Jurisdictions and Gender Categorization Protocols

Draft V1.0, comments are appreciated

Laurens J. Buijs
laurensbuijs@protonmail.com
La Convivencia, Amsterdam,The Netherlands

Jan A. Bergstra
janaldertb@gmail.com
Minstroom Research BV, Utrecht, The Netherlands

June 11, 2023

Abstract
We propose an outline for the design of a gender categorization protocol. We first
perform requirements capture. Thereupon we propose a gender categorization proto-
col which is supposed to implement said requirements. We motivate the plausibility
of gender categorization protocols by contemplating a plurality of jurisdictions each
entitled to their own gender categorization protocol. Gender theory is understood as
the theoretical framework which different jurisdictions must share, while per juris-
diction a gender architecture (i.e. a gender categorization protocol) implements the
universal requirements imposed by gender theory. A jurisdiction may comprise a (part
of a) national state, while it may also comprise an international organization. By way
of a case study, we will contemplate in some detail the jurisdiction constituted by the
Roman Catholic Church (RCC), for which we propose a dedicated refinement of the
general gender theory, which then allows to design a tailor made gender architecture
specifically for RCC.

c Laurens J. Buijs & Jan A. Bergstra Licence CC BY-SA 4.0
Amsterdam Gender Theory Research Team AGTRT-2023:5 V1.0
Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Formal gender theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Jurisdictions: areas of uniform instantiation of gender theory . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Aim and structure of the paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 Pseudo-disambiguation of gender 4
2.1 Bridging terminology between Barnes 2022 and Turyn 2023 . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Gender identity and gender categorization may differ: rejecting the fully-
subjective position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Cis-cis-female, cis-cis-male, cis-cis-neutral, cis-cis-gender . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Non-classical gender theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Giving up on gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6 Neutral gender: cis-neutral or transneutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

3 Potentially general rules on matters of b-sex and gender 9

3.1 Rules per jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Rules about b-sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2 Rules about the gender framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.3 Rules about interfacing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Gender policy rules for international institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4 Case study: proposal for a Roman Catholic Gender Theory 11

4.1 Accepting neutral gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Further rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3 The RCC position is gender critical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4 Other RCC views on gender and sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5 Connection of RCC gender theory with “Dembroff versus Byrne” . . . . 16

5 GenCPn,m 17
5.1 Requirements on GenCPn,m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
v1
5.2 Description of GenCPn,m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
v1
5.3 Meta-protocol for GenCPn,m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

6 Concluding remarks 21
6.1 Deviating from the fully-subjective gender self-categorization . . . . . . 21
6.2 On the need for gender categorization protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3 A remark on sexual orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

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 6.4 On (pseudo)disambiguation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.5 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.6 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

References 24

1 Introduction
A viewpoint or position is understood to be gender critical if it deviates in whatsoever way
from the idea that for all persons P gender self-identification (if possible) determines gen-
der categorization. The terminology of gender identification versus gender categorization
follows Barnes 2022 [4]. We will call the (seemingly) unique position that is non-gender
critical fully subjective (on matters of gender categorization). Fully-subjective positions
may differ in the way one deals with gender self-identification, for instance in how to
determine to what extent gender self-identification is sincere.
Thus a position (e.g. the justification of a certain method for categorization) is gender
critical if there are any circumstances under which the position allows a challenge (i.e. be
critical of) a person’s gender self-identification. It seems to be more systematic to call a
gender critical position a gender self-identification critical position. However, under the
assumption that gender self-identification determines gender categorization (the gender
non-critical position indeed) the shift from “gender critical” to “gender self-identification
critical” makes no difference. We find, for what it’s worth, that the phrase gender critical
can be precisely justified on the basis of the gender non-critical position.

1.1 Formal gender theory

We will work in the paradigm of formal gender theory (FGT) as specified in [10]. The
idea is that gender framework is used with three proper gender labels: male, female, and
neutral and also with peripheral gender label ⊥, where ⊥ may be used as the result of
a failed attempt to self-identification; we denote this framework a 3G⊥ . Formal gender
theory is not so much a formalization of gender theory, rather it is a theory of formal
genders. Gender can be thought of as a property of persons, each person being equipped
at any time with a unique gender. Different genders are thought to be mutually exclusive,
whence the 3G⊥ gender framework obtains characteristics of a formal logic. Except for
⊥ which was introduced in [10] for technical reasons, FGT is in conformance with the
quickly developing literature on gender theory in early 2023. We will proceed on that
path, well aware that gender theory may take quite different directions at any time. If no
use of ⊥ is made we speak of a 3G gender framework.

3
1.2 Jurisdictions: areas of uniform instantiation of gender theory
Gender categorization of persons plays a role in various jurisdictions. Such jurisdictions
may be determined by nation states, political units and institutions within nation states,
but just as well by religions, ideologies, and non-governmental organisations.

Definition 1.1. (Jurisdiction) A jurisdiction is a coherent set of rules regarding societal

functioning. A jurisdiction J may impose constraints on gender categorization protocols
which are to be performed in the scope of J. A jurisdiction may be legal and for that reason
may have a geographic area as its scope; alternatively, a jurisdiction may be institutional
and its scope may intersect with some or even with all legal jurisdictions. With a gender
categorization protocol comes a formal notion of gender for a jurisdiction J.

We hold, as discussed at length in [10], that regarding matters of gender, a jurisdiction

will at any time provide a gender categorization protocol which determines how (at any
time) gender is assigned to, or recognized in, an individual. Different jurisdictions may
use different protocols and transfer of persons between different jurisdictions requires clear
interfaces, and is best managed in a setting where as much as possible the different gen-
der categorization protocols are specified in the same language and notation in spite of
significant differences which may arise. Formulated in IT terms, a common ontology is
needed.
We will suggest elements of a uniform language and notation for gender theory that
allows different gender architectures and gender categorization protocols. As a case study,
we will work out in some detail a gender architecture that might work well for the Roman
Catholic Church (RCC). The protocol that we will propose in 5.2 below is specified in
a language that allows for very different architectures some of which the RCC does not
approve of.

1.3 Aim and structure of the paper

The aim of the paper is to discuss gender categorization protocols in relation to the under-
lying jurisdiction. We will make a proposal for such a protocol as a proof of existence, not
so much as a specification of our views and preferences regarding gender categorization.
We will first discuss the ambiguity of the term gender as it occurs in gender theory, and
we will propose a pseudo-disambiguation of gender. Then we describe some generalities
on gender theories. Next we discuss constraints on gender categorization which we expect
to hold for all jurisdictions and we discuss as a case study nthe way gender is dealt with in
the RCC.

4
2 Pseudo-disambiguation of gender
We will use the phrases ‘gender identity’ and ‘gender categorization’ as in Barnes 2022 [4].
We understand that the viewpoint [4] adopts a mono-angular perspective (using the visual
metaphor implicit in the terminology of [20]) of gender identity, a perspective which is
exclusively based on gender self-identification. We need to be somewhat more specific
about the term ‘gender’. From Andler [2] we quote:
The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form:
sex is “natural,” while gender is the “social meaning” of sex.
Here feminist philosophy refers to a rather heterogeneous area, and writing “some authors
from philosophy of feminism” instead might be better suited. However obvious the above
quote may seem to a casual reader, it is not immediate how to reconcile this view of gender
with the now popular 3G framework (using the terminology of [10]) where gender can take
three proper values: male, female, and neutral, or else ⊥ representing no information on
gender in the 3G⊥ . It is definitely implausible that ‘social meaning of sex’ takes only one
of three or four discrete values (such as the elements of 3G⊥ ). In [4] merely a 2G frame-
work is used, though without any implication that there is a problem with its embedding
in a 3G gender framework, that’s just not made use of in [4].
We find a dilemma: ‘gender’ in FGT is quite different from ‘gender’ as inherited from
the philosophy of feminism. A first way out of this dilemma is to understand gender as
ambiguous. Doing so would be convincing if the concept denoted by ‘formal gender’ were
well-established. The very controversy of ‘Dembroff versus Byrne’ indicates, however,
that precisely such clarity is currently missing. In other words: formal gender is a concept
which seems to be still in its formative phase.
We prefer to look for another way out of said dilemma by assuming that in formal
gender theory (FGT), gender is meant as “formal gender” where formal gender is given by
one of a discrete number of options. Thus all occurrences of gender in FGT are to be read
as formal gender for which gender is used as an abbreviation.1 Gender as used in Andler’s
quote would then be understood as an abbreviation of social gender. The relation between
social gender and formal gender is non-obvious. A tentative claim concerning the relation
between social gender and formal gender reads thus:
Claim 2.1. Formal gender is a 3G or 3G⊥ projection of social gender.
Underlying, though implicit, in Definition 2.1 is the proposal of [20] to think in terms
of a ramification of notions of gender identity: three mono-angular perspectives on gender
identity, three bi-angular perspectives and our preferred triangular perspective.
1
So we have (about gender) what in theory of computing is often referred to as polymorphism with type
inference.

5
 We speak of pseudo-disambiguation because we do not imply that gender is ambigu-
ous: in this paper there is no notion of gender, the latter is merely an abbreviation which
needs to be completed in a context dependent manner.

2.1 Bridging terminology between Barnes 2022 and Turyn 2023

Turyn 2023 [39] provides a survey and analysis of the role of first person authority (FPA)
in the determination of gender identity. FPA is a well-known feature of gender theory
which has to do with the foundations of self-identification. An original reference for FPA
in gender theory is Bettcher 2009 [14]. The terminology of Barnes 2022 [4] and Turyn
2023 [39] show discrepancies in terminology rather than in meaning which are not imme-
diately recognizable:
(i) Turyn’s “sincere avowal about one’s gender identity” corresponds to “gender iden-
tity” of Barnes.
(ii) “gender identity” of Turyn comes close to “gender categorization” as used by
Barnes.
(iii) Turyn uses “existential self-identity” which has no obvious counterpart in Barnes.

Regarding (iii) we proceed as follows: we intend to achieve a stable terminology by

appealing to an internal/external distinction using the prefixes endo and exo. We prefer
to introduce endo-gender (with alternatives: true gender, real gender, internal gender) as a
new phrase which can be added to the terminology of Barnes 2022, and then to read “gen-
der identity” of Turyn as endo-gender. Gender categorization would be rather exo-gender
(i.e. gender as a perceived from outside a person). Turyn 2023 discusses “existential
self-identity” (on the matter of gender), a phrase due to Bettcher [14]. We propose that
existential self-identity may be read as endo-gender, or conversely (endo-gender may be
defined as existential self-identity).

Having introduced endo-gender we suggest that Barnes 2022 does not make use of
any distinction between endo-gender and gender categorization, while a more convincing
understanding of gender categorization is that it might deviate from endo-gender (granting
that Barnes 2022 uses the simplifying assumption that both notions can be identified).
FPA may be understood as an explanation of why to adopt (sincere) avowals (by P )
about P ’s gender identity as being definitive for an assessment of endo-gender. FPA as
used for such purposes may be justified along different lines: an epistemic justification
is based on the idea that P is best informed about their endo-gender, while an ethical
justification is based on the idea that P is entitled to being authoritative about their own
endo-gender. Turyn 2023 argues that gender theory cannot do without an epistemic justifi-

6
cation of FPA (or rather gender theory cannot do without instances of FPA which need an
epistemic justification). How to obtain circumstances that allow an epistemic justification
is not so clear, however.

2.2 Gender identity and gender categorization may differ: rejecting

the fully-subjective position
We recall that the gender identity of P captures the gender that P ascribes to themselves,
while gender categorization captures the gender which is ascribed to P by external ob-
servers. We notice that following [1] the transgender identity of P describes whether or
not P self-identifies as transgender. Following the style of terminology of [4] we pro-
pose that transgender categorization stands for an external judgement/assessment of the
transgender status of P . In [3] the phrase transgender modality is proposed for the same
notion instead of transgender categorizaton. By using the phrases transgender identity and
transgender categorization speaking and writing about b-sex at birth can be avoided.
By allowing gender identification and gender identity to be different a fundamental
degree of freedom arises, which has been advocated in our [21], in fact following the ar-
guments of Bogardus 2022 [15]. Below we will describe a gender categorization protocol
which makes use of said degree of freedom.
Definition 2.1. (Fully-subjective position) The fully-subjective position in gender theory
amounts to the claim that under all conceivable circumstances, if for person P the gender
identity is g ∈ {male, female, neutral} then eventually (i.e. after some reasonable delay)
the gender categorization of P must equal g as well.
In the literature there are many papers (e.g. Barnes 2022 [4]) which either adopt a
fully-subjective position or some lightly amended version of it. A recent critique of the
fully-subjective position in gender theory can be found in [15].
Positions that are non-fully-subjective are also termed gender critical.

2.3 Cis-cis-female, cis-cis-male, cis-cis-neutral, cis-cis-gender

Assuming that we consider a legal jurisdiction J which maintains a database on matters of
gender. We assume that at any time all persons have a unique (current) gender in {male,
female, neutral}. Said unique gender is contained in the governmental data regarding a
person. The current gender may differ from a persons’ b-sex, in which case the latter is
unlikely to be recorded in governmental data about a person.
A cis-gender person has gender equal to gender assigned at birth. It is also required
that a cis-gender person has always been cis-gender. A cis-cis-gender person (at some

7
moment t) is first of all cis-gender and in addition has (current) gender identity equal to
the (current) gender categorization, i.e. equal to the gender assigned at birth. A cis-gender
male who self-identifies as female is not cis-cis-gender.
We find that with gender theory expanding from 2G to 3G and including gender iden-
tity in the discussion, one finds sharpening of notions like cis-male and cis-female into
cis-cis-male and cis-cis-female.

2.4 Non-classical gender theory

FMT works like a logic, and as soon as 3G is considered canonical, i.e. having three
proper genders available is a standard (with ⊥ merely present for technical reasons, having
to do with handling failures and faults), it becomes tempting to contemplate non-classical
versions of it. Non-classical logics may admit either more truth values or fewer proof rules
than classical logics, or both. With non-classical FMT we think in terms of more gender
labels to begin with. The first option for moving from FMT to a version of non-classical
FMT is to add pairs of different proper gender label to the possible values of “gender”,
while ⊥ plays the role of the triple of all gender labels.
The combination (male, female) may be understood as giving explicit room for a large
part of the androgynous spectrum. The combinations (female, neutral) end (male, neutral)
occur in [33] as well as in may blogs and posts on social media about gender. On Reddit
r/genderqueer [34] one finds various testimonies dating from 2021/2022 of persons who
identify as woman and as non-binary at the same time, though perhaps not in the same
contexts.
So each of the new gender labels, now considering pairs as labels as well, has a rea-
sonably clear interpretation, though making sense of all six labels at the same time is less
straightforward.

2.5 Giving up on gender

Increasingly we feel helpless when trying to make sense of the term gender. In practice
we now use four forms of gender:
(i) Formal gender: one of the few elements of 3G or of 3G⊥ . Formal gender is used
for categorization of people. Why such categorization is useful is usually left unexplained.
Formal genders are also called gender labels.
(ii) Psycho-bio gender: degrees of belonging to the various gender labels, which come
about from considering biological and psychological characteristics of a person. In more
detailed versions of psycho-bio gender, different traits of a person are distinguished and
per trait the degrees of beloning to a gender label are determined.

8
 (iii) Social gender: degrees of belonging to the various gender labels given the sociol-
ogy of roles in a given society, including the dynamics of the definition and distribution of
roles.
(iv) Endo-gender. (In the terminology of [14]: existential gender identity): the endo-
gender of P is the self assigned/identified gender of P which is sincere and which by
definition can only be expressed by P . (We, as authors, do not yet believe that endo-
gender exists, but other authors, e.g. Bettcher [14] are convinced of the relevance, and for
that reason existence of endo-gender.)
When in [20] we wrote about a triangular perspective on gender we were still thinking
of a concept of gender which allows for an integrated picture. However, these angles of
perspective are nothing more than the intellectual sources of the three specialzed notions
of gender as distinguished above.

2.6 Neutral gender: cis-neutral or transneutral

The terminology of neutral gender is difficult, see e.g. [25], and many neutral (i.e. non-
binary) self-identified persons are uncertain about their transgender status and understand
gender attributions as temporary and transient (see e.g [44]). We propose to split the
neutral category in two parts: cis-neutral (ANAB individuals as used in [10] and transneu-
tral (those neutral persons who are either AFAB or ANAB). We hold that by definition
transneutral persons are also transgender. In other words being transneutral (MTN trans-
gender or FTN transgender) captures two out of six ways of being transgender.

3 Potentially general rules on matters of b-sex and gender

In [21] we have proposed that gender theory must come with degrees of freedom and must
not come with a claim or imperative that all jurisdictions have the same perspective on
gender, i.e. the same gender architecture in the terminology of [10] or the same gender
categorization protocol (also in the terminology of [10]). In favour of international com-
munication about matters of b-sex and gender we would propose that for all jurisdictions
some uniformity is advisable.

3.1 Rules per jurisdiction

Here is a package of rules which might bring about the desired uniformity.

9
3.1.1 Rules about b-sex
• There is a b-sex module which indicates how the notion of b-sex is approached and
maintained. For a b-sex module we refer to [11]. There is an explanation concerning
decision taking as well as an update protocol for a database on matters of b-sex.

• The b-sex module allows for a characteristic M/E-sex (see the b-sex module in [11])
which can be determined at any time, and which can be determined especially at
birth. AAB-sex is defined as M/E sex at birth.

• Having AAB-sex as b-sex and only allowing for change if it is manifest that at the
time of birth a grave failure has occurred with “b-sex assignment at birth” is an
option, it is in fact the most conservative option, all other options are more liberal.

• It is made explicit whether or not the notion of b-sex allows b-sex transition (i.e.
whether or not the notion of b-sex is transition permissive).

3.1.2 Rules about the gender framework

• There is a possibly non-classical (formal) gender theory (either 3G or 3G⊥ ). It is
made explicit whether or not combi-gender labels will be used. It is made explicit if
and why/where the peripheral gender label ⊥ will be used. By consequence there is
a notion of gender as well as a notion of natural gender (gender simply derived from
b-sex).

• There is a gender categorization protocol which determines how the gender of a

person evolves during their life-cycle (the simplest form being that natural gender is
adopted, in which case the notion of gender is redundant but is still needed in order
to communicate with other jurisdictions on matters concerning b-sex and gender.

• There is a notion of gender identity, and it is made explicit whether or not and if so,
to which extent, gender identity plays a role in the gender identification protocol.

• The notion of gender is made independent of sexual orientation. Definitions of

sexual orientation (as made use of in a given jurisdiction) may refer to the notions
of b-sex and gender (as maintained in that same jurisdiction), but not the other way
around.

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3.1.3 Rules about interfacing
• Each jurisdiction adopts an instance of gender theory (i.e. gender architecture).
There is no such thing as denial of gender theory at large, but there are many options
for fine-tuning of the gender architecture.
• For each jurisdiction it must be made explicit how one intends to deal with incom-
ing travellers: is the current gender categorization from their original jurisdiction
adopted, or is some form of re-gendering required. (Precisely this step requires that
a notion of gender is always available.)
For positive transgender experience within the RCC we mention [46]. For the positive
relation between transgender prejudice and religious fundamentalism we refer to [30].

3.2 Gender policy rules for international institutions

International institutions need to adapt locally to the implementation of gender theory
(gender architecture), as embodied in the local jurisdiction and local conventions. These
adaptations may vary significantly, given the significant differences between various juris-
dictions on matters of b-sex and gender.
It is relevant that an institution acknowledges the terminology of gender theory. The
policies of an institution may deviate from what local jurisdictions prescribe, though not
so much that problematic, if not useless legal battles result.

4 Case study: proposal for a Roman Catholic Gender

Theory
We take as an example of an international institution the Roman Catholic Church (RCC),
writing under the (perhaps somewhat hypothetical) assumption that the rules per jurisdic-
tion have been adopted universally. The RCC maintains an institutional jurisdiction which
coexists in any nation with the legal jurisdiction for that nation. Coexistence may range
from comfortable compatibility to problematic incompatibility.
In each jurisdiction the RCC will be confronted with a local implementation of the
general rules. The local implementation may or may not be in conformance with the
views held by the RCC at an international institutional level, or at a national institutional
level (e.g. see the statement of the Committee on Doctrine–United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 2023 [41], a document in which the existence of b-neutral,
cis-neutral and trans-neutral individual is denied, among other restrictions on matters of
gender transition).

11
4.1 Accepting neutral gender
We propose that RCC adopts the view that a person may be of neutral gender that is ANAB,
assigned neutral at birth). That has always been the case, but as a (bio)medical truth it has
only recently reached the RCC. About this matter we have some remarks:
• We notice that in Committee on Doctrine–United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops 2023 [41] it is claimed that all persons are either male or female, and that
“Persons affected by Disorders of Sexual Development do not fall outside the two
categories of male and female, but they do exhibit ambiguous or abnormal indicators
of sexual difference, so that the sex of their bodies is difficult to determine, though
not impossible for modern medical and genetic techniques.”
• By consequence of the above remark in previous centuries it has been impossible to
determine bodily sex with 100% certainty in all cases. From this observation alone
it follows that b-sex is to some extent socially constructed, a paradoxical conclusion
by all means. However, we do not know whether or not, when the bible was written,
people were aware that bodily sex could not be assigned at birth with 100% certainty
in all cases.
• Making sense of the situation is simplified by considering endo-gender as one of the
forms of formal gender, in fact representing a “true” formal gender of a person at
a given time. Taking on board the still speculative assumption that endo-gender at
birth can be determined with 100 % certainty with the help of a b-sex determination
protocol making use of genetic information etc. it may be assumed that before say
1900 (with modern analytical methods still not yet available) the determination of
sex (i.e. b-sex) at birth in some cases failed to identify the endo-gender of a newborn,
say P . In such cases (when contemplating what happened in hindsight) one would
expect rather than be surprised about P ’s intent of transgendering if that were to
become manifest.
• Given the fact that (in previous centuries) only visual inspection of genitals was
available as a method for assigning gender at birth there must have been some non-
determinism in case of ANAB (assigned b-neutral at birth) persons for whom some
choice must be made. Said non-determinism is hard to reconcile with [41] (item 5),
however, where the The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is quoted:
the importance and the meaning of sexual difference, as a reality deeply
inscribed in man and woman, needs to be noted. “Sexuality characterizes
man and woman not only on the physical level, but also on the psycho-
logical and spiritual, making its mark on each of their expressions.”It

12
 cannot be reduced to a pure and insignificant biological fact”, but rather
“is a fundamental component of personality, one of its modes of being,
of manifestation, of communicating with others, of feeling, of expressing
and of living human love.” This capacity to love–reflection and image
of God who is Love–is disclosed in the spousal character of the body, in
which the masculinity or femininity of the person is expressed.

Indeed if, lacking sufficient morphological/anatomical information, instead genetic

information is used for assigning sex at birth then after all “sex is reduced to a pure
and insignificant biological fact”. Modern medical insights on gender dysphoria,
including various treatments, allow to prevent precisely that from happening.

• In Item 17 of [41] it is suggested that medical treatment of gender dysphoria or gen-

der incongruence always “aims at transforming the sex characteristics of a body in
to the sex characteristics of the opposite sex”. The latter claim, however, is uncon-
vincing for gender (re)affirmative interventions aiming at transneutral gender status.

• The statement in [41] subscribes to the side of Byrne in “Dembroff versus Byrne” as
discussed in our [10, 11], where b-sex is determined at birth with a protocol that uses
M/E-sex as the first take on b-sex, while relying (in the terminology of [11]) on CS-
sex, GoS-sex, and GmS-sex. The details of such reliance are left to the discretion
of medical staff, so that a person’s gender is in part determined by the medical staff
involved in the process of birth.

• The arguments used to decide (the key issue raised in) Dembroff versus Byrne
in [41] are entirely theological, and are therefore disjoint from the arguments used
by Byrne. In [11], however, we have argued for a position that is closer to Dem-
broff’s position than to Byrne’s conclusion, which for that reason contradicts the
position voiced in [41].

4.2 Further rules

• RCC is able and willing to interact with local persons and organizations in terms of
the general rules per jurisdiction as mentioned above. In particular RCC will use and
understand the term “gender” even if only natural gender is in conformance with the
views of RCC (so that from the perspective of RCC gender seems to be a redundant
notion).

• RCC adopts defeasible essentialism as a paradigm for reading bible texts: e.g. “ev-
eryone is male or female” is understood as: with the exception of special categories

13
 of persons, all persons are male or are female. Thus: non-existence of gender neutral
persons cannot be inferred from mere reading of bibles texts as universally quanti-
fied assertions.

• RCC adopts the gender assignment for persons as it is provided by the local jurisdic-
tion. Thus, even if, say RCC opposes transgendering at an institutional level, RCC
will interact with transmen (according to the local jurisdiction) as if they are male
and with transwomen as if they are female.

• RCC has its local policy rules for dealing with their own staff, as well as with the
members of the church when they are transgendering. For instance:
(i) a rule may be that a priest upon becoming transsexed or transgendered will not
be a priest anymore,
(ii) a rule may be that a priest must be cis-cis-male.
(For the complications of designing and implementing such policies, see e.g. [16].)

• RCC may issue advice on medical treatments as provided by RCC institutions (hos-
pitals, clinics etc.) For instance there may be a negative advice about providing
gender reassignment therapy.

• When new members of RCC are welcomed these persons are initially incorporated
with their gender as given by the local jurisdiction, and without any question about
or investigation of b-sex.

• If a transman or a transwoman enters the RCC then their status as transman or

transwoman may be made public (within RCC) and must neither be challenged nor
be made a cause for any form of negative discrimination against them. In other
words, transmen and transwomen will not be asked to hide their past, and will at the
same time be treated as men and women respectively.
We notice that in XII 9 of [28] the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) explicitly states
otherwise: new members of the ROC can only be baptized under their gender as-
signed at birth.

• RCC accepts that the rule for incorporating new members creates a necessity for
RCC to be able and willing to speak and think in terms of gender theory. RCC
promises to interact in terms of the terminology of gender theory when appropriate
(here a promise is meant in the sense of promise theory [9]).

14
 • The RCC also acknowledges that it is challenge (for RCC members and officials)
to interact with transgender persons in a respectful manner, in spite of fundamental
differences of opinion. RCC acknowledges that acceptance of homosexuals was
long overdue, and is now taking place in many dioceses.

• The RCC (or rather its local officials) acknowledges that it has a successful tradition
of learning on the long term, paired with a tradition of top-down resistance against
“the obvious” on the short term, where short term may easily amount to a century or
more. (See e.g. [31].)

4.3 The RCC position is gender critical

We notice that the RCC’s position on gender may safely be considered gender critical. We
very much disagree with the connection that is laid between gender critical thinking and
genocide on the site of the Lemkin institute (see [32] as of March 2023), however, and
we see no grounds whatsoever for such outrageous claims. The Lemkin Institute creates a
formidable disservice to gender theory by casting differences of opinion in that manner.
Investigating the incorporation of gender in RCC doctrine is by no means a new sub-
ject, proposals to that extent may be found e.g. in [43]. RCC views on gender theory are
said to be in discourse coalition with Russian Orthodox views in [29].

4.4 Other RCC views on gender and sex

With USCCB-GT-2018 we denote the resources on gender theory of the USCCB dated in
2018 [40] consisting of a catalogue of snippets of information regarding the RCC (read
USCCB) position on gender. That catalogue has been collected by the USCCB and it
displays an unfortunate landmark of (binary) heteronormative cis-genderism.
We notice that USCCB-GT-2018 does not acknowledge the relevance of sexual orien-
tation, and does not provide moral space for the lives of homosexuals who do not cherish
the perspective of a heterosexual marriage. These matters are relevant because the exis-
tence of homosexual persons has been established as a scientific fact as well as the lack
of effect of so-called conversion therapies. Changing one’s sexual orientation is very dif-
ficult, and cannot be asked from arbitrary persons. It follows that the RCC catechism as
quoted in USCCB-GT-2018 (and as below and as quoted below from that source) fails to
pay proper attention to persons who are not heterosexual.

(No. 2333) “Everyone, man and woman, should acknowledge and accept his
sexual identity. Physical, moral, and spiritual difference and complementarity
are oriented toward the goods of marriage and the flourishing of family life.

15
 The harmony of the couple and of society depends in part on the way in which
the complementarity, needs, and mutual support between the sexes are lived
out.”

(No. 2393) “By creating the human being man and woman, God gives per-
sonal dignity equally to the one and the other. Each of them, man and woman,
should acknowledge and accept his sexual identity.”

Remarkably USCCB-GT-2018 skips the trivial observation that the RCC just as well pro-
claims a gender theory which might be termed a gender ideology. Given the fact that
the RCC version of gender theory is in contradiction with several US laws it would be
plausible that the USCCB acknowledges that they maintain some form of Roman Catholic
Gender Theory (RCGT) which, as do proponents of most alternative gender theories, they
claim to be universally valid for all of mankind.
How different is the situation in the Church of England, in [24] the details of welcom-
ing transgender persons in various services are detailed. Anglican bishops are openly split
on the matter of same sex marriage, however.

4.5 Connection of RCC gender theory with “Dembroff versus Byrne”

The controversy “Dembroff versus Byrne” (see [10, 11]) captures, as a theme in analytical
philosophy the questions “what is a woman?” and “what is a man?”, where Byrne defends
the classical, though philosophically novel, position (AHF/AHM) that a (wo)man is an
adult human (fe)male, thereby making redundant the concept of gender, while Dembroff
denies the arguments fielded by Byrne. Various bodies within the Roman Catholic Church
(RCC) have recently produced statements, among which USCCB-GT-2018, which may be
understood as a more detailed version of Byrne’s position, where additional detail comes
about from being more precise about assigning sex at birth. Remarkably the arguments
put forward in USCCB-GT-2018 side have little overlap with Byrne’s arguments.
We find that the arguments for AHF and AHM as put forward by the USCCB are
needlessly non-modern, technically unconvincing, and logically inconsistent. We suggest
defeasible gender essentialism as a path towards a modern RCC compatible take on the
(in)validity of AHM and AHF.
We notice that a (wo)man may be defined as an adult human with (fe)male gender. The
position of Byrne implies that for male and female individuals, the gender equals b-sex,
and consequently the introduction of the concept of gender has nothing to offer. It also fol-
lows from AHF and AHM that an adult human, say P , of neutral gender must have neutral
b-sex. Otherwise if P is (fe)male P is a (wo)man, and has gender (fe)male. It follows that

16
assuming AHF and AHM formal gender corresponds to b-sex, so that introducing a notion
of formal gender has no merit.

5 GenCPn,m
We will now describe GenCPn,m in three stages: requirements, protocol specification, and
metaprotocol. The metaprotocol describes how parameters for the protocol can be dynam-
ically adapted according to circumstances.

5.1 Requirements on GenCPn,m

The following requirements will be met. The tag PCGSId (potential compromise of gen-
der self-identification) which is present with some of the requirements indicates that a
requirement may involve compromising for a person P , P ’s gender self-identification in
some phase of their life, by having a different gender categorization for P than P ’s self-
identification (i.e. than P ’s gender identity).
If elements of a political (say feminist) agenda are represented in this collection of
requirements that state of affairs is rather by accident the case than by intention.
1. A 3G gender framework is adopted together with a classical gender theory. By
consequence combi-gender labels like female-neutral, male-neutral, or male-female
are not used.

2. Transsexed persons change b-sex, and change natural gender correspondingly (in
other words the notion of b-sex at use is transition permisssive).

3. Transgender individuals may but need not be transsexed (i. e. have made a b-sex
transition).

4. Detransitioning is acknowledged, and detransitioning need not involve a move back

to the original gender (usually GAAB). Upon transitioning (or partially transition-
ing) MTF or FTM a detransitioning step towards neutral gender is an option (see
e.g. [35] where a nuanced perspective on detransitioning is proposed which goes
beyond mere regret, and which casts in a plausible manner transitioning as a mean-
ingful phase in advance of detransitioning).

5. An expected correspondence of 75% or more with natural gender.

6. (PCGSId requirement) Sex typing involves a serious attempt to fit in the natural
gender as assigned from birth.

17
 7. (PCGSId requirement) Sex typing mechanisms for AFAB and AMAB persons (or
better called gender typing mechanisms) are allowed enough time for the population
to create adequate circumstances for reproduction. This criterion gives rise to the
parameter n below which neither b-sex transition nor gender transition is allowed
(under normal circumstances).

8. There are no assumptions on sex typing (i.e. gender typing) for ANAB persons
(assigned b-neutral at birth) because there is little or none experience with such
cases.

9. (Barnes’ assignment requirement) Persons who are actually incapable of gender

self-identification (thereby producing ⊥ as their gender) will be gender categorized
by an independent agent who focuses on the individual best interests of said person.
The proposal to make an agent provide gender categorization for persons incapable
of self-identification is taken from [4].

10. (Extended Barnes’ assignment requirement) Persons who are considered incapable
of (advantageous, for them) gender self-identification will be gender categorized by
an independent agent who focuses on the individual best interests of said person.

11. (PCGSId requirement) There is a minimum age (parameter n of the protocol) for
transgendering for AFAB persons and for AMAB persons.

12. ANAB persons may be transgendered to male gender or female gender below the
age of n under watch of professional consultation and on the proposal of parents.

13. (PCGSId requirement) There may be a phase of pre-transgendering where in ex-

pectation of a forthcoming gender transition gender typing into the current natural
gender is discontinued. This step is always performed under professional consulta-
tion.

14. There is an age (parameter m of the protocol) above which anyone may transgender
according to their gender self-identification. Above age n transgendering may but
need not be preceded by a phase of pre-transgendering. The latter choice is made by
the transgendering individual themselves.

15. All gender neutral persons who are not cis-neutral have self-identified as neutral and
have been considered capable of doing so.

18
 v1
5.2 Description of GenCPn,m
We describe version 1 of the protocol, assuming that suggestions obtained from readers
may provide input for subsequent modification and improvement, and to further versions
of the protocol.
Reasonable choices for n and m (counting in years) are n = 10 and m = 30. A team
of experts must contain an experienced physician, a (developmental) psychologist, and a
biologist (in case of b-neutral assignments).

1. At birth of P a b-sex is assigned to P resulting in AFAB, AMAB or ANAB (assigned

b-neutral at birth, see [10]). There must be two independent specialists arriving at
the same judgement, otherwise a third specialist must be asked to help out. If three
different results were obtained the result is ANAB.

2. The b-sex assignment is done with M/E-sex as discussed in our [11]. We assume
that M/E-sex is a version of anatomic/endocrynologic biological sex which is tran-
sition permissive, that is: at least in some cases a combination of medical treatments
(typically involving both surgery and possibly permanent hormonal interventions)
may change a b-sex assessment into either male or female. Under these somewhat
uncommon conditions, natural gender is transition permissive as well as it simply
follows b-sex (which is transition permissive by assumption).

3. The gender life-cycle of a person is started immediately after birth by adopting the
gender corresponding to b-sex at birth (thereby mapping male to male, female to
female, b-neutral to neutral).

4. Until age n care takers are advised to work towards gender typing corresponding
with the natural gender. (There is no obligation of this kind, and the details of
upbringing with adequate gender typing will vary with societal conventions.)

5. Between ages n and m one or more of the following processes may take place once
or more (though in such a manner that at most three times the b-sex is changed, if at
all):

• The situation is kept unchanged and no event triggers any investigation into the
appropriateness of natural gender for P .
• caretakers may work towards reassignment oriented gender typing under the
following condition:
(i) the subject has expressed a corresponding wish and has convinced a local
team of experts of the plausibility of that intention,

19
 (ii) each quarter there is an inspection by a local team of experts to confirm
that the plan for reassignment is still adequate,
• treatment for gender dysphoria may change the b-sex of P (most plausibly
towards b-neutral). Then gender re-categorization follows suit (so that natural
gender categorization is preserved).
• With consent of and under permanent watch of the local expert team a full
reassignment therapy may be carried out making P transsexed and ending in
corresponding gender recategorization.
• With consent of and under permanent watch of the local expert team a par-
tial reassignment therapy may be carried (the therapy being ended by lack of
expected success) failing to make P transsexed as required and now, in consul-
tation with the local expert team the envisaged gender may (but need not) be
chosen for categorization. These steps are constrained by the rule 4.1 (FTMp)
and 4.4 of our [11].
We notice that transitions under this clause are transitions of gender which
cannot be explained as transitions of b-sex according to the notion of M/E-sex
that is used to “implement” b-sex. In other words, these transitions are proper
gender transitions. At the same time these rules are very limited and one may
easily imagine more liberal rules. We aim at a gender categorization protocol
that is very consiervative while still giving room for both b-sex transition and
proper transgendering.

6. At age m or above the person is allowed to switch gender at will, though in to-
tal at most 5 switches will be permitted (including a switch at death). As AGT
(see [20]) becomes well developed it is envisaged that self-identification will be
AGT informed.
The upper bound 5 is chosen higher than what is now used in several jurisdictions.
A second switch may happen after a first switch did not yet lead to a satisfactory
outcome. A third switch may take place if, after two switches, a person becomes
transneutral, a fourth switch may take place at death. At the writing we see no
rational of allowing more than 5 switches.

7. At death a person is finally assigned the last gender unless

(i) the person has written a will, and
(ii) the will of the person indicates another gender which is then taken as the gender
at death (unless a total of 5 switches has already been reached in which case the last
gender is taken for the gender at death).

20
 v1
5.3 Meta-protocol for GenCPn,m
Not part of the gender categorization protocol proper, and not formally described here, is
a mechanism which moves the bounds n and m up and down. These moves are part of a
meta-protocol which may be extended to add and remove rules for gender categorization.
These moves will require decision taking at a political level.
The lower bound n is moved up if demographic studies indicate an unwanted increase
in youth transgendering to neutral gender, the lower bound can be decreased in the opposite
circumstances.
The upper bound can be increased if too many non-obvious transgendering events take
place so that worries about preservation of societal reproduction are justified. The upper
bound may be lowered in the opposite circumstances. The idea that at most 25% of the
population has gender different from gender assigned at birth is leading for these moves.

6 Concluding remarks
We have adopted elements of the terminology of Barnes 2022 [4] in order to obtains some
uniformity. By consequences the need arises to translate developments on other work into
the terminology derived from [4], which is done with Turyn 2023 [39]. We expect that
similar translations of terminology will be needed when making use of new developments
for writing further work in this line of research.

6.1 Deviating from the fully-subjective gender self-categorization

It is an underlying assumption of the protocol that gender and b-sex can be meaningfully
distinguished and that the Dembroff [27] versus Byrne [22] controversy (with [23] as the
first step of round 2) is resolved in favour of Dembroff’s position. That assumption has
been confirmed in our [11].
We are aware that, by deviating from the fully-subjective position on gender, the above
protocol may trigger transphobia accusations (see [10] for a catalogue of related accusa-
tions and [12, 13] for the accusation concept). We rely on [15] for arguments which allow
for a discrepancy between gender identity and gender categorization (for a specific person
P ).
Implicit in the protocol is that below age m any participant is supposed to promise
(see [9]) to be open to the local team of experts about intentions for transgendering and
about discussing the how and why of such intentions. If such promises cannot be made ad-
ditional scrutiny may follow when wishes for transgendering are merely formulated with-
out further backing or attempt to validation. We refer to [17, 19] for additional justification

21
for caution with transgendering to neutral at an early age.
v1
We emphasize that GenCPn,m is merely one of many possible gender categorization
protocols. It uses all available mechanisms (including sexual transition), however, and it
makes proper use of a notion of gender, i.e. the protocol can be hardly explained without
making use of a gender architecture that deviates from gender assigned at birth.

6.2 On the need for gender categorization protocols

We will not embark on the question why b-sex (biological sex) or gender is not simply
considered a private personal attribute which, like much medical information, is left in
the private sphere and is dismissed as a possible entry on questionnaires for all sorts of
purposes. Bem (e.g. [6]) motivated her work with an intention to reduce the relevance of
b-sex as much as possible, by using a catalogue of more specific characteristics instead.

6.3 A remark on sexual orientation

Perhaps the most important theme where notions of b-sex and gender play a role is sexual
orientation. Although freedom of sexual orientation is legally guaranteed in many juris-
dictions, at the same time sexual orientation is still a source of legal problems for citizens
of many countries. And even in te presence of legal protection persons of diverse sexual
orientation may find that enforcement of such protections is a different matter.
We tried to determine to what extent formal gender, psycho-bio gender or social gender
play, or might play a role in defining concepts in connection with sexual orientation. We
were unable to find anything worth reporting, the state of the field is remarkably confusing.
Our starting point is the account of conceptualizations of sexual orientation in Sell
1997 [37]. Sell provides a history if the field from it inception (as a topic for academic
work) around 1880. Sell also explains in detail why it is so difficult to make significant
progress in this subject.
Then Salomaa & Matsick 2019 [36] provide a successor survey reporting significant
progress w.r.t. [37]. A notable next step is made by Sari van Anders with SCT (sexual
configurations theory) [42]. SCT initiates a new path of investigation, though with consid-
erable complexity. SCT seems to be the state if the art about defining sexual orientation.
SCT seems to us to be too complex for practical purposes, however. In SCT the formal
notion of gender plays a minor role only, as far as we can see. In SCT use is made of
psycho-bio gender and of social gender, however.
As with b-sex and gender an alternative path towards defining sexual orientation is of
a philosophical nature. However, while the analytical philosophy of b-sex and gender is
flourishing, the analytical philosophy of sexual orientation culminates in a single paper by

22
Robin Dembroff in 2016 [26]. We are unconvinced that the formalistic approach of [26]
sheds much light on the subject. For instance for [26] a typical SO (sexual orientation) is
(in our terminology replacing non-binary by neutral): (male, neutral) i.e. “ being sexually
attracted to b-sex males with neutral gender”. We are unconvinced that there is any evi-
dence for isolating (male, neutral), alternatively denoted as MTN transneutral, as a notable
category in the context of SO.
In the context of a philosophical approach to SO some further remarks can be made:
in [45] it is proposed that categorical phenomenalism be taken as the defining criterion for
sexual orientation, we quote:

Categorical Phenomenalism What it is for x to be sexually oriented to y is

for x to phenomenally experience sexual arousal in response to y in virtue of
the features that constitute y’s manhood, womanhood, etc.

At face value the above definition relies on social gender rather than on formal gender
as we assume that with manhood is meant “to have b-sex male” etc. As [45] indicates
it requires observations and statistics, with to some extent arbitrary thresholds to work
from a definition of sexual orientation between two specific individuals to a judgement
regarding the sexual orientation of a single person which may endure over a longer period
of time.
For trans people defining notions of sexual orientation seems to be an unfinished matter
of current research. Susalka [38] maintains that it is essential for an understanding of
a substantial percentage of transfolk that “...there are men living in ‘women’s’ bodies
and women living in ‘men’s’ bodies.” Moreover Susalka suggests that a posthumanistic
approach will allow to make sense of this state of affairs as a manifestation of variation
rather than as a manifestation of deviance.
Arguing against the style of [38] we would claim that recognizing and properly un-
derstanding what it means for a woman to have been born in a man’s body, and not to
experience any mismatch in need for a cure, is a precondition for the development of a
second class of transnormative persons (besides those who have gone through thorough
medical reassignment therapy). Defining sexual orientation in a way that applies to “male
in female” or “female in male” transfolk is a challenge which has been taken on board
in [26], but as stated above we are as yet unconvinced or the formalistic approach chosen
by in [26].
Bartram 2023 [5] starts with the assumption that sexual orientation is determined dur-
ing prenatal brain development. On the basis of that assumption various data sets can
better be analysed without any control variables. Following [38] the approach taken in [5]
is based on homonormativity as well as on heteronormativity, and for that reason would be
without merit for transgender people. In practice, however, all that is known about sexual

23
orientation seems to be rooted in cis-cis-gender heterosexual, homosexual and bisexual
behaviour. Published work about sexual orientation of various categories of trans people
is very limited.

6.4 On (pseudo)disambiguation
The issue of disambiguation and pseudo-disambiguation has bothered one of the authors
(JAB) in other contexts as well. For instance in [7] it is argued that there is no such thing
as a fraction. Pseudodisambiguation of fraction leads to: formal fraction (an expression
with a numerator and a denominator) and mathematical fraction (a quantity which equals
the result of dividing an integer by a non-zero integer). In many contexts (in particular in
arithmetical education at school) mathematical fraction can be taken for ‘rational number’.
In [7] ‘fracterm’ is used as a shorthand for formal fraction.
A complication with disambiguating fraction is that there are a range of notions in
between of formal fraction and mathematical fraction that merit attention as well. For that
reason [7] takes focus on the notion of fracterm and does not pretend to provide a definitive
account of the meanings of fraction.
In [8] a definition is given of the notion of an algorithm. As it turns out two notions
have to be developed in tandem: informal algorithm and algorhyme. Here one might
think of algorhyme as formal algorithm and of informal algorithm, where the informal
algorithm (or perhaps psychological algorithm) is a human readable rendering of the idea
that is incorporated by the algorhyme.
We speak of pseudo-disambiguation in cases where disambiguation is applied to a
word or phrase, the ambiguity of which is initially non-obvious.

6.5 Future work

We feel that developing a Roman Catholic Gender Theory (perhaps in tandem with a
Russian Orthodox Gender Theory) is a worthwhile path of which only the beginning has
been developed above. Similar gender theories may be developed for other religions. For
instance the Islamic tradition in Iran gives rise to a completely different Gender Theory,
see our [10]. We feel that gender theory may in due time provide a framework which
helps comparing different specializations of it, and which allow the various jurisdictions
and policies to be properly modeled.

24
6.6 Acknowledgements
We have profited from several suggestions made by Marcus Düwell (TU Darmstadt). John
Tucker (Swansea University) has provided detailed comments on several versions of the
paper.

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