EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: TOMORROW (MAR. 6, 2019), 2PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 130
4. CA ruled Section 20.
1. People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015. - BONOAN
ISSUES: 2. People v. Aleman, G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013. - SIQUIAN
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 3. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013. -
MONTES
RULING + RATIO: 4. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic, G.R. No.
1. Blah 188956, March 20, 2013. - MAGISTRADO
a. Sub Blah
2. Concept Section 21.
a. Explain explain 1. People v. Esugon, Supra.
2. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? 3. People v. Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014. - OCAMPO
4. People v. Golimlim, G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004, 427 SCRA 15. -
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc MANAHAN

Section 22.
1. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra.
2. Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005. - DONES
3. People v. Pasensoy, G.R. No. 140634, September 12, 2002, 388 SCRA
669. - SOLCO

Section 23.
1. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra.
2. Garcia v. Vda. de Caparas, G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013. - LOPEZ
3. Ah Po v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September, 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 321. -
MANALANG
4. Sanson v. CA, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003. - CABOCHAN

Section 24.
1. Belen v. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017. - TAYLO
2. Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra.
3. Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013. - TALION
4. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77. - NOEL
5. Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December
13, 2007. - NAVAL
6. Alvarez v. Ramirez, Supra.
7. Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA
610. - PEREZ

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015
FACTS:
1. Information stated: On October 22, 2003, in Mandaluyong City, the
accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of
force and violence, did take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did attack, assault and
stab her with the said bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
2. CA’s adoption of the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution:
[MOST IMPORTANT] Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim,
testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche,
and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their
house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and
stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair.
Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs.
After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw
blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to
the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often
goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s
pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator
because there was no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated
that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was
sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which
illumined the ground floor through the stairway.
3. Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the
victim’s death was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was
located at the epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of
the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing
the right ventricle of the heart, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung.
4. Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he
and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they
have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5
years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21,
2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their
baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 x 3
meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs
to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout
"magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their door was open.
He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he
returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and
saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped
him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent
₱23k for the funeral and ₱44k for the wake and burial. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it
was his son who saw the appellant.
5. Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband
were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from their sleep at around 2
a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that there was
blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she
noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying.
They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She
took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok
bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since
there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether
he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and
demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person
who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to
appellant and said " siya po yung pumasok sa bahay namin." As a resident
there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the
television at the house of the victim.
6. PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a
stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and
interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively
identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed
them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police
station.
7. PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in
the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders.
They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was
appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited
the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed
the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in
arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl.
8. In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had
frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses
away from where he lived, and, on the evening in question, he had been
the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 p.m. and had then gone home. He
recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around
2 a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had
then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police
officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the
killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had
pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he
had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had
assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any
wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood. The appellant’s
mother corroborated his version.
9. RTC: Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article
294 (1) of the RPC, the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA - 50k civil
indemnity, 57.5k actual damages, 50k moral damages.
10. On appeal: the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide
based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose
recollections could only be the product of his imagination.
11. CA: Affirmed (modified damages) RTC, gave credence to the child witness,
and opined that his inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, and thus
affirmed the conviction of the appellant - 57.5k actual damages is deleted
in leiu of 25k temperate damage.
ISSUE: W/N the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was
Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated
the appellant as the person who killed his mother.
HELD: YES. Appeal is bereft of merit.
EVIDENCE ISSUE:
1. The most important task of the State in the successful prosecution of the
accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of
the crime.
2. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others
the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial
proceedings, to wit:
a. Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. -
i. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
ii. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
b. Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses:
i. (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
ii. (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
3. Thus, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to
others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a
witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people
to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case,
and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds
for disqualification.
4. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification.
The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were
treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
5. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the
trial court. Questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best
addressed by them by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial
and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while
testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the
nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage
of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the
demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the
witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on
appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of
the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is
even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the
trial court.
6. The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not
attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that
the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a
competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination
of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-
examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the
testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity
to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his
perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
7. The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That
is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever
inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but
related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not
negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also,
that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had
stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he
could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees
of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their
ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the
trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or
misappreciation on the part of the trial court.
8. It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of
the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are
still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.
This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct
and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence,
giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum
during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the
witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy.
With both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility,
his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his perception, we
cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according
credence to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be
unprecedented. In People v. Mendiola, the Court considered a 6-year-old
victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused
credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals, the testimony of the three-year-old
victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to
full probative weight.
9. Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation
and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been
mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity
with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the
child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that
the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
July 23, 2010 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN
ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil
indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of
₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned from the date of the
finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
CRIM ISSUE (not important):
1. The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery
itself must be proven as conclusively as the other essential element of the
crime; and that it was not established that the taking of personal property
was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or
by using force upon things. The contention lacks persuasion.
2. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must
prove the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or
by reason of the robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery.
3. The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The
fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was
undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of
violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as
robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant
was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only
in the course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the
records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting "
Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom
the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering
that the original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the
taking of the money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim
under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide.
4. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special
complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law
as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one
criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by
law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. A composite crime is truly distinct
and different from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the
composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound
crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that
is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to
commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified
combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the
penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a
complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate
information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed.
5. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not
appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the information did
not specifically allege them. But they should be appreciated in order to
justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence. Under
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at

least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.
The aggravating circumstance for this purpose need not be specifically
alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or attendant
circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:
6. The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by
an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty
or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a
State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.
7. In line with current jurisprudence, we increase the civil indemnity to
₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00. In addition to the
damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the
heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the
monetary awards for damages from the date of the finality of this decision
until the awards are fully paid.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Aleman, G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013
FACTS:
1. Edwin Aleman was charged with the special complex crime crime of robbery
with homicide. The accused conspired and mutually helped with another
unidentified person, robbed and killed Mr. Ramon Jaime Birosel while the
victim was inside his car talking over his cellphone.
a. The victim was a 55-year old real estate broker at the time of his
death. He was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, with
whom he had no child. Filomena spent a total of P477,054.30 in
funeral expenses in connection with the burial of her deceased
husband. Filomena stated that the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45
cellular phones taken away from Ramon were valued at P3,500.00
each, while the necklace snatched from him was worth P20,000.00.
2. The prosecution established the cause of death of the victim shown in the
medico-legal report.
a. In the report, the cause of death was stated as “hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax.”
b. In particular, three penetrating stab wounds were inflicted on the
upper left portion of the victim’s chest, “piercing the upper lobe of
the left lung and perforating the heart.”
c. He also suffered stab wounds in the right eye, stomach and left
forearm and incised wounds in the left upper eyelid and left palm.
3. The case relied on sole-eyewitness’ account of Mark Aldovar, a 14-yr old
deaf mute. During trial, a licensed sign language interpreter assisted him in
his testimony. He communicated the situation of the victim who had just
boarded his car; the respective positions of accused and his still unidentified
cohort vis-à-vis the victim; accused knock on the window of the victim’s car
and the sudden series of stabs accused inflicted upon the victim; the taking
of the victim’s various personal properties; accused walk away from the
crime scene; and, the revelation of accused identity when he finally removed
the bonnet that covered his face.
4. However, accused interposed denial and alibi. He claimed that, at the time
the incident happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall
which was a 15-minute walk from his residence.
a. Aleman’s testimony was that he was at the billiards hall on
February 10, 2003 playing against Ruben until around 10:00 in the
evening was corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of
Ruben, who saw accused-appellant and Ruben playing when she
went to the billiards hall twice that night to fetch Ruben. 11 Hilda,
accused-appellant’s sister, also corroborated accused-appellant’s
testimony that she fetched him from the billiards hall at around
10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003. She further stated that,
upon getting home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner together
and, thereafter, watched some television shows until accused-
appellant went to sleep some 30 minutes later.
5. The accused was twice made to join a police line-up and thereafter was
given a spot report as the alleged suspect and turned over to police custody.
He stated that witness failed to identify him during police line-up.
6. RTC rejected the defenses of the accused but viewed the prosecution's
evidence favorably, particularly the eyewitness testimony as simple and
credible and his positive identification.
7. On appeal, accused aimed at discrediting the witness. He questioned the
qualification of Mark as witness being deaf-mute and failure to identify him
as perpetrator during the line-up.
8. CA denied the appeal and affirmed with RTC that prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery with
homicide.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Mark, a deaf-mute, can be a competent witness? YES
2. W/N the non-identification of accused in police line-up would prejudice the
case? NO
RULING + RATIO:
1. The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified
to be a witness. The rule is that “all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.” A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her
other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and
allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute
from communicating orally with others but he/she may still
communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and,
as in this case, sketches.
a. Mark was able to communicate through drawing and sketches in
open court to show the relative position of things and persons as he
perceived like a normal person.
b. Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed
sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of
Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine
School for the Deaf since 1990 and possessed special education
and training for interpreting sign language. The trial and the
appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for
Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.
c. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he has
the faculty to make observations and he can make those
observations known to others.
d. RTC and CA saw no improper motive, which would impel Mark to
testify falsely against the accused.
2. Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up on February
13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police line-up is
essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the

witness in open court.
a. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony was
corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was
“hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the
thorax.” The multiple mortal wounds inflicted on the victim
constitute physical evidence which further establish the truth of
Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs any
corroborative testimony which accused-appellant requires of the
prosecution.
b. Aleman’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him
fails. Indeed, the law requires not simply an eyewitness account of
the act of committing the crime but the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
c. Mark identified Aleman as the robber-killer of the victim in a police
line-up and, more importantly, in open court in the course of Mark’s
testimony.
d. The settled rule is that the positive and credible testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to secure the conviction of an accused.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision dated November
16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No.
Q-03-118348 which found accused-appellant Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in so far as legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on
the civil indemnity, moral damages and actual damages awarded to the heirs of the
victim, which shall commence from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

DOCTRINE: IN BOLD

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES
NAVARRO, JR., G.R. No. 198240, July 3, 2013
FACTS:
1. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
2. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
3. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
4. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
5. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate.
6. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
7. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness.
8. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. No.
RULING + RATIO:
1. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
2. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
3. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.
4. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
5. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. [DOCTRINE]
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a
maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
6. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
7. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
8
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

8. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that

Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
9. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
10. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
11. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic, G.R. No. 188956,
March 20, 2013
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFPRSBS) was created under PD No. 361, as amended,
and was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous
financial support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines military retirement
system.
2. AFPRSBS filed an Application for Registration of Title over 3 parcels of
land located in West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City.
a. These 3 parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former President
Fidel V. Ramos.
3. After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no
oppositor registered any oppositions after the AFPRSBS met the
jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an order of general
default against the whole world, and AFPRSBS was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
4. AFPRSBS then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Aban), its
Vice President and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office.
a. She testified, inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure
that the properties and assets of AFPRSBS, especially real
property, are legally titled and freed of liens and encumbrances;
the subject properties were acquired by AFPRSBS through a land
grant under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the
Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and
peaceful possession and occupation of the subject properties in
the concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time
immemorial; AFPRSBS has been paying the real estate taxes on
the subject properties; and the subject properties are not
mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.
5. The court a quo granted the application.
6. However, the OSG filed an MR, wherein it argued that AFPRSBS failed to
prove that it has personality to own property in its name and failed to show
that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its
behalf.
7. Subsequently, the court a quoissued the assailed order granting the MR of
the OSG on the ground that AFPRSBS failed to prosecute its case.
ISSUE: WoN the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it
dismissed AFPRSBS’ application for land registration on the ground that AFPRSBS
failed to prosecute the subject case. YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. The reason of the court a quo in dismissing AFPRSBS’ application for land
registration on the ground of failure to prosecute was the lack of authority
on the part of Aban to testify on behalf of the AFPRSBS.
2. However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, provides only 3 instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case
for failure to prosecute:
a. SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a
separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
court.
3. Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that AFPRSBS failed to
prosecute its case is not among those grounds provided by the Rules. It
had no reason to conclude that AFPRSBS failed to prosecute its case.
a. First, AFPRSBS did not fail to appear at the time of the trial. In
fact, it was shown that AFPRSBS appeared before the Court and
was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that
AFPRSBS was able to present its evidence, and as a result, the
RTC rendered judgment in its favor.
b. Second, AFPRSBS did not fail to prosecute the subject case
considering that it appeared during trial, presented Aban, who
gave competent testimony as regards the titling of the subject lots,
and the court a quo never held AFPRSBS liable for any delay in
prosecuting the subject case.
c. Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that AFPRSBS
did not fail to comply with the Rules or any order of the court a
quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the latter to this effect.
4. On the alleged lack of authority of witness Aban to testify on behalf of
AFPRSBS, the Court ruled that there is no substantive or procedural
rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of
authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or
her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such
omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of
the party presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a
witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications provided therein.
5. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
6. Cavili v. Judge Florendo speaks of the disqualifications:
10
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific

disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally
incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides
for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship.
Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
7. A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Aban is
qualified to testify as a witness for AFPRSBS since she possesses the
qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to make her
perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated February 17, 2009 and July 9, 2009
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
April 21, 2008, granting the Application for Registration of Title of the petitioner is
hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.

DOCTRINE: There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for

a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that
such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party
presenting such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein.

11
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Esugon, Supra
FACTS:
12. Information stated: On October 22, 2003, in Mandaluyong City, the
accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of
force and violence, did take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did attack, assault and
stab her with the said bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
13. CA’s adoption of the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the Prosecution:
[MOST IMPORTANT] Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim,
testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche,
and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their
house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and
stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair.
Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs.
After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw
blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to
the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often
goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-
examination, he related that the assailant took money from his father’s
pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator
because there was no light. Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated
that although there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was
sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which
illumined the ground floor through the stairway.
14. Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the
victim’s death was hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was
located at the epigastric region, measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of
the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing
the right ventricle of the heart, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left lung.
15. Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he
and the victim were married for nine years before the incident and that they
have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5
years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21,
2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their
baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 x 3
meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs
to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout
"magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that their door was open.
He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he
returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and
saw blood on her back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped
him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent
₱23k for the funeral and ₱44k for the wake and burial. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it
was his son who saw the appellant.
16. Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband
were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from their sleep at around 2
a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that there was
blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she
noticed that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying.
They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She
took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok
bahay namin" pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since
there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether
he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and
demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person
who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity. He then pointed to
appellant and said " siya po yung pumasok sa bahay namin." As a resident
there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the
television at the house of the victim.
17. PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a
stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and
interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively
identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed
them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police
station.
18. PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in
the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders.
They were asking Carl questions when he suddenly blurted out that it was
appellant who entered their house and stabbed his mother. They invited
the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having committed
the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in
arresting appellant was the information relayed by Carl.
19. In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had
frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated only four houses
away from where he lived, and, on the evening in question, he had been
the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 p.m. and had then gone home. He
recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help around
2 a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had
then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police
officers had later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the
killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the victim, had
pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary suspect; that he
had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had
assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any
wrongdoing in his years of living in the neighborhood. The appellant’s
mother corroborated his version.
20. RTC: Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article
294 (1) of the RPC, the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua
12
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
and to indemnify the heirs of JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA - 50k civil
indemnity, 57.5k actual damages, 50k moral damages.
21. On appeal: the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide
based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose
recollections could only be the product of his imagination.
22. CA: Affirmed (modified damages) RTC, gave credence to the child witness,
and opined that his inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, and thus
affirmed the conviction of the appellant - 57.5k actual damages is deleted
in leiu of 25k temperate damage.
ISSUE: W/N the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was
Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated
the appellant as the person who killed his mother.
HELD: YES. Appeal is bereft of merit.
EVIDENCE ISSUE:
10. The most important task of the State in the successful prosecution of the
accused is his credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of
the crime.
11. The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others
the acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court makes clear who may and may not be witnesses in judicial
proceedings, to wit:
a. Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. -
i. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
ii. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided
by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
b. Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses:
i. (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception
to others;
ii. (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
12. Thus, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to
others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a
witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people
to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case,
and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds
for disqualification.
13. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification.
The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were
treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is
now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on
motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
14. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the
trial court. Questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best
addressed by them by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial
and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while
testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court because of the
nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage
of actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the
demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the
witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on
appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of
the trial court’s assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts
and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. The rule is
even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the
trial court.
15. The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not
attempt to adduce evidence to challenge such competency by showing that
the child was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a
competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination
of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-
examination. All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the
testimony of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his capacity
to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his
perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
16. The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That
is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever
inconsistencies the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime charged but
related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not
negate the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also,
that Carl did not shout to seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had
stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he
could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an adult.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees
of perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their
ability to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to the
trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or
misappreciation on the part of the trial court.
17. It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of
the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are
still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.
This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct
and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence,
giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum
during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the
witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy.
With both the RTC and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility,
his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his perception, we
cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according
credence to Carl’s testimony despite his tender age would not be
unprecedented. In People v. Mendiola, the Court considered a 6-year-old
victim competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused
credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals, the testimony of the three-year-old
victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s testimony was entitled to
full probative weight.
18. Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation
and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been
mistaken about his identification of him in view of his obvious familiarity
with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the
child’s family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly showed that
the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
July 23, 2010 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN
ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil
indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of
₱30,000.00; temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum on all monetary awards for damages reckoned from the date of the
finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
CRIM ISSUE (not important):
8. The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery
itself must be proven as conclusively as the other essential element of the
crime; and that it was not established that the taking of personal property
was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or
by using force upon things. The contention lacks persuasion.
9. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must
prove the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of
personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or
by reason of the robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to
the robbery.
10. The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The
fact that the appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was
undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of
violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the offense as
robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant
was originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only
in the course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the
records show, Dennis was awakened by someone shouting "
Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom
the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering
that the original criminal design to rob had been consummated with the
taking of the money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the killing of the victim
under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide.
11. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special
complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law
as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one
criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty provided by
law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. A composite crime is truly distinct
and different from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the
composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound
crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that
is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to
commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified
combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the
penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of a
complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate
information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed.
12. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not
appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the information did
not specifically allege them. But they should be appreciated in order to
justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence. Under
14
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at

least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.
The aggravating circumstance for this purpose need not be specifically
alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or attendant
circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:
13. The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic
sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by
an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty
or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a
State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.
In line with current jurisprudence, we increase the civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and
the moral damages to ₱75,000.00. In addition to the damages awarded by the CA,
the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for damages from the date of the
finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.

15
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra
FACTS:
9. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
10. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
11. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
12. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
13. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate.
14. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
15. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness.
16. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. No.
RULING + RATIO:
12. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
13. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
14. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.
15. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
16. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. [DOCTRINE]
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a
maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
17. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
18. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
19. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
16
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
20. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
21. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
22. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

17
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Obogne, G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014 DOCTRINE: Mental retardation per se does not bar a witness’ credibility if they
can intelligently make their perceptions known to others.
FACTS:
1. Obogne was found guilty of raping a 12 year old “mentally retarded” girl,
AAA.
2. RTC and CA found Obogne guilty but did not appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of AAA being mentally retarded for the reason that it was not
proven that Obogne knew this.
3. In the SC Obogne is arguing that AAA’s testimony which proved
instrumental in convicting him should not be appreciated seeing as R130
s21 disqualifies mentally retarded people from being witnesses.
a. AAA recounted how she was lured into Obogne’s home with the
promise of sugar cane, then raped.
4. Basically Obogne is saying AAA’s testimony should not be taken into
account due to her mental handicap, so he isn’t guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
a. The qualifying circumstance part is not really being questioned

ISSUE: WON AAA’s mental disability serves to disqualify her from being a
witness? NO. R130 s21 only disqualifies those whose mental condition
renders one incapable of intelligently making one’s perceptions known to
others. Mental disability is not a bar per se if they are capable of doing that.

RATIO:
1. AAA is totally qualified to be a witness notwithstanding her condition. AAA
recounted how she was lured into Obogne’s home with some sugar cane
and how she was certain that she was penetrated by him, after which she
was given the sugar cane and went home.
2. Contrary to Defense Counsel’s assertions it seems that AAA was actually
able to make known her perception to others notwithstanding her condition.
AAA’s simple testimony shows sincerity and truthfulness.
3. The fact that AAA faltered in delivering her testimony is not proof that she’s
unable to make her perceptions known. Ordinary people can’t possible
recall with 100% accuracy everything that happens to them. Even
considering that, AAA’s testimony was replete with crucial details that
proves Obogne raped her beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Only simple rape because Information failed to allege qualifying
circumstance that Obogne knew of AAA’s condition.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA–G.R. CR H.C. No. 03270 finding appellant Jerry Obogne guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay “AAA” civil indemnity of P50,000.00
and moral damages of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellant is not eligible for parole; the amount of exemplary damages is increased to
P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

18
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Golimlim, G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004, 427 SCRA 15
FACTS:
1. Evelyn Canchela is a mental retardate. When her mother Amparo left for
Singapore to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care
and custody of her sister Jovita and her husband Salvador Golimlim.
2. Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal resident to meet a
certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant Golimlim (Papay Badong).
Golimlim took advantage of the situation and instructed Evelyn to sleep.
Soon after Evelyn had laid down, Golimlim kissed her and took off her
clothes. He poked her with an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, then
he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lust,
Golimlim fell asleep.
3. Evelyn told Jovita what happened to her but the latter didnt believe her and
even scolded her.
4. December 1996: Lorna, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from their
mother instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay
in Novaliches where Lorna was staying.
5. A week after, Lorna suspected that Evelyn was pregnant as she noticed
her growing belly. They went to the hospital to have Evelyn checked.
Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the exam results revealed that
Evelyn was indeed pregnant.
6. Lorna asked Evelyn how she got pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
Golimlim has sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
7. Feb 1997: The sisters went to Sorsogon to file a criminal complaint against
Golimlim. The Police first advised Evelyn to be examined. So Evelyn was
examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo of the Municipal Health Office of Bulan
Sorsogon. The sisters then went back to the police station and executed
their sworn statements.
8. A criminal complaint for rape was filed against Golimlim before the MTC of
Bulan, Sorsogon.
9. May 1997: In the meantime, Evelyn gave birth to a Girl, Joanna.
10. When confronted with the accusation, Golimlim simply said that it is not
true “because her mind is not normal”, she having “mentioned many other
names of men who had sexual intercourse with her”.
11. TC: convicted Golimlim as charged
ISSUE: W/N the Court gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the
contradictory and implausible testimony of Evelyn, a mental retardate? NO
RULING + RATIO:
1. TC made the following observations:
a. Evelyn was consistent in her claim that Golimlim raped her and
that he was the author of her pregnancy and nobody else
b. She remained consistent that Golimlim raped her once
c. That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative
to the details of how she was raped, although would seem
derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness under
normal conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who
examined her and supported by her findings
d. Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is
still subject to question considering that the victim could not
elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that she never
pointed to anybody else as the author of her pregnancy, but her
Papay Badong/Golimlim.
2. The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is,
as has repeatedly been held by this Court, accorded great respect on
appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had
the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses. In the present case, no cogent
reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the
trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.
3. That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness
nor render her testimony bereft of truth.
a. SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
b. (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
c. (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
4. People v Trelles: A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per
se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a
vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
5. It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her
testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
6. Thus, in a long line of cases,this Court has upheld the conviction of the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was
a mental retardate.
7. From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason
to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without
discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
8. By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the
Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn,
although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ
of 46,she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to
her.
a. Dr. Belmonte’s testimony, Evelyn could give spontaneous and
consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions.
9. Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the
positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as her rapist.
10. It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate
constitutes statutory rape which does not require proof that the accused
19
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for

conviction.The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not, however,
alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for
conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the
commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the
Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental
faculties of a retardate being different from those of a normal person, the
degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum
of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be
more than enough when employed against an imbecile

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant,
Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which
this Court finds to have been committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is hereby AFFIRMED.

20
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra
FACTS:
17. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
18. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
19. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
20. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
21. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate.
22. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
23. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness.
24. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. No.
RULING + RATIO:
23. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
24. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
25. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.
26. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
27. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. [DOCTRINE]
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a
maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
28. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
29. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
30. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
21
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
31. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
32. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
33. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

22
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005
FACTS:
1. Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a Criminal Case for Arson
against Maximo Alvarez. Alvarez is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez,
sister of Ramirez.
2. Private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner. Petitioner raised no objection.
3. Esperanza testified:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, wife of the accused, Your Honor.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH (sic):
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly
that accused Maximo Alvarez pour (sic) xxx gasoline in the house xxx the house owned by his
sister-in0law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the
door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan
Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the
accused; xxx
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
A: When I stand (sic) by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my
sister [and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room].
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
[Court makes witness identify Maximo Alvarez, who was in the courtroom]
4. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 130 [Disqualification for
reason of marriage]
a. Respondent filed an opposition
5. Trial court issued an order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.
a. Prosecutor filed an MR. Denied.
6. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Preliminary
Injunction and TRO with the Court of Appeals.
a. Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Order. MR Denied by CA
ISSUE: WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband - YES, this is an
DISPOSITION:
exception to Sec. 22, Rule 130.
CA Decision AFFIRMED. RTC Ordered to Allow Esperanza to testify.
RATIO + RULING:
DOCTRINE:
1. Sec. 22, Rule 130 provides for the disqualification of a witness for
[In bold]
reason of marriage. The reasons for the given rule are: (1) the identity
of the interests between husband and wife; (2) if one were to testify
for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; (3) the
policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and (4) where there is want of
domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.
2. This rule, however, has exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent.
a. Ordono v. Daquigan, citing Cargil v. State: “xxx [T]he better rule is
that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
by one against the other.”
b. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act,
embodied in the Information, eradicates all major aspects of
marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
c. CA Findings: “The act of [petitioner] in setting fire to the house of
his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife
was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved. xxx There is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
d. Additionally, the Records show that prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident.
23
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Pasensoy, G.R. No. 140634, September 12, 2002, 388 SCRA 669
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution
1. Analie Pansensoy (“Analie” for brevity), 28 yrs old, is the legitimate wife of
appellant (Roberto Pansensoy). She testified that she had been living-in
with the victim, Hilario Reyes (“Hilario” for brevity).
2. She and Hilario were in the house they were renting at Lumang Bayan,
Antipolo. Hilario was lying down inside the house. She stood up when she
heard someone knocking on the door. As she opened the door, she saw
appellant holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the
gun away from him but she failed.
3. Hilario went out of the house and sat on a bench. Appellant approached
Hilario and asked him if he really loves his wife. Hilario answered in the
affirmative. Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single. Hilario
answered yes. Appellant counted one to three and at the count of three
shot Hilario. Hilario was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the ground.
4. Gregoria Reyes (“Gregoria” for brevity), mother of Hilario, testified that she
came to know about the death of her son through a neighbor, Rogelio.
5. Rogelio testified that he was alerted by loud knocks coming from his
neighbor’s house (10 meters away). When he went out to check he saw
Hilario who open the door. Hilario then sat on the bench by the door.
When Hilario answered yes to appellant’s question of whether he loved his
wife, appellant immediately fired a shot. Rogelio testified that he watched
appellant fire the shot and then left to report the incident to the parents of
Hilario.
Version of the Defense
6. Appellant, twenty-eight years old and a security guard, invoked self-
defense in his testimony. He testified that Analie is his wife and they have
three children. According to him, their relationship as husband and wife
was normal.
7. He was on his way home when Amadong Bisaya (“Bisaya”) told him that
he saw his wife with their youngest child and boyfriend “Tisoy”, referring to
Hilario, board a jeep on their way to Lumang Bayan. He asked Bisaya to
accompany him to Lumang Bayan where Bisaya pointed to the room where
his wife and “Tisoy” entered.
8. The appellant kicked the door of the room and there he found his wife and
“Tisoy” lying beside each other. They were clad in their underwear. He
dragged his wife out of the room by her hair and while doing so, he saw
“Tisoy” pull a gun from the table which was covered with clothes. He let go
of his wife and jumped on “Tisoy” to grab the gun. While they struggled for
possession of the gun he hit the testicles of “Tisoy” with his knees. “Tisoy”
fell on his knees but was still holding the gun.
9. Still grappling for possession of the gun, appellant held on to the back
portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his other hand held Hilario’s
hand which was holding the butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt down,
appellant was able to twist Hilario’s hand and to point the barrel of the gun
towards the latter.
10. The gun suddenly went off. At that moment, “Tisoy” was holding the trigger
of the gun. “Tisoy” was shot on the head and fell down. It was “Tisoy” who
was holding the trigger when the gun fired and hit him on the head. “Tisoy”
was still holding the gun when he fell to the floor.
11. The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Analie
and rejected the version of the appellant that he acted in self-defense. The
trial court also noted that appellant, who was then a security guard, was
charged by his employer with the crime of qualified theft for the loss of
a .38 caliber revolver. Also, a man who acted in self-defense would report
the incident instead of just fleeing. He was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua
12. Hence, the instant petition
ISSUE: WON there is Marital Disqualification under Rule 130, Section 22? YES
BUT IT WAS WAIVED. Take note that the issue raised by appellant in the case
is not WON there is marital disqualification but WON he is guilty of murder
beyond reasonable doubt. The SC just mentioned in passing that he could
have objected to the admissibility of his wife’s testimony (which was used as
evidence against him) but failed to do so.
RULING (YOU CAN SKIP TO NUMBER 5):
1. Appellant’s assignment of error is focused on the sufficiency of the
evidence for the prosecution, questioning in particular the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution’s eyewitness, Analie.
According to him, Analie’s testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and
appellant had been separated for more than three years but this is belied
by the fact that their youngest daughter is barely a year old.
2. We reiterate the time tested doctrine “that a trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight – even conclusive and
binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence.” The alleged flaws in the testimony
of Analie do not serve to impair her credibility or diminish the truthfulness of
her remarks as to who initiated the aggression and fired the shot.
3. The allegedly incredible statements do not pertain to the act of killing, but
rather to minor or incidental matters which happened before and after the
fact of killing. Analie’s testimony that she had been separated from
appellant for three years which, as pointed out by appellant, was belied by
the age of their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair her
credibility. Analie’s 3-year separation from appellant does not preclude
Analie’s still having a child with appellant. As to Analie’s version that
appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him, suffice it to say that it is
a matter of common observation that the reaction of a person when
confronted with a shocking or unusual incident varies. As admitted by
appellant himself, it was the first time he saw his wife and Hilario together,
veritably confirming what Bisaya had told him some time in April 1994 that
Bisaya always saw his wife with someone else. It was not at all strange for
appellant to have asked Hilario if he really loved his wife. Were we to agree
with the appellant and treat each strange or unusual event in the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

occurrence of a crime, such as appellant’s interrogation of the victim, as

basis for reasonable doubt, no criminal prosecution would prevail.
4. The trial court relied on Analie’s testimony to convict appellant and we find
that her testimony is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
5. As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analie’s testimony would have
been disregarded had appellant timely objected to her competency to
testify under the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to
testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in
the case of other witnesses generally. The objection to the
competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness. In this case, the incompetency was waived by
appellant’s failure to make a timely objection to the admission of
Analie’s testimony

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial

Court of Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant
ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking
into account the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The award of actual damages of
P40,000.00 is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and loss of earning capacity in the
amount of P3,379,200.00.

DOCTRINE: BOLDED

NOTE: HE WAS NOT FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER BUT JUST HOMICIDE

BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION DID NOT ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT OF
PREMEDITATION.THEY ALSO TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. He was on his way
home from work and saw his wife sleeping with another man.

25
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra
FACTS:
25. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
26. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
27. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
28. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
29. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate.
30. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
31. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness.
32. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. No.
RULING + RATIO:
34. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
35. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
36. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.
37. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
38. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. [DOCTRINE]
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a
maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
39. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
40. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
41. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
26
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
42. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
43. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
44. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

27
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Garcia v. Vda. de Caparas, G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013
FACTS:
1. Flora Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam,
Malolos, Bulacan. This is being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as
agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. When Makapugay died,
she was succeeded by her nephews and niece Amanda dela Paz-Perlas
(Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela Paz (Augusto). While
Eugenio’s children – Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina Salamat (Salamat)
and Pedro – succeeded him.
2. Makapugay appointed Amanda as atty in fact. She and Pedro entered in an
agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan" followed by an Agricultural
Leasehold Contract. Pedro was recognized as the lone agricultural lessee
and cultivator of the land. When Pedro died, his wife Dominga Robles Vda.
de Caparas (Dominga), took over.
3. On July 10, 1996, Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia
and Salamat entered in into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa where they
were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees.
4. Garcia and Salamat filed a complaint for nullification of leasehold and
restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heirs before the
PARAB. Claimed that they had an agreement with Pedro to alternately farm
the land on a per season basis, and that Pedro reneged on this, he
misrepresented to Amanda that he was the sole heir and deceived her into
making him sole lessee. That in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and
Augusto executed in their favor the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa",
recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees. When Pedro passed away,
Dominga took over the land and, despite demands, continued to deprive
them of their rights as co-lessees. Petitioners prayed that the Agricultural
Leasehold Contract between Pedro and Amanda be nullified and they be
recognized as co-lessees.
5. In Dominga’s answer, the petitioners never assisted Pedro in farming the
land. The "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and the
petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979 Agricultural
Leasehold Contract; that under Section 38of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA
3844).
6. PARAD ruled in favor of Dominga. Held that the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without
cause. Petitioners have not shown by evidence that they actually cultivated
the land, or that they paid rentals to the landowners. The "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being issued against Pedro’s existing
1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, which has not been cancelled by
competent authority.
7. On appeal, DARAB affirmed PARAD, Doming is lawful successor tenant of
the land. It held that there was no alternate farming agreement between the
parties, and Pedro merely shared his harvest with petitioners as an act of
generosity. "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners and
petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and
his rights as the sole tenant over the land.
8. CA affirmed DARAB decision. Held that petitioners may not be considered
as Pedro’s co-lessees, for lack of proof that they actually tilled the land and
with petitioners’ own admission in their pleadings that they merely received a
share from Pedro’s harvests. Without proper legal termination of Pedro’s
lease in accordance with RA 3844, the landowners cannot designate other
tenants to the same land in violation of the existing lessee’s rights.
ISSUES: W/N the alternate farming agreement between Petitioners and Pedro is
admissible evidence - NO.
RULING + RATIO:
1. DARAB case was filed in 1996, long after Pedro died in 1984, has no leg to
stand on other than Amanda’s declaration in her 1996 affidavit that Pedro
falsely represented to Makapugay that he is the actual cultivator of the land,
and when confronted Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters
had an understanding about it and he did not have the intention of depriving
them of their cultivatory rights”. Petitioners have no other evidence, other
than such verbal declaration, which proves the existence of such
arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have
they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one
cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter’s
share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward.
2. What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that
Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission
and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a
violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides that "if one party to
the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity,
or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account
of the transaction.
a. Since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains
to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa
Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with
petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the present case
and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-
in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used
against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of
her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a
result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.
b. The alleged admission of Pedro that he entered into a sharing of
leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used as evidence
against the herein respondent as the latter would be unable to
contradict or disprove the same.
3. If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed
mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate
farming scheme, then they should have confronted Pedro or sought an
audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-
lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after
Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that
they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As
correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus
precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.
4. Amanda cannot claim that Pedro deceived her into believing that he is the
sole successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s
representative or administrator was to know the personal circumstances of
the lessee Eugenio. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who
survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or she as representative –
could choose from among them who would succeed to the leasehold. When
she executed the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract with Pedro, she is
deemed to have chosen the latter as Eugenio’s successor, and is presumed
to have diligently performed her duties, as Makapugay’s representative, in
conducting an inquiry prior to making the choice.
5. Petitioners should be held to a faithful compliance with Section 9. If it is true
that they entered into a unique arrangement with Pedro to alternately till the
land, they were thus obliged to inform Makapugay or Amanda of their
arrangement, so that in the process of choosing Eugenio’s successor, they
would not be left out. They did not; they slept on their rights. They allowed
17 years to pass before coming out to reveal this claimed alternate farming
agreement and insist on the same.

DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 31, 2007 Decision and
December 13, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."

29
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Ah Po v. Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September, 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 321
FACTS:
1. Arsenio Ting is the son of Teng Ching from the latter’s first marriage.
Arsenio’s heirs are the respondents in this case. Teng’s heirs from the
second marriage are the petitioners. The two families are fighting over who
really owns the lot in Malate— Arsenio or Teng.
2. Before Arsenio was married, he bought a lot in Malate. The lot was allegedly
paid for by Teng but was named under Arsenio since Teng was a Chinese
citizen, and he cannot own land, (resulting to a constructive trust). Arsenio
also owns Triumph Timber in Butuan City, but Teng was allegedly the one
making decisions re the business.
3. Teng eventually became a naturalised Filipino citizen, but the TCT of the
Malate property wasn’t transferred in his name.
4. The property has two houses— one was occupied by Teng and the second
family, the other one was occupied by Arsenio and his family.
5. Arsenio, his family, and Teng relocated to Butuan for their timber business,
while the second family stayed in Malate house. Whenever Arsenio and his
family goes back to Manila, they stayed in the said house.
6. Arsenio then predeceased his father. His estate was settled in Butuan. The
Malate property was included in the settlement and was adjudicated in
favour of the wife and minor children. The TCT was transferred in their
name.
7. Arsenio’s wife and Teng started fighting over the stocks in the Timber
company. Teng died.
Ejectment case
1. Arsenio’s wife filed an ejectment case against second family re the Malate
lot. MeTC ruled in favor of Arsenio’s wife. This was affirmed on appeal.
Reconveyance of Title
1. Teng’s second family filed a case in the RTC for the cancellation and
reconveyance of the Malate lot’s title in their favour since it was actually
Teng who bought the lot.
a. Angel Sembrano was presented as witness. He was the corporate
accountant of the Timber business, and Teng’s personal
accountant.
b. Sembrano testified that he prepared the ITR of Teng in 1960 and
1961, (the year the Malate lot was sold).
c. Sembrano said that Arsenio told him that year that Teng would buy
the house in Manila, and directed him to prepare a voucher and
check. The said voucher wasn’t presented as it was lost in a flood.
d. He also said that Teng told him that the house was his but since he
was a Chinese national at time of purchase it was placed in the
named of Arsenio.
e. Sembrano said he didn’t now the vendor of the Malate property but
Arsenio told him it’s for 150k. He didn’t know where the
voucher/check went, but he insisted that the check he was told to
prepare was intended for the purchase price of the house.
2. Arsenio’s heirs insisted that Arsenio bought it for himself, (he was already
lawyer at that time), and the subject lot was already adjudicated to them in
the settlement proceedings of Arsenio’s estate.
3. RTC ruled in favour of Arsenio’s heirs. CA affirmed.
4. The ejectment and reconveyance cases were appealed and consolidated.
ISSUE: W/N Teng’s heirs in the second family was able to prove that Teng
actually owns the Malate property? NO.
HELD:
1. The second family needed a preponderance of evidence to prove that Teng
really own the property, but they primarily relied upon Sembrano’s testimony,
which carries no probative value.
a. Sembrano has no personal knowledge re the execution of the
Contract of Sale nor the agreement between Arsenio and Teng. He
only testified as to what the deceased allegedly told him.
b. Any evidence is hearsay if its evidentiary weight is NOT based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person not on the witness stand.
2. Even if Sembrano’s statements were admissible, the veracity of such is still
subject to scrutiny. Both RTC and CA doubted his credibility. SC will not
interfere with such assessment absent any showing that it was overlooked,
misapplied, or misunderstood or there was GAD.
3. Furthermore, Sembrano’s testimony about the interest of a person who is
dead in an action that is in effect a claim against his estate is barred under
the surviving parties rule or the dead mans statute under Section 23 of Rule
130.
Section 23, Rule 130. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind.
4. While Sembrano wasn’t a party, he is a surrogate of the second family since
he was the personal accountant of their predecessor-in-interest (Teng's) and
the corporate accountant of the corporation he controlled.
5. Since the second family failed to show that Ten was the real owner, their
other argument of a constructive trust must fail.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated January 31, 2002 and May 7, 2002, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 47804, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Sanson v. CA, G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
FACTS:
1. Juan Bon Fing Sy died on January 10, 1990.
a. Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition for
the settlement of the estate of Mr. Sy. Sanson claimed that the
deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and
to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount
of P360,000.00.
b. Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola
(Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging
that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00,
respectively.
2. RTC appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as
administratrix of his estate.
3. During the hearing of the claims, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola
(wife of Eduardo Montinola and daughter-in-law of Angeles) testified on the
transactions giving rise to the claims
a. Objected by the administratrix, invoking Section 23 of Rule 130
(AKA Dead Man’s Statute).
b. Sanson supported the claim of his sister Celedonia, testifying it as
a transaction evidenced by 6 checks issued before the death of
Mr. Sy. Upon demand, Sy’s son, Jerry, assured that her that Mr.
Sy will settle once he gets better (he never did get better). After
the death of Sy, the checks were presented to the bank, but were
dishonored due to closure of account.
c. Celedonia testified to support Sanson’s claim, which was
evidenced by 5 checks and such were dishonored due to closure
of account.
d. Jade, testified that Mr. Sy borrowed 50K and 150K from her
husband and mother-in-law, evidenced by 3 checks. Mr. Sy said
he would pay in cash (but never did), then upon presentment in
the bank, the checks were dishonored.
4. Administratrix objected to the admission of the checks and check return
slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon the ground that the
witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Man’s
Statute.
a. She argued Jade, who is not a party to the claim, was covered by
the Dead Man’s Statute.
b. The administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by
the deceased and that the return slips were issued by the
depository/clearing bank.
c. The administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing the
trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against their claims. #ConfidentButStupid
5. RTC in favor of Claimants, holding that the Dead Man’s Statute did not
apply to the witnesses who testified in support of other claims.
6. CA Reversed, ruling in favor of the Administratrix. MR Denied.
ISSUE: WON the Dead Man’s Statute applies in this case (stated differently,
WON those who testified in support of claims that are not their own rendered
incompetent by the Dead Man’s Statute)? NO.
RULING + RATIO:
1. The Dead Man’s Statute renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their
assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
a. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope
by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein.
Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration
are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took
no active part therein.
b. Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a
person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She
testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to
those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly
family members or relatives of the parties.
c. That Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate
arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with
respect to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify
on the others transaction.
d. In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the
admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose
before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined
to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson
and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence,
their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
e. In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their
evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the
deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix
who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when
she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against the claims.
On Genuineness of the Checks:
1. Jades testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on the
checks-exhibits of the Montinolas is clear.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose
signature is this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he
signed this check.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

2. The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is

prima facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value,
following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
3. Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie
presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who
expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of
the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
1. Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
2. Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;
3. Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00. representing unsettled
checks issued by the deceased.

DOCTRINES:
1. The [Dead Man’s Statute] is exclusive and cannot be construed to
extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not
mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above
enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no
active part therein.
2. What the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of
testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of
the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are
supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be
prosecuted on the bases of said checks.

32
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Belen v. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017
FACTS:
1. On March 12, 2004, petitioner Medel B. Belen, then a practicing lawyer and
now a former Judge, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle,
Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San
Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Victoria Suñega-Lagman for preliminary investigation.
2. With the submission of the parties’ and their respective witnesses'
affidavits, the case was submitted for resolution.
3. In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his cause,
petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing.
4. Without acting on the request for clarificatory hearing, Suñega-Lagman
dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004.
5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of
which later became the subject of this libel case.
6. Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the
Office of the Secretary of Justice, Manila.
a. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed
envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor
of San Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on
August 27, 2004.
b. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first
received and recorded at the Receiving Section, then forwarded
to the Records Section before referral to the City Prosecutor for
assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
7. ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion
from Michael Belen, the son of Nezer. She was also informed about the
motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City.
a. She then asked the Receiving Section for a copy of the said
motion, and requested a photocopy of it for her own reference.
8. On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a
criminal complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations in the
Omnibus Motion before the OCP of San Pablo City.
9. Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of
San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited itself from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its records to the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
10. On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order
designating State Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor
of San Pablo City in the investigation of the libel complaint.
11. On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution
finding probable cause to file a libel case against petitioner.
12. On December 8, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi filed an Information
charging petitioner with the crime of libel.
13. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court
entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY."
14. Trial on the merits ensued.
a. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely:
i. (1) Complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman,
ii. (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative of
respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and
iii. (3) & (4) Joey R. Flores and Gayne Garno Enseo, who
are part of the administrative staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City.
b. The defense presented the accused petitioner as its sole witness.
15. Trial court found petitioner guilty of libel (Fine of PHP3K)
16. CA affirmed.
a. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the
defamatory matter was made known to third persons because
prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo, who are the staff in the
OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion
filed by petitioner, as well as Michael, son and representative of
Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP Suñega-
Lagman, was furnished copy of the motion.
b. Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged
communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the
subject statements were unnecessary or irrelevant in
determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed by
petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory
remarks on the personality, reputation and mental fitness of
ACP Suñega-Lagman.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that the privileged communication rule is
inapplicable.
RULING + RATIO: NO, the privileged communication rule DOES NOT APPLY.
1. Petitioner avers that the alleged defamatory statements in his Omnibus
Motion passed the test of relevancy, hence, covered by the doctrine of
absolutely privileged communication.
a. He asserts that the statements contained in his motion are
relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry, as they were used
only to highlight and emphasize the manifestly reversible errors
and irregularities that attended the resolution rendered by ACP
Suñega-Lagman.
2. Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.
3. A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable,
even if the author has acted in bad faith.
a. This class includes allegations or statements made by
parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as
answers given by the witness in reply to questions
propounded to them in the course of said proceedings,
provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
issues, and the answers are responsive to the questions
propounded to said witnesses.
b. The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings
are considered privileged is not only because said pleadings
have become part of public record open to the public to
scrutinize, but also to the undeniable fact said pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and
legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated
before the courts for proper administration of justice and,
therefore, of general public concern.
c. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations
substantially true because they can be supported by
evidence in good faith, the contents of which would be under
scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all
improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.
d. Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the
doctrine of absolutely privileged communication extends to
statements in preliminary investigations or other
proceedings preparatory to trial,
i. The Court found as persuasive in this jurisdiction
the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas which categorically
declared the existence of such protection.1
4. The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor
and the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry.
a. Sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although
tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize
proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if
relevant to the issues.
b. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to
make the alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are
inclined to be liberal.
c. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so
palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and
impropriety.
5. The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP
of San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of his estafa
complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of
relevancy.
a. An examination of the motion shows that the following
defamatory words and phrases used, even if liberally
construed, are hardly material or pertinent to his cause,
which is to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of his
1 “It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the
actual participants therein are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an
official nature have been given absolute privilege.”
estafa complaint and the disqualification of ACP Suñega-
Lagman from further acting on the case:
i. (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons";
ii. (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumptions were
tarnished in silver ingots";
iii. (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and
convoluted frame of mind";
iv. (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons";
v. (5) "moronic resolution";
vi. (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind";
vii. (7) "manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity";
viii. (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and
ix. (9) "a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability
and mental honesty."
b. These diatribes pertain to ACP Suñega-Lagman's honor,
reputation, mental and moral character, and are no longer
related to the discharge of her official function as a
prosecutor.
i. They are devoid of any relation to the subject matter of
petitioner's Omnibus Motion that no reasonable man can
doubt their irrelevancy, and may not become the subject
of inquiry in the course of resolving the motion.
6. The pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of
material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. If the
pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute, and alleges an
irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED, and the Decision dated April 12, 2013 and the Resolution
dated January 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32905, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the penalty imposed upon petitioner
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
DOCTRINES:
(1) A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable,
even if the author has acted in bad faith.
(2) The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor
and the presence of malice, if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry.
(3) As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the
alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be
liberal.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, Jr., Supra
FACTS:
33. Spouses Navarro, Sr. and Mrs. Navarro died and left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.
34. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, and
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr.
The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
35. Luisa and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim
on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
36. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not
written by one and the same person.
37. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for ANNULMENT OF THE
DEED OF DONATION before the RTC of Masbate.
38. After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless
piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
39. The motion was granted; thus, PO2 Alvarez was disqualified as a witness.
40. MR got denied. The sisters appealed the case to the CA but was denied
also. MR denied. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the Civil Case. The CA held that a
CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending
before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a
member. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is disqualified to be a witness. No.
RULING + RATIO:
45. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
a. SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
b. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
46. Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness
by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
47. In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, we have held that the specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to
include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
a. The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is
apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.
48. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
49. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. [DOCTRINE]
The law does not provide default as an exception. The specific
enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a
maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes
that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes
other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should
not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
50. As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others.1âwphi1We have no doubt that she
is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and
weight of her testimony.
51. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
a. SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
52. For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that
Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
35
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
53. Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
54. True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony
of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
55. In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examination she conducted.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1)

Decision dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and
October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215. We DENY
respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[Note: Study the other sections as well.]

36
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013
FACTS:
1. Josielene Chan (Petitioner) filed in the RTC of Makati a a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan (Respondent), the
dissolution of their CPG, and custody of their children. Josielene claimed
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and
excessive use of prohibited drugs. In fact she had convinced him to
undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
2. Johnny however claims that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties.
He agreed to marriage counseling but when they got to the hospital he was
forcibly held down and was given an injection instead. Worse, the police
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and was released
after the case ended. By then their marriage was couldn’t be repaired.
3. PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE: Josielene premarked the Philhealth Claim
Form 1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. It contained a physician’s
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse. From this, she filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s
medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records
sought by subpoena duces tecum. In short she wants to use his medical
records to prove his mental unfitness as her reason for nullity of marriage.
4. Johnny opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician patient privilege. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Evidence which reads: (c) A person authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information
was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would
blacken the reputation of the patient.
5. RTC: sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also
denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil
action of certiorari before the CA, for grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
6. CA: denied Josielene’s petition, ruling that if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left with no
assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their
physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only
testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose
of showing his alleged forcible confinement. (correct ruling)
7. Josielene’s Claims:
a. the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged and does not cover the hospital records,
but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
b. Since Johnny already admitted that he had been confined against
his will (Philhealth claim form), he should be deemed to have
waived the privileged character of its records.
c. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence
that provides: When part of an act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of
the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given
in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
evidence.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician patient communication.
RULING+RATIO: YES, CA was correct.
1. The physician patient privileged communication rule essentially
means that a physician who gets information while professionally
attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s
reputation. It is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the
physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct
diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear
that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court
and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
2. OTHER EVID ISSUES DISCUSSED:
a. The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the
hospital records, would be at the time they are offered— during
trial. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or
as independent evidence that he had made entries in those
records that concern the patient’s health problems. Josielene’s
request for subpoena is premature. They’re still at pre-trial.
b. Also, it is when those records are produced for examination at the
trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in
evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
c. It is possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a
subpoena as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available under the ROC, but the right to compel the
production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged." Here it is, so no go.
3. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
37
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible

without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the
equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters
he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior
consent.
4. The trial in the case had not yet begun. Thus, Johnny technically has not
yet presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated
above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure
of his hospital records would again be premature.

DISPOSITION: SC DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.

DOCTRINE: See bold.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77
FACTS:
1. DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) project amounting to
approximately 16 billion pesos. The project was to be financed by China
2. Several resolutions were in the Senate:
a. Directing the Blue Ribbon Committee to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the circumstances leading to the approval of the
broadband contract
b. Urging GMA to direct the cancellation of the ZTE contract
c. Directing the DND to conduct an inquiry into the national security
implications
3. Such investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of 3
pending bills with regard international agreements
4. Respondent committee sent invitations to personalities and cabinet officials
involved in the NBN project and petitioner was among them. He only
attended the Sept. 26 hearing
5. Petitioner testified for 11 hours and disclosed that COMELEC Chairman
Abalos offered him 200 million in exchange for his approval of the project.
GMA instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when asked about the
NBN project, he refused to answer and invoked “executive privilege”—
refused the ff questions:
a. Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
b. Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
c. Whether or not she directed him to approve
6. Respondent issued a subpoena ad testificandum requiring him to appear
and testify. Exec. Sec. Ermita requested respondent to dispense with the
petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege and sent a letter
7. Petitioner did not appear before respondent committees so the latter issued
show cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. Petitioner replied and said that it was not his intention to ignore
the Senate but that the remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege
8. Respondent cited petitioner in contempt
9. GMA issued Memo Circular No. 151 revoking EO 464 and MC no. 108.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s show cause letter and contempt order
were issued with GADALEJ. He argues that conversations with GMA are “
candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions”
ISSUES:
1. W/N the communications elicited by the subject 3 questions are covered by
executive privilege? YES
2. Did respondent committees commit GADALEJ? YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. Art. VI Sec. 21 is different from Art. VI Sec. 22 – the former related to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and aims to elicit information
that may be used for legislation while the latter pertains to power to conduct
a question hour which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function. Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive
officials under Sec. 22 and may only be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation
2. Communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by the Executive
Privilege
a. There is a recognized claim of Executive Privilege despite the
revocation of EO 464: the note of Exec. Sec. Ermita limits the
bases for the claim of privilege to Senate v Ermita, Almonte v
Vasquez and Chavez v PEA.
b. Nixon and Post-Watergate cases: Presidential Communications
Privilege – the confidentiality of conversations that take place
in the President’s performance of his official duties;
considered as presumptively privileged, founded President’s
generalized interest in confidentiality
c. In order to provide the President and those who assist him… with
freedom to explore alternatives in the policies of shaping policies
and making decisions
d. 2 Kinds of executive privilege:
i. Presidential Communications Privilege:
1. communications, documents or other materials
that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential
2. applies to decision-making of the President
ii. Deliberative Process Privilege
1. advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated
2. applies to documents in their entirety and covers
final and post-decisional judicial legislation
e. Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege:
i. Protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non delegable presidential power;
ii. Communication must be authored or received by a
close adviser of the President or president himself—
operational proximity
iii. The presidential communications privilege remains a
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need
3. Exec. Sec. Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on presidential
communications privilege and matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations
39
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. Using the elements, the 3 questions relate to a quintessential and

non-delegable power of the president to enter into an executive
agreement; was received by a close adviser or cabinet member; no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of privilege
b. The questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Sec. 22 rather than Sec. 21. Senate v
Ermita ruled that the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.
4. No violation on right of the people to information on matters of public
concern: petitioner appeared before the committee and was questioned for
11 hours. He also manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
Senators with the exception of those covered by the privilege
a. Right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot
be equated with the people’s right to public information
5. Claim of Executive Privilege is properly invoked: there was a precise and
certain reason for preserving the confidentiality so as not to leave the
committees in the dark on how the questions qualified as privileged
a. Senate v Ermita only required requires that an allegation be made
“whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door cabinet meetings etc”
6. Respondent Committees committed Grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Contempt order
a. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance
suffers from constitutional infirmity
b. Respondents didn’t comply with the requirement that invitations
should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for inquiry along with usual indication list of questions
c. Only a minority of members of Blue Ribbon committee were
present during the deliberations
d. Respondent had not published its rules of procedure
e. Issuance of order was arbitrary it did not first pass upon the claim of
executive privilege

DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. The subject order dated January 30, 2008
citing petitioner Romulo Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing
his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.

40
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Air Philippines is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of air transportation services. Respondent Pennswell, was
organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial
chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
2. On various dates, Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry
goods in trade, covered by Sales Invoices which correspond to Purchase
Orders. Under the contracts, Petitioners total outstanding obligation
amounted to Php 449,864.98 with interest at 14% p.a. Until the amount
would be fully paid.
3. For failure of the Petitioner to comply with its obligation under the contract,
Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with the RTC.
4. Petitioner says that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable
reasons.
a. In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount
of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items,
covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were
misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but
were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had
previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it
was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and
labels of such goods.
5. According to petitioner, respondents products, namely Excellent Rust
Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric Strength Protective Coating, and
Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact
Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner
asseverated that had respondent been forthright about the identical
character of the products, it would not have purchased the items
complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud
was discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and respondent
on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent would
return to petitioner the amount it previously paid.However, petitioner was
surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding
payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondents Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.
6. During pendency of trial, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Respondent to
give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of certain
products. It appears that Petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a
comparison of Respondent’s goods.
7. RTC rendered an Order granting Petitioner’s motion.
8. Respondent sought reconsideration, contending that it cannot be
compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter
is confidential. It argued that what Petitioner endeavored to inquire upon
constituted a trade secret which Respondent cannot be forced to divulge.
a. RTC gave credence to Respondent’s reasoning, and reversed
itself.
9. CA: denied Petitioner’s petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and affirmed
RTC’s Order. Petitioner’s MR was denied.
ISSUE: W/N the chemical components/ingredients of Respondent’s products are
trade secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to compulsory disclosure?
YES
RULING + RATIO:
1. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or
compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it
is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or
process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
possess the information.
2. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The
inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation
has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an
injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by
one who obtained the information "in confidence" or through a "confidential
relationship."
3. The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents
special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law.
Respondent was established to engage in the business of general
manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise
dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited
to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints,
oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others.
4. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear.
The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondents production and
business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondents
competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondents business,
and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of
respondents lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose
the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing
less than the probable demise of respondents business.
5. Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be
produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must
not be privileged against disclosure.
6. Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of
privileged communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and
wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
41
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however,
other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16
them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the February 2006, and the Resolution dated 25 May 2006, of the Court of Appeals in
source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax
census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
7. We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of
Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis
for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over
the detailed chemical composition of its products
8. Also, in the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic
Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in order to compel
respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is
true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured
locally or imported, shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in
their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent.
Respondents specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector
Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products.
Consumer products, as it is defined in Article 4(q),\ refers to goods,
services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal,
family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be
limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of
respondents products. Its products are not intended for personal, family,
household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use,
specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and engines.
a. Petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special
Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the disclosure of the active
ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground. Respondents
products are outside the scope of the cited law. They do not come
within the purview of a drug
9. Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure
where it is indispensable for doing justice.We do not, however, find reason
to except respondents trade secrets from the application of the rule on
privilege. The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better
purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is
on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of
business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and
sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of
justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If we were
to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the
greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater
protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from
being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling
reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality which shields respondents
trade secrets.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Alvarez v. Ramirez, Supra
FACTS:
7. Susan Ramirez is the complaining witness in a Criminal Case for Arson
against Maximo Alvarez. Alvarez is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez,
sister of Ramirez.
8. Private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner. Petitioner raised no objection.
9. Esperanza testified:
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, wife of the accused, Your Honor.
xxx
ATTY. MESIAH (sic):
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly
that accused Maximo Alvarez pour (sic) xxx gasoline in the house xxx the house owned by his
sister-in0law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the
door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he
successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan
Ramirez, the members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the
accused; xxx
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
A: When I stand (sic) by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my
sister [and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room].
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
[Court makes witness identify Maximo Alvarez, who was in the courtroom]
10. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from
testifying against him pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 130 [Disqualification for
reason of marriage]
a. Respondent filed an opposition
11. Trial court issued an order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records.
a. Prosecutor filed an MR. Denied.
12. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Preliminary
Injunction and TRO with the Court of Appeals.
a. Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Order. MR Denied by CA
ISSUE: WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband - YES, this is an
DISPOSITION:
exception to Sec. 22, Rule 130.
CA Decision AFFIRMED. RTC Ordered to Allow Esperanza to testify.
RATIO + RULING:
DOCTRINE:
3. Sec. 22, Rule 130 provides for the disqualification of a witness for
[In bold]
reason of marriage. The reasons for the given rule are: (1) the identity
of the interests between husband and wife; (2) if one were to testify
for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; (3) the
policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and (4) where there is want of
domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.
4. This rule, however, has exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained
that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such
harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent.
a. Ordono v. Daquigan, citing Cargil v. State: “xxx [T]he better rule is
that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
by one against the other.”
b. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act,
embodied in the Information, eradicates all major aspects of
marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
c. CA Findings: “The act of [petitioner] in setting fire to the house of
his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife
was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved. xxx There is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
d. Additionally, the Records show that prior to the commission of the
offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 610
FACTS:
1. Joel Sanvicente was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Chua.
Sanvicente fatally shot the victim outside the Far East Bank after the latter
allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the ATM.
2. Sanvicente's counsel wrote a letter addressed to the police Station
Commander saying that “According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, he just
withdrew from the bank a large amount of cash. On his way out, said victim
immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just withdrew. My
client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a
warning shot upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed
his gun. After a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot the deceased
in the defense of his person and money…this letter shall serve as a
voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client.”
3. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, which included
the letter of Sanvicente's counsel to the police. The trial court admitted all
the prosecution's exhibits.
4. Sanvicente filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based
on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the
accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution's
evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt
of the accused was not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed the
RTC and found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and
authenticity of the letter which, it claimed, "positively identified Sanvicente
as the perpetrator of the crime charged."
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter amounted to confession of guilt – No
RATIO:
1. The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of
a piece of documentary evidence vis-á-vis the truth of its contents.
Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the fundamental distinction between
an admission and a confession.
2. The prosecution maintains that the letter constituted a confession and
argues thus: "What better evidence is there to positively identify the
perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the Sanvicente himself,
freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?" According to the
prosecution, this "extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest
evidence of guilt."
3. An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court
as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A
confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged
or any offense necessarily included therein. In short, in a confession, an
accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of
guilt in an admission.
4. Here, the letter is an admission, not a confession, because of the
unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that “this letter shall serve
as a voluntary surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my
client.”
5. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the scope of
"privileged communication," it would, more importantly, be tantamount to
converting the admission into a confession.
6. The contents of the letter, particularly with regard to the details of the
shooting communicated by Sanvicente to his attorney, is privileged
because it is connected with the business for which Sanvicente retained
the services of the latter. More specifically, said communication was
relayed by Sanvicente to attorney, in order to seek his professional advice
or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to
explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better
advice his client or manage the litigation.
7. According to Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
a. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:
i. (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment nor can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.
8. It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon Sanvicente himself
to testify although he too was a signatory of the letter. Apparently, it was
aware that Sanvicente could well invoke his right against self-incrimination
and refuse to answer its questions. The prosecution then attempted to
draw out what it could not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, said
letter had earlier been admitted in evidence by the RTC. What was
objectionable was the prosecution's sole reliance on the document without
proof of other facts to establish its case against Sanvicente because of its
mistaken assumption that the same was a confession.
9. Prosecution could have established the genuineness and due execution of
the letter through other means to establish its case against Sanvicente but
it mistakenly assumed that said document was a confession. Thus,
Prosecution could have called to the witness stand the police (the
addressee of the letter) to identify the said document since it was
supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the signatures
appearing on the document which can be readily obtained or witnesses
who are familiar with them could have also been presented. But the
prosecution did not.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

10. Moreover, the letter is hearsay inasmuch as its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some person other
than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1997 and the Resolution dated January 2,
1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43697 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

45