Friedman Fallacies
ABSTRACT. Milton Friedman's article. The Social Respon-
sibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits,' owes its appeal
to the rhetorical devices of simplicity, authority, and finality.
More careful consideration reveals oversimplification and
ambiguity that conceals empirical errors and logical fallacies.
It is false that business does, or would, operate exclusively in
economic terms, that managers concentrate obsessively on
profitability, and that ethics can be tnarginalized. These
errors reflect basic contradictions: an apolitical political base,
altruistic agents of selfishness, and good deriving fi'om greed.
No Other piece of writing can begin ro compere with
Milron Friedman's 1970 New York Times Magazine
arricle, T h e Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Irs Profits,'' for status in tbe canon of
business ethics classics. It does not matter that one of
tbe central messages of the article would seem to be
that there is no place for anything like business
ethics in any significant sense. That only provides a
useful foil for considering the possibilities and pro-
spects for business ethics. The appeal of the anicle,
however, probably bas more to do with its own
intrinsic qualities than with this utilitarian function.
It possesses the winning characteristics of great
rhetoric simphcity, certainty, and finaHry, It de-
scribes the purpose and procedures of business with
the absolute assurance of the authoritative expert.
Colin Crant is a Professor in the Department of Religious Studies at
Mount Allison University. He teaches an undergraduate course
on "The Ethics and Ethos of Business." His article "Civing
Ethics the Business" appeared in JBE 7 (198S), pp. 489-495.
Some of the journals in which he has published are: T h e
Christian Century, Tlie Dalhousie Review, Journal ofthe
American Academy of Religion, Modem TTieology,
Religious Studies, Studies in Religion/Sdences Reli-
gieuses. The Toronto Journal of Theology,
Journal of Business Ethics 1 0 : 9 0 7 - 9 1 4 , 1 9 9 1 ,
© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Colin Grant
Upon examination, however, the simplicity turns
out to be oversimpUficadon, the certainty is seen to
conceal fundamental ambiguities, and thus the air of
finality is dissipated in a recognition of fundamental
fallacies in Friedman's rhetorical extravagance. On
one level, these feUacies can be seen as simply em-
pirical errors in his descriptions of business and of
the significance of ethics for business; but ultimately
they are indicative of cardinal contradictions at the
heart of Friedman's position as outUned in that
seminal article.
Empirical errors
Business as autonomous economic activity
The appeal of Friedman's paper is achieved at the
price of misrepresenting business itself. This is tbe
first of his empirical errors. His charaaerization of
business as an autonomous activity is simply false,
empirically. Business does not operate in regal
isolation, totally disconnected from other areas of
hfe.
It is important to notice that this is not a matter
of challenging Friedman's rugged firee-enterprise.
laissez-faire defence of the independence of business
as self-conrained economic activity. Tbe adequacy of
that theory is no doubt at stake in this error, but the
error itself is empiricaL Whatever the merits of the
theoretical debare about the respective vimies of
economic systems, a Uttle reflection shows that
Friedman's depiction of business is far removed from
the way business does operate. In the simplistic
authoritarian style that gives his statement its im-
pact. Friedman portrays business as the self-con-
tained economic pursuit of profit. Other concerns of
the wider society are the responsibility of tbat wider
 908 Colin Grant
society, and not of business. If the pursuit of eco-
nomic efficiency by business comes into conflict
with these wider social concerns, then it is the
prerogative of the socio-political machinery to place
restrictions on business in the form of legal sanc-
tions. But these sanctions must be expressed in terms
that business itself can deal with, which means
economic terms. Laws affecting business must cul-
minate in fines. Then business can decide whether it
is more efficient to pay tbe fines, or to conform to
tbe requirements of die law and avoid the fines. This
economic decision is the only kind that business can
be expected to make.
In all the controversy that the Friedman article
has evoked, there has been surprisingly Urde com-
ment on the extreme naivete of his proposal in light
of the way business actually does function. Indeed,
the consensus seems to be that one of the article's
chief merits is its realism. But in order to find the
proffered direction credible at all, we must overlook
the massive involvement of business in the realm of
law. Far fi'om specializing in pure economic activity,
with law being left to the separate socio-political
domain, business is heavily involved in the realm of
law in both its legislative and judicial dimensions.
No political lobby can begin to match the business
lobby, thus no influence can begin to match the
influence of business on the law-making processs.
Far fi'om business operating in its own economic
sphere, reacting to the demands of law in its own
economic terms, business is actively and profes-
sionally engaged in attempting to ensure that the
laws that are enacted will be in its own interests.
This powerful political lobby is supported nor only
by the massive financial resources of business but
also by the business sympathies of the legislators
themselves. For not only are a significant number of
legislarors business people, the single most promi-
nent profession represented in legislatures, that of
attomeys-at-law, consists largely of individuals with
decidedly pro-business sympathies. As parr of the
professional bureaucratic mechanism, lawyers bene-
fit significantly from current economic arrange-
ments, with the result that they are able to accumu-
late funds to invest in business, so tbat the alignment
of their interesrs with business interests predisposes
them to lend a sympathetic ear to the powerful
business lobby.
If this actual symbiosis of business and legislators
is not enough to explode the naivete of Friedman's
simphstic picture of the autonomous specialization
of business, consider how business deals with laws
that are not in its immediate interest. If public
pressure and blatant disregard of public welfare on
the part of business conspire to evoke legislation that
serves to restrict the activities of business, precisely
the way that Friedman holds business and law
should operate, far from responding in pure eco-
nomic terms to the fines that may result from the
imposition of sucb laws, the typical reaction of
business is to confront this situation through direct
intervention in the judicial process. The scope for
any pure economic decision recedes behind the
stalhng tactics and countersuits of the legal arm of
the business corporation, the bank of high-priced
corporate lawyers that not even the pubHc treasury
can match. For Friedman's proposal to retain any
credibility at all, we must overlook fbi<: massive legal
apparatus with which business deals vvdth any laws
that do get by its powerful political lobby.
That Friedman's article enjoys the attention it
does suggests that it cannot possibly be as naive as
this reading would suggest Perhaps it is this reading
that misses the point, and that point may be that
Friedman does not profess to deal with the way
business actually functions at alL His concern is to
state the case for the way business should function.
Yet legitimate though this reminder most certainly
is, it can hardly dispel the air of unreality surround-
ing Friedman's proposal, unless we are prepared to
believe that it is plausible tbat there could be institu-
tions endowed with absolute economic power which
would nor use this power in legislative and judicial
directions like contemporary business actually does.
The unlikelihood of this eventuality points beyond
misrepresentations of the reality of business to a
fundamental contradiction at the heart of the Fried-
man vision.
The profit obsession of management
The expectation that business could operate in
purely economic terms suggests a conspicuous
naivete in the outlook of an economist, but there is a
second error in Friedman's approach to the social
responsibility of business that is even more startling.
For not only does his insistence on the autonomy of
 Friedman Fallacies
business reflect a naive view ofthe nature of business
in its neglect of the extra-economic aspects and
involvements of business, but his account of the
operations of business itself represents a simplistic
distorted depiction of how business acmally func-
tions. According to this account, business executives
are seen to be fixated on the pursuit of profit. Their
mandate is to ensure that the return to the stock-
holders is as high as it can possibly be. However,
as has been pointed out, profitability is only one
of several goals on the agenda of the dedicated
executive.
Management will try to prevent the dividend retum from
being too small, the stock firom failing to appreciate, or
the price-earnings ratio from being too high because
these events may cause the shareholders to withdraw
their money. Management vfih not, however, retum as
much money as possible to the stockholders. The appro-
priate retum to the stockholders should keep them
invested in the corporation's stock, while leaving plenty
of corporate cash for improvement and expansion,^
To pay out the largest possible dividends would
be one of tbe surest ways to undermine a business
corporatioiL Tbe first call on tbe management ofthe
corporation is not to raise the highest possible profits
for the stockholders but to ensure the viability of the
corporation itself Paradoxically, this must be the
case even to ensure the greatest possible retum to the
stockholders. So Friedman's mandate for business
implies the more fundamental focus on the success
and stabihty ofthe business itself.
It is another curious feature of Friedman's ac-
count that he recognizes something of this in his
analysis of the way that social considerations might
be addressed by business, but does not begin to
entertain such wider directions in his depiction of
the economic operations of business. It might be a
sound business decision for a corporation to provide
daycare services, for instance, not because a business
would be making a social contribution by so doing
but because it might enhance the efficiency of the
business operation irself by reducing absenteeism
and eliminating distractions for working parents.
The reason Friedman raises this type of wider
consideration is to insist that even such apparently
humane projecrs represent purely prudential deci-
sions, and are in no way expressions of social or
ethical responsibility on the part of the business
909
corporation. They are means of increasing the profit
margin of the business itself However, even that
prudential rationale is not explored in the more
direct consideration of the economic operations of
business. It may be that to make allowance for such
wider concerns in business as seeking the security of
the corporation would compromise the insistence on
the determinative significance of the pursuit of
profitability. In any event, the characterization of
business as involving tbe uncompromising pursuit of
profit constitutes as inadequate a portrayal of the
operations of business as the contention that business
represents autonomous economic activity is abstract
and incredible as a depiction of the nature of
business.
The dispensability of ethia
That Friedman's simplistic treatment so misrepre-
sents the reality of business suggests tbat, for all its
rhetorical power, the thesis that the social responsi-
bility of business is to increase its profits is seriously
lacking in plausibility. This is particularly the case
because as an economist, Friedman can be expected
to affirm a credible vision of business. The most
worrisome aspect of tbe article, however, emerges
not from the peculiarities of Friedman's aeatment of
business, but from his treatment of ethics. Here the
misrepresentation amounts more to total confusion
rather than to empirical error, and, of course,
Friedman is by no means alone in this. He is reflect-
ing the state of ethics generally. However, the
simplistic and authoritarian tone of the article serves
to reinforce the popular notion ofthe secondary and
optional nature of this whole area.
Three approaches to ethics are implied in the
Friedman article. The central thesis suggests the
equation of ethics with law. In contrast to the purely
economic responsibility of business, etbical concern
must come from the wider social context where the
standards of society receive expression in the form of
law. In this starkest form, the implication is not only
that ethics is excluded from tte deliberations of
business, but tbat the ethics that is recognized is of
the minimalist variety. Business is assumed to be
endowed with its own intrinsic integrity. Ethics
comes into play only when the wider society finds
some aspect of business operation inrolerable so tbat
910 Colin Grant
it has to pass a law restricting the scope of this
otherwise autonomous activity. In this respect, the
standard features of law-based ethics — their nega-
tive tone, their concentration on the worst excesses,
and their impersonal impositional demeanor — are
all indicated, so that ethics is seen as an outside
intrusion that husiness might have to deal with, hut,
if so, this should be strictly on the terms of business
itself, monetary penalties that business can either
take into its stride or seek to avoid.
From the point of view of serious ethical concern,
we must wonder whether this really involves ethics
at all. It may be that what is at stake here is rather
what the tide of the article suggests, "Social Respon-
sibility." This is the second approach to ethics that
can be elicited from the Friedman article, and it
poses the question of how he understands the
relation between ethical and sodal responsihihty. For
all that can be ascertained from the article itself, he
might well accept the common tendency to equate
the two, or he might not regard sodal responsibihty
as an ethical matter at all. Either way, we are faced
with a very ambiguous and confusing situation. If he
regards soda! and ethical responsibihty as synony-
mous, he must then explain how "ethical" can mean
any more than a power play between competing
sodal forces. This characterization could certainly fit
the Friedman scheme, where business has its own
area of spedalizadon as the economic segment of
sodety, with wider concerns being the preserve of
other sodal forces. The picture lends itself to being
seen as a straightforward power struggle, a power
struggle which, once we have observed the way
business involves trespassing into the wider domain
and thereby gaining dominance as in its extension
into the formation and apphcation of law, is heavily
weighted in favour of business. That Friedman
should promote such an arrangement is certainly
understandable, but if this is his meaning, then not
only is ethics exduded from the supposedly purely
economic calculations of business; it is ehminated
from sodal arrangements entirely insofar as these
become the subject of direct power clashes. On the
other hand, if Friedman means to distinguish be-
tween sodal and ethical responsibihty, how he
would charaaerize the disdnctiveness of the ethical
remains to be explained.
One answer to this residual question is suggested
by the third possible meaning of ethics that can be
detected in the article. Besides the implication that
ethics is a matter of law, imposed on business by the
wider sodety, and the focus of the title on social
responsibility, the most direct use of ethical terms
suggests a fundamentally personal approach to ethics.
"Only people can have responsibility, "•• Friedman
assures us early in the artide; and in its final words,
quoting his book Capitalism and Freedom, stipulates
diat what can be expeaed of business is that "it stays
within the rules of the game, which b to say, engages
in open and free competition without deception or
fraud."* Clearly, Friedman assumes hasic ethical
integrity on the part of the individuals who engage
in bminess. It seems that he takes personal ethics for
granted. His attribution of this expectation to busi-
ness may be ascribed to exuberance, even though it
has the added authority of occurring in a quote from
one of his books. On his own terms, avoidance of
deception and fi-aud would seem to be predsely the
kinds of things that cannot be expected of business.
Remember "Only people can have responsibilities."
But even allowing for some carelessness in phrasing,
there is still a fundamental problem about how this
can be expected even of individuals in business. How
are they to make serious efforts to avoid deception
and fraud if their primary and determinative loyalty
is to the pursuit of profitability? If personal ethics are
seriously acknowledged in the domain of business,
the strict autonomy of business is breached, and it is
difficult to see how Friedman can persist in his
isolationist version of business operations. With this
once again we are moving beyond empirical mis-
representations of the nature and operations of
business or of ethics, and are approaching the
prospea of blatant logical contradiction at the heart
of the Friedman agenda.
Logical fallacies
An apolitical basis of political freedom
The ambiguities and distortions in Friedman's treat-
ment of business and ethics can each be traced back
to fundamental contradictions in his foundational
assumptions. The outlandish depiction of business as
an autonomous economic activity not only mis-
represents the way in which business does, or
conceivably would, operate, given the prospects and
 Friedman Fallacies
predilections of power, economic or otherwise, but it
ako reveals a basic logical contradictioti at the heart
of the free market vision extolled by Friedman. The
market is supposed to function in its own independ-
ent economic terms, and yet this independent
market is also touted as the source and guarantee of
political freedom. "Economic freedom is an essential
requisite for political freedom,"' Friedman insists in
Free to Choose. The economic arrangement which
prides itself on its separation from the political
realm, in contrast to the sociaUst alternative where
the economic and poUdcal are intimately connected,
is also supposed to underlie and sustain the reality of
a free political system. Economic freedom is the
cradle of poUtical freedom and yet the economic
itself is supposed to be totally apoUtical.
In his recognition that business might engage in
what might appear to be acts of social responsibility,
but which for business itself would have to be
justified pnidendally by economic criteria as calcu-
lated to contribute to the overall profit margin ofthe
operation, Friedman comes close to recognizing this
lacuna in his armoury. For he notes the impossibility,
on his own terms, of challenging business executives
who profess to pursue these prudential programs as
though they were really interested in the causes
themselves and not simply engaging in them in the
interests of the economic bottom hne. "It would be
inconsistent of me to call on corporate executives to
refrain from this hypocritical window-dressing
because it harms the foundations of a free society."'
It would be inconsistent because business is supposed
to be a self-contained economic activity. What it
does is not supposed to involve the wider society at
all, except in its own econorruc terms. And yet the
rationale for promoting this pure economic activity
is not only that it produces the most efficient
economic results, the widely available products and
services of the free market, but that it also underlies
the parallel form of political organization, democ-
racy in its fiillest sense, government of, by, and for
free citizens. Much of the ambiguity and over-
simplification in Friedman's program, particularly
the naivete in his depiction of business as
autonomous economic activity, can be traced to this
failure to think through this contradiction involved
in the official gap between economics and politics
and the contradictory assumption that a free political
system depends upon a free economy. It may be that
911
this latter is more indicative of the direction implicit
in Friedman's program and that it would issue in a
political order dominated by economic power just as
the socialist direction he opposes involves a poUtical
domination of the economic order. It is certain that
he cannot have it both ways. Economic arrange-
ments cannot be both totally apohtical and forma-
tive for the political process.
Altruistic agents of self-interest
The second of Friedman's misrepresentations, his
portrayal of business managers as dedicated agents
of profit-intent shareholders, is equally indicative
of a fundamental debilitating contradiction. Alex
Michalos depicts the fallacy as the contradiction
between the assumption that shareholders are moti-
vated entirely by self-interest and the requirement
that the managers of corporations, as agents of these
self-interested individuals, must be essentially devoid
of self-interest, or at least have their self-interest
sufficiently in check to dedicate themselves to the
self-interest of the shareholders,' This suggests two
fundamentally diflFerent forms of humanity; those
who are essentially characterized by self-interest, and
those who are capable of devotii^ themselves to the
interests of others. Michalos asks why the share-
holders may not also be capable of something more
than self-interest In other words, are there really
two types of human beings, takers and givers, or is
this characterization required because such priority
is given to taking that nothing can be allowed to
quahfy this lest it compromise the total economic
devotion, with the result that the agents of this self-
interest seem like another species?
Even within his own exposition, Friedman is not
able to maintain the stria version of the agency
thesis. "When he complains that the business execu-
tive who diverts corporate funds into social projects
is in effect levying and spending taxes, because this is
outside the strict economic mandate of the business
corporation, he has to acknowledge that it is not
simply the shareholders' money that is being spent.
For while such expenditures might reduce the
dividends the shareholders receive, they might also
result in lower wages for employees than would
otherwise be available, and in higher prices for the
consumers of the company's products. Thus the
 912 Colin Grant
implication is that the business executive is an agent
of employees and customers, tather than simply and
solely an agent of the ptofit-seeking shareholders. In
this, Friedman is slipping from the classical share-
holder view of business to the broader version that
has tended to replace that monolithic focus for most
students of management, the stakeholder view. Al-
though it would undermine his position, Friedman
comes close to recognizing that management owes a
loyalty to all who have a stake in the company,
employees and customers as well as shareholders. To
embrace this stakeholder expansion explicitly would
be fatal to Friedman's position, however, because
there would be no reason to stop short of those who
have a stake in the company simply by living in an
area where it operates, and if management had to
take that kind of stakeholder into account, they
would be directly involved in the deflections of
sodal responsibihty.
The recognition of the impact of executive action
on employees and customers dilutes the strict
agency-of-the-stockholders view of management,
but it does not address the question of the interests
of the agents themselves. One solution which would
help to bridge Friedman's gap between self-inter-
ested stockholders and altruistic managers is the
stock option package which gives managers a de-
finite stake in the interests of stockholders. But this
eases the problem by collapsing it in the direction
of stockholders, and would be tantamount to the
abandonment of loyal agency. Thus insofar as the
loyal agent is affirmed, this affirmation faces the
diffiision of agency over the disparate demands of
stakeholders and the logically contradictory anthro-
pological vision implied in the affirmation of totally
self-interested stockholders and totally other-serving
managerial agents.
Greed yields good
Beneath the fallacies of business isolationism and of
the expectation of unselfish agents of selfishness, the
central and determinative fallacy in the Friedman
program is almost certainly his assumption of what
has come to be regarded as the first principle of the
market system as outlined by Adam SmitL As a
proponent of the free market, Friedman can be seen
as a latter day disciple of Smith, an allegiance that he
himself owns in the article under consideration. That
Smith would own the economic system that claims
his patronage, however, is another matter. It is
doubtful whether he would endorse the assumption
of the autonomy of the economic realm and its
corollary, the marginalization of ethics in the single-
minded pursuit of economic efficiency. It is possible
that Smith was moving in rhii; direction in The
Wealth of Nations, but it would mean that he had
disowned his sensibilities as a moralist as evidenced
in The Theory ofthe Moral Sentiments. For repudiation
of this allegiance and vision would amount to a
complete reversal because not only was Smith first
and foremost a morahst, but his morality revolved
around the notion of sympathy, the complete
antithesis of the self-sufficient individual who stands
at the heart of the pure market vision. The more
adequate reading of Smith is almost cenainly the one
which holds that his economic scheme takes for
granted the moral context of mutual sympathy. Thus
it is highly unlikely that Smith the moralist would
have expected a good society to evolve from the
pursuit of individual greed. That expectation is only
possible when the distinctive demands of morality
have been silenced by the insistent imperative of
economic efficiency. That Friedman can expect a
society that gives free reign to economic specialists
to operate in purely economic terms, apart from
restrictions imposed from outside this economic
expertise, to be even a sustainable, much less a good,
society, is the determinative fallacy of his whole
program.
The central challei^e of Friedman's position has
been well stated by Bill Shaw. "Friedman will not be
dislodged until it can be shown that the social and
political institutions of this nation, that is, the
mechanisms for determining how power and control
over economic resources are distributed, are inade-
quate to promote the common good and social
justice,"' Until recently the prospects for such dis-
lodgement were not evident, the economic superi-
ority of this system appeared all but unassailable. For
some that superiority continues to be demonstrated
by the dramatic movement in this direction in
Russia and Eastern Europe. People who followed the
extreme socialism of communist regimes are recog-
nizing the advantages, and even the necessity, of
 Friedman Fallacies
developing a free market system. From another point
of view, however, this enthusiasm for free market
economics is particularly troublesome in the hght of
what can seen to be intrinsic defects in this system
itself. Two factors in the experience of the North
American versions of this system stand out as par-
ticularly worrisome. On the one hand, while this
system has achieved unheard of levels of produc-
tivity, it has also resulted in a dramatic increase in
disparity between rich and poor, with levels of
luxury assured for the few at the top and more and
more people at the other extreme relegated to food
banks and soup kitchens.
That this is not accidental but the inevitable
outcome of the free market direction is indicated
more clearly in the other development that prompts
concern about this economic system, the environ-
mental crisis. Not only is this system a significant
contributii^ factor to the depletion of natural
resources and the pollution that results from the
refinement and consumption of those resources, but
that effect is promoted by the inner logic of the
system itself. A system dedicated to the maximiza-
tion of shareholder profit has to treat environmental
costs as externalities, diseconomies that can only be
absorbed within the system under the pressure of the
kind of external force about which Friedman fanta-
sizes. These life-threatening costs give the lie to the
promise of the free market The market is free only
because nature and the most vulnerable of our own
species pay its real costs.
Still some might want to object that this reading
of the situation is also undermined by the eastern
European experience They might point out that the
environmental destruction found in western market
economies is nothing compared with the devastation
wrought by these communist regimes. But while, on
the surface, this provides further vindication of the
market system, this is so only so Iong as we continue
to operate with stereotypes of communist and
capitalist systems. Thus the market is seen as the free
and open economic system where priorities are
determined by individuab in contrast to the socially
planned, bureaucratically imposed state economic
system. A more comprehensive vision of what is at
stake is afforded, however, by the consideration that
rather than communism representing the polar
opposite of the capitalist market system, it can be
913
seen as a more intense version of capitalism. This is
true of the mature Marx himself, for instance, in that
his original humanistic concerns seem to progres-
sively displaced by preoccupation with economic
arrangements as foundational and determinative for
every other aspect of life. Insofar as communism
reflects this economic preoccupation of the mature
Marx, it can be seen as the epitome of the market
ideal. Horrified though Friedman would no doubt
be at being aligned with the coUectivist form of state
economics, insofar as that state exists for economic
reasons it reflects exactly the same vision of life as
Friedman's single-minded shareholders. And this is
the fundamental difficulty, the assumption that the
economic can be significant in itself and that con-
centration on its demands can, and even wdll, lead to
fullness of life. The impact on the environment, east
and west, suggests that this is not so. Reflection adds
that it cannot be so. The more the focus is on short-
term economic gain for its own sake the more
detrimental the long-term effect can be expected to
be. Whatever Adam Smith might say about the fate
of his proposals if he were to reappear on the scene
today, to expect that cumulative greed can yield
collective good is surely a particularly amazing
expectation, even in a paper that conceives of a
totally independent economic sphere peopled by
unselfish agents of selfishness.
Notes
' Friedman, M: 1970, "The Social Responsibility of Business
is to Increase its Profits', New York Times Magazine (Sep-
tember 13), pp. 32 et seq.
2 Birsch, D.: 1990, 'The Failure of Friedman's Agency
Argument', in J. R. Desjardins and J. J. McCall, eds. Con-
Umporary Issues in Business Ethia, second edition (Wadsworth
Publishiiig Co., Belmont, CA)
' Friedman, op. ciu, p. 33.
• Ibid., p. 126.
' Friedman, R. and Friedman, M.: 1981, Free lo Choose
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York). 'Introduction', p.
xvi.
° Friedman, op. dt., p. 124.
' Michalos, A. C: 1987, 'Moral Responsibility in Business',
in D. PofF and W. Waluchow, Business Ethics in Canada
(Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ont.), p. 21; see
also Michalos, A. C J 'The Loyal Agent's Argument', in D.
914 Colin Grant

Poff and W. Waluchow, Business Ethics in Canada, pp. 136— Dept. of Religious Studies,
141. Mount Allison University,
* Shaw, B.: 1988, 'A Reply to Thomas Mulligan's 'Critique jVof Brunswick, EOA 3C0,
of Milton Friedman's Essay 'The Social Responsibility of Canada
Business [Is, sic] to Increase Its Profits" ', Journal of Business
£(/iics7(7),p.538.