TOPIC

Max weber on the rationality of the religious

ABSTRACT
Max Weber's approach to the study of religion
reflected an interpretive methodology that contrasted with the
positivist methodology adopted by
Durkheim. e of situations and planning and implementing 
change in a rational and orderly way. Weber's theory of
one of the main tasks in understanding the motives and
values that determine people's behavior. In
this article, we will focus more on the Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism, an original
work by the respected sociologist Max Weber.
INTRODUCTION
ne of the most striking features of Weber’s writings on religion is the frequency with which he
uses the word “rationality” and its derivatives (Rationalisierung, Durchrationalisierung, etc.). It
follows from this that the sociological explanation of religious phenomena and religious beliefs,
for him, as with an explanation of any social phenomenon, comes from an interpretive method.
According to the fundamental postulate of the metatheory on which this interpretive method is
based, the cause of an individual’s beliefs coincides with the meaning these beliefs have for him
or her. According to Weber, for the sociologist to explain that a certain category of people
adheres to a certain belief is to show that these beliefs make sense to these people.

2Weber’s writings on the sociology of religion remain relevant because of their methodological
and theoretical framework. Like those of Durkheim, the data on which they draw has aged.
Scholars and theorists of Indian society are critical of what Weber wrote concerning Indian
castes, particularly concerning the Untouchables (Deliège 1993; Baechler 1988). In addition, the
Dead Sea Scrolls provide information on ancient Judaism and early Christianity unavailable to
Weber. His writings are also mostly posthumous, and it is not certain that they have come to us
in a form that Weber would have considered definitive. However, the scope of the
methodological and theoretical lesson they hold for us (both dimensions of scientific activity
standing in reciprocal relation to one another) remains intact. It is this lesson, above all, that is
worth emphasizing today, in the case of Weber’s writings on the sociology of religion, as in that
of Durkheim’s Elementary forms (1912/1965). [1][1]In Boudon (1999), I presented an
interpretation of the Forms… This will be my purpose in the following remarks.

Two Main Categories of Theories of Religion

3Although Weber applies the metatheory of understanding to the analysis of religious beliefs in
a particularly conscious and systematic manner, he is not the only one to do so. If we take a
broad overview of the ways in which religious beliefs are explained by the social sciences, we
can discern two main categories of theories. On the one hand, discontinuist theories regard
religious beliefs as fundamentally distinct from other kinds of human thought. They explain
these beliefs by assuming that the believer is subject to laws of thought distinct from those
governing scientific thought. Lévy-Bruhl’s “primitive mentality,” Levi-Strauss’ “savage mind,”
and now Shweder’s “magical thinking” or d’Andrade’s “cognitive anthropology” fit into this
framework. [2][2]See Lévy-Bruhl (1938; 1966a; 1966b; 1975), Lévi-Strauss (1966),… Shweder
(1991) later abandons the concept of “magical thinking” that he had previously used, but under
the label of “cognitivism,” he develops a discontinuist theory of thought, assuming that different
cultures use distinctive patterns of thought.
4The “primitive mentality” and the “savage mind” are distinct concepts, certainly, but both
postulate the existence of forms of collective thought that depart from the rules governing the
modern human being’s ordinary thought process. According to Horton, this category of concepts
mainly reflects the attitude—condescending at the turn of the century, deferential since the mid-
century—which generally prevails among anthropologists toward non-Western societies and
especially societies without writing. Indeed, in the passage from the “primitive mentality” to the
“savage mind,” it seems that there is moral rather than scientific progress (Horton 1993).

5These discontinuist theories repeat, in an erudite tone, notions we find in Comte (the Three
Stages—theological, metaphysical and positive thought—stripped of their evolutionary
dimension), in Pareto (the “non-logical” as distinct from both logic and the “illogical”), and,
reaching even further back in time, in Voltaire (1767/1961).

6Weber’s metatheory, by contrast, is continuist: adherence to any belief, religious or scientific as

well as juridical, is explained by the fact that the subject has strong reasons to believe it, and that
this belief makes sense to him or her. Therefore, it is up to the sociologist to reconstruct
(nachbilden) these reasons. This assumes that the observer and observed share the same rules of
thought.

7Weber is not alone in adopting this theoretical framework. Tocqueville before him shares the
same theoretical and methodological principles. He shows that the macroscopic differences
observed between the United States and France in the content and distribution of religious beliefs
are “understandable”: the Americans have reasons that the French do not for remaining attached
to their traditional religious beliefs (de Tocqueville 1845/2004). Renan (1863/1955), too, shares
these principles, especially in his Life of Jesus. It is the same with Durkheim’s Elementary forms
of religious life: we cannot explain religious beliefs as illusions; scientific interpretations stand in
a continuum with religious interpretations of the world.

8It may be noted incidentally that the Voltaire of Lettres philosophiques also adopts this
framework. To him, the ideas of Penn, the Quaker founder of Pennsylvania, seemed perfectly
“understandable”: he wishes to impose tolerance, respect for the dignity of others, and the
supremacy of being over having as core values; Voltaire (1734/2003, 16) only reproaches Penn
with translating them into a “ridiculous” symbolism; Penn “would have secured them [his ideas]
respectability in Europe if men were able to respect virtue when it lies beneath a ridiculous
exterior.” In his Tombeau du fanatisme, Voltaire, well informed of the scholarship of his own
times on the history of religions (Pomeau 1956), attributes to those whom we would now call
“intellectuals” the fact that ideas based in Christianity have given rise to speculations that
eventually make them unrecognizable: “It was only when they tried to Platonize that they
became lost in chimerical ideas [Voltaire has in mind the doctrine of the Trinity]” (Voltaire
1767/1961).

An Open Conception of Rationality

9We must not understand the word “rationality” as Weber uses it in the narrow sense it is now
commonly given in the social sciences. Thus, Rational Choice Theory (a term commonly
translated into French as “théorie du choix rationnel” (TCR), but more accurately translated as
“modèle de l’utilité espérée” or “expected utility model”) conceives of social actors as
individuals driven solely by the concern to satisfy their preferences by the means each deems
most suitable. Here rationality includes characteristics (on the one hand, egoism; on the other,
consequentialism and instrumentalism) which are by no means obligatory ingredients of
rationality. Furthermore, as it assumes that altruistic preferences are always a matter of
enlightened self-interest, [3][3]The assumption of egoism is as essential to Rational Choice… the
theory of rational choice confuses rationality per se with instrumental rationality (or, as we might
also say, with consequentialist rationality). This entirely unnecessary reduction has the
disadvantage of producing a metaphysical image of the social actor, of which one can only see
what justifies it from a scientific point of view. Moreover, not everyone shares this view. Thus,
the philosopher Nicholas Rescher (1995) states:“[…] rationality is in its very nature teleological
and ends-oriented,” adding immediately that the teleological is not to be confused with the
instrumental. Indeed, he continues: “Cognitive rationality is concerned with achieving true
beliefs. Evaluative rationality is concerned with making correct evaluation. Practical rationality
is concerned with the effective pursuit of appropriate objectives.” Thus, it is obviously not
instrumental rationality but the rationality that Rescher calls cognitive that gives scientific work
its sense (Boudon 2002). In the same vein, the Weberian distinction between “instrumental
rationality [Zweckrationalität]” and “axiological rationality [Wertrationalität]” implies that
rationality should not be confused with “instrumental” rationality and that the social sciences
must take this distinction into account when they propose to explain the beliefs and feelings of
social subjects. For those who are troubled by the notion of a plurality of types of rationality, we
can see that all of these types posit that a subject believes X or Y because, like all those who find
themselves in the same situation (in the broad sense of the term “situation”), he has reasons he
perceives as valid to believe X or Y.
10In the chapter “Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen” in his Gesammelte Aufsätze zur
Religionssoziologie, Weber speaks of “rationalization” (Rationalisierung) to describe various
cognitive processes. These include the search for coherence—and more generally for credibility
—in the explanation of phenomena, but also the search for means tailored to ends themselves
inspired by basic needs, the simplification of theories proposed to explain natural or human
phenomena, the definition of practices and design techniques derived from these theories, or the
codification of these techniques and practices (Weber 1922/1988, 266). Religious thought, like
any form of thought, seems to him to be subject to these processes of rationalization. In short, the
subject seeks to produce credible explanations (or, according to his or her social “role,” to find
them in the marketplace of ideas and take them up) regarding phenomena of interest or concern
to him (pain, bountiful harvests, the survival and reproduction of cattle, etc.), so as to discover
useful lines of conduct. He then subjects these theoretical explanations to a critical gaze, which
of course will be better or worse equipped depending on the state of the knowledge at his
disposal. Far from obeying special rules of thought or being enslaved to psychological or social
mechanisms operating without his knowledge, such as those highly speculative mechanisms
postulated by discontinuist theories, the subject obeys the general rules that characterize ordinary
thought, scientific thought, and legal thought.

11Weber is not the only one to observe that the techniques employed by magical practices often
have an objective basis; Pareto had seen this as well. There is a contemporary illustration of this
thesis: the geophysicist Jelle de Boer of Wesleyan University in Connecticut has demonstrated
that the Pythia of Delphi sat above a fault corresponding to the intersection of two tectonic plates
from which emanated vapors of methane, ethane and ethylene with effectively hallucinatory
properties (de Boer 2000).

12The “rational” conception of religious beliefs that Weber defends does not imply that a person
endorses them based on some reasoning on his part. He recognizes that, whatever their nature
may be, beliefs are normally transmitted through education and generally by socialization. He
notes that the new beliefs are imposed through the mediation of “charisma,” the special authority
that subjects accord to the innovators who induce them to accept the new theories and beliefs
they offer:

13

Die Deckung allen über die Anforderungen des ökonomischen Alltags hinaus gehenden Bedarfs
dagegen ist, je mehr wir historisch zurücksehen, desto mehr, prinzipiell gänzlich heterogen und
zwar : charismatisch, fundiert gewesen. Das bedeutet : die natürlichen Leiter in psychischer,
physischer, ökonomischer, ethischer, religiöser, politischer Not waren weder angestellte
Amtspersonen, noch Inhaber eines als Fachwissen erlernten und gegen Entgelt geübten Berufs im
heutigen Sinn dieses Wortes, sondern Träger spezifischer, als übernatürlich (im Sinne von : nicht
jedermann zugänglich) gedachter Gaben des Körpers und Geistes.  [4]

The Soul, Demons, Spirits, and Gods

26Apart from the theory of magic, we can illustrate the theoretical

framework of Weber’s sociology of religion via his analysis of animism. As
with magical beliefs, it is easy for us to see animistic theories as so foreign to
our own modes of thought that we tend to attribute them to causes such as a
“savage thought” or a “primitive soul”—in short, to mobilize
the Kollektivbegriffe that Weber intends to eliminate.
27This is not the direction Weber takes. The concept of the soul, he says, was
designed to explain a variety of immediately observable and important
phenomena. First, death leaves the body intact; only the breath of life
disappears. This is why breath is treated as the cause and condition of life.
The notion of soul also explains the doubling of the personality in dreams or
ecstatic states, as well as the phenomena of fainting or loss of self-control.
Thus, it explains a variety of crucial phenomena. Given its explanatory
power, it is understandable that it should be present in all religions. Durkheim
says (1912/1965, 66) almost the same thing in Elementary Forms. He rejects
the assumption that “the idea of the soul was first suggested to men by the
badly understood spectacle of the double life they ordinarily lead, on the one
hand, when awake, on the other, when asleep.” He does not accept, in fact,
that the notion of soul is an illusion suggested to the social subject by the
phenomenon of dreaming. Like Weber, he wants to trace it to a theory about
phenomena that cannot escape our awareness. Here, it is of no importance to
us that the content of this theorization is different in the two authors, and that
Weber imagines this theorization proceeding from an ensemble of psychic
phenomena, while Durkheim envisions a theorization of the
individual’s duality as a being of passions, instincts, and desires who at the
same time feels subservient to moral values.
28Disease in its infinite varieties as well as a person’s longevity are likewise
complex and crucial phenomena. No society has ignored them. To act on
these phenomena, it is necessary to theorize them. In one form or another, the
notion of “spirit” is normally referred to in order to account for them. It is
very close to the notion of “force,” Weber tells us. These “spirits” are in fact
conceptualized as forces that can act on the body and that can be counteracted
or propitiated by what are considered to be the appropriate formulas
according to certain theories. The immediate character of these theories, in
societies where scientific medicine is unknown, explains the fact that they are
found in many societies, without any of these having needed to borrow them
from the others. The notion of a “demon” is a variation of the concept of
“spirit.” It refers to those spirits that produce consequences perceived as
negative by the subject.
29Again, Weber offers a simple explanation that refers to cognitive
mechanisms readily observable in contemporary societies. These mechanisms
simply consist in accounting for a certain phenomenon by creating an
explanatory principle that is normally interpreted as corresponding to a
reality. In other words, it is easily hypostasized. Any physicist knows for
example that “centrifugal forces,” so seemingly familiar to us, do not exist.
The expression simply refers to the consequences of the principle of inertia.
Yet, as the concept of “centrifugal force” allows us to unify so many easily
observable phenomena, it is easy for us to believe that it designates a
particular kind of force. The notions of “spirit” or “demon” issue from the
same cognitive mechanisms. Arguably, cum grano salis,
the Kollektivbegriffe I mentioned above issue from the same analyses. Like
the concepts of “demon” or “spirit,” those of the “primitive mentality” or
“savage thought” describe many easily observable phenomena and attempt to
subsume them under an explanatory principle to which a “reality” is naturally
attributed. In support of the continuist theory of knowledge proposed by
Weber (and Durkheim), it may be observed that the history of science is
replete with “explanatory” principles of the same kind, commonly used and
interpreted in a realistic manner, abandoned as soon as we can do without
them (cf. the “vortices” abandoned as a result of Newton’s formulation of the
principle of inertia, the “horror vacui” attributed to nature and ultimately
abandoned in the wake of Pascal’s “great experiment,” the “ether”
invalidated by the theory of relativity, etc.).
30Animism’s inductive concepts are thus explained by simple and
universally observable cognitive mechanisms. They testify not to a
discontinuity between “magical thinking” and “scientific thinking” but, on
the contrary, to the uniformity of rules of thought and to the continuity
between religious or magical thinking, on the one hand, and scientific thought
on the other (which obviously does not mean that science and magic are to be
confounded). The impression of discontinuity we feel is easily explained: it is
the result of our sociocentrism, and the universal tendency to attribute
substantial causes to certain categories of phenomena (“centrifugal forces,”
the “primitive mentality,” “demons,” etc.).
31A concept such as “force” in physics has given rise to endless debates. At
the beginning of the century, the Vienna Circle itself was not clear on what to
think of it, and in view of its persistent opacity, occasionally proposed to
eliminate it. The case is the same with the very notion of the “soul,” and of
“spirits” or “demons.” Once such explanatory principles have been posited, it
is indeed necessary to clarify them. Moreover, they give rise, a posteriori, to
further theories, forming networks. Thus, Weber remarks, the phenomena of
“ecstasy” are theorized as contact with demons or spirits.
32Charisma itself is a variation on ecstasy. It describes individuals with
qualities inaccessible to ordinary mortals. Because they are perceived as
such, they can under certain circumstances give others the impression that
what they say is true simply because they are the ones who say they enjoy
these abilities. Charisma is a concept that Weber restores to its place among
the tools of scientific sociology, but he borrows it from both St. Paul and the
German romantics (Abbruzzese 2001, 298–9). The latter believed that
“genius” allows access to higher truths inaccessible to ordinary mortals. We
still believe this, on occasion.
33The fuzziness of concepts such as “soul” or “spirit” thus gives rise to a
cognitive dynamics. The “gods” are an evolution of the concept of spirit.
They frequently lack names and are designated only by the processes they
control (Weber 1979, 402). They give rise to rituals. The content of these
rituals is dictated by the theorization of the desires, sensibility, and
psychology of a particular god that is proposed and accepted. Naturally, the
psychology attributed to the gods is drawn from social observation. Scheler
states, in a very Weberian analysis, that “Mohammed’s God has the character
of a fanatic and sensuous sheik roaming about the desert,” that “Aristotle’s
God has the character of a self-sufficient, contemplative Greek sage who is
satisfied with his own wisdom,” and that “the Christian God of the Germanic
tribes more or less has blue eyes and the temperament of a Germanic duke to
whom one belongs by trust and without a contract […] quite different from
the Romans’ regimental religious representation of God” (Scheler 1985, 292–
3). Rituals are fixed from the moment they have demonstrated their
effectiveness: “Every purely magical act that had proved successful in a
naturalistic sense was
Of course, once actually created, it repeats itself as form" (Weber 1979, 40
5). [7]
[7]
"[S]successful in the naturalist sense": It seems to carry a truth...a proces
s of "rationalization" , that is, replacing the soul with the gods: by this he 
means that the "gods" allow a more subtle and complex theorizing of the w
orld, the answer is no. Therefore, the gods always follow the soul (Net 197
9, 437)

The Dimensions of Religious Rationality

Falsificationism
35Like ordinary or scientific thought, religious thought is “critical”: it wants to be sure of the
solidity of the theories it presents.

36The rationality of religious thought appears first of all in the fact that the believer is
“falsificationist.” A god who does not perform the services expected of it disappears (Weber
1979, 427). The peasant is reluctant to accept monotheism, because the unity of inspiration we
expect from a unique divine will is hardly compatible with the vagaries of nature with which he
is confronted. One theory, according to which phenomena are in fact wills in competition with
each other, seems more consistent with what he sees every day. This is why the word “pagan”
comes from the exchange of an insult: those who appeared recalcitrant toward monotheism were
called paganus. The saints have become an essential part of Catholicism because they allow
religious theory to be reconciled with the real in the peasant’s eyes. In Ancient Judaism, Weber
(1952, 310) emphasizes that the interpretation of the prophecies appears to be constantly adapted
to reality. A prophecy announced an impending disaster; when this was not forthcoming, its
predictions were forgotten for some time (Weber 1952, 308). Having identified cognitive
mechanisms similar to those evoked by Weber, Renan says that when the hope of Christ’s
imminent return was not realized, John no longer interpreted the resurrection literally at the end
of his life, in contradiction to Paul’s two Epistles to the Thessalonians (Renan 1863/1955, 18).

Verificationism
37The rationality of religious thought, then, translates into the fact that the believer turns out to
be a “verificationist.” Since Popper, verificationism has had a bad name in the philosophy of
science: we cannot verify a theory, we can only “falsify” it (Popper uses falsify in the sense of
disproving). But this is only true of theories in the form of universal propositions (such as “all
swans are white”), not theories in the form of singular propositions. From a scientific point of
view, singular propositions are no less important than universal ones (e.g. “a meteorite impact
caused the disappearance of the dinosaurs”; “global warming is taking place”). Verificationism
also describes current scientific practice. A scientist convinced of the truth of a theory normally
looks for confirmation, seeking out peers and seminars in sympathy with this theory. All
histories of science demonstrate this spontaneous verificationism. Thus, a careful study of the
history of discussions on the language of bees shows that we have long believed in its existence
because those who were in favor of this hypothesis not only tended to pay attention solely to
evidence confirming it, but also to associate only with colleagues who shared their opinion
(Wenner and Patrick H. Wells 1990). Here we find familiar cognitive mechanisms well known to
sociologists of science, as well as analysts of electoral choices (which indirectly confirms
Weber’s conjecture that ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge are based on the same
procedures).

38The crystallization of religious beliefs involves a similar mechanism. When a prophecy is

“verified,” it tends to acquire an authority that is all the more solid to the extent that its
fulfillment had seemed unlikely. Furthermore, tradition tends prioritize prophecies that were
fulfilled or that can be expected to be fulfilled, emphasizing those that are fulfilled against all
odds: “This applied, first, to Amos’ oracles of disaster concerning the then mighty Northern
Kingdom, then to Hosea’s oracles of doom for the dynasty of Jehu and for Samaria. […] Above
all, the conquest and destruction of Jerusalem confirmed the frightful oracles of disaster of the
youthful Isaiah, of Micah and especially of Jeremiah and Ezekiel” (Weber 1952, 308). [9]

Seeking unity
40 A third important aspect of the theory of religion is that different social a
ctors seek unity in their interpretation of the world. Just like the scientist or 
man of the way explained by the "mystery of thought," the Christian wants 
the content of his religious interpretation of the world to be harmonious. W
e can explain this with the theodism model.

41 Weber returns to the subject of Theodism. When the world is designed to 
be ruled by rival or conflicting gods, there is little trouble explaining the e
vil of the world.
Each god had his own supporters who fought each other for, for, or under t
he influence of the gods; Natural events have been shown to have a neg
ative effect and cause conflict. Conversely, theodism becomes a critical is
sue when the world is viewed from a single point of view.

42 Weber says that religion has had some solutions throughout history. 
Manichaean dualism, the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul, and deat
h are our solutions to the evil of the world as expressed by the religion of hi
story (Weber 1979, 523-5). Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Christianity share 
each of our solutions.
There may be more, according to Weber, but solutions will be limited.

43 According to the definition of dualism, God is responsible for good and 
Satan is responsible for evil. While this is adopted in very wide areas of po
wer exercised by Zoroastrianism, it also emerges outside of direct areas of 
influence such as heresy or the threat of heresy (Weber 1979, 523-4). More i
mportantly, it inspired Christian Gnosticism.

44 The second solution to Theodicy is the Indian solution: The injustice suff
ered by today's context will be corrected in the future so that the world can s
ee global equality, given its entire life.
Just like the first solution, the second solution needs explanatory power, whi
ch makes it huge. This is why the religion that does not know karma carri
es the threat of heresy or birth as it gives. This is why Weber believes the i
dea of the resurrection may have come from eastern India. Discussed in an
cient Judaism: Pharisees believed it, Sadducees did not (Weber 1952, 390).

45 Although it is understood that these thoughts represent their explanator
y power, that is, their power to explain the negative aspects of the world rul
ed by Allah, their emergence and creation is based on the wisdom of histo
ry.
Thus, the solution to the problem of rebirth is embedded in the traditional 
belief that the souls of the dead can enter the natural world (Weber 1979, 5
25). Without this idea, the idea of reincarnation will not come true and it will 
not be so easy to force it.

An Evolutionary Conception
These processes of “rationalization” explain the appearance of historical
irreversibilities, including the “disenchantment of the world” which is at the
forefront of Weber’s interests. His analysis of disenchantment alone would
justify classifying Weber among evolutionists. In fact, in the early passages
of chapter 5 of Economy and Society devoted to religion, Weber shows
himself to be an evolutionist when he describes the passage from “pre-
animist naturalism” to “symbolism.”
54The primitive rips the heart from an enemy’s chest or severs his genitals
on the basis of a theory: the strength of the enemy has its seat in these body
parts. By assimilating them, he takes on the power of his enemy. Symbolic
theories are then substituted for theories arising from what Weber called
“pre-animistic naturalism.” Fire is conceived first of all as a god: this is the
phase of “pre-animistic naturalism.” Then a more abstract conception appears
in which it is not the fire itself that is treated as a god, but in which the
existence of a god presiding over the fire is postulated. Authority over the fire
is maintained by the worship dedicated to him (Weber 1979, 406–7). Unlike
the fire itself, the god persists and is endowed with an identity: we enter into
the phase of “symbolism” (here in its animist variant).
55The reason why Weber is not mentioned in histories of evolutionism may
lie in the fact that his conception of evolution is especially cautious and
nuanced. Thus, it is more satisfying than the “classic” versions of Comte,
Spencer, or John Stuart Mill, or perhaps even the modern versions of Robert
Bellah (1970, 211–44) or Friedrich Hayek, which, beyond all the differences
between them, all appear much more mechanical and “fatalistic” than his.
Weber deserves to be ranked among the evolutionists insofar as the
identification and explanation of historical irreversibilities is a central
concern for him. The history of ideas, including religious ideas, reveals
innumerable such irreversibilities, and all the pages comprising the sociology
of religion are dedicated to them. But he is by no means fatalistic, as he
expressly declares time and time again, particularly at the end of The
Protestant Ethic, in the notes accompanying the famous metaphor of the iron
cage (Stahlhartes Gehäuse). In no way does he see the modern world as
doomed to produce only Fachmenschen ohne Geist—specialists without
spirit—and Genussmenschen ohne Herz—sensualists without heart—even if
it seems to encourage these types of personality.
Disenchantment
56Ultimately, monotheism has contributed most powerfully to the “disenchantment of the
world.” By this phrase, which he borrows from Schiller, Weber refers to the discrediting of
magic. It is generally accepted that the elimination of magic that characterizes modernity is
mainly due to the success of science. This is not untrue, but religion had already laid the
groundwork. The establishment, with Judaism, of a single, all-powerful God tended, indeed, to
discredit magical practices: magic only functions when the gods are conceived as open to
influence, but an all-powerful God cannot be such. Ancient Judaism repeatedly affirms this
attribute of God. Only a God more powerful than Pharaoh could bring the Jews out of Egypt.
Yahweh hardened Pharaoh’s heart in order to let the believer witness the extent of his own power
(Weber 1952, 3

References

 Abbruzzese, Salvatore. 2001. International Encyclopedia of the Social

and Behavioral Sciences, s.v. “Charisma.” London: Elsevier.

 Baechler, Jean. 1988. La Solution indienne. Paris: PUF.

 Baumgarten, Eduard. 1964. Max Weber: Werk und Person. Tübingen:

Mohr.

 Bell, Daniel. 1988. The End of Ideology, Cambridge: Harvard UP.

 Online Bellah,Robert. 1970. “Religious Evolution.” In Readings in

Social Evolution and Development, edited by S. Eisenstadt, 211-244,
London: Pergamon.