European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

22,313-329 (1992)

Preattributional and attributional

determinants of emotions and
expectations

FRANK Van OVERWALLE, FRANCIS

HEYLIGHEN, SARAH CASAER and
MARLEEN DANIELS
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Abstract

Explores how preattributional variables describing an event (i.e. consensus, consistency,

distinctiveness, and efectuality) as well as dimensions of attributions given to explain
the event (i.e. locus, stability, globality, and control) determine subsequent emotions
and expectations. In a first pilot study, subjects described actual emotion-evoking inci-
dents. The results indicated that these free descriptions included preattributional vari-
ables more often (43 per cent) than attributional appraisals (13 per cent), and that
the hypothesized preattributional cues were used to describe the emotions. In a second
experimental study, preattributional or attributional information about an event was
presented, and subjects were asked to judge an actor’s emotions or expectations. The
time needed to make this judgment was recorded. Judgments and response times were
not significantly diferent after preattributional or attributional information, but were
diferent for distinct emotions and expectations in accordance with the hypotheses.
The data were interpreted as suggesting that people possess cognitive schemus about
the preattributional and attributional determinants of emotions, and that these schemas
speed up the processing of diagnostic inputs that shape emotions.

INTRODUCTION

Most cognitive theories of emotion share the assumption that the experience of
distinct emotions is generated by people’s appraisal of their environment along several
cognitive dimensions (De Rivera, 1984; Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus
and Folkman, 1987; Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988; Roseman, Spindel and Jose,
1990; Scherer, 1982; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Weiner, 1986). Appraisal
theorists ‘claim that evaluations and interpretations of events, rather than events
per se, determine whether an emotion will be felt and which emotion it will be’
Addressee for correspondence: Frank Van Overwalle, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Department of Psy-
chology, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussel, Belgium.

00462772/92/040313-17$13.50 Received 14 June 1991

0 1992 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 9 March 1992
314 I;. Van Overwalle et al.

(Roseman et al., 1990, p. 899, our italics). While we support the idea that emotions
are largely determined by subjective appraisal, we propose that a closer analysis
of the eliciting situation may reveal some characteristics of the stimulus event which
are also responsible for emotional responses. Our reasoning is that to appraise the
situation, people often rely on relevant information about the event so that this
information not only guides the cognitive appraisal, but the emotional experience
as well. Likewise, social perceivers may use relevant information not only to appraise
the situation for themselves, but also to reconstruct how others might interpret the
event and how they might feel. The information variables that give rise to subjective
appraisals have seldom been analysed in appraisal theories of emotion (but see Brewin
and Furnham, 1986). The goal of this article is to explore information variables
and their effect on emotions for a limited set of cognitive appraisals involving causal
attributions.
A causal attribution reflects a cognitive appraisal of an event in terms of its eliciting
cause. Numerous studies have documented that there are several causal appraisals,
termed attributional dimensions, which generate distinct emotions: Locus (internal
versus external to a person), stability (stable versus variable over time), globality
(global across situations versus situation-specific), and controllability (within versus
beyond a person's control). It has been found that (a) attributions perceived as
internal to the self produce self-esteem feelings of pride after a positive event or
shame after a negative one'; (b) attributions perceived as being stable over time
increase the expectation that similar outcomes will recur in the future and give rise
to anticipatory feelings of certainty after success and anxiety after failure2;(c) causes
perceived as global increase the expectancy that the same outcome will generalize
to other situations; and (d) attributions that are thought to be controllable by oneself
elicit moral feelings of guilt after negative events, whereas negative events under
the control of other people generate social responses of anger (for reviews see Brown
and Weiner, 1984; Peterson and Seligman, 1984;Weiner, 1986).
But how do people infer a causal appraisal of an event in the first place? Kelley
(1973) suggested that people make use of information in which the target event
is contrasted against similar comparison cases. He described three information vari-
ables carrying such comparisons: Consensus denotes the degree to which the outcome
of the target person and the outcome of other persons are similar; consistency refers
to the frequency with which the outcome has recurred in the past; distinctiveness
denotes the extent to which the effect of a particular stimulus differs from the effect
of other stimuli. In addition, Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1991) postulated a
fourth variable, termed efectuality, which denotes the extent to which the expected
result of a set of actions corresponds to the actual outcome. For example, when

' There has been some inconsistency in the literature on the attributional determinants of shame. In
some studies, shame has been found to be generated by effort (an internal and controllable cause; Brown
and Weiner, 1984, pp. 152, 154, 157), whereas in other work it has been documented that shame is
elicited by ability (an internal and uncontrollable cause; Weiner, 1986, p. 151). In the light of these
findings, we reasoned that shame is probably linked to internal attributions that can be either controllable
(effort) or uncontrollable (ability). Thus, the more essential determinant of shame seems to be internal
locus, regardless of controllability.
* Because we assume that people's responses are very often affectively loaded, we make no strong theoretical
distinctions here between anticipatory reactions that are either cognitive (expectations) or emotional
(certainty, anxiety). Therefore, we use emotional responses as a general common term throughout this
article to refer to both cognitive and emotional reactions following an event.
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 3 15

a student succeeds an exam after working for long hours, declining an invitation
for a dinner, getting extra help from a teaching assistant and so forth, this situation
is referred to as high effectuality. Conversely, when a student failed after the same
efforts, this situation would be characterized as low effectuality. In line with Brewin
and Furnham (1986), we refer to these four variables as preattributional because
although attributions are at least partly based on them, their content does not consist
of causal material itself.
Several theories have been proposed to describe how attributions are induced
from preattributional information, based on the principles of covariation (e.g. Kelley,
1973), contrast (e.g. Hilton and Slugoski, 1986) and invariance (Van Overwalle and
Heylighen, 1991). The invariance approach postulates that both preattributional
data patterns and attributional appraisals can be characterized by features of invar-
iance (i.e. similarity) or variation (i.e. difference) in the relevant comparisons. Per-
ceivers tend to select causal attributions which have the same invariance features
as the preattributional information. Consistent with this principle, Van Overwalle
and Heylighen (1991) documented that (a) outcomes that differ between persons
(low consensus) are attributed to internal causes; (b) outcomes that are invariant
over time (high consistency) are attributed to stable causes; (c) outcomes that remain
identical in most situations (low distinctiveness) are attributed to global factors;
and (d) when the anticipated outcome of several actions is similar to the attained
effect (high effectuality), attributions are made to high controllability. These predic-
tions are unique to the invariance principle, and it is indeed difficult to conceive
how they could have been derived from a covariation or contrast framework.
Although many theories of causal induction agree that preattributional infor-
mation leads to attributional appraisals, the nature of this process is not completely
understood and the specific associations between information variables and apprai-
sals are still a matter for research. Therefore, in this article, the effect of preattribu-
tional information on emotions and expectations is studied independently from the
effect of attributional appraisals. Our predictions, based on the invariance principle,
concerning the specific information - attribution - emotion linkages are s u m a r -
ized in Table 1. It is suggested, for example, that we feel pride after winning a
contest because we infer that success was due to ourselves (internal) and also because
we have beaten all the others (low consensus). As another example, we may feel
guilty for failing an exam after realizing that we did a lot that made failure likely
(high effectuality) and that we could have done much to avoid it (controllable).

STUDY 1: FREE DESCRIPTION OF EMOTION-ELICITING EVENTS

In a first pilot study, we examined whether people explain emotion-elicitingsituations

spontaneously in terms reflecting preattributional information or attributional dimen-
sions. Our main goal was to ascertain whether we deal with notions that really
matter to people. We therefore used retrospective reports of actual emotion exper-
iences. This paradigm has been used quite often in prior emotion research (Frijda
et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1990; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, Summerfield
and Wallbott, 1983). Subjects were asked to recall an incident in which they had
experienced a particular emotion (e.g. shame). To prompt for preattributional
responses, they were asked to describe in as much detail as possible what actually
316 F. Van Overwalle et al.

Table 1. Preattributional and attributional determinants of emotions and expectations

Preattributional information
Low consensus
High consistency
Low distinctiveness
High effectuality of own
actions
High effectuality of others’
actions
Attributional dimension Emotions and expectations
Internal Self-esteem: pride and shame
Stable Future expectations: certainty
and anxiety
Global Generalizations across
situations
Controllable by self Moral evaluations: guilt
Controllable by others Social emotions: anger

happened, and to induce attributional responses, we asked what they had been think-
ing during that episode.

Method

Subjects
Eighty-nine undergraduate male and female students (43 freshmen taking Economics
and 46 sophomores taking Communication Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
volunteered to participate in a study on emotions during the last half-hour of a
regular class. They were asked to respond to the questions as honestly and directly
as possible.

Material
Subjects received a booklet with on each page questions on one emotion, including
pride, shame, certainty, anxiety, guilt, and anger. The order of the pages was ran-
domized for each subject. Subjects were asked to recall an incident in which they
had experienced the emotion and to describe the provoking incident. The incident
took place in either an achievement or a social context and subjects were randomly
assigned to one of these two context conditions. The instructions read as follows:
Try to recall a situation following an exam or contest [achievement] when you
were with friends or family [social] and you felt [emotion]. Describe as precisely
as possible what had happened. Make your account sufficiently detailed and
extensive so that someone else can imagine the course of the event.
Following ample space to write down their answers, the subjects were then
prompted a second time to describe what they had been thinking during the incident
so that someone else could understand why they were feeling that particular emotion.

Coding of the responses

The written responses were first transcribed, with the exception of any emotion
term which was replaced by an ‘X’ to allow for blind coding of the material. Next,
two raters independently coded the material. A unique code was given for each
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 317

preattributional statement and for each attributional statement using coding rules
that were developed during a prior pilot study. Thus, for each response, a maximum
of two codes was assigned. After coding 10 random cases, the two raters and a
third came together to discuss discrepant codes and to refine coding instructions
where necessary. After this discussion, the remaining cases were coded. Agreement
between the two raters was 69.2 per cent (kappa = 0.65) for preattributional infor-
mation and 81.6 per cent (kappa = 0.79) for attributional dimensions. Disagreements
were resolved by the third rater who decided between the two raters. Although
the agreement scores are modest at best, it should be noted that raters not only
coded particular sentence parts, they also had to identify relevant statements in
the first place. It was not always an easy matter to decide whether or not some
sentence parts were explicit enough to be coded. However, the lower reliability of
the data is not very problematic because it actually minimizes the possibility of detect-
ing reliable associations between the coded answers and emotions. Thus, the weaker
reliability does not invalidate any association revealed in this study.

Results and discussion

Our main question was whether subjects would spontaneously refer to preattribu-
tional or attributional variables while explaining an emotion-evoking event. Preattri-
butional terms were used in 43.5 per cent of all cases, whereas only 13 per cent
of the statements contained references to attributional dimensions.
It is possible that the context of the incident leads to differences in the use of
particular concepts. To evaluate this possibility, we analysed the data in function
of the achievement or social condition in which the emotion appeared. X2-Tests
revealed a significant difference in the amount of preattributional information
between the two settings, x2 ( N = 191,3) = 9 . 3 9 , ~< 0.025. Although consensus, con-
sistency and effectuality by self appeared equally often in both settings, effectuality
by others was more prominent in social settings (74 per cent) than in achievement
settings (26 per cent), x2 ( N = 3 1,l) = 6.64, p < 0.01. No such differences were found
for the attributional dimensions, x2 ( N = 57,3) = 2 . 6 8 , ~
> 0.40.
We then analysed the associations between preattributional statements and emo-
tions. (A similar analysis was not feasible for the attributional statements due to
their low frequency.) The proportions of preattributional statements along each emo-
tion are shown in Table 2. As can be seen, the results strongly confirm our hypotheses.
Pride and shame were most often described in terms of low consensus (82 per cent
and 64 per cent respectively, ps < 0.0001); certainty and anxiety were most often
associated with high consistency (50 per cent, p < 0.001 and 32 per cent, p < 0.01
respectively); and guilt and anger were explained mostly in terms of effectuality by
the actor and by other persons respectively (both 68 per cent, p < 0.0001). The
remaining proportions were scattered unsystematically over the table and reach no
higher than 28 per cent, p < 0.001. To test our predictions more explicitly, we con-
ducted a series of planned contrasts using Dunn’s multiple comparison test (Dunn,
1961; Marascuilo and Serlin, 1988, p. 375). For example, the first comparison was
made between pride and shame (each receiving a weight of +2) on the one hand
versus all remaining emotions (each receiving a weight of -1) on the other hand.
As shown in the last column of Table 2, all predicted contrasts were highly significant,
p s < 0.0001.
 W
L
00

3
?
9
Table 2. Proportion of preattributional statements as a function of emotion type 9
$
h
.-.
Preattributional Emotions Marginal Dunn’s rp
statements Pride Shame Certainty Anxiety Guilt Anger N Z a
Consensus 5
Low 82* 64* 13t 231 14 6 76 12.20*
High 5 - 6 - 5 - 6
Consistency
High 4 - 50* 3% - 3 26 6.91$
Low 4 8 - 9 9 3 9
Effectuality by self
High 5 12 28* 1st a* 9 37 5.95%
Low - - 3 5 5 9 6
Effectuality by others
High 14 a* 30 9.36%
Low - 3 1

Marginal N 56 25 32 22 22 34 191
Predicted effects are in boldface.
sp < 0.0001. * p < 0.001. $p < 0.01. tp < 0.05.
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 3 19

In sum, it was found that preattributional notions were used in almost half of
the statements describing an emotion-evoking event, whereas attributional dimen-
sions were seldom used. In addition, most emotions were described in terms of the
hypothesized preattributional determinants. One possible reason for the higher fre-
quency of preattributional terms may be the nature of the task. In describing events,
subjects may spontaneously activate event-related language specifications that indi-
cate the actors, their actions, and the time range of the event. Such specifications
may actually include consensus, effectuality and consistency information respectively.
Another possible reason for the lower frequency of attributional dimensions may
be that the dimensions belong to the defining features of emotions, so that our
subjects simply considered this information as redundant.
To conclude, the free response format of this study offers some evidence for our
suggestionthat preattributional variables are an intrinsic part of people’s spontaneous
recall of their emotions. However, the present design did not allow us to ascertain
the causal precedence of preattributional and attributional variables in generating
emotional states. To provide more evidence on this point, we turn to the next exper-
iment.

STUDY 2: RESPONSE TIME EXPERIMENT

This second, main study explores the hypothesized effects of preattributional infor-
mation and attributional dimensions in the context of judging another person’s emo-
tions. We presented subjects with brief stories containing either preattributional
information about the event or the attributional thoughts of the actor, and then
asked them to judge whether the actor would experience a particular emotion. We
not only recorded subjects’ answers, but also measured the time it took to provide
that answer. These response times allowed us to explore two additional questions
about the cognitive processes by which preattributional and attributional variables
generate emotional judgments.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that the more diagnostic determinants will
not only lead to more frequent judgments of a particular emotion, but that these
judgments will be made more easily and efficiently, leading to a faster judgment
overall. That is, we predict that after receiving preattributional information or attribu-
tional appraisals which are diagnostic for a particular emotion, a judgment concern-
ing that emotion will be readily available and the response time will be short in
comparison to other information provided. For example, knowing that failure is
attributed to the actor is a sufficient cue in and of itself to anticipate shame reactions
by that person, so that a response can be given very quickly if the presence of
shame reactions is to be judged.
Second, the response time measures allow us to test predictions about the mediating
role of causal dimensions in judging emotional reactions from preattributional infor-
mation, independent of particular emotions. Our theoretical analysis assumes that
preattributional information does not directly produce emotions, but rather leads
to attributional inferences which, in turn, determine emotional responses. If this
is true, it seems likely that judgments following attributional thoughts should be
reported faster than after preattributional information. The basic logic behind this
prediction is that less complex judgments require shorter response times. Note that
320 F. Van Overwalle et al.

this logic clearly rules out the mediation hypothesis if the responses following attri-
butions are slower because ‘judgments that take longer to arrive at cannot plausibly
mediate or come prior to judgments that take a shorter time’ (Smith and Miller,
1983, p. 493). If, however, attributions take less time than preattributional variables,
the mediation hypothesis is not necessarily valid because different response times
could simply result from two unrelated processes.
In sum, we predicted that preattributional variables as well as attributional
thoughts are diagnostic cues for inferring the emotions of another person. On the
basis of the response time measures, we also predict that diagnostic cues lead to
faster emotion judgments (diagnosticity hypothesis), and that attributions lead to
quicker judgments than preattributional information (mediation hypothesis).

Method

Overview
In this study, we adopted the response time procedure used in prior research by
Smith and Miller (1983), Smith (1984) and Graham and Brown (1988). The general
outline of the procedure is as follows. First, a short story and one preattributional
or attributional cue were displayed on a computer screen. The subject signalled
that he or she had read and understood the information by pressing the space bar.
The time between the appearance of the information and the pressing of the space
bar was recorded as reading time. Immediately afterwards, a question appeared on
the screen. The subject responded as quickly as possible by pressing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
key. The time to read the question and to make a judgment was recorded as response
time. In addition, the computer also recorded the actual ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.

Story sentences and information cues

There were 16 stories, describing in one sentence a negative outcome for the actor
either in achieving a goal (e.g. Stephen attained a low outcome at an inter-university
athletics meeting) or during a social interaction (e.g. Elsa arrived late for an appoint-
ment with friends). We chose negative outcomes because only the negative emotions
of shame and guilt can differentiate fully between locuslconsensus and control/effec-
tuality as the positive emotion for both conditions is pride (Weiner, 1986).
Each story was followed by one additional cue involving either preattributional
information about the event or an attributional inference by the actor. Although
actually not used in all experimental conditions, we illustrate here the precise wording
of the preattributional and attributional cues with the story of Elsa (the sentence
parts that vary in each opposite cue condition are in italics):
Nobody but Elsa/Everyone came late for the appointment (low/high consensus);
On previous appointments with her friends, Elsa alwayslnever came late (high/
low consistency);
Elsa also came latelcame on time to school and to the dentist (low/high distinctive-
ness);
Elsa had done nothing she could have dorzeleverything she could to be on time
(highflow effectuality).
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 321

Elsa believes that the cause of this event lies within herselfllies outside herself
and is due to the situation or to otherpersons (internaVexterna1);
Elsa believes that the cause of this event is permanent, that is, does not change
in timeltemporary, that is, changes in time (stablelunstable);
Elsa believes that the cause of this event is something general, that plays a
role in many different appointmentslspecijic, that plays a role in appointments
with her friends only (global/specific);
Elsa believes that she could do a Zotlnothing about the cause of this event (con-
trollable/uncontrollable).
The order in which the stories were followed by one of the cues was counterbalanced
across achievement versus social context, preattributional versus attributional source
type or type of invariance dimension (see Kenny and Smith, 1980). Four such orders
were constructed, and the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four versions.
The order in which story sentences, additional cues and questions were displayed
on the screen was randomly determined for each subject by the computer.

Questions
After the subject had pressed the space bar, a question appeared on the screen
below the story and cue information. These questions were displayed as a single
keyword to control for reading time. Six keywords and related questions were memor-
ized by the subject prior to the beginning of the trials. The questions and correspond-
ing keywords (between parentheses) were:
Would the person feel ashamed after this event? (ASHAMED)
Would the person feel guilty after this event? (GUILTY)
Would the person expect this event to repeat? (REPEAT)
Would the person expect this event to occur also in other [stimulus]? (stimulus
word)
Is the person in this event a boy or a girl? (BOY I GIRL)
Unlike the three former keywords, the stimulus word was a varying term denoting
different stimuli for each story; it was therefore typed in lower-case. (In the previous
example of Elsa, the stimulus word was appointments). In spite of this precaution,
the added complexity of this keyword may require more time to retrieve the related
question, resulting in a longer response time for that reason only. The last two
keywords, BOY or GIRL, were presented randomly and used mainly as a screening
device for identifying inattentive subjects.

Procedure
Subjects, usually two, were brought to the experimental room where there were
two personal computers separated by a curtain. After introducing the general purpose
of the study (ostensibly a perception experiment), subjects received a sheet containing
keywords and corresponding questions and were given a few minutes to memorize
them. The experimenter then questioned the subjects until they were all able to
repeat each question verbatim after the related keyword was given. Once all the
subjects could recall the questions, the practice sheets were collected, and the subjects
were brought to a personal computer (a Zenith Z-159 with VGA-screen). The room
322 F. Van Overwalle et al.

was darkened to avoid reflections on the screen. All further instructions appeared
on the screen. Briefly, subjects were instructed to read the story information, press
the space bar to signal understanding and to call up a question, and then to answer
that question as quickly as possible by pressing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key. The position
of ‘yes’ho’ keys was reversed randomly between subjects. Prior to the experimental
session, subjects practiced the procedure during a practice session of sixteen trials.
Then, 80 experimental trials were displayed. The entire session lasted about 30 to
40 minutes.

Subjects
Forty-six (28 female and 18 male) freshmen students from the Vrije Universiteit
Brussel voluntarily participated in this experiment. Three subjects were excluded
from the analyses because they made more than three mistakes on the gender control
question (see Smith and Miller, 1983; Smith, 1984; Graham and Brown, 1988). This
left 43 subjects for the analyses.

Design and analysis

Before analysing the data, outlying cases (0.28 per cent) were replaced by the subject’s
mean reading or response time where appropriate. The data were then analysed
in a 4 (question) x 2 (preattributional versus attributional source) x 4 (invariance
type) x 2 (yes-no) within-subjects MANOVA, unless otherwise indicated. The latter
yes-no factor differentiates conditions where the information is assumed to result
in a ‘yes’ answer given the corresponding question (e.g. internal causes and shame)
as opposed to information that should result in a ‘no’ answer (e.g. external causes
and shame). This yes-no factor also controls for the effect of shorter RTs given
positive (‘yes’) as opposed to negative (‘no’) responses. In many response time studies,
including prior research using the paradigm used here (Smith and Miller, 1983),
‘yes’ responses are on the average faster than ‘no’ responses. Hence, a ‘yes’ answer
may result in shorter RTs for that reason alone.

Results and discussion

We first analyse the time subjects took to read and comprehend the scenarios. Next,
we turn to the yes-no answers to explore the effects of preattributional and attribu-
tional variables on emotion judgments. Finally, we analyse the response times (RTs)
which were performed on the logarithmic transformation of the RT data (see Winer,
1971, p. 400). For ease of presentation, however, the nontransformed means,
expressed in seconds, are reported in the text and the tables.

Story reading time

The time needed to read and comprehend the stories was analysed in a 4 (question)
x 2 (source) X 4 (invariance) X 2 (yes-no) within-subjects MANOVA. The analysis
revealed significant main effects of source type F(1,42) = 198.59, p < 0.0001, invar-
iance type, F(3,40) = 22.80, p < 0.0001, and their interaction, F(3,40) = 9.77, p
< 0.0001. However, all these effects are largely due to differences in length of the
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 323

sentences carrying the preattributional or attributional information. The correlation

between log reading time and average number of characters in each sentence was
quite high, r = 0.77, p < 0.001. After controlling for source type and invariance type,
the correlation dropped marginally (partial r = 0.68, difference p > 0.60) indicating
that source and invariance type had no effect beyond the length of the sentences.
Because the stories were read before questions were given, comprehension time should
not have been influenced by the question variable. Indeed, all main and interaction
effects with question type remained nonsignificant (Fs = 0.42-2.31 ,ps = 0.09-0.89).

Yes-no responses
Before analysing the yes-no responses, we calculated a difference score to reflect
answers that were consistent with our theoretical predictions for the yes-no factor.
For example, when a subject responded on the shame question with an expected
‘yes’ given internal attributions and an expected ‘no’ after external attributions the
response was tallied, whereas all other combinations of answers were not counted.
This procedure was repeated for all other questions and information variables. A
high difference score thus indicates that the emotion judgment was clearly differen-
tiated in line with the hypotheses. Table 3 depicts the difference scores (in percentages)
for each information condition and question type.
The difference scores were then analysed in a 4 (question) X 2 (source) X 4 (invar-
iance) within-subjects MANOVA. In line with our predictions, there was no signifi-

Table 3. Difference scores (in percentages) as a function of question and information conditions
Condition Ashamed Repeat Other stimuli Guilty
Locus 67 23 16 81
(1nternal-external)a
Consensus 74 40 42 70
(Low-high)
Stability 30 65 41 33
(Stable-variable)
Consistency 9 74 40 5
(High-low)
Globality 19 31 60 16
(Global-specific)
Distinctiveness 40 41 58 33
(Low-high)
Control 71 16 30 88
(Controllable-uncont.)
Effectuality 37 23 19 42
(High-low)

Contrast F 46.66$ 46.19$ 22.36* 23.81$

Residual F 14.87$ 5.92s 3.82t 49.22$
The expected effects are printed in bold. Degrees of freedom for contrast F = 1 and 42; for residual
F = 2 and 41.
aFor the difference score only ‘yes’ responses on the first term and only ‘no’ responses on the second
term were tallied.
f p < 0.0001. * p < 0.001. $ p < 0.01. t p < 0.05.
324 F. Van Overwalle et al.

cant effect of source type, F(1,42) = 1.42, p > 0.24, and a significant interaction
between question and invariance type F(9,34) = 1 9 . 9 1 , ~< 0.0001. These results indi-
cate that corresponding preattributional or attributional cues both give rise to the
same distinct emotion judgment. In addition, there was a significant main effect
< 0.0001.
of invariant type, F(3,40) = 9 . 8 1 , ~
To examine the specific predictions of this research on the distinct effects of preattri-
butional or attributional cues on emotionaliexpectancy responses, we conducted a
series of planned orthogonal Helmert contrast tests between means within each ques-
tion type. For example, we compared the shame scores following locus and consensus
information with the shame scores following the remaining information variables.
If these contrasts are significant then our hypotheses are supported. Moreover, if
no residual variance remains to be explained then the hypothesized variables are
unique determinants of emotions (see Keppel, 1982; Graham and Brown, 1988, p.
877). The F-values of the contrast and residual tests are shown in the bottom panel
of Table 3. In agreement with the hypotheses, the planned contrasts were significant
for all four questions, although all residual tests were also significant, especially
for shame and guilt. Thus, a substantial deal of the variance in the yes-no responses
is due to other information than predicted. Inspection of the mean scores shows
that shame judgments are also strongly determined by attributions of control (77
per cent). Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that shame scores after controllability infor-
mation did not differ from those following locus and consensus,ps > 0.99. Moreover,
guilt judgments were also often given following locus (81 per cent) and consensus
(70 per cent) information, whereas they were not affected much by the predicted
effectuality information (42 per cent) contrary to our predictions. Tukey tests revealed
that the guilt scores for control, locus and consensus did not differ from one another,
ps > 0.31, and that the scores in these conditions were all significantly higher than
the other conditions, ps < 0.0001. (These unpredicted results were confirmed by signi-
ficant interactions in the overall MANOVA between source and invariance type,
F(3,40) = 9.95, p < 0.0001, and between source and question type, F(3,40) = 6.51,
p < 0.001).

Question response time

We now turn to an analysis of the time needed to judge the emotional responses.
We analysed the log transformed RT data with a 4 (question) x 2 (source) X 4 (invar-
iance) x 2 (yes-no answer) within-subjects MANOVA. There was a significant main
effect of question type, F(3,40) = 3 4 . 1 2 , ~< 0.0001. The mean RTs for each question
are shown in Table 4. As can be seen, subjects took the shortest time to answer
the gender control question ( M = 1.52 seconds), and 0.61-0.64 seconds more for
the shame ( M = 2.13 seconds) and guilt questions ( M = 2.16 seconds). These were
followed by the repeat question ( M = 2.39 seconds) and the stimulus question
( M = 3.10 seconds), the latter requiring almost one full second more. Post hoc compar-
ison tests shown in Table 4 revealed that all differences were significant (except
between shame and guilt). As noted before, the substantially slower RT for the
generalization condition is probably due to procedural differences, as subjects had
to read different cue words for this question.
We now come to the specific questions of the second study. In a critical test
of the mediation hypothesis, the relevant effect of source type appeared to be nonsigni-
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 325

Table 4. Response time (in seconds) per question

Question All cues Diagnostic cues Non-diagnostic cues
Boy/Girl 1.52, - -
Ashamed 2.13, 1.86 2.22
Guilty 2.16, 1.95* 2.37
Repeat 2.39, 2.08 2.50
Other stimuli 3.10, 2.79 3.21

Mean RTt 2.44 2.17 2.51

Cell entries with different subscripts differ significantly after t-tests with Bonferroni correction,p < 0.01.
* Consensusflocusinformation is here also considereddiagnostic for guilt.
f‘ For all questions except boy/girl.

ficant, F < 1. Across all emotions, the judgments were equally fast given preattribu-
tional ( M = 2.44 seconds) or attributional ( M = 2.46 seconds) cues. This finding rules
out the assumption that preattributional information is mediated by attributional
appraisals to produce emotion judgments.
To analyse the diagnosticity hypothesis, we tested whether the most diagnostic
cues of an emotion were processed more quickly than other cues. The MANOVA
revealed the expected invariance by question interaction, F(9,34) = 5.38, p < 0.001.
The response times are shown in Table 5. To test our specific predictions, we con-
ducted a series of planned orthogonal comparisons between mean RTs with the
same contrasts as for the yes-no responses (see bottom panel of Table 5). Consistent
with the diagnosticity hypothesis, the planned contrasts were significant for all four
questions. Contrary to our predictions, however, subjects responded most quickly
on a guilt question when locus and consensus cues were present ( M = 1.78 seconds),
and took 0.34 seconds longer given control and effectuality cues ( M = 2.12 seconds).
Note that RTs after effectuality cues ( M = 2.25 seconds) were roughly equal to those
after control cues ( M = 2.00 seconds, F(2,41) = 1.74, p > 0.18). Thus, the weaker
effect of effectuality cues in comparison to control cues on yes-no responses was
not repeated here.
Overall, the pattern of RTs findings closely parallels that of the yes-no responses
(see Table 3). This observation was confirmed by a substantial correlation between
RT logs in the ‘yes’ conditions and the difference scores computed across the 32
experimental cells (Y = 0 . 5 2 , ~< 0.01). Hence, not only is there more consensus among
the subjects in conditions where the more informative cue is available, but their
‘yes’responses tend also to be faster in these cells.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This research strongly supports our contention that preattributional information

describing an event generates emotional responses in much the same way as attribu-
tional appraisals do. Conform to our predictions, we found that the most diagnostic
preattributional variables were used to describe actual emotion-eliciting experiences
(Study 1) and that diagnostic preattributional and attributional variables produced
both more differentiated and more rapid judgments for the predicted emotion than
non-diagnostic cues (Study 2). As can be seen from Table 4, diagnostic cues speed
326 F. Van Overwalle et al.

Table 5. Response time as a function of question and information conditions

Condition Ashamed Repeat Other stimuli Guilty
Internal 2.01 2.38 3.42 1.46
External 2.04 2.65 3.06 1.82
Low consensus 1.77 2.57 2.76 2.38
High consensus 1.63 2.62 3.33 1.48
Mean 1.86 2.55 3.14 1.78

Stable 2.77 2.04 3.57 2.24

Variable 2.36 2.24 2.75 2.42
High consistency 2.03 1.68 3.29 2.74
Low consistency 2.43 2.38 3.35 2.36
Mean 2.39 2.08 3.24 2.44

Global 2.11 2.62 2.80 2.31

Specific 2.47 2.28 2.57 2.37
Low distinctiveness 2.22 2.11 2.45 2.30
High distinctiveness 1.89 2.84 3.37 2.22
Mean 2.17 2.46 2.79 2.30

Controllable 2.12 2.58 3.14 2.02

Uncontrollable 2.05 2.61 3.55 1.96
High effectuality 2.27 2.50 3.28 2.21
Low effectuality 2.01 2.34 3.03 2.29
Mean 2.1 1 2.50 3.25 2.12

Contrast F 19.29f 14.57* 13.04* 5.54t

Residual F <2 <1 <1 16.25f
The expected effects are printed in bold. Degrees of freedom for contrast F = 1 and 42; for residual
F = 2 and 41.
$ p < 0.0001. * p < 0.001. t p < 0.05.

up the response time by about 0.40 seconds in comparison with non-diagnostic infor-
mation. The judgments following diagnostic variables are on average only 0.44
seconds slower than the mere retrieval of a simple fact like the actor’s gender (except
cross-situational expectancies which take more time). It is instructive to note that
in a study using the same RT methodology, Graham and Brown (1988) presented
specific causes such as effort and ability rather than preattributional information
or attributional dimensions and found response times that were generally two and
a halfseconds slower than in the present study. This again points to the prevalence
of (pre)attributional determinants in producing emotion judgments.
Contrary to the mediation hypothesis, the data of Study 2 showed that preattribu-
tional information required about the same amount of processing time as attributional
appraisals. This implies that emotion judgments following preattributional infor-
mation are not mediated by attributional inferences. The most parsimonious explana-
tion for this null effect is that people conceive preattributional and attributional
variables as belonging to the same schematic structure (Fiske and Taylor, 1984),
because both variables become connected in memory after being habitually exposed
together during causal inference processes. Once a schema has been formed, the
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 327

activation of one of its components tends to activate the other parts as well. Thus,
while reading and comprehending the scenarios in Study 2, preattributional infor-
mation may have immediately activated attributional inferences in subjects’ memory,
reducing any discernible differences in processing time during responding.
An alternative explanation might be that the response times result from two unre-
lated schemas. Although it may seem quite improbable that two unrelated schemas
require the same processing time and, additionally, lead to similar responses, this
possibility cannot be excluded on the basis of the present data alone. It is also
conceivable that the null effect might be due to the insensitivity (e.g. lack of power)
of our design. Although this interpretation cannot be dismissed altogether, it seems
unlikely. Since this same design did reveal strong differences between distinct emotion
responses, one would have to explain why our design was sensitive for diagnosticity
effects, while it was insensitive for mediation effects. In general, it should be noted
that processing time data are more likely to rule out certain processes than to firmly
establish the validity of a process. Confirmation of the present null result thus awaits
further research. An encouraging finding is that path-analytic data from Brewin
and Furnham (1986) confirmed that preattributional variables determine self-esteem
and depressed feelings directly, without the mediation of attributions.
Some of our findings were inconsistent with the hypotheses concerning the determi-
nants of shame and guilt. The yes-no answers and response time data in Study
2 showed that internal locus and low consensus were not only a diagnostic cue
for shame, as predicted, but also for guilt. Conversely, the yes-no response data
indicated that high control was not only a diagnostic cue for guilt, as predicted,
but also for shame. A likely explanation for these findings is that shame and guilt
were confounded, because they focus, respectively, on the intrinsic and moral value
of the self. Or, perhaps, the attributional dimensions of locus and control themselves
were confused, because both appraisals also involve the self. The confounding
between shame and guilt, and between their corresponding determinants is also appar-
ent in some contemporary theories on emotion (e.g. Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman
et al., 1990; Scherer, 1982; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987). A related explanation is
that because of the time pressure in Study 2, subjects did not give themselves sufficient
time to notice the subtle differences between the two emotions and their determinants.
This explanation seems plausible because when time constraints were absent as in
Study 1, subjects were quite capable of differentiating between shame and guilt.
Another unpredicted finding was that effectuality had much weaker effects on
guilt responses than control, although the response times were in the same range.
This suggests that our subjects anticipated a guilt question after effectuality cues
were given, but disagreed on the correct answer. Perhaps this weaker effect is caused
by the greater complexity of the invariance concept underlying effectuality. Indeed,
because effectuality reflects a comparison between expected outcomes and actual
ones, it is somewhat more complex than the simple comparison of actual outcomes
like in other preattributional determinants. However, it is also possible that effectua-
lity is simply not the direct determinant of control, contrary to the proposal by
Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1991).
This research extended the typical paradigm of appraisal theories one step further
to information variables that determine the appraisals which perceivers make and
the emotions they experience. Focussing on the information about the event itself,
independent of subjective appraisals, may be profitable in several respects. For
328 F. Van Overwalle et al.

example, it may point out how people interpret their environment in terms of emotion-
relevant appraisal dimensions, how perceivers may empathize with other persons’
feelings because they communicate the relevant information with one another, and
how people can control negative emotions by attending selectivelyto more favourable
pieces of information. On the other hand, the use of information variables may
increase the experimenter’s control over the induction of distinct emotions in the
laboratory.
However, an important limitation of the present research is that we studied the
emotion process from the perspective of a perceiver who recalled his or her own
emotions from the past (Study 1) or judged the emotions of another person (Study
2). We did not arouse actual emotional states nor did we analyse such vivid reactions
of the experiencer directly. This leaves the possibility that subjects’ responses were
based on common cultural beliefs only, rather than on actual experiences (cJ: Wilson,
Laser and Stone, 1982). Although this limits the generality of our data, our position
adopted thus far is that actual emotions experienced by a person are mediated by
the same cognitions as judgments about emotions of another person. A possible
direction to test this assumption would be to induce preattributional or attributional
information in the laboratory while, for example, performing a task and then to
record subjects’ emotional reactions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are very grateful to B. Weiner, S. Graham, J. Juvonen and the U.C.L.A. attri-
bution research group for their helpful advice on previous research proposals, and
to R. Reisenzein for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Our
sincere thanks also to G. Eisendrath for developing the response time program.

REFERENCES

Brewin, C. R. and Furnham, A. (1986). ‘Attributional versus preattributional variables in

self-esteem and depression: A comparison and test of learned helplessness theory’, Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 5 0 1013-1020.
Brown, J. and Weiner, B. (1984). ‘Affective consequences of ability versus effort ascriptions:
Controversies, resolutions and quandaries’, Journal of Educational Psychology, 76: 146-1 58.
De Rivera, J. (1984). ‘The structure of emotional relationships’. In: Shaver, P. (Ed.) Review
ofpersonality and Social Psychology, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA.
Dunn, 0. J. (1961). ‘Multiple comparisons among means’, Journal ofthe American Statistical
Association, 56: 52-64.
Fiske, S. T. and Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social Cognition, Random House, New York.
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P. and ter Schure, E. (1989). ‘Relations among emotion, appraisal,
and emotion action readiness’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 212-228.
Graham, S. and Brown, J. D. (1988). ‘Attributional mediators of evaluation, expectancy and
affect: A response time analysis’, Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 55: 873-881.
Hilton, D. J. and Slugoski, B. R. (1986). ‘Knowledge-based causal attribution: The abnormal
conditions focus model’, Psychological Review, 93: 75-88.
Kelley, H. H. (1973). ‘The process of causal attribution’, American Psychologist, 28: 107-128.
Kenny, D. A. and Smith, E. R. (1980). ‘A note on the analysis of designs in which subjects
receive each stimulus only once’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1 6 497-507.
Keppel, G. (1982). Design and Analysis: A Researcher’s Handbook, 2nd edn., Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
 Preattributional determinants of emotions 329

Lazarus, R. S. and Folkman, S. (1987). ‘Transactional theory and research on emotions and
coping’, European Journal of Personality, 1: 141-1 69.
Marascuilo, L. A. and Serlin (1988). Statistical Methods for the Social and Behavioral Sciences,
Freeman, New York.
Ortony, A., Clore, G . L. and Collins, A. (1988). The Cognitive Structure of Emotions, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Peterson, C. and Seligman, M. E. P. (1984). ‘Causal explanations as a risk factor for depression:
Theory and evidence’, Psychological Review, 91: 347-374.
Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S . and Jose, P. E. (1990). ‘Appraisals of emotion-eliciting events:
Testing a theory of discrete emotions’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59:
899-9 15.
Scherer, K. R. (1982). ‘Emotion as a process: Function, origin and regulation’, Social Science
Information, 12: 555-570.
Scherer, K. R., Summerfield, A. B. and Wallbott, H. G. (1983). ‘Cross-national research
on antecedents and components of emotion: A progress report’, Social Science Information,
22: 355-385.
Smith, C. A. and Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). ‘Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion’, Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 48: 8 13-838.
Smith, C. A. and Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). ‘Patterns of appraisal and emotion related to taking
an exam’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52: 475-488.
Smith, E. R. (1984). ‘Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the
self versus others’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20: 97-1 15.
Smith, E. R. and Miller, F. D. (1983). ‘Mediation about attributional inferences and compre-
hension process: Initial findings and a general method’, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 44:492-505.
Van Overwalle, F. and Heylighen, F. (1991). ‘lnvariantiekenmerken bij antecedente condities
en attributionale dimensies: Waarnemen van oorzaken, verwachtingen en emoties’. In: Van
der Pligt, J., van der Hoot, W., van Knippenberg, A. and Poppe, M. Fundamentele Sociale
Psychologie, deel5, Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, The Netherlands, pp. 44-60.
Weiner, B. (1986). An Attributional Theory of Motivation and Emotion, Springer-Verlag, New
York.
Wilson, T. D., Laser, P. S. and Stone, J. I. (1982). ‘Judging the predictors of one’s own
mood: Accuracy and the use of shared theories’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
18: 537-556.
Winer, B. J. (1971). Statistical Principles in Experimental Design, McGraw-Hill, New York.