EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: MONDAY (MAR. 11, 2019), 12NN
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 133:
4. CA ruled Section 1.
1. Jimenez v. Francisco, A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014. - REMOLLO,
ISSUES: P.
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO 2. Metrobank v. Ley Construction and Development Corp, G.R. No.
185590, December 3, 2014. - HILADO
RULING + RATIO: 3. BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014. -
1. Blah MONTES
a. Sub Blah 4. Republic v. Reyes-Bakunawa, Supra.
2. Concept
a. Explain explain Section 2.
1. People v. Estibal, Supra.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? 2. Balerta v. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014. - ROMERO
3. Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013. - BALONAN
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc 4. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013. - SY

Section 3.
1. People v. Wahiman, Supra.
2. People v. Cachuela, Supra.
3. Salapuddin v. CA, Supra.
4. Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA
224. - FERNANDO

Section 4.
1. People v. Magbitang, G.R. No. 175592, June 14, 2016. - ALCANTARA
2. People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 200081, June 8, 2016. - ALCAZAR
3. San Diego v. People, G.R. No. 176114, April 8, 2015. - CABUSORA
4. People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014. - CANDELARIA
5. People v. Gerandoy, G.R. No. 202838, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA
520. - BAUTISTA
6. People v. Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014. - REMOLLO, D.
7. People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014. - MAGISTRADO
8. Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA 84. -
SO

Section 5.
1. Nacion v. COA, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015. - OCAMPO
2. Casimiro v. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014. - MANAHAN
3. Ombudsman v. Mallari, G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014. - DONES
4. CSC v. Andal, A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November 18, 2014. - PELONGCO

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

5. Agile Maritime Resources v. Siador, G.R. No. 191034, October 1, 2014,

737 SCRA 360. - SOLCO
6. Republic v. Arias, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014. - LOPEZ

Section 6.
1. People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 741. -
MANALANG
2. Go v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 147923, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 445. -
CABOCHAN
3. People v. Webb, G.R. Nos. 132577, 147962, & 15035, August 17, 1999,
312 SCRA 573. - TAYLO

Section 7.
1. Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 405. -
TALION

RULE 134:
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.
1. Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012. - NOEL
2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.

Section 7.
1. People v. Webb, Supra.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Jimenez v. Francisco, A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Atty. Edgar Francisco (Atty. F) was the legal counsel of Mark Jimenez. What
happened was Mark Jimenez filed a complaint for estafa against Caroline
Jimenez (complainant) and several others. Jimenez alleged that he was the
true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation, which was incorporated specifically for the
purpose of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati. In
order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion
simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of P80,750,000.00.
Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of
P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a
check in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale,
however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that
the Forbes property was purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the
money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
2. Caroline (complainant) was shocked with the complaint. More so, she felt
betrayed by Atty. Francisco who helped Jimenez filed the estafa case. So,
Caroline filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional responsibility before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD). Caroline claimed that Atty. F represented conflicting
interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly,
the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property
were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.
3. In his defense, Atty. F denied that he was ever the personal lawyer of
Caroline. He admitted that he acted as legal counsel of Clarion, but then
again, the corporation has a personality separate from that of Caroline. He
also said that he helped Caroline under the impression that it was what
Jimenez would have wanted.
4. The CBD sided with Caroline and recommended that Atty. F be suspended
from the practice of law for one year. This was upheld by the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. F was guilty of violations of the CPR?
RULING + RATIO:
1. Canon 1 and Rule 1.0 was violated, but he was not guilty of representing
conflicting interests.
a. CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
2. In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly
prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule
133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence,
the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.
3. In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons
and his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its
corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the
GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of
these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon
the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct
in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he
executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it
is indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on
contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate
secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers
of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele
with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco
admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property.
He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes.
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave
legal infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the
persons involved.
4. Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the
cause of their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and
justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
5. The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. But
here, there was no proof of such lawyer-client relationship.
6. Elements of lawyer-client privilege: (1) There exists an attorney-client
relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason
of this relationship that the client made the communication; (2) The client
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

made the communication in confidence. (3) The legal advice must be sought
from the attorney in his professional capacity.
7. Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the
evidence on record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As
discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship
between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All
that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice
from respondent in various occasions." Considering that complainant failed
to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado,
such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid
then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege
applies, failed in this regard.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of
Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

DOCTRINE: In bold.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Metrobank v. Ley Construction and Development Corp, G.R. No. 185590, show that the Bank did not set forth the contents of the Trust Receipt
December 3, 2014. verbatim in the pleading. It did not also set forth the substance of the Trust
Receipt in the Complaint but simply attached a copy thereof as an annex.
FACTS: Metrobank erred in simply describing the Trust Receipt as LCDC’s
1. Philippine Banking filed a case for recovery of sum of money against Sps manifestation of “its acceptance/conformity that the negotiation of the LoC is
Ley and LCDC alleging that LCDC was granted a Letter of Credit of $802k in order.”
covering the importation of Iraqi cement. LCDC filed 2 applications for 4. Therefore, Metrobank’s attempt to cling to the Trust Receipt as its “primary
amendment of LOC. actionable document” is negated by its allegations in the complaint. Based
2. Global Enterprises negotiated the LOC with Credit Suisse, the negotiating on the contents of the contract between Metrobank and LCDC, the legal
bank, and after the conditions were met, Phil Banking was debited $766k. rights of both parties have not been sufficiently established by Metrobank in
3. LCDC executed a trust receipt after receiving shipping documents, but the view of the failure of Metrobank’s evidence to show the provisions and
cement never arrived in the Philippines. conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the
4. Payment by LCDC was guaranteed by Sps Ley under Surety Agreement. absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of
5. LCDC failed to pay the LOC, which made Phil Banking file the case. the Application and Agreement for the Commercial LoC.
6. Phil Banking presented Cabrera, head of its Foreign Department in the head
office, and thereafter filed its formal offer. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
7. Only exhibits A, B, C, C-1, and N, N-1 to N-4 remain admitted in evidence, SO ORDERED.
since other exhibits were not properly identified and authenticated.
8. LCDC and Sps Ley filed a demurrer on the ground that Cabrera was
incompetent to testify with respect to the transaction between them and that
documentary exhibits were not properly identified and authenticated.
9. RTC granted the demurrer since the remaining exhibits were insufficient to
show that LCDC and the Sps Ley were responsible for the improper
negotiation of the LOC and that Cabrera was incompetent to testify; hence
the Bank failed to make a preponderant case.
10. CA affirmed despite admitting Exhibit F and G.
11. Bank insists that it was able to establish its cause of action not only through
preponderance of evidence but also by admissions of LCDC and Sps Ley
and that its cause of action is on the breach of the trust receipt and not the
improper negotiation.

ISSUE: WON the Bank was able to establish its cause of action through
preponderance of evidence.

RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. The required burden of proof in civil cases is preponderance of evidence,
which is essentially a question of fact. It is defined as the weight of
aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term “greater
weight of evidence.” Preponderance of evidence means probability to truth.
It concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based
on the evidence presented.
2. A review of respective findings of the trial and appellate courts requires that
the reviewing court address a question of fact. Since it is a question of fact, it
is not the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition, which only reviews pure
questions of law. Metrobank attempts to avoid the “only questions of law”
rule by invoking the misapprehension of facts exception.
3. Specifically, it asserts that its cause of action is not grounded on the LoC but
on the Trust Receipt. However, a look at the allegations in the Complaint will
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages against BJDC
Construction (company). The company was the contractor of the re-blocking
project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at
San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur.
2. Nena was the wife of Balbino Lanuzo who died due to a motorcycle
accident. She claims that Balbino’s Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road
barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road,
causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly
cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the company’s failure
to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project, especially during
night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.
3. The company denied Nena’s allegations of negligence, insisting that it had
installed warning signs and lights along the highway and on the
barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were
working and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the DPWH,
the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that
it was found to have satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of
motorists.
4. The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident
brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police
investigation report that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing
any helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was
overtaking another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the
road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light. Thus, it sought the
dismissal of the complaint.
5. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the company.
6. CA reversed the RTC because the elements for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present. (refer to last part). The company
filed an MR, but the CA denied it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the company’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Balbino.
RULING + RATIO: NO. BJDC was able to prove that there was no negligence on
its part.
1. The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the
burden to establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action
based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance of
evidence.
2. The Court must ascertain whose evidence was preponderant, for Section 1,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence.
3. [DOCTRINE] Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount
of evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. Generally,
the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either
side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual
allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court,
but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if
proved, will exculpate him from liability.
a. Preponderance of evidence, according to Raymundo v. Lunaria, is
meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered
to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
4. In addition, according to United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defendant’s.
5. Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and
rules that the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not
establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of
the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
6. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
7. During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of
illumination instead of the total omission of illumination. Their first witness
recalled that lights had been actually installed in the site of the project.
The next witness had seen only a gas lamp, not light bulbs. The last
witness claimed that there was no light at all. Obviously, the witnesses of
the plaintiffs were not consistent on their recollections of the significant detail
of the illumination of the site.
8. IN CONTRAST, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate
illumination. Zamora, its flagman in the project, rendered an eyewitness
account of the accident by stating that the site had been illuminated by light
bulbs and gas lamps, and that Balbino had been in the process of overtaking
another motorcycle rider at a fast speed when he hit the barricade placed on
the newly cemented road. On his part, SPO1 Corporal, the police
investigator who arrived at the scene of the accident, recalled that there
were light bulbs on the other side of the barricade on the lane coming from
Naga City; and that the light bulb on the lane where the accident had
occurred was broken because it had been hit by the victim’s motorcycle.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Witnesses Gerry Alejo and Engr. Victorino del Socorro remembered that the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the
light bulbs and gas lamps had been installed in the area of the project. fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive
9. The company presented as its DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE the control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how
investigation report of SPO1 Corporal (Annex 1), the relevant portions of he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he
which indicated the finding of the police investigator on the presence of himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared,
illumination at the project site that: upon arrival at the scene of the incident it Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the
was noted that road sign/barricade installed on the road has a light; one of process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be
the passerby revealed that the victim possibly be miscalculated the road thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s
block that made him to tumble down when he applied sudden brake; the investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This causation of the
driver/victim has no crush (sic) helmet at the time of the incident considering fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
that it should be a basic requirement as to prevent from any accident. 18. According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal
10. Additionally, the company submitted the application for lighting permit depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to
covering the project site (Annex 7) to prove the fact of installation of the be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road after being thrown
electric light bulbs in the project site. off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown that Balbino was not
11. The RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the time of the accident, he
Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective head
justification for doing so, because the greater probability pertained to the gear or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
former.
12. The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer DISPOSITION:WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on August 11,
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties. The 2003 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the decision rendered on October 8,
presumption, although rebuttable, stands because the Lanuzo heirs did not 2001 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur dismissing the
adduce evidence to show any deficiency or irregularity in the performance of complaint; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
his official duty as the police investigator of the accident. They also did not
show that he was impelled by any ill motive or bias to testify falsely.
13. The CA unreasonably branded the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1
Corporal as "self-serving." They were not. Self-serving evidence refers to
out-of-court statements that favor the declarant’s interest; it is disfavored
mainly because the adverse party is given no opportunity to dispute the
statement and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. But
court declarations are not self-serving considering that the adverse party is
accorded the opportunity to test the veracity of the declarations by cross-
examination and other methods.
14. There is no question that Zamora and SPO1 Corporal were thoroughly
cross-examined by the counsel for the Lanuzo heirs. Their recollections
remained unchallenged by superior contrary evidence from the Lanuzo
heirs.

(You may skip this)

15. Lastly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here.
16. For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist,
namely: (a) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the
possibility of contributing conduct that would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
17. Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be
fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its installation of
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Reyes-Bakunawa, Supra.
FACTS:
1. A civil case in the Sandiganbayan for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages was brought by the Republic against respondents
Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, President Marcos and Imelda
Marcos for allegedly acquiring ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property “in unlawful concert with one another” and in “flagrant breach of
trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers”
2. The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Bakunawa was Imelda’s Social
Secretary during the Marcos administration, and during her term, she
acquired assets, funds and other property grossly disproportionate to her
salary and income. It also alleged that Bakunawa, by herself or in unlawful
concert with the Marcoses, taking undue advantage of her position and
connection, illegally:
a. Acted as dummies, nominees or agents for construction and cattle
ranching
b. Secured favorable contracts for construction of government
projects
c. Acquired heads of cattle from dispersal program
d. Amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government
financial institutions and incorporating cost-escalation adjustment
provisions
e. Imported units of heavy equipment without paying customs duties
and taxes
3. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of respondents and dismissed the petition. It
ruled that with the evidence provided, neither the presence of the link with
the Marcoses nor the irrefutability of the evidence against the Bakunawas for
their misuse of that connection exists to jurstify the action by the PCGG
a. Many of the allegation in the specific averments of the complaint
are alluded to in the evidence in a general fashion
b. For properties shown in the name of spouses Bakunawa, there is
no indication that the acts of oppression involved the improper use
of influence by reason of being employed in the office of Imelda
c. While influence may be assumed or conjectured, there has been no
evidence which would categorically show that the position of
respondent was abused
4. Petitioner contends Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary and mentions
several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the
Marcoses and thus proved the association with the Marcoses
ISSUE: W/N Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-
gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawa’s employment during the Marcos administration?
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Concept of Ill-gotten wealth
a. Ill-gotten wealth consists of the vast resources of the government
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates both her and abroad
b. Elements:
i. Must have originated from the government itself;
ii. Must have been taken by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal
means
c. The identity of the close associates must be duly proven – it does
not suffice that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration, there must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with the Marcoses
d. Factual premises of the executive orders cannot simply be
assumed; it requires competent evidentiary substantiation made in
appropriate judicial proceedings to determine:
i. Whether assets or properties had come from the
government funds
ii. Whether the individuals owning or holding such assets
were close associates
2. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by
one side is, as a whole, superior to that of the other side.
a. Here, the Bakunawas filed a motion to dismiss, by which they
specifically demurred to the evidence adduced against them.
b. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an
action to the effect that the evidence that his adversary produced,
whether true or not, is insufficient in point of law to make out a case
or to sustain the issue.
c. The demurring party thereby challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a judgment.
d. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence, is
required merely to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or claim, or to
support a verdict of guilt or liability.
3. Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to
find for and to dismiss the case against the defendant should the
scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence that tilts
the scales to one or the other side.
a. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof has failed to establish its
case, and the parties are no better off than before they proceeded
upon their litigation.
b. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they are.
4. Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of
the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiff's side if
its evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action.
a. Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence, and
the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

evidence can result only if the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to e. Functions of formal offer:
establish the cause of action. i. Enable the judge to know the purpose for which the
b. For this purpose, the sheer volume of the evidence presented by proponent is presenting the evidence
one party cannot tip the scales in its favor. ii. Allow opposing parties to examine the evidence and
c. Quality, not quantity, is the primordial consideration in object to its admissibility
evaluating evidence. iii. Facilitate review by the appellate court which will not
5. Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to be required to review documents not previously
establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee during the scrutinized by the trial court
Marcos administration, but did not establish her having a close relationship f. A document or any article is not evidence when it is simply
with the Marcoses or her having abused her position or employment in order marked for identification; it must be formally offered
to amass the assets subject of the case. Respondent could not be 7. Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been
considered as a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the irregularly entered into by the Bakunawas or that the public had been
context of EO 1 and 2 prejudiced, it is pointless to declare their invalidity. Sandiganbayan correctly
a. For Land-grabbing: the dispossessed persons whom the observed the presumption of the validity of contracts prevailed
petitioner presented could not tell in court htat the Bakunawas had
employed the people who fenced or occupied the lands in question. DISPOSITION: Deny the petition for review for its lack of merit; and affirm the
They admitted that they did not resist because of their belief that decision of the Sandiganbayan
the Bakunawas had been very influential and enjoyed close ties
with the Marcoses. However, they did not show that they had any
direct contract or communication with the respondent—they only
suspected the participation of the respondent in their
dispossession.
b. For Negotiated Construction contracts: petitioner contends that
the contracts had been entered when respondent was a member of
the presidential staff, laying heavy emphasis on the notations and
handwritten instructions by President Marcos found on the written
communications from Manuel Bakunawa to DPWH Sec. Aquino
i. Yet petitioners offered the negotiated contracts solely to
prove that the Bakunawas had been incorporators or
owners or had held key positions in the corporations that
entered into the contracts
6. Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the contracts could be considered and
appreciated only for those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving
the irregularity of the contracts
a. It was basic that the Sandiganbayan could NOT consider any
evidence that was NOT formally offered; and could consider
evidence only for the purposes it was specifically offered
b. Sec. 34, Rule 132 states: Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
c. The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose
of the offer cannot be overemphasized. This need is
designated to meet the demand for due process by apprising
the adverse party as well as the court on what evidence would
soon be called upon to decide the litigation
d. The offer and purpose will also put the court in the position to
determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or
denying admission to the evidence being offered.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Estibal, Supra.
FACTS:
1. Estibal, 43 years old, was accused of raping his 13yo daughter.
2. Prosecution presented four witnesses:
a. The medico-legal who testified that she examined the victim and
results show penertration and trauma to the hymen;
b. Two men from Barangay Security Force who testified that in the
evening of Feb 2009, AAA and BBB went to them to narrate the
incident of rape that happened, and that they arrested the accused
thereafter
c. Police officer assigned to PNP Women and Children Protection
Center, who testified that she took down the sworn statement of
AAA, and that in the narration she said that AAA and BBB were
crying when AAA told her that she was raped by the accused since
Grade 3. Police officer said, that according to her training and from
her observations of AAA’s demeanor, she’s telling the truth
3. During the pre-trial and trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother
of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case.
Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-appellant and, according to
her, AAA had already forgiven her father. They didn’t appear in court and all
the subpoenas issued was returned unserved.
4. Accused only presented denial. He said that he and his wife are security
guards, and that his wife was on night duty the night of the alleged rape, and
that he slept with his two children around midnight.
5. RTC ruled for the accused’s conviction. The Court relied on the Police
Officer's testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the
spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by the police
officer as part of the res gestae.
6. Accused, on appeal said that there’s failure to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the prosecution’s testimonies were all hearsay and
does not fall under the exception of res gestae.
7. CA upheld RTC decision. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses form
part of the res gestae, although none of them was a participant, victim or
spectator to the crime.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies were all hearsay? YES
2. W/N the it falls within the ambit of res gestae? NO
RATIO:
1. The testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements
were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
2. Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the
original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to
cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the
statement is considered part of the res gestae.
a. It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own
personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His
testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he learned or
heard from others.
b. Furthermore, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x
x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x.” By allowing the accused
to test the perception, memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial
court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his
testimony.
3. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity
and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
4. The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have
been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against
a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is
hearsay just the same.
a. Which is why Section 1 R132 requires that all the witnesses in a
judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath and
affirmation; and
b. Section 6 R132 requires all the witnesses by subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party
5. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement
depends.
Res Gestae
6. The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations
must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation.”
a. Three essential requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances
b. There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to
i. the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act
or transaction and the making of the statement,
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

ii. the place where the statement is made, WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby
iii. the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless
iv. the presence or absence of intervening events between he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to
the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
v. the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
c. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
d. In this case, AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the
police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the missing
element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time
between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient
opportunity for reflection.
i. there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive
about the declarations which AAA made since it was a re-
telling of what she had already confessed to her mother
earlier that afternoon
ii. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious
deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage
as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of
her father.
7. Since the inculpatory facts were susceptible of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence
does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction, the
accused is acquitted.
a. People v. Ganguso: “An accused has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must
be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the
accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience
must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.”

DISPOSITION:
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Balerta v. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Summary of information:
a. The accused, an employee/cashier of Balasan Associated
Barangays Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BABMPC) was in-charge of
collecting and keeping the collections turned over to her by the
collectors of the cooperative and depositing the collected amount to
the depository bank which is the Balasan Rural Bank, Balasan,
Iloilo,
b. Said accused unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert to her personal use and benefit the total collection of
₱185,584.06 and despite repeated demands, the said accused
failed and still fails, to liquidate or render formal accounting of her
collections or return the aforesaid amount.
2. Version of the prosecution:
a. During pretrial, prosecution manifested that Timonera (manager)
would testify on the function of BABMPC and the duties of the
petitioner, while Ambros’ (internal auditor’s) testimony would
revolve on the facts and circumstances leading to the filing of the
complaint.
b. During trial, only Timonera appeared to testify. Both the prosecution
and the defense did not formally offer any documentary evidence.
c. Timonera was authorized by the board to file a criminal complaint
against Balerta.
d. The petitioner neither resigned nor was terminated from
employment, but she stopped reporting for work from June 19,
1999 onwards after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud
in her records.
e. Balerta reported to the bank the passbook was lost, so the bank
issued a new one. Balerta used the old passbook to enter falsified
entries, while using the new passbook for actual transactions.
f. Timonera sent three letters to Balerta to explain the discrepancies.
Two were sent to the house of Balerta and the last one through
mail. None were received by Balerta.
g. Balerta’s table and drawers were opened using duplicate keys.
3. Version of the defense:
a. The petitioner testified that the last day she reported for work as a
cashier in BABMPC was on June 17, 1999. Timonera got angry
that day when the petitioner reminded him of his cash advances,
which were already equivalent to his salaries for five months. The
petitioner emphasized that Timonera had exceeded the allowable
cash advance amount of one month salary.
b. She was sick so she was advised by her doctor to rest for two
weeks. She received a letter prompting her to go the office. She
was presented with the audit report but she was not given a copy.
c. Balerta proceeded to the Balasan Police Station to report about the
forced opening of her table and drawers which occurred on June
25, 1999.
d. The petitioner alleged that Timonera was ill motivated when he
initiated the filing of the criminal complaint against her. Timonera
intended to evade his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to
his cash advances and the money which he had diverted to other
projects in violation of the rules of the cooperative.
4. RTC ruled against Balerta
5. CA affirmed (INCORRECT RULING): Elements of estafa are present.
a. Firstly, it was sufficiently proven from the testimonies of both the
prosecution and defense witnesses that the [petitioner] was
employed as one of the three cashiers of the cooperative.
b. Secondly, on the matter of misappropriation, [the petitioner]
deplored the conduct of an internal audit in her absence but she
merely denied the shortage of money as shown by the result of the
internal audit. [The petitioner] did not cause an audit of her own to
rebut the evidence against her.
c. Thirdly, it is needless to say that the cooperative was greatly
prejudiced by the misappropriation of its funds and by the denial of
[the petitioner] of the shortfall.
ISSUE: W/N Balerta was guilty of estafa?
RULING + RATIO: No to both criminal and civil liabilities.
1. The petitioner claims that in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
that a cashier cannot be convicted of estafa if he or she has no juridical
possession over the funds held. Further, the element of demand was not
established. There was no proof conclusively showing that the three letters
were sent to the petitioner by BABMPC. Assuming they were sent, no ample
evidence exists to prove that they were in fact received by the petitioner.
2. In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling
the funds lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds
in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or material
possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up
against BABMPC. The petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash
custodian. Hence, the Court finds that juridical possession of the funds as an
element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation is absent in the instant
case.
3. In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there
exists evidence of misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive
proofs of both misappropriation and demand are wanting.
4. Considering the absence of formal offers of documentary evidence, the
judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA solely hinged on who was more
credible between the two witnesses. Timonera for the prosecution; Balerta
for the defense.
5. Timonera failed to state with certainty where in the records held by the
petitioner were the discrepancies shown. Timonera evaded answering the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew
more about the matter. Note too that Timonera admitted it was the petitioner
and De Asis (the accountant) who were the two authorized signatories
relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by Care Philippines.
6. It was thus fatal for the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, De Asis
(accountant), Mombay (secretary) and the bank personnel did not take the
witness stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally
offered as well.
7. The RTC and the CA faulted the petitioner for not offering countervailing
evidence, including an audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not
justify a conviction to be handed on that ground because the courts cannot
magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the prosecution’s failure
to discharge the onus probandi.
8. Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This,
however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
9. In the case now under consideration, the Court acquits the petitioner not
because she is found absolutely innocent of the crime charged. The Court
acquits merely because reasonable doubt exists anent her guilt. Hence, the
petitioner can still be held civilly liable to BABMPC if preponderant evidence
exist to prove the same.
10. The acquittal of the accused from the crime charged does not necessarily
negate the existence of civil liability.
11. However, in the instant petition, the prosecution manifested during the pre-
trial that Timonera's testimony would touch on the functions of the BABMPC
and the duties of the petitioner. During the trial, Timonera made references
to the alleged falsifications and misappropriations committed by the
petitioner. However, he denied specific knowledge of where exactly the
falsifications and misappropriations were shown and recorded. This, plus the
fact that the prosecution made no formal offer of documentary evidence,
leaves the Court in the dark as to how the petitioner's civil liability, if any,
shall be determined.
12. The Court finds that Timonera's testimony does not quality as preponderant
evidence1 from which the Court can conclude that the petitioner is civilly
liable to pay BABMPC the amount of ₱185,584.06.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00693 is REVERSED. The petitioner, MARGIE BALERTA, is ACQUITTED of
the crime of Esta/a under Article 315(l)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The directive of
the Court of Appeals for Margie Balerta to PAY Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-
Purpose Cooperative the amount oL₱185,584.06 as CIVIL LIABILITY is likewise SET
ASIDE for lack of basis.
DOCTRINES:
Related to Rule 133, Section 2:
1. "In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.”
Related to Rule 133, Section 1:
1. Two kinds of acquittal:
a. “First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of this instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
1 SECTION 4. Use of depositions.— At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the
province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may
introduce any other parts.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict

complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
b. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt
of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.”
2. Restatement: There was no preponderance of evidence in this case. A
testimony uncorroborated with documentary evidence, even if the defense is
weak, doesn’t equate to preponderance.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Ganzon v. Arlos, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013. 2. An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings.
The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
FACTS: or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative
1. DILG Regional Office held a Christmas party at its office parking lot case does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry
2. When the Christmas party was about to end, Arlos, OIC Provincial Director with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the quantum of
of DILG, left to get some documents in the office proof required in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence,
3. Ganzon approached Arlos and pulled out a gun and pointed it to Arlos unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt
shouting angrily 3. Substantial evidence, according to Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, is
4. Arlos was able to parry the gun from Ganzon but Ganzon blocked his path "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
and pushed him back adequate to justify a conclusion." In contrast, proof beyond reasonable
5. Arlos pushed Ganzon’s hand. Ganzon shot but hit the floor doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
6. Arlon ran away but Ganzon caught up to Arlos and said “Patay ka”. of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainty only is required,
7. A few days later, Arlos went to the DILG office to see the Regional Director or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
and filed an administrative case against Ganzon for grave misconduct mind.
8. Ganzon denied the charges and was investigated. Both parties agreed to
dispense with the presentation of witnesses and other evidence but agreed DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the
to adopt the evidence presented in a pending criminal case for attempted Court of Appeals and ORDERS petitioner Rolando Ganzon to pay the costs of suit.
homicide
9. Both parties presented witnesses in the criminal case:
a. Arlos presented: Himself, a DILG employee, DILG provincial
director, and a security guard who all testified that Ganzon
attempted to shoot Arlos
b. Ganzon presented: Himself, an employee of DILG, and another
person who testified that Ganzon was with the 2 others waiting for
the drinks to be served to the guests during the Christmas party.
Arlos asked them what they were doing in the lobby. Arlos
confronted Ganzon about certain performance ratings which irked
Arlos. Arlos pushed his body to Ganzon and started shoving each
other. Ganzon claims that the hole found in the lobby was not from
a shell or a slug because no bullet was recovered. Ganzon also
claims that he had no ill feelings against Arlos.
10. CSC regional office ruled that Ganzon was guilty of grave misconduct
11. CSC main office affirmed the ruling
12. Ganzon appealed to CA. CA dismisses appeal

ISSUE: W/N Ganzon’s acquittal from his criminal case would preclude administrative
liability?

RULING + RATIO: No, admin case requires only substantial evidence not proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
1. The mere fact that he was acquitted in the criminal case (said criminal case
was based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the instant
administrative case) does not ipso facto absolve him from administrative
liability. Time and time again, the Supreme Court has laid down the doctrine
that an administrative case is not dependent on the conviction or acquittal of
the criminal case because the evidence required in the proceedings therein
is only substantial and not proof beyond reasonable doubt

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013.
FACTS:
1. Ruzol was the municipal mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to
2004.
2. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly
composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned
stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the
transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General
Nakar.
a. During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate
the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through
Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the
corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.
3. Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, 221 permits to transport salvaged forest
products were issued to various recipients, of which 43 bore the signature of
Ruzol while the remaining 178 were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T.
Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.
4. On the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for
violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria.
5. Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product, person
given the permit, and official receipt number, the said Informations were
substantially uniform, charging both for issuing permits to transport various
forest products under the pretense of official position and without such
authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the government.
6. Ruzol’s contends that he is innocent, in his defense he alleges, among
others, that:
a. As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, he is
authorized to issue permits to transport forest products pursuant to
the LGC which include necessarily implied powers
b. he cannot be convicted of Usurpation of Authority since they did not
act "under the pretense of official position," accused Ruzol having
issued the permits as Mayor and there was no pretense or
misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of DENR.
7. Sandiganbayan acquitted Sabiduria but found Ruzol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 221 counts of Usurpation of Official Functions under Art.
177 of the RPC.
a. The Sandiganbayan held that the authority to issue transport
permits with respect to salvaged forest products lies with the DENR
and that such authority had not been devolved to the local
government of General Nakar. To the graft court, Ruzol’s issuance
of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions
of the DENR.
8. The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or innocence of
Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the subject permits to
transport, which in turn resolves itself into the question of whether the
authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the permits to transport issued by Municipal Mayor Ruzol are valid.
2. [EVIDENCE-RELATED] W/N Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official
functions.
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO, the permits to transport issued by Municipal Mayor Ruzol are NOT valid. While
a local government unit can issue such under the general welfare clause of Sec. 16 of
the LGC, such permits are NOT valid for failure to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth by law for its enforcement. SC finds that an enabling ordinance
(which is lacking in this case) is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity.
9. SC: The LGU has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest
products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment
have been faithfully complied with.
10. While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged
with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of
the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such authority — contrary to the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
11. The claim of DENR’s supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the
principle of local autonomy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution in relation to
the general welfare clause under Sec. 16 of the LGC of 1991.
12. As can be deduced from Ruzol’s memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in
their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the
subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol––to regulate the salvaged
forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence,
prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.
13. Although the DENR requires a Wood Recovery Permit, an LGU is not
necessarily precluded from promulgating, pursuant to its power under the
general welfare clause, complementary orders, rules or ordinances to
monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest products.
14. Notwithstanding, SC still finds that the Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol
are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth
by law for its enforcement. SC finds that an enabling ordinance is necessary
to confer the subject permits with validity.
15. In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General Nakar’s
Revised Municipal Revenue Code and Municipal Environment Code reveals
that there is no provision unto which the issuance of the permits to transport
may be grounded. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance for the regulation
and transportation of salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by
Ruzol are infirm.
16. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be issued to complement,
and NOT substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit, and may be used only as
an additional measure in the regulation of salvaged forest products. To
16
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
elucidate, a person seeking to transport salvaged forest products still has to
acquire a Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR as a prerequisite before
obtaining the corresponding permit to transport issued by the LGU.
2. NO, Ruzol is NOT guilty of usurpation of official functions.
17. Admittedly, while the SC considered Ruzol’s acts as INVALID, it does
NOT necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to
rule a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that
"all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime
should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."
18. DENR is NOT the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue
permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also
exercise such authority.
a. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under
his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the official
functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of
any showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses
that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an
excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
19. The requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a
manifestation of usurpation of DENR’s authority but rather an additional
measure which was meant to complement DENR’s duty to regulate and
monitor forest resources within the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction.
20. The foregoing discussion on Issue #1 notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held
guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions under Art. 177 of the RPC.
21. As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of
committing this crime:
a. 1. Crime of usurpation of authority — by knowingly and falsely
representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government; and
b. 2. Crime of usurpation of official functions — under pretense of
official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so.
22. Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with
moral certainty.
23. Contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good faith. It
bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, this Court enunciated
that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official
functions
a. In dismissing Ruzol’s claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan
opined that the fact “[t]hat Ruzol had to arm himself with their
endorsement could only mean that he actually knew that he had no
legal basis for issuing the said permits; thus he had to look
elsewhere for support and back-up.”
b. SC: disagrees. the Court CANNOT subscribe to this view as there
is neither legal basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion
that good faith is negated when an accused sought another
person’s approval.
24. Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the
unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting." Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
25. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he
issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that
Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged
forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence
of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable
for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and
would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to
take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
conservation of our natural resources.
26. Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case and
considering further that this case demands only the determination of Ruzol's
guilt or innocence for usurpation of official functions under the RPC, for
which the issue on the validity of the subject Permits to Transport is only
subsidiary, We hereby resolve this case only for this purpose and only in this
instance, pro hac vice, and, in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s
acquittal.
DISPOSITION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259,
finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus,
ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.
DOCTRINE: [in bold]
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Wahiman, Supra.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Wahiman was charged with the crime of murder for the death of
Jose Buensuceso. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
2. The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in
the evening, Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in
Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house on board
his Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of his employees.
3. While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned
down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on
duty, David Azucena (Azucena), who was then opening the gate, identified
one of the assailants as herein appellant.
4. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the
case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. However, when it was
appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was
at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of
his brother-in-law.
5. RTC: found Wahiman guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Appeal:
a. Wahiman argued that when his supposed extrajudicial confession
was being taken, Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao),
the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. He
arrived only when appellant was about to sign the extrajudicial
confession.
7. CA: found no reason to depart from RTC’s findings and disregarded the
contentions of Wahiman.
a. Appellant’s contention that he lacked legal intervention and
assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was
totally belied by the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered
assistance to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and
carefully explained to the latter the consequences of his
admission. Besides, the voluntariness of the execution of the
extrajudicial confession was apparent considering that it is replete
with details that only appellant would know.
b. Wahiman’s assertion of torture has no basis since it was not
supported by a medical certificate.
c. Ballistic exam proved that the slugs used in killing Jose were fired
from the firearm confiscated from Wahiman.
ISSUE: W/N Wahiman is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. Crime of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
2. SC agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that Wahiman’s
extrajudicial confession was voluntarily and duly executed and replete with
details that only Wahiman could supply.
a. Wahiman was informed of his rights.
b. He then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Laranjo and
Canadilla for and in behalf of Alonzo who owns a quarry, to kill
Jose Buensuceso for a fee.
c. He narrated how Jose was to be killed, how he executed the plan,
how he received payments, etc.
d. He signed the extrajudicial confession with the assistance of Atty.
Dumlao, and subscribed the same before Atty. Caayupan at the
Office of the Clerk of Court.
3. Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to
appellant all throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the
ramifications of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that
anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Notwithstanding,
appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.
4. In any event, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based
solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented
the eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after
hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu
pick-up of the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black
motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that
the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier
confiscated from the appellant. Moreover, appellant was not able to
establish that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene at the time of its commission.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y
Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost
earnings is reduced to P9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in
lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as
temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Cachuela, Supra.
FACTS:
1. RTC and CA found Ibañez and Cachuela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
2. The secretary and sales representative of Weapons System Corporation
(WSC), Henessy Auron, stated that when she went to WSC and called Zaldy
Gabao, another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but
Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front
door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door
because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the
company’s operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy’s hands had
been tied. After one hour, the police arrived. When Henessy and the police
entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault.
Zaldy informed the police that the company’s gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was
inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the
lifeless body of Rex.
3. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received information from an
asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in
the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for
prospective buyers for the stolen firearms.
4. The NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino with other NBI agents, set up an
entrapment operation to catch Cachuela.
5. When they proceeded to execute the operation, Melvin Nabilgas approached
them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look
for buyers of firearms.
6. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were
conducting an entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at
WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the
other persons involved in the crime.
7. Both Ibañez and Cachuela were arrested for selling the stolen firearms.
8. At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-
up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of
Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the
appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
9. The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before the
RTC against Cachuela, Ibañez, Nabilgas and Zaldy. They all pleaded not
guilty.
10. RTC: Cachuela, Ibañez and Zaldy were found guilty while Nabilgas was
acquitted.
11. CA: Affirmed RTC decision and modified the award of damages.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession was
valid. NO.
2. Whether the appellants are guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
YES.
RATIO:
Out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession was INVALID.
1. Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in
the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up. We note that
Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for
Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the trial..
2. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
3. In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up,
identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and
in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took place; how this
line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the
appellants; and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same
height and built as the appellants. To our mind, Lino’s failure to state
relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that
renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-of-court identification.
4. Nabilgas also executed an extrajudicial confession where he implicated the
appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this
confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and
that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.
5. Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is also inadmissible in evidence. The
Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must
be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."
6. We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the
authorities when he executed the alleged written confession.
7. The records show that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty.
Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the
very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned
the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators that
he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.
8. In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by
a witness who was present at the time the written confession was made.
9. At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against
his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
10. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This
provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself;
(b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
11. This exception does not apply in the present case since there was no
other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial
confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in
committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and
must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself.
Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Appellants were found guilty through circumstantial evidence
1. In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldy’s out-of-court identification and
Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case rests purely on
circumstantial evidence. The prosecution sufficiently established the direct
and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and that the
death of Rex had been committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. The fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range
(where the lifeless body of Rex had been discovered) matched with one of
the guns recovered from Ibañez during the entrapment operation clinches
the case against the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus between
the robbery and the victim’s killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by
Rex also came from the same caliber of gun recovered from Ibañez.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, SC increased award of damages.
DOCTRINES:
General Rule: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is
considered as hearsay against them.
Exception: An admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his
or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by
evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
Salapuddin v. CA, Supra.
FACTS:
1. On November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the adjournment of the day's
session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex,
Quezon City. The blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar
(Congressman Akbar), Marcial Taldo, Jul-Asiri Hayudini, Maan Gale
Bustaliño and Dennis Manila, and the inflicting of serious injuries on
Representatives Henry Teves and Luzviminda Ilagan, Ismael Lim, Vercita
Garcia, Kumhar Indanan, Larry Noda and Paula Dunga.
2. The post-blast investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by an
improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked near the entrance
stairs of the South Wing lobby.
3. Acting on a confidential information that the person who parked the
motorcycle near the South Wing lobby of the HOR was staying with
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and learning that one ASG
member, Abu Jandal alias "Bong," has standing warrants of arrest for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, police officers raided an alleged
ASG safehouse in Parkwood Hills, Payatas, Quezon City (Parkwood) on
November 15, 2007. During the course of the operation, a firefight ensued
killing three persons. Several items were likewise seized from the premises,
including 2 Cal. 45 pistols, 1 motor vehicle plate number "8," an I.D. of HOR
issued to Ikram, and a black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to Aunal with
calling cards of Salapuddin. One of the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced
back to Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin.
4. On November 16, 2007, Ikram executed the first of his several affidavits
(Ikram's first affidavit). He stated that he is a driver working for Salapuddin
since July 2002 and was staying in a house at 48-A Greenbucks, Filinvest
St., Batasan Hills, Quezon City (Greenbucks), owned by Salapuddin, from
June 2004 until he went home to Isabela City, Basilan in June 2007.
a. He stressed that before returning to Manila, or on October 9, 2007,
his cousin Redwan talked to him (Ikram) about a mission to kill
Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means of a bomb to be planted
on a motorcycle. He was not, however, informed of the reason for
the mission or the identity of the person who gave the order.
5. On the basis of various sworn statements, a request for the conduct of
inquest proceedings relative to the participation or involvement of Aunal,
Ikram, Kusain, and Jang was made.
6. On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily
gave a sworn statement denying any knowledge of the Batasan bombing,
asserting that his name was being used by the media only because of his
relationship with the persons arrested in connection with the incident: Ikram
was his former driver; Aunal, his former brother-in-law, being a brother of
his ex-wife whom he divorced under Muslim laws; and Kusain who once
sought his assistance for employment.
7. Notably, Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned Salapuddin's
involvement, let alone implicate him, in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar.
20
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Ikram's narration of events altogether changed in his third supplemental
affidavit dated November 20, 2007 (Ikram's fourth affidavit).
8. Ikram would later amend the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavits by
executing an affidavit dated January 10, 2008 (Ikram's fifth affidavit), where
he made it appear that after bringing Redwan to Salapuddin's house in
Basilan, he and Redwan again saw each other on the night of September 5,
2007, not October 9, 2007. He declared, however, that Redwan talked to
him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar only on September 8, 2007,
which was also the date that they started for Manila.
9. Salapuddin submitted his counter-affidavit where he reiterated the
statements he made in his previous affidavit and assailed Ikram's attempt to
implicate him as Ikram's desperate act of self-redemption after owning up to
the crime.
10. Nevertheless, Prosecutor Zuño approved the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Investigating Panel's Supplemental Resolution, recommending amending
the Charter to include respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan
Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin.
a. Referring to Salapuddin in particular, the DOJ Investigating Panel
stated the observation that: "Salapuddin's participation in the
cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in
the planning. Rather, despite this, it has his hands written all over it.
The circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or
another, associated with him.”
11. The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the
Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus
modifying the Supplemental Resolution of the Investigating Panel.
a. The Secretary of Justice predicated his modificatory action on the
interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence
against Salapuddin is the statements of Ikram. However, Ikram's
statements are laden with irreconcilable inconsistencies and
contradictions that they cannot be considered worthy of belief.
What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on record that
will indicate that x x x Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the
offense charged." The Secretary of Justice observed that the
statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as they
were obtained through force and intimidation contrary to the
Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
12. Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for
certiorari, questioning the Secretary of Justice's Resolution before the CA..
13. CA reversed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. CA held that the
totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin
lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime," the CA adding in this regard that "the absence (or
presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature
after a full-blown trial on the merits." CA denied for the MR.
14. Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing on the
appellate court the commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial
admissions of Jamiri, Kusain, and Aunal obtained as they were through
torture and physical abuse, without the effective assistance of a competent
independent counsel of their choice, and were in fact recanted. The
appellate court also grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in according full
probative value to Ikram’s extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin
even if it was riddled with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in reversing the SOJ Resolution which excluded Salapuddin
from the information from for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder.
RULING + RATIO: YES, CA erred; SOJ Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the
information is reinstated.
1. The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition before the SC.
Salapuddin filed an MR, specifically inviting attention to the prosecution's
admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking him to the
crime charged except Ikram's testimony. Since, as urged, Ikram has
recanted his testimony on account of the violations of his constitutionally
protected rights, in a Resolution, the Court granted the MR filed by petitioner
and reinstated the petition. Upon a second hard look and thorough
reexamination of the records, the Court finds merit in the instant petition.
2. The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system,
an executive function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than
necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion
and must rest on competent relevant evidence.
3. A review of the records, however, show that the only direct material
evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every conceivable
turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably
relevant, this is NOT the evidence competent to establish the probability that
Salapuddin participated in the commission of the crime.
4. As pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this CANNOT be considered
against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
5. Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It
cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as
hearsay against them.
a. Exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 to the rule allowing the
admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.
b. In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the
participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the
Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of
the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation
professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a
bomb in the Batasan grounds.
c. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on
Salapuddin's association with these persons to conclude that he
was a participant in the conspiracy, ruling thus: “Respondent Gerry
Salapuddin's participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

just because he did not actively take part in the planning. Rather,
despite this, it has hands written all over it. The circumstances, the
people and place used are all, one way or another, associated with
him. It cannot be mere coincidence. “
6. This Court, however, has previously stressed that mere association with the
principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice.
Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy.
a. Salapuddin's complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be
anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his
ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.
7. The Hataman brothers were named not just by Ikram but also by Jamiri &
Aunal as the persons who ordered the murder of Akbar. It is with more
reason, therefore, that the foregoing rationale applies squarely to Salapuddin
who was mentioned only by Ikram, not by the other persons arrested.
8. As a matter of fact, the CA has failed to capture the import of the ruling in
People v. Listerio in supporting its general declaration that "the totality of
evidence" indicates Salapuddin's participation in the conspiracy.
a. In holding thus, the CA failed to correctly appreciate that even in
Listerio, the "assistance," which was considered by this Court as an
"overt act" of conspiracy, was extended while "by being present at
the commission of the crime."
9. In this case, on the other hand, no evidence or testimony, not even Ikram's,
suggests the presence of Salapuddin during the blast that killed
Congressman Akbar and injured several others. He cannot, therefore, be
properly accused of exerting an "overt act" by extending "assistance" to
whoever was responsible for the commission of the felony.
10. Discrepancies in Ikrams' affidavits & the variations in the statements of the
other accused do not persuade this Court to find probable cause that
Salapuddin - indicted primarily because of Ikram's confession - was part of
the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. While the Court is not pre-
empting the findings of the trial court with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and
Kusain, the inconsistencies contained in their affidavits lend credence to
their allegations of torture & coercion, especially as these allegations are
supported by medical reports prepared by an independent medical
practitioner who was assisted by the personnel of the HRC

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Decision

dated August 6, 2008 and Resolution dated October 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution
of the Secretary of Justice dated April 23, 2008 in I.S. No. 2007-992 is REINSTATED.
Accordingly, let the name of Gerry A. Salapuddin be stricken off and excluded from
the Information for the complex crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder filed in
Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 in Quezon City.

22
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 224.
FACTS:
1. 13 Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines via UAE Flight which arrived
at NAIA. The group leader, Sonny Wong, presented a Baggage Declaration
Form to Customs Examiner Cinco. In the first bag, she saw few personal
belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she
pressed. In the second bag, Cinco noticed chocolate boxes which were
almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she
took out 4 of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. She saw a white
crystalline substance inside contained in a white transparent plastic. She
called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
Customs Appraiser Sancho, who advised her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. She guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the 4 boxes earlier discovered.
2. At the ICU, Cinco checked Pang's bag and only found personal effects, but
recalled that 2 of the chocolate boes discovered earlier at the express lane
belonged to him. Cinco called the other tourists and examined their bags
and found a total of 18 chocolate boxes.
3. NARCOM Agent de Castro corroborated the testimony of Cinco. He
conducted a test on the white crystalline substance using the Mandelline Re-
Agent Test. The substance was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). The chocolate boxes were bundled together with
tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
4. The 13 tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. The confiscated
substance were turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and
examined them, and found them positive as shabu. Out of the 13 tourists,
the NBI found evidence for violation of RA 6425 only against petitioner Pang
and his 5 co- accused.
5. Six separate informations were filed. Petitioner Pang filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation, which was granted by the trial court. The reinvestigation
gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and this resulted to
the filing of a single Amended Information. They plead guilty, and invoked
denial as their defense. They claimed to have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance taken from their traveling bags which
provided by the travel agency.
6. RTC found them guilty. All the accused appealed to the SC, but later on, all
accused except for petitioner Pang withdrew their appeal. SC granted the
withdrawal. Petitioner Pang's appeal was referred to the CA for proper
disposition and determination.
7. CA denied the appeal, and affirmed the RTC decision. While conceding that
petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation
was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other
evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked
petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory
right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial
court’s ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the
accused.
Petitioner:
8. He was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the
custodial investigation. He was not duly informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. CA should have
excluded the evidence taken during such investigation. He was deprived of
his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. Only a full
understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an
accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to
refute it by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence
Respondent (OSG):
9. Nothing mentioned in full text on contention regarding violation of rights
during custodial investigation. Petitioner was given the opportunity to
confront his accusers and/or witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel
cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter to
understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should
have manifested it before the court. Petitioner was nevertheless able to
cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices
as compliance with petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him.
ISSUE: Whether he was duly informed of his (constitutional) right to remain silent and
to have competent counsel during custodial investigation, in accordance with Section
12, Article 3 of the Constitution
RULING + RATIO: Constitutional right was violated, but substance discovered
during inspection at NAIA still admissible as evidence.
10. Section 12, Article 3:
a. Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
11. Petitioner Pang was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by
the custom authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right.
However, the Constitution only prohibits as evidence confession and
admissions of the accused as against himself.
12. "Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.” - Aquino vs Paiste
13. Petitioner Pang did not make any confession or admission during his
custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial
confession extracted from his as evidence of his guilt. No statement was
23
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

taken from him during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. The determination of his guilt was based on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu.
14. “Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” - People
vs. Buluran
15. Petitioner's conviction was on the strength of his having been caught in
flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of
any confession or admission. Cinco's testimony was found to be direct,
positive and credible by the trial court; it need not be corroborated. She
witnesses the entire incident and provided direct evidence as eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the

assailed June 16, 2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the

so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during such investigation. "The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules,
is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation."

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Magbitang, G.R. No. 175592, June 14, 2016.
FACTS:
1. Magbitang was charged with rape with homicide in Nueva Ecija.
2. At around 5pm of December 25, 1998, 7 year old AAA asked permission
from her mother BBB, to go to a nearby store. BBB allowed her daughter to
leave the house, but AAA did not return home. Later that evening, AAA’s
lifeless body was found by the riverbank. The post-mortem examination
of her cadaver revealed that she had succumbed to asphyxiation and that
there were incidental findings compatible to rape.
3. The lone witness to what had happened was 6 year old CCC, who recalled
in court that he and AAA had been playing when Magbitang approached
AAA and that Magbitang brought AAA to his house. CCC testified on re-
direct examination that he had witnessed Magbitang rape AAA, as well as
burning her face with a cigarette.
4. Magbitang denied the accusation and claimed that he had attended a
baptismal party on December 25, 1998 from 4-5pm. That from the party,
he had gone looking for his nephew to have the latter tend to his watermelon
farm. He returned home around 6pm but left again around 7:30pm to
check on his nephew. He and his wife remained in the farm until 4am the
next day.
5. RTC found Magbitang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide.
a. CCC had the capacity to observe, recollect and communicate what
he had witnessed; hence, he was entitled to credence. It ruled that
sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to Magbitang as the
author of the rape with homicide existed in the records
considering his being the last person seen with AAA; that he had
admitted leaving the drinking session at the party around 4:00 p.m.
or 5:00 p.m., thereby substantiating CCC's testimony; and that
AAA's lifeless body had been found at the back of his house.
6. CA affimed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Magbitang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
with homicide?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Magbitang’s contention that CCC, being a child of tender age, was not a
competent witness because his testimony was filled with inconsistencies and
suffered from improbabilities was unfounded.
a. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness,
unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the
child's mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of
relating the facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound mind
with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can
be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to
testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the
character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full
credence.
b. In this case, the defense did not persuasively discredit CCC’s
worthiness and competence as a witness. As such, the Court
considers the reliance by the RTC on his recollection fully justified.
2. [PERTINENT TO EVIDENCE] We dismiss the argument of Magbitang that
the trial court erroneously relied on circumstantial evidence to establish his
criminal responsibility for the rape with homicide. The evidence of guilt
against him consisted in both direct and circumstantial evidence. The direct
evidence was supplied by CCC's testimony, while the circumstantial
evidence corroborated CCC's testimony. Such evidence, combined,
unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit.
a. Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in
persuasive quality than direct evidence.
b. People v. Villaflores:
i. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any
reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the
factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly
proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw
an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To
be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted
to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately
lead to setting a felon free.
ii. The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct
evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from
which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence
is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the
trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused. Nor has the quantity of
circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed
as to be reduced into some definite standard to be
followed in every instance.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality
than direct evidence.
25
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 200081, June 8, 2016.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
FACTS:
1. Eduardo S. Carlos (Carlos) put up a business engaged in the sale of tires,
batteries, and services for wheel alignment, wheel balancing and vulcanizing
under the name and style of Chromax Marketing (Chromax).
2. During the infancy of Chromax, Carlos sought the help of Edgardo Cruz
(Cruz) to register and manage the business, i.e.,attend to the needs of the
customers, receive orders, issue receipts and accept payments, and to
prepare daily sales report for Carlos to be able to monitor the number of
sales made, credits given, and total amount collected.
3. Carlos through his sis sister discovered that Cruz was stealing from
Chromax.
4. Carlos discovered that Cruz took cash advances from the remaining balance
of customers without his consent and at the bottom of the balance sheet was
an acknowledgment that the amount stated as lost was actually used by
Cruz, which reads, "Mr. Eddie Carlos (sic) Amount stated lost was actually
used by me for my personal use and (sic) which I promise to pay you back.
5. Carlos also discovered an irregularity in the receipts issued to services
rendered to Miescor covering the same transaction with an invoice number
0287. The receipt issued to Miescor indicated the amount of Pl,259.00 while
the receipt shown to him by Cruz contained the amount of P579.00.
6. Cruz was charged with qualified theft for stealing P97,984.00.
7. The defense presented its sole witness, Cruz, who denied liability for
qualified theft. He insinuated that Chromax started losing money from the
time another employee, Jeffrey Albaitar (Albaitar), was employed. Cruz also
averred that his purported signature and declaration in the balance sheet
that the missing collectible sum of money was allegedly used by him for
personal use were forged.
8. RTC: Found Cruz guilty for qualified theft. The court stated that Cruz's
admission of taking the amount stated as loss for his personal use is enough
to sustain his conviction.
a. RTC also stated that even without Cruz's extrajudicial admission,
there is enough circumstantial evidence to uphold his conviction.
The RTC ruled that the following circumstances were established
by the prosecution, which prove that it was only Cruz who had
sales control and supervision of Chromax from receipt of payment,
issuance of receipts, and credit collections because he was the
manager and was in-charge of cash purchase and sales of
merchandise of Chromax marketing.
9. CA: Affirmed RTC decision. The CA stated that Cruz was entrusted to
receive payments, issue receipts, and oversee all aspects pertaining to cash
purchases and sale of merchandise of the business. By taking advantage of
and gravely abusing the trust and confidence of Carlos, Cruz was able to
appropriate the proceeds of the missing amounts for his personal benefit.
ISSUE: Whether Cruz is guilty of qualified theft.
1. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence
are as follows:
a. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of
confidence are as follows:
b. Taking of personal property;
c. That the said property belongs to another;
d. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
e. That it be done without the owners consent;
f. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; [and]
g. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
2. All the elements of qualified theft are present in this case.
3. The defense contends that the prosecution was not able to prove Cruz's guilt
by direct evidence. The defense's contention is incorrect. The records reveal
that it is by Cruz's own admission why a conviction can be sustained. As
already stated, Cruz declared that he took the money for his personal use,
"Mr. Eddie Carlos Amount stated lost was actually used by me for my
personal use and which I promise to pay you back.
4. Nevertheless, even without Cruz's own admission and direct evidence
proving Cruz's guilt, a conviction can still be sustained. As correctly held by
the CA, direct evidence is not the sole means to establish guilt because the
accused's guilt can be proven by circumstantial evidence.
5. Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which "goes to prove a fact
or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may
tend by inference to establish a fact in issue." Rule 133, Section 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides for the requirements in order for
circumstantial evidence can sustain conviction: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and ( c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Contrary to the defense's allegation that due to lack of direct evidence the
Court cannot uphold Cruz's conviction, circumstantial evidence is not a
"weaker" form of evidence. The Rules of Court does not distinguish
between direct and circumstantial evidence insofar as their probative
value is concerned.
7. In this case, the combination of the circumstantial evidence draws no other
logical conclusion, but that Cruz stole the money with grave abuse of
confidence.
8. The SC enumerated circumstances to show that Cruz misappropriated the
unaccounted money without Carlos' knowledge or consent:
a. Besides Cruz's own admission that he took the unaccounted money
without Carlos' knowledge and authority, Cruz's guilt was also
proven through the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the
manager of Chromax, had sole access to the money and other
collectibles of Chromax; he had sole authority to issue receipts; he
gave commissions without Carlos' authority; he forged the amount
26
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

in the sales report and receipts; and finally, insinuated that it was
Albaitar who misappropriated the money without providing any
scintilla of proof to support his accusations.
b. The money unaccounted for was owned by Carlos. While Cruz is
the manager of Chromax, whose authority is limited to receiving
payments, issuing receipts, and overseeing all aspects pertaining to
cash purchases and sale of merchandise of the business, he has
no right to dispose of the same, and Carlos, as the owner of
Chromax, has sole power of dominion over the proceeds therefrom.
c. Cruz himself admitted that he took the money for his benefit. During
his direct examination, Cruz admitted it was a cash advance or
vale, which he used for his mother's hospitalization.
d. As Chromax's manager, Cruz had free access to Chromax's
cashier. Indeed, his position entails a high degree of confidence as
he had access to the lists of sales report and the cash of the daily
sales. However, Cruz took advantage of this trust and confidence.
He exploited his position to take the money and was able to
accomplish the crime with grave abuse of confidence.
9. As regards the defense's insinuation that it was Albaitar who
misappropriated the money, such bare allegations must fail. It cannot prevail
over the overwhelming evidence proving his guilt.

DISPOSITION: Appeal is DISMISSED. RTC decision AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE: SEE BOLD

27
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
San Diego v. People, G.R. No. 176114, April 8, 2015.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the accountant of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. from January 1993 to March
11, 1997. Petitioner was in charge of accounting all business transactions of
the cooperative. Included here she was entrusted with a set of black checks
pre-signed and was authorized to fill in them.
2. (Sometime from 1996-1997) Petitioner both acted as cashier and teller when
her co-employees were on leave. During this time she had had complete
access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its
documents were kept.
3. (12 Mar 1997) Petitioner stopped reporting for work. Narciso Correa
(General Manager) instructed the bookkeeper, Angelita Dimapelis, to
prepare bank book balance based on the cash transactions during the day at
the office to check the accountability of San Diego. Dimapelis asked the
different depository banks for their bank balances since their savings
account passbooks and bank statements were missing at that time.
4. Corres and Dimapelis later discovered discrepancies in petitioner's report.
Cash on hand in bank was supposed to be P9.5M but petitioner’s report said
P3.7M only.
5. An information was later filed against petitioner for the crime of qualified
theft. Petitioner pleaded not guilty.
6. RTC: San Diego guilty. CA: AFFIRMED RTC + indemnify OFMPC.
7. Petitioner insists that the prosecution was not able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because there was no proof in the audit that the
cooperative had alleged amount of funds and thus had deficiency (~P6M)
when compared to pertinent bank statements. Petitioner asserts that it is
essential for a successful prosecution for theft that the existence of the
personality stolen be established by qualitative evidence, so the
prosecution must fail if no such proof of good quality was adduced.
ISSUES/HELD: (Only the first issue is related to the topic)
1. WON the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the proof
adduced by the people suffices to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence (because she was convicted by circumstantial evidence); - NO.
Circumstantial evidence allowed.
2. WON the she was corrected convicted of qualified theft instead of estafa; -
YES.
DISPOSITION: PETITION IS DENIED.
RATIO:
1. (First Issue) The prosecution presented the testimony of Piscasio, the
DOCTRINE: see Rationale# 3
cooperative's independent auditor since 1992. He stated that his audit was
based on standard and generally accepted auditing procedures. The audit
report, duly offered and presented in the trial, was supported by
certifications by several depository banks of the cooperative indicating
its balance on its account. Records are bereft of any showing that the
audit report made by the independent auditor is erroneous and unsupported
by documents and bank statements. Thus, there lies no reason for this Court
not to afford full faith and credit to his report.
2. Petitioner's own expert witness, Oplas, failed to dispute the audit
report presented. She admitted to focusing her review on bank
reconciliation made by Piscasio. It was only upon cross-examination that she
saw the daily cash flow that petitioner prepared and certified. She did not go
over the primary books of accounts of the cooperative like the ledgers,
journals and vouchers nor its commercial documents such as invoices,
returned checks including account deposits. She limited herself to the
monthly conciliation reports. Petitioner also asserts that the People did not
present any witness who categorically testified that petitioner ran away with
the supposed missing funds. She claimed that the demonstration that some
checks of varying amounts not recorded in petitioner's books
notwithstanding their return or dishonor, only proved her incompetence in
the performance of her assigned task and not necessarily criminal
authorship. Court disagrees to this.
3. People v. Ragon: Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable when
there are no eyewitnesses to a crime. Direct evidence of the commission
of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. The courts are allowed to rule on the bases of
circumstantial evidence if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
corollary rule is that the circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
4. In the instant case, the following facts were established: see Facts#1-4.
Petitioner deposited P1.05M and P250K in her PCIBank account.
5. In view of the foregoing circumstances and based on records, such
created an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person.
6. (Second Issue) Petitioner asserts that estafa and not qualified theft should
be charged against her since she was entrusted with the accounts. Court
held no, since for estafa, both physical and juridical possession should be
given. In this case, only physical possession was given to petitioner as
testified by Correa and no juridical possession. Thus, she was correctly
charged with qualified theft and not estafa.
28
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Penamente lived across the victim Barbie’s house. After work, he went
home, and before entering his house, he saw and identified Chavez, who
was wearing black garments and holding something, who had just left the
house/parlor of victim Barbie. He saw him because there was a light beside
Barbie’s house. Chavez could not close the door, so he simply left.
Penamente then entered his house and slept.
2. The next day, police officers examined the scene of the crime, and
conducted an initial survey. The team noted that the parlor was in disarray,
and found Barbie’s dead body inside. Penamente’s landlady woke him up
and told him of Barbie’s death.
3. Penamente then informed the police that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s
house. Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that there
were 22 injuries on Barbie’s body -- 21 were stab wounds in various parts of
the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised wound
caused by a sharp object. Penamente described to the police the physical
appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbie’s parlor.
4. Chavez, accompanied by his mother, voluntarily surrendered. His mother
told the police that she wanted to help her son. After being warned of the
consequences of making a statement, the mother still gave one, and
surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie.
5. Penamente was then called to identify from a line-up the person he saw, and
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez, and executed his written
statement.
6. Chavez explained that he was at home on the day of the incident, and that
he exchange texts with Barbie. To fix their misunderstanding, Chavez went
to Barbie’s house at 1am, and Barbie let him ent the house, and he went
home afterwards.
7. RTC found Chavez guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. CA affirmed.
8. Chavez now raises the presumption of innocence in his favor; that his
mother’s statement was inadmissible since she was not presented for cross-
examination; and that based on Dr. Salen’s findings, it is possible that 2
assailants were involved. Plaintiff argues that direct evidence is not
indispensable when the prosecution is establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstantial evidence presented laid down an unbroken chain
of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavez’s acts of killing and
robbing Barbie.
ISSUE: W/N Chavez’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING + RATIO: YES, but only as to homicide, NOT robbery with homicide.
1. R132 expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused,
specifically when (1) there is more than once circumstance; (2) facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The lower courts found that circumstantial evidence was established against
Chavez. While there is no direct evidence that Chavez robbed and fatally
stabbed the victim to death, the Court believes that the following
circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events that lead to the
conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that Chavez committed the crime:
(1) Chavez admits that he went to Barbie’s parlor at 1am, and he was
allowed to enter the parlor; (2) Barbie’s (2) cellular phones (Nokia and
Motorola) without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as part of
the missing personal belongings of Barbie, were handed to the police by
Chavez’s mother; (3) Penamente saw Chavez, and subsequently identified
him, as the man who was left Barbie’s house at the time of the incident; and
(4) that the time when Chavez decided to patch things with Barbie and the
circumstances when the latter was discovered fatally killed is not a
coincidence. Homicide was established.
3. However, the circumstantial evidence do not satisfactorily establish an
original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery. The statement of the
mother as to Chavez’s intent to steal the belongings is merely hearsay, since
Chavez’s mother was not presented as a witness during trial. An original
criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the
infliction of 21 stab wounds. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted
make it difficult to show an original criminal intent of taking Barbie’s personal
property since in a special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide
is supposed to be committed to (a) facilitate the robbery; (b) preserve the
possession of the loot; (c) prevent discovery of the commission of the crime;
or (d) eliminate witnesses. None of these circumstances were present.
4. Homicide was proven by the following circumstances: (1) Chavez’s alibi still
places him at the scene of the crime; (2) Penamente’s positive identification;
(3) Dr. Salen’s testimony; (4) number of stab wounds; and (5) motive
(Chavez was suspected by Barbie of having a relationship with Barbie’s
boyfriend, leading to a misunderstanding); and (6) confrontation with the
victim immediately prior to the victim’s death.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant Chavez is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime
was not attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant
Chavez is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum
29
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Gerandoy, G.R. No. 202838, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 520. caressed her body and touched her breasts. The appellate court dismissed
the argument that it is highly unlikely that the victim would be sexually
FACTS: abused in a small room surrounded by her own siblings.
1. Before the RTC of Surigao City, Gerandoy was charged with two counts of
the crime of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266- ISSUE: Whether Gerandoy is guilty of Rape.
B of the Revised Penal Code committed against his daughter, AAA.
2. The victim, AAA, then 13-years-old at the time of the commission of rape,
RULING + RATIO: YES but for only one charge. Gerandoy is convicted for acts
narrated that her father, accused Gerandoy, raped her on 2 occasions on 7
of lasciviousness for the other charge.
and 16 December 2001. She recalled that the first rape was committed on or
1. It is evident from the testimony of AAA that all the elements of rape were
about 12:00 a.m. of 7 December 2001 at their house. She narrated that
established. The prosecution was able to prove that on 7 December 2001,
while she was sleeping with her brothers and sisters in one of the two rooms
the accused Gerandoy entered the room where AAA was sleeping with her
inside their house, she was awakened when Gerandoy entered the room
siblings and through the use of force, threat, intimidation and deadly
and hugged her. The accused then forced her to lie down despite her
weapon, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim against her
resistance and had carnal knowledge of her. The accused stabbed and
will.
boxed her stomach. She lost her consciousness. After she became
2. The appellate court lowered the crime from rape to acts of lasciviousness
conscious, she was already undressed and noticed that her vagina was
upon finding that the testimony of the victim was incomplete to constitute all
bleeding while the accused was lying beside her. She cried and went away
the elements of rape.
to the farm and reported the incident to the elder sister of her mother, CCC
3. We do not agree. Despite the absence in AAA's testimony that there was
(Aunt CCC).
actual carnal knowledge considering that she lost consciousness before that,
3. The second incident of rape happened on 16 December 2001 at around
circumstances indicate that the bloodied vagina was a result of insertion of
11:00 p.m. AAA recalled that she was sleeping in a room she shared with
the accused's penis to the vagina of the victim.
her brothers and sisters when awakened by Gerandoy.
4. Direct evidence is not the only means of proving rape beyond reasonable
4. During trial, AAA clarified that she reported the first incident of rape to her
doubt. Even without direct evidence, the accused may be convicted on the
aunt one month after it happened. She reported the second incident three
basis of circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances
months after. She explained that the delay was due to her fear that her
constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion
father would make real his warning and continuing threats that he would kill
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
them all. When asked why she reported the incidents to her aunt instead of
5. To prove conviction based on circumstantial evidence, 1) there was more
her mother, she answered that she did tell her mother about what happened
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences were derived
but she was told to keep quiet about them because it was embarrassing.
were proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances was such as to
She reported the incident to the police on 2003 and was medically
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What was essential was that
examined.
the unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to no other logical
5. The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Del Carmen, the medico-legal expert
conclusion except the appellant's guilt.
who examined AAA on 3 September 2003. In lieu of her testimony in open
6. We find the accused guilty of the crime of rape based on the following
court, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the genuineness and due
unbroken circumstances. First, the accused entered the room where AAA
execution as well as the authenticity of her findings. Aside from the
was sleeping and forced her to lie down. Second, AAA resisted but the
testimony of AAA and stipulation of facts relating to the medical examination
accused continued to kiss her. Third, the accused succeeded in undressing
on the victim, the prosecution likewise offered as evidence the Certificate of
her by tearing her clothes with a knife despite her resistance. Fourth, he
Live Birth of the victim to prove that she was a minor when the two incidents
pointed his knife in her waist and threatened to kill her. Fifth, due to AAA's
of rape were committed and the medical certificate issued by Dr. Del
continued resistance, he stabbed and boxed her stomach causing AAA to
Carmen.
lose consciousness. Sixth, upon regaining her consciousness, AAA was
6. The trial court found Gerandoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt for each
already undressed and her vagina was already bleeding while the accused
count of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
was lying at her side.
all the accessory penalties and civil indemnities. Upon appeal, the CA
7. Clearly, conviction is proper. Combining in an unbroken chain the proven
modified the ruling of the trial court and held that the 2 counts of rape have
circumstances, there can be no other logical conclusion than that AAA was
not been sufficiently established by the prosecution with moral certainty but
raped by appellant.
nevertheless still found the accused liable for acts of lasciviousness in
relation with Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610. It found credible the
testimony of AAA that the accused hugged, kissed her lips and nipples,
30
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 29 November 2011

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00709 modifying the
judgment of conviction dated 13 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29
of Surigao City is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

In Criminal Case No. 6624: Finding the accused-appellant guilty of acts of

lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610;

In Criminal Case No. 6625: Finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape in
violation of Art. 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code.

DOCTRINE: To prove conviction based on circumstantial evidence, 1) there was

more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences were derived
were proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances was such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What was essential was that the unbroken
chain of the established circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except the
appellant's guilt.

31
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014.

Judgment of the RTC – ACCUSED GUILTY
FACTS:
1. On March 6, 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur Decision of the CA
filed an information charging Belgar with rape, thus: 9. On appeal, Belgar contended that the rape had not been proven because no
2. “...with lewd designs, with force and intimidation and after entering and direct evidence of the sexual intercourse was presented due to AAA having
pulling the victim from her house, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and been unconscious during the rape; and that the non-submission for
feloniously lie and have carnal knowledge with AAA, a 15 year old lass, laboratory examination of the red and white substance in AAA’s vagina casts
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in doubt on the charge of rape.
such amount as shall be proven in court.” 10. The CA affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction for rape could be
3. Belgar pleaded not guilty to the charge. based on the circumstantial evidence adduced through the testimony of
4. Testifying for the Prosecution were AAA, BBB (AAA’s mother), and Dr. AAA; that the absence of spermatozoa from the vagina of the victim did not
Penafrancia N. Villanueva, while Belgar was the lone witness for the disprove rape because ejaculation was not an element of the crime; and that
Defense. the RTC properly rejected Belgar’s alibi upon finding AAA’s testimony
credible.
Version of the Prosecution:
5. On January 20, 2000, at about 8:00 p.m., AAA and her two sisters were ISSUE: WON Belgar is guilty of rape.
sleeping in their house in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she was awakened
because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who
RULING + RATIO: YES. The appeal lacks merit.
was poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to
1. The elements of the crime charged are that the offender had carnal
shout or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her outside the
knowledge of a female, and that the same was committed by using force,
house and brought her to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown
threat or intimidation. The elements were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
substance into her stomach. She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon
According to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get up
regaining consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was
from her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and
aching and soaked with white and red substance. She put on her clothes
would have shouted but he warned her against shouting, and threatened to
and returned to the house. She attended school the next morning. During
stab her and her sleeping sisters. Once they were outside, he injected a
her class, she broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her teacher came to
substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness. Upon
her aid and had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to her
regaining her consciousness, she was already naked and had blood in her
teacher. She was thus brought to the Municipal Health Office of Tigaon,
vagina.
Camarines Sur, and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva, who issued her
2. Belgar employed force, threat and intimidation in order to commit carnal
medico-legal report containing the following findings:
knowledge of AAA. Her relevant testimony ran as follows:
6. Extragenital Findings:
a. Q. You were awaken when (sic) somebody holding your feet, tell us
a. Brownish discoloration of the skin at the anterior area of the distal
what happened next?
portion of the left lower arm.
b. A.When I was awaken I suddenly rose up and I saw a man, he, he
7. Genital Examination:
suddenly poked me with [a] balisong/knife
a. Multiple hymenal lacerations old, healed complete at 9’ oclock and
c. Q. When you said he, whom are you referring?
6’ oclock positions and old healed partial lacerations at 3’ oclock
d. A. Bobby Belgar, sir.
and 12’ oclock positions.
e. Q. When you identifie(d) Bobby Belgar who was already inside your
b. Admits small finger with ease.
room on January 20, 2000 at barangay Casuna tell us what
happened next if any?
Version of the Defense:
f. A.When he poked the knife on me he forced me to stand and
8. Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he was
forced me to let me go out of the house, sir.
sleeping in his house in San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur at midnight of
g. Q. While you were being poked upon by (sic) that batangas knife,
January 20, 2000, having gone to bed there at 8:00 p.m. on the same date
what did you do?
and waking up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day; that he did not leave the house
h. A.I was resisting and I was able to shout but he told me that if I
in that period of time; and that it was his first time to see AAA when she
shout he will stab me and also my two (2) sisters, sir.
identified him inside the Municipal Jail of Tigaon as the one who had raped
i. Q. How were you able to know that the accused is responsible to
her at midnight of January 20, 2000.
the crime being charged?
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

j. A.I am sure that he was the one who rape[d] me because while I reasonable doubt because they formed an unbroken chain that unerringly
am (sic) still sleeping he was the one who went inside and pulled showed Belgar, and no other, had committed the rape against her.
my legs toward the creek and there he injected. 7. The RTC and the CA were also correct in their uniform findings that AAA’s
k. Q.FISCAL SOLANO: In other words,you are 100% sure because identification of Belgar as the rapist was reliable. AAA’s view of the face of
the accused is the only one who get (sic) near you and nobody the rapist was unquestionable because of the illumination from a lighted
else? kerosene lamp inside the room. She could not be mistaken about him
l. A.Yes, sir. because she was familiar with his face from always seeing him whenever
m. COURT: Was the pulling of legs prior or after you become (sic) she went to her school in Barangay San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.
unconscious.
n. A.While I was still conscious. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals
o. Q. When you become (sic) conscious after you were unconscious promulgated on August 31, 2007 in all respects subject to the MODIFICATION that
who were the very persons around by the way? accused BOBBY BELGARis also liable to pay ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to
p. A.No more, sir. AAA, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the civil indemnity, moral damages
3. Like the RTC and the CA, we find AAA’s narration of her ordeal as credible and exemplary damages from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
and truthful. ORDER him to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
IMPORTANT
4. The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had
DOCTRINE: See under “IMPORTANT”
been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the
commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for
circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the
crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for
rape based on circumstantial evidence. In this connection, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions set forth in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Courtare shown to exist, to wit:
a. Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. –
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
i. 1. There is more than one circumstance;
ii. 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
iii. 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
5. In People v. Perez, the court likewise held that conviction for rape may be
based on circumstantial evidence when the victim cannot testify on the
actual commission of the rape as she was rendered unconscious when the
act was committed, provided that more than one circumstance is duly proved
and that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead
to no other logical conclusion than the appellant’s guilt of the crime charged..
6. This case has factual kinship with People v. Perez. The Prosecution proved
through AAA’s testimony that: (1) Belgar had poked the knife at her neck; (2)
he had dragged her outside the house and had brought her to a nearby tree;
(3) he had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then
rendered her unconscious; (4) upon waking up, she had found herself lying
naked on the ground; (5) she had felt pain in her vagina, which held a red
and white substance in it; and (6) he had been the only person last seen by
her before she had passed out. The lack of direct evidence against him
notwithstanding, these circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond

33
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Petrus and Susana Yau were charged with the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom. They allegedly kidnapped and took Alastair Joseph Onglingswam
within the vicinity of Shoemart (SM) Megamall, Mandaluyong City through
the use of a sleeping substance.
2. Version of the Prosecution
a. Private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing
lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati
Shangri-La Hotel and hailed a taxicab to take him from said hotel to
Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan.
b. While said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of
SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his
associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong.
c. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his
associate, the taxi driver would from time to time turn to him and
talk as if he was also being spoken to.
d. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no
longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying
down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was
handcuffed and chained.
e. A certain “John” (captor wearing mask) informed him that he was
being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make
phone calls to his family and friends.
f. The kidnappers were demanding US$600,000 as ransom and
Php20,000 a day as room and board fee.
g. The family of the victim informed the US Embassy about the
situation and a meeting with the representatives of the PNP was
arranged.
h. Subsequently, upon instructions of the kidnappers, Iris Chau
(girlfriend of the victim) and Aaron Onglingswam (brother of the
victim) made deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metrobank to
ensure Alastair’s safety and eventual release.
i. The Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force
(PACER) received an information that a taxi plying along Bacoor
was victimizing passengers. The group proceeded to Bacoor and
positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway fronting SM
Bacoor. When they were able to chance upon the vehicle, they
followed it, flagged it down and approached the driver. The driver
was found to be the appellant Petrus Yau, a British national.
j. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car
registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station
for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private
complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man
is being kept in his house.
k. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under
arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam
after being informed of his constitutional rights.
l. Appellant led the team to his house and they found Alastair sitting
on the floor chained and handcuffed.
m. During the trial of the case, Alastair positively identified Petrus Yau
as his captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the US FBI
reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by the captor
matched that of the appellant Petrus Yau.
3. Version of the Defense
a. Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime and
averred that it was a set up against him and his family.
b. At the time the victim was kidnapped, Petrus Yau was at home
sleeping.
c. At the time the victim was rescued, Petrus Yau was abducted by 3
men, who tied his hands, covered his head and brought him to a
certain room where he was accused of being a kidnapper, to which
he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to
make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to
no avail.
d. When he was taken into custody, he had various personal
properties, but none of those items were returned to him.
e. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER
Custodial Center.
f. Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary
to the victim’s testimony that he was placed in the basement. He
was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the
kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning
before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had
markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
g. Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the
company of the kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s
food (lunch and dinner). Susana and Petrus Yau were separated
since June 2003 and were living separately.
h. At the time the victim was rescued, she requested Petrus to do
some errands for her as she does not trust her househelp. Later on,
4 to 5 policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with
them to the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a
vehicular accident along Aguinaldo Highway.
i. They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office.
Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small
room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She,
together with her children and helpers, were detained for 3 days
inside a small room and after that, they were released.
4. RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susan Yau, as an accomplice to
the commission thereof.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses a. The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by
credible and sufficient, with their versions of the incident dovetailing Petrus and Susana;
with each other even on minor details. b. The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which
b. It stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the the victim recalled boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills
prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was Shopping Center and where he lost consciousness, was found in
the perpetrator of the heinous act. the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus;
5. The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. c. The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong
6. Hence, this appeal Kwai Ping were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of
Petrus Yau;
ISSUE: WoN the accused-appellants were guilty of the crime charged. d. In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence
were found: 1 chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain;
checkered pajama; black blazer; 1 Onesimus black coat; 2 video
RULING + RATIO: YES.
camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position
1. In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is,
and family footages, and the other one labeled “sex scandal”; 8
(1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged;
pieces of cellphones; notebook; 2 Talk n Text SIM cards; Globe
and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the
SIM card; 2 Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in
person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of
Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of Susana Sumogba; original copy
the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the
of the Official Receipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki
malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained. Here, the prosecution was
1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and
able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus
2. Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota
Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth
Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost
certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia
consciousness. He claimed that while he was conversing with his business
Trust deposit slips; 5 ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
e. 2 cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being
the possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the
spoken to. Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample
owner of the QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper
opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver as to be able to
Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been
recognize and identify him in court.
known yet; and
3. Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his
f. The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that
kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. Alastair declared with certainty that it was
was recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from
the voice of Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who
Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.
introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the
7. The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing
phone for 3 weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release
pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together,
of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the
with Chinese accent.
kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence
4. Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of
effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
circumstantial evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable
8. The elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as
conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged.
amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the
5. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
for the release of the victim.
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
9. All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First,
the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a
of all others, as the guilty person.
taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and
6. The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm
detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived
35
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus
made demands for the delivery of a ransom in the amount of US$600,000
for the release of the victim.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y
Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00.

DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial

evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

36
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Atienza v. People, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA 84.
FACTS:
1. Atibula, Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the
CA Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday
party (petitioners) he was introduced to a certain Dario and asked him to
assist the latter in searching for a certain CA decision entitled “Mateo
Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc.”
2. Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office – followed a few minutes later by
Dario – and searched for the aforementioned decision which was found.
Atibula observed that Dario was comparing its pages to the discolored
papers he was holding. Dario likewise scanned Vols 265 and 267 and
placed check marks on the papers he was holding.
3. A few days after, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound. Dario
requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of
the volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and
immediately left.
4. Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for Volume
260, which the latter turned down. Disturbed by the situation, Atibula
reported the incident to Atty. Macapagal, the Assistant Chief of the CA
Reporter’s Division, who then instructed Atibula to hide Volumes 260, 265
and 267 in a safe place.
5. Atibula discovered that Volume 266 covering the period from January 28 to
February 12, 1969 was missing and, hence, immediately reported the same
to Atty. Macapagal.
6. Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter’s Division, handed to
Atibula a bag containing a gift–wrapped package which turned out to be the
missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver
the said package to Atibula.
7. Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions
and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein, namely: (a)
first case was edited recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment
earlier issued in the Fernando case; and (b) second was edited amending
the original decision.
8. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal who, in turn,
informed Atty. Tablate, then Chief of the CA Reporter’s Division, of the
same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and existence of the
subject resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the
duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not
bear the said promulgations.
9. The NBI investigation shows that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed been altered;
and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and
decision (questioned signatures) and their standard/sample signatures “were
not written by one and the same person,” leading to the conclusion that the
questioned signatures were forgeries.
10. An inspection of the air–conditioning units at the office of the CA Reporter’s
Division was conducted, whereby it was discovered that the improvised
angle bar supporting the air conditioning unit at the right most end from the
main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall holding the
same was broken (“may bak–bak na”) and found that: (a) the perpetrators
gained entry to the office of the CA Reporter’s Division “by passing through
the hole on the concrete wall after removing the air conditioning unit”; (b)
there was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public
Document between Atienza and Dario in view of their concerted efforts
through previous or simultaneous acts and deeds; and (c) Castro assisted
Atienza and Dario “to profit from the effects of the crime by returning safely
the missing volume.
11. A criminal complaint was filed against Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the
following crimes: (a) Falsification of Public Document; (b) violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as amended; and (c) violation of Section
848 of RA 6713.
12. After investigation, the charges (b) and (c) were dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence, but it was contrarily determined that there existed probable
cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario for the crimes of Robbery, and of
Falsification of Public Document.
13. The RTC and CA found petitioners guilty.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ conviction for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document should be upheld on account of the circumstantial evidence in this
case proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on
reason and common experience. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the
others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether
or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent
with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent
with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
2. Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence to the facts that appear on
record, the Court finds that no sufficient circumstantial evidence was
presented in this case to establish the elements of the crimes, and/or of
petitioners’ supposed conspiracy therefor. To this end, the Court examines
the participation of and evidence against each petitioner and forthwith
explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.
3. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro
a. Notwithstanding Castro’s failure to refute the charges against him,
the Court finds no evidence to link him to the commission of the
crimes. To begin with, it is essential to note that Castro’s purported
possession and eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised
upon the statement of one Nelson de Castro, who averred that on
May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him to
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

pass by his office and there handed him a bag which, as it turned inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the prosecution’s theory of
out, contained the missing Volume 266. conspiracy does not deserve any merit.
b. Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, 6. All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked
hence, was not subjected to any in–court examination. It is settled constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable
that while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the
are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer culprits. As such, their conviction, tested under the threshold of proof beyond
authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as hearsay reasonable doubt, was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable
evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness doubt is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record,
stand to testify and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s
cross–examine them. Since this was absent, his affidavit is culpability. Such moral certainty is, however, lacking in this case due to the
inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims. insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented.
Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove Castro’s guilt. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
4. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza
a. In similar regard, while records show that Atienza was positively DOCTRINE: The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent
identified by Atibula as having attempted to bribe him to take out until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the
Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporter’s prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the
Division, the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted. This, despite
in a different document, that is Volume 266. The discrepancy of the fact that his innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the
accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence
the strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At of defense. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
best, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well–established certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be
that mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be
support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the did not commit. Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to
accused was the malefactor. support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however,
b. In fact, even if Atienza’s bribery attempt is taken together with the to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the
other circumstance couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in incidents in this case.
this case, the Court still finds the evidence to be lacking. This
allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that Atienza
howsoever affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume
266. Clearly, the utterance was made by Atibula who did not bother
to state Atienza’s response thereto or any other subsequent action
connected therewith so as to bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can
this circumstance be properly linked to the act of Castro inviting
Atibula to Atienza’s party. It would be a stretch to conclude that this
mere invitation, without any other proof of Castro’s participation,
was instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to
Atienza and his own alleged participation in the crimes.
5. In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners
conspired in this case. While direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime which point to a joint
purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests, records are,
however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of petitioners
figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Nacion v. COA, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015.
FACTS:
1. Nacion as State Auditor assigned to MWSS allegedly received certain
benefits from MWSS.
a. Nacion received a bonus, availed a MWSS housing project,
and a car loan.
b. The problem here is that Nacion is a State Auditor, so she’s
really under Comission on Audit (CoA).
2. MWSS Administrator Allado complained to CoA that there were unrecorded
checks and irregular disbursements traced to CoA personell assigned to
MWSS.
3. CoA investigated and discovered Nacion to be part of this conspiracy.
4. Chairperson Tan of CoA filed an admin complaint against Nacion for her
reprehensible actions.
5. As evidence Tan attached the investigation reports based on the
claims control indices, and vouchers of MWSS.
6. Nacion denied receiving cash bonuses, but admitted to the housing project
and car loan.
a. Nacion’s argument against the cash bonuses were that the
vouchers were not conclusive proof of her receipt absent the payroll
with signature.
b. Nacion honestly believed she could avail the loans though.
7. CoA: Found Nacion guilty of grave misconduct for availing benefits and
bonuses from other government entities.
8. Nacion argued that due process was violated when her MWSS records were
used absent an order from the CoA chairman, and that documentary
evidence did not amount to substantial evidence.
a. Basically no written complaint against Nacion for her first contention
and she also wasn’t the one being complained about.
2. (Evid Related) In admin cases Rule 133 s5 provides that substantial
evidence is the quantum that must be met to sustain a conviction.
Substantial evidence is that evidence adequate to lead a reasonable
mind to justify a conclusion.
a. The indices and vouchers evidencing that Nacion received
benefits constituted this substantial proof. These documents
are actually public records. The CoA requires that MWSS maintains
these documents. It’s no accident that Nacion’s name appears in it.
b. A payroll with her signature was not indispensable because
obviously she would try to avoid leaving a paper trail. Resort to
other evidence is necessary since that payroll with her signature
doesn’t exist.
c. Nacion argued the fact that her name appears in the indices and
there was no payroll meant that there was no conclusive evidence.
Again the quantum to be met is substantial evidence not
conclusive evidence. The fact that Nacion’s name appears in the
indices and vouchers as having received something indicates
Nacion actually did receive something.
d. Nacion’s acts were violative of RA6758 s18 which prohibits auditors
from receiving any special bonus or benefit from the office they’re
assigned to. This is because as auditor they can use their position
to their advantage and the entire point of an auditor is to avoid
unnecessary expenditures.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON Nacion’s right to due process was violated? NO
2. WON the documentary evidence submitted constitutes substantial
evidence? YES

RATIO:
1. In an admin proceeding due process is merely the opportunity to be heard
which was actually granted to Nacion.
a. In fact Chairperson Tan is actually empowered to initiate an admin
proceeding motu proprio. Chairperson Tan does not need a formal
written complaint as she’s the Chairperson.
b. It doesn’t matter that the MWSS complaint was made by a different
officer than when Nacion was assigned there. CoA did not need to
form a separate fact finding committee just for Nacion.What really
matters is that CoA gave Nacion an opportunity to be heard before
reaching a decision, which they did.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Casimiro v. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014.
FACTS:
1. 2005: General Investigation Bureau-A of the OMB (GIB-A-OMB) conducted
a lifestyle check on Respondent Rigor, then RD of DPWH-NCR
a. A complaint was then filed against Rigor charging him criminally
and administratively before the OMB for alleged unexplained wealth
and violation of RA 3019 and RA 1379.
b. Complaint was mainly based on certain irregularities on Rigor’s
SALN, allegedly failing to declare properties, interests, etc.
i. He allegedly failed to declare in his SALNs (1999-2002):
parcels of land, buildings, SUVs, business interests, Ram
Road Trek, etc.
2. 2006: OMB issued a Decision finding Rigor guilty of Dishonesty.
a. Penalty of dismissal, perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
the government service and without prejudice to criminal
prosecution.
b. Rigor moved for an MR which the OMB granted. OMB’s previous
Decision is modified and set aside. Rigor was then adjudged guilty
of simple negligence, fined Php 1,000, and warned. (April 29, 2011
Order)
3. DPWH Secretary filed through the OSG, an Omnibus Motion praying for iits
intervention in the case to be allowed. DPWH argued that there existed
strong and compelling reasons for the reversal of the OMB Order (re
granting of Rigor’s MR).
4. July 18, 2011: OMB issued another Order which set aside the finding that
Rigor was guilty of simple negligence and imposed on him a fine of Php
1,000. This Order found Rigor guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification
of Official Documents.
5. Rigor brought the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
a. CA: July 18, 2011 Order is nullified and set aside. April 29, 2011
Order finding Rigor guilty of simple negligence is reinstated.
6. Petitioners Casimiro (acting Ombudsman) and Singson (DPWH Secretary)
filed this petition.
ISSUE: W/N There is merit to the petition?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or
probity in principle; lack of fairness and straight forwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt on
one’s ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded
of a public officer or employee. The requirement of filing a SALN is
enshrined in the Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service and
serves as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching
themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government
official or employee must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities
and net worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable
accumulation of wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of a
complete, truthful, and sworn SALN as a measure to defeat corruption in the
bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is
necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the
opportunities for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in the
public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor movement in the
fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance mechanism
to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. The failure to file a truthful SALN
reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and normally amounts to
dishonesty
2. In the case at bar, Rigor deliberately omitted his wife’s business
interests in corporations, his buildings, his RAV4 (SUVs), his Road
Trek in his SALNs for the years 1999-2002.
a. Also, Rigor’s SALN for 1999 has two (2) versions. Though it
appears that both SALNs contain the same property values and
liabilities, his networth in the SALN which he submitted to OMB-
Luzon is substantially higher than that in the SALN submitted to
DPWH-Region 1, on account of the declared accumulated
depreciation in the amount of ₱5,898,181.00. True, no liability can
be attributed to him for submitting two (2) different SALNs for a
calendar year, as his real purpose behind it cannot be ascertained
with accuracy, but such act still manifests Rigor’s predilection to
misrepresent a fact. Since there are two (2) versions of a SALN
which appear to have been subscribed on the same date before the
same administering officer, it cannot, therefore, be determined
which of these two versions represents his real networth.
b. Rigor also alleged that he had no obligation to declare 14 parcels of
land in Tarlac because they were actually owned by his family’s
corporation and that he was merely authorized to mortgage the
same while claiming that he does not own the same.
c. Lastly, as to the twenty-nine (29)copies of his SALNs from 1972 to
1998, he knew that the Administrative Division did not have file
copies of his SALNs because of the fire that gutted the DPWH
Legal Office where its employees’ SALNs were kept. Instead of
admitting and informing the Administrative Division of DPWH-
Region 1 that copies of his old SALNs were no longer available,
here constituted them and made it appear that said reconstituted
SALNs were the very same documents which he executed from
1972 to 1998.
3. Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave
offense. It amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are
grave offenses punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first
offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its
possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is
also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of

an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be
committed in one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of public
accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven
into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust,
which embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and
efficiency. Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from these
standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws so
that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court
is mandated to apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms
envisioned for our public service.
4. [EVID SYLLABUS TOPIC] Administrative proceedings are governed by
the "substantial evidence rule," meaning a finding of guilt in an
administrative case may and would issue if supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the
complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise. Its absence is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary evidence, direct or circumstantial, on record.
Here, the pieces of evidence met the quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases to justify Rigor's dismissal from service. Not only did he
fail to declare in his SALN the separate properties of his wife, as required by
law, he likewise failed to satisfactorily explain the other glaring irregularities
involved with his SALNs. These facts certainly constitute sufficient and
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
sustain a finding of guilt against Rigor for Serious Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Documents, for which the penalty of Dismissal from
Service is imposed pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, as amended.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2012 and its Resolution dated March
27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP 120708 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman dated July 18, 2011 in OMB-C-A-05-0123-C finding
Josefino N. Rigor guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents,
and ordering his Dismissal from Service, is hereby REINSTATED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Ombudsman v. Mallari, G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014.
FACTS:
Background:
1. ECOBEL Land, Inc. (ECOBEL) applied for a medium term financial facility
loan with GSIS for the construction of its 26-storey twin tower condominium.
This was however denied for (1) insufficiency of collateral, (2) inadequate
track record of ECOBEL in property development, and (3) loan was sought
during the Asian financial crisis.
2. ECOBEL then applied for a two-year surety bond with GSIS to guarantee
payment of a $10 Million loan with the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB)
acting as obligee.
a. This was approved in principle, “subject to analysis/evaluation of
the project and the offered collaterals.” Evaluation was done by
GSIS Bond Reinsurance Treaty Underwriting Committee chaired by
Leticia Bernardo, Manager of Surety Department, General
Insurance Group (GIG).
i. Evaluation found that collateral offered was a second
mortgage.
ii. Committee rejected the collateral offered and requested
for additional collateral.
3. Alongside evaluation, Alex Valencerina, VP Marketing and Support Services,
GIG, submitted the ECOBEL bond application for evaluation and
endorsement of the GSIS Investment Committee (INCOM). Valencerina
stated that the project was viable and payment guarantee bond was fully
secured by reinsurance and real estate collaterals. Valencerina added that
the funder has given the principal limited time to avail of the loan.
a. This was coursed through Mallari, then Senior VP of GSIS, GIG,
addressed to the President and General Manager of GSIS. Mallari
wrote “Strongly reco. based on info and collaterals herein stated.”
b. Mallari also presented to the INCOM a proposal to grant the
guarantee payment bond to ECOBEL.
i. INCOM requested Mallari to look into the viability of
ECOBEL’s project.
4. INCOM subsequently approved ECOBEL’s application.
a. GSIS Surety Bond in the amount of $10 Million was issued in favor
of ECOBEL with PVB as obligee. ECOBEL Bond was signed by
Mallari on behalf of GSIS GIG to guarantee repayment of the
principal and interest on the loan granted to ECOBEL through the
obligee to be used for construction of its tower building.
b. Meanwhile, Mallari was reassigned to the Housing and Real
Property Development Group (HRPDG).
5. A Memorandum was issued by Federico Pascual, President and General
Manager of GSIS, ordering the suspension of the processing and issuance
of guarantee payment bonds.
a. Despite this directive, Valencerina and Fernando Campaña, then
VP of the London Representative Office (LRO), International
Operations, GIG, issued a Certification stating that ECOBEL bond
is “genuine, authentic, valid, and binding obligation of GSIS and
may be transferred to Bear, Stearns International Ltd., and any of
its assignees, and Aon Financial Products, Inc., and any of its
assignees.
6. Thereafter, TCT of the land submitted as collateral turned out to be spurious.
Said land located in Lipa City, Batangas, was the major collateral for the
issuance of the ECOBEL bond. It was titled in the name of Vicente
Yupangco who was not an officer or stockholder of ECOBEL.
7. Thus, GSIS cancelled the ECOBEL bond.
8. Despite notice of the bond cancellation, ECOBEL was granted a loan by
Bear and Stearns International Ltd. (BSIL) in the face amount of $10 Million
using the ECOBEL bond. The amount drawn and received by ECOBEL was
$9.307 Million. After said drawdown, Campaña at the LRO received the
surety bond premium check payments in the amount of $200,629.00.
9. Notice of Default on Payment was issued against ECOBEL.
10. PVB stated that it did not accept the proposal for it to be named “obligee” in
the ECOBEL bond, as there was no contract or agreement executed
between ECOBEL and PVB.
The Case Before the Ombudsman, and Subsequent Appeal to the Court of Appeals:
1. Investigation was conducted regarding the ECOBEL Bond.
a. The Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed criminal and administrative complaints against
Mallari, Bernardo, Campaña and Valencerina before the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) and the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g), of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), and Sec. 22 (b) and (p),
Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292).
b. The administrative case is the subject of this case.
c. AAB directed Mallari to file his counter-affidavit and controverting
evidence. Mallari submitted his Counter-Affidavit.
d. FFIB found Mallari liable for simple neglect of duty, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of his official duties when he
affixed his signature on the bond despite deficiencies apparent on
its fact. It also held that there being a finding of positive violation of
RA 3019, corresponding administrative liability also attached.
Mallari was meted out a one-year suspension without pay.
2. Ombudsman approved with Modifications the FFIB decision. It found that
there was more than substantial evidence on record to hold Mallari
administratively liable (See NOTES)
a. Mallari filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied.
3. Mallari appealed to the CA.
a. CA reveresed the Ombudsman.
i. CA said that the Ombudsman did not exert efforts to
explain the facts and show the evidence to support its
finding of guilt against Mallari for grave misconduct
justifying his dismissal.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
b. CA ruled that there was no substantial evidence to hold Mallari
administratively liable for grave misconduct warranting the
imposition of dismissal, Mallari affixed his signature in the proposed
bond after the GSIS INCOM approved the ECOBEL bond for the
payment guarantee bond. The proposed bond signed by him did
not legally come into existence because PVB did not agree to be
the obligee of the ECOBEL bond. Hence, it could never be the
source of any obligation. CA said that it was the certifications as to
the validity and authenticity issued by Campaña and Valencerina
that gave life to the bond. It found no evidence linking Mallari to the
subsequent use of the bond as he was transferred from the GIG to
the HRPDG. CA concluded that the quantum of proof which was
substantial evidence needed in the adminstrative case against
Mallari had not been met.
4. Hence this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. Mallari argues that the CA was correct in reversing the order of the
Ombudsman for want of substantial evidence to support his
dismissal from the service. He says that there was nothing irregular
when he signed the guaranty agreement bond as it was authorized
by the GSIS INCOM. He signed the bond with PVB as obligee,
which bond did not materialize since PVB withheld its acceptance
of its being obligee. Mallari contends that by reason of his transfer
to HRPDG from GIG, he ceased to have anything to do with the
ECOBEL Bond. He says that it was the subsequent acts of
Valencerina, etc. that gave life to the extinct bond, and that the
latter were responsible for the acts that led to the drawdown. Mallari
concluded that there was no evidence linking him to the
subsequent use of the bond and that there was no showing that he
participated in the drawdown made by ECOBEL with BSIL.
ISSUE: WON there was substantial evidence to hold Mallari administratively liable.
RULING + RATIO: YES, these pieces of evidence are listed below (See NOTES).
1. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is a reasonable ground to believe,
based on the evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible
for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or
preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence
beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the
evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion.
a. Court finds substantial evidence to prove Mallari’s administrative
liability.
b. Policy and Procedural Guideline (PPG) No.. 16-76 (Bond
Underwriting Guidelines for the General Insurance Fund), as
amended by PPG No. 64-80-A provides:
i. “With the information obtained from the documents
submitted by the application as basis, it shall be
determined whether the applicant is qualified for the
projected undertaking or obligation by a careful
examination of his character, capacity, and capital.”
ii. “High-risk bonds [are] those exposed to greatest risk of
loss [which includes a] Surety Bond to guarantee loans or
other financial arrangements”
iii. “All high-risk bonds […] shall be subject to the approval of
the Board of Trustees, regardless of amount.”
c. The Court notes that irregularities, defects and infirmities attended
the processing, approval, issuance, and the actual drawdown of the
$10 Million ECOBEL bond in which Mallari actively participated. In
the Memorandum which was adopted by reference as part of the
Ombudsman Order, the Ombudsman outlined the facts it looked
into in order to make a finding that there was substantial evidence
to hold Mallari administratively liable. (See NOTES)
2. Findings of fact and conclusions by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual
findings are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality
by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction.
a. The Court found no reason to overturn the finding of the
Ombudsman that Mallari was guilty of grave misconduct.
b. Misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements
such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence;
otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
c. It was Mallari who presented to INCOM a proposal to consider the
grant of a guaranty payment bond to ECOBEL. He hastily approved
and signed ECOBEL’s bond application without complying with the
instruction of INCOM to look into the viability of the project of
ECOBEL; without the required counter-bond and sufficient
collateral; without the prior approval of the GSIS Board of Trustees;
without payment by ECOBEL of the corresponding premium; and
without the mandatory Loan Agreement between ECOBEL and
PVB. During the INCOM meeting, Mallari made the representation
and conclusion, without sufficient basis, that dollar funding was
assured as the target clientele involved the Fil-Am markets in the
U.S. and Europe. Only a day after its approval, he immediately
signed and issued the ECOBEL bond without giving ample time
and opportunity for undertaking work to be done such as
inspection, survey and assessment of properties offered as
collateral. He also made it appear that the obligee was PVB when
he fully knew that ECOBEL had a foreign funder. Mallari also gave
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

his strong recommendation to the INCOM, withour basis, that the 3. Surety Bond No. 029132 was issued before
bond was fully secured by collaterals. ECOBEL Land, Inc. paid the corresponding
d. Mallari’s acts constituted an obvious disregard of the GSIS policies premium therefor;
and guidelines which evidently rendered undue benefit and 4. Surety Bond No. 029132 was issued to
advantage to ECOBEL to the detriment of GSIS. Philippine Veterans Bank, not Bear and Stearns.
e. Mallari cannot also use the defense of reassignment, since he Accordingly, GSIS London Representative Office
facilitated communications and negotiations regarding the approval (LRO) should not have accepted Ecobel's premium
of the ECOBEL bond, through Facsimile Transmittal Sheets and payment a year after the bond was issued;
personal appearances, even after being transferred from GIG to
5. Surety Bond No. 029132 was issued without
HRPDG.
furnishing GSIS a copy of the Loan Agreement
f. Indeed, the CA’s Decision completely exonerating Mallari from between Ecobel Land, Inc. and Philippine
administrative liability is a violation of the rule that as long as Veterans Bank;
substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman’s ruling, its decision
will not be overturned. The Ombudsman was correct when it ruled 6. Surety Bond No. 029132 was hastily prepared
that there was more than substantial evidence to hold Mallari and issued without talking concrete action to
administratively liable for grave misconduct. Under Sec. 27, RA protect the interest of GSIS;
6770, the findings of fact by the Ombudsman, when supported by 7. Atty. Campana of GSIS LRO accepted Ecobel's
substantial evidence are conclusive. premium without the authority to do so.

DISPOSITION: xxx xxx xxx

Petition GRANTED, CA Decision REVERSED, Mallari DISMISSED for Grave
The more detailed and exhaustive Memorandum dated August 29, 2001 of
Misconduct. the GSIS Office of the Auditor determined that the following GSIS Officials
be held accountable for the irregular issuance of Surety Bond No.
DOCTRINE: 029132, viz.:
[SEE BOLD]
1. Amalio A. Mallari, former SVP, GIG, for having
NOTES: signed said surety bond, classified as a high-risk
B. REPORTS OF THE GSIS LEGAL SERVICES GROUP, GSIS INTERNAL AUDIT bond, without the approval of the Board of
SERVICES AND WITNESS ATTY. NORA SALUDARES Trustees pursuant to GSIS guidelines and
policies, for having strongly recommended the
In a Memorandum for the Senior Vice-President and General Counsel same to be fully secured and for having issued
dated March 10, 2000, the GSIS Legal Service Group (Litigation and the same and making it appear that the Obligee
Investigation) determined that: was Philippine Veterans Bank when he fully knew
that the Principal (Ecobel) had a foreign funder.
1. Surety Bond No. 029132 was prepared and
issued without a counter-bond and sufficient xxx xxx xxx
collateral being posted as required by Policy and
Procedural Guidelines (PPG) Nos. 64-80 [Re;
Amendment of, and supplement to PPG No. 16-76
on Bond Underwriting Guidelines for the General
Insurance Fund] and 16-76 [Re: Bond
Underwriting Requirements for the General
Insurance Fund];

2. Surety Bond No. 029132, considered a high-

risk bond per GSIS guidelines, was prepared and
issued without the approval of the GSIS Board of
Trustees;

44
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
CSC v. Andal, A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November 18, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in
the Sandiganbayan.
2. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-
Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the
examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%.
3. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by
respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do so,
verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan
and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in
the facial features.
4. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered
judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service.
5. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in
favor of the respondent.
6. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied.
Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. The Court recognizes the CSC's administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service.
2. Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.
3. But the CA ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Court’s power
of administrative supervision over court personnel.
4. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the CA cited Section 6, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution which provides that the SC shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
5. The CA further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the
administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the
Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case.
6. The CSC's authority and power to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases are not in dispute. In the present case, it cannot be said
that Andal was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC.
7. This notwithstanding, the Court reiterates that it will not and cannot tolerate
dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all
its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables. The instant petition is DENIED. The Court orders CSC to refer
the case of Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the
appropriate administrative case against him.
8. [EVID RELATED] After a judicious examination of the records, we partially
adopt the above recommendation. Justice Jurado’s Investigation Report and
Recommendation is supported by the evidence on record showing that
respondent did not take the CSPE-CAT of 24 January 2000. Firstly, by
claiming that he was nursing a hangover on the day of examination,
respondent was effectively admitting that he did not take the test; and
logically, he did not earn for himself the 81.08% passing rate. Secondly, the
pictures in his Civil Service Application Form and PSP are entirely different.
In other words, it cannot be doubted that another person took the test under
his name.
a. Despite this established fact, respondent still tries to refute the
charge of dishonesty by claiming that the actual examinee
impersonated him and took the test without his knowledge.
Indeed, to be found guilty of dishonesty, there must be
substantial evidence that respondent intentionally made false
statements or practiced deception in securing his permanent
employment with the Sandiganbayan.
b. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required
in this administrative case, is that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. This standard is satisfied in the present case so
long as there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if the
evidence may not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
c. First, the claim of respondent is self-serving and
uncorroborated by any witness. Second, it is more reasonable
to believe that the employees who had an axe to grind against
him would rather have him fail than pass the test. Third, as
Justice Jurado aptly pointed out, it defies reason that the
actual examinee would take the test for the benefit of another
without any recompense. Fourth, even assuming arguendo
that respondent had an unauthorized impersonator, he should
have alerted the CSC or the Sandiganbayan as soon as he
received the passing grade. Respondent’s scheme of passing
the blame to the actual examinee is old hat.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, respondent Herminigildo L. Andal is hereby found
GUILTY of dishonesty. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits, except the value of his accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his records.
DOCTRINE: [in bold]
45
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Agile Maritime Resources v. Siador, G.R. No. 191034, October 1, 2014, 737 SCRA
360.
FACTS:
1. Dennis Siador was an ordinary seaman on board the vessel LNG Aries.
Apolinario Siador, Dennis’ father, is now claiming death benefits from Pronav
Ship Management, Inc. and its local manning agent, Agile Maritime
Resources (Agile) because on the course of his duties Dennis jumped out of
the vessel and died in the high seas. The latter’s body was never recovered.
2. Agile interposed the defense that Dennis willfully took his life by jumping
overboard. A life ring was immediately thrown into the water by the vessel’s
crew, but Rolando Moreno, the fitter, saw Dennis floating on his back and
making no efforts to swim towards the life ring.
3. Apolinario claims that Dennis was suffering with mental disability days prior
to the incident. Thus, his act of jumping overboard cannot be considered as
willful.
4. Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the employer is not liable for the
compensation if the death is directly attributable to the seafarer. Both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed the complaint finding that substantial
evidence exists to support that Dennis, saddled by heavy personal and
psychological problems, took his own life by jumping overboard.
5. The Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s decision finding the latter gravely
abused its discretion in holding that substantial evidence exists to support its
conclusion that Dennis willfully took his life. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Agile able to prove by substantial evidence that Dennis willfully took his
life by jumping overboard thus shifting the burden on Siador to prove by substantial
evidence that Dennis was insane at the time of incident?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that
the seafarer’s death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened during the term of
the employment contract. Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden
of proof. Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof,
Agile,et. al., in order to avoid liability, must similarly establish their defense. If
they are able to establish their defense by substantial evidence, the burden
now rests on Apolinario to overcome the employer’s defense. In other words,
the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer’s heirs. Apolinario has to
prove by substantial evidence that Dennis may be insane at the time he took
his life.
2. Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death
is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer
willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be
presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-
defense. Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of
the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness
required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his
senses.
3. In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA uniformly found that Dennis
jumped from the ship. Additionally, the petitioners cited the following
personal circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do what he did: his
dysfunctional family; the death of his mother after a lingering illness; the
bitter parting with his father whom he had not seen for three (3) after he and
his two (2) brothers were thrown out from their home in Talisay, Cebu; and
his disappointment with his sister whose medical education he supported,
only to learn that she got married and did not even invite him to the wedding.
4. Also, just a few hours before the incident, 1. Filipino crew members spoke
with Dennis in his cabin and asked him if there was anything wrong with his
state of health; Dennis replied that everything was in order. 2. After Dennis
jumped from the ship, he was seen calmly floating on his back and was not
swimming towards the life ring or the lifeboat while floating on the ocean. 3.
Even the labor federation to which Dennis belonged, agreed that Dennis
committed suicide
5. His strange behavior cannot be the basis for a finding of grave abuse of
discretion because portions of the Crewmembers’ Statement itself rendered
the basis for a finding of insanity insufficient. A few hours before the
accident, Filipino crew members approached Dennis to ask him if anything
was wrong with him and Dennis simply replied that everything was in order.
No proof was ever adduced as well showing that whatever personal
problems Dennis had were enough to negate the voluntariness he showed in
stepping overboard.
6. The Court finds that Agile, et. al., sufficiently established that Dennis willfully
caused his death while Siador's evidence fell short of substantial evidence to
establish its counter-defense of insanity.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
DOCTRINE: Since the seafarer’s heir has initially discharged his burden of
proof, the employer, in order to avoid liability, must similarly establish their
defense. If the employer is able to establish its defense by substantial
evidence, the burden now rests on the seafarer’s heir to overcome the
employer’s defense. In other words, the burden of evidence now shifts to the
seafarer’s heirs.
46
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Arias, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Florendo B. Arias was the Assistant Bureau Director of the
Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWIH). Respondent, along with other DPWH officials were charged with
violation of Section 3(e), (i) or Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, Sections
4(a), (c) and 7(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, and the Memorandum from the
President dated 19 November 1999 on the doctrine of command
responsibility for corruption in government office.
2. On Nov. 22, 2002, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) issued a
Formal Charge against respondent and indicted for indicted for the following
acts: 1) recommending the approval of twenty-four (24) Requisitions for
Supplies and/or Equipment (RSEs) made on a Mercedes Benz and a Nissan
Pick-up which were not requested/certified and signed by the end-users of
the vehicles; 2) signing the Request of Obligation and Allotment (ROA) and
approving the Report of Waste Material for said vehicles when there were no
such waste materials because the vehicles were not subjected to actual
repairs; 3) affixing his signature in Box C of the twenty-four (24)
Disbursement Vouchers; and 4) approving 10 Reports of Waste Material
despite personal knowledge that there were no repairs done and/or
replacement of spare parts made on a Mitsubishi Pajero.
3. Respondent denied the charges that capital outlay funds were wrongfully
used for emergency repairs of DPWH-owned vehicles. With respect to the
approval of repair of the subject vehicles, he argued that he merely relied on
the representations of his subordinates that said vehicles were in need of
emergency repairs. He further explained that all RSEs were prepared by the
Chief of the Motor Pool Section, Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division
(CESPD) under the BOE and submitted by the Chief of CESPD and that all
RSEs were supported by Motor Vehicle Pre-Repair Inspection Reports and
Job Orders. Respondent defended his approval of the waste material reports
in that he was exercising his ministerial duty. Moreover, his signing of the
RSEs and the pertinent ROAs relative to the 24 repair transactions was
based on Department Order No. 42,Series of 1998 which vested him with
authority to recommend for approval of requisitions, purchase orders and
contract for the acquisition of supplies and materials, office equipment, spare
parts. Before he signed the disbursement vouchers, respondent saw to it
that all supporting documents were properly attached, such as the job
orders, pre-repair inspection reports, RSE as approved by Director Burt
Favorito, post repair inspection reports, cash invoice, certificate of
emergency repairs, certificates of acceptance, reports of waste materials
and price monitoring slip, to prove that emergency repairs had in fact been
made on the subject motor vehicles and were paid for, and that
corresponding vouchers’ approval was in order. He relied on good faith and
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of his
subordinates
4. PAGC found him guilty. Ruled that there is a need for a certification/request
by the end-user of a service vehicle before any action may be done on the
request for repair. It refuted the assertion of respondent that the
recommendation for approval of the RSEs is purely a ministerial act, DPWH
officials are required by law to exercise their judgment to ascertain if, on the
face of the document itself, the same is complete.
5. The Office of the President concurred with the findings of the PAGC.
6. CA dismissed the administrative charges against respondent. It found no
sufficient basis to hold respondent administratively liable. CA observed that
the documents appear to be regular on their faces as the requisite
signatures of the proper officials and it was only after inspection of these
documents did respondent recommend the approval of the emergency repair
of the 3 service vehicles and the payment.
7. Respondent’s acquittal from the administrative charges prompted petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the President,
DPWH and PAGC, to file the instant petition for review on certiorari.
8. Petitioner disagrees with respondent’s claim that his recommendation for
approval of the 24 RSEs and disbursement vouchers were regular and
ministerial. It contends that respondent should have reviewed and evaluated
the documents prior to recommending its approval. Petitioner expounds that
the emergency purchases and repairs must first be requested by the end-
user of the vehicle sought to be repaired. The defense of good faith is
likewise unavailing because respondents relied on documents which showed
palpable defects when he signed them.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
administratively liable in administrative cases is substantial evidence.
a. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5.
Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
2. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as
required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or
evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs
3. At the onset, this Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions:
a. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
47
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
c. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
f. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
g. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
h. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
j. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record
4. The instant case falls under the exceptions because the findings of fact of
the Office of the President are contrary to that of the Court of Appeals
warranting review by this Court.
5. Petitioner highlights the importance of the certification and signature of the
end-user on the documents relating to emergency purchases, because, the
end-user would be the first to detect if there are actual defects on the
vehicles and who will certify on the immediate need for the repairs of the
vehicle to justify the emergency purchases, and exempt such requisition
from public bidding. Moreover, the job order signed by the end-user is the
initiating document and primary basis for determining accountability.
6. While respondent is not expected to scrutinize each and every transaction
covered by the RSEs and other documents, he should have at least verified
the contents of these documents and seen to it that each requisition
complied with existing safeguards on emergency purchases and/or repairs.
Petitioner correctly pointed out that the annotation on the RSEs "turned over
to the CESPD-BOE due for repair and/or issuance to various field offices"
should have alerted respondent on the irregularity of the purported
emergency purchases and repairs.1awp++i1 Indeed, the fact that the
vehicles were turned over to Central Equipment Spare Parts Division for
repair without certification from the end-users only meant that repairs were
not urgently needed.
7. Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as
Assistant Director of BOE under DPWH, does not exercise purely ministerial
duties. His duties entail review and evaluation of documents presented
before him for recommending approval. As Assistant Director of BOE, his
obligation is not limited to merely affixing his signature in the emergency
purchases documents. While he does not need to personally and physically
inspect each and every vehicle subjected to emergency repair and/or
purchases, he must ensure that the subject vehicles in fact necessitate
repairs through the signature and certification of the end-users. There exists
a ground other than the signatures appearing on the emergency
purchase/repair documents that should have prodded respondent to conduct
a more than cursory examination of the documents. The absence of a
certification and signature of the end-user which would justify the emergency
repair and/or purchase is glaring.
8. Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in
securing his examination, registration, appointment or registration.
Respondent’s act of recommending approval despite lack of certification
from end-users does not constitute dishonesty. It is actually a form of gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct.
9. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. As
differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest.
10. The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he
recommended for approval documents for emergency repair and purchase
in the absence of the signature and certification by the end-user, in complete
disregard of existing DPWH rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds thereby
causing undue injury to the government.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Administrative Order No. 57 issued by
the Office of the President imposing the penalty or dismissal from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service on Florendo B. Arias is hereby REINSTATED.
DOCTRINE: in bold
48
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 179150, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 741.
FACTS:
1. Bayani was charged of drug pushing, in violation of RA 9165. He allegedly
sold and distributed as broker 6.41 grams of Shabu. Bayani pleaded not
guilty.
2. Prosecution presented P03 Bernardo, who testified that while he was on
duty, an informant told him that Bayani would be trading drugs in Novaliches,
QC. Bernardo and his team conducted a buy-bust operation with the
informant. Bayani was in front of her house and Bernardo was introduced to
her by the informant. Bernardo told her he wants to buy 10K worth of Shabu,
and Bayani nodded and gave him two sachets. After the exchange, the
police apprehended Bayani.
3. Denying the charge filed against her, Bayani testified that she was changing
her clothes inside her room when seven men barged inside her house.
When she asked them what they were doing inside her house, they refused
to answer. When they couldn’t find the drugs, they introduced themselves as
police officers and commanded her to show them the shabu. She denied
possession and they took her to the Police Station. When they arrived at the
Police Station, she was asked if she knew a certain "Allan." She said no.
After a day of detention, she was brought to the office of the inquest fiscal
where she was informed that she was being charged with drug pushing.
4. Bayani’s 17yo son corroborated his mother’s testimony. He recounted that
he was about to leave their house when five men barged into their house
and went straight to his mother’s room at the third floor. He testified that he
did not know what happened on the third floor since, at that time, he stayed
in their sala at the second floor of the house. Thereafter, the rest of the
police officers and his mother left the house, while he stayed put.
5. RTC and the CA convicted Bayani, hence this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N Bayani is guilty of drug pushing?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. Bayani reiterates in this appeal that the RTC, saying that the there was
instigation from the police in the buy bust transaction.
2. This petition must fail. As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as
a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of Republic Act
No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.
3. In this case, the solicitation of drugs from Bayani by the informant utilized by
the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police
received an intelligence report that Bayani has been habitually dealing in
illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug
transaction with Bayani. There was no showing that the informant induced
the Bayani to sell illegal drugs to him.
4. In the present case, PO3 Bernardo testified that Bayani stood in front of her
house and was in possession of drugs readily available for anyone who
would buy them. PO3 Bernardo did not even have to employ any act of
instigation or inducement, such as repeated requests for the sale of
prohibited drugs or offers of exorbitant prices.
5. In addition, PO3 Bernardo was able to identify the accused, the boodle
money, and the two packets of crystalline substance, which tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
6. In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer,
together with the dangerous drug taken from the Bayani, more than
sufficient to prove the crime charged.
7. Finding no compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, this Court affirms the same.
8. The self-serving denial of the Bayani deserves scant credence, since it is
unsupported by any evidence other than the testimony of her son, Dan
Jefferson.
a. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a
common and standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. To
substantiate such defense, which can be easily concocted, the
evidence must be clear and convincing.
b. In this case, there was no allegation of any attempt at extortion on
the part of police officers or any reason for the police officers to
falsify a serious criminal charge against Bayani. Bayani admitted
that she had never even seen any of the police officers until she
was arrested. This negates any vengeful motive for her arrest.
c. Contrary to the Bayani’s claim, the prevailing doctrine is that
additional corroborating testimony of the confidential informant is
not essential to a successful prosecution. Intelligence agents are
not often called to testify in court in order to hide their identities and
preserve their invaluable service to the police. Once known, they
may even be the object of revenge by criminals they implicate.
9. Lastly, the testimonies of other arresting officers are not required in
obtaining a conviction. The testimony of PO3 Bernardo, being candid
and straightforward, is complete and sufficient for a finding of guilt.
a. Section 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court allows the court to stop
introduction of further testimony upon a particular point when more
witnesses to the same point cannot be expected to be additionally
persuasive. Furthermore, Bayani cannot allude to or suggest the
possibility of any irregularity that could have been revealed by the
presentation of additional witnesses, when she herself failed to
exert any effort to summon these witnesses when she had the
chance to do so.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2005 in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 00310 is
AFFIRMED. Bayani Delia Bayani y Botanes is found GUILTY of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No 9165. No costs.
49
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Go v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 147923, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 445.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business associates.
Respondent is the registered owner of Noah’s Ark Merchandising, a sole
proprietorship. These businesses are collectively known as the Noah’s Ark
Group of Companies. Go was the business manager or chief operating
officer of the group of companies.
2. Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that spawned
numerous civil lawsuits. Among these actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and
Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several incidents which
eventually became subject of these consolidated petitions.
Crim Case 98-1643 (Estafa) [G.R. No. 154035]
3. Looyuko was charged before the Makati RTC with Estafa (Art. 315 par. 1(b))
for allegedly misappropriated and converted in his name petitioner’s 41,376
China Banking Corporation (CBC) shares of stock. Petitioner averred that he
entrusted the stock certificates to respondent for the latter to sell, but the
accused, once in possession of said stock certificates, far from complying
with his aforesaid obligation, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapply
and convert the said shares of stocks to his own personal benefit.
a. After respondent pleaded "Not Guilty," and after the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses among them, Go and Amalia de Leon,
an employee of CBC, who testified that certificates of stocks in Go’s
name were cancelled and new certificates were issued in
Looyuko’s name. Earlier, subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena
duces tecum were issued to 3 witnesses (Peter Dee, President of
CBC, Atty. Arsenio Lim, Corporate Secretary of CBC, and Gloria
Padecio). The trial court also felt no need for the testimonies of
those 3 and ordered the prosecution to offer its evidence.
b. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that the
prosecution be allowed to present its last witness from Amsteel
Securities, Inc., Bohn Bernard J. Briones. The RTC granted the
motion. However, at the conclusion of Briones’ testimony, the
prosecution moved to subpoena Alvin Padecio which was
vehemently objected to by the defense. The trial court denied the
motion.
c. Prosecution could have formally offered evidence, but kept filing
multiple MRs and the like to convince the court to allow it to take
the testimony of Alvin Padecio.
d. Trial Court still denied. It even held eventually that the Prosecution
waived its Offer of Evidence, prompting the accused to file a
Demurrer.
4. Rule 65 to CA: CA dismissed the Petition, ruling that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that the petitioner had waived his
right to file a formal offer of documentary evidence and in allowing
respondent to file a demurrer to evidence.
ISSUE: WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not allowing more
witnesses?
RULING + RATIO: YES.
1. We find that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in patently and
arbitrarily denying the prosecution the opportunity to present four (4)
witnesses in the instant criminal case.
2. Rule 133, Sec. 6 clearly grants the trial court the authority and discretion to
stop further testimonial evidence on the ground that additional corroborative
testimony has no more persuasive value as the evidence on that particular
point is already so full. The discretion granted by the above proviso has the
clear caveat that this power should be exercised with caution, more so in
criminal cases where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for the
conviction of the accused.
a. The superfluity of a testimony vis-à-vis what has already been
proven can be determined with certainty only after it has been
adduced. Verily, the testimonies of petitioner Go and de Leon on
the issue of the transfer cannot be said to have truly proven and
been corroborated with certainty as they are.
b. It is basic that the case of the prosecution in a criminal case
depends on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense. This is so as proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required in criminal cases. Thus, the prosecution must be afforded
ample opportunity to present testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove its case.
c. It must be emphasized that in a catena of cases we have reiterated
the principle that the matter of deciding who to present as a witness
for the prosecution is not for the defendant or the trial court to
decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. It cannot be
overemphasized that the trial court must accord full opportunity for
the prosecution, more so in criminal cases, to adduce evidence to
prove its case and to properly ventilate the issues absent patent
showing of dilatory or delaying tactics. The reason is obvious: it is
tasked to produce and adduce evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. Sans such evidence, a dismissal of the criminal case on a
demurrer to the evidence is proper. In the case at bar, there was no
showing that the presentation of the three (3) witnesses previously
approved by the trial court would be dilatory and manifestly for
delay.
d. Moreover, after much wrangling with the prosecution conceding the
non- presentation of the three (3) witnesses, the testimony of
Briones was allowed as final witness for the prosecution. But
Briones’ testimony left much to be desired as he was not able to
testify on some points the prosecution considered vital to its case.
Thus, the prosecution requested for the presentation of Alvin
Padecio, the son of respondent and Gloria Padecio, the alleged
stock agent of Amsteel Securities, Inc. who handled the transaction
50
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

involving the subject shares of stock of CBC. This was likewise

denied by the trial court, which led to the motion for inhibition and
administrative case against Judge Felix, and the adamant stand of
petitioner not to rest his case by filing his formal offer of evidence
until the testimony of Padecio is had.
e. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the
prosecution to present the testimony of Alvin Padecio considering
that Briones of Amsteel Securities, Inc. did not provide some details
on the transfer. Alvin Padecio, petitioner claims, is the person who
can shed light on these matters, more particularly if one considers
the fact that he is the son of respondent Looyuko.
3. Based on the foregoing findings, we hold that the trial court whimsically,
arbitrarily, and gravely abused its discretion amounting to a denial of the
prosecution of its day in court.

DISPOSITION: The petition in G.R. No. 154035 is GRANTED. The January 31,
2002 Decision and June 3, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62296 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Likewise, the Orders dated May 9, 2000 and
September 22, 2000 of the Makati City RTC in Crim. Case No. 98-1643 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

DOCTRINE: Rule 133, Sec. 6 clearly grants the trial court the authority and
discretion to stop further testimonial evidence on the ground that additional
corroborative testimony has no more persuasive value as the evidence on that
particular point is already so full. The discretion granted by the above proviso
has the clear caveat that this power should be exercised with caution, more so
in criminal cases where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for the
conviction of the accused.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Webb, G.R. Nos. 132577, 147962, & 15035, August 17, 1999, 312 SCRA
573.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in a criminal case
for rape with homicide pending before the RTC of Parañaque, presided by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
2. During the proceedings, respondent filed a Motion To Take Testimony By
Oral Deposition of 5 people before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Philippines, alleging that the said persons are all
residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by
subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
a. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of
said individuals whose testimonies are allegedly 'material and
indispensable' to establish his innocence of the crime charged is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.2
3. The prosecution filed an opposition to the said motion averring that:
a. (1) Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in
criminal cases;
b. (2) Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during
trial; and
c. (3) Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure
does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.
4. RTC → denied Respondent’s motion.
2 SECTION 4. Use of depositions.— At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the
province and a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may
introduce any other parts.
5. CA reversed.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion
to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used
in the criminal case before her Court.
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. The only reason why respondent was seeking the deposition of the
foreign witnesses was to foreclose any objection to the admissibility of
two defense exhibits, which had already been admitted.
a. Further, the evidence sought to be obtained through the
deposition-taking would be superfluous as there are exhibits
of the same species previously introduced and admitted in
evidence by the trial court.
b. Hence, the same would be merely corroborative or cumulative
in nature and will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of
the evidence already in hand.
c. Additionally, respondent had more than ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense.
2. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge.
a. Sec. 6, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court (Power of the court to
stop further evidence) states that the court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point
when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to
be additionally persuasive, but this power should be exercised
with caution.
b. Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law.
c. Here, the Court found no indication of grave abuse of discretion in
the denial of the motion.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 45399 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to
render judgment therein accordingly.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 405.
FACTS:
1. Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
Parel with the RTC Baguio. He is claiming that he is the owner of a two-
storey residential house and that it was constructed in 1972-1975 from his
own funds and declared in his name in a tax declaration and that he has
been paying the taxes on it ever since.
2. In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already habitable, he allowed
Parel’s parents to live there and supervise the construction below. When the
house was finished, the Parel family was allowed to live there since they
have no house of their own.
3. Parel’s dad, Florentino, now deceased, was Prudencio’s brother in law.
4. In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate
the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the
place.
5. Parel’s parents heeded this when they migrated to US in 1986, however,
Parel and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground
floor of the house; and refused to leave despite many demands
6. So Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession, and also asked
rentals and damages.
7. Parel asked for the dismissal of the complaint. He alleged that his parents
are co-owners of the house (ground floor to Parel’s parents; 2nd floor to
Prudencio), and that his parents spent their own resources in improving the
house and that the construction workers were hired by Florentino, and that
Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands.
8. An affidavit executed by Florentino was later presented by Prudencio and it
states that: “I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and
residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to
according to law depose and say: That he is the occupant of a residential
building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the
subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the
City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation
purposes; That I am not the owner of the building in question; That the
building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently
residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City. Further, affiant say
not.”
9. RTC: the house is co-owned by Parel and Prudencio, so Prudencio cannot
evict Parel. It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the
house as owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its
entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed
because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City
Treasurer concerning the property’s tax assessment and Florentino, thought
then that it should be the Prudencio who should pay the taxes; and that the
affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
10. CA (correct ruling): Reversed. Prudencio is the sole owner. Parel failed to
formally offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to
refute the evidence offered by respondent. The RTC’s statement that
defendants’ occupancy of the house is due to a SPA executed by his
parents is wanting of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of
attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioner’s
evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Regua,
the carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the house and
Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated
to petitioner’s father, there was no supporting document which would
sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial court’s conclusion; and that
the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory. The affidavit of Florentino, stating
that he is not the owner of the house is conclusive proof of Prudencio’s sole
ownership of the subject house as it is a declaration made by Florentino
against his interest.
11. Parel concedes that his counsel did fail to formally offer his documentary
evidence in court and that the court shall not consider evidence not formally
offered however he cites the case of Bravo v. Borja insisting that his
documentary evidence which were not formally offered in evidence
were marked during the presentation of the testimony of his witnesses
and were part of their testimonies; that these evidence were part of the
memorandum filed by him before the trial court.
12. Parel insists that even in the absence of the documentary evidence, his
testimony as well as that of his witnesses substantiated his claim of co--
ownership of the subject house between his late father and Prudencio as
found by the trial court. He argues that the CA erred in finding the affidavit of
petitioner’s father declaring Prudencio as owner of the subject house as
conclusive proof that Prudencio is the true and only owner of the house
since the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
which it was executed.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his
father was a co-owner of the subject two storey residential house.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. The SC agrees with the CA that Prudencio had shown sufficient evidence to
support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the
subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. The court treats this as a
declaration against interest. It is safe to presume that he would not have
made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his children’s interests as his heirs. A declaration
against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of
the facts in dispute. More so, Florentino never revoked the statement in all
the times Prudencio tried to get the property back through different means in
court while he was alive (trespassing and unlawful detainer— which didn’t
prosper either because of lack of evidence or wrong remedy)
2. The building plan and taxes were all under the name of Prudencio.
Prudencio therefore had sufficiently established his claim and the burden
has now shifted to Parel.
3. In this case, the records show that although Parel’s counsel asked that he
be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

file the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence
presented by petitioner.
4. Parel insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally
offered, the same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial
evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v.
Borja.
5. Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., the SC allowed evidence on
minority by admitting the certified true copy of the birth certificate
attached to a motion for bail even if it was not formally offered in
evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate was
properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioner’s
minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already
formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo
case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions and not
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to
the present case.
6. Parel failed to prove that his parents co-owned the house.

DISPOSITION: SC affirms CA

DOCTRINE: (the only mention of Rule 133 Section 7 is regarding that case of Bravo)
In bold.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged
before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Art. 318 of the RPC.
2. The prosecution’s complaining witness Li Luen ping, a frail old businessman
from Laos Cambodia, traveled from his country back to the Philippines in
order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability.
3. Private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of
Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at
Cambodia and that the doctor advised that he could not make a long travel
to the Philippines
4. MeTC granted the motion after the submission of a medical certificate of the
witness. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision which was
denied. It then filed for certiorari with the RTC.
5. RTC granted the petition and declared the orders of MeTC void. It ruled that
Sec. 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases
cannot apply supplertorily to the case since there is a specific provision in
Rules of Criminal Procedure with regard taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases which intends to safeguard the constitutional
rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
6. CA reinstated the ruling of MeTC and held that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed for allowing the deposition of complaining witness because
no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal
cases and that petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-
examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the
taking of oral deposition through counsel or consular officer taking the
deposition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the deposition of prosecution’s witness and
infringed the Constitutional right of the petitioners for public trial and to confront the
witness face to face?
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. The procedure for testimonial examination of an Unavailable prosecution
witness is covered under Sec. 15, Rule 119
a. Even in criminal proceedings, the conditional examination of
witnesses is available, both for the benefit of defense and
prosecution. Rule 23-28 of ROC allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases either upon oral examination or
written interrogatories before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths; or any Philippine
consular
b. For Criminal cases, particularly prosecution witness who
would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending, as required by
Sec. 15, Rule 119
c. Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness
must take place at no other place than the court where the
case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC’s orders
granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping
before the consular official in Laos Cambodia
d. To take the deposition elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would deprive the accused of
his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’
deportment and properly assess his credibility
e. The suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness
has been categorically ruled out by the Court – considering
the Rule 119 of Criminal procedure adequately and squarely
covers the situation, no reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily
(Vda. De Manguerra case)
2. Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights
of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
a. CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-
examine the deponent witness and raise their objections during the
deposition-taking as in regular court trial—SC disagrees. Great
difference between face-to-face confrontation in a public criminal
trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-
examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in
the absence of trial judge
b. Right of Confrontation applies specifically to criminal proceedings to
afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witness
by cross-examination and allow the judge to observe the
deportment of witnesses – as a guarantee against the use of
unreliable testimony in criminal trials
3. Webb ruling is Not in all fours with the Case
a. In Webb, the accused sought for the oral deposition of 5 defense
witnesses before a consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live
witnesses since they were all residents of US and could not be
compelled by subpoena. RTC disallowed the deposition taking. SC
sustained the trial court’s disallowance on the limited ground that
there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter to be
proved was considered merely corroborative evidence of defense
b. In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the
complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure
under Sec. 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the
constitutional rights of the accused
c. Court takes note that the prosecution witness had managed to
attend the initial trial proceedings. At that time, his old age and
fragility should’ve been apparent and yet the prosecution failed to
act with foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

the MeTC. It should’ve been imperative for them to have moved for
the preservation of Ping’s testimony at that first instance given that
he’s a non-resident alien who can leave the country anytime.

DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside.

Decision of MeTC is REINSTATED

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Supra.
FACTS:
1. The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), commenced a complaint for "reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages" against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. (Tantoco ),
Dominador R. Santiago (Santiago), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda, R.
Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes
Tantoco-Pineda.
2. Instead of filing an Answer, respondents Tantoco and Santiago filed a
"Motion To Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of
Particulars," which were both denied for lack of bases.
3. On 27 July 1989, Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a
pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff."
4. A month later, they filed both an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" and a
Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
5. This time, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and
granted the Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. When the
PCGG elevated the issue to the Supreme Court, this Court, through then
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, affirmed the Orders of the Sandiganbayan in this
wise:
a. The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there
is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents
subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. Some of the
documents are, according to the verification of the amended
complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said
complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may
adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial
6. Pre-trial commenced, and from 3 January to 14 July 1993, the PCGG
produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit "A" to "LLL" before Atty. Renato
T. Bocar and respondents’ counsel.
7. On 23 and 25 September 1996, the temporary markings of Exhibits "A" to
"LLL," together with their sub-markings, were adopted. However, over the
objections of respondents Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and
caused the pre-marking of additional documents, Exhibits "MMM" to
"AAAAAAA."
8. Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court,"
claiming that the additional documents were never produced at the discovery
proceedings and praying that petitioner be sanctioned for contempt. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
9. Trial proceeded; however, new documents not shown at discovery were still
being marked. Tantoco and Santiago again filed a "Motion to Ban Plaintiff
From Offering Exhibits Not Earlier Marked During the Discovery
Proceedings," which the graft court denied.
10. The Sandiganbayan ruled that with the exception of some documents, "all
Exhibits... are denied admission. The due execution and authenticity of
these documents remain challenged since the prosecution failed to show
otherwise."
11. On petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan partly
relented and admitted Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA" (Second Resolution).
12. As certified to by the Chief Administrative Officer of the PCGG,14 Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA" were turned over to its Legal Division and included.
13. Respondents filed MR. MR was granted and Sandiganbayan ruled to
sanction the plaintiff for its deliberate refusal and failure to comply with the
directive of this Court which was confirmed no less (sic) by the Supreme
Court.
14. Sandiganbayan further said that the plaintiff must be prevented from offering
in evidence all the documents that were not produced and exhibited at the
time the plaintiff was under a directive to do so, i.e. Exhibits "MMM" to
"AAAAAAA" xxx. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is not unmindful of
the fact that the exhibits involved have not passed the test of admissibility in
any event.
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding
the documents due to petitioner’s own failure to produce them at the pre-trial.
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. After a careful scrutiny of the records, We find that in excluding Exhibits
"MMM" to "AAAAAAA," the Sandiganbayan properly exercised its discretion
over evidence formally offered by the prosecution.
2. Nothing therein shows that the court gravely exceeded its jurisdiction. For
the reviewing court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the lower
court, the petitioner must show that the former's action was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual
refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the
law.
3. Petitioner would have us reverse the Sandiganbayan solely because the
latter purportedly made contrary rulings in its earlier Resolutions. The
Republic invokes the First Resolution, specifically the graft court’s view that
the exclusion of the Exhibits "would be too technical," since their non-
production "could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful
disobedience." However, this First Resolution merely disposed of
respondents’ Motion to cite petitioner in contempt. It does not constitute an
irrevocable stamp of admissibility.
4. Petitioner conveniently disregards the basic rule of evidence, namely, that
the issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon
formal offer thereof. This is why objection to the documentary evidence must
be made at the time it is formally offered, and not earlier.
5. The Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles as follows: The
identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is
not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in
evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it
is formally offered as an exhibit.
6. It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection,
this time seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is
curious that it did not, especially so since the objections to the formal offer of
exhibits was made in writing. In fact, the defense filed no objection at all not
only to the photocopies but to all the other exhibits of the prosecution.
7. Seasonable objection to the subject "Exhibits" can only be properly made
upon formal offer. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Tantoco and
Santiago had been consistent in reiterating their objections. The court even
clarified in its First Resolution that their "Motion Filed Under Rule 29," was
but in pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not
produced at discovery. Hence, nothing in the said Resolution can be read as
a ruling on its admissibility. Its dispositive portion clearly states: "Under all
these circumstances, there is no basis for the Court to declare plaintiff in
contempt of court and it would be too much of a technicality to bar it from
introducing the additional exhibits in evidence."
8. The Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its
Formal Offer of Evidence, noted that all the documents contained therein
were photocopies. It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of Court
that they "appear to be the original copy" would not suffice. The
Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason cited for
doing so was liberality, viz: "There is nothing in the rules which categorically
prohibits the admission of additional documentary evidence when called for
as a case progress [sic]. What is clear is that it is the Court’s discretion to
allow or disallow its reception." Thus, the Sandiganbayan fittingly corrected
itself when once and for all, it excluded the photocopies in its latest
Resolution.
9. For those documents introduced in evidence as proof of their contents, the
assailed Resolution stated that petitioner has not made any effort
whatsoever to explain why it submitted mere photocopies. When the subject
of inquiry is the content of a document, submission of a certified true copy is
justified only in clearly delineated instances such as the following:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
10. Nothing on record shows, and petitioner itself makes no claim, that the
Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule.
Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted on the theory that
the original cannot be produced by the party who offers the evidence within
a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Even then, the
general rule is that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the non-
production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently accounted for.
11. While the Sandiganbayan provided several reasons for its ultimate exclusion
of the documents, it did not distinguish: 1) Which particular documents are to
be excluded for violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and 2) Which of the
remaining ones it has treated as private documents that lacked proper
authentication. The detailed analysis of each piece of evidence vis-à-vis the
purpose for which they were presented falls squarely under the purview and
competence of the trial court. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own
conclusions for the factual determinations of the trial court. It is not the
function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence. Absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, as discussed above, this Court is
then constrained to uphold the reasons forwarded by the Sandiganbayan.
12. As for the documentary evidence which are purportedly transmittal letters,
petitioner remains unable to prove their due execution and authenticity.
13. The fact that the documents were certified as true copies of the original by
the PCGG does not enhance its admissibility. These documents have
remained private even if it is in the custody of the PCGG. What became
public are not the private documents (themselves) but the recording of it in
the PCGG. For, "while public records kept in the Philippines, of private
writings are also public documents...the public writing is not the writing itself
but the public record thereof. Stated otherwise, if a private writing itself is
inserted officially into a public record, its record, its recordation, or its
incorporation into the public record becomes a public document, but that
does not make the private writing itself a public document so as to make it
admissible without authentication.
14. Aside from lack of authentication and failure to present the originals of these
documents, what ultimately tipped the scales against petitioner in the view of
the graft court was the former’s lack of forthrightness in complying with the
Supreme Court directive.
15. After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it
was clearly ordered by both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court to
do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the due execution and
authenticity of the documents. Failed in its belated attempts to assuage the
Sandiganbayan through the submission of secondary evidence, petitioner
may not use the present forum to gain relief under the guise of Rule 65.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition
for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0008 (dated
3 June 2009) is AFFIRMED.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Webb, Supra. b. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of
witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment
FACTS: of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use
1. Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in a criminal case in the event of further proceedings in the said court” and even
for rape with homicide pending before the RTC of Parañaque, presided by during the process of execution of a final and executory
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino. judgment.
2. During the proceedings, respondent filed a Motion To Take Testimony By 3. In addressing the issue on how to take the testimony of a defense
Oral Deposition of 5 people before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or witness who is unable to come to testify in open court because he is a
consular agent of the Philippines, alleging that the said persons are all resident of a foreign country, though the Rules on Criminal Procedure
residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by is silent, Sec. 11, Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure may apply. 4
subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
a. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
said individuals whose testimonies are allegedly 'material and GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R.
indispensable' to establish his innocence of the crime charged is SP No. 45399 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.3 Parañaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to
3. The prosecution filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: render judgment therein accordingly.
a. (1) Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in
criminal cases;
b. (2) Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional
examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during
trial; and
c. (3) Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure
does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused/defense outside Philippine jurisdiction.
4. RTC → denied Respondent’s motion.
5. CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion
to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used
in the criminal case before her Court.

RULING + RATIO: NO
DAVIDE, JR (SEPARATE OPINION) (he basically agreed with the Main Opinion,
but wanted to address the opposition of the prosecution):
1. Sec. 4, Rule 24 (which is formerly Sec. 7, Rule 134) of the Rules of
Court is available in all actions, including criminal cases.
2. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient.
a. There is no rule that limits depositions-taking only to the
period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking 4 Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the
of deposition after pre-trial. burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
3 SECTION 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.— In a intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
rogatory; or (c) the person referred to in Section 14 hereof. preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
59