I.

Definition of “each occurrence”

a. Michigan caselaw concerning the definition of “occurrence” is not on point. Searching for
"occurrence" within 10 words of “definition” solely yielded cases where the definition “occurrence”
was defined in an insurance policy. See, e.g., Western Cas. and Sur. Group v. Coloma Tp., 140
Mich.App. 516 (Mich. App. 1985).
b. Michigan courts use the dictionary definition for undefined terms in the antilockout state in Nelson v
Grays, 531 N.W.2d 826
c. Blacks
II. Repair issues giving rise to unlawful interference counterclaim
III. Purpose of 2918
a. The statute is meant to stop landlords from evicting tenants themselves. Blonde v Long
(unpublished 2014) quotes the Deroshia court explaining the purpose and historical context of MCL
600.2918. It was intended to abrogate a landlord’s right to self-help during an eviction and instead
resort to judicial process to recover possession.1 Blonde (citing Deroshia v Union Terminal Piers,
151 Mich App 715, 717; 391 NW2d 458 (1986))
b. If there’s no violence, stratagem or trick, then section (1) of 600.2918 (trebled damages, etc)
does not apply. Per Seymore in 2016, precedent dating to 1872 dictates Section (1) applies if
there is the use of violence or threat of violence against the individual 2. "Under MCL 600.2918(1),
an eviction is forcible if the landlord obtains possession by stratagem or trick, carried out under a
false pretense, and the tenant is prevented by force from reentering the premises." Dunbar v.
Dunbar (Mich. App. 2003) (citing Pelavin v Misner, 241 Mich 209, 213-214; 217 NW 36 (1928)).
The Dunbar decision, finding that section (1) did apply, relied upon a distinguishable set of facts:
the tenant was present during the eviction, being handcuffed by police while the personal property
was being removed constituted the requisite force.
IV. Statutory interpretation

1
The purpose of MCL 600.2918, which is sometimes referred to as "the antilockout law," is to abrogate a landowner's
right to self-help and to require a landowner to "resort to judicial process to recover possession" from a tenant
wrongfully in possession. Deroshia v Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich App 715, 717; 391 NW2d 458 (1986). The
Court in Deroshia explained the historical context of MCL 600.2918(1) as follows:

At common law a landlord could use reasonably necessary force to remove a holdover tenant or other unauthorized
occupant of his land. See Practice Commentary to MCLA 600.2918. However, this rule was very early modified by
statute to prohibit forceful entry by the landlord, in the interest of protecting the peace. The forcible entry and detainer
statute has remained unchanged in substance and is incorporated as subsection (1) of the present antilockout law,
MCL. 600.2918; MSA 27A.2918.
***
The statute was held to prohibit forceful self-help regardless of whether or not the tenant was in rightful possession of
the premises. Gallant v Miles, 200 Mich 532; 166 NW 1009 (1918).
The statute was amended in 1977 to add a subsection eliminating self-help altogether even where not forceful except
in certain narrowly defined circumstances[.] [Id. at 718 (emphasis in original).

2
Moreover, plaintiff's claim that the fact that she was locked out of her residence represented forcible ejectment
under MCL 600.2918(1) is unsustainable based on binding precedent interpreting the statute. In 1872, the
Michigan Supreme Court interpreted a similar predecessor version of MCL 600.2918(1)2 and concluded that
the statute was not intended to apply to a mere trespass, however wrongful; but the entry or the detainer must be
riotous, or personal violence must be used or in some way threatened, or the conduct of the parties guilty of the
entry or detainer must be such as in some way to inspire terror or alarm in the persons evicted or kept out; in
other words, the force contemplated by the statute is not merely the force used against, or upon the property, but
force used or threatened against persons as a means, or for the purpose of expelling or keeping out the prior
possessor. Seymore v. Adams Realty (Mich. App. 2016) (quoting Shaw v Hoffman, 25 Mich 162, 168-169 (1872))