EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: MONDAY (MAY 13, 2019), 12 NOON
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 132
4. CA ruled Section 26.
1. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Director of Labor Relations, G.R. No.
ISSUES: L-48931, July 16, 1979. - ALCANTARA
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO
Section 27.
RULING + RATIO: 1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
1. Blah 2. People v. Castañeda, Jr., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013, 712
a. Sub Blah SCRA 800. - ALCAZAR
2. Concept 3. Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149802, January 20, 2006, 479
a. Explain explain SCRA 1. - CABUSORA

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? Section 28.

1. Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013. - CANDELARIA
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc 2. Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428. -
BAUTISTA

Section 29.
1. Miranda v. Tiangco, G.R. No. L-7044, January 31, 1955, 96 Phil 526. -
REMOLLO, D.

Section 30.
1. Heirs of Sps. Liwagon v. Heirs of Sps. Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117,
November 26, 2014. - MAGISTRADO
2. Espineli v. People, Supra.
3. Skunac Corp. v. Sylianteng, G.R. No. 205879, April 23, 2014. - SO
4. Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. NO. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014. - OCAMPO

Section 31.
1. Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015. -
MANAHAN
2. Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009. - DONES
3. Sps. Cirelos v. Sps. Hernandez, G.R. NO. 146523, June 15, 2006. -
PELONGCO
4. Cabotaje v. Sps. Rivera, G.R. No. 134712, August 13, 2004. - SOLCO

Section 32.
Section 33.
1. Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of Doronio, Supra.
2. People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004. - LOPEZ

Section 34.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

1. Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015. - MANALANG

2. Sabay v. People, G.R. No. 192150, October 1, 2014. - CABOCHAN
3. Barut v. People, G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014. - TAYLO
4. CIR v. United Salvage and Towage Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 197515, July 2,
2014, 729 SCRA 113. - TALION
5. Republic v. Reyes-Bakunawa, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013, 704
SCRA 163. - NOEL

Section 35.
1. Heirs of Pasag v. Sps. Parocha, G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007, 522
SCRA 410. - NAVAL
2. Rivera v. 4th Division of Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 157824, January 17,
2005, 448 SCRA 623. - PEREZ
3. People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 143935, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 42. -
DOROJA
4. People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003. - REYES, G.

Section 36.
1. People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015. - FUEGO
2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
3. Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013. - SANTOS, JR.
4. Bayani v. People, G.R. No. 155619, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 84. - UY

Section 37.
Section 38.
1. Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005, July 14, 2006. -
BONOAN
2. Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1747, July 31, 2003. -
SIQUIAN

Section 39.
Section 40.
1. Catacutan v. People, G. R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 524. -
ANTE
2. Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa, Supra.
3. Yu v. CA, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 280. -
CAPUCHINO

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Director of Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-48931,
July 16, 1979.
FACTS:
1. On June 24, 1976, or within 60 days prior to the expiration on August 19,
1976 of the unregistered CBA between the Associated Labor Unions and the
General Milling Corporation, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly
registered labor union, filed a petition for certification election.
2. Med-Arbiter granted the petition. However, Associated Labor Unions
appealed to the Director of Labor Relations.
3. Instead of deciding the appeal, the Director turned over the records of
the case to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), a
federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement
between the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases
involving its member-unions must first be referred to it.
4. TCUP failed to decide on the appeal. More than 20 months after the
federation received the record, Ilaw at Buklod filed the instant petition for
mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide the case, or
in the alternative, require the TUCP to return to the Director the record of the
case.
lamentable and ridiculous situation of having to beg the TUCP for
the return of the record and then to ask for a court order to compel
its return since the TUCP has cavalierly not heeded its request.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the president, secretary, or any responsible officer of
the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, is ordered to return to the Director of
Labor Relations within 48 hours from notice the original record of the case.
DOCTRINE: There is another aspect of this case which should be underscored. And
that is that the Labor Code never intended that the original record of a labor case, an
official public record, should be removed from the legitimate custodian thereof and
entrusted to a private person or entity. It should be obvious that the delivery of an
official public record to a private person is fraught with mischievous consequences.
(See sec. 27, Rule 132, Rules of Court on irremovability of public record.)

ISSUE: Whether it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor Relations to
refer to the TCUP the appeal?

RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. The referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly illegal and void. The
Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations should
abdicate, delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in favor of a
private person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such a surrender
of official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and censurable renunciation
of the Director’s adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation cases.
2. Articles 226 and 259 of the Labor Code regarding the jurisdiction of the BLR
are mandatory and should be strictly adhered to. They are part and parcel of
the adequate administrative machinery established by the Labor Code for
the expeditious settlement of labor disputes. The Director's act of referring
the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions to the TUCP is not only contrary
to law but is a patent nullification of the policy of the Labor Code to avoid
delay in the adjudication of labor controversies.
3. There is another aspect of this case which should be underscored. And
that is that the Labor Code never intended that the original record of a
labor case, an official public record, should be removed from the
legitimate custodian thereof and entrusted to a private person or entity.
It should be obvious that the delivery of an official public record to a
private person is fraught with mischievous consequences. (See sec.
27, Rule 132, Rules of Court on irremovability of public record.)
a. Respondent Director of Labor Relations in imprudently and illegally
delivering to the TUCP the record of the certification election case
(instead of a transcript thereof) placed himself in the pitiable,
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
FACTS:
1. The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), commenced a complaint for "reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages" against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco ),
Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R.
Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes
Tantoco-Pineda.
2. Instead of filing an Answer, respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a
"Motion To Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of
Particulars," which were both denied for lack of bases.
3. On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a
pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff."
4. A month later, they filed both an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" and a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
5. This time, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and
granted the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. When the
PCGG elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, this Court, through then
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan in this
wise:
a. The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there
is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents
subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. Some of the
documents are, according to the verification of the amended
complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said
complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may
adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial
6. Pre-trial commenced, and from 3 January to 14 July 1993, the PCGG
produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit "A" to "LLL" before Atty. Renato
T. Bocar and respondents’ counsel.
7. On 23 and 25 September 1996, the temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to
"LLL," together with their sub-markings, were adopted. However, over the
objections of respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and
caused the pre-marking of additional documents, Exhibits "MMM" to
"AAAAAAA."
8. Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,"
claiming that the additional documents were never produced at the discovery
proceedings and praying that petitioner be sanctioned for contempt. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
9. Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at discovery were still
being marked. Tantoco and Santiago again filed a "Motion to Ban Plaintiff
From Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery
Proceedings," which the graft court denied.
10. The Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some documents, "all
Exhibits... are denied admission. The due execution and authenticity of
these documents remain challenged since the prosecution failed to show
otherwise."
11. On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly
relented and admitted Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" (Second Resolution).
12. As certified to by the Chief Administrative Officer of the PCGG,14 Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA" were turned over to its Legal Division and included.
13. Respondents filed MR. MR was granted and Sandiganbayan ruled to
sanction the plaintiff for its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the
directive of this Court which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme
Court.
14. Sandiganbayan further said that the plaintiff must be prevented from offering
in evidence all the documents that were not produced and exhibited at the
time the plaintiff was under a directive to do so, i.e. Exhibits "MMM" to
"AAAAAAA" xxx. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is not unmindful of
the fact that the exhibits involved have not passed the test of admissibility in
any event.
15. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
excluding the documents due to petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-
trial.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. After a careful scrutiny of the records, We find that in excluding Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA," the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion
over evidence formally offered by the prosecution.
2. Nothing therein shows that the court gravely exceeded its jurisdiction. For
the reviewing court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower
court, the petitioner must show that the former's action was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual
refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the
law.
3. Petitioner would have us reverse the Sandiganbayan solely because the
latter purportedly made contrary rulings in its earlier Resolutions. The
Republic invokes the First Resolution, specifically the graft court’s view that
the exclusion of the Exhibits "would be too technical," since their non-
production "could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful
disobedience." However, this First Resolution merely disposed of
respondents’ Motion to cite petitioner in contempt. It does not constitute an
irrevocable stamp of admissibility.
4. Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely, that
the issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon
formal offer thereof. This is why objection to the documentary evidence must
be made at the time it is formally offered, and not earlier.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
5. The Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles as follows: The
identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is
not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in
evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it
is formally offered as an exhibit.
6. It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection,
this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is
curious that it did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of
exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not
only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.
7. Seasonable objection to the subject "Exhibits" can only be properly made
upon formal offer. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and
Santiago had been consistent in reiterating their objections. The court even
clarified in its First Resolution that their "Motion Filed Under Rule 29," was
but in pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not
produced at discovery. Hence, nothing in the said Resolution can be read as
a ruling on its admissibility. Its dispositive portion clearly states: "Under all
these circumstances, there is no basis for the Court to declare plaintiff in
contempt of court and it would be too much of a technicality to bar it from
introducing the additional exhibits in evidence."
8. The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its
Formal Offer of Evidence, noted that all the documents contained therein
were photocopies. It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of Court
that they "appear to be the original copy" would not suffice. The
Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited for
doing so was liberality, viz: "There is nothing in the rules which categorically
prohibits the admission of additional documentary evidence when called for
as a case progress [sic]. What is clear is that it is the Court’s discretion to
allow or disallow its reception." Thus, the Sandiganbayan fittingly corrected
itself when once and for all, it excluded the photocopies in its latest
Resolution.
9. For those documents introduced in evidence as proof of their contents, the
assailed Resolution stated that petitioner has not made any effort
whatsoever to explain why it submitted mere photocopies. When the subject
of inquiry is the content of a document, submission of a certified true copy is
justified only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
10. Nothing on record shows, and petitioner itself makes no claim, that the
Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule.
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that
the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence within
a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Even then, the
general rule is that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the non-
production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently accounted for.
11. While the Sandiganbayan provided several reasons for its ultimate exclusion
of the documents, it did not distinguish: 1) Which particular documents are to
be excluded for violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and 2) Which of the
remaining ones it has treated as private documents that lacked proper
authentication. The detailed analysis of each piece of evidence vis-à-vis the
purpose for which they were presented falls squarely under the purview and
competence of the trial court. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own
conclusions for the factual determinations of the trial court. It is not the
function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence. Absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, as discussed above, this Court is
then constrained to uphold the reasons forwarded by the Sandiganbayan.
12. As for the documentary evidence which are purportedly transmittal letters,
petitioner remains unable to prove their due execution and authenticity.
13. The fact that the documents were certified as true copies of the original
by the PCGG does not enhance its admissibility. These documents
have remained private even if it is in the custody of the PCGG. What
became public are not the private documents (themselves) but the
recording of it in the PCGG. For, "while public records kept in the
Philippines, of private writings are also public documents...the public
writing is not the writing itself but the public record thereof. Stated
otherwise, if a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public
record, its record, its recordation, or its incorporation into the public
record becomes a public document, but that does not make the private
writing itself a public document so as to make it admissible without
authentication.
14. Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of these
documents, what ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in the view of
the graft court was the former’s lack of forthrightness in complying with the
Supreme Court directive.
15. After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it
was clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to
do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the due execution and
authenticity of the documents. Having failed in its belated attempts to
assuage the Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary evidence,
petitioner may not use the present forum to gain relief under the guise of
Rule 65.
16. The rest of the exhibits, which were public records of private documents
required by law to be entered therein, fell under Section 19 (c) of Rule 132.
As to them, Section 27 of Rule 132 states:
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. Section 27. Public record of a private document. — An authorized

public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of
the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the
custody.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition

for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0008 (dated
3 June 2009) is AFFIRMED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Castañeda, Jr., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 800.
FACTS:
1. Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza
Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.) were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) for the unlawful and fraudulent import into the Port of Manila, 858
cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security
Premium 2012, which was falsely declared as 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of
CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case.
2. The Kaspersky CDs customs duties were supposed to amount Php
3,341,245 of which only the amount of Php100,362 was paid, in violation of
violation of Section 3602 in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1,
(3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
3. To the prejudice and damage of the Government in the amount of
Php3,240,883.
4. Garcia and Vestidas Jr. pleaded "Not Guilty"
5. The prosecution presented a number of witnesses who essentially observed
the physical examination of Container Van and explained the process of
electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of
the BOC and the alleged misdeclared goods therein.
6. Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to
Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing. Stating that:
a. The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution
were inadmissible in court;
b. The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods
were not presented as evidence; and
c. None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive
identification of the two accused as the ones responsible for the
supposed misdeclaration.
7. CTA: Ruled in favor of respondents.
a. It stated that anent its offer of private documents, the prosecution
likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy
thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody."
Considering that the private documents were submitted and
filed with the BOC, the same became part of public records.
Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present
the certified true copies of the documents.
b. The CTA also noted that the prosecution even admitted that none
of their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in open
court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently
and properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.
8. MR of Petitioner was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the
pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in
evidence.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Basically, the SC did not expound on the case anymore because the petition
for certiorari under rule 65 must have been filed within 60 days from notice of
judgment. In this case, it was filed out of time. Prosecution also failed to
provide convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition to warrant
the relaxation of the Rules.
2. The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court
to suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by
design from the start.
3. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the
failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the
failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this
petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a
reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by
the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against
inefficiency in the administration of justice.
4. Had the Customs Lawyers been eager and keen in prosecuting the
respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the
CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.
5. In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this
recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process.
6. In this case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not
disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of
due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner
actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of
evidence and opposed the demurrer.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED CTA decision.
DOCTRINE: An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the
original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record,
with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. In this case, the
prosecution failed to show the certified true copy of the documents.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149802, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 1. Cojuangco, et al] is GRANTED. Complaint-in-Intervention [filed by the
Yuchengcos] is DISMISSED.
FACTS: 11. G.R. No. 153207 filed by the complainants-in-intervention Yuchengcos. G.R.
Initial Facts: No. 153459 filed by the Republic, both challenge the Partial Decision.
1. PHI was registered on October 5, 1977 with the following five (5)
incorporators: Jose D. Campos, Jr. (son of Jose Yao Campos), Rolando ISSUES/HELD:
Gapud (Gapud), Renato Lirio (Lirio), Ernesto Abalos (Abalos), and Gervacio 1. WON petitioners in G.R. Nos. 149802, 150320 and 150367 were denied due
Gaviola (Gaviola), with 400 shares each, with a par value of P100 per share. process when the SB in effect directed them to terminate the presentation of
The total amount of capital stock subscribed was thus P200,000.00, their respective evidence; - NO.
P50,000.00 of which was actually paid. Its place of business was at 66 2. WON the Partial Decision being assailed via petition for review in G.R. Nos.
United Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. 153207 and 153459, conforms to the evidence presented, the law and/or
2. 54,349 shares in PTIC were given by GTE, an American corporation, to settled jurisprudence. – NO only for the fifth petition.
PTIC. Shares were purchased by PTIC President Cojuangco. Cojuangco
and Luis Tirso Rivilla [seller] with PHI President Gapud [buyer] agreed that
RATIO:
111,415 common shares (46.125%) of PTIC would be sold to PHI.
1. Court DISMISSED the petitions as follows: First become moot. Second and
3. Gapud and Jose D. Campos, Jr. later assigned all their shares in PHI (400
Third for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SB. Fourth in the
shares each) to Cojuangco and PTIC Director Oscar Africa (Africa).
absence of reversible error on the part of the SB. What is in issue now is the
4. Cojuangco and Africa were elected directors of PHI, replacing Gapud and
fifth petition which denied the prayer of the Republic for a judgment ordering
Jose D. Campos, Jr., while the other directors — Lirio, Abalos, and Gaviola
the Estate of Ramon U. Cojuangco (Cojuangco), Imelda O. Cojuangco, PHI,
— remained as such. Africa transferred all his 400 PHI shares — 240 to
their assigns, nominees and agents to reconvey to the Republic 111,415
Antonio Cojuangco and 160 to Trinidad Cojuangco Yulo. The remaining
PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI. The partial decision stated
incorporators on the board of directors — Lirio, Abalos, and Gaviola — each
that Republic has failed to prove that the PLDT shares sought to be
executed a deed of assignment transferring their PHI shares to members of
recovered are ill-gotten. SB: “[A]lmost all the documents offered by the
the Cojuangco family.
Republic are photocopies, and no effort was undertaken . . . to submit
the originals of said documents, or to have them properly identified, or
Facts Proper:
to otherwise justify the admission of mere photocopies.” [This is
5. This petition is the consolidation of five (5) petitions.
incorrect]
6. The complaint in Civil Case No. 0002 (or the case) was filed before the
Sandiganbayan on July 16, 1987 by the Republic of the Philippines through
Beneficial Ownership of PHI:
the PCGG against former President and Mrs. Marcos, their three children,
2. Respondents in G.R. No. 153459, namely: Estate of Ramon Cojuangco,
and some other individuals.
Imelda O. Cojuangco, PHI, and Imelda R. Marcos all agree with petitioner
7. The case is for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
Republic that PHI has an undisclosed beneficial owner, their only
among which are shares of stock in the PTIC: 76,779 shares – Ramon U.
disagreement being who this owner is.
Cojuangco, 21,525 shares – Imelda O. Cojuangco, and 111,415 shares –
3. PHI and Cojuangcos claim that the beneficial owners are the Cojuangcos.
PHI. PTIC is the biggest stockholder of PLDT (~28% outstanding shares) at
4. Imelda Marcos and Republic both claim that the beneficial owners were
the time Civil Case No. 0002 was filed.
the Marcoses. [THIS WAS UPHELD. SUBJECT SHARES WERE
8. G.R. Nos. 149802 and 150320 – filed by Alfonso Yuchengco and Y Realty
CONSIDERED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES]
Corporation. Petition for certiorari against SB orders and resolutions denying
their motions to suspend trial pending discovery proceedings and to re-set
Quantum of Evidence:
trial dates, and declaring them as having waived their right to present
5. Sec. 3, E.O. No. 14-A clearly states that the degree of proof required in
evidence.
cases such as the one at bar is preponderance of evidence. The SB was
9. G.R. No. 150367 – filed by the Republic. Petition for certiorari against SB
not to look for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but to determine, based on
Orders denying its Respectful Motion for Additional Time to Complete the
the evidence presented, in light of common human experience, which of the
Presentation of Evidence and directing it to submit its offer of evidence
theories proffered by the parties is more worthy of credence. The evidence
within 30 days.
presented by the parties show that the preponderance clearly lies with the
10. First three petition still pending, SB issued a Partial Decision. Republic’s
Republic, but the Sandiganbayan grossly misappreciated it and, therefore,
petition is DISMISSED. Motion for Summary Judgment [filed by Imelda
committed a reversible error.

8
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
The Testimonies of Campos, Gapud, and Atty. Francisco De Guzman (De
Guzman) Establish The Marcoses' Ownership Of Phi:
SWORN STATEMENT AND DEPOSITION OF JOSE YAO CAMPOS:
6. It is not disputed that Jose Yao Campos is a former Marcos crony who
surrendered to the government substantial assets which he confessed to
have held in behalf of Marcos. He is one of the Republic's witnesses in the
case. In his SWORN STATEMENT taken at Vancouver, Canada, the
authenticity and truthfulness of which was reaffirmed by him during the
taking of his deposition also at Vancouver, Campos. He declared that one of
the 23 corporations organized in behalf of Pres. Marcos by Campos is PHI.
According to the testimony, they had a “policy” wherein whenever a
corporation was organized in trust for Pres. Marcos, they executed and
required all your business associates to execute a Deed of Trust or
Assignment in favor of an “unnamed beneficiary” and delivered the originals
to Pres. Marcos. When asked with respect to PHI, Campos stated “The
policy is followed by every corporation that we organized for the President.”
7. These statements speak for themselves. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan,
after finding that "almost all the documents offered by the Republic are
photocopies" and ruling that the same were unreliable, omitted any
discussion of the evidentiary weight of the Republic's testimonial
evidence, including the deposition statement of Campos. Notwithstanding
Campos' testimony linking Marcos to PHI (and thus to the subject PTIC
shares pertaining to PHI), the graft court concluded that "[t]here is no
competent evidence to tie defendant Ferdinand Marcos with PTIC."
8. In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan grossly misappreciated the weight of
the evidence presented by the Republic, reducing to naught Campos'
categorical statement that PHI is one of the corporations he organized in
behalf of Marcos and that in "[a]ll the corporations [he] organized — that was
the standard policy — that we surrendered [a Deed of Trust or Deed of
Assignment] direct to President Marcos."
Deposition of Gapud:
9. Gapud, one of the incorporators of PHI, affirmed Campos' sworn statement
quoted above that he is his associate. His deposition taken at the Philippine
Consulate Office in Hong Kong substantially corroborates the statements of
Campos and further establishes that PHI was a dummy corporation of the
Marcoses. When asked, if he owned the 400 shares of the PHI, he
answered no and that “the shares and/or assignments indorsed in blank
were delivered by Mr. Campos to President Marcos.”
10. As with the testimony of Campos, the Sandiganbayan did not explain its
reasons for holding that, notwithstanding the existence of Gapud's testimony
in the records, there is no competent evidence to support the Republic's
thesis.
DEPOSITION OF DE GUZMAN:
11. The Republic also presented the deposition of de Guzman, former corporate
secretary of PHI, taken at the Mandarin Hotel, Makati City. His testimony
also sheds light on the origins and organization of PHI, and substantially
corroborates the statements of Campos and Gapud. To properly appreciate
the import of de Guzman's testimony, it is needful to recall the avowals of
Campos regarding his family's participation in UNILAB, as in his (de
Guzman's) deposition, he mentions UNILAB several times.
12. The statements of de Guzman clearly support the thesis of the Republic that
PHI is a dummy of the Marcoses, it having been completely organized by
associates of Campos, who had categorically testified to having organized
PHI for the benefit of President Marcos. On the other hand, there is hardly
any evidence on Cojuangco's role in the organization of PHI to substantiate
the thesis that the same was beneficially owned by him.
Preponderance of Evidence lies with the Republic:
13. Clearly, the Republic's thesis that President Marcos is the beneficial owner
of PHI "is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability." Only a
Marcos ownership can make sense of the circumstances surrounding
the origins of PHI, especially its close ties with UNILAB and the
Camposes. Only a Marcos ownership of PHI can plausibly account for the
substantially corroborated admissions of Campos and Gapud that they
organized PHI in behalf of Marcos.
14. From evidence, these conclusions inevitably follow:
a. Cojuangco was elected President and took over the management
of PHI in 1981 with the cooperation of the Marcos nominees who, it
must be emphasized, still held the majority stockholding as of that
date;
b. As the remaining incorporators on the Board divested their shares
only in 1983, Cojuangco managed a Marcos-controlled corporation
for at least two years;
c. The simultaneous divestment of shares by the three remaining
incorporators on the Board to Cojuangco's close relatives in 1983
were with the knowledge and authorization of their principal —
President Marcos.
15. Clearly, all these circumstances mark out Cojuangco either as a
nominee of Marcos as was Gapud whom he replaced as President of
PHI or, at the very least, a close associate of Marcos.
16. Respecting the thesis that PHI was, from its inception, beneficially
owned by Ramon Cojuangco, the Cojuangcos can only point to the
deeds of assignment of PHI shares to members of their family as
confirming the same. The Sandiganbayan considered these deeds as
competent evidence, as opposed to the purported lack of such evidence on
the part of the Republic. The most these deeds could show, however, is
that the Cojuangcos acquired PHI shares in the years 1981 and 1983,
long after the 111,415 PTIC shares were acquired in 1978 by PHI. On
the decisive question of whether the incorporators who organized PHI
in 1977 acted as Marcos (or Cojuangco) nominees, these deeds are
absolutely silent.
9
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
17. In marked contrast, the testimonies of Campos, Gapud, and de
Guzman, persons who actually participated in the formation and early
years of operation of PHI, constitute evidence that directly addresses
the critical issue. Indubitably, the preponderance of evidence lies with
the Republic.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines in G.R.
No. 153459 is GRANTED to the extent that it prays for the reconveyance to the
Republic of 111,415 PTIC shares registered in the name of PHI. The petitions in G.R.
Nos. 149802, 150320, 150367, and 153207 are DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: see Garcia, DISSENT #7-10
Garcia, DISSENTING: (Sorry, summary of dissent was taken online except
specific portion for the topic)
1. The majority and the minority differed in their determinations of whether the
disputed PLDT shares were part of the “ill-gotten wealth” of the Marcos
family.
2. Justice Garcia believed that these shares were not. He reasoned that the
Republic had failed to prove its theory that the disputed PLDT shares were
in fact owned by the Marcos family, and that the Cojuangcos and PHI were
mere dummies/nominees/conduits in the Marcos family’s attempts to control
PLDT.
3. Justice Garcia pointed out that the connection of PHI to Marcos had not
been convincingly shown by the testimony of Campos. There was no
declaration that the deeds or stock certificates in blank delivered to the late
President included those of the company. Accordingly, the allegation that it
had been incorporated to hold the PTIC shares did not prove that PHI and
the Cojuangcos were dummies of the Marcos family.
4. Justice Garcia contended that the testimony of Gapud did not support the
Republic’s theory. The latter said that he had assigned his shares in PHI to
Ramon U. Cojuangco for a consideration. Further, he had no personal
knowledge of whether or not it owned shares in PTIC.
5. The testimony merely reiterated facts deducible from the testimonies of
Campos and Gapud. Moreover, De Guzman disclosed that the Deeds of
Assignment designated the persons to whom they had been transferred.
Justice Garcia said that, because those deeds were not indorsed in blank,
there was a departure from the set pattern usually followed in the
organization of corporations on behalf of Marcos.
6. Justice Garcia therefore agreed with the Sandiganbayan’s finding that
respondent had failed to give sufficient proof that the PLDT shares were
recoverable. That those shares were part of the “ill-gotten wealth” of the
Marcos family was not deducible from Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co.,
Inc. (Baseco) v. PCGG.
(Portion specifically related to topic Sec. 27, Rule 132)
7. "General Telephone & Electronics [GTE] Documents" are one of the material
evidentiary link to prove that the disputed PLDT shares form part of the
Marcoses' "ill-gotten wealth", but which merited scant consideration from, if
not altogether ignored by, the respondent court.
8. Two (2) letters comprise the GTE Documents: one, purportedly from Leslie
H. Warker of GTE to Mr. Ramon Cojuangco confirming an appointment with
the latter's "principal"; and the other, from Theodore F. Brophy of GTE to US
Assistant Secretary of State Eugene H. Braderman naming then Pres.
Marcos as the "Principal". Per petitioner Republic's account, photo-copies
of the GTE Documents were among the papers and materials seized by
the US Customs Service from the Marcos family in February 26, 1986 in
Hawaii and subsequently turned over to PCGG.
9. Petitioner Republic contends that the said GTE Documents are
"authorized public records of a private document ". As such, it argues,
citing Section 27 of Rule 132, 88 that there would be no need to present
the original copies thereof, as they may be proved by a mere copy
thereof, provided such copy is attested by the legal custodian of the
records, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the
custody. According to said petitioner, the attestation of Ms. Lourdes Magno,
PCGG Record Officer, with the certification that she has such custody would
suffice for the purpose of authenticating and proving their genuineness so as
to have the GTE documents received in evidence.\We disagree. Not every
single paper or document in the custody of PCGG in relation to its
quest to recover the "ill-gotten wealth" of the Marcos family has the
character and probative value of an "authorized public record ". Even
the official seal of the PCGG on the two (2) GTE Documents does not
suffice to make them "authorized public records" of a private
document and thus enhance their admissibility. The GTE Documents
are still private writings. The GTE Documents turned over by the US
Government in the hands of the PCGG are not self-authenticating, for
what is contextually considered a public document is not the private
writing, but the public record thereof. Their authenticity and due
execution, as condition sine qua non for their reception in evidence,
with the evidentiary weight they might otherwise be entitled to, must
first be proved under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
10
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013. 4. Under R131, S3(m), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
FACTS: contrary. This presumption may be defeated by affirmative evidence of
1. Syed Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with irregularity or failure to perform a duty. No such affirmative evidence was
Gloria Goo-Abbas, alleging the absence of a marriage license as a ground. shown that the MCR was lax in performing her duty of checking the records.
In their Marriage Contract, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967 The presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
issued at Carmona Cavite, was presented to the solemnizing officer. Syed, a having been conducted, since the marriage license was indeed located and
Pakistani citizen, testified that he and Gloria got married in Taiwan in 1992. submitted to court. The fact that it does not pertain to the parties does not
2. When he arrived in the PH in 1993, he stated that he was told by Gloria’s overturn the presumption of regularity that the MCR conducted a diligent
mother that they were going to undergo a ceremony to stay in the PH, but search of the records.
was not told of the nature of the ceremony. He did not know that he did not 5. Gloria failed to present their marriage license. She failed to explain why the
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. marriage license was secured in Carmona, where none of them resided. She
3. He then went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona to check on their could have acquired a copy of the marriage license in the LCR of Manila,
marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR) issued a certification assuming that the testimony of the solemnizing officer was true, but failed to
that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract was the do so.
number of another marriage license issued to another couple. An employee
of the office which issued the certification testified in favor of Syed. DISPOSITION: PETITION GRANTED. RTC RULING REINSTATED.
4. Gloria, along with her other witnesses, testified that Syed was her husband,
and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures. She and her
mother asked for Atty. Sanchez’s help in securing the marriage license.
They then gave the marriage license to the solemnizing officer (who also
testified in Gloria’s favor), who then celebrated their marriage.
5. RTC ruled in favor Syed, giving credence to the certification that no marriage
license had been issued in favor of the parties. CA reversed, ruled in favor of
Gloria, relying on the fact that the language of the certification lacked the
words “despite diligent search”, and since the certification stated no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted, no diligent search had been conducted and the certification
cannot be given probative value.

ISSUE: W/N the certification has probative value.

RULING + RATIO: YES.

1. To prove that no marriage license was issued, Syed acquired a certification
issued by the office of the MCR of Carmona who allegedly issued such
license, which stated that no license was issued. Such certification is
permitted under R132, S29.
2. In the Republic v CA case, the Court stated that the certification issued by
the civil registrar stating that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor is not
in the register, enjoys probative value, as it is the custodian’s duty to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The
MCR of Carmona issued a certification to the effect that no marriage license
was issued in favor of the parties, and that the marriage license actually
pertained to another couple.
3. In accordance with Republic case, it is not required that a categorical
statement that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is it
absolutely necessary for R132, S28 to apply.
11
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428. book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for
the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." xxx
FACTS: Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is
1. In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on
19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon marriage license no. 2720792.
him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose 5. Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence, this
Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to Petition for Review on Certiorari.
the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which
marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
2. Based on the records of the trial court, Jaime testified that he and Carmelita
RULING + RATIO: YES.
appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel,
1. Cariño v. Cariño: “[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract in civil
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In
rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, Jaime alleged, was an aide of
Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
Carmelita's father accompanied them, and who, together with another
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969
the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never
under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a
applied for any marriage license.
marriage license.”
3. Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the Jaime, himself manifested that
2. Republic v. Court of Appeals: “The above Rule authorized the custodian of
when his service was engaged by Jaime, and after the latter narrated to him
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining
wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated were all sent to
a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
Certifications several certifications that "no marriage license no. 2770792
license was issued and such other relevant data.”
was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish
3. Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of Jaime and
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
Carmelita and a Certificate of Marriage, wherein it noted that it was a "purely
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
on May 19, 1969."
4. The first Certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
4. The trial court ruled in favor of Jaime and declared the nullity of the latter’s
Manila, was dated 11 March 1994 and the second Certification dated 20
marriage with Carmelita. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
September 1994 both stated: “No Marriage License Number 2770792 were
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and held:
(sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License
a. In People v. De Guzman, the Supreme Court explained that: "The
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
the above problem.”
The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
5. The third Certification, issued on 25 July 2000, states:
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
a. This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
b. In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the
12
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
CARDENAS-SEVILLA. officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a
b. This is to further certify that the said application and license do not marriage license. The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify
exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
fictitious. particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
6. Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia,
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and license was issued and such other relevant data. Thus, the certification to be issued
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist
work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
whether or not such license was issued. search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
7. This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record
that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
8. Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
9. According to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and
can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
10. Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we
cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or
falsity of entries therein.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution
dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

DOCTRINE: As certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
13
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Miranda v. Tiangco, G.R. No. L-7044, January 31, 1955, 96 Phil 526.
FACTS:
1. Isidro Miranda was the sublessee of three contiguous lots leased by Manuel
Dominguez from the Hospicio de San Jose. The sublease began in the
years 1945 and 1946, during the liberation.
2. As Miranda defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly rentals,
Dominguez filed an action of ejectment.
3. When the case was called for trial, on October 10, 1947, the parties
submitted a compromise agreement (first agreement) in which the sublessee
admitted the following:
4. Arrears in rental of P940 of which amount he paid P200 and agreed to pay
later the balance of P740, together with current rentals at the rate of P330
every month. On the same day this agreement was approved by the court,
which enjoined the parties to comply with it.
5. As Miranda did not live up to his agreement, an order for the execution of
said judgment was entered on November 28, 1947.
6. But on June 23, 1948 the parties again submitted another agreement
(second agreement). In this new agreement the back rentals amounting to
P1,585 were to be paid at the rate of P170 per month, beginning July, 1948.
7. It was expressly agreed also that upon failure of defendant to comply with
the agreement the defendant could be compelled to be ejected at his
expense upon notice by plaintiff, and that upon failure to vacate the plaintiff
would revive the judgment (or order) of October 10.
8. The new agreement was also approved by the court. Again the defendant
failed to comply there with. He was also given again until December 20,
1948 within which to comply with the compromise.
9. On February 18, 1949, upon petition of plaintiff, the court issued an order for
the demolition of Miranda's house.
IMPORTANT
10. On April 7, 1949 Miranda filed the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to annul the agreement of June 23, 1948, which is the
agreement being enforced in the order of execution, on the following
grounds: (1) that the agreement does not represent the true intent of the
parties; (2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction to approve and enforce it,
as the order modifies another order or judgment which had become final and
executory; (3) that the stipulated rentals is contrary to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 66.
11. The court of first instance dismissed the complaint and plaintiff Miranda
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to this Court as
nothing but questions of law are raised in the appeal.
ISSUES/HELD
1. WON the payment of the rentals agreed upon in second agreement can be
enforced (YES)
2. WON the municipal court had no jurisdiction to approve the second
agreement as its decision in the case had already become final (NO, it had
jurisdiction)
3. WON the writ of execution finally issued in said Civil Case No. 14 of the
Municipal Court of Pasay City is null and void (NO, it is valid)
RATIO:
1. It should be noted that the judgment rendered in said Civil Case No. 14 of
the Municipal Court of Pasay City was a judgment by consent. The nature
and effect of the judgment was explained by this Court in Manila Railroad
Company vs. Arzadon, A judgment by consent of the parties is more than a
mere contract in pais; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has all the force and effect of any other
judgment, being conclusive as an estoppel upon the parties and their privies.
2. A judgment rendered upon an admission of fact or by consent is conclusive
on the parties to the same extent as though rendered upon a contest.
3. The basis of the judgment was the stipulation of facts submitted by the
parties and their agreement fixing the liability of the defendant therein for
rentals and the manner in which the same was to be paid by him. It is
conclusive between the parties, not only as to the question on which the
parties made stipulation but also as to any other possible issue which the
parties could have raised in the case.
4. The fact that the defendant in that action, plaintiff-appellant in this, did not
raise that issue in the previous case is no reason for allowing him to raise
the same issue in the action he has instituted to annul the said judgment.
The principle of res judicata does not apply. As defined by the court res
judicata is “a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding
parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose."
5. The plaintiff-appellant herein is absolutely barred from rising the issue of
legality of the agreement that he has entered into said Civil Case No. 14.
IMPORTANT
6. Considered from a different angle, the present action instituted by the
plaintiff-appellant is one for the annulment of a final judgment rendered by a
court to competent jurisdiction, after a trial on the merits, in which both
parties were under the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment can only be set
aside under any one of the grounds mentioned in section 45 of Rule 123,
Rules of Court(NOW section 29 of Rule 132), which provides: “Any judicial
record may be impeached by evidence of a want of jurisdiction in the court
or judicial officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the party
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.” None of the grounds
above mentioned is claimed as basis of the action and the judgment sought
to be annulled can not therefore, be impeached or attacked.
7. As to the second ground of the appeal, it is true that the first judgment was
entered on November 28, 1947. But it is also true that on June 23, 1948 the
parties voluntarily submitted another agreement, under the terms of which
14
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

defendant agreed that upon his failure to pay the amount and in the manner
specified, he could be compelled to be ejected at his expense and upon
notice by the plaintiff. The subsequent agreement was also approved by the
court. Plaintiff-appellant's contention is that as the first judgment of
November 28, 1947 had already become final and executory, it may not
again be changed by the court as the court no longer retains jurisdiction. The
other contention against the court's later order is that the new compromise
may not be enforceable by execution, because the original judgment had
become final about seven months before the new compromise was entered
into.
8. The above contentions seems to be valid at first glance, but they are based
on a failure to distinguish between two concepts in the law of procedure, the
jurisdiction of the court over its judgment, to change, alter or modify it, and
its jurisdiction over the case to enforce said judgment. The former terminates
when the judgment becomes final; the latter continues even after the
judgment has become final, for the purpose of the execution and
enforcement of the judgment.
9. There is no modification of the original judgment that had become final; there
is only provision for the payment of the rents due in accordance therewith,
which provision is included in the new judgment.
10. The other question is, can the parties enter into the new compromise
agreement as to the rents falling due after the original judgment, and is the
court empowered to act on such compromise agreement? As the case was
still under the jurisdiction of the court, for the execution of the original
judgment, the plaintiff may not institute a new action to recover the rents that
had fallen due pending the complete payment of the judgment. He is
prohibited from doing so by the principle of multiplicity of suits, which
requires that all questions arising from a case should be ventilated in one
single action. In any case, the parties already before the court, may not be
prevented from submitting the new compromise agreement because it (the
new agreement) embraces the subject of the original judgment — the rents
that had been ordered to be paid in the former judgment. So the new
agreement may be said to be in execution of the original judgment, over
which the court's jurisdiction can not be denied.

DISPOSITION: PETITION DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE: SEE UNDER “IMPORTANT”

15
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Heirs of Sps. Liwagon v. Heirs of Sps. Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117, November 26,
2014.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners and respondents in the case at bar are all children and
grandchildren of the late spouses Angel and Francisca Liwagon.
2. On June 4, 1957, Angel was provisionally awarded a parcel of land through
the Board of Liquidators of the Y. Furukawa Plantation. Together with his
children, he cultivated and introduced improvements on the land.
3. Later, his children got married and lived their own lives ¾ except for his son
Demetrio.
4. Demetrio, together with his wife Regina, stayed with Angel and administered
the property in litigation. The defendants ¾ who are all Demetrio’s children
¾ helped with the cultivation and took care of the family’s copra-making
business.
5. Eventually, Angel applied to the Y. Furukawa Plantation for final acquisition
of the land by sale. A deed of conveyance was thus executed in Angel’s
favor.
6. Upon Angel’s demise, the petitioners demanded from their brother Demetrio
for the partition of the subject landholding.
7. When Demetrio died, followed shortly by Regina, petitioner Josefina signified
her demand for partition to one of Demetrio’s sons named Rodrigo.
8. Rodrigo ignored the demand, however, contending that they now owned the
property as inheritance from their parents, who had earlier lawfully acquired
the land by purchase from their grandfather Angel, as evidenced by a deed
of sale.
9. As heirs of Angel and Francisca, the petitioners filed a case for annulment of
the sale, partition, accounting and damages against the defendants-heirs of
Spouses Demetrio and Regina.
10. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It found that
petitioners failed to disprove the genuineness of the signature of Angel in the
purported deed of sale which was duly executed before a notary public.
Thus, the trial court held that the authenticity of the document must be
upheld under the doctrine of presumption of regularity.
11. On appeal, the CA denied the same for lack of merit.
12. It ruled that the purported deed of sale appears regular and valid on its face
and petitioners failed to present clear and convincing evidence to controvert
the presumption that it was issued with regularity.
a. Being duly notarized, it carries with it the presumption of regularity,
authenticity, and due execution.
b. It has been the consistent rule that without clear, convincing, and
more than preponderant evidence to controvert, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its execution, as well as the statements
and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand. x x x
13. As to the allegation of forgery, the CA ruled that while there may be some
variance or difference from the signatures affixed by Angel in the sales
application and the assailed deed of sale, “these variances could not be
considered per seas conclusive proof that the signature in the document in
question has been forged.” Further, the CA found that petitioners themselves
failed to present strong, concrete, and conclusive proof that the subject deed
of sale was forged.
a. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that forgery cannot be presumed;
it must always be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden of proving it.
b. Unarguably, no examination of the alleged different signatures was
ever conducted in the instant case. Plaintiff-appellant Josefina’s
allegation to the effect that the signature found in the assailed
document is not the real and true signature of their father will not
suffice to overcome the positive value of the notarized deed of sale
dated 24 July 1972. x x x
14. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the alleged deed of sale executed by Angel Liwagon in favor of Regina
Liwagon in 1972 is valid.
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. Both the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled in favor of the due
execution of the subject deed of sale which was duly acknowledged and
recorded by Atty. Alfredo Abayon in his notarial registry.
2. It is a rule in our jurisdiction that the act of notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. By law, a notarial document
is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It enjoys the presumption of
regularity and is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein ¾ which
may only be overcome by evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant. Without such evidence, the presumption must be
upheld.
3. Petitioners failed to overcome this presumption.
4. In the case at bar, a single fact fatal to the cause of petitioners is clear: that
aside from the sole testimony of petitioner Josefina that the signature
appearing in the assailed deed of sale is not that of her father, no clear,
positive and convincing evidence was shown to corroborate such claim. The
trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Josefina in its ruling on the
issue, viz.:
a. The plaintiffs in this case failed to overcome the presumption of
regularity. Josefina testified that the signature affixed on top of the
typewritten name of Angel is not the real and true signature of her
father Angel. The presentation of a copy of a sales application is
not enough to substantiate her claim that the signature found on
said application is the real and true signature of her father Angel.
Plaintiff did not present the notary public who notarized the deed of
sale or any witness to prove that the signature of Angel appearing
on the deed is not the true signature of her father. x x x
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

5. Plaintiff merely said in her testimony that the signature in the deed of sale is
not the signature of her father. No other evidence was offered that would
indubitably show that the signatures appearing on the sales application and
deed of sale were written by two different persons or that one of the
signatures was written or affixed by a person other than Angel.
6. The contention of petitioners must fail that a “visual comparison” of Angel’s
signatures in the purported deed of sale and in his application with the
Bureau of Lands and Affidavit would reveal “that the signature in the deed of
sale was not genuine.” Not only did petitioners fail to present clear, positive
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor
of the assailed document, they merely stated these two sentences in this
petition for review to support their claim of forgery via visual comparison of
two signatures, viz.:
a. In the application and affidavit, the word “Liwagon” in his signature
is very legible and readable. On the other hand, the word “Liwagon”
in his signature appearing in the deed of sale is not legible or clear.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution dated October 23, 2009 and June 24, 2010,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City in CAG.R. CV No.
00965-MIN are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: It is a rule in our jurisdiction that the act of notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. By law, a notarial document is entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. It enjoys the presumption of regularity and is a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein ¾ which may only be overcome by evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Without such evidence,
the presumption must be upheld.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Espineli v. People, Supra.
FACTS:
1. An Information charging petitioner Jose Espineli (a.k.a. Danilo "Danny"
Espineli) with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC.
2. In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie
(Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM,
was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house in
Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime
scene on board a waiting car.
3. Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes
(Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.
4. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital
information regarding the Berbon case.
a. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial)
interviewed Reyes and reduced his statement into writing
(Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes), whereby Reyes claimed that on
December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes
(Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm
and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that
"ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon."
b. Reyes posted bail and was released. Thenceforth, he jumped bail
and was never again heard of.
5. The victim's widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified.
a. According to her, sometime in the third week of February 1997,
Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the
province and protect them from any untoward consequence that
may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the
death of Sabina's husband.
i. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00 and
promised to help him in applying for the witness protection
program.
ii. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina's
brother, Bartolome Pakingan.
b. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
6. Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to
three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1,
1996.
a. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to
him by the police officers.
7. Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy
Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and
body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or
entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
8. Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense.
a. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
b.As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court,
petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for
decision.
9. RTC → GUILTY of MURDER
10. CA → GUILTY of HOMICIDE
a. On the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength: none
of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated.
b. On the aggravating circumstance of nighttime as the time of the
commission of the crime: not alleged in the Information.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established."
2. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender if:
a. (1) there is more than one circumstance;
b. (2) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and
c. (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
3. All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
4. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided
that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
5. The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of
conviction on circumstantial evidence.
6. In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:
a. (1) In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard
telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car.
Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with
a .45 caliber pistol;
b. (2) The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution
witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero;
c. (3) The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December
15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled
riding a red car; and
d. (4) Post-mortem examination of the victim's body showed that he
sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-
powered guns, possibly an armalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.
Circumstance #1:
7. NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the
latter's statement into writing declaring
8. Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn
statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible.
He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it
lacks probative value → WRONG
9. While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.
a. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown.
b. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant
statements.
10. In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence.
a. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial's testimony was not
presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the
purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn statement
containing such narration of facts.
b. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes' statement.
c. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement.
d. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as
evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.
e. Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before
Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI.
i. As such, it may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this
instrument or document involved pursuant to Section
30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Circumstance #2:
11. The identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the
1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero
clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the
killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Circumstance #3:
12. Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same
car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Circumstance #4:
13. Though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered
guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way
in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Circumstance #5 (not found by the RTC/CA):
14. Petitioner's escape from detention while the case was pending can also be
considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.
Conclusion:
15. All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of
the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have
satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an
unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner
was responsible for the killing of the victim.
16. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of
homicide in view of the prosecution's failure to prove any of the alleged
attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO "DANNY" ESPINELI
is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE
P50,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
DOCTRINE: A notarized document may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due
execution of this instrument or document involved.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Skunac Corp. v. Sylianteng, G.R. No. 205879, April 23, 2014.
FACTS:
1. There are 2 parcels of land identified as Lot 1 and Lot 2, both found in Block
2 of the Pujalte Subdivision situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San
Juan City which are portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the
name of Luis A. Pujalte.
2. Respondents Sylianteng base their claim of ownership through a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their mother, Emerenciana.
Appellants further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late
Luis.
3. Petitioners Skunac Corporation and Enriquez, on the other hand, claim that
a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig City as the
sole heir of Luis Pujalte. Romeo Pujalte then allegedly sold the lots to
Skunac and Enriquez in 1992.
4. Respondents contend that they have a better right to the lots in question
because the transactions conveying the same to them preceded those
claimed by petitioners as source of the latter's titles. They further assert that
petitioners could not be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith and
for value because they had prior notice of the previous transactions as
stated in the memorandum of encumbrances annotated on the titles
covering the subject lots.
5. Petitioners argue that respondents acquired the lots under questionable
circumstances since there was no copy of the Deed of Sale, between
Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
6. RTC rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners.
7. CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: W/N Respondents presented a valid copy of their deed of sale?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Emerenciana’s acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her subsequent
sale of the same to respondents are valid and lawful. However, Petitioners
assail the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis
and Emerenciana. They contend that respondents' presentation of the
"duplicate/carbon" original of the Deed of Sale is in violation of the best
evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
2. The court does not agree.
3. The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case, because the
issue is the the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale.
Therefore, any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without
need to account for the original.
4. Petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents
submitted as part of their evidence is a duplicate of the original deed of sale.
It is settled that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed
at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe
introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the
original.
5. In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject
deed is the fact that it was notarized. The notarization of a private document
converts it into a public document. Moreover, a notarized instrument is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. This presumption is affirmed if it is beyond dispute
that the notarization was regular.
6. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
7. Here, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the
notarization of the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public
character. On the contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the notarial register
of the notary public who notarized the subject deed of sale, which was
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office of Manila, shows
that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly
notarized.
8. Petitioners question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale by arguing
that only one copy of such deed was prepared as only one document
number was assigned by the notary to the said deed. Petitioners claim that
this is contrary to the claim of respondents that the said deed of sale was
prepared, executed and notarized in several copies. The Court is not
persuaded.
9. It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that "[t]he notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded." In this regard, the Court agrees with respondents'
contention that the "instrument" being referred to in the abovequoted
provision is the deed or contract which is notarized. It does not pertain
to the number of copies of such deed or contract. Hence, one number
is assigned to a deed or contract regardless of the number of copies
prepared and notarized. Each and every copy of such contract is given
the same document number. It is, thus, wrong for petitioners to argue
that only one copy was prepared and notarized, because only one
document number appears on the notarial book of the notary public
who notarized the said deed. On the contrary, evidence shows that at
least two copies of the subject deed of sale was prepared and
notarized – one was submitted for registration with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and the other was retained by Emerenciana,
which is the copy presented in evidence by respondents.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, dated August 10, 2012 and February 18, 2013, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92022, are AFFIRMED.
Tupal v. Rojo, A.M. NO. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

document the notarizer has to make an objective examination. It is

FACTS:
1. Tupal filed an administrative complaint against Judge Rojo for gross
ignorance of the law.
2. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation of marriages that he
solemnized, on the same day.
a. These notarized affidavits can stand in place of a marriage license
provided the husband and wife to be have been cohabiting for 5
years without legal impediment to marry, prior to the marriage as
provided by Art 34 of the Family Code.
3. Tupal says this is a violation of Circular 1-90 which says that judges can
notarize ex officio in connection with their official functions and duties.
a. Said circular also provides that in case it is certified that there are
no notaries or lawyers in the area the judge may act as ex officio
notary also.
4. Judge Rojo argued that Circular 1-90 only prohibits judges from notarizing
private documents but since a marriage license is a public document then its
replacement is one as well.
5. Judge Rojo said that the Guidelines on Solemnization of Marriages does not
actually prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation so no foul.
6. The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Rojo guilty and fined him
Php9000, or 1k for every affidavit he notarized.
7. Judge Rojo appealed insisting that he had not violated any rule.
impossible for the judge who is going to solemnize the marriage to be
objective in notarizing an affidavit of cohabitation to be used in lieu of a
marriage license for that marriage.
5. Circular 1-90 also provides that judges are prohibited from notarizing private
documents. An affidavit of cohabitation is a private document until it is
notarized even if it serves a public purpose, and remains private until
notarized. Judge Rojo’s argument that he only notarized public documents
falls flat since they only became public AFTER he notarized them, so they
were disqualified before that.
6. On top of all this Judge Rojo actually also violated the Rules on Notarial
Practice. Said rules say that notaries can only notarize if the person is there,
and if the persons are personally known to the notary or has
competent evidence of identity. Judge Rojo failed to note that these
people personally known or had competent evidence. The fact that he
interviewed them on the same day doesn’t satisfy that requirement either.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is
SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS.
His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.

ISSUE: WON a judge can act as ex officio notary in order to notarize affidavits
of cohabitation?

RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. Notarizing an affidavit of cohabitation is NOT among the duties of a judge as
solemnizing officer. Circular 1-90 does NOT allow a judge to notarize private
documents which bear no relation to their function as judges. It is NOT a
function of a judge to notarize affidavits of cohabitation. A judge looks
to see if the requirements for a valid marriage are met, a judge does NOT
prepare them as part of their functions.
2. Circular 1-90 also allows judges to act as ex officio notary publics if
there are no lawyers or notaries in the area. To allow this however
there must be certification as to that fact to be made in the notarized
document.
3. Before performing a marriage ceremony the judge looks to see if the
requisites have been met. This means he either looks at the license or the
affidavit. The Guideline for Solemnizing Marriages says that the judge also
has to (a) personally interview the parties (b) examine the affidavit
specifically as to the fact of the 5 years cohabitation (c) execute a sworn
statement that (a) and (b) were met. This is the only thing the Guideline
tells a judge to do, it does NOT say they can notarize the affidavit of a
marriage they solemnize.
4. Taking Judge Rojo’s argument into account it would be redundant to have
the solemnizing officer also be the notarizing officer. In order to notarize a
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Heirs of Fernandez, G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015.
FACTS:
1. The heirs of Fernandez are the owners of an 11,156 sqm property
(agricultural land) in Bataan.
2. On June 2001, the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of DPWH, filed a
verified Complaint for Expropriation against the heirs of Fernandez and
Sotera Santuyo, the owner of another property in the same brgy in Bataan.
a. RP alleged that DPWH intended to construct a four-lane highway in
Brgy Tuyo and that it was necessary to acquire the properties of the
heirs of Fernandez and Santuyo for that purpose. RP prayed that a
Writ of Possession be issued in its favor and be allowed to
deposit the value of the property as provisionally ascertained
by the Court (not more than Php 50 per sqm).
3. In their Answer, the heirs of Fernandez admitted that there was “nobility and
utility” in the construction of the highway but disputed the necessity of
expropriating their property. They alleged that expropriation of their property
was not permitted under the Consti and that the fair and true market value of
their property was Php 1,200 per sqm.
4. Pre-trial was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. (in the Pre-
trial Order, RP submitted documentary evidence while the heirs did not mark
theirs)
a. RP filed a Motion/Manifestation and alleged that it offered the heirs
and amount (above the zonal value) to which the heirs rejected as
they were demanding Php 1,000 per sqm. RP also alleged that they
were in compliance w the IRR of RA 8974 and that it has already
deposited the amount.
b. Heirs also filed their Manifestation and prayed for the re-opening of
the pretrial.
5. TC: issued an Order allowing RP to take possession of the property of the
Heirs of Fernandez in view of their payment of Php 167,475 as evidence by
an LBP check in the name of Gabriel Fernandez. (Php 167,475 based on
Php 15 per sqm)
a. Heirs prayed for the nullification of the Order and requested for the
admission of the existence of 7 roads connecting Balanga to the
Roman Highway etc.
b. TC issued another Order finding that RP had a lawful right to take
the property and appointed 3 commissioners to determine the
amount of just compensation to be given.
6. Heirs appealed before the CA and argued that the expropriation was
unnecessary since there were 7 existing public roads that connected
Balanga to the Roman Highway.
7. CA: rendered a Decision setting aside RP’s authority to take possession of
the property but affirmed the Order to appoint commissioners to determine
the amount of just compensation.
a. Acknowledged that while there were roads that connected Balanga
to Roman Highway, it conceded that the construction of a four-lane
highway was a public need that would undeniably become
beneficial to Balanga and the Province of Bataan
b. Said that the Heirs were not denied due process
c. On the correct valuation of the property, the CA relied on the Heirs’
copy of the BIR zonal valuation and tax declaration. The amount
deposited was incorrect since the Php 15 per sqm was for
pastureland and not agricultural land. MR of RP (re amount)
denied.
ISSUE: W/N the correct zonal value of the property is Php 50 per sqm, not Php 15
per sqm?
RULING + RATIO:
1. The case records show that the parties presented as evidence two different
sets of the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuations covering Barangay
Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan.
2. The relevant zonal value of the properties in Balanga, Bataan at the time of
the filing of the expropriation case was covered by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Department Order No. 92-96. This Department Order was effective
from December 30, 1996 to December 27, 2002.
a. Heirs’ copy: Barangay Road Classification A1 Php 50
i. This copy was certified as true by Recana signing in
behalf of Pelino, the Assistant Division Chief of the Asset
Valuation Board and verified by tolentino on June 2001.
b. RP’s copy: Barangay Road Classification A1 (Php 50 for
riceland, Php 20 for unirr riceland, Php 15 for pastureland)
i. This copy was certified as true by Felipe Jr. the Group
Supervisor Chief Assessment Br. on Feb 2002
3. Since there was a discrepancy as to the two certifications, reference must be
made to the zonal values posted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on their
website, which are accessible to the general public. The zonal values of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for Barangay Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan do not
reflect the same typewritten annotations as that of the Republic's photocopy.
What appears in the Bureau of Internal Revenue's records, in fact, is
the same document presented by respondents Heirs of Fernandez.
4. It is clear, therefore, that alterations were made to the Republic's photocopy
of the zonal values. These alterations, however, were not properly
authenticated in court by the Republic. Rule 132(B), Section 31 of the Rules
of Evidence provides:
a. Section 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The
party producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration.
He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected
by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the
22
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be

admissible in evidence. (Emphasis'supplied)
b. Felipe Jr. was not presented as a witness to testify on the
typewritten annotations. No evidence was presented that the
BIR or any of its officers consented to the typewritten
annotations. RP also failed to give an explanation as to why
there were typewritten annotations to what otherwise
appeared to be a genuine document.
c. Under RA 8424, only the Commissioner of BIR has the power to
determine the zonal value of properties. The CIR is authorized to
delegate his power under the law. However, the Republic did not
present any evidence that the signatory, Marciano P. Felipe, Jr.,
was authorized by the Commissioner to make alterations on the
photocopy of the document.
5. Even assuming that the Republic's' photocopy were valid, the zonal value of
respondents Heirs of Fernandez's property at P15.00 per square meter,
corresponding to "pastureland," would still be incorrect. According to the tax
declaration of Gabriel Q. Fernandez submitted by the Republic before the
trial court, the property was classified as "Veg. land."54 In the Bureau of
Internal Revenue Department Order No. 92-96, the classification legend of
vegetable land was "A7" while the classification legend for pastureland was
"A9." The Republic would have to pay the zonal value corresponding to "A7,"
not "A9."
6. As it stands, the Bureau of Internal Revenue Department Order No. 92-
96 only classified the area of respondents Heirs of Fernandez's
property as "A1," valued at P50.00 per square meter. The proper zonal
value of the property, therefore, is P50.00 per square meter. The
incorrect amount paid by petitioner Republic cannot be considered as
sufficient pre-payment since it was less than the amount required by Section
4 of Republic Act No. 8974. The Court of Appeals correctly set aside the Writ
of Possession in view of petitioner Republic's failure to pay the correct
provisional value.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009.
FACTS:
1. Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were co-owners of
lots in Cebu. The sisters were based in the U.S.
a. They sold the lots to their nephew, Antonio J.P. Lozada under a
Deed of Sale.
b. With an SPA from Anita, Peregrina went to their brother, Dr.
Antonio Lozada. Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price
of P10 Million for Antonio.
c. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the
Philippine Consul’s Office. Dr. Lozada then forwarded the deed,
SPA, and owners’ copies of the titles to Antonio in the Philippines.
Upon receipt of the documents, Antonio recorded the sale with the
Register of Deeds. Consequently, a TCT was issued in Antonio’s
name.
2. Pending registration of the deed, Marissa R. Unchuan caused the annotation
of an adverse claim on the lots. She claimed that Anita donated an undivided
share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation.
3. Antonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title.
Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel the
TCT in Antonio’s name.
a. Both cases were consolidated.
4. At trial, Lozada’s presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn
statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor
of Marissa.
a. Dr. Lozada testified that he agreed to advance payment for Antonio
in preparation for their plan to form a corporation, as part of
capitalization, where he and Anotnio are to have 40% and 60%
stake, respectively.
b. Marissa testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of Atty.
Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation. She allegedly kept
it in a safety deposit box but continued to funnel monthly rentals to
Peregrina’s account.
c. Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, witness for petitioner, testified on Peregrina’s
medical records from Martin Luther Hospital. She said that it was
physically impossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale
when she was reported to be suffering from edema. Peregrina died
soon after the alleged signing of the Deed of Sale.
5. RTC promulgated a Decision declaring Antonio J. P. Lozada the absolute
owner of the lots. The Deed of Donation was also declared null and void.
a. On Motion for Reconsideration, an Order was promulgated
declaring the Deed of Sale void and upholding the validity of the
Deed of Donation in favor of Marissa.
b. Lozada’s filed MR and the RTC reinstated the earlier Decision,
except for damages and costs
6. Marissa appealed to the Court of Appeals.
a. CA affirmed the RTC’s earlier Decision but modified it to include
costs.
7. Hence the instant petition.
a. [IMPORTANT] Circumstances of notarization of the Deed of
Donation ostensibly evidencing transfer through donation of the lots
from Anita to Marissa: Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly
notarized. In page 3 of the deed, the stamped name of Cresencio
Tomakin appears above the word Notary Public until Dec. 31, 1983
but below it were the typewritten words Notary Public until Dec. 31,
1987. Closer examination of the document further reveals that the
number 7 is “1987” and “Series of 1987” were merely
superimposed. This was confirmed by Marissa’s nephew, Richard
Unchuan, who testified that he saw Marissa’ husband write 7 over
1983 to make it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987.
Moreover, a Certification from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino
of the Notarial Records Division disclosed that the Deed of
Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Doc. No. 48, and
Page No. 35, Series of 1987, was not reported and filed with said
office.
ISSUE: WON alteration in the Deed of Donation would make it inadmissible.
RULING + RATIO: YES, alteration was not explained.
1. When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable.
2. The Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has
been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a
part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration.
He may show that the alteration was made by another (1) without his
concurrence, or (2) was made with the consent of the parties affected
by it, or (3) was otherwise properly or innocently made, or (4) that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument.
a. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be
admissible in evidence.
b. Here, Marissa did not explain the alterations to the date of the
expiration of the authority of the notary public who notarized the
Deed of Donation, as well as the alteration of the year in which the
Deed was notarized (i.e. Series of 1983/7). Add to this the
testimony of Marissa’s witness that the latter saw Marissa’s
husband editing the year written on the Deed of Donation.
3. As to the Deed of Sale, despite Marissa’s insistence that Peregrina could not
have executed the Deed of Sale to Antonio due to her sickness and
subsequent death, nothing in the records appears to show that Peregrina
was so incapacitated as to prevent her from executing the Deed of Sale.
Peregrina was even able to issue checks, pay for attorney’s professional
fees and her own hospital bills on Mar 9, 1994, a date close to the date
stipulated on the Deed of Sale.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. Peregrina submitted medical records to support her claim regarding

Peregrina’s health but this was rebuffed by Randy E. Rice,
Manager for Health Information Management of Martin Luther
Hospital. The latter denied having certified or mailed said medical
records. Being unauthenticated by its author, said medical records
are inadmissible in evidence.

DISPOSITION:
Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION (deleting damages
and costs).

DOCTRINE:
[SEE BOLD]

25
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Sps. Cirelos v. Sps. Hernandez, G.R. NO. 146523, June 15, 2006.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Aniceto and Thelma Cirelos filed a complaint for Breach
of Contract, Annulment of Sale and Damages before the RTC of Quezon
City, against respondent spouses William G. Hernandez and Rosemarie
Zafe.
2. Thelma alleged that she obtained a loan from respondent William
Hernandez and as security therefor, executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Hernandez covering the house and lot of petitioners.
3. Thelma further alleged that in order to effect the immediate release of the
loan, Hernandez asked her to sign a blank bond paper containing nothing
but her name which Hernandez said will be converted into promissory note,
but was converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the house and lot
of petitioners. Moreover, the Deed did not have the consent of Aniceto,
husband of Cirelos, and the Release of Real Estate Mortgage is
fictitious as petitioners have not yet paid their loan.
4. Respondents in their Answer countered that: Thelma did not sign any blank
paper neither did they require her to do so; the execution of the Release of
Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Absolute Sale was out of the free will and
volition of petitioners who could no longer pay the loan plus interest; in the
execution of the promissory note, Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of
Absolute Sale, Thelma was authorized by her husband, Aniceto,
through a power of attorney executed way back on January 27, 1990;
and it is not true that petitioners learned of the sale only after receiving
a letter from respondents’ lawyer dated February 15, 1993 and
thereafter verifying with the Register of Deeds, because as early as
September 5, 1991, respondents’ counsel had been writing petitioners
asking them to vacate the property.
5. The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint while CA which denied
their appeal, finding that: Cirelos testimony that she was made to sign
a blank paper which will be converted into a promissory note is not
worthy of belief as there was already a promissory note at the time the
Real Estate Mortgage was executed.
6. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the true
agreement between them and respondents is mortgage and not sale.
Petitioners also argue that at most, the sale must be considered only as
equitable mortgage as the amount stated in the deed of sale is inadequate,
petitioners remain in possession of the property, and it took a year and a half
after the date of the purported sale before respondents demanded that
petitioners leave the premises
ISSUE: Whether there is an equitable mortgage in the present case.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. The Supreme Court says NO. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
a. While there is no single conclusive test to determine whether a
deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation
secured by a mortgage, the Civil Code under Art. 1602 enumerates
several instances when a contract is presumed to be an equitable
mortgage.
b. The presence of even just one of the circumstances set forth under
Art. 1602 suffices to convert a contract to an equitable mortgage.
No concurrence or an overwhelming number is needed.
c. Petitioners claim that there was inadequacy of the price is not
supported by the evidence on record. They did not present any
proof that the fair market value of the real property in the area at
the time of the transaction were much higher than the selling price
of the lot in question.
d. Mere allegation that the price paid is inadequate, without more,
does not make a case favorable to petitioners. Petitioners also
claim that since they remained in possession of the property, the
presumption of equitable mortgage should govern.
e. It is true, that where the vendor remains in physical possession of
the land as lessee or otherwise, the contract should be treated as
an equitable mortgage. Respondents presented proof however that
as early as September 5, 1991, or more than a month from July 30,
1991, the date of the deed of sale, they already sent a letter to
petitioners asking them to vacate the premises. Reacting thereon,
Cirelos went to Hernandez personally and requested for more time.
f. Thus, respondent had shown by preponderance of evidence that
the possession of petitioners of the subject property after the date
of the absolute sale is without the acquiescence of respondents.
g. The Court also notes that, as admitted by Cirelos in her testimony,
petitioners have not been paying real estate taxes for the lot since
1990 up to the time of her testimony in 1993. In Bernardo vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court noted that a party’s nonpayment of realty
taxes on the subject land from the time the document of sale was
signed, was inconsistent with his claim of continued ownership.
2. [EVID RELATED] As to SPA, Petitioner-husband Aniceto testified that the
words "sell," "absolute sale" and "sale" were not in the SPA when he signed
it and that his intention was only to authorize his wife to mortgage and not to
sell the property; he also said that while his initials are ABC, he was not the
one who placed the same in the SPA.
a. Cirelos testified that she gave her only copy of the SPA to
Hernandez when she mortgaged their property; and that when she
gave the said SPA to Hernandez the words "sell", "absolute sale",
and "sale" were not yet inserted in the said document.
b. Hernandez on the other hand testified that when Cirelos gave him
the SPA, there were already insertions and when he asked Cirelos
about them, Cirelos countered that it was made before the Notary
Public when she had it notarized.
c. Under Rule 132, Section 31 of the Rules of Court, the party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered, in a
part material to the question in dispute must account for the
alteration. In this case, since it is the respondents who
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

presented the SPA, the burden is on them to account for the

alterations.
d. On this score, Atty. Campos, testifying for the respondents
stated that while the Deed of Absolute Sale which he notarized
involved a property registered in the names of the spouses,
and the deed was signed only by Cirelos, he allowed the same,
as an SPA (Exhibit "7") was shown to him with the words
"sell", "absolute sale", and "sale" with the initials ABC; and
that said SPA was already annotated at the back of the title as
Entry No. 9115 and marked as Exhibits "1-B" and "1-B-1."
e. As respondents were able to show that there was already an
annotation on the title anent the SPA dated January 27, 1990
executed by Aniceto in favor of Cirelos, with power to sell as
well as mortgage, which was inscribed on July 10, 1990 or
before Cirelos started transacting with Hernandez, we find that
respondents were able to comply with the requirements of
Rule 132, Section 31 and were able to show, by convincing
evidence that the insertions in the SPA were already existing
when it was given to them by Cirelos.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs

against petitioners.

DOCTRINE: (in bold)

27
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Cabotaje v. Sps. Rivera, G.R. No. 134712, August 13, 2004
FACTS:
1. Bonifacia Lang-ew was the owner of two parcels of land located in Lamut,
Indiana, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. Lang-ew died intestate on November 23,
1965.
2. Due to dire need of money, Maria Cabotaje and Daniel Pugayan (heirs of
Lang-ew) borrowed P1,000 from the Spouses Sotero Pudunan and Maria
Rivera. They signed a private document prepared by Juan Anungos, which
stated that the payment of the said amount was secured by a mortgage
over one of the lots (LOT 1) of Lang-ew redeemable within one year,
extendible for another.
3. On the same day, the Heirs affixed their signatures over a deed entitled
"Confirmatory Deed of Sale," in which they undertook to sell the second
lot (LOT 2) to the Spouses Pudunan for the price of P2,000.00.
4. The document was notarized by Judge Tomas P. Maddela. However, the
deed was not filed with the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
Subsequently, it was made to appear in the original copy of the said deed
that both LOTS 1 and 2, consisting of 6,382 square meters and 9,951
square meters, respectively, were sold to the Spouses Pudunan. Such
altered original copy was filed on July 18, 1966 with the Register of Deeds
and a TCT (TCT No. T-1657) covering both lots issued by the Register of
Deeds in favor of the Spouses Pudunan.
5. After nineteen years, petitioners Maria Cabotaje, Agustin Cabotaje, Amelia
Tomas and Daniel Pugayan sought for the recovery of ownership and
possession of Lots 1 and 2 covered by TCT No. T-1657. The petitioners
alleged inter alia that in a private document they signed on January 4, 1966,
it appears that they only mortgaged Lot 1 to secure the payment of a
P1,000-loan from the respondents and did not intend to sell it.
6. RTC granted and annulled the TCT insofar as it includes LOT 1, CA
reversed. Hence this petition.
7. The petitioners assert that they did not sell Lot 1 to the respondents, much
less receive from them the P2,000.00 purchase price which appears in the
original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale. Absent their consent to the
sale & the price or consideration for their property, such deed is null & void.
8. Respondents contend that the original copy of the Confirmatory Deed of
Sale is valid. They aver that the alterations and intercalations contained in
the original copy of the deed were reflective of the fact that Lot 1 was sold by
the petitioners after the execution of the said deed, and that such alterations
were known and agreed to by the petitioners before the same was filed with
the Register of Deeds.
ISSUE: Whether of not there has been a perfected contract of sale as regards LOT 1
RULING + RATIO:
1. Rule 132, Section 31 provides that: Alterations in document, how to explain.
– The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with
the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or
language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be
admissible in evidence. Petitioners failed to show compliance with this
section.
2. Respondent Maria Rivera admitted in court that the alteration occurred after
the execution of the Confirmatory Deed of Sale. There is also no doubt that
the alteration is material as it includes the subject of the sale.
3. The petitioners did not authenticate the alterations in the assailed deed by
affixing their initials or signatures thereon. Neither did Ex-Officio Notary
Public, Judge Tomas Maddela authenticate the said alterations when he
notarized the Confirmatory Deed of Sale.
4. The respondents also claim that they told Judge Maddela that they were
also buying Lot 1 from the petitioners, but since the judge was in a hurry to
leave, he merely instructed his clerk of court to make the necessary
alterations in his copies of the deed of sale. However, the clerk that they
claim that purportedly made the alterations was not the clerk during Judge
Maddela’s tenure as declared by the clerk himself. The clerk of court at that
time is already deceased. Moreover, Judge Maddela was not presented as a
witness by respondents to prove this claim. Judge Maddela would have
known the legal implications of the alterations on the original copy of the
Confirmatory Deed of Sale without making the appropriate alterations in his
own copies of the deed, and could not have agreed to merely ordering the
clerk of court to make the alterations himself.
5. In the assailed deed, the petitioners purportedly also sold Lot 1 to the
respondents, but the purchase price thereof remained unchanged. Thus,
under the assailed deed, the respondents paid P2,000.00 for the two lots.
The respondents failed to give a satisfactory explanation why the price of the
property remained at P2,000.00.
6. Thus petitioners did not consent to the sale of Lot 1 to the respondents. One
of the essential requirements of a valid contract, including a contract of sale,
is the consent of the owner of the property. Absent such consent, the
contract is null and void ab initio. In fine, the petitioners, not the respondents,
are the rightful owners of Lot 1.
DISPOSITION: IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 207 is REINSTATED. No costs.
DOCTRINE: IF YOU ALTER A MATERIAL SUBJECT IN A DEED OF SALE YOU
HAVE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 132 SECTION 1 OR ELSE IT WOULD RESULT IN
THE SALE BECOMING VOID FOR LACK OF CONSENT.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of Doronio, Supra.
FACTS:
1. Spouses Simeon and Cornelia, both deceased, were the registered owners
of a parcel of land. The spouses had children but the records fail to
disclose their number. It is clear that Marcelino and Fortunato, now both
deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their
heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino, while respondents are the
heirs of Fortunato.
2. A private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by spouses
Simeon in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter's wife, Veronica. One
of the properties subject of said deed of donation is the one that it
described as follows:
a. Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio of
Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on the
north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio;
on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west by a road to
Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials also
a part of the dowry. Value 200.00.
3. It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one
covered by OCT No. 352. But there is a significant discrepancy with
respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side.
Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Najordas, whereas based
on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato
Doronio. Deed of donation was never notarized.
4. Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades
although they have different theories regarding its present ownership.
According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in
view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their
predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
5. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was
actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that
Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is
the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents posit
that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato
Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been
possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.
6. The heirs of Marcelino and Veronica filed, before the RTC in Urdaneta a
petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"During the
hearings, there was no opposition. After the RTC ordered a general
default, petition was granted.
7. The heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form
of a petition in the same Petition Case. The petition was for the
reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of
the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be
issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of
donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was
dismissed on the ground that the decision in the Petition Case had already
become final as it was not appealed.
8. Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of
Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for reconveyance and
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner heirs of
Marcelino Doronio (as defendants) before the RTC, Pangasinan.
Respondents contended, among others, that the subject land is different
from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No.
352 and under the private deed of donation were different. They posited
that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to donate only
one-half of the property. During the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated, among others, that the property was originally covered by OCT
No. 352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481.
9. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio
(defendants). It concluded, among other things that the deed of donation in
consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it
led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said
parents.
10. Respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed. It determined that
(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees
predecessors can be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions
appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on
April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees predecessors. Taking note that the
boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico
differ from the boundaries of the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante, the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante donated only half of the property covered by OCT No. 352.
11. Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the
ground that it is written in Spanish language. They posit that (d)ocumentary
evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence,
unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether OCT 352 in Spanish although not translated into English or Filipino
is admissible for lack of timely objection.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be
accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for
its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to
enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to
decide the issue. Where such document, not so accompanied with a
translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to,
either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in
which the document is written is understood by all, and the document is
admissible in evidence.
2. Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides: An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3)
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the
court.
3. Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence
on time, it is now too late in the day for them to question its admissibility.
The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may
be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true
even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely
been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
4. As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents
of Exhibit A, that is, OCT No. 352 in their comment on respondents’ formal
offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged,
among others, that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for
the purpose they are offered because these exhibits being public and
official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for
what a party would like it to prove. Said evidence was admitted by the
RTC. Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under
an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it. Consequently, the
evidence that was not objected to became property of the case, and all
parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the said evidence.

DISPOSTION: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET

ASIDE. (Deed of donation was found void)

DOCTRINE: The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must

be accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its
admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the
court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.
Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is
offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be
presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all,
and the document is admissible in evidence.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004.
FACTS:
1. At around 11pm of Dec. 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin with Rico and
Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking. Appellant
left the group at around 1am saying he has a headache. The group
transferred place, and a few minutes after, they heard Rustica Isogan
shouting for help as the latter heard JaquelynTatoy, the victim and her
goddaughter, asking for help. Isogon together with a certain Moises and
brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal went up to the first floor of Jaquelyn’s
house, while Noel and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the
door hinge was damaged, the light in the kitchen was open and saw a black
shoe on the stairs and in the sala, which he claims belongs to the appellant.
When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled
face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container. She was
brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres
cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be
appellant’s
2. At around 12:00nn of Dec. 15, 1996, barangay tanods searched for
appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes
and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. They
went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily
staying, and found him sleeping. The tanods told appellant that he is a
suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay
captain, Atty. Fortunato Parawan. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take
appellant to the police station.
3. In the morning of the next day, appellant was investigated. After being
apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was
willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan. When Atty. Parawan arrived,
he conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then
called SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant was ready to give his
statement. The extrajudicial confession was completely in the Cebuano
dialect.
4. On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree
with Rico Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident is
that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him. He claims that it was
Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside
Tatoy’s house. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated
him in the presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he
was brought to the latter’s house. He was made to admit committing the
crime because Rico has a family while he is single. He repudiated his
extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him to sign
a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist
and help him with his expenses
5. RTC-Cebu found him guilty of murder. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. [SYLLABUS ISSUE] W/N the extrajudicial confession in Cebuano,
without a Filipino/English translation, could be admitted as evidence?
NO. But in this case it was admitted because there was no objection on
part of appellant.
2. Is a lawyer at the same time barangay captain competent and independent?
NO
3. W/N the circumstantial evidence in this case is enough to convict appellant?
NO.
RATIO:
ISSUE #1 [Syllabus issue: Rule 132, sec. 33]
1. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the
Cebuano dialect. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
2. Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents
written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.
3. The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written
in any language other than the official language (Filipino or English), if
there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the official
interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the
parties, and both original and translation sent to this court.
4. In this case, there is no official translation of appellant’s extrajudicial
confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly
follow the rule, then appellant’s extrajudicial confession should not have
been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
5. Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, and the parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned
appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the
document was written, such extrajudicial confession was appropriately
considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
ISSUE #2 [Consti issue]
1. In this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain,
was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict
with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was
accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter
executed his extrajudicial confession.
2. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and
competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.
3. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective
and vigilant counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. The
Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded
appellant’s rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself
entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and
naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it. Atty.
Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and
competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an
uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated
circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the
evidence itself is in serious doubt. Rico’s lone testimony is not sufficient to
establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other
legal cause

ISSUE #3 [Rule 133, sec 4] DOCTRINE: in bold

1. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty.
2. The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the
guilty person.
3. For one, appellant’s act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the
morning does not establish appellant’s whereabouts at the time the crime
was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico Magdasal and the
other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to
Jaquelyn’s house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her
residence. If at all, what was proved is that appellant was found by the
barangay tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of the same day.
4. Added to that is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of
these valuable pieces of evidence. There was no showing who turned over
those articles to the police and the person who gave the shoes to the police
was not presented to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres
cantos found in Jaquelyn’s house. The police who received it was not called
to the witness stand to confirm if those articles were the same evidence
turned over to him and later presented in court. Even if appellant did own the
pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the scene of the
crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point
in time. But it does not prove when particularly he was there
5. The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s
guilt is mainly the testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony is
uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to
sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively establishes the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The doctrine of long standing that the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015.
FACTS:
1. Henry Lim is the owner of the Jeep. It got into an accident, so he hired
Medina, a mechanic and owner of a repair shop, to repair it.
2. When the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running
condition and serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and
the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were functioning.
3. A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep.
4. Purita Lim, Lim’s sister, instructed Beltran to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s
shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own
auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator,
starter, battery, and two tires could not be found.
5. Medina told Beltran that he took and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle,
an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop.
6. Beltran was able to get the jeep without the missing parts. He reported the
incident to Purita.
7. A criminal complaint for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing her
brother. Medina pleaded not guilty.
8. During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former
barangay kagawad, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case was
submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the
defense.
9. RTC found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. CA
affirmed the conviction of Medina.
ISSUE: Whether Medina is guilty of simple theft?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
2. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under
the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. To appropriate means
to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.
3. In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s
parts, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up
owned by Lim. With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on
him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken.
4. Upon perusal of the TSNs, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily
discharged the burden. Medina’s position was that he cannot be convicted of
theft since there was no “taking”, in view of the acknowledgment receipt that
he and Tumamao identified.
a. Medina said that Mendoza came to his place and saw the auto
parts being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, and Medina
then called the barangay officials and let them sign a document to
bear witness.
b. The document was marked as Exhibit 2, and was signed by
Mendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual
(Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (barangay
kagawads). They signed the document while facing each other in
front of Medina’s house.
5. The Court can relaxed the application of Sec 34, Rule 132 of the ROC by
allowing the admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible,
however, two essential conditions must concur: (1) The same must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, (2) The same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.
6. As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered
by the trial court because it was not formally offered in evidence. While
it was duly identified by the defense testimony that was duly recorded,
the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records.
a. CA opined that nowhere from the case records does the
acknowledgment receipt appear. But upon examination, it appears
that the acknowledgment receipt was attached in Medina’s
Appellant’s Brief. The CA should have considered this piece of
document, especially so since the prosecution prayed and was
granted during the trial that said receipt be marked as Exhibit C.
7. Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment
receipt, the same would still not exonerate Medina. This is due to his
admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him
remove the alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and
put the same to the pick-up.
a. While Medina asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was
shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to
the pick-up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to
confirm such expedient claim.
b. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for
being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is considered with
suspicion and always received with caution because it is inherently
weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted. To be worthy
of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.
8. There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to
the factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,1 which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3), Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case
No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Sabay v. People, G.R. No. 192150, October 1, 2014.
FACTS:
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
1. 12 June 2001, 3PM-4PM: Federico Sabay (Sabay) and his daughter Erlinda
Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of
Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted Sabay about his (the
Sabay’s) alleged intrusion into Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation
ensued between them.
a. In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the
head with a hard object. The petitioner joined in by throwing a stone
at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses. Sabay and
Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.
b. Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course
his efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo. Other neighbours
came in and pacified the parties.
2. Medico Legal Certificates showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on
the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while
Jervie sustained a wound in his right palm.
3. Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the Sabay before the
barangay. The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the
recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in
their Kasunduang Pag-aayos (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001.
a. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented because the
building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to
resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.
b. Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File
an Action.
4. Case filed before MTC. Sabay invoked Self-Defense, but was not given
credence.
5. MTC Convicted the 2 for Slight Physical Injuries, but the charge of Light
Threats was dismissed.
6. RTC Affirmed the MTC in Full.
7. CA; Before the CA, Sabay contended that:
a. (1) the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case in view of the
prosecution’s failure to offer the Certification to File an Action in
evidence; and
b. (2) the trial court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.
8. CA Affirmed RTC.
a. The CA held that even if there had been no formal offer of exhibit
pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, the
Certification to File an Action could still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the records of
the case. Noting that the Certification to File an Action was
identified by the complainants and is attached to the records of the
case, the CA ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence could be recognized.
ISSUE: WON MTC has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING + RATIO (Skip to #2 if rushing): YES.
1. The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation prior to the institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The
parties in fact admitted that a meeting before the Lupon transpired between
them, resulting in a Kasunduan.
a. Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduan
that embodied their agreement was never implemented; no actual
settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his
promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay
Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an
Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any
settlement.
b. The Barangay Captain, as a public official, is presumed to act
regularly in the performance of official duty. In the absence of
contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his issuance of the
disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to
law. Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to
File an Action.
c. Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No.
1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had
already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents
as defendants therein.
2. Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court
cannot consider any evidence that has not been formally offered. Formal
offer means that the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their
admissibility in case the adverse party objects. Without a formal offer of
evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been
previously marked and identified.
a. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal- offer
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.
b. People v. Mate, among others, enumerated the requirements
so that evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted,
namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.
c. In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of
the formal-offer rule are present. As the lower courts correctly
observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action
during his cross-examination.
i. "At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that
this particular certification referring to the case 181-01
entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez versus Mr.
Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as
Exh. "1" for the defense."
ii. Although the Certification was not formally offered in
evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and attached to the
records of the case. Significantly, the petitioner never
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

objected to Godofredo's testimony, particularly with the

identification and marking of the Certification. In these
lights, the Court sees no reason why the Certification
should not be admitted.
3. Court Rejected Claim of Self-Defence.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and

AFFIRM the decision dated October 23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 31532. SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE:
1. People v. Mate, among others, enumerated the requirements so that
evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely:
a. first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and,
b. second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the
records of the case.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Barut v. People, G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Around 6pm of September 24, 1995 → SPO4 Vicente Ucag was coming from a
picnic in Laguna and returning home to Taguig, Metro Manila on board a passenger
jeepney driven by his brother Rolando on SLEX.
2. Ucag's wife and 16-year-old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type
jeep driven by Rico Villas on the same route.
3. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat Interchange ahead of Ucag's
passenger jeepney, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
guards Conrado Ancheta and Emeritu Barut stopped Villas and directed him
to park his vehicle at the road side.
4. After informing Villas that his vehicle had no headlights, Ancheta asked for
his driving license.
a. Villas ultimately surrendered his driving license, and Ancheta
issued to him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket.
5. Right about then, the passenger jeepney carrying Ucag stopped where
Villas' jeep had parked.
a. Ucag and Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and
approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the matter was.
6. Ucag argued with Ancheta and Barut.
7. Later on, however, Ucag turned around in order to avoid further argument,
and simply told Villas to return for his driving license the next day.
a. This apparently irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the issue
right there and then.
8. Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several
times, hitting Ucag on both thighs.
9. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta.
10. Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent rushed towards his father
a. Before Vincent could reach his father, Barut fired at Vincent in the
chest.
11. Vincent, badly bleeding, tried to go back to the owner-type jeep where his
mother was, but fell to the ground before reaching the jeep.
12. Vincent was rushed to the Parañaque Medical Center, where he died while
undergoing emergency surgery.
13. RTC → Barut guilty of homicide.
14. CA affirmed.
15. Barut adverts to the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave at about
1pm of September 25, 1995 — barely a day following the fatal shooting of
Vincent — in which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun.
a. Barut contends that this declaration definitely contradicted Villas'
court testimony on June 10, 1996, and manifested that he was "not
clear and convincing because he never pointed out who [had] really
shot Vincent Ucag."
b. Citing Villas' answer of "Maybe he was hit" to the question on direct
examination: "What was the reason if you know why he [referring to
Vincent Ucag] was weak?"
ISSUE: W/N Villas’ extra-judicial sworn statement can be considered.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas' extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been
offered and admitted as evidence by either side.
a. Only evidence that was formally offered and made part of the
records could be considered; and that in any event, the supposed
contradiction between the extra-judicial sworn statement and the
court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
b. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
RTC as the trial court could consider only the evidence that
had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party
must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being
offered.
c. The rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due
process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party would not be
put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as
to properly counter the impact of evidence not formally
offered.
2. The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can
be considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely:
a. (1) the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and,
b. (2) the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case.
3. Furthermore, the rule has no application where:
a. (1) the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court;
b. (2) the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences
from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or,
c. (3) the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses,
determines their credibility even without the offer of the
demeanor as evidence.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the conviction for homicide of
petitioner EMERITU BARUT, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) his
indeterminate sentence is from 10 years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17
years and four months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; (b) he shall pay to the
heirs of the late Vincent Ucag civil indemnity of P75,000.00 for his death; moral
damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P25,000.00, plus interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on each of the items of damages hereby awarded from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid; and (c) he shall pay the costs of suit.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
CIR v. United Salvage and Towage Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 197515, July 2, 2014, 729
SCRA 113.
FACTS:
1. United Salvage and Towage (UST) subcontracts work for service contractors
engaged in petroleum operations in the Philippines.
2. The CIR found UST liable for deficiency income tax, withholding tax, VAT
and DST for years ’92, ’94, ’97 and ’98. The BIR issued demand letters with
attached assessment notices for withholding tax on compensation (WTC)
and expanded withholding tax (EWT) for taxable years ’92, ’94 and ’98. UST
filed protests on the ’94 and ’98 EWT assessments.
3. UST appealed to the CTA alleging that the Notices of Assessment are bereft
of any facts, law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence; thus, the
assessments are void and the right of the government to assess and collect
deficiency taxes from it has prescribed on account of the failure to issue a
valid notice of assessment within the applicable period
4. UST later moved to withdraw the aforesaid Petition because it availed of the
benefits of the Tax Amnesty Program (RA 9480). The CTA partially granted
and case was submitted for decision regarding the EWT and WTC only.
5. CTA division - the PANs for the deficiency EWT for the years ’94 and ’98
were not formally offered pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the RoC and
the Court shall neither consider the same as evidence nor rule on their
validity. The FANs do not show the law and the facts on which the
assessments were based, hence void. The only remaining valid assessment
is for taxable year 1992— however the right to collect has already lapsed. All
deficiency taxes assessed were cancelled.
6. CTA En Banc - affirmed with modification upholding the 1998 EWT
assessment.
7. CIR’s argument: technical rules of evidence should not be strictly applied.
While it failed to formally offer the PANs of EWTs their existence and due
execution were duly tackled during the presentation of petitioner’s witnesses
and although the PANs were not marked as exhibits, their existence and
value were properly established, since the BIR records were forwarded to
the CTA in compliance with the latter’s directive and were, in fact, made part
of the CTA records.
ISSUE: W/N the CTA is is governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Under Section 828 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court
of record. Moreover, as cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party
litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Thus, no evidentiary
value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules
on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally
offered before the CTA.
2. It is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party.
3. Distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its
formal offer as an exhibit: the first is done in the course of the trial and
is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the
second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A
party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it
will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do
the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
4. People v. Napata relaxed the rule and allowed evidence not formally
offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court. The evidence
may, therefore, be admitted provided the following requirements are
present:
a. the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and
b. the same must have been incorporated in the records of the
case. Being an exception, the same may only be applied when
there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned above;
otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court should prevail.
5. Here, the CIR categorically admitted that it failed to formally offer the PANs
as evidence. Worse, it advanced no justifiable reason for such fatal
omission. Instead, it merely alleged that the existence and due execution of
the PANs were duly tackled by petitioner’s witnesses. We hold that such is
not sufficient to seek exception from the general rule requiring a formal offer
of evidence, since no evidence of positive identification of such PANs by
petitioner’s witnesses was presented. Hence, we agree with the CTA En
Banc’s observation that the 1994 and 1998 PANs for EWT deficiencies were
not duly identified by testimony and were not incorporated in the records of
the case, as required by jurisprudence.
6. While the SC concurs with the CIR that the CTA is not governed strictly by
technical rules of evidence, the presentation of PANs as evidence of the
taxpayer’s liability is not mere procedural technicality. It is a means by
which a taxpayer is informed of his liability for deficiency taxes. It serves as
basis for the taxpayer to answer the notices, present his case and adduce
supporting evidence. More so, the same is the only means by which the CTA
may ascertain and verify the truth of respondent's claims.
7. Hence a formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates
review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.
8. Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The formal offer of
one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time. The court cannot admit an offer of
37
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so

would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not noncompliance with a
court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice."
9. Therefore the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that CIR had
waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence.
Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, the CIR failed
to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse
before finally submitting it. CIR’s failure to comply with the rule on
admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and
expeditious dispensation of justice.

DISPOSITION: petition is DENIED. Decision of the CTA En Banc is hereby

AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: In bold.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Reyes-Bakunawa, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 163.
FACTS:
1. A civil case in the Sandiganbayan for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages was brought by the Republic against respondents
Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, President Marcos and Imelda
Marcos for allegedly acquiring ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property “in unlawful concert with one another” and in “flagrant breach of
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers”
2. The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Bakunawa was Imelda’s Social
Secretary during the Marcos administration, and during her term, she
acquired assets, funds and other property grossly disproportionate to her
salary and income. It also alleged that Bakunawa, by herself or in unlawful
concert with the Marcoses, taking undue advantage of her position and
connection, illegally:
a. Acted as dummies, nominees or agents for construction and cattle
ranching
b. Secured favorable contracts for construction of government
projects
c. Acquired heads of cattle from dispersal program
d. Amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government
financial institutions and incorporating cost-escalation adjustment
provisions
e. Imported units of heavy equipment without paying customs duties
and taxes
3. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of respondents and dismissed the petition. It
ruled that with the evidence provided, neither the presence of the link with
the Marcoses nor the irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for
their misuse of that connection exists to jurstify the action by the PCGG
a. Many of the allegation in the specific averments of the complaint
are alluded to in the evidence in a general fashion
b. For properties shown in the name of spouses Bakunawa, there is
no indication that the acts of oppression involved the improper use
of influence by reason of being employed in the office of Imelda
c. While influence may be assumed or conjectured, there has been no
evidence which would categorically show that the position of
respondent was abused
4. Petitioner contends Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary and mentions
several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the
Marcoses and thus proved the association with the Marcoses
ISSUE: W/N Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-
gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos administration?
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Concept of Ill-gotten wealth
a. Ill-gotten wealth consists of the vast resources of the government
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates both her and abroad
b. Elements:
i. Must have originated from the government itself;
ii. Must have been taken by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal
means
c. The identity of the close associates must be duly proven – it does
not suffice that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration, there must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with the Marcoses
d. Factual premises of the executive orders cannot simply be
assumed; it requires competent evidentiary substantiation made in
appropriate judicial proceedings to determine:
i. Whether assets or properties had come from the
government funds
ii. Whether the individuals owning or holding such assets
were close associates
2. Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to
establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee during the
Marcos administration, but did not establish her having a close relationship
with the Marcoses or her having abused her position or employment in order
to amass the assets subject of the case. Respondent could not be
considered as a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the
context of EO 1 and 2
a. For Land-grabbing: the dispossessed persons whom the
petitioner presented could not tell in court htat the Bakunawas had
employed the people who fenced or occupied the lands in question.
They admitted that they did not resist because of their belief that
the Bakunawas had been very influential and enjoyed close ties
with the Marcoses. However, they did not show that they had any
direct contract or communication with the respondent—they only
suspected the participation of the respondent in their
dispossession.
b. For Negotiated Construction contracts: petitioner contends that
the contracts had been entered when respondent was a member of
the presidential staff, laying heavy emphasis on the notations and
handwritten instructions by President Marcos found on the written
communications from Manuel Bakunawa to DPWH Sec. Aquino
i. Yet petitioners offered the negotiated contracts solely to
prove that the Bakunawas had been incorporators or
owners or had held key positions in the corporations that
entered into the contracts
3. Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the contracts could be considered and
appreciated only for those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving
the irregularity of the contracts
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. It was basic that the Sandiganbayan could NOT consider any

evidence that was NOT formally offered; and could consider
evidence only for the purposes it was specifically offered
b. Sec. 34, Rule 132 states: Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
c. The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose
of the offer cannot be overemphasized. This need is
designated to meet the demand for due process by apprising
the adverse party as well as the court on what evidence would
soon be called upon to decide the litigation
d. The offer and purpose will also put the court in the position to
determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or
denying admission to the evidence being offered.
e. Functions of formal offer:
i. Enable the judge to know the purpose for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence
ii. Allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility
iii. Facilitate review by the appellate court which will not
be required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court
f. A document or any article is not evidence when it is simply
marked for identification; it must be formally offered
4. Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been
irregularly entered into by the Bakunawas or that the public had been
prejudiced, it is pointless to declare their invalidity. Sandiganbayan correctly
observed the presumption of the validity of contracts prevailed

DISPOSITION: Deny the petition for review for its lack of merit; and affirm the
decision of the Sandiganbayan

40
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Heirs of Pasag v. Sps. Parocha, G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 410.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners alleged a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents.
They averred that their grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag, died
intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their eight (8) children
Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata.
2. However, Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit
of self-adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir of Benito
and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was able to appropriate to himself
the properties. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over
the said properties in favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha.
3. In denying the material allegations in the Complaint, respondents averred in
their Answer that the properties left behind by the spouses Benito and
Florentina Pasag had already been partitioned among their eight (8)
surviving children and the parcels of land in question formed part of
Bonifacio’s share and the latter later on renounced the share in favor of
Severino.
4. The trial of the case commenced on March 19, 1996.
a. March 9, 1999, petitioners rested their case and were granted ten
(10) days within which to submit their formal offer of documentary
exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading
within the required period.
b. April 19, 1999, petitioners asked the trial court to give them until
May 11, 1999 to submit their offer of evidence; and it subsequently
granted their motion. However, on May 11, 1999, they again failed
to submit.
c. Consequently, in its June 17, 1999 Order, the trial court deemed
waived petitioners' right to make their formal offer of evidence.
d. On July 27, 1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer
of evidence. On September 1, 1999, however, the trial court issued
an Order denying petitioners' formal offer of evidence for their
"consistent failure" to submit it.
5. Respondents filed a Motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence. RTC
granted. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners waived their offer of evidence
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
2. The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
striStrict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in
Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence
is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of
time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after
a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an
inexcusable laxity.
3. Under the Rule on guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and
clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and case of deposition and
discovery measures:
a. On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to
make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last
witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose
his objection thereto. Thereafter the judge shall make the ruling on
the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the
discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with
Section 35, Rule 132
b. On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that "documentary and object evidence shall be offered
after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence." It requires
that "such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to
be done in writing."
4. The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is
made clear that the party who terminated the presentation of evidence
must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day the party
presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the
party's documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule
132 says that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in writing,
this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object evidence
or documents are large in number' 'say from 100 and above, and only
where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.
5. Both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective pieces
of evidence whether testimonial, documentary, or object even prior to the
preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the
scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified
or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered
inutile. The parties should strictly adhere to the principle of "laying one's
cards on the table."
6. However, the Court, in its discretion, may allow introduction of
additional evidence in the following cases despite it not being pre-
marked or identified: (a) those to be used on cross-examination or re-
cross-examination for impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on re-
direct examination to explain or supplement the answers of a witness during
the cross-examination; (c) those to be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal
purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-trial proceedings
despite due diligence on the part of the party offering the same.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed
February 15, 2002 Decision and September 6, 2002 Resolution of the CA
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Rivera v. 4th Division of Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 157824, January 17, 2005, 448
SCRA 623.
NOTE: Sorry, there are a lot of dates of resolutions involved here.
FACTS:
1. An Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
Montano *then Deputy General Manager for Special Projects of Public
Estates Authority (PEA)), John Doe and Peter Doe with violation of RA 3019
in Crim Case A for receiving from Amari P6.25M in consideration for a
favorable action on the JVA between PEA and AMARI. An information was
also filed against Lagdameo in Crim Case B also for violation of RA 3019.
2. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. After
the pre-trial in both cases, the prosecution commenced presenting its
testimonial evidence. By September 27, 2001, the prosecution had already
14 witnesses on its evidence-in-chief. The prosecution then manifested that
it had no more witnesses to present, and prayed for a period of 20 days
within which to file its formal offer of documentary evidence.
3. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and granted the accused 15 days
from service of the said formal offer of evidence within which to file their
comment thereon. The Sandiganbayan set the trial for the accused to
adduce their evidence of December 3, December 5 and December 11, 2001.
4. Instead of filing its formal offer of evidence, the prosecution filed an
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Issuance of Subpoena"
on October 22, 2001. The prosecution alleged that, after a serious study of
the facts and the evidence, it found it imperative to withdraw its oral
manifestation that it had no more witness to present and prayed that it be
allowed to adduce additional testimonial and documentary evidence from the
several banks.
5. Accused Lagdameo and Gregorio Fider opposed the motion of the
prosecution.
6. On October 29, 2001, Sandiganbayan granted the motion of the prosecution
in Crim Case A, but denied the said motion in Crim Case B.
7. Accused Lagdameo, filed a motion to dismiss Crim Case B because of the
prosecution's failure to file its formal offer of evidence.
8. The prosecution then filed a Manifestation with Prayer for Partial
Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's October 29, 2001 Resolution.
9. On February 7, 2002, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the motion to file
formal offer of evidence in Crim Case B. On February 27, 2002,
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion of the Prosecutor
and gave the prosecutor 7 days from notice of said resolution within which to
file the said formal offer of evidence in Crim Case B. It also warned the
prosecution that the failure to file the formal offer of evidence on or before
the deadline shall be considered as a waiver of its right to do so.
10. During the trial of March 6, 2002, the prosecutor opted not to present any
witness, in view of Sandiganbayan's denial of its Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. The court then issued an Order granting the motion of the
prosecution for a resetting of the trial to May 4, 2002, and the filing of its
formal offer of evidence.
11. On September 2, 2002, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
dated August 29, 2002 in Crim Case B. The prosecution manifested therein
that with the testimonies of all its witnesses, as well as the admission of the
exhibits described therein, it was resting its case.
12. Nevertheless, on December 17, 2002, the Sandiganbayan made a volte face
and issued a Resolution 19 granting the March 11, 2002 Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the prosecution and allowing it to adduce additional
evidence in the two cases.
13. Petitioner is now assailing this resolution of Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its December 17, 2002
Resolution allowing the prosecution to adduce additional evidence in Crim
Case B, and its February 11, 2003 Order denying his motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution. The petitioner asserts that, by filing its
formal offer of evidence on September 2, 2002, the prosecution thereby
waived its plea to adduce additional evidence; yet, the Sandiganbayan
allowed it to adduce additional evidence.
14. In their Comment, respondents-prosecutors maintain that the matter of the
reopening of the case for the reception of additional evidence for the People
is addressed to the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan, taking into
account the interest of substantial justice. They maintain that
Sandiganbayan acted judiciously when it allowed the prosecution to adduce
additional evidence despite their filing of a formal offer of documentary
evidence. According to the respondents, such filing of formal offer of
evidence was without prejudice to the resolution of their March 11, 2002
Motion for Partial reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution of
October 29, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction (a) in issuing Resolution of December 17,
2002 and Order dated February 11, 2003 in Crim Case B.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documentary and
object evidence shall be offered by a party after the presentation of its
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the
trial court to be done in writing.
2. SC agreed with the respondents-prosecutors that the Sandiganbayan may
allow the reopening of a case for the reception of additional proofs before
judgment. The Rules of Court does not contain any provision prohibiting the
trial court from allowing a party to offer additional proofs on the evidence-in-
chief or rebuttal evidence after it had rested its case, or even after the case
has been submitted for decision but before the rendition thereof. Neither
does the Rules of Court contain a specific rule allowing the reopening of a
case to allow a party to adduce additional proofs. The matter of the trial
court's allowing the reopening of a case for additional proof by a party or by
42
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

the parties is addressed to the court's discretion provided that, by reopening 7. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan tolerated and condoned the deft but
the case, the court does not commit a grave abuse of its discretion. SC also deleterious somersaults of the respondents-prosecutors and itself flip-
agreed with the respondents-prosecutors that they are mandated to exhaust flopped, to the prejudice of the accused, including the petitioner, and the
available proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and being taken to orderly, fair and impartial administration of justice. While the Sandiganbayan
justice for their offense against the State; and, if they deliberately and may set aside and recourse its Resolutions and Orders for valid and cogent
willfully refused to do so, they would be prosecuted for dereliction of duty. reasons, in the present case, it did so imprudently and capriciously.
3. In the present case, when the January 2002 Manifestation with prayer for
partial reconsideration of the October 29, 2001 Resolution of the DISPOSITION: The December 17, 2002 and February 11, 2003 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan was denied by Sandiganbayan on its February 27, 2002 Sandiganbayan, insofar as Criminal Case B is concerned are NULLIFIED.
Resolution, the remedy of the prosecution was two-fold: either to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for the nullification of the October 29,
2001 and February 27, 2002 Resolutions predicated on grave abuse of
discretion, or to file its formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by
the Sandiganbayan. However, the prosecution opted not to file any petition
for certiorari in this Court. Indeed, during the trial respondent Prosecutor
manifested, in open court, that the prosecution was opting not to present any
witness because of the Sandiganbayan's denial of its January 10, 2002
Manifestation with Prayer for Partial Reconsideration.
4. Instead, barely a week thereafter, the prosecution, through respondents
Prosecutors made a "somersault," and filed on March 11, 2002, a
Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 2001 and
February 27, 2002 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, praying that it be
allowed to adduce additional proofs in Crim Case B to establish conspiracy
among all the accused in both cases. The prosecution made another volte
face when, without waiting for the resolution of their March 11, 2002 Motion
for Partial Reconsideration, respondents Prosecutors filed a "Formal Offer of
Evidence" manifesting that "with the testimonies of all the prosecution
witnesses, as well as the admission of the documentary evidence accounted
to them, the plaintiff rested its case."
5. The Sandiganbayan should have merely resolved the Formal Offer of
Evidence of the respondents-prosecutors. However, with grave abuse of its
discretion, Sandiganbayan ignored such formal offer of evidence and
resolved and granted the March 11, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents-prosecutors per its December 17, 2002 Resolution.
6. In resolving and granting the March 11, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of
the respondents-prosecutors, the Sandiganbayan declared that pleadings
should be liberally construed so that the issues may be properly ventilated
and resolved. Such rather curt statement is disconcerting, considering that
the Sandiganbayan failed to explain in its October 29, 2001 Resolution why
it declared that the additional proofs that the prosecution wanted to adduce
pertained solely to Crim Case A, and its reason for ignoring the formal of
documentary evidence of the prosecution; instead, it granted the March 11,
2002 Motion for Reconsideration filed by the prosecution. Indeed, while it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, to
insure an orderly administration of justice. 28 It is this symbiosis between
form and substance that guarantees that discernible result.

43
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 143935, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 42.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Boy Ulep was charged together with Ancheta, Areola, etc. with
multiple homicide and frustrated murder
2. They stole 30 cavans of palay belonging to Alfredo Roca and to carry out the
robbery, they fired guns and hurled grenades, killing Alfredo’s son, wife, and
mother
3. All the accused except for Ulep remain at large
4. Alfredo was one of the witnesses for the prosecution and he testified on how
Ulep and friends arrived in his farm on board an owner-type jeepney from
which they alighted, proceeded to start shooting, and then eventually left
with 35 sacks of palay
5. Other prosecution witnesses include Alfredo’s daughter Virgiliata who was
nearby when the incident was taking place, the assistant provincial health
officer who conducted autopsies, and the husband of Alfredo’s mother (who
testified on the civil aspect)
6. Ulep was convicted by the trial court
7. Ulep alleges that the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite failure of the prosecution to
make a formal offer
8. Prosecution witnesses also had no ill-motive to testify against appellant and
his co-accused and any discrepancies in testimonies which relate to minor
matters does not make such inadmissible
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, convicting appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs
of the victims: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity for each of the three victims; (2) P50,000
as moral damages for each of the three victims; (3) P7,875 as reparation for the 35
stolen sacks of palay; (4) P20,000 as exemplary damages for each of the three
victims and (5) P25,000 as temperate damages.
DOCTRINE: Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse
party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object but such right
can be waived if not timely made.

ISSUE: WON the testimonies should be admitted.

RULING + RATIO: YES.

1. The records show that the prosecution failed to formally offer the questioned
testimonies of witnesses Alfredo and Virgilita but appellant waived this
procedural error by failing to make a timely objection, i.e., when the ground
for objection became reasonably apparent the moment said witnesses were
called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent
2. Appellant even impliedly acquiesced to the materiality, competence and
relevance of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies by cross-examining
them
3. Since appellant failed to raise before the trial court the issue of the
prosecution's failure to formally offer the testimonies of its witnesses, an
objection on this score raised for the first time on appeal will not be
entertained
4. The formal offer of testimonial evidence is necessary in order to enable the
court to rule intelligently on any objections to the questions asked
5. As a general rule, the proponent must show its relevance, materiality and
competence
6. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse
party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object BUT
such right can be waived if not timely made
7. Appellant also questioned the credibility of the witnesses but it is settled that
when the issue of credibility of a witness is involved, the appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter
was in a better position to resolve the matter
44
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003.
FACTS:
1. SPO1 Alfredo Dan Cocjin y Magnaye was shot to death on January 4, 1992
by an unidentified assailant. Seven months after the shooting incident,
eyewitness Job Bieren gave a sworn statement before the police authorities
and identified herein accused-appellant as the one who fatally shot the
deceased.
2. Job Bieren, a laborer and a resident of Sto. Domingo, Barotac, Iloilo, had
been dishonorably discharged from the Philippine Constabulary for being
absent without going on official leave. At around 1:00 p.m. on January 4,
1992, he went to the basketball court located in the town plaza of Banate,
Iloilo. He had earlier agreed to meet his friend Clark Batzar, for a game of
basketball. Job waited for an hour or so, but Clark did not show up. Job
decided to leave the place and proceeded to the house of Jose Vargas
located at Zona Sur, Banate, Iloilo, to watch the "daily double," an illegal
local gambling game. He passed through the fence at the back door of the
house, and arrived there at around 2:30 p.m.
3. Among the people in the house were Edgardo "Dodoy" Vargas, who had
been appointed as Commander of the Civilian Volunteers Organization by
his cousin Mayor Jonathan Sanico, and SPO1 Alfredo Dan Cocjin, who had
just been transferred from the Banate to the Barotac Viejo Police Station.
4. Job gravitated to the balcony while waiting for the games to start. Suddenly,
there was a commotion and pandemonium ensued. People fled from the
house. Job saw Edgardo 3 as the latter collared SPO1 Cocjin with his left
arm and with his right hand pointed a pistol at the policeman's right temple.
Job was about five meters away. Edgardo dragged SPO1 Cocjin away from
the house, through a narrow passageway leading to the national highway.
Edgardo then shot SPO1 Cocjin in the head. Edgardo stepped away from
the fallen victim, and fired another shot, hitting SPO1 Cocjin at the back.
Warlito "Buloy" Bagcal, who was outside the fence asked Edgardo, "Doy,
nga-a gin tira mo gid si Dan?" (Doy, why did you shoot Dan?). Edgardo saw
Job, and the latter was petrified. Job hurriedly left the place, passing through
the back way.
5. Dr. Rustum Larawan, a resident of Barangay Poblacion, Banate, Iloilo,
reported the shooting incident to the Banate Police Station. Police
investigators arrived at the scene of the incident and conducted an on-the-
spot investigation. Despite proddings from the police investigators, no one
came forward to give any details about the identity of the perpetrator or the
circumstances surrounding the shooting. The shooting incident was
thereafter entered in the police blotter.
6. Job opted not to report the shooting incident to the police authorities or to
the NBI because he did not want to be involved. Job also felt that Edgardo
knew very influential people, including Mayor Sanico. However, in August of
1992, Job had a change of heart and decided to reveal what he knew about
the shooting incident to the police authorities of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo.
7. On August 2, 1992, Job disclosed what he knew about the killing of SPO1
Cocjin on January 4, 1992. 9 He gave a sworn statement to SPO3 Dwight
Maluda, identifying Edgardo as the assailant.
8. An Information for murder was filed against Edgardo. During arraignment,
Edgardo pleaded not guilty.
9. Edgardo denied the charges. He testified that he had been appointed by his
cousin, then Municipal Mayor Jonathan Sanico as Chief of the Civilian
Volunteers Organization.His duties as such included giving assistance in
monitoring sea vessels plying within the municipality's area of responsibility,
and enforcing the law when necessary. The volunteers used a patrol boat in
their sea patrols.
10. On January 4, 1992, Edgardo said he was on duty patrolling as a civilian
volunteer of the Department of Agriculture's Bantay Dagat program. He was
with three other companions: Jonas Vargas, Arnel Deduyo and Rico
Deduyo. They patrolled the seas of Banate, about two kilometers from the
shoreline. Their patrol duty lasted until about 5:00 P.M. Edgardo was
unarmed at the time.
11. RTC found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.
12. The appellant argues that the trial court ignored the fact that when the police
investigated the shooting incident, nobody came forward to identify him as
the culprit. He asserts that the prosecution's eyewitness, Job Bieren, was a
planted witness. Job's testimony is too incredible to be believed because it
took him all of seven months after the shooting incident to give his statement
and to identify the appellant as the assailant. The appellant also argues that
the prosecution failed to formally offer Job's testimony in evidence; thus, the
trial court likewise erred when the said testimony was considered and given
credence and probative weight. The appellant insists that the trial court erred
when it rejected his defense of alibi.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to formally offer Job’s testimony as
evidence. NO.
2. Whether or not Job's testimony is too incredible to be believed because it
took him all of seven months after the shooting incident to give his statement
and to identify the appellant as the assailant. NO.
RATIO:
1. The party calling a witness must give a gist of the proposed testimony to
enable the court and the adverse party to determine its relevancy to the
issues at hand.
2. The transcript of the stenographic notes taken when Job testified show that
the public prosecutor indeed offered Job's testimony.
3. The appellant did not object to Job's testimony when the public prosecutor
offered it. Instead, the appellant cross-examined the witness. The appellant
did not protest when the prosecutor faultily offered its documentary and
physical evidence and rested its case. The appellant even offered
testimonial evidence to controvert Job's testimony. It is now too late in the
day for the appellant to assail, for the first time in this Court, the public
45
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

prosecutor's failure to offer the testimony of a witness before direct records that he was on sea patrol on January 4, 1992, but failed to do so. He
examination. even failed to present any of his companions while on patrol to corroborate
4. Job cannot be blamed for leaving the situs criminis rather than helping out his testimony.
the victim. It bears stressing that the appellant was armed with a gun, while 9. The appellant's contention that Job testified against him because he had
Job was not. Job feared for his life. Moreover, although Job knew the victim, confronted Job twice for dynamite fishing, in violation of Presidential Decree
they were not even friends. This Court has held that not every witness to a No. 704, as amended, is hard to believe. The appellant admitted that he did
crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the expectation not even file any criminal complaint against Job for such crimes. If indeed,
of mankind. In some instances, witnesses to a crime do not give succor to Job was caught fishing with they use of dynamite the appellant should have
the victim due to fear for their personal safety. Self-preservation is still charged Job for violation of P.D. No. 704, as amended. The appellant did not
recognized as the most fundamental human instinct. do so, and even failed to explain such failure. We likewise do not believe
5. While it may be true that Job did not report the killing for some months, this that Job would testify and implicate the appellant in the killing of the victim
does not necessarily affect his credibility. It is not unusual for a witness to simply because the appellant slapped him.
show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case and such
reticence of most people is of judicial notice. The length of delay is not as DISPOSITION: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
significant and pivotal as the reason of explanation of the delay, which must Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, finding appellant Edgardo Vargas y Lucero guilty
be sufficient and convincing. of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
6. Job cannot be faulted for keeping silent and opting not to report to the police accessory penalties prescribed by law is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
authorities the fact that he saw the appellant shoot the victim, and that he did appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim SPO1 Alfredo Dan Cocjin
so only seven months thereafter. Municipal Mayor Jonathan Sanico, the P22,785.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P50,000,00 as
appellant's cousin, appointed the latter as head of the Civilian Volunteers moral damages.
Organization under the Office of the Mayor. Fearing retaliation from the
appellant, the mayor and his henchmen, Job hesitated, not wanting to be
involved in the incident. He was afraid to divulge to the police authorities that
he witnessed the commission of the crime. It was only after Mayor Sanico
lost in the election and was replaced that Job divulged what he knew about
the shooting incident. Moreover, the appellant had left Banate. The peril to
his life having diminished considerably, Job found it safe to come out and
report what he knew about the killing.
7. Job can hardly, if at all, be classified as a "planted witness." The fact is that
his testimony is corroborated by the physical evidence on record. Dr.
Ricardo H. Jaboneta's necropsy report shows that the victim sustained two
gunshot wounds. He found powder burns on the body of the victim. Job
testified that he heard a gunshot and saw the appellant pointing a pistol on
the victim's right temple with his right hand. He saw the appellant shoot the
victim anew at the back, after the victim was dragged from the bamboo
fence of Jose Vargas' house to the edge of the highway. Indeed, the victim
was found sprawled on the edge of the national highway. The policemen
found a trail of bloodstains along the narrow passageway, to the edge of the
road. This corroborates the testimony of Job, that the gunshot he heard
coming from the highway was a second shot. The appellant must have
already shot the victim before Job saw the appellant with his gun pointed at
the victim's head. Job even quoted Warlito Bagcal asking the appellant:
"Doy, why did you shoot Dan?" There is no evidence on record that Job
nurtured any ill motive to prevaricate and falsely testify that Warlito Bagcal
was at the situs criminis. The presumption is that Job was not so actuated;
hence, his testimony must be given credence and full probative weight.
8. Other than his sole testimony, the appellant failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence to prove his alibi. He could have presented official
46
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015.
FACTS:
1. [SUMMARY] Diaz was charged with illegal sale of shabu in violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Information:
a. That on or about August 2, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade,
deliver, or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale one (1)
heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "ARD-1"
containing ZERO POINT ZERO ONE EIGHT (0.018) [gram] of
white crystalline substance known as "SHABU", [or]
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. CONTRARY
TO LAW.
2. Diaz pleaded not guilty and filed a petition for bail.
a. Petition was denied for lack of merit.
3. [NARRATION] On 01 Aug 2008, a confidential informant reported to the
Pandacan Police Station about Diaz’s illegal drug trade activities in Kahilum
I, Pandacan, Manila.
a. At around 10PM of the same day, a briefing was held and a buy-
bust team composed of PO2 Arthuro Coronel as poseur-buyer,
PO3 Edgar Lacson, PO1 Ramil Carel, and PO1 Richard Sibayan as
back-ups, was created.
b. PO2 Coronel was provided with three pieces of 100-peso bills
which he marked with his initials "AC1-AC3." A Pre-Operation
Report and Coordination Sheet were then prepared and sent to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
c. At about 4:00 a.m. the next day, the team along with the informant
proceeded to Kahilum I, Pandacan on board three vehicles. From a
distance, they saw appellant chatting with a male companion. The
informant and PO2 Coronel approached appellant who was by then
already alone.
d. The informant introduced PO2 Coronel to the appellant as a buyer
of shabu. Appellant informed them that he has available shabu by
saying "mayroon." Thus, PO2 Coronel gave appellant the
previously initialed three 100-peso bills and, in exchange therefor,
the latter gave him a small plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. Diaz was then
arrested.
e. After appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights, the buy-
bust team brought him to the police station and turned him over to
the investigator. At the police station, the plastic sachet containing
the suspected shabu was marked by PO2 Coronel with "ARD-1,"
the initials of appellant. A request for laboratory examination of the
subject item was thereafter prepared by Police Senior Inspector
Peter L. Nerviza. Later, the submitted specimen weighing 0.018
gram was found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug, per Chemistry Report No. D-725-08.
4. Diaz, on the other hand, claimed that between 10-11PM. of August 1, 2008,
he was walking home when he was suddenly arrested, allegedly for
verification purposes only, by policemen whose names he cannot recall.
a. He was brought to a police station and thereafter to an inquest
prosecutor in the City Hall of Manila where he first came to know
that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165.
5. RTC convicted Diaz. Decision read:
a. WHEREFORE, finding accused, Allan Diaz y Roxas, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
6. Diaz appealed to the CA contending that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the police officers failed to mark,
conduct a physical inventory of, and photograph the subject item in his
presence and those of the persons mentioned under Sec. 21(1) of R.A. No.
9165.
7. CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
a. It found that the prosecution was able to establish appellant's guilt
to a moral certainty. Moreover, the CA did not doubt that the shabu
presented before the RTC was the same shabu seized from
appellant since the prosecution likewise established its unbroken
chain of custody.
ISSUE: WON Diaz may still be found guilty despite the failure to faithfully
observe the [marking] requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.]
9165.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. The appeal has no merit.
2. Diaz assails RTC’s assessment of the credibility of prosecution witness PO2
Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2 Coronel's
testimony regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial.
3. "[P]rosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is
fundamental that the factual findings of the trial [court] and those involving
credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The
rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the [CA]," as in this case.
4. The Court has thoroughly examined the records of this case and finds the
testimony of PO2 Coronel credible.
a. The said testimony is pertinently supported by documents such as
the marked buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest,
47
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that a sale of alleged "shabu" was brought to the forensic chemist for
shabu took place between him and appellant. examination.
b. On the other hand, appellant's defense of denial, aside from being d. Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their
self-serving, is unsubstantiated and thus, has little weight in law. affidavits of arrest immediately after appellant was apprehended
Hence, the lower courts correctly gave more credence to the and at the trial, PO2 Coronel positively identified the seized drugs.
evidence of the prosecution. Indeed, the prosecution evidence had established the unbroken
8. Diaz banks on the prosecution's alleged failure to comply with the chain of custody of the seized drugs from the buy-bust team, to the
requirements of law with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking investigating officer and to the forensic chemist.
of photograph of the seized specimen. e. Thus, there is no doubt that the "shabu" presented before the court
a. However, it does not escape the Court's attention that appellant a quo was the same "shabu" seized from appellant and that indeed,
failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item he committed the crime charged in the information.18
during trial. 12. All told, the Court finds appellant's conviction of the offense charged, as well
b. At no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses as the imposition upon him of the penalty of life imprisonment and payment
on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which of fine of ₱500,000.00, proper. It must be added, however, that appellant
affected its integrity and evidentiary value. shall not be eligible for parole.
c. In People v. Domado, citing People v. Hernandez: Objection to
the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time DISPOSITION:
on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the WHEREFORE, the assailed February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04206 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the Allan Diaz y Roxas shall not be eligible for parole.
first time on appeal.
d. In this case, appellant raised the police operatives' alleged non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first
time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following established
jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the
prosecution's case.
9. In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty,
despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided
under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken."
10. Here, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the
necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject specimen from the
moment it was seized from appellant up to the time it was presented during
trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
11. CA: [T]he contention of appellant that the police officers failed to comply with
the provisions of paragraph 1, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 for the proper
procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs, is untenable.
a. Record shows that PO2 Coronel marked the confiscated sachet of
"shabu" at the police station and in the presence of appellant and
the duty investigator.
b. PO2 Coronel clarified that the reason why he marked the said
"shabu" at the police station and not at the scene of the crime was
because the place where they transacted was dark. Thus, it is only
proper to preserve the confiscated item and mark it in a lighted and
safe place which is at the police station.
c. Then, the said "shabu" was properly turned over to the duty
investigator, together with the marked money. Afterwards, the

48
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
FACTS:
1. Republic, through PCGG, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 0009) against
Africa, Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (respondents) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the
Sandiganbayan.
a. PCGG alleged that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase
of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) which
shareholdings Africa and Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and,
through their holdings and the corporations they organized,
beneficially for Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
2. Civil Case No. 0009 spawned many cases, one of which is Civil Case No.
0130.
a. Civil Case No. 0130 is a corporate squabble about the composition
of board of directors of ETPI.
i. PCGG conducted an ETPI stockholders meeting where a
PCGG-controlled board of directors was elected. The
registered ETPI stockholders, however, convened a
special meeting wherein another set of board of directors
was elected.
ii. Africa, as ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari
with the Sandiganbayan seeking to nullify the orders of
PCGG. These orders directed Africa to account for his
sequestered shares in ETPI and for him to cease
exercising management over ETPI.
iii. While Civil Case No. 0130 was pending, Africa filed a
motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the PCGG
had been illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of
ETPI, especially in the election of the members of the
board of directors. Africa prayed for a stockholders
meeting to be held under the court’s control and
supervision.
iv. Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion. PCGG brought
this resolution up to the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari (G.R. No. 107789), but the Supreme Court
enjoined Sandiganbayan from implementing the assailed
resolution.
b. Sandiganbayan then ordered consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130,
among others, with Civil Case No. 0009.
3. During the pendency of G.R. No. 107789, PCGG filed with the Supreme
Court a “Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’
Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital
Stock (Urgent Petition).” Urgent Petition was then referred to
Sandiganbayan, and the Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil
Case No. 0130.
a. To resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Maurice V. Bane,
former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI, was taken, - at
PCGG’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking
on respondents - by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
Deposition) before the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy in
London, England.
i. The stated purpose of Bane Deposition is for Bane to
identify and testify on the facts set forth in the affidavit…
so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of PCGG
and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for
sequestration of ETPI’s stock in support of the Urgent
Petition. It is also stated that PCGG shall use the Bane
Deposition in evidence, in the main case of Civil Case No.
0009.
ii. Only Africa was present on the deposition date, where he
was able to cross-examine Bane.
b. Sandiganbayan granted the Urgent Petition.
i. Africa went to the Supreme Court, through a petition for
certiorari, questioning Sandiganbayan’s grant of the
Urgent Petition (G.R. No. 147214)
1. Supreme Court jointly resolved G.R. Nos. 107789
and 147214 by referring both petitions to
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to
determine whether there is a prima facie
evidence showing that the sequestered shares
are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of
dissipation to entitle PCGG to vote them in a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of
Directors and to amend the ETPI AoI for
increasing its authorized capital stock
4. At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, PCGG filed a Motion where it is stated
that in the hearings of the incidents of Civil Case No. 0009 (including Civil
Case No. 0130), one of the witnesses was Maurice Bane, and that PCGG
wishes to adopt in Civil Case No. 0009 the testimonies and documentary
exhibits presented in the incidents of Civil Case No. 0009, and that the
adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses.
a. To this Motion, respondents filed their Opposition.
b. Sandiganbayan denied this Motion in a 1998 Resolution. As
regards Bane, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for the reason
that Bane as deponent is not available for cross-examination.
5. PCGG did not in any way question the 1998 Resolution; instead it made a
Formal Offer of Evidence which excluded the Bane Deposition. Later on,
PCGG filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice.
a. Prayers of Urgent Motion: (1) order re-opening the plaintiff’s case
and setting the same for trial for the sole purpose of introducing
additional evidence and limited only to the markin and offering of
the Bane Deposition which already forms part of the records and
used in Civil Case No. 0130; and (2) in the alternative, the
49
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Sandiganbayan to take judicial notice of the facts established by
the Bane Deposition, together with the marked exhibits appended.
b. The Sandiganbayan denied this Motion, holding that admission of
the Bane Deposition should be through ordinary formal offer of
evidence wherein the respondents could be given the opportunity
to cross-examine.
6. PCGG filed a third Motion, seeking to admit the Bane Deposition. This was,
however, denied by the Sandiganbayan, for being a Motion for
Reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period.
7. Hence the present petition to the Supreme Court where PCGG argues that
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not taking judicial
notice of the Bane Deposition in Civil Case No 0130, the Bane Deposition
being evidence already adduced in the “parent” case - Civil Case No. 0009.
Respondents counter that the Bane Deposition cannot be a proper subject of
judicial notice under Rule 129.
ISSUE: WoN judicial notice may be taken to include evidence adduced in another
case?
RULING + RATIO: NO, as a general rule. Subject, however, to certain EXCEPTIONS
which do not exist in this case.
1. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to
them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are bona fide disputed. It is traced from the
Latin maxim manifesta (or notaria) non indigent probatione. Taking judicial
notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of
presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is
so notorious that it would not be disputed.
2. Rule 129 provides for judicial notice and for the matters which are
automatically taken judicial notice of. A party-litigant may ask the court to
take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be
heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.
a. Here, respondents were able to file their oppositions.
3. In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. This rule, admits of exceptions:
a. (1) a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the
court’s direction, at the request of or with the consent of the parties,
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending; and
b. (2) court should take judicial notice of the records of another case
of cases where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case
4. Petitioner argues that since the Bane Deposition had already been
previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the
Sandiganbayan ought to have taken judicial notice of the Bane Deposition
as part of Civil Case No. 0009.
a. Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in
any of the “children” cases - Civil Case No. 0130 - as evidence in
the “parent” case - Civil Case No. 0009 - or of the whole family
cases.
b. The Court STRONGLY DISAGREES. The petitioner admits that the
present case has spawned a lot of cases, which involve issues of
varying complexity. Agreeing with petitioner’s contention would
espouse judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing admission of
evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and
relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of
the cases. It is petitioner’s duty, as a party-litigant, to properly lay
before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it
seeks.
i. Lopez v. Sandiganbayan: “...the Judge in trying a case
sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing
about the facts of the case, except those which have been
adduced judicially in evidence… it is incumbent upon the
litigants to the actin to establish by evidence the facts
upon which they rely…”
DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
DOCTRINES:
1. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to
them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. Rule 129 provides for judicial notice and for
the matters which are automatically taken judicial notice of. A party-litigant
may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may
allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the
matter involved.
2. Generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule, admits
of exceptions:
a. (1) a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the
court’s direction, at the request of or with the consent of the parties,
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending; and
b. (2) court should take judicial notice of the records of another case
of cases where sufficient basis exists in the records of the case
before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013.

RULING + RATIO: NO.
FACTS: 1. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent
1. Josielene Chan (Petitioner) filed in the RTC of Makati a a petition for the evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan (Respondent), the patient’s health problems.
dissolution of their CPG, and custody of their children. Josielene claimed 2. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive a. SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be
use of prohibited drugs. In fact she had convinced him to undergo hospital made immediately after the offer is made.
confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. b. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
2. Johnny however claims that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
He agreed to marriage counseling but when they got to the hospital he was therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
forcibly held down and was given an injection instead. Worse, the police c. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3)
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and was released after days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by
the case ended. By then their marriage was couldn’t be repaired. the court.
3. PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE: Josielene premarked the Philhealth Claim 3. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. Since the
Form 1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. It contained a physician’s duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
abuse. From this, she filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object,
medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about
subpoena duces tecum. In short she wants to use his medical records to non-disclosure of privileged matters.
prove his mental unfitness as her reason for nullity of marriage.
4. Johnny opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
physician patient privilege. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17,
of Evidence which reads: (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, 2007. SO ORDERED.
surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
5. RTC: sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied
her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of
certiorari before the CA, for grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
6. CA: denied Josielene’s petition, ruling that if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance
that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians
would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies,
but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. Although
Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached
the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement. (correct ruling)
7. Josielene’s Claims:

ISSUE: W/N the hospital records were properly objected?

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Bayani v. People, G.R. No. 155619, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 84.
FACTS:
1. Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of BP 22 that on
or about the 20th day of August 1992, accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously issue and make out Check No. 054924 dated
August 26, 1992, in the amount of P10,000.00, drawn against the PS Bank,
Candelaria Branch, payable to "Cash" to one Dolores Evangelista in
exchange for cash although the said accused knew fully well at the time of
issuance of said check that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored and refused
payment.
2. After trial, petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lucena City, Branch 55, making the following facts:
a. That PSB has issued to the accused check booklet (Exh. "C") with
the Check No. 054924 as one of those included in said booklet of
checks;
b. That the said Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, was
drawn P10,000.00; and made to apply to the account of the
accused, Bayani whose name appears therein in bold print at the
upper portion of the said check;
c. That the post dated check was subsequently dishonored by PSB
for insufficiency of funds;
d. That the checking account of the accused Bayani was closed on
September 1, 1992 (Exh. "B3"), which at the time had only
remaining deposit in the amount of P2,414.96 (Exh. "B4")
3. The check was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for
encashment by Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was
deposited with the bank, it was returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of
funds (Exh. "A5"). Thereafter, she pursued the following events to demand
payment of the value of the check.
4. Evangelista has had another confrontation with the accused Bayani and
Alicia Rubia at Candelaria municipal building before Brgy. Captain Nestor
Baera, but again the accused and Rubia pointed to each other for the
settlement of the amount involved in the check in question.
5. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court's decision.
6. Thus, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUE: W evidence pinpointing to petitioner as the signatory on the check is merely
hearsay.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Under Rule 130 Sec 36, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand.
Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the latter before it
reaches the court is considered hearsay.
2. In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was
approached by Alicia Rubia who told her that she was requested by
petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash, as he needed money
badly. Evangelista's testimony is hearsay since she had no personal
knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the
check exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when
petitioner supposedly made this request. What she testified to, therefore,
was a matter that was not derived from her own perception but from Rubia's.
3. However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of
Evangelista's testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial court shall not consider
any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the
same Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the
offer must be made at the time the witness is asked to testify. And
under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question propounded
in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
4. Thus, it has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted."
Since no objection to the admissibility of Evangelista's testimony was
timely made — from the time her testimony was offered and up to the
time her direct examination was conducted — then petitioner has
effectively waived any objection to the admissibility thereof and his
belated attempts to have her testimony excluded for being hearsay has
no ground to stand on.
5. While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted to evidence, it need not be
given evidentiary weight. Admissibility and evidentiary weight must be
differentiated. Thus, although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of
lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without
probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within
the exception to the hearsay evidence rule
6. Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an independently relevant
statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely
to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact
that it has been made is relevant. Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia
told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of Rubia's
statement since Rubia was not presented in court to attest to such utterance.
7. Evidence regarding the making of such independently relevant statement is
not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a
fact in issue or (b) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that
fact. Independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista's statement is
relevant to the issues of petitioner's falsehood, his authorship of the check in
question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.
8. In any event, petitioner's conviction did not rest solely on Evangelista's
testimony. There are other pieces of evidence on record that established his
guilt, to wit: the subject check was included in the booklet of checks issued
by the PSBank to petitioner; the subject check was made to apply to the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

account of petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion of the said
check; and most telling is that petitioner never categorically denied that the
signature appearing on the check was his. Neither did petitioner claim that
the signature was a forgery. Had he done so, then a forensic examination of
the signature would have been ordered.
9. Bear in mind that what BP 22 punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The law does not make any distinction on whether
the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or
to merely guarantee the obligation. Thus, WON prosecution failed to prove
that subject check was issued to apply on account of or for value is
immaterial in sustaining his guilt.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

54
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2005, July 14, 2006.
FACTS:
1. Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter
and a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of the complainant to
represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he undergoes medical
treatment in the USA.
2. Notwithstanding the presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during
the pre-trial, respondent Judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his
absence.
a. The respondent also refused to issue an order to that effect thus
depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of petition for
certiorari.
3. Complainant also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several
paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her
witness without giving her counsel a chance to comment on the objections
raised by the defendants.
4. Moreover, respondent judge refused to issue a written order excluding
certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to file
certiorari proceedings.
5. Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or
collusion by silence with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for
Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum thus providing
opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
6. Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and
proper dispensation of justice.
7. Respondent judge made a ruling inhibiting herself from trying the case.
8. In her Comment, as regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the
Affidavit constituting as the direct testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
respondent judge points out that she gave the other party the chance to go
over the affidavit to make objections thereto.
a. She claims that no written order is necessary as demanded by
complainant’s counsel because her rulings were made in open
court during the course of trial and are already reflected in the
transcript of the stenographic notes.
9. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found complainant’s accusations
unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative case for
lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge erred in ordering the exclusion of several
paragraphs in the Affidavit.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of
complainants witness, the rule is that evidence formally offered by a party
may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party’s offered documentary
or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached
to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he
may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are
known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against
the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded
evidence. The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the
assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record of the
case.
2. On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately
after an objection is made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented;
but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will
give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations
presented by the ruling. Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out
of portions in Atty. Arevalo’s affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or
otherwise improper. Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality need
no specification or explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a
matter of logic, since it is determined simply by ascertaining its logical
connection to a fact in issue in the case.
a. The Court agrees with OCA’s observation that: “There is also
nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order to
reflect the objections of the defense counsel to each of the
allegations in the sworn affidavit which was adopted as the direct
testimony of complainant’s counsel as the court’s rulings thereto
were made during the trial. As pointed out by respondent [judge],
these matters are already reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes and are not subject to written order. Orders resolving motions
for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or
those made in the course of a hearing or trial, may properly be
made orally. (Echaus vs. CA, GR No. 57343, July 23, 1990, [187
SCRA 672]). Moreover, the acts of a judge in his/her judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption which
complainant failed to prove in the instant case.”
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge
Lydia Querubin-Layosa, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 217, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Beltran, Jr. v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1747, July 31, 2003.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. charges respondent Judge Maximo G.
Paderanga, RTC-Br. 38, Cagayan de Oro City, with "Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order" and "Making Untruthful Statements in the Certificate of
Service" stemming from Civil Case No. 98-381, "Ponce de Leon v. Orteza"
where respondent is the Presiding Judge and complainant is counsel of
record for the plaintiff.
2. On 21 March 2001, after the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence in Civil Case
No. 98-381, respondent issued an Order granting plaintiff fifteen (15) days to
offer her evidence. On 17 April 2001 plaintiff through counsel filed a Motion
to Admit Formal Offer of Exhibits. On 23 April 2001, since the motion
contained confusing references to the exhibits, respondent judge was
constrained to give plaintiff another ten (10) days to make "an orderly and
proper offer of exhibits" and another five (5) days from receipt of the motion
for defendants therein to proffer their objections thereto.
3. As a result of the errors of Beltran, the presentation of the evidence for the
defense was deferred from 23 April 2001 to a later date to be determined
only after the matter [i.e., admission of plaintiff’s offer of exhibits] shall have
been resolved by the Court.
4. On 5 June 2001 respondent Judge received from complainant in behalf of
plaintiff an Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits with Apology for his gaffe.
Unfortunately, respondent Judge Maximo G. Paderanga failed to rule on the
offer of exhibits within a reasonable time and to expedite the trial of Civil
Case No. 98-381; his omission in fact delayed the progress of the case since
the defense evidence was to be presented only after plaintiff’s offer of
exhibits was resolved. It was only on 6 March 2002 when complainant filed a
Manifestation asking respondent to rule on plaintiff’s Amended Formal Offer
of Exhibits that respondent realized his "miscue" and issued his Order of 7
March 2002 admitting plaintiff’s formal offer of exhibits after nine (9) long
months.
5. Respondent admits his "actions and inactions" and apologizes for his
"shortcomings" and" ‘inadequacies." He however proffers an excuse: he had
misplaced the case folder of Civil Case No. 98-381 and believed in good
faith that he had disposed of all pending incidents in that case, for which he
certified, although inaccurately, that he had no backlog in his Certificate of
Service. With respondent’s admission, he and complainant submitted this
administrative case for our resolution.
6. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent Judge be
held accountable for "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" and fined
P1,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Significantly, the OCA notes that respondent has
another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660 for "Serious
Misconduct" and "Grave Abuse of Authority" pending before this Court.
ISSUE: WoN respondent Judge Paderanga should be held liable for “Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order"?
1. We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator that
respondent is administratively liable for the delay of nine (9) months in
resolving a routine and perfunctory Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits, but
we have serious reservations on penalizing him for the inclusion of
inaccurate statements in his Certificate of Service.
2. Actionable tardiness in resolving controversies and incidents therein violates
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to
"dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods." Under the Rules of Court, a judge is mandated to rule
on every offer of testimonial and documentary evidence "immediately
after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a
reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented," but the
ruling "shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will
give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the
situation presented by the ruling." In any event, a reasonable time must
not extend beyond the ninety (90)-day reglementary period from the
date of submission of the formal offer of evidence.
3. In the case, observance of these deadlines is especially important since the
presentation of defense evidence and other proceedings in Civil Case No.
98-381 was made by respondent Judge to depend upon his ruling on the
Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits. The prolonged inaction in effect
adversely impinged on the prompt termination of the civil case.
4. The delay of nine (9) months cannot be excused by respondent’s
allegation that he had misplaced the appropriate folders of the civil
case. Incompetent court management does not help him explain and gloss
over a serious violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases, which was brought about by his failure to resolve incidents within the
period fixed by law.
5. A well-organized court includes the proper physical inventory of cases,
which is as much Judge Paderanga’s duty as his adjudicative
functions, for which he is provided a court staff and a branch clerk of court
who assist him in accomplishing these tasks.
6. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period is
designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, for obviously,
justice delayed is justice denied. An unwarranted slow down in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
7. We do not find however any transgression of respondent Judge’s ethical
obligations when he collected his salaries upon his certification that he had
no pending cases or incidents submitted for decision. While indeed a
Certificate of Service is not merely a means to a judge’s paycheck but an
instrument by which courts can safeguard the fundamental right of the
people to a speedy disposition of their cases, respondent judge executed
this document before he was informed by complainant that his Amended
Formal Offer of Exhibits was still awaiting his action, and that the delay was
caused by complainant himself. In the absence of any evidence or
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

circumstances res ipsa loquitur that he allowed himself to be an unwitting

instrument of fraud, we have to give credit to his defense that his imprecise
statements were done with "the honest belief that he has faithfully complied
with his duties." The rule is that in case of doubt the case must be resolved
in favor of the Respondent. Hence, the charge of "Making Untruthful
Statements in the Certificate of Service" must be dismissed.
8. Moreover, while it is true that Sec. 4, Rule 140, of the Rules of Court
punishes the less serious charges of "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order",
nevertheless, the strict imposition of the penalties is unwarranted in the case
at bar. As stated above, complainant himself was responsible for the delay.
If complainant only complied faithfully and diligently with his part of
dispensing justice in Civil Case No. 98-381 by marking his exhibits correctly
and comprehensively, perhaps there would have been no occasion for
respondent Judge to err in the performance of his task to decide efficiently
the incidents of the civil case.
9. Respondent Judge did not act maliciously nor contumaciously when he was
delayed in ruling upon complainant’s Amended Formal Offer of Exhibits for
respondent immediately rectified his innocent and innocuous mistake by
issuing an Order admitting the formal offer of exhibits. Hence, out of
respondent Judge’s own volition and eagerness to do what was right, he
averted any material injury to complainant or his client’s case that could
have been triggered by the tardiness other than the common and general
concern for the speedy administration of justice.
10. The fine of P1,000.00 suggested by the OCA for the administrative offense
of "Undue Delay in Rendering an Order" is legally and justly commensurate
with the ingenuous miscalculation committed by Respondent. We adopt this
recommendation and impose this penalty upon respondent Judge not so
much to chastise him as to gently and sympathetically remind him to be
more prudent and efficient henceforth in his difficult vocation as a magistrate
of the law.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Maximo G. Paderanga, RTC-Br.

38, Cagayan de Oro City, is held LIABLE for the less serious charge of "Undue Delay
in Rendering an Order" as a first offense and fined P1,000.00, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

DOCTRINE: IN BOLD

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Catacutan v. People, G. R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 524.
FACTS:
1. Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary
Grade 13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an
Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao
del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).
a. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga
Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private
complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary
Grade 18 at SNSAT. These promotional appointments were duly
approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.
b. Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved
appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6,
1997, copy furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of
the appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to
assume their new position since petitioner made known that he
strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not
implement them despite written orders from CHED and the CSC,
Caraga Regional Office.
c. Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal
complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and
disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao
d. In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged
before the RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019
2. For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the
promotional appointments of the private complainants because of some
procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment
papers. According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT
Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the
letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office who made the
appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire
plantilla (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of
only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise
claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments
contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and
other supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted
that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity
of the appointments.
3. RTC: rendered its Decision holding that the act of the petitioner in defying
the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject promotional
appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his
palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity
or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
4. SB: petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.
5. Invoking the constitutional provision on due process, petitioner argues that
the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of
his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not
able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to
present the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795
which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his
intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants
falls short of malice or wrongful intent.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law were violated when he was denied the opportunity to
present in evidence the CA decision.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.
a. Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements,
petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due
process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case
vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense.
2. There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow
petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
51795. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of
evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the
proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be
presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an
administrative matter.
a. The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court
trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based
on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does not
foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a
clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of
an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal
proceeding with the same subject matter.
b. It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the
same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is
not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.
c. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal
cases. x x x
d. In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated: This Court is not
unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case
does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the
disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of
the other case/s
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

3. At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the
introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without
legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in
Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:
a. Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. – If documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have
the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and
other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of
the proposed testimony.
b. As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on
having the RTC admit the CA’s Decision for whatever it may be
worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an
exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit
attached
c. As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records
of the case, thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence that a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be
formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and
cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of

the Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED.

59
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Cruz-Arevalo v. Querubin-Layosa, Supra.
FACTS:
1. Complainant narrates that Conrado R. Cruz executed an authorization letter
and a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of the complainant to
represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he undergoes medical
treatment in the USA.
2. Notwithstanding the presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during
the pre-trial, respondent Judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his
absence.
a. The respondent also refused to issue an order to that effect thus
depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by way of petition for
certiorari.
3. Complainant also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several
paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her
witness without giving her counsel a chance to comment on the objections
raised by the defendants.
4. Moreover, respondent judge refused to issue a written order excluding
certain paragraphs thus depriving complainant the opportunity to file
certiorari proceedings.
5. Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or
collusion by silence with the defendants for not acting on her Motions for
Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum thus providing
opportunity for defendant Quimbo to avoid compliance therewith.
6. Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and
proper dispensation of justice.
7. Respondent judge made a ruling inhibiting herself from trying the case.
8. In her Comment, as regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the
Affidavit constituting as the direct testimony of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
respondent judge points out that she gave the other party the chance to go
over the affidavit to make objections thereto.
a. She claims that no written order is necessary as demanded by
complainant’s counsel because her rulings were made in open
court during the course of trial and are already reflected in the
transcript of the stenographic notes.
9. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found complainant’s accusations
unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of the administrative case for
lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge erred in ordering the exclusion of several
paragraphs in the Affidavit.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of
complainants witness, the rule is that evidence formally offered by a party
may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party’s offered documentary
or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached
to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he
may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. These procedures are
known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against
the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded
evidence. The appellate court will better understand and appreciate the
assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in the record of the
case.
2. On the other hand, the ruling on an objection must be given immediately
after an objection is made, as what respondent judge did, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented;
but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will
give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations
presented by the ruling. Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out
of portions in Atty. Arevalo’s affidavit which are incompetent, irrelevant, or
otherwise improper. Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality need
no specification or explanation. Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a
matter of logic, since it is determined simply by ascertaining its logical
connection to a fact in issue in the case.
a. The Court agrees with OCA’s observation that: “There is also
nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order to
reflect the objections of the defense counsel to each of the
allegations in the sworn affidavit which was adopted as the direct
testimony of complainant’s counsel as the court’s rulings thereto
were made during the trial. As pointed out by respondent [judge],
these matters are already reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes and are not subject to written order. Orders resolving motions
for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or
those made in the course of a hearing or trial, may properly be
made orally. (Echaus vs. CA, GR No. 57343, July 23, 1990, [187
SCRA 672]). Moreover, the acts of a judge in his/her judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
erroneous in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption which
complainant failed to prove in the instant case.”
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge
Lydia Querubin-Layosa, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 217, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Yu v. CA, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 280. 7. Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent’s
tender of excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition
FACTS: before the Court of Appeals since the move evinced that she had
1. On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against her another speedy and adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds
husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and otherwise.
dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and 8. Section 40, Rule 132 provides:
physical abuse. Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence - If documents or things
2. During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have
tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and
suspected to be petitioner’s illegitimate child. other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of
3. RTC RULED (IMPORTANT FACTS) - Denied the motion. It ruled that the the proposed testimony.
insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11- 9. It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the
2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which presumably prevents evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before
insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified
information pertaining to insurance policies. and presented before the court
4. CA RULED - private respondent was merely seeking the production of the 10. While private respondent made a “Tender of Excluded Evidence”, such
insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for obviously,
part of her evidence. Thus, it declared that petitioner’s objection to the the insurance policy and application were not formally offered much
admission of the documents was premature, and the trial court’s less presented before the trial court.
pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible, precipitate. The 11. Tender of Excluded Evidence was a manifestation of an undisputed
contents of the insurance application and insurance documents cannot be fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial
considered as privileged information. Ruled that a trial court does not have court even before these were presented during trial.
the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this
privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence. DISPOSITION: Premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 30
April 2002 and Resolution dated 27 June 2002 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
ISSUE: W/N the trial court has the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, petitioner.
before the it was offered? NO.
DOCTRINE: Bolded
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Private respondent maintains that the details surrounding the insurance
policy are crucial to the issue of petitioner’s infidelity and his financial
capacity to provide support to her and their children.
2. She argues that she had no choice but to make a tender of excluded
evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance
application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.
3. While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such
power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.
4. In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy
were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it.
5. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the
assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be
declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to make a
declaration to that effect at that point.
6. Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even
before they were formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial
court acted in excess of its discretion.
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