Sharif (R/20/A/1256,
Hussein to O'Conor, 8/9/1906). Furthermore, he accused
the local administration of deliberately misinforming
the sultan of the real situation in Yemen. He insisted
that the basis of any understanding with the Ottomans
should commence with the withdrawal of the troops
to Manäkhah, in accordance with the treaty signed at
the capitulation of Sancä3, but the imãm was apparently
prepared to negotiate. In his counter-request, he made it
clear that he wanted to administer, under the suzerainty of
the sultan, the mountainous part of Yemen that formerly
belonged to his ancestors, paying tribute to the Ottoman
government. A small Ottoman garrison would also be
allowed to stay at Sancã3 (R/20/A/1256, Richardson to Dr
Hussein, 6/11/1906).
In October 1906 the Ottoman officials made another
move by sending a delegation of officials to negotiate
with the imãm. In reply, the imãm sent his representatives
and a few of his principal followers to Raydah - about
30 miles (c.48 km) north of Sancã3 - to meet the Ottoman
delegation, consisting of Mahmüd Pasha, Mahmüd
Nadlm Bey, and Ahmad Bey. The main objectives of the
delegation were to persuade the imãm to cease hostilities,
to arrange for the release of the Arab hostages held by
him, and to return to the government the military stores
taken from Sancã3. The result of the negotiations was
not fruitful (R/20/A/1256, Richardson to Dr Hussein,
6/11/1906) and accordingly, an imperial delegation
from Constantinople was sent to Yemen with the aim of
patching up matters with the imãm and his followers.
Although the Commission was given very wide powers
to deal with the imãm it did not reach an agreement, as
he repeatedly demanded his own autonomy in the Zaydl
districts and the evacuation of Sancã3, in accordance with
the capitulation of Sancã3 in April 1905 (R/20/A/1256,
Richardson to O'Conor, 27/4/1907).
As a result, the Ottomans tried to bypass the imãm
by attempting to win over his followers or divert their
allegiance from him. They invited inhabitants to select
their chiefs and shaykhs to submit their grievances
personally before the sultan and to point out the causes
 Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule : an overview 415
of uprisings and offer suggestions. Accordingly, in April
1907 about forty Arabs selected from the principal tribes
sailed for Constantinople (R/20/A/1256, Richardson
to O'Conor, 30/5/1907). Once again, the mission was
fruitless.
Subsequently, in September 1907, at the request
of the sultan, another move was made by the Sharif of
Mecca in an attempt to subdue the imãm. A delegation
consisting of four muftis, representing the four madhãhib
(sg. madhhab) - HanbalT, Hanafî, MãlikT, and ShãficT,
who resided at Mecca - four other culamã 3 from Mecca,
and one from Medina, was sent to Yemen. Their duty
was to tour the vilayet , to advise the people to remain
loyal to the caliph, and to renounce their allegiance to
the imãm, who was described an impostor and a rebel
whose acts were contrary to the laws of the Prophet. The
delegation also addressed a letter to the imãm, warning
him against his rebellious and defiant behaviour towards
the government during the past years. They informed
him that if he tendered his submission, the sultan was
prepared to grant him a monthly allowance and accord
him a status similar to that of the Sharif of Mecca. They
further requested him to release all the Arab hostages and
Ottoman prisoners at Shahãrah, and earnestly advised him
to desist from illegally demanding tithes from tribesmen
in the mountainous districts, as they already had to pay
taxes to the Ottoman authorities.
In reply, the imãm stated that he was not a rebel
but that, on the contrary, he was loyal to the sultan. He
added that it was the local Ottoman officials, owing to
their abuse of authority and the oppression of the poor
agricultural classes, who were responsible for his action
in waging war and for the bloodshed that had resulted. A
second letter was then sent to the imãm by the deputation
to remind him of the severe chastisement awaiting him
unless he submitted in good time and to rebuke him for
having described himself as 'Commander of the Faithful'.
When they left the capital, no answer was received from
the imãm and the mission was likewise unsuccessful
(R/20/A/1256, Richardson to O'Conor, 18/9/1907).
Besides his opposition to the Ottomans, Imãm Yahyã
had to face a rival in the person of another imãm who
claimed the Zaydl imamate at the death of his father,
Imãm Muhammad. Thus two potential candidates
for the imamate appeared on the scene at the death of
Imãm Muhammad: his son Yahyä Hamid al-Dïn, and
Muhammad al-Hãshim al-Dahyãnl who was 60 years
old, capable, educated, and chief of the tribe of Dahyãn,
which was located in the Sacdah district. The chief Zaydl
tribes, however, chose Yahyã as the new imãm. He wrote
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to Dahyãn! to exhort him to come to an agreement and
to operate jointly with him against the Ottomans, but al-
Dahyãnl rejected the offer, arguing that the imamate was
not hereditary but should be held by a Zaydl who was
over 40 years old - a condition not fulfilled by Yahyã
- and that the imãm should not only be the most learned
in the doctrines of Islam but also the most valiant in war.
Imãm Yahyã marched against al-Dahyãnl, defeated him,
and forced him to relinquish his right to collect taxes
from neighbouring tribes (R/20/A/1256, O'Conor to Sir
E. Grey, 2/7/1906).
During the Ottoman move to retake Sancã3 from
Imãm Yahyã in 1905, al-Dahyãnl rebelled against Yahyã
apparently hoping that the Ottomans would reward him
by nominating him as imãm of Yemen. Furthermore,
al-Dahyãnl appeared to develop a conciliatory attitude
towards the Ottomans as he had applied for a small
pecuniary subsidy and some munitions of war, promising
that if such were granted, he would fight against Yahyã.
The offer was submitted to Constantinople for a decision
by the sultan, but it was declined due to the attitude of the
Zaydls who did not recognize the sultan as 'Commander
of the Faithful', claiming that the title was vested in the
Zaydl Arabs who were descended from the Prophet,
whereas the sultan was a Turk.
The restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908
as a result of the Young Turk Revolution was thought to
bring new hope for the Yemenis. The constitution was
written by members of the Young Ottomans, notably
Midhat Pasha, during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II
(1876-1909), and was only in effect for two years, from
1876 to 1878. In November 1908, two notable Yemeni
shaykhs, Shaykh Muhammad Muzaykir and Sharif c Abd
Allãh b. Hasan al-Mutawakkil, were sent to Yemen.
Their duty was to persuade the imãm to send his deputies
to Constantinople to present his claims before the
government, with a view to bringing about a permanent
peace in the province. Accordingly, three very influential
notables, Sayyid cAbd Allãh Ibrãhlm, Qãdl 'Izzî al-
Sharql, and Sayyid Muhammad al-Shãml were selected
by the imãm to go to Constantinople. The imãm wrote to
Aden on 20 March 1909 to inform the British authorities
that his delegation to the Sublime Porte was
to disclose the facts of circumstances, to prevent the
shedding of blood which lasted so long as its duration
of time required, to put an end to fights and battles,
to recover to our possession [s/c] all that possessed
by our ancestor the family of imãm, to aid and
substantiate the magnified law of justice, to forbid
 416 Abdol Rauh Yaccob
the evil and wrong and to establish the Shariah of our
Prophet, the last of the Prophets, may the grace and
blessing of God be on him. (R/20/A/1268, imãm to
Aden, 20 March 1909)
In an interview at Aden the imam's emissary, Sayyid
Muhammad b. CA1T, disclosed the fact that the imãm
had made a request to the Porte to be independent in his
own country and to be allowed to continue to occupy
the territory which he had taken from the Ottomans.
The Porte, he anticipated, would not agree to the imam's
demand (R/20/A/1268, notes on the interview with the
imam's emissary, 24/4/09). As had been expected by
the emissary, it became obvious that no satisfactory
understanding would materialize.
In December 1908, however, there was a new
move when the Council of Ministers in Constantinople
discussed the possibility of implementing further reforms
in Yemen. These included replacement of corrupt officials;
reorganization of the police; prevention of malpractice
in the collection of taxes; an increase in the number of
schools; and the secession of cAsTr from the province
of Yemen. In March 1909 the Council of Ministers
made another proposal, which was to delegate the civil
and religious administration in the district of Sacdah to
Imãm Yahyä in an attempt to broker a settlement with
him. These proposals remained idle for some time due to
internal friction among the Zaydls.
Although the new central authorities at Constantinople
were not yet prepared to accept the imäm's request, the
replacement of Fay di Pasha with Hasan Tahsin Pasha
was much welcomed by the Yemenis, and the new wall
(or governor) was described by the imam's emissary,
Sayyid Muhammad, as being very friendly with the
imãm. The latter accordingly wrote to Aden to inform
the British authorities of his good relations with the
Ottoman government (R/20/A/1268, imãm to Aden, April
1909). The improved relationship between the imãm and
Ottoman officials was, however, short-lived when a new
unpopular wall, Muhammad CA1I Pasha, was appointed in
May 1910. Malpractice again became rampant following
this new appointment, and this in itself inevitably
provoked a fresh revolt. In 1 9 1 1 , Imãm Yahyä led a revolt
provoked by Muhammad CA1T Pasha's bad conduct, which
had caused discontent among the people. This coincided
with the revolts of al-IdrlsT in cAsTr and of the Zarãniq
tribesmen. The first manifestation of the new revolt under
Imãm Yahyã was the appearance of armed bands near the
capital on or about 12 January 1911. Simultaneously with
this operation, the rebels in great strength seized the town
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of Sancã3 from all sides and cut off all communication
both with Manãkhah and Tacizz to the south and with the
garrisoned towns in the north.
At the end of April 1911, however, the revolt in the
Yemen highlands under the ZaydT imãm collapsed almost
as suddenly as it had begun. This was partly due to lack
of support and cooperation from tribesmen who inhabited
the agricultural districts lying between Hujaylah and
Sancã°. They were probably tired of the prolonged internal
strife and were busy attending to their fields, which had
received plentiful rains during the previous year. Imãm
Yahyã had therefore been obliged to have recourse to the
warlike mountain tribesmen of the north-west of Sancã3,
such as Hãshid and BakTl, Dhü Muhammad, and Dhü
Husayn, with whom he had overrun the country. Various
tribesmen, on the other hand, had been reluctantly
compelled to take sides with the imãm as they had
previously given up hostages as a guarantee for giving
him support in his cause against the Ottomans.
The revolt of 1911, although less successful than that
of 1905, had little effect on the strength of the imãm,
who did not incur heavy expenses during the operation.
In a letter to the cAbdalT sultan during the course of his
reconciliation with the Ottomans, the imãm vigorously
stated that 'this was not because of weakness or impotency
that happened to us but for the sake of preserving the
blood and preventing it from being shed in fighting'
(R/20/A/1268, imãm to cAbdalI, 5/9/1911). Nevertheless,
since the collapse of the revolt, sympathy towards the
imãm from a considerable number of influential sections
among his followers had deteriorated. Furthermore,
there were signs of alienation from him, and even of
open revolt against his authority. These factors played an
important part during his negotiations with the Ottomans
and undoubtedly put pressure on him to make the best
of any bargain offered by the Ottomans. The move to
reconciliation with the imãm was initiated by cIzzat Pasha
and it was mainly in response to a new threat from the
Italians when Tripoli was attacked in September 1911,
that a compromise was finally reached.
Treaty of Dacãn 1911
Secret negotiation between cIzzat Pasha (who was also
the commander-in-chief) and the imãm apparently began
in June 1911, and in September 1911 an agreement was
finally concluded. The treaty was signed by both parties
at a place called Dacãn north of cAmrãn on Wednesday
18 October 1911 (FO 195/2376, Richardson to Lowther,
 Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule: an overview 417
14/9/1911). The terms of settlement were apparently
accepted in principle by the cabinet at Constantinople,
and in 1913 the treaty was ratified by the Sublime Porte.
G. A. Richardson, the British vice-consul at Hudaydah,
outlined the terms of settlement as far as he was able
to ascertain them. Imãm Yahyã agreed to renounce his
claim to the caliphate, to drop the title 'Commander of the
Faithful' assumed by his predecessors and himself, and to
style himself simply as imäm of the ZaydTs. He further
consented to release all Arab hostages, which was the
guarantee of his authority in securing the assistance and
cooperation of the Zaydl tribesmen. The imãm further
agreed to liberate all Ottoman prisoners and to renounce
his right to collect zakãt within the areas under Ottoman
jurisdiction.
The Ottomans, for their part, agreed to support Sayyid
Yahyã against all possible rivals to the imamate in the
future, to permit him to reside at Kawkabãn, and to grant
him an annual subsidy of 25,000 Turkish pounds from
the revenue of the province. Ottoman civil law would
be entirely abrogated and would be replaced by Islamic
law in the seven highland districts of cAmrãn, Kawkabãn,
Dhamär, Yarîm, cIbb, Hajjah, and Hajjür. Islamic law in
those districts would be administered under the imãm,
who would nominate the qudãt (sg. qâdî) in those
districts subject to the approval of the central government.
The Ottomans also agreed to grant a monthly subsidy to
nearly every shaykh of any importance in the highland
districts and to provide a similar allowance to the culamã'
fuqahã' and sãdãt throughout Yemen.
The principal terms reported by Richardson, however,
were not all spelled out in the text of the signed agreement
reported at Aden and Cairo, notably the abandonment of
the title 'Amir al-Mu3minTn' and the financial subsidy
to the imãm and others. Presumably the treaty was not
yet available to him, the terms of settlement he reported
being merely earlier drafts of the treaty. The Richardson
version should not be neglected, however, as it contains
points of mutual understanding between the imãm and
cIzzat Pasha, which led to the signing of the agreement.
Important differences exist between the Richardson
version and other versions of the treaty, which can be
seen from the texts of the agreement (FO 195/2376,
Richardson to Lowther, 14/9/1911).
The version in the Aden Records appears to be the
most authentic, on the grounds that it was a translation
from the Arabic text handed over to the Residency by an
Arab shaykh. Unfortunately, the Aden Records do not
contain the Arabic text for us to be able to scrutinize it
further. The Public Record Office also has the translation
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of the treaty, which was recorded by the Arab Bureau in
Cairo. Examining the text from the Arab Bureau, it is
possible that it is a summary of the original reported to the
British Consul, but it does contain all terms of settlement.
The Treaty of Dacãn marked a turning point in
the history of the Yemeni uprising since the Ottoman
occupation of SancäD in 1 872. It eliminated all the principal
sources of friction and discord between the Ottomans
and the imãm. Moreover, the treaty recognized the imãm
as temporal and spiritual leader of the ZaydTs and this
provided him with the power to appoint and dismiss
judges in the Zaydl districts as well as the authority
over awqãf and taxation. The treaty also granted other
demands made by the imãm, namely the implementation
of the sharia.
Imãm Yahyã must have been extremely pleased with
the terms of the treaty, as he had achieved the goal of
his predecessors in securing the Yemen highlands for
the ZaydTs, although he was less successful than Imãm
Qäsim and his son who managed to free the highlands
from the Ottomans. Short of removing the Ottomans
from Yemen entirely, Imãm Yahyã must have wanted to
remove them from the highlands. If so, time was against
him, for the IdrTsT and the British had firmly strengthened
their position in cAsTr and Aden respectively. In order to
strengthen and stabilize his position in the highlands, and
further to regain the ZaydTs' influence in the Tihãmah,
notably by repulsing the IdrTsT in cAsTr, Imãm Yahyã
required support from the Ottomans. For these reasons
and other considerations, Imãm Yahyã, in accordance
with the settlement, approved the presence of the Ottoman
wall and troops at Sancã'
Imãm Yahyä's pleasure with the settlement can be
seen in his letter to the cAbdalT sultan on 19 November
1911, describing the admirable personality of cIzzat
Pasha, whose behaviour and conduct had won his heart
and so had led to the mutual understanding between them.
cIzzat Pasha also appeared to have won over the majority
of Imãm Yahyä's staunchest supporters at the beginning
of the negotiations. The imãm stated that cIzzat Pasha was
unique amongst the famous officials of Government
or perhaps the exceptional individual.... From
his manners we realised that he was truthful in
his speech and faithful in action and regardful of
matters conductive of honour to Islam and Muslims
and pleasing to the Eternal God; he facilitated most
of the matters around which we hovered [sic] and
the greatest wishes we were anxious to acquire and
obtain. (R/20/ A/1257, imãm to cAbdalT, 19/11/1911).
 418 Abdol Rauh Yaccob
The imãm further stated that 'after the compromise we
turned up our minds towards uniting together the word
of the Muslim irrespective of the different creeds to
render assistance and cooperation for the purpose of
elevating the word of God and resisting the aggressions
of Italy and other foreigners should the former persist
as before to commit misdeeds in Tripoli' (R/20/A/1257,
imãm to cAbdalT, 19/11/1911). This expression appears
to be genuine. The imãm remained loyal not only to one
particular official but to the Ottomans in general, as he
abided by the treaty which was ratified later, in 1913.
Immediately after signing the treaty, the imãm released
500 Ottoman prisoners.
For the Ottomans, the Treaty of Dacãn relieved them
from the internal disturbances of the Yemenis in order to
face a new external threat, that of the Italians. As early as
1911, there had been discussion in the capital on a new
solution to the province. The newspaper Sabah published
an article inviting the Minister of Interior to study the
problem and suggesting that Yemen and cAsIr should be
governed through the local chiefs: the imãm in the Yemen
highlands and Sayyid IdrTsT in cAsTr. It appears that the
move by the Ottomans to reconcile themselves with the
imãm was mainly in response to a threat by the Italians
when Tripoli was attacked in September 1911, and the
Ottomans were not prepared to send troops simultaneously
to both Yemen and Tripoli. The Yemeni revolt of 1911
cost the Ottomans some 3 or 4 million Turkish pounds
to bring an army of 10,000 men to the province with a
proportionate number of guns and a considerable quantity
of stores and ammunition, and to maintain that force in
the field during the one-month campaign (FO 195/2376,
Richardson to Lowther, 12/6/1911).
Conclusion
It can be said that historically the Ottomans' view of
Yemen was mainly based on Egypt's interests and
viewpoints. Yemen, under the Mamlüks of Egypt,
surrendered to the Ottomans in the 1530s, following the
defeat of the Mamlüks during the Ottoman conquest of
Egypt in 1 5 1 7. They were expelled from Yemen after they
had occupied the country for 100 years, from the 1530s to
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the 1630s, a relatively short period compared to the rest
of the Muslim lands within the empire. Moreover, it was
two and a half centuries later, in 1872, that the Ottomans
regained control in the Yemen highlands, and only after
Muhammad CA1T of Egypt succeeded in subduing the
Wahhãbiyyah movement in Arabia, which paved the
way for the Ottomans to strengthen their position in the
Tihãmah in the 1840s. The Ottomans moved to occupy
Sancã3 in 1849, on the invitation of the Zaydl imãm, but
were soon forced to settle in the Tihãmah at the uprising
of the Zaydl. At the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869,
the Ottomans once more began to consider the policy of
securing the whole of Yemen. Although the Ottomans
succeeded in taking Sancã3 in 1 872 - but not the whole of
Yemen - their policy of governance of the province was
totally ineffectual. As a result, less than two decades later
the Zaydl imäms started a series of uprisings in opposition
to the Ottoman maladministration of the country.
Before the conclusion of the Treaty of Dacän in
1911, Imamic-Ottoman relations were not harmonious.
Irritated by the malpractices of the Ottoman officials, the
Zaydl imãms, who were treated only as local religious
leaders, looked back to their historical claim over greater
Yemen for inspiration. This was further stimulated by the
Zaydl political concept, by which they were encouraged
to rise up as imãms against an unjust ruler as part of
their religious duty, thus gaining support and approval
from the Zaydl tribesmen and notables. The purpose of
the uprising was finally achieved through the Treaty of
Dacãn, which not only benefitted the imãm and the ZaydTs
but also the Ottomans.
This research is based mainly on the local records of
the Aden Residency, and the records of the India Office,
the Government of India, and the Foreign Office. Most of
the facts related to the Yemeni-Ottoman conflicts come
from the classified individual files of the Aden Records
reported by G.A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul
at Hudaydah, to the Aden Residency (R/20/A) and the
Foreign Office (FO 195). The information reported by
Richardson was reliable, as can be seen, for example,
in the case of the Treaty of Dacãn where he reported the
points of mutual understanding between the imãm and the
Ottoman official, which did not appear in other versions
of the treaty.
 Yemeni opposition to Ottoman rule : an overview 419

References

Documents and records

Aden Records at the British Library, London R/20/A/1102, R/20/ A/1256, R/20/ A/1257 & R/20/ A/1268
National Archives, Kew FO 195/2174, FO 195/2198, FO 195/2224, FO 195/2376 & FO 195/2376

Books and articles

al-cAmrT CA. A.
1984. Mrtof cãw аши ta°rJkh al-Yaman al-hadîth. Damascus: Dar al-Fikr.
Anís M.

1963. Al-Dawlah al-cUthmãniyyah wa al-Sharq al-c Arabi 1514-1914. Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjlû al-Misriyyah.
Arab Bureau.
1917. Handbook of Yemen. Cairo: Government Press.
Baldry J.
1963. al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation 1849-1914. Arabica 23: 156-196.
1985. The History of Tihamah. Pages 45-50 in F. Stone (ed.), Studies on the Tihamah: the report of the
Tihamah Expedition 1982 and related papers. London: Longman.
Kour Z.

1976. Why the British took Aden. Middle East International (1 February): 28-29.
Naval Intelligence Division, Great Britain.
1 964. Western Arabia and the Red Sea. Oxford: Geographical Handbook Series.

Author s address

Abd Rauh Yaccob, Faculty of Arabic Language and Islamic Civilization, Sultan Sharif Islamic University, Jalan Pasar
Baharu, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.
e-mail rauh@unissa.edu.bn

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