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Impact of globalization on human Impact of

globalization
rights: evidence from on human
rights
Sub-Saharan Africa
Aman Takiyar and N.V.M. Rao 1453
Department of Economics and Finance, Birla Institute of Technology and Science,
Pilani, India Received 27 December 2019
Revised 25 September 2020
Accepted 11 October 2020
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of globalization and its multiple dimensions on
human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Design/methodology/approach – The study extends the Poe and Tate (1994) model, which enumerates the
various determinants of human rights. Ordered probit estimation is used to estimate the impact of globalization
and its dimensions. For the purpose of empirical analysis, the period has been divided into three phases: short,
medium and long term. This helps in understanding how the impact of the different dimensions of globalization
has evolved over a period of time. Furthermore, analysis has been carried out to detect causality between
human rights and globalization.
Findings – As per the results, overall globalization and social dimension of globalization do have a positive
impact on human rights in long and medium term and, also, Granger-cause human rights. The political
dimension of globalization has a positive relation with human rights, though there exists no causality between
the two. On the other hand, the economic dimension of globalization fails to have a statistically significant
impact on human rights. Impact of the social dimension of globalization dominates that of other dimensions of
globalization.
Originality/value – This is one of the few studies that examine, in an empirical fashion, the impact of
globalization on human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Keywords Economic globalization, Social globalization, Political globalization, Human rights, Sub-Saharan
Africa
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
The term “globalization” has been used, in both academic literature and popular media, as a
condition, a process, a force and as a system. Given these competing identities, there arises the
scope for confusion. As per Roland Robertson, professor of sociology at University of
Aberdeen, globalization is a concept that refers to both compression of the world and the
intensification of the consciousness that the world should be seen and treated as a whole.
David Held, professor of politics and international relations, Durham University, states that
globalization is a set of processes that symbolize an evolution in the spatial organization of
social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their intensity, extensity, velocity and
impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity,
interaction and the exercise of power. Globalization is an economic, political, social and
ideological phenomenon that carries with it unanticipated, often contradictory, and
polarizing consequences (Sjolander, 1996). As per the general view, it seems as if
globalization should have little to do with the state of human rights. Yet, the spread of the
idea of human rights worldwide has paralleled globalization in the recent history of mankind.
Globalization should not be seen as just the sum total of unprecedented economic, social and
International Journal of Social
political processes, but also as the harbinger of social change brought about by the responses Economics
of the people. Vol. 47 No. 12, 2020
pp. 1453-1480
Ideas of human rights have spread across geography and time. International norms for the © Emerald Publishing Limited
0306-8293
protection of human rights are much more developed and universally recognized than at any DOI 10.1108/IJSE-12-2019-0752
IJSE other point in history. At large, the avenues for appealing against repression of any kind are
47,12 growing in the global civil society. While globalization may have led to the establishment of a
global human rights regime, it may also have led to the creation of unconventional sources
and ways of human rights abuse. Although, broadly speaking, human rights practices have
seen considerable improvement, this improvement has not been completely universal or
linear (Milner et al., 1999). Views of the governments and societies toward human rights
practices still vary tremendously. This coupled with uneven access to the mechanisms of
1454 justice has left certain countries and societies, especially the ones already at the fringes of past
century’s economic development, with little to no chance at redressal.
For instance, one can look at the case of Sub-Saharan African countries. Human rights
violation was an important issue for the anti-colonial movements of the 1950 and 1960s.
These movements helped in mobilizing national and international support for African
self-determination. During the Cold War era, many governments in Sub-Saharan Africa were
replaced by authoritarian regimes on account of alliance with either the USA or Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, human rights violations became more prevalent. These regimes were at the
liberty to violate the basic rights of their citizens, as they were supported more by the foreign
aid than the electoral roll. For decades, it has just been a handful of human right activists who,
despite all threats and atrocities against them, have been trying for the protection of basic
human rights. But, as democracy has spread across Africa in the recent decades,
governments and societies are realizing the importance of human rights protection for the
long-term economic and social development.
To the best of our knowledge, few empirical studies deal with the impact of globalization
on human rights in Africa. Most of the empirical studies in the context of Africa dwell on the
subject of globalization and its impact on governance, and not specifically on a sub-aspect of
governance (i.e. human rights). The current study presents conclusions that are robust to the
choice of multiple methodologies such as panel ordered probit regression and pooled mean
estimation. The results are also robust to alternate measure of human rights and ethnic
fractionalization. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to analyze the relation between
globalization and human rights over different time frames.
In the present study, an attempt has been made to extend the Poe and Tate (1994) model by
empirically investigating the impact of globalization on human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The next section presents a discussion about the impact of various dimensions of
globalization on human rights and the related literature. Section 3 then presents how human
rights have been measured in the current study, motivation for the chosen control variables
and the choice of methodology. The results are shown in Section 4. The final section
concludes the paper.

2. Globalization and human rights – a discussion

The effect globalization has had and will have on the condition of human rights affairs has
rapidly become a concern among the policy makers, scholars and the global community at
large (Friedman, 2000; Schmitz and Sikkink, 2002; Wolf, 2004; Bhagwati, 2004; Stilwell, 2006).
Broadly speaking, two opposing schools of thought have emerged in this regard. Some are of
the view that the integration of the states at economic, social and political levels has an
uplifting effect on the human rights (Russett and Oneal, 2001). The opposing group believes
the effect of integration is quite the opposite.
One of the many reasons human rights violation comes to happen is the violence and social
conflict arising from the abuse of political power by the state, which, at times, is exercised to
bestow political privilege to certain groups. Going by the ideal setup of free markets, this is in
stark contrast to how it should operate. Allocation of resources and voluntary exchange of
goods and services as per the supply and demand are features of the free market. Free
markets are believed to allocate resources better than the state, thus being enablers of Impact of
individual wealth and productivity (Bilson, 1982; Bjornskov and Foss, 2008). As these globalization
wealthy individuals are expected to form a flourishing tax base, the governing authorities
have the incentive to maintain a stable environment in the economy and have consistent rules
on human
for all. Olson (1993) has referred to this as the social bargain between the people and the rights
“stationary bandit.” In other words, developing countries that get better integrated into the
global network will resolve the problem of underdevelopment and gain economically.
Economic development, in turn, is one of the guarantors of state respect for human rights 1455
(Busse, 2004; Apter, 2008). Li (2006) states that in the event of an imminent war, the
probability of receiving foreign direct investment and its magnitude reduce for the host
countries. Thus, fearing loss of investments and trade, countries tend to lose the willingness
to go to war (Li and Sacko, 2002; Iqbal and Zorn, 2006). And, nations that are exposed to the
global networks tend to absorb the norms of functioning and market culture, which
ultimately binds individual states to the rule of law (Mousseau and Mousseau, 2008). Thus,
the more connected to global markets a country is, the more likely it will respect global rules
to avoid costly sanctions (Dreher et al., 2008). To sum it up, it can be said that economic
globalization is likely to affect political violence negatively directly due to increased material
well-being and indirectly by diffusion of respect for human rights.
Though focus of most of the scholars has been on economic dimension of globalization, the
social and political dimensions of globalization can also affect the spread of human rights
norms and subsequently, generate massive international pressure on national governments
and multi-national corporations (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Social integration impacts a
state’s human rights performance through the exchange of ideas and norms, increased
communication, public awareness, cultural diversity, etc., which is affected by immigration,
tourism, newspapers, smartphones, television, internet, social media, etc. New attitudes and
norms toward human rights disseminate from cultured and well-functioning societies
(Bhagwati, 2004). Social globalization has the power to act as a deterrent against the acts of
human rights abuse due to the adverse implications for the perpetrators. A tremendous
increase in the reach of the internet and other communication media has also increased the
chances of human rights violations being discovered and that too at a greater speed than
before (Rosenau, 2003). Rosenau (2003) also states that social globalization helps in mobilizing
supporters of human rights with increased ease and speed. International groups and
networks have been formed with the goal of opposing oppressive regimes. Social activists
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been helped tremendously in their
mission of informing the masses about the problem of human rights violation (Finnemore
and Sikkink, 1998). Tourism and migration have increased the acceptance of different
ethnicities, religions, genders and sexual preferences (Rosenau, 2003). As a result, social
integration has incentivized governments to recognize and adhere to internationally accepted
norms of human rights (Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994). Richards et al. (2001) state that
globalization leads to the rising of the middle class, which is capable of demanding
fundamental rights.
Political globalization lends support to human rights through two different channels.
More a country is politically integrated with global politics, more it is integrated economically
(De Haan et al., 2006). Many argue that economic globalization leads to increased wealth,
establishment of efficient judiciary and greater respect for personal freedom and human
rights (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Apodaca, 2001). Because of the
increased modernization and subsequent political stability brought about by economic
globalization, governments lose motive to control through means that may violate human
rights of the citizens (Gelleny and McCoy, 2001). Secondly, fearing high economic and
diplomatic costs of ostracism, a country that is more politically bound to others is likely to
have common preferences about human rights sometimes even overriding the local belief and
IJSE traditions. Membership in international organizations provides privileges to its member
47,12 nations, which they do not want to be discontinued in the event of a human rights violation.
Even though there are multiple studies that point to a positive relationship between
globalization and respect for human rights, it is still doubtful if increasing globalization
translates into better levels of human rights. A few prominent economists, such as Rodrik
(1997) and Stiglitz (2002), are of the view that instead of diffusion of values of justice,
globalization and the conditions imposed by it on the poor countries can lead to social unrest.
1456 Globalization, though accompanied by all its concomitant positive effects, has the potential to
take away the autonomy of the governments (especially of poorer countries) and thus may
prevent them from acting for the welfare of the local community. Lowering social standards
of labor force to retain the competitive edge in the global market may spur a race to the
bottom. Evans (1999) goes as far to claim that globalization may even generate incentives for
the government to exploit disenfranchised people. Benefits of trade and foreign investment
may not reach every section of the society (Chua, 2003). Hafner-Burton (2005) finds evidence
supporting the claim that in export-led countries, the probability of suppression rises with the
level of exports. Globalization may increase the size of the pie, but it may be less equally
distributed. This, in turn, may become the source of simmering anger and, later, turmoil in
those sections of the society. This may result in higher levels of repression and political
violence as the state authority may be challenged. Due to problems arising from strain on
natural resources, social infrastructure, employment opportunities, citizens of developed
countries may respond negatively toward the immigrants. Additionally, in the event of
human rights abuse, even though governments may be rebuked by media, NGOs and
international organizations, they may offset the withdrawal of state violence with violation in
some other way (Hafner-Burton, 2008).
Even though there exists large volume of research on human rights and its determinants
and its impact on economic growth, empirical evidence on the how globalization impacts
human rights is sparse. The existing studies in this context use very simple and single-
dimension measures of globalization. Instead of using proxies for globalization, it is better to
use an index that aggregates several indicators of global integration. For this purpose, the
present study utilizes the KOF Index of Globalization, which was created by Dreher (2006)
and has been updated by Gygli et al. (2019). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the idea of human rights
protection is relatively new. In 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted by the United Nations, all the African countries, barring just three of them, were
under colonial rule. After gaining independence, the state of human rights in African nations
continued to be pathetic, as the citizens were subjected to forceful repression and persecution.
Even though the objectives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were based on the
principles contained in the Universal Declaration, the ground reality in most of the nations is
quite the opposite (Nyanduga, 2007). Even today, the struggle is far from over. Human rights
activists continue to struggle against oppressive regimes and their nexus with opportunistic
business firms. Critics of governments are harassed and charged on false grounds. Killings of
protestors by state police go unpunished. Kodila-Tedika (2018) presents evidence in support
of conditional convergence in governance among African countries. Through this conclusion,
he implies that there exists little reason to believe that the level of governance can improve in
Africa. Basic human rights have been crushed in many African countries under the pretext of
socio-economic development and nation-building. The abuse of human rights can be
attributed to numerous issues, such as poverty, debt and corruption (Magnarella, 2000).
Genyi and Akpa (2017) state that globalization can lead to better governance in Africa
through the medium of democratization. Asongu (2014) and Lalountas et al. (2011) confirm
the positive role that globalization has on improving the state of governance in African
countries. For a panel of 53 African countries, Amavilah et al. (2017) conclude that trade
integration positively affects the state of peace and stability within a country. They later state
that this improved state of peace and stability leads to better governance. Asongu (2017) Impact of
investigates the impact of globalization on governance in 51 African countries using globalization
instrumental variable quantile regression. He concludes that globalization has a positive
impact of political governance. McMillan has established that globalization is the main driver
on human
behind progressive institutional reforms in Africa. Aka (2001) states that the interaction rights
between globalization and human rights has had a positive impact on the state of human
rights in Africa. On the other hand, privatization and growth of transnational modes of
governance, both the by-products of globalization, can lead to concentration of immense 1457
authority and power. This, in turn, may negatively impact the liberties of common men
(Akech, 2013). As Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) remark, it is important to note that
governance may refer to political governance (political stability, violence, voice and
accountability), economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and
institutional quality (corruption control and rule of law). In this context, we would like to take
this opportunity to highlight that within the framework of the present study, our focus is not
on the impact of globalization on governance as a whole, but on its impact on a singular
aspect of governance, i.e. government’s respect for human rights.
Thus, in the backdrop of the above-mentioned arguments supporting and opposing
globalization, an attempt has been made to figure out in an empirical fashion if we can benefit
the state of affairs of human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa by integrating them into the global
scenario or such an attempt will reinforce the efforts of the governments against human
rights. For this purpose, this study employs panel data for 40 Sub-Saharan African countries
over the period 1976–2017. Data for the KOF Globalization Index and our human rights
measure, Political Terror Scale (PTS) (our measure of human rights), are available from 1970
to 2017 and 1976 to 2019, respectively. Incidentally, by 1976, all of the Sub-Saharan Africa
(barring Namibia) had gained independence from the colonial rule. Thus, the measure of
human rights used does not reflect the stance or, to be more precise, actions of the colonial
powers but that of the native governments. Furthermore, for the purpose of analysis, the
period has been divided into three phases: short term (2007–2017), medium term (1997–2017)
and long term (1976–2017). This helps in understanding how the impact of the different
dimensions of globalization has evolved over a period of time.

3. Data and methodology

3.1 Measuring human rights
For the purpose of the analysis, our definition of human rights follows Gibney et al. (2019).
Their PTS dataset is designed to quantitatively measure political terror. As per the
framework of the scale, political terror refers to the violation of the human rights to the
physical integrity (personal integrity or security) of the people carried out by the state agents
within the territorial boundaries of the state. The dataset is released annually, and at present,
covers more than 150 countries from 1976 to 2018. The scope of human rights violation
captured by the PTS includes torture, cruel treatment, sexual violence, unlawful use of force,
extrajudicial executions, political imprisonments and assassinations, kidnappings and forced
disappearances that have been sanctioned or perpetrated by the agents of the state. Agents of
the state include, but are not limited to, police, security personnel, military, intelligence
agents, militias, death squads, political parties and their offshoots, mercenaries and private
military contractors.
The data for the PTS are provided by three sources: the annual human rights reports of
Amnesty International, the US Department of State and Human Rights Watch. As these
reports describe the condition of human rights in a non-quantitative manner, they are
analyzed by at least two coders who assign a score for each country in the given year on a
five-point ordinal scale for each of the three sources. A higher value on the scale means
IJSE deteriorating levels of human rights (refer to Appendix 1 for more information). The present
47,12 study uses scores for the reports of Amnesty International. Scores for Human Rights Watch
report, which are available for a limited period (2013–2017). Scores for US Department of
State reports have not been considered for the analysis because, as noted by McCormick and
Mitchell (1997), these reports may be politically motivated and may be structured to be used
as a political instrument. Blume and Voigt (2004) state that this fact cannot be excluded from
consideration that US allies or countries that receive substantial from the USA are reported in
1458 a more favorable light.
Figure 1 shows the unweighted average of the PTS scores for World, Sub-Saharan Africa
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over a
period of 42 years from 1976 to 2017. The average PTS score for world has remained fairly
constant after 1990. Since then, the average PTS score for Sub-Saharan Africa has risen
above the global average and has always remained well above that. On the other hand, OECD
countries witnessed a drop in the average PTS score, and since then, it has managed to remain
between 1.5 and 2. This clearly draws attention to the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has been
lagging in terms of human rights.
Since 1980s, PTS has been used by researchers in over 500 studies (Carleton and Stohl,
1985; Henderson, 1996; Blanton, 2000; Jorgensen, 2009; Fariss and Dancy, 2017; Bardall, 2018;
Fong, 2019; Aarhus and Jakobsen, 2019; Chu, 2019). Other than PTS, many studies have also
used the Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) index created by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) to
the capture the state of human rights. Both PTS and PIR are coded from the same source and
capture the same category of human right violations (De Soysa and Vadlamannati, 2011;
Dreher et al., 2012). But one of the limitations of PIR is that the data for it are available only
from 1981 to 2011. Though this does not limit the present analysis much, there are other
concerns as well. PIR is a sum of four other indices each capturing a type of human rights
abuse. Such a kind of disaggregation complicates matters and provides a misleading picture
of human rights standards when comparing two countries (Wood and Gibney, 2010). In the
3.5
Political Terror Scale (PTS)
1.5 2 2.5 3

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Year
Figure 1. World OECD
Development of PTS Sub - Saharan Africa
over time
act of summation, implicit is the assumption that an extrajudicial killing is same as an Impact of
instance of arbitrary imprisonment or an act of torture is equivalent to a disappearance. One globalization
can raise valid doubts to the assertion stated by the creators of PIR (Cingranelli and Richards,
1999) that states follow a sequence of abuse beginning with imprisonment to acts of torture
on human
and finally disappearance or killing. The PIR index also does not factor the size of the country rights
under consideration; for example, 100 incidents of extrajudicial killings in the most populated
country, China, are given the same treatment as 100 incidents of extrajudicial killings in a
country like Nepal, which has 1/50th the population of China. This in particular does not allow 1459
for proper comparison of the state of affairs in two countries.

3.2 Determinants of human rights

Borrowing from the framework developed in the pioneering study by Poe and Tate (1994), in
the present study, control variables pertaining to the following dimensions have been chosen.
Poe and Tate (1994) mention that the government’s respect for human rights depends on six
factors:
(1) The level of economic development;
(2) The population size;
(3) The level of democracy or the kind of government rule;
(4) Involvement in civil wars;
(5) British cultural influence; and
(6) Prevalence of military regime.
Accordingly, the model controls for the above factors. The effects of economic development
have been controlled by including the log of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in
constant 2010 US dollars. As the quantity and quality of goods and services increase, scarcity
reduces, and thus, the potential for conflict between the state and its citizens reduces
(Henderson, 1991). With increasing population, scarcity of goods may increase, which in turn
may create a potential for conflicts (Henderson, 1991). Rapid population growth also increases
the percentage of young people, which, as a group, is generally more destabilizing (Poe and
Tate, 1994). Thus, log of population is used as one of the control variables. Also, as the size of
the population increases, there are greater chances that it becomes fractionalized, and in the
presence of multiple ethnic groups, the probability of conflict is higher. This factor has been
controlled by including the degree of ethnic fractionalization indicator in the model, Historical
Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (Drazanova, 2019).
If a government feels threatened, it may respond by repressing the citizens. Such conflicts
can be resolved more peacefully and in a systematic manner in democracies (Henderson,
1991; Poe and Tate, 1994). Democracy provides an opportunity to the electorate to abandon
the ruling party in the next elections. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) state that democracies
improve governments’ respect for human rights. Democracy is controlled by using the Polity
IV index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). Furthermore, involvement of countries in civil wars
surely increases the instances of human rights violations. Burkhart (2002) states that during a
war, civil liberties are disregarded even in the most democratic countries. Conflict years are
defined as those years that are marred by internal conflicts, internationalized internal
conflicts or interstate conflicts. For a given year or observation, number of peace years refers
to the total number of war-free years prior to that year. These war data have been collected
from the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Burkhart
(2002) state that British colonial experience and its cultural experience is associated with
IJSE greater respect for human rights. Thus, we capture the effects of British legal heritage by
47,12 using a dummy variable. Additionally, abundance of natural resources has been associated
with increased repression and brutality due to the so-called natural resource curse (De Soysa
and Binningsbo, 2009). This is controlled by including natural resource rents as a percentage
of GDP.

1460 3.3 Methodology adopted

The following model utilizes data for 40 Sub-Saharan countries for the period 1976–2017. As
data are not available for some indicators for some countries, the panel data are unbalanced.
The model to be estimated is specified as:
PTSit ¼ β1 :PTSit−1 þ β2 :Vit þ β3 :Zit þ υt þ uit (1)

where PTSit refers to PTS in country i at year t, Vit refers to either of the globalization indices
(namely, KOF Globalization Index, Index of Economic Globalization, Index of Social
Globalization and Index of Political Globalization) and Zit is a vector of control variables. υt are
time fixed effects, and uit is a well-behaved error term. It is to be noted that the model includes
a lagged dependent variable. This is because the state of human rights develops gradually
over the years, and the present decision to repress or not depends on the past behaviour of the
state (Poe et al., 1999).
The models are estimated using ordered probit method with time dummies and robust
standard errors. We report the results of the regression over periods of varying length – going
back different number of years from the last year (2017) of the analysis. This minor
modification helps us in getting a sense of any changes in the impact of globalization over
time. Time periods are divided into short term (10 years; 2008–2017), medium term (1998–
2017) and long term (1976–2017). No doubt, it is debatable what short, medium and long terms
mean. Despite that, by differing the estimation period, we can get a sense of how the impact of
globalization indices evolves over time. Another reason being that the impact of
globalization, whether positive or negative, cannot be observed in the short term. To make
a judgment on the effectiveness of globalization as a tool for social change over the short term
would be akin to passing judgment on the impact of the industrial revolution in 1780 or 1800
(Howard-Hassman, 2005). The idea to evaluate the impact of globalization over different time
horizons has been inspired from Rajan and Subramanian (2008), who evaluated the impact of
aid over long, medium and short run. This was done in response to Clemens et al. (2004)
concluding that aid can be disaggregated on the basis of short- and long-term impacts.
Similarly, it has been noted by Howard-Hassman (2005) that the impact of globalization on
human rights cannot be observed in the short run, and its medium- and long-run effects may
be very different from those in the short term. He argues that the process of globalizing may
adversely impact the state of human rights in the short run, whereas in the long run,
globalization may lead us into a world of increased prosperity and peace. Thus, in this study,
we segregate the total time (from 1976 to 2017) into short, medium and long term, in an
attempt to capture the essence of the above statement empirically. Howard-Hassman (2005)
further points out the shortcomings of Meyer (1996) and Smith (1999), both of whom used
data for 52 countries in 1985 and 1990, respectively, to estimate the relationship between
investments by multinational corporations (MNCs) and human rights. During this very short
period, both of them reported conflicting results. This is because both Meyer (1996) and Smith
(1999) base their empirical investigation on the fact that the relationship between
globalization and human rights could be determined over a few years. Thus, the
relationship cannot be predicted over a short period of time and tends to vary in short and
long runs. Howard-Hassman (2005) further argues that the long-term period of the second
Great Transformation can be shortened, by technology, from 200 to 50 years.
 Furthermore, Blume and Voigt (2007) state the level of human rights in a country also Impact of
impacts the extent to which it can be a part of the global network. For example, prevalence of globalization
violence and political instability can deter trade, investments, tourism and different kinds of
cultural exchange. On the contrary, greater respect for human rights may lead to higher levels
on human
of integration. Such concerns of endogeneity can be tackled using valid and strong rights
instruments for globalization though they are hard to come by. Thus, the question of
causality is addressed using a causality test. Our methodology is based on Hurlin (2005),
panel non-causality test. It consists of a simple test of the Granger (1969) non-causality 1461
hypothesis. Globalization Granger-causes respect or disrespect for human rights if the lagged
globalization levels help us to forecast the level of human rights. To test the relationship
between the two variables, the following model is considered:
Xn X n
yit ¼ αk yit−k þ βk xit−k þ εit (2)
k¼1 k¼1

To test whether x Granger-causes y, an F-test is run on the βk. The null hypothesis of this test
is that x does not Granger-cause y. Two main panel unit root tests have been used to check the
stationarity of variables used in the above model: Im et al. (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999).
These tests conclude the rejection of non-stationary hypothesis.

4. Empirical results
The results of the regressions estimating the impact of globalization on human rights in Sub-
Saharan Africa are presented in Tables 1–4.

Long term Medium term Short term

Lagged dependent 0.825 0.788 0.906

(9.72)*** (7.06)*** (4.15)***
KOF globalization (log) 0.967 1.061 1.028
(2.92)*** (1.70)* (1.21)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.020 0.010 0.058
(0.18) (0.07) (0.37)
Population (log) 0.245 0.299 0.234
(4.86)*** (3.66)*** (2.29)**
Polity IV 0.033 0.063 0.048
(3.15)*** (3.38)*** (1.80)*
Ethnic fractionalization 0.202 0.126 0.075
(0.92) (0.29) (0.12)
Britain legal origin 0.254 0.360 0.154
(1.74)* (1.78)* (0.62)
Natural resource rent 0.012 0.014 0.013
(2.95)*** (2.10)** (1.50)
Conflict year 0.925 0.967 0.663
(6.59)*** (5.62)*** (3.20)***
Peace years 0.003 0.011 0.024
(0.35) (0.47) (0.42)
Observations 1,120 552 253
Countries 40 38 36 Table 1.
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.34 0.35 KOF globalization
Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time index and human
dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively rights
IJSE Long term Medium term Short term
47,12
Lagged dependent 0.838 0.798 0.893
(9.81)*** (7.06)*** (3.61)***
Economic globalization (log) 0.128 0.067 0.086
(0.67) (0.17) (0.11)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.125 0.094 0.032
1462 (1.08) (0.73) (0.21)
Population (log) 0.211 0.252 0.201
(4.18)*** (3.01)*** (1.89)
Polity IV 0.035 0.068 0.056
(3.37)*** (3.69)*** (2.03)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.304 0.226 0.169
(1.30) (0.51) (0.25)
Britain legal origin 0.175 0.282 0.093
(1.37) (1.47) (0.39)
Natural resource rent 0.011 0.014 0.013
(2.89)*** (2.02)** (1.41)
Conflict year 0.958 0.989 0.675
(7.10)*** (6.00)*** (3.24)
Peace years 0.002 0.004 0.049
(0.17) (0.18) (0.69)
Observations 1,120 552 253
Countries 40 38 36
Table 2. Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.35
Economic globalization Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time
and human rights dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively

Long term Medium term Short term

Lagged dependent 0.825 0.793 0.866

(9.30)*** (6.95)*** (3.98)***
Social globalization (log) 0.578 0.674 1.057
(2.04)** (1.69)* (1.32)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.028 0.031 0.134
(0.26) (0.25) (0.70)
Population (log) 0.146 0.202 0.159
(1.94)* (2.09)** (1.45)
Polity IV 0.027 0.061 0.049
(2.51)** (3.17)*** (1.75)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.427 0.255 0.144
(1.93)* (0.61) (0.24)
Britain legal origin 0.309 0.376 0.222
(1.84)* (1.92)* (0.81)
Natural resource rent 0.010 0.012 0.012
(2.42)** (1.96)** (1.36)
Conflict year 0.929 0.961 0.649
(7.04)*** (5.54)*** (3.05)
Peace years 0.001 0.003 0.034
(0.14) (0.15) (0.58)
Observations 1,120 552 253
Countries 40 38 36
Table 3. Pseudo R2 0.36 0.34 0.35
Social globalization Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time
and human rights dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
 Long term Medium term Short term
Impact of
globalization
Lagged dependent 0.834 0.787 0.901 on human
(9.84)*** (6.99)*** (4.09)***
Political globalization (log) 0.514 0.689 0.860 rights
(2.04)** (1.62) (1.28)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.100 0.080 0.015
(0.99) (0.64) (0.10) 1463
Population (log) 0.320 0.365 0.318
(4.01)*** (3.36)*** (2.20)**
Polity IV 0.036 0.065 0.048
(3.50)*** (3.46)*** (1.73)*
Ethnic fractionalization 0.156 0.092 0.051
(0.62) (0.20) (0.08)
Britain legal origin 0.140 0.279 0.082
(1.11) (1.39) (0.31)
Natural resource rent 0.010 0.012 0.011
(2.53)** (2.02)** (1.32)
Conflict year 0.950 0.965 0.668
(6.96)*** (5.67)*** (3.28)***
Peace years 0.006 0.008 0.032
(0.62) (0.36) (0.56)
Observations 1,120 552 253
Countries 40 38 36
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.34 0.35 Table 4.
Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time Political globalization
dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively and human rights

According to Table 1, government’s respect for human rights increases with the increasing
levels of overall globalization in the long and medium terms, though the positive impact of
globalization is not significant in the short term. The PTS score ranges from 1 (secure rule of
law) to 5 (expansion of terror to the whole population). Therefore, the negative coefficient
suggests that higher levels of the corresponding indicator reduce the level of violations,
resulting in increased respect for human rights. As per Table 2, economic globalization fails
to impact the government’s outlook toward human rights in any of the timeframes. Social
globalization has a positive and significant impact on human rights in the long and medium
terms, but not in the short term. The results in Table 4 suggest that political globalization
lends a positive impact to the state of affairs of the human rights only in the long term.
As it is an ordered probit model, the marginal effects of globalization and its dimensions
are not easy to interpret; thus, we have reported the same for the long term in Table 5. The
estimated probabilities reported in the table correspond to the situation when the respective
dimension of globalization is increased by one standard deviation. According to these figures,
social globalization seems to have the largest impact on the PTS score. On increasing the level
of social globalization by one standard deviation, the estimated probability of observing a
score of 1 and 2 increases by 0.58 and 17.76%, respectively. The estimated probability of
observing a score of 3, 4 and 5 decreases by 4.27, 12.94 and 0.97%, respectively. The effects
reported in the table are not always statistically significant (marginal effects of economic
globalization for each of the scores are insignificant), though some marginal effects of social
and political globalization are.
Finally, we report the results for Granger causality tests in Table 6. The p-values reported
are to be interpreted as follows: the first entry of p-value as 0.00 suggests that PTS is
Granger-caused by economic globalization, whereas, as per the p-value of 0.14, PTS does not
IJSE PTS scale Dimensions of globalization Estimated probabilities (in %) p-values
47,12
1 Econ 0.13 0.495
Soc 0.58 0.216
Pol 0.52 0.161
2 Econ 3.93 0.507
Soc 17.76 0.048
1464 Pol 15.87 0.037
3 Econ 0.94 0.503
Soc 4.27 0.152
Pol 3.82 0.050
4 Econ 2.87 0.510
Soc 12.94 0.033
Pol 11.6 0.047
5 Econ 0.24 0.515
Table 5. Soc 1.12 0.107
Marginal effects Pol 0.97 0.093

Variable A Variable B p-values Conclusion

Economic PTS 0.00 Economic globalization Granger-causes PTS

globalization
PTS Economic 0.14
globalization
Social globalization PTS 0.00 Social globalization Granger-causes PTS
PTS Social globalization 0.53
Political globalization PTS 0.86 No Granger causality
PTS Political globalization 0.16
Globalization Index PTS 0.04 KOF Globalization Index Granger-causes
PTS
PTS Globalization Index 0.11
Table 6. Note(s): p-values for Granger causality tests are reported using two lags. The null hypothesis is that variable
Granger causality tests A does not Granger-cause variable B

Granger-cause economic globalization. Granger causality runs from economic, social and
overall globalization indices to human rights. There is no causality between political
globalization and human rights.
Looking at the above set of results, it can be concluded that social globalization dominates
the other dimensions of globalization. It has a positive impact on human rights, which
fructifies much before political globalization can bring a change, and it also Granger-causes
human rights (unlike political globalization). Social interdependence or integration among
countries is able to transform the outlook of society much more than economic or political
globalization. Policy makers in Sub-Saharan African countries, other developed countries,
international bodies and human right activists should first attempt to connect the people of
these countries at the social and cultural level, rather than only focusing on trade and capital
flows. The above findings are in line with Stiglitz (2002) and Soysa and Vadlamannati (2011).
Soysa and Vadlamannati (2011) accuse economists and political scientists of ignoring the
social effects of globalization and attaching undue importance to trade, capital flows and
international diplomacy. Stiglitz (2002) states that by empowering capitalists, we are
endangering the interest of a community. This can suppress progress of underprivileged
society due to instances of suppression and resistance. Hafner-Burton (2005), using trade as Impact of
a measure of globalization, too does not find a significant impact of economic globalization. globalization
The above findings also resonate with those of Dreher et al. (2012), who state that social,
political and overall globalization have a positive impact on PIR (a measure of human
on human
rights). rights
Human rights instruments allow for the exercise of the rights subject to the local social and
cultural realities and proclaimed norms, which, when given a chance, may be positively
influenced by norms elsewhere. This change can be brought about by numerable agents of 1465
social globalization: tourism, freedom of press, internet, cultural exchange programs and
exchange of ideas through literature, movies, etc. These agents of social globalization help in
creating awareness (that flows both ways) and, also, forging human connections. Today’s
means of communication and interaction are also powerful tools of non-formal education with
the potential to change individual and collective views, values and identities. Despite the
importance of social diffusion, Sub-Saharan Africa lags other regions of the world (refer
Appendix 6 for information on some of the parameters). Among all this, governments of
Sub-Saharan African countries do have a role of active regulation to play. They should also
not allow unrestricted contact with external elements, as this may become a cause of trouble
for the internal situation of these countries. Influence of anti-social elements (such as radicals,
terrorists, etc.) may introduce false beliefs into the society, which may ultimately wreak havoc
on the state of human rights.
Furthermore, by looking at the results for overall index of globalization, it can be said that
Africa needs involvement with the global network at all levels over a longer period of time so
as to bring a positive change in the grim state of human affairs. In the short term, the effects of
globalization do not start bearing results. The developed countries and those other countries
that are recently getting involved in Africa in any way (such as China) should commit
themselves to the betterment of the local populace over a longer time span.

4.1 Robustness checks

4.1.1 Alternate measure of human rights: physical integrity rights (PIR). As a measure of
robustness, the results have also been reported using an alternate index for measuring the
state of human rights, PIR index. It was created by Cingranelli and Richards (1999). It is an
index created by the addition of the values for indicators capturing four different aspects of
human rights violation, namely, torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and
disappearance. The values of PIR range from 0 to 8, where 0 signifies there exists no
government respect for these four rights in the country and 8 signifies full government
respect. Reports on Human Rights Practices by the US State Department have been taken as
the primary source for coding this index. Only violations of human rights by the government
within the territorial borders of the country are counted for the construction of the index. This
puts the PIR index and PTS at par in terms of the aim of both the indices. As data for the PIR
index are available for the limited period, 1981–2011, periods are not broken down for the
estimation, as was done previously. The following table reports the results of the analysis
(Table 7).
The results obtained are quite similar to the previous results for each of the globalization
index in the long run. KOF Globalization Index and other sub-indices of globalization have a
positive relationship with government’s respect for human rights. As the PIR index ranges
from 0 (rampant human rights violation) to 8 (secure rule of law), a positive coefficient on
globalization indices suggests that higher levels of the corresponding globalization index are
accompanied by reduction in violations of human rights. All sub-indices of globalization have
a positive and statistically significant coefficients, with the coefficient of social globalization
being the highest in magnitude among the sub-indices.
IJSE KOF Economic Social Political
47,12 globalization globalization globalization globalization

Lagged dependent 0.434 0.434 0.433 0.434

(10.69)*** (10.64)*** (10.66)*** (10.56)***
KOF Globalization (log) 0.201
(5.03)***
1466 Economic globalization 0.129
(log)
(1.97)*
Social globalization (log) 0.140
(7.03)***
Political globalization 0.026
(log)
(2.7)**
Per capita GDP (log) 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.021
(0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.31)
Population (log) 0.303 0.291 0.282 0.304
(6.43)*** (6.07)*** (5.07)*** (5.03)***
Polity IV 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.047
(4.63)*** (4.89)*** (4.38)*** (4.86)***
Ethnic fractionalization 0.185 0.197 0.222 0.207
(0.92) (1.01) (1.11) (1.01)
Britain legal origin 0.147 0.148 0.165 0.128
(1.53) (1.60) (1.58) (1.41)
Natural resource rent 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008
(1.94)* (1.95)* (1.89)* (1.85)*
Conflict year 0.973 0.975 0.973 0.983
(6.12)*** (6.38)*** (6.29)*** (6.46)***
Peace years 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
(1.87)* (1.75)* (1.77)* (1.81)*
Observations 1,091 1,091 1,091 1,091
Table 7. Countries 40 40 40 40
2
KOF Globalization Pseudo R 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Indices and PIR index Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time
(1981–2011) dummies. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively

4.1.2 Alternate measure of ethnic fractionalization. As another test of robustness, we

replace the previous measure of ethnic fractionalization (earlier captured using Historical
Index of Ethnic Fractionalization; Drazanova, 2019) by the ethnic fractionalization index
created by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Fearon’s ethnic fractionalization index is approximated
on the basis of similarity between languages. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 signifies
that a single language is spoken by the entire population and 1 signifies that multiple
unrelated languages are spoken by the population. The results with the alternate measure of
fractionalization are presented in Appendix 7. Similar conclusions can be drawn from these
results as earlier.
4.1.3 Pooled mean group estimation. In an attempt to make our conclusion robust to the
methodologies being deployed, pooled mean group (PMG) estimation of the model has been
presented. This builds on the concepts outlined in Lee et al. (1997) and Shin et al. (1998). As
both N (541) and T (542) are large, it is possible to apply PMG estimation. The following
equation is estimated using the xtdcce2 command in Stata. It was developed by Ditzen (2019):
Δyi; t ¼ αi þ γ 1 : yi;t−1 þ γ 2 : xi;t þ β0;i : Δxit þ ei;t (3)
where yi;t refers to the PTS in country i at year t, xi;t refers to the vector of either of the Impact of
globalization indices (namely, KOF Globalization Index, Index of Economic Globalization, globalization
Index of Social Globalization and Index of Political Globalization) along with the control
variables and ei;t is a well-behaved error term. The coefficients on the level variables capture
on human
the long-run effects on yi;t, whereas the intermediate or short-run effects are captured by β0;i. rights
PMG estimation constrains the long-run coefficients to be homogenous across the cross-
sectional units, while the short-run coefficients can be heterogenous. With a view to brevity,
we report only the pooled coefficients for lagged dependent variable, differenced 1467
globalization indices and levels of globalization indices (Table 8).
Looking at the results in the table above, it can be said that there is significant support for
the hypothesis that overall globalization index has positive impact on the state of human
rights (even though the impact of economic globalization is statistically insignificant in the
long run). Social globalization happens to be the only sub-index that has a positive impact on
the state of human rights not only in the long run but also the short run. Political globalization
has a positive impact, though it turns statistically significant only in the long run. On the
other hand, economic globalization impacts human rights conditions adversely in the short
run. The convergence coefficient (for the lagged value of PTS) is negative and significant as
expected.

KOF Economic Social Political

globalization globalization globalization globalization

Short-run coefficients
Δ[KOF globalization 1.445
(log)]
(1.15)
Δ[Economic 2.433
globalization (log)]
(1.46)
Δ[Social globalization 0.598
(log)]
(3.70)**
Δ[Political globalization 1.699
(log)]
(1.07)
Long-run coefficients
PTS1 0.857 0.824 0.779 0.818
(4.81)*** (4.93)*** (4.48)*** (4.65)***
KOF globalization (log) 2.169
(5.34)***
Economic globalization 1.157
(log)
(1.34)
Social globalization (log) 1.203
(5.36)***
Political globalization 2.807
(log) Table 8.
(3.62)** KOF Globalization
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 Indices and human
Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time rights (PMG
dummies. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively estimation)
IJSE 5. Conclusion
47,12 In the present study, an attempt has been made to find out the impact of globalization and its
dimensions on human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa. As per the results, overall and social
globalization do have a positive impact on human rights in long and medium term and, also,
Granger-cause human rights. Political globalization has a positive relation with human
rights, though there exists no causality between the two. On the other hand, economic
globalization fails to have a statistically significant impact on human rights. The impact of
1468 overall globalization on human rights is observed starting medium term. As can be seen in the
above results, though statistically insignificant, economic globalization has a negative
relationship with human rights in the short term. This goes to say that the initial process of
economic globalization may result in deterioration of levels of human rights (McCorquodale
and Fairbrother, 1999). This does not mean that one should put up barriers to economic or any
other forms of globalization, as countries stand to gain from globalization in the long term,
provided the process of integration is handled in a careful and bespoke manner keeping in
mind the demands, needs and background of the concerned country. This is in line with the
assessment of Howard-Hassman (2005), who states that many of the medium- and long-term
effects (including those on human rights) of globalization will be positive, despite the
detrimental short-term effects. According to the present analysis, governments of Sub-
Saharan African countries should also lend focus to the levels of social integration and the
changes resulting from it. It is the social context and structure that may (or may not) lend
support to the practice of human rights. It is the cultural and social practices, beliefs, norms
and requirements that influence the effective exercise of human rights in a country. This is
because, ultimately, human rights are a result of the past and concurrent state of the social
fabric.
African policy makers from various governments and inter-government organizations
should focus on integrating not just the economies of countries but also help the African
people with greater exposure to ideas of human rights, democracy, justice and equality. As
more and more African countries open up to trade, the policy makers should be cautious and
formulate and implement laws that safeguard the rights of the labor as well. Africa should
learn from the experience of workers from countries that specialize in cheap exports, such as
China. Laws should be enacted and enforced to uphold the rights of workers working in
factories and to protect them from exploitation. Efforts by African states to increase the
inflow of capital should be subjected to scrutiny and evaluated from the prospective of human
rights protection. African states should engage the African scholars in the diaspora so as to
utilize their knowledge and experience to improve the living conditions in Africa. Experts
should be encouraged to combine global ideas with insights from traditional expertise to help
nations in a bespoke manner. The governments of African countries should sponsor greater
number of scholarships so as to help the meritorious students to study in universities abroad.
Student exchange programs should be encouraged. Ultimately, this will not only help the
economic situation of the people but also expose them to newer ideas prevalent in the
developed countries. Education is capable of informing people of their rights and thus,
leading to an understanding of equality, justice and democracy. Not only the children but also
the military and police personnel should be exposed to curriculum that inculcates respect for
human rights. If the population is educated, it will make an informed decision while electing
their local and national leaders. Governments should implement checks to prevent the
increased role of police and military in governance. Furthermore, better infrastructure is
needed to be put in place so as to allow greater internet penetration and better connectivity.
As economic globalization brings in economic growth for the continent, this opportunity, if
utilized properly, can lead to increased social and political globalization as well.
To conclude, African leaders and public should give globalization a chance, but at the
same time, should keep in mind that pushing for greater integration is simply a means to an
end, rather than an end in itself. Higher value should be placed on achieving human rights Impact of
and social justice than just protecting and upholding the free markets. globalization
on human
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Appendix 1 Impact of
globalization
Level Interpretation
on human
rights
1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views and torture is rare or
exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare
2 There is limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are 1473
affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare
3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other
political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for
political views is accepted
4 Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders,
disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level, terror
affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas
5 Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the Table A1.
means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals PTS levels

Appendix 2

Angola Congo, Rep Kenya Nigeria

Benin Cote d’Ivoire Lesotho Rwanda
Botswana Eritrea Liberia Senegal
Burkina Faso Eswatini Madagascar Sierra Leone
Burundi Ethiopia Malawi South Africa
Cabo Verde Gabon Mali Sudan
Central African Republic Gambia, The Mauritania Togo
Chad Ghana Mauritius Uganda
Comoros Guinea Namibia Zambia Table A2.
Congo, Dem. Rep Guinea-Bissau Niger Zimbabwe Countries under study

Appendix 3

Indicators Data sources

PTS scale Gibney et al. (2019)

Globalization indices Gygli et al. (2019)
GDP per capita World Development Indicators – 2019
Population World Development Indicators – 2019
Polity IV score Polity IV Project
Ethnic fractionalization Drazanova (2019)
British legal origin Porta et al. (1998)
Natural resource rent World Development Indicators – 2019
Conflict years UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) Table A3.
No. of peace years UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) Data sources
IJSE Appendix 4
47,12
Standard No. of
Indicators Mean Median Maximum Minimum Deviation observations

PTS scale 2.97 3.00 5.00 1.00 1.04 1,358

1474 Overall globalization 3.64 3.67 4.27 2.78 0.27 1,671
(log)
Economic globalization 3.65 3.69 4.48 2.64 0.30 1,642
(log)
Social globalization 3.28 3.30 4.34 1.64 0.49 1,686
(log)
Political globalization 3.80 3.82 4.51 2.08 0.39 1,686
(log)
GDP per capita (log) 6.89 6.72 9.88 5.10 0.95 1,597
Population (log) 15.59 15.73 19.07 12.49 1.35 1,716
Polity IV score 0.70 2.00 10.00 10.00 6.16 1,685
Ethnic fractionalization 0.65 0.75 0.89 0.02 0.24 1,691
British legal origin 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 1,722
Natural resource rent 11.13 8.00 59.62 0.00 10.25 1,608
Table A4. Conflict years 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 1,722
Descriptive statistics No. of peace years 16.91 16.00 42.00 0.00 11.73 1,722
 Appendix 5

GDP British Natural No. of

Overall Economic Social Political per Polity Ethnic legal resource Conflict peace
globalization globalization globalization globalization capita Population IV fractionalization origin rent years years

Overall 1.00
globalization
Economic 0.79 1.00
globalization
Social 0.78 0.70 1.00
globalization
Political 0.65 0.17 0.12 1.00
globalization
GDP per capita 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.08 1.00
Population 0.12 0.22 0.37 0.69 0.25 1.00
Polity IV 0.51 0.32 0.52 0.28 0.19 0.03 1.00
Ethnic 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.43 0.04 0.40 0.05 1.00
fractionalization
British Legal 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.09 1.00
origin
Natural resource 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.20 1.00
rent
Conflict years 0.20 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.18 1.00
No. of peace 0.61 0.45 0.57 0.37 0.17 0.10 0.51 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.31 1.00
years
globalization

1475
on human
rights
Impact of

Correlation matrix
Table A5.
IJSE Appendix 6
47,12
Tourist Arrivals (percentage of global total) - 2017
60%

1476 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
East Asia & Pacific Lan America & Middle East & North OECD members Sub-Saharan Afr
Africa
Caribbean Africa

Source(s):
(s): World Development
n Indicators
c.

Freedom of Press - 2017

30

25

20

15

10

0
East Asia & Pacific Lan America & Middle East & North OECD members Sub-Saharan Africa
Caribbean Africa

F PF NF

Source(s): Freedom House. (F – No. of countries with free press; PF – No. countries
with partly free press; NF – No. of countries where press is not free)
 Inbound and Outbound number of tertiary students (percentage of global Impact of
total) - 2017 globalization
30% on human
rights
25%

20%
1477
15%

10%

5%

0%
East
st Asia & Pacific Lan America & Middle East & North OECD members Sub-Saharan Africa
Af
Caribbean Africa

Source(s): UNESCO
U ESCO
UN C
.

Trade in Cultural Goods (percentage of global total) - 2017

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Sub-Saharan Africa OECD members Lan America & Middle East & North East Asia & Pacific
Caribbean Africa

Export Import

Source(s): UN Comtrade
IJSE Appendix 7
47,12
Long term Medium term Short term

Lagged dependent 0.817 0.794 0.911

(9.57)*** (6.95)*** (4.26)***
1478 KOF globalization (log) 0.943 1.066 1.116
(2.78)*** (1.78)* (1.34)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.035 0.009 0.066
(0.31) (0.06) (0.40)
Population (log) 0.248 0.290 0.220
(4.83)*** (3.73)*** (2.13)**
Polity IV 0.034 0.065 0.05
(3.30)*** (3.46)*** (1.96)**
Ethnic fractionalization 0.024 0.256 0.330
(0.08) (0.54) (0.49)
Britain legal origin 0.268 0.358 0.144
(1.75)* (1.70)* (0.58)
Natural resource rent 0.012 0.014 0.011
(3.07)*** (2.08)** (1.41)
Conflict year 0.934 0.957 0.667
(6.58)*** (5.63)*** (3.18)***
Peace years 0.004 0.010 0.02
(0.41) (0.42) (0.35)
Observations 1,104 551 253
Table A7. Countries 38 37 36
KOF Globalization Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.35
Index and human Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time
rights dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
 Long term Medium term Short term
Impact of
globalization
Lagged dependent 0.830 0.803 0.903 on human
(9.67)*** (6.93)*** (3.67)***
Economic globalization (log) 0.11 0.07 0.007 rights
(0.55) (0.19) (0.01)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.141 0.1 0.025
(1.17) (0.76) (0.16) 1479
Population (log) 0.223 0.25 0.184
(4.34)*** (2.97)*** (1.68)*
Polity IV 0.037 0.070 0.057
(3.51)*** (3.80)*** (2.14)**
Ethnic fractionalization 0.085 0.139 0.218
(0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
Britain legal origin 0.189 0.287 0.087
(1.41) (1.42) (0.36)
Natural resource rent 0.011 0.014 0.013
(3.03)*** (2.06)** (1.37)
Conflict year 0.965 0.983 0.676
(7.06)*** (6.00)*** (3.22)***
Peace years 0.003 0.005 0.042
(0.27) (0.22) (0.69)
Observations 1,104 551 253
Countries 38 37 36
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.35 Table A8.
Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time Economic globalization
dummies. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and human rights

Long term Medium term Short term

Lagged dependent 0.817 0.798 0.870

(9.12)*** (6.82)*** (4.04)***
Social globalization (log) 0.535 0.650 1.094
(2.01)** (1.91)* (1.36)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.054 0.019 0.138
(0.49) (0.14) (0.69)
Population (log) 0.159 0.199 0.14
(2.11)** (2.02)** (1.22)
Polity IV 0.029 0.064 0.052
(2.73)** (3.34)*** (1.91)*
Ethnic fractionalization 0.122 0.167 0.311
(0.44) (0.36) (0.44)
Britain legal origin 0.314 0.373 0.21
(1.81)* (1.80)* (0.78)
Natural resource rent 0.010 0.012 0.01
(2.58)*** (1.95)* (1.23)
Conflict year 0.938 0.957 0.652
(6.98)*** (5.61)*** (3.01)***
Peace years 0.001 0.005 0.03
(0.02) (0.22) (0.53)
Observations 1,104 551 253
Countries 38 37 36
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.35 Table A9.
Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time Social globalization
dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively and human rights
IJSE Long term Medium term Short term
47,12
Lagged dependent 0.826 0.792 0.903
(9.70)*** (6.88)*** (4.14)***
Political globalization (log) 0.503 0.681 0.875
(1.96)** (1.52) (1.36)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.111 0.084 0.015
1480 (1.06) (0.66) (0.10)
Population (log) 0.322 0.361 0.307
(4.20)*** (3.53)*** (2.18)**
Polity IV 0.037 0.066 0.05
(3.58)*** (3.56)*** (1.83)*
Ethnic fractionalization 0.002 0.199 0.246
(0.01) (0.40) (0.34)
Britain legal origin 0.154 0.280 0.072
(1.18) (1.32) (0.27)
Natural resource rent 0.010 0.012 0.01
(2.60)*** (2.01)** (1.24)
Conflict year 0.959 0.958 0.671
(6.95)*** (5.72)*** (3.25)***
Peace years 0.007 0.009 0.029
(0.67) (0.37) (0.55)
Observations 1,104 551 253
Countries 38 37 36
Table A10. Pseudo R2 0.36 0.33 0.35
Political globalization Note(s): Authors’ calculations. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. All regressions include time
and human rights dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively

About the authors

Aman Takiyar is currently working as a Research Scholar in the Economics and Finance Department at
the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani (BITS, Pilani). He completed his Master of Science
(Hons.) in Economics and Bachelor of Engineering (Hons.) in Mechanical from BITS Pilani in 2017. He
worked as a Market Risk Analyst for Deutsche Bank from 2017 to 2018. Aman Takiyar is the
corresponding author and can be contacted at: takiyar.aman@gmail.com
Prof. N.V.M. Rao is currently working as a Professor of Economics and Finance at the Birla Institute
of Technology and Science, Pilani, Rajasthan. Prof. Rao has 25 years of comprehensive teaching
experience in economics, finance and management courses. He has published more than 50 research
papers in international refereed journals and serves on the editorial board of seven economics, finance,
management and accounting journals. He is also a reviewer for nine reputed international journals. He is
a passionate, optimistic and dedicated person who takes up responsibilities with utmost enthusiasm and
sees to it that he completes the tasks and assignments sincerely.

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