POL3217 | Comparative Politics

August 11, 2022 (Thu - AS)

Reading 1: The Man in the Baghdad cafe

Main Idea: what civilization you belong matters less than actuality

● Goering: grimaced whenever he heard culture. Culture was defined to be the foundational driving
force on human behavior shortly after the Cold War ended.
● Culture is so imprecise and changeable it explains less that what most people think
● Bernard Lewis (history of ME): The dominating factor in the consciousness of most MEasterners has been
the impact of Europe, the West generally later on, and the corresponding transformation it brought
○ He focused more on how cultural identity changes (deemed to be the least studied in the area)
● Samuel Huntington: The clash of civilizations and remaking of world order
○ Henry Kissinger, a state secretary, defined Huntington’s essay as one of the most important
books following the end of the cold war
○ Huntington claimed that the dominating source of conflict is not primarily ideological nor
economic, but cultural
■ After the cold war, culture seemed to be more fit as the organizing principle of foreign
policy rather than ideology

■ Future wars would be between nations and civilizations, eventually dominating global
politics and these disputes will possibly be outlines for future battle-lines

Culture and cultural identities are shaping cohesion, disintegration and conflict patterns in the post-cold war
setting, and global politics is becoming alterized as a result

○ Hungtington looked at the influence of culture on international conflict

● Culture and economy: the oldest schools holding cultural values and norms either equip the people
and the country for economic success or not
○ Max Weber’s protestant work ethic investigation claims that this notion is the reason why
protestant parts in Germany/Switzerland were more successful economically than Catholic
areas (more conservative)
○ Lawrence Harrison claims that values and attitudes - culture, are mainly responsible for a
country’s performance and current situation in different areas e.g. economy
○ Thomas Sowell’s Race and Culture: A world view explains that academics plays a small role in
possible disdain in commerce and industry and that e.g. Asian values as a Confucian work
ethic has helped aid economic development more in some countries e.g. Lee Kuan Yew
(Singapore’s former prime minister)
● Culture as a social blueprint
○ Robert Putnam traced the social and political institutions of Italy to its civic culture and found out
that fully developed democratic institutions are similar to areas that initially began those
institutions back in the 14th century. He concluded that democracy is part of a country’s social
fabric that takes a long time to develop
○ Francis Fukuyama focuses more on trust and its inherent level in a society and claims that this
social and cultural trait conditions a nation’s well being and ability to compete.
■ He argues that low-trust societies wherein close relations are mostly limited in families are
at a competitive disadvantage due to their inefficiency in creating large/complex social
institutions unlike high-trust nations
● Low-trust nations: China, SoKor, Italy, | High-trust nations: Germany, Japan, US
● Culture and decision making
○ Politicians all around the world see the same issue differently due to differing cultural
backgrounds -> this led them to claim culture as an international barrier
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○ Ole Egstrom cites a situation wherein a Japanese prime minister means no when he claims he
will do his best to implement a certain policy, while Americans applaud for a victory -> erupting
misperceptions in international relations brought by culture. It sparks arguments -
■ Would it be right for Huntington to group all Europeans into one culture despite having
different languages, while Separating Mexico and Spain that speak the same language?
■ With Fukuyama’s claim, why did China grow fast despite having few companies? And
how was South Korea able to create big firms?
○ What is culture in the first place? Most define it as what people think of themselves as part of. For
Hungtington, civilization serves as the broadest level of identification a person highly identifies
■ Problem: few people intensely identify with a broad identification level but narrower -
nation or ethnic groups
● In a poll created in Europe, findings show that 70% identified more in terms of their
nation rather than a general European. It shows that national loyalty can still
coexist with cultural identification although the former is capable of
overpowering the latter due to national characteristics that come off as more
unique
○ Seymour Martin Lipset defined this as American Exceptionalism
○ David Wiletts a conservative mentioned that policies by opposition labour
party goes against the grain of English exceptionalism
○ In Islamic countries, cultural identification is deemed stronger than national identification but
national loyalty in other cultures is preeminent
■ For Huntington, Thai, Tibet, and Mongolia are all Buddhists, but in terms of national
identification it will be hard to say that the three have a lot in common - hence
subjective identification is hard to apply
○ Bernard Lewis’ man in the Levantine cafe: Culture/s is/are a bundle of characteristics although
such are ambiguous
● Culture as muddle (cause of disorder)
○ Islamic values are assumed to be the direct opposite of modern western ones (tradition is good
but departure from it is bad). But Islam is monotheistic and ecourages rationalism and science
○ Confucian tradition at present puts emphasis on the importance of hardwork, savings and
investment for the future and cooperation for a single end - and this heavily influenced Asian
growth
■ Max Weber saw it however in a different light, he believed that Confucian tradition
lessened competitiveness and innovation due to strict obedience to parental authority -
which prevented economic success
○ Same cultures embrace conflicting features producing entirely different effects at different times
○ Culture never operates in isolation and is always part of a wider mix when affecting behavior -
the mix includes gov’t policies and economic changes
● Culture as passenger
○ Influence of ideas during the cold war was considered as a giant organizing principle, however
the cold war divided the world between communists and capitalists - all of us mostly in the
latter.
○ The government is deemed to be falling unlike cultures who are almost capable of replacing
states in other parts of the country.
■ Huntington - nations having the same culture are coming together…and vice versa
■ The gov’t however controls the army, a powerful force in any country. And gov’ts
influence cultures as much as vice versa. They are also able to act positively to create
something new and beneficial for their nation, but the opposite can also happen e.g.
destroy a culture when they collapse.
● Robert Kaplan’s The Ends of the Earth concludes that the effect of a culture is
more a mystery at then end rather than at the beginning - government collapse
causes cultural turbulence as much as vice versa
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● Culture as processed data

○ In the knowledge era, culture remains as a primary engine of change 1) new era has the
makings of a world culture 2) beginnings of international professional class cutting across cultural
and national boundaries
■ Fukayama says unfolding of modern natsci guarantees increasing uniformity of all
human societies
■ Others think that technology and innovation is just modern western culture, and not a
way for a new world order
○ The concept that modernity is set to collide with culture is seen in the books of cultural writers -
Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs McWorld argues than main conflicts in the present will be mostly
tribal-local-cultural (Jihad) and McWorld of technology and demoracy
○ The world market is not a cultural concept - globalisation is causing large changes in every
society
○ The knowledge era spreads economic idea and they have 3 cultural effects
■ 1) cultures rub each other - international friction 2) tie different cultures closer 3) increase
tension within a culture - some embrace the new world and some do not
● Culture will still continue to influence but mostly they are secondary (a reaction of
the knowledge era)

Conclusion: the role of culture might be declining rather than the opposite due to being stuck between the
reigns of government expansion and globalisation

Reading 2: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics

● 1) Committed to possibility -> generating systematic body of theoretical knowledge about politics. The
discipline advances through theoretical discovery/innovation. 2) Embrace catholic approach to
comparative methodology

Theory and Methods

● Some research designs/methods for gathering and analyzing evidence are not fruitful. But techniques
employed by comparativists (econometric analysis of cross national data sets and observational data)
eploy a variegated toolkit to make sense of pol processes and outcomes

● Starkest shift in compol: rise of statistical studies of large numbers of countries

○ Compol frequently entailed not making comparisons but studying the politics of a foreign
country
❖ Almond and Verba: The Civic Culture - compared citizens’ attitudes in 5 countries
❖ John Gerring contends - neither case studies/large-N comparisons are purely good, both have
compromises and is advised to retain both approaches in repertoire
➢ Case studies: for building theory and insights, internal validity, allows for exploration of causal
mechanisms
➢ Large N research: good for confirming/refuting theory, external validity, allows for identification
of causal effects
❖ Elizabeth Wood: expounds on the dangers of giving up field research. Interacting personally w/ subjects
in a natural setting -> only way to get crucial research questions. Interview subjects may be
evasive/dissimulating. Researchers may also have strong reactions that may color conclusions
❖ James Mahoney and Celso Villegas discuss comparative historical studies (another variant of quali
research), it asks questions about causes of major outcomes in specific cases.
➢ In contrast Large N researchers are concerned with generalizing ave causal effects for large
populations and do not seek to explain specific outcomes in particular cases
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➢ M&V discuss recent methodological developments - identification of necessary conditions,

Boolean algebra to uncover interactive causal effects, fuzzy set logic
➢ Definition of primary historical research - primary sources as those that describe past events at
the time they were occurring w/ exception of diaries. Archival sources are functional equivalent
for personal interviews for field researchers. Government documents are like primary sources but
produce for public consumption
❖ Rober Franzese defends large N, quanti techniques against some critiques
➢ Comparative political scientists are afflicted with 4 problems: 1) tradeoff btw quali/tity in data
collection 2) multicausality 3) context-conditionality 4) endogeneity
➢ Imprecision in large numbers shouldn’t make you adapt a qualit study of small numbers - altho
precise they fail to have strong conclusions
❖ Adam Przeworski offers less optimistic perspective on observational research, Large N/otherwise
➢ Endogeneity cannot deal adequately w/ endogeneity problems (study causes of effects and
effects of causes)
➢ To identify causal effects -> assumptions, and assumptions are untestable
➢ Observed, unobserved, unobservable
❖ Robert Bates argues on should do theoretically sophisticated work informed by game theory
➢ 1) apprehension 2) explanation
➢ For him, explanatory drive should begin w/ assumption of rationality and use game theory to
impose structure on observed phenomena -> validation -> test of confirmation
❖ Elinor Ostrom “the theory of collective action is the central subject of political science and its problem
is rooted in a social dilemma -> rational indivs in pursuit of optimal outcome may not cooperate even if
it’s in their interest”
➢ She calls for shift towards theory of boundedly rational, norm-based human behavior. Humans
are adaptive creatures

States, States Formation, and Political Consent

❖ Hendrick Spruyt
❖ Russel Hardin
❖ Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood
❖ Ashutosh Vashney

Political Regimes and Transitions

❖ Christian Welzel and Ronal Inglehart

❖ Barbara Geddes
❖ Hobbes
❖ Almond and Verba Sabetti
❖ Gambetta
❖ Coleman
❖ Putnam
❖ Juan Linz
❖ Ronald Wintrobe

Political Instability, Political Conflict

❖ Steven Pincus
❖ Goldstone
❖ Przeworski - MB
❖ Kalyvas
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❖ Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly

❖ Lichbach and de Vries

Mass Political Mobilization

❖ Carles Boix
❖ Herbert Kitschelt
❖ Ann Wren and Kenneth McElwain
❖ Frances Hagopian and Susan Stokes
❖ Pippa Norris
❖ Verba and Nie
❖ Coleman and Putnam - MB

Processing Political Demands

❖ Bingham Powell
❖ Rein Taagepera
❖ David Samuels
❖ John Ferejohn, Frances Rosenbluth, and Charles Shipan
❖ Pablo Beramendi
❖ Kaare Strom and Benjamin Nyblade
❖ William Riker

Governance in Comparative Perspective

❖ Raymond Dutch
❖ Nordhaus
❖ James Alt and Shanna Rose
❖ Matthew Carnes and Isabela Mares
❖ Cameron and Katsenstein
❖ Philip Keefer
❖ Jose Maria Maravall
❖ Timothy Frye

Looking Ahead

Module 1: Why are some states strong and other states weak? | Migdal, Slater, and Tilly | 8/30/22
UNORGANIZED

https://www.notion.so/Comparative-Politics-Notes-From-Seminars-49e695b449cd40ed85d703df8146aaa5 |
Module 1 Notes (Organized ver)

What is state capacity and why do we care about it? (Recitation)

● State capacity: ability and capability of states to enforce norms and tungkulin ng isang estado - state
functions, exercise of power
● It enables us to know why some states are weak/strong, and why states are able to do their functions
well and others incompetent. As citizens we are being affected by the capacities of our states - human
nature to be involved in this “state capacity”
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Why do we care about state capacity? (Intro)

● State capacity: “…penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate
or use resources…” (Migdal, 1987)
○ ability to accomplish intended state functions (economic, financial, political, social, etc)
● Interests of comparativists: Coercion and Taxation powers
○ 1. Order
○ 2. development outcomes

💡 If the state is unable to control and manage coercion and taxation, it will be hard to live in that specific
state. *Society will be hard to live in w/o a properly functioning state*

- low state capacity means law and order are compromised, life will be rooted in cruelty wherein violence will
proliferate, no system of penalties and mechanisms, no rights at all - social order is compromised

- Afghanistan (extreme case): failed state, social order vacuum, there are rebels due to little coercive
powers

- North Triangle Nations (extreme case): most violent nations (Guatemala or Honduras) → fails to enforce law
and order to mitigate the chaos

- low state capacity affects taxation: most of the time it is tied to developmental outcomes. A state should be
able to compel its constituents to pay taxes.

- sometimes it cannot compel influential families to pay taxes like the Marcos family.

- developmental outcomes: public housing, public education, public healthcare, etc.

- analytically we can separate coercion and taxation but they are intimately tied in practice

- low coercive power → security is compromised as well as law and order → low taxation capacity

💡 In a state where it cannot enforce law and order → likely the same for taxation in the area
- some state capacities in the world are in a spectrum rather than binary. The weaker the state, the poorer
state developmental outcomes are

- a lot of global south countries have weak state capacities, but the spectrum is very large

- E.g. Ph and Afghanistan are both weak states but not relatively the same

**Why do we care about state capacity?**

- it affects the basic conditions of life and society | social order → the very foundation of how we live as states

- not focused on young states but also old states as well. The Philippines for example is an old state but yet we
still face challenges in terms of state capacity
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**The direction of the relationship between state strength and taxation?**

- Analytically, some researchers suggest that it could go both ways.

- In practice/actual existing societies: you can’t really separate the two. Understand that any movement in
area of state capacity might affect the taxation capacity

- E.g. If you can’t put the Marcos family in jail for not paying taxes: low coercive capacity, low taxation
capacity (vice versa)

**Weak states and Strong societies? (Discussion and Recitation)**

💡 Migdal says that states in the global south that are 3rd world countries are considered weak states, but
have strong societies.

- there’s always a society within that weak state. Many of our societies actually predate the creation of our
states. States are very modern/recent in human history and are younger than societies.

- E.g. Ph: own rajas, family-centric rule in the past

- Migdal says that why some states are weak is because the society is stronger than the state, meaning there
are stronger social relationships within that state that challenges state legitimacy.

- E.g. Mindanao: Issues of illegal exports and imports from lower countries in the map → poor coercive and
taxation capacity **(Lens of state capacity)** | The relationship in that region predates the state and the state
is unable to overcome that strong relationship **(Lens of Migdal)**

- the capability of state to exercise social control: States are considered by Migdal to be one of the many
social organizations among social organizations. The state is being challenged for its legitimacy in the eyes of
the people.

- E.g. The state is as legitimate as the church, your family

- E.g. In times of disaster, you ask first sa immediate family for money, house → which is considered to be a
state function

- Why people do not comply to the state most of the time, it’s because they comply to the rules of other social
organizations that they find more legitimate and more applicable for their everyday lives. Social dominance in
society.

- E.g. Philippines in times of calamities are assisted by numerous NGOs (like Angat Buhay).

- A contribution to a weak state but strong society is a lack of social trust. → Lack of credibility and
trustworthiness of elected officials because people would rather donate to NGOs rather than the government
. *A natural phenomenon in weak states, strong society*

**Instances of strong states, weak societies?**

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- In the Philippines it is often a concern that sons and daughters are considered the retirement plan of their
parents, and it is expected because a weak state cannot guarantee those functions hence, you have to do it
yourself.

- In other countries, there is accessible healthcare, and pensions when you become old, which are exhibited
by a strong state. This however in turn becomes inconducive to establish strong ties/relations with social
organizations (like your family) because your needs are being provided by the state. *The state can take care
of them, so why would I take care of them?*

The case of Singapore:

- An example: Singapore. Civil society is restricted, religions cannot do things like processions, occupy public
streets. As if the only identity that matters to Singapore is their state. They are continuously repressing other kinds
of identities because they believe it can be a source of conflict for their society (they are ethically diverse). The
state does not want social organizations to step in and perform their supposed-to-be roles.

> Why we have strong families is that we have a weak state so they have to step in to provide the functions we
associate with the state. Electorally speaking, we are used to families running the state.

**The struggle for social dominance (Question)**

- In very strong states, they would like that all other social organizations are inferior to them.

- E.g. China: Bishops of Catholic church decisions are shared by the government

- Declining religiosity in other states is not caused by cultural effects, but rather the state has become so
dominant that they are not as influential as before.

- Socially, social organizations can exist but politically speaking, according to Migdal it is a struggle for social
control and social dominance

**Is there a middle ground? Middle-level outcome? (Question)**

- *It is difficult to build strong societies in places with strong social groups*
- Theoretically: that is possible.
- E.g. US can be an example of a strong state and strong society
- Politically: it can be but might be unstable because it can be a breeding ground or recipe for conflict if there
are equally dominant groups

**The case of Banana Republic (Recitation)**

- Guatemala was a weak state and the United Fruit Company emerged and blew up → They started building
infrastructure and railroads which sparked conflict and rivalry with the government. They were able to gather
enough support to overthrow the government.

And why should we care that states in the Global South are weak?
Weak states, strong societies (Migdal, 1987)
- state, as only one organization among many
- other social groups also exercises/imposes social control
- noncompliance to the state as indication of struggle for social dominance in a society
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**So why are some states strong and other states weak?**
> State building origins (how it was made) shape state capacity.

Charles Tilly (discussion and recitation) 1985

- states use or utilize war to further their goals, and that is what makes them strong in a way - developed
institutions that made them strong

💡 War makes states. (External)

- If the state was built to win wars/survive then it’s likely to end up in a strong state capacity

Dan Slater (discussion and recitation) 2010

- Protection pacts: convince elites to make this and with this, a state is more likely to end up strong

💡 Internal conflicts make states.

- if domestic elites experienced strong threats, then it’s likely that they would end up having a strong state
capacity

**War makes states (Tilly, 1985)**

- *role of wars in the creation of European states*: there was usually no consent during the time of war-making
→ all to succeed and win wars. Secure domestic territory first and foremost.
- War-making: gaining control of foreign territory
- Extraction: raising resources for war and state-making
- able to generate taxes
- Protection: safeguarding clients and their economic interests
- by paying taxes, we protect you from dangers. But the security threat is from the state itself. Technically a
scam.
- State-making: gaining control of domestic territory
- coercive and extractive capacity as significant state-building activities
- organizational legacies of war-making
- prior to creation of states, there were no central government police
- states began to realize that they needed loyal standing armies to the central government rather than
wasting their time trying to persuade the lords, and other influential houses.

**War-making and varieties of state capacity (Tilly)**

- variations of European states
1. Popular resistance to ‘coercive exploitation’: against scammer states
- consult aristocrats. Not going against individual rights (for other states).
2. Relative balance among war making, protection, extraction, and state making
- not all focused on them equally but depended based on their historical wars experienced, focusing on
what is more needed. This affects what state capacity will be built.
- colonial state-building process produced even more variation in states
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- Colonial military
- Extraction without protection: colonial in history

💡 It depends on whether states experience wars and how they are able to establish these 4 capacities that
determine if a state is strong or weak.

**Counter-intuitiveness of Tilly’s argument? How about those who went to wars but lost? Does war destroy
states? (discussion and recitation)**
- Empires are pre-states and these wars actually helped them create stronger states. For their organizational
legacy, they are able to build their state capacity.
- E.g. Roman Empire does not exist now but the technologies that they have passed on to recent roman
states enable a stronger state capacity

💡 As they lose wars, they are able to use it as a starting point to create stronger states.
- Wars have high risks but it is also highly rewarding that’s why some states risk being battered. If they win they
are able to acquire new territories and implement their system in those areas they conquered.

Case of Southeast Asia

- Those in the mainland usually are the stronger states which have developed stronger armies.

**Internal conflicts make states (Slater, 2010)**

- strong states as products of elite ‘protection pacts’
- Protection pacts: as products of elite collective or response to threats
- Possible threats: Ethnic groups, Communist, Religious types threats that mobilize the elites to come together
and make strong states

**Patterns of contentious politics and varieties of state capacity (Slater)**

💡 Different patterns mean producing different ways of responses and these affect the state capacity of the
states.

- Domination (Malaysia, Singapore): threat is urban, communal, and endemic

- social unrest, there was disorder, protests, and conflicts between groups that happened in cities, also the
ethnic dimension was wide and inclusive. Cities were shut down because of it. States in this pattern are made
for the groups to submit and overpower them.

- Fragmentation (Ph, Thailand): threat is rural, non-communal, and episodic

- the threat is mostly contained in rural areas, not much in terms of ethnic dimension. No existential
crisis/threat happened on the part of the elites. Rather than come together, the idea is we can handle our
own.

- E.g. Build a set-up of anarchy of political dynasties that have control to impose order on their area

- Militarization (Myanmar, Indonesia): threat is regional

- strong military capacity but that does not mean there is a strong state capacity.
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- E.g. Myanmar is a very abusive state as a response to threats from different ethnic groups throughout their
historY

**Questions of the Blocks**

**How do states with relatively weak to almost no establishment of protection pacts manage their state
capacity? (question)**

- that protection pact will eventually be challenged because there are no more threats that can mobilize the
agreement for that pact.

**Is a state able to remain in power without the influence of these elites? (question)**

- Slater attempted to talk about internal regime dynamics. Where protection pacts are established can
change the state capacity that these pacts are able to make. There will always be power struggles that can
affect.

💡 Important to remember that state formation takes time (historical moments). If you think that the threat
would only last 1 administration, it is not that much of a threat to you.

- E.g. In the next 6 years will the Duterte-Marcos administration be out of power? Not really, that’s when we feel
threatened. It will take years to have a completely united opposition. People should really feel the cost before
they override the collective action problem.

- Degree and form of threat matter.

**Is terrorism an existential threat that fosters state-making? (question)**

- Theoretically yes. Categorizing it, it is quite an episode rather than an endemic. But to a certain degree, it
could galvanize elites to create protection pacts.

**Why are some states strong and other states weak?**

- state building origins

- shaping state capacity
- via path dependence: the idea that institution origins are very path dependent, once they are created as
a response to a particular problem, it will persist and go on until the present time until there will be a moment
where it is changed through collective action
- may change if the collective action problem is overcome

💡 Path dependence: If your state was built strong/weak, it will remain that way until the moment of
collective action, challenges, etc.

- endogenous explanations
- state strength as outcomes rather than causes
- *institutions and political processes that we try to understand are treated as outcomes rather than causes*
POL3217 | Comparative Politics

Module 2: Where do democracies come from? Structural response| Moore and Ziblatt
Origins of Philippine democracy:
● Political families have learned how to gain elections, supportive of democracy and advocates of it in a
sense that they do not counter or reverse that political arrangement

Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy|Moore

Conflict and cooperation among feudal classes in modernizing Europe

Monarchy
● Has absolute powers, have royal absolutism

Rural Classes Urban Classes

Landlords Bourgeoisie: Like merchants, professionals, wealth

Aristocrats can be from trades across different territories,
Most of them derive their wealth and influence from practice of professions/skills
owning lands ● Capitalists
● Urban middle classes

Peasants Proletariat: In bad working situations

● Middle peasants: have at least means ● Workers
● Poor peasants ● Urban poor

● Cities are slowly become important places, and main places to create wealth and do commercial
activities

Moore’s Argument
● There is a particular combination of alliance of classes | democracy is a cooperation among several
feudal classes, and if this did not happen there would be a different pathway in terms of their society
● Argument: If the bourgeoisie would play a role in the transition toward a modernizing Europe, they
would most likely end up in a democracy. If other social classes would lead in the transition, they would
end up in a different political arrangement other than democracy.
● There are structural differences among agrarian or feudal societies that either favored or inhibited the
development of democracy.

💡 Moore: No bourgeoisie, no democracy.

Different routes to the Modern World|Moore
● Aimed to explain the trajectory of the transformation from agrarian societies in Europe to modern
industrial ones. Some became democracies, some did not. Used structural approach: he wanted to
focus on the conflict/cooperation among social classes, coalitions of these classes
○ E.g. Who are the social classes that elected PRRD? Looking at the structure of social classes for
every political development.

1. Capitalist Democratic Route

● Societies that ended up with a democracy. Countries like UK, France, US. Sa middle class
nanggaling ung threat to demcoratize.
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● Idea: there was a strong bourgeoisie that allied itself with other social classes, and it led the
other social classes in challenging the absolute monarchy and won democratic gains - they are
an advocate of democratization in their society
● Conduciveness to democ: The monarchy anjoys absolute powers, there was tension among
social classes. The monarchy mostly depends on aristocrats in terms of support like financial
support in wars and taxes. The convergence of interest btw aristocracy and bourgeoisie is that
the bigger/biggest threat would be the monarchy/crown because:
○ It is not accountable to anyone, not subject to negotiation. There would be activities by
the monarchy that poses existential threat to the two
○ This convergence of interest made them form an alliance. The way to balance the
power of the monarchy is through the introduction of constitutional monarchy or
parliamentary democracy -> the result of alliance btw Aristocrats and Bourgeoisie. They
can only secure the benefits of their alliance if it would have as much power as that of
the monarchy, which became the reason why they became an advocate of
parliamentary democracy.
○ After some time, the aristocrats became less and less important in the coalition and the
bourgeoisie gained the upper hand
■ Some factors for this: Cities kept growing, more transitions to capitalist societies.
○ Why didn’t the aristocrats fight the bourgeoisie? Ziblatt: Some of them realized they
could put a strong political party and also win elections so they are no longer
threatened by democracy. They only become anti-democratic if they are continuously
threatened and cannot win in elections against the bourgeoisie
2. Capitalist Reactionary Route:
● E.g. conservative revolution’s ending in facism in Germany, Japan
● Idea: bourgeoisie and aristocracy connived, formed a coalition -> meant to protect them from
the challenges made by the peasantry: a reactionary take because they were able to protect
their interests w/o giving any democratic concessions to the rest of the population
● The tension: the peasants are very strong, it poses fear that they may any time win control of the
government and start a revolution and win that revolution.
● The threat comes from the lower class but the upper class is more powerful here.
3. Communist Route:
● Countries like China and Russia. Peasant’s actions leading to communism
● Idea: the bourgeoisie was not really present, what is strong are the peasants and would be able
to overtake the aristocracy/monarchy. They ran a radical revolution from below leading to this
set-up
● Threat is coming from below and they are also more powerful.

Block Concerns
● England (freedom) and Germany (slavery), why did they both became democracy? No answer from
Moore. Democratization from strength: they are very powerful and later on they realise they have
nothing to fear and that in a democracy they can still win their interests.
● Case of India: colonial experience
● What is the ‘structural’ in the origins of democracy? Ziblatt: Social institutions like political parties
● Not to include colonial dynamism to Moore
● Coalitions are not synonymous with political parties. Not all organizations are parties
○ Political parties: institutional based, professionals know how to log elections
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● The peasant question? Leads to achievement of democracy? Moore: both theoretical and practical
issue, question of is there a peasant class and are there classes within the peasant class? What are the
interests of the peasant class? Differences in interests.
○ Peasant class: to own lands. Not applicable to the working class.

Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy|Ziblatt

💡 No strong conservative parties, no democracy

● Historical period of Ziblatt: more modern than Moore. This is an era of nearing democratic reforms in
society.
● Similarities with Moore and Ziblatt: There is tension and threat. The interest is the response of social
classes.
● Connection of strong conservative parties to the long run durability of democracy? Why does it go to
the outcome of a strong democracy?
● Conservative parties formed before and after universal suffrage (differences)
○ Those before: more leftist, are caught off guard - won’t perform as good and unable to establish
hierarchical conservative party -> likely to develop hostility to democracy (but there more
resources to mobilize if controlled)
● These incumbent conservative elites must feel secure and develop a bypin to democracy for
democracy to be given birth to and be endured -> primary mechanism for that is if they were able to
develop strong conservative parties
● Paradox of having these parties as actors ambivalent to democracy: would always feel that they are
threatened by democratization but at the same time their participation in the process (they agree to
do), they would endure it
● 2 ways how conservative elite parties have responded to the threat of democratic reforms
1. Strong response: building a strong hegemonic professional conservative party. Electoral
machinery capable of winning elections, mass network of supporters, institutionalized roles of
selection and recruitment, professionals involved. Together it is well planned and the whole
party is in control of the electoral process. This is conducive for the long run of democracy
because this gives them a bypin to democracy - they are less fearful and elss threatened by
democracy. They don't feel insecure and do not feel the need to oppose democratization -
they just always need to do better in coming elections
2. Weak response: instead of forming a political party (tedious and resource heavy) they would
just resort to easier actions of dishonesty (pandaraya: electoral fraud, manipulation, clientelism,
coercion, fear among voters. They don’t have an institutional base for their activities and would
always feel threatened that if a reformist government appears that they might be subjected to
reforms.

💡 Ziblatt argues that timing is also important among conservative elites in forming a bypin for democracy to
emerge.
● Dependent on circumstances because the parties formed are not sequential

From block
● Timing? Elites in the Ph were given the chance to build capacity elections before mass elections.
Elections in Ph started in the local setting: elite families already have ample time and/or capacity to
mobilize and win in national elections because they already know how to perform well.
● Why do some resort to vote buying and clientilism? Ziblatt has to work on this because it does not
capture this situation of the Philippines. We are an example of an unsettled democratisation. There are
Philippine elites that are not confident in the democracy set-up so they may depend on such measures.
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Synthesis of Lesson (Ppt)

● Structural approach to democratisation: interests of classes, threats to their interest, how they respond to
it in response (alliances or coalitions)
○ Earlier works: classes as key actors (role of the classes in democratization)
■ E.g. Middle class revolt shown through PRRD victory
○ Recent works: political institutions as key democratizing element (Political parties, electoral
system)
■ They make democracies endure with their presence, and with their absence poses a
threat to the durability of democracy
○ The attitude of the dominant elite has something to do with the birth of democracy (Partiality of
the consensus that democracy is birthed through clamor by the masses: romanticized)
■ It’s their attitude that determine whether we will have a democratic political
arrangement
● Attitude of dominant elites to democracy
● Critical junctures in comparative politics: special moments in history that we identify that because of this
particular development during that particular time, this is the political outcome that can be observed
at present

Module 3: Where do democracies come from? Agency response |O’Donnel & Schmitter and Burmeo
● Value of agency, but what matters the most if there is a birth of democracy is how actors will make
choices given different situations - what outcomes would be (patterns can result to democracy and
some may not)

4 Players in Democratization | O’Donnell and Schmitter

Regime hard-liners Opposition moderates

Regime soft-liners Opposition radicals

In the context of authoritarianism

● RHL: believe they can perpetuate authoritarianism and reject all forms of movement towards
democracy by instilling more repression on rights and freedom
● RSL: at first they seem to be similar with RHL, but realize they need to give way to democratization to
preserve what they started
● OM: will accept certain degrees of authoritarian measures for the sake of peaceful times
● OR: attempt forth another transition and overthrow that authoritarian democratic regime

The players and their appetite for risk - how does it affect their choices? (democratization dilemma context)
● RHL: plays it safe since they keep on adding on the repression, suppressed popular movement to go
against them once opportunity arrives
○ I don’t want to concede power to a parliament, I want to decide myself for the country. Higher
risk if you lose as a RHL
● RSL: need to take the risk of democratization to preserve the regime they have made/interest
○ Part of the ruling elites, have the interest in the status quo. They are more likely to compromise
that their interest will be met with the set-up. Okay with powersharing as long as they won’t be
killed or jailed
● OM: accept measures made by the government
○ Together with OR, they are usually pro-democratization/liberalization actors. Willing to
compromise because they’re interest with changing the status quo and ensuring that the
radicals would not be too powerful - fear that radicals would take over
● OR: risk to revolution or violence to meet their ends. They take extreme measures and make dictators in
authoritarianism accountable - unlikely to negotiate and feel that a compromise is legitimate. No
concessions to any of those in the regime - exile
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These players exist in a certain time - to make decisions either to liberalize or not

Costs of toleration and costs of repression?

4 general types of democratization shifts that leads to democratization itself

1. Transformation/Reforma: elites of the regime took the lead in introducing democratic reforms
● RSL will come to dominate the regime space by themselves in their own initiative and introduce
democracy
● Regime elements feel they can win the democratic process, can legitimize their rule better, not
afraid to democratize
● Dominant actors: Reformists
● Pre-empting: if you’re at the top you can make implementations in the shift - more stronger,
more legitimate - what convinced RSL to pursue reforma: Let’s just make sure we’re on top of it

Opposition moderates
Regime soft-liners
Opposition radicals

2. Replacement/Ruptura: opposition groups took the lead to bring democracy

Opposition moderates
Regime soft-liners ←---------
Opposition radicals

● Complete breakdown, total replacement - opposition groups could totally overthrow the
regime (revolutionary upheavals e.g.)
● E.g. of reasons why RHL would not want to compromise - why are they more likely to end up in
this situation?
○ (Block answers)Their power would minimize/lessen. They are pessimistic because they are
unprepared and cannot survive in the democratization process.
○ It will inevitably lead to their removal from power due to opening consciousness of the
public (domino effect)
● Communist party of China in elections - why would they remain as a RHL?
○ They already have the power, there is appetite and ample machineries and strong
systems - risk would surround the process. Even if they have the power, why would they
do it if they have the control already - to play safe.
○ They need to allot resources which are expensive
○ From sir: China is dominated by RHL (Xi Jin Ping as an extremist) - the force is coming from
external/outisde, and these cannot promise the government that they will not overthrow
them (uncertainty)
● Most of the time here, the RHL become radicalized - they become more than the moderates.
● This is the most rarest form of democratization. Why?
○ Transition to a democracy would lead to an avenue to chaos -> leading to conflict of interests
among others and within themselves. They fear to lose the order they have established for
themselves
○ Concerned about their own survival: risk is too high if they give in to the demands of attempts to
democratize -> may lead to their demise. They would avoid it using all their resources should
that situation comes
○ (From sir) 1) Fight to the death, the RHL would do everything to stay in power - they don’t care
about human rights and would do everything to crush the opposition. 2) Armed groups are
created and unlikely to result to democracy - rebel groups, splits

3. Transplacement/Pacted Transitions: democracy is product of compromise among RSL and OM

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RHL OM

RSL OR

● Cooperation of RSL and OM: the leaders here, they negotiate a pact that will result in
democracy - it can be explicit but also implicit both in agreement and in process (written e.g.)
● Elements:
○ Agreement on concessions (those RSL who surrender, what do they get in return)
○ Agreement on number of seats, electoral system (will they get sued)
○ RSF would give something to the OM: exchange of compromises
● This is the very usual type because it is the easiest

💡 Easier to democratize if the opposition are dominated by moderates

● If the opposition cannot moderate their demands, democracy cannot occur
● Burmeo’s argument: extremism is not always a barrier to democratization. The threat of popular
mobilization does not hinder the threat to democratization because popular mobilization does
not affect the authoritarian regime. Elites are not afraid of popular mobilisation because it does
not affect their interest and it can pave a way to democratize (but depends on how elites
perceive the threat)
○ Moderation argument: okay lang may extremists because not all of these activities by
them are detrimental to the interest of the elites

4. Intervention/Imposed Democracy: democracy came from outside, was invited by one of the players in
the democratization process
----
Hot family feuds and transitions to democracy

Key lessons and questions

● Dynamism of democratization process
● Role of strengths/weakness of actors and their (strategic) interactions
● Key role of opposition moderation on demands that might impinge fundamental elite interests

BERMEO: This essay examines the moderation argument: transitions to democracy are threatened if
radical forces push their demands too long or too hard. Drawing on evidence from Iberia, South America,
and Asia, it illustrates when moderation is required and when it is not. Conditions for democratization
hinge less on the absence or existence of radicalism than on pivotal elites' perception of the effects of
radicalism. Successful transitions to democracy can be made despite radical activity if elites project that
radical forces will not dominate electoral politics.

Used structural approach: he wanted to focus on the conflict/cooperation among social classes, coalitions of
these classes For our purposes, the most important aspect was the growth of the notion of the immunity of
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certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, along with the conception of the right of resistance to
unjust authority.

To a very limited extent these three types - bourgeois revolutions culminating in the Western form of
democracy, conservative revolutions from above 'ending in fascism, and peasant revolutions leading to
communism - may constitute alternative routes and choices.