SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: SUNDAY (MAR. 17, 2019), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS:
4. CA ruled 1. Testate Estate of Vda. de Biascan v. Biascan, GR 138731, December 11,
2000 - REYES, G.
ISSUES: 2. Republic v. Nishina, GR 186053, November 15, 2010 - NAVAL
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 3. Lebin v. Mirasol, GR 164255, September 7, 2011 - FUEGO
4. Banez v. Banez, GR 132592, January 23, 2002 - DONES
RULING + RATIO: 5. BPI v. Pryce Gases, GR 188365, June 29, 2011 - ONGSIAKO
1. Blah
a. Sub Blah
2. Concept
a. Explain explain

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED?

DOCTRINE: etc etc etc

1
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Testate Estate of Vda. de Biascan v. Biascan, GR 138731, December 11, 2000
FACTS:
1. On June 3, 1975, private respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petition at
the then CFI of Manila praying for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta.
2. In an Order dated August 13, 1975, private respondent was appointed as
regular administratrix of the estates.
3. On October 10, 1975, Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of
Florencio Biascan filed a pleading containing several motions including a
motion for intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private respondent's
appointment as special administratrix and administratrix, and a motion for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan.
4. After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, Judge Serafin Cuevas,
then presiding judge of CFI Manila, Branch 4, issued an Omnibus Order
dated November 13, 1975 which, among others, granted Maria's intervention
and set for trial the motion to set aside the Orders appointing respondent as
administratrix.
5. On April 2, 1981, the trial court issued an Order resolving that:
a. Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio
b. respondent and her brother are the acknowledged natural children
of Florencio
c. All three are the legal heirs of Florencio who are entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings;
d. The motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as
administratrix is denied; and
e. The motion to approve inventory and appraisal of private
respondent be deferred.
6. On June 6, 1981, or 58 days after her receipt of the order, Maria filed MR
which private respondent opposed.
7. On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was
completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were
among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent
filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records.
8. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it
was only on April 30, 1985 that the RTC issued an Order denying Maria's
June 6, 1981 Motion for Reconsideration.
9. Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the
subject of settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as
interim special administrator and engaged the services of the Siguion Reyna
Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on behalf of the estate.
10. On August 21, 1996, the law firm was allegedly made aware of and given
notice of the April 30, 1985 Order when its associate visited Branch 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila to inquire about the status of the case. The
associate checked the records if there was proof of service of the April 30,
1985 Order to the former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he
discovered that there was none. He was able to secure a certification from
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 which
stated that there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30, 1985
contained in the records of SP. Proc. No. 98037.
11. A Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996 was filed by petitioner from the
Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the trial court. While the
said notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the trial court on
the first page of the notice clearly indicated that the same was received by
the trial court on September 20, 1996. A Record of Appeal dated September
20, 1996 was likewise filed by petitioner.
12. On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order 16 denying petitioner's
appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.
13. The trial court ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the
appeal already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was
filed sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the
court ruled that the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the
same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985
Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
14. Petitioner appealed to CA. CA denied.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the subject April 2, 1981 Order in the Special Proceeding is subject
to appeal. YES
2. Whether the appeal was timely filed. NO.
RATIO:
1. Appointment of a regular administrator of a deceased person's estate is a
final determination of the rights of the parties and is thus appealable.
2. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and
judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal.
Thus:
a. "SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. — An interested person may appeal in a special proceeding
from an order or judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:
i. Allows or disallows a will;
ii. Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive shares of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
iii. Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against
the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented
on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
iv. Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee
or guardian;
v. Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal
2
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

shall be allowed from the appointment of a special from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly dated August
administrator; and 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp of the trial court that the same was
vi. Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated October
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioner's appeal, the court clearly stated
unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on Appeal was filed on
trial or for reconsideration." September 20, 1996.
3. An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or 9. Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner's notice of appeal
judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. And
4. In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court decreed, while the rules on special proceedings recognize that a motion for extension
among others, that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife of the of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may be granted, no
deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and her such motion was ever filed by petitioner before the trial court. Consequently,
brother, German Biascan, are entitled to participate in the settlement the trial court committed no error when it dismissed the appeal of petitioner.
proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise denied Maria's motion to set
aside the order appointing private respondent as regular administratrix of the DISPOSITION:
estate. These rulings of the trial court were precisely questioned by Maria in
her Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 1981. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of
5. The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan merit. The decision dated February 16, 1999 and the Resolution dated May 18, 1999
and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court has
effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the
deceased. As such, the same may be me proper subject of an appeal.
6. Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioner's motion to set aside
the order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix of the
estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. We
have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a regular
administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the
rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast
with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a
limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character
and special character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable
for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. Considering
however that private respondent has already been appointed as regular
administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her appointment as such
may be questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.
7. It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject
of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, such as the
instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any
decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the
appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or
new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
8. At this point, we note with disapproval petitioner's attempt to pass off its
Notice of Appeal as having been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings
before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of
Appeal was filed the day after it secured the August 21, 1996 Certification
3
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020

Republic v. Nishina, GR 186053, November 15, 2010 DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions of September 2, 2008 and December 22, 2008 in CA G.R. CV No. 90346
FACTS: are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of petitioners before the appellate
1. Nisaida Sumera Nishina (Respondent Daughter), represented by her court is REINSTATED.
mother, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a verified petition for
cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry DOCTRINE: in bold
2. She was born to her Filipina mother and Japanese father, Koichi Nishina.
Her father later died and her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi
Hakamada
3. (Important) As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil
registry, respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993
under the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.” Her
mother and the second husband eventually had a divorce
4. Her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, husband (third).
The third husband adopted Respondent Daughter.
5. In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
Malolos Civil Registry under the name “Nisaida Sumera Nishina,” hence, her
filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate
bearing the surname “Hakamada,” issued through late registration in 1993,
be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname
“Nishina” in the original birth certificate be changed to “Watanabe.”
6. RTC granted the petition and changed Respondent’s name from Nisaida
Sumera Nishina to Nisaida Sumera Watanabe
7. The OSG, on behalf of the petitioner, filed a notice of appeal.
8. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did
not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41
(appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
9. RTC dismissed the appeal

ISSUE: WON Petitioner filed the correct appeal.

RULING + RATIO: YES.

1. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders
or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal
2. The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the
notice of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said
court and held to be final.
3. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary
since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial
court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition
for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil
registry.

4
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
Lebin v. Mirasol, GR 164255, September 7, 2011
[Heavily procedural, hence he lengthy digest]
FACTS:
1. Petitioners relayed their offer to the administrator of the Estate of L.J.
Hodges to purchase for ₱22,560 an asset (lot) of the Estate in Jaro, Iloilo
City.
a. They deposited 20% of the offer.
2. The administrator sought judicial approval of the offer, stating to the RTC
that petitioner Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of the lot.
3. RTC commissioned one Atty. Tabares to conduct an ocular inspection to
ascertain if Erlinda was really the occupant – confirmed. RTC granted the
administrator’s motion for approval of the offer.
4. In the meantime, respondent Vilma Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to
purchase the lot containing an area of 188sqm where her house stood.
5. The lot was initially identified as a distinct one, but a later survey revealed
that her house was actually standing the lot where Erlinda resides.
6. Learning of the approval of the petitioners’ offer to purchase subject lot,
Mirasol filed a petition for relief from the order.
7. Pending resolution of the petition for relief, the petitioners paid the last
installment for the lot, and moved for the execution of the deed of sale.
Apparently, the motion was not acted upon by the RTC.
8. RTC instead favored Mirasol’s petition; ordered equal selling of lot between
petitioners and Mirasol.
9. Petitioners moved for MR/new trial; denied.
10. Petitioners appealed via petition for review on certiorari to seek the review
and reversal of the orders of the RTC.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. [SYLLABUS] Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners’
appeal for their failure to timely file a record on appeal – NO.
2. Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that subject
lot be sold to both the petitioners and Mirasol in equal portions – NO.
RATIO:
1. [SYLLABUS] RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for their
failure to timely file a record on appeal (skip to k).
a. Among the innovations introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 12923 is
the elimination of the record on appeal in most cases, retaining the
record on appeal only for appeals in special proceedings and in
other cases in which the Rules of Court allows multiple appeals.
Section 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the
period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice
of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu
thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the
contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
b. Clarification in Murillo v. Consul: Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there is
no way by which judgments of regional trial courts may be
appealed to the Supreme Court except by petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended. The
proposition is clearly stated in the Interim Rules: "Appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall
be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
c. On the other hand, it is not possible to take an appeal by certiorari
to CA. Appeals to that Court from the Regional Trial Courts are
perfected in two 2 ways, both of which are entirely distinct from an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are:
i. By ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error - where
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and
ii. By petition for review - where judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
d. The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, and shall point out the
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the
decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
e. An ordinary appeal is taken by merely filing a notice of appeal
within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special
proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which
event the period of appeal is 30 days and a record on appeal is
necessary.
f. There is therefore no longer any common method of appeal in civil
cases to the SC and CA.
g. The present procedures for appealing to either court – and, it may
be added, the process of ventilation of the appeal – are distinct
from each other. To repeat, appeals to SC cannot now be made by
petition for review or by notice of appeals (and, in certain instances,
by record on appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
h. In fine, if an appeal is essayed to SC or CA by the wrong
procedure, the only course of action open is to dismiss the appeal.
i. In other words, if an appeal is attempted from a judgment of a
Regional Trial Court by notice of appeal, that appeal can and
should never go to this Court, regardless of any statement in the
notice that the court of choice is the Supreme Court; and more than
5
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
once has this Court admonished a Trial Judge and/or his Clerk of
Court, as well as the attorney taking the appeal, for causing the
records to be sent up to this Court in such a case.
j. If an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial
Court to the Court of Appeals and in the latter Court, the appellant
raises naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. And finally, it may be stressed once more, it is
only through petitions for review on certiorari that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may properly be invoked.
k. A judgment or final order in special proceedings is appealed
by record on appeal. A judgment or final order determining and
terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it
completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless
otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.
i. Rationale for requiring a record on appeal instead of only
a notice of appeal: the multi-part nature of nearly all
special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being
finally determined and terminated independently of the
other parts.
ii. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that
envisions the elevation of the original records to the
appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in
its further proceedings regarding the other parts of
the case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the
trial court to continue with the rest of the case
because the original records remain with the trial
court even as it affords to the appellate court the full
opportunity to review and decide the appealed matter.
l. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the
multi-part nature of special proceedings by enumerating the
particular judgments and final orders already subject of appeal
by any interested party despite other parts of the proceedings
being still untried or unresolved.
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator;
m. The petitioners’ appeal comes under above item due to the final
order issued in the settlement of the estate of L.J. Hodges being "a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing."
n. In order to elevate a part of the records sufficient for appellate
review without the RTC being deprived of the original records,
the remedy was to file a record on appeal to be approved by
the RTC.
o. The elimination of the record on appeal under BP 129 made
feasible the shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30
days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order.
i. Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the
original 30 days as the period for perfecting the appeal by
record on appeal to take into consideration the need for
the trial court to approve the record on appeal.
ii. Within that 30-day period a party aggrieved by a judgment
or final order issued in special proceedings should perfect
an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of
appeal and a record on appeal upon the adverse party
within the period; in addition, the appealing party shall pay
within the period for taking an appeal to the clerk of the
court that rendered the appealed judgment or final order
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees.
iii. A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection
of an appeal by record on appeal, or the non-payment of
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal.
p. The petitioners received the assailed RTC order on May 15, 1995.
They filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on May 24,
1995. On March 23, 1998, they were served with the order dated
March 2, 1998 (denying their motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial).
i. Although they filed a notice of appeal on March 27, 1998,
they submitted the record on appeal only on May 5, 1998.
Undoubtedly, they filed the record on appeal 43 days from
March 23, 1998, the date they received the denial of their
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. They should
have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their
notice of the judgment. Their appeal was not perfected,
therefore, because their filing of the record on appeal
happened beyond the end of their period for the perfection
of their appeal.
q. The petitioners’ filing of the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the
order of May 3, 1995 interrupted the running of the period of 30
days; hence, their period to appeal started to run from May 15,
1995, the date they received the order of May 3, 1995.
r. They filed their motion for reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By
then, 9 out of their 30-day period to appeal already elapsed. They
received a copy of the order dated March 2, 1998 on March 23,
6
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
1998. Thus, the period to appeal resumed from March 23, 1998
and ended 21 days later, or on April 13, 1998. Yet, they filed their
record on appeal only on May 5, 1998, or 22 days beyond the end
of their reglementary period. Although, by that time, the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure had meanwhile taken effect (July 1, 1997), their
period of appeal remained 30 days. It is stressed that under the
1997 revisions, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
interrupted the running of the period of appeal, pursuant to Section
3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, viz:
s. Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.
t. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
(emphasis supplied)
u. Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court empowers the RTC as
the trial court, motu proprio or on motion, to dismiss the appeal for
having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period.32 For that reason,
the RTC rightly granted Mirasol’s motion to dismiss the record on
appeal.
2. RTC committed no reversible error in allocating the lot in equal portions to
both petitioners and respondent
a. The non-perfection of the appeal by the petitioners notwithstanding,
the Court declares that the RTC did not err in allocating the parcel
of land equally to the parties if only to serve and enforce a standing
policy in the settlement of the large estate of the late L.J. Hodges to
prefer actual occupants in the disposition of estate assets. The
policy was entirely within the power of the RTC to adopt and
enforce as the probate court.
b. The approval of the offer to purchase would be conditioned upon
whether the petitioners were the only actual occupants.
i. The condition was designed to avoid the dislocation of
actual occupants, and was the reason why the RTC
dispatched Atty. Tabares to determine who actually
occupied the property before approving the motion.
ii. It turned out that the report of Atty. Tabares about the
petitioners being the only occupants was mistaken,
because the house of Mirasol, who had meanwhile also
offered to purchase the portion where her house stood,
happened to be within the same lot subject of the
petitioners’ offer to purchase.
iii. The confusion arose from the misdescription of Mirasol’s
portion.
c. Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the
sale, mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate.
d. The approval of the sale in question, and the modification of the
disposition of property of the Estate of L.J. Hodges were made
pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 89:
Section 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial
to interested persons; Disposal of proceeds. -When it appears
that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate
will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other
interested persons, the court may, upon application of the
executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs,
devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be
sold, authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or
a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts,
legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall
not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case
of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons
entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
e. Without doubt, the disposal of estate property required judicial
approval before it could be executed.
f. Implicit in the requirement for judicial approval was that the probate
court could rescind or nullify the disposition of a property under
administration that was effected without its authority.
g. This power included the authority to nullify or modify its approval of
the sale of the property of the estate to conform to the law or to the
standing policies set and fixed for the purpose, where the
invalidation or modification derived from the falsity of the factual
basis of the disposition, or from any other factual mistake, or from
the concealment of a material fact by a party.
h. Consequently, the probate court’s modification of its approval of the
petitioners’ offer to purchase was well within the power of the RTC
to nullify or modify after it was found to be contrary to the condition
for the approval. Thereby, the RTC’s ruling, being sound and
judicious, constituted neither abuse of discretion nor excess of
jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review, and AFFIRM the final orders dated
May 3, 1995 and March 2, 1998.
Bañez v. Bañez, GR 132592, January 23, 2002
FACTS:
1. RTC Cebu decreed the legal separation between Aida Bañez (petitioner)
and Gabriel Bañez (respondent) on the ground of respondent’s sexual
infidelity. Also decreed were: (1) dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and division of the net conjugal assets; (2) forfeiture of
respondent’s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the
common children; (3) payment to petitioner’s counsel of P100,000 as
7
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
attorney’s fees taken from petitioner’s share in net assets; and (4) the
surrender of a Mazda vehicle and the smaller residential house to petitioner
and the common children.
a. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.
2. Petitioner moved for execution pending appeal.
a. Respondent opposed, and prayed for reconsideration.
b. RTC gave due course to the execution pending appeal, ordering
respondent to vacate the premises of the residential house, after
petitioner had posted a P1.5 Million bond (to answer for any
damage respondent would suffer due to the execution pending
appeal).
3. Respondent went to the CA, through a petition for certiorari.
a. CA set aside the RTC Order of execution pending appeal.
b. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA.
c. Hence G.R. No. 132592 with the SC.
4. Meanwhile, RTC acted on respondent’s Notice of Appeal and elevated the
entire case records to the CA.
a. Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
respondent failed to file a Record on Appeal.
b. CA denied the Motion to Dismiss.
c. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the CA.
d. Hence G.R. No. 133628 with the SC.
5. SC consolidated petitioner’s two petitions.
6. G.R. No. 132592
a. Regarding the residential house, petitioner claimed that being
conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children be
allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the
entire proceedings before the RTC, she did not have the chance to
occupy it. Additionally, she posted a bond of P1.5 Million for the
damages which respondent may suffer. Thus, execution pending
appeal was warranted.
b. Respondent denied that petitioner did not have the chance to
occupy the residential house. He argued that she could have, but
chose not to. According to him, as the inventory of the couple’s
properties showed, petitioner owned two houses and lots in the
U.S., where she is a permanent resident. Thus, there was no
compelling reason to have the judgment executed pending appeal.
7. G.R. No. 133628
a. Petitioner contends that an action for legal separation is among the
cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She argues that filing
of a Record on Appeal is required. Thus, respondent’s appeal
should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record on
appeal.
b. Petitioner also prays that, in the event that the SC does not dismiss
respondent’s appeal, SC should direct CA to return the records of
the case to the RTC. Thereafter, respondent should file his record
on appeal for approval and transmittal to the CA.
c. Respondent argues that legal separation is not a special
proceeding, nor is it a case where multiple appeals are allowed.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON execution pending appeal was proper. – NO, no compelling reason
existed.
2. WON record on appeal is required for legal separation cases. – NO, it is not
one of those cases where record on appeal is required by law.
RATIO:
1. Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances
demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance
of the writ.
1. Considering the reasons cited by petitioner, SC finds that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweigh the damage which respondent
would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. Petitioner did not refute
respondent’s allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that
she had 2 other houses in the U.S. where she is a permanent resident, while
petitioner had no other house. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient
reason to justify execution pending appeal, absent compelling reason to
grant such prayer.
2. An action for legal separation is not one of those action where multiple
appeals are allowed. Hence, a record on appeal is not required for legal
separation cases as a condition sine qua non for appeal.
1. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings. The rationale behind
allowing multiple appeals is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the
event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to
be final.
2. In an action for legal separation, the issues involved will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation
of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or
distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to
or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
DISPOSITION: Petitions DENIED
8
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS JUDGE CARINGAL 3D 2020
BPI v. Pryce Gases, GR 188365, June 29, 2011
FACTS:
1. Pryce Gases, Inc. (PGI) is a corporation engaged in the business of
producing, selling and trading in all kinds of liquids, gases, and other
chemicals.
2. PGI is a debtor of IFC, an international organization and an affiliate of the
World Bank, and FMO, a Dutch development bank engaged in promoting the
expansion of private enterprise in emerging markets.
3. August 27, 2002: IFC and FMO filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with the
RTC of Makati due to the failure of PGI to service its debts as well as the
refusal of PGI’s parent company, the Pryce Corporation, to provide financial
support to PGI.
4. The petition for rehabilitation was meant to preserve PGI’s workforce and
ensure that its cash flow would not be diverted to ill-advised ventures but
would instead be channeled back to its operating capital to generate profits
to pay off and retire debts.
5. IFC and FMO proposed a financial restructuring that called for the
conversion of dollar-denominated loans to peso and the splitting of the whole
debt instrument into two categories:
a. The sustainable debt which would be rescheduled as a senior loan
and secured by PGI’s assets; and
b. The unsustainable portion to be transformed into redeemable
preferred shares with voting rights.
6. Based on the proposed financial restructuring, PGI’s loan from BPI shall be
paid in 10 years as it was a non-MTI creditor.
7. RTC: Gave due course to the petition and approved the rehabilitation plan.
8. BPI filed a notice of appeal.
9. PGI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that BPI failed to
perfect the appeal because of failure to file the record on appeal within the
required period.
10. RTC dismissed BPI’s appeal.
11. BPI filed a petition for certiorari.
12. CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the RTC’s dismissal of
BPI’s appeal.
RULING + RATIO: No, CA was correct.
1. Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The party who
seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of
the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.
2. Section 5 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides that
"(t)he review of any order or decision of the court or an appeal therefrom
shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court x x x." Under A.M. No. 00-8-
10-SC, a petition for corporate rehabilitation is considered a special
proceeding.
3. Thus, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19(b) of the Interim Rules
Relative to the Implementation of BP 129 for special proceedings shall
apply.
a. That is, the period of appeal shall be 30 days since a record of
appeal is required.
4. In this case, BFB did not perfect the appeal when it failed to file the record
on appeal.
a. The filing of the notice of appeal on 3 November 2003 was not
sufficient because at the time of its filing, the Rules required the
filing of the record on appeal and not merely a notice of appeal.
5. The issuance by the Court of AM 04-9-07-SC providing that all decisions and
final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies under RA 8799 shall be appealed to the CA through a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to be filed within 15 days
from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC, did not change the fact
that BPI’s appeal was not perfected.
a. Since BPI filed a notice of appeal before the effectivity of A.M. No.
04-9-07-SC.
b. Hence, at the time of filing of BPI’s appeal, the applicable mode of
appeal is Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states: “x x x No record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings x x x”
c. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "(a)
party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him
with respect to the subject matter thereof upon approval of the
record on appeal filed in due time."
6. In addition, BPI filed a MR.
a. But under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation, the proceedings shall be summary and
non-adversarial in nature and MNT or MR is a prohibited pleading.
b. Hence, in view of the failure of BPI to perfect its appeal and its
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration which is a
prohibited pleading, the order of the RTC approving the
rehabilitation plan had become final and executory.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 February
2008 Decision and the 11 June 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 98626.
DOCTRINE: Record of appeal is the applicable mode of appeal for special
proceedings. The period of appeal is 30 days. The appeal by record on appeal is
deemed perfected upon approval thereof.